Block chain management system, management method and device, storage medium and equipment

Abstract

The invention provides a block chain management system, management method and device, a storage medium and equipment, the block chain management system comprises a sender, a receiver and a manager, the sender generates a receiver hidden address and initiates a block chain transaction according to an obtained modulus, a generator and a receiver public key; the manager obtains a to-be-managed transaction in the block chain, and calculates a receiver hidden address in the to-be-managed transaction according to the management key to obtain a virtual private key; and executing exponentiation on the generator by taking the virtual private key as an index to obtain a virtual public key, and verifying the consistency of the virtual public key and the public key of the receiver in the composite modulus group so as to determine whether the real receiver of the transaction to be managed is the receiver or not. According to the scheme, while the privacy of the receiver is protected, the manager is allowed to analyze the identity of the transaction, and the security of the block chain transaction is further ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This specification relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a blockchain management system, management method, device, storage medium, and equipment. Background Art

[0002] As a decentralized, tamper-proof distributed ledger system, blockchain technology achieves the openness, transparency and irreversibility of transaction records in the network through chain data structure and consensus mechanism. It has shown great potential in the fields of finance, supply chain, Internet of Things, etc., but it also faces inherent challenges in privacy protection. That is, due to the public nature of blockchain ledgers, the identities and asset details of transaction participants may be traced through address correlation analysis, thus limiting its application in privacy-sensitive scenarios.

[0003] To address the risk of privacy leakage in blockchain transactions, hidden addresses are currently commonly used to protect the privacy of the recipient. That is, each time a transaction is conducted, the sender dynamically generates a hidden address that is only recognizable by the recipient. Other participants in the blockchain except the recipient cannot identify the hidden address, thereby achieving anonymity protection of the recipient's identity at the technical level.

[0004] However, although existing address hiding technology strengthens the privacy protection of transaction participants, it creates a contradiction between privacy protection and transaction security management: due to the mechanism of hiding addresses, the management party is unable to identify the identity of the transaction recipient, making it difficult for the management party to effectively manage abnormal transactions, seriously affecting the security of on-chain transactions. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, this specification provides a blockchain management system, management method, device, storage medium and equipment to address the deficiencies in the relevant technology.

[0006] Specifically, this specification is implemented through the following technical solutions:

[0007] According to a first aspect of an embodiment of this specification, a blockchain management system is provided, including a sender s, a receiver t, and a manager m;

[0008] The receiver t maintains a composite modulus group The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The result of performing modular exponentiation on the generator g of ;

[0009] The management party m maintains a management key, which contains the key for the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization;

[0010] in:

[0011] The sender s is used to generate a recipient hidden address based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, and use it as the recipient address to initiate a blockchain transaction; wherein the recipient hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification factor T obtained by performing modular exponentiation on the recipient's public key pk;

[0012] The management party m is used to: obtain the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculate the hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed according to the management key, and recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; perform power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent to obtain the virtual public key, and in the composite modulus group The consistency between the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk is verified internally to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

[0013] According to a second aspect of the embodiments of this specification, a blockchain management method is provided, which is applied to a sender s and includes:

[0014] According to the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, the recipient hidden address is generated, and the blockchain transaction is initiated using the recipient address, so that the manager m obtains the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, and calculates the recipient hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by it, so as to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N modulo the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; the generator g is exponentially operated with the virtual private key to obtain the virtual public key, and the virtual public key is obtained in the composite modulus group. Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein:

[0015] The management key includes a key for the composite module group To implement factorization parameters within the receiver's implicit address, the receiver's implicit address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0016] According to a third aspect of the embodiments of this specification, a blockchain management method is provided, the method being applied to a management party m, including:

[0017] Get the pending transactions in the blockchain;

[0018] The hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed is calculated based on the self-maintained management key to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; wherein the management key includes the virtual private key for the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization;

[0019] The virtual public key is obtained by performing a power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent, and then Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein:

[0020] The receiver's hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0021] According to a fourth aspect of the embodiments of this specification, an electronic device is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the steps of the method described in the second aspect and / or the third aspect are implemented.

[0022] According to a fifth aspect of the embodiments of this specification, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in the second aspect and / or the third aspect are implemented.

[0023] According to a sixth aspect of the embodiments of this specification, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method described in the second aspect and / or the third aspect.

[0024] In the technical solution provided in this specification, the sender s generates the recipient's hidden address and initiates a blockchain transaction based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient's public key pk; the manager m obtains the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculates the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key, and obtains a virtual private key; uses the virtual private key as the exponent to perform a power operation on the generator g to obtain a virtual public key, and then generates a virtual public key in the composite modulus group. The consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient's public key pk is verified internally to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

[0025] As can be seen from the above embodiments, this specification achieves a dynamic balance between privacy protection and transaction management by using the embedding mechanism of modulus N and generator g as public parameters. On the one hand, the sender uses the above public parameters and random numbers to encrypt the actual public key of the receiver, thereby ensuring that its real address is not disclosed during the transaction process. On the other hand, the management party can use the management key managed locally to encrypt the data in the composite modulus group. The recipient's hidden address is calculated to recover the virtual private key, and the identity of the transaction recipient is verified based on the virtual private key. This protects the privacy of the recipient while allowing the administrator to resolve the identity of the transaction, further ensuring the security of blockchain transactions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a blockchain management system shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0027] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an interactive process of a blockchain management system shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0028] Figure 3This is a flowchart of a blockchain management method applied to a sender, as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0029] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a blockchain management method applied to a management party, as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0030] Figure 5 This is a business process diagram of a blockchain as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0031] Figure 6 is a structural diagram of an electronic device shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0032] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a blockchain management device applied to a sender in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0033] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a blockchain management device applied to a management party in an exemplary embodiment of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this specification more clear, the following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions of this specification in conjunction with the specific embodiments of this specification and the corresponding drawings. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of this specification, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this specification, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making any creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this specification.

[0035] To address privacy risks in blockchain transactions, address obfuscation-based technical solutions have been developed. The core concept is to conceal the true identity of the recipient by constructing temporary, non-correlated transaction identifiers. Typical implementations include: using public key cryptography to generate one-time addresses, allowing the sender to dynamically generate a unique receiving address for each transaction; or using a hierarchical address derivation mechanism to decouple the primary account address from the transaction address. These solutions ensure that even if the same entity initiates multiple transactions, external observers cannot identify transaction patterns or fund flows through address correlation, thereby technically protecting the anonymity of the recipient's identity.

[0036] However, existing address hiding technologies suffer from significant drawbacks in practical applications. First, completely anonymized transaction addresses lead to a breakdown in transaction chains, making it difficult for regulatory authorities to identify suspicious data flows through address tracking, creating technical obstacles for risk management of abnormal trading behavior. Second, over-reliance on private keys as the sole means of identity authentication creates the risk of irrecoverable assets if users lose or leak their private keys, leading to loss of access to their assets. Furthermore, fully decentralized anonymity mechanisms conflict with existing regulatory frameworks, potentially hindering the compliant implementation of blockchain technology in managed scenarios. Therefore, a stealth address solution that both safeguards user privacy and supports controllable management is urgently needed to ensure that the privacy of all participants is protected while meeting the requirements of transaction security management.

[0037] Based on this, this specification proposes a blockchain management system that generates a one-time hidden address for the recipient during each transaction. The public parameters are pre-disclosed in the blockchain, and the management key is visible only to the management party. The recipient can verify the hidden address based on its own private key and public parameters to ensure that its own address is not leaked. The management party can, when necessary, parse the actual recipient corresponding to the hidden address based on the underlying public parameters, thereby performing effective management.

[0038] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this specification are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0039] Figure 1 1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a blockchain management system shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification, wherein the blockchain management system includes: a sender s, a receiver t, and a manager m.

[0040] Among them, the sender s, the receiver t and the manager m are all connected to the blockchain network. The sender s can be the node that sends transactions in the blockchain, the receiver t can be the node that receives transactions in the blockchain, and the manager m can be the corresponding node of the management agency in the blockchain.

[0041] In addition, the transactions in this specification may refer to transactions for digital collectibles such as non-fungible tokens (NFTs). Of course, they can also refer to transactions for objects such as cryptocurrencies, virtual equipment in games, digital tokens of physical assets, financial derivatives, etc. This specification does not make specific restrictions on this.

[0042] Specifically, before executing a transaction, the blockchain management system can be initialized. During the initialization process, a secure prime number p and a secure prime number q can be generated based on a preset security parameter λ, and the modulus N can be further determined by the secure prime number p and the secure prime number q, where N=pq.

[0043] In this specification, auxiliary prime numbers p' and q' can be determined based on safe prime numbers p and safe prime numbers q, where the values of p' and q' can be factors of the Euler function values of p and q. For example, p = 2p' + 1 and q = 2q' + 1.

[0044] The size of the security parameter λ can be set according to the actual situation. The larger λ is, the longer the bit length of the safe prime number, the higher the encryption of the address, and the greater the difficulty of parsing the subsequent hidden address.

[0045] It should be noted that in practical applications, the relationship between p', q' and p, q is not limited to the above formula. For example, p = Xp' + Y and q = Xq' + Y. As long as the values of p' and q' are factors of the Euler function values of p and q, the scheme described in this specification can be implemented.

[0046] In addition, the order of determining the auxiliary prime numbers p' and q' and the safe prime numbers p and q can also be not specifically distinguished. For example, first generate p' and q' based on a preset security parameter λ, and then determine the safe prime numbers p and q according to the above relationship based on the auxiliary prime numbers p' and q'.

[0047] After determining the auxiliary prime numbers p' and q' and the modulus N, a pqp'q'-order element g can be randomly selected as the generator, where On this basis, the conditions that the generator g needs to satisfy can be expressed as:

[0048] g p′q′ mod N 2 = 1 + kN

[0049] where the integer k satisfies: 1 ≤ k < N. Here, N 2 is the result of performing modular exponentiation on the generator g of the composite modulus group

[0050] Thus, public parameters (N, g) including the modulus N and the generator g can be obtained, and a management key msk = (p'q', k -1 mod N) including p'q', k -1 [[ID= to 36]] mod N. The order of the generator g in the composite modulus group is the dot product result of the modulus N and the management key p'q' controlled by the management party (i.e., N·p'q'). The parameters in this management key are used to perform factorization within the composite modulus group The specific factorization process is described in detail below.

[0051] It should be noted that in practical applications, the parameters in the management key can also be msk = (p', q', k -1 ​modN), the management can use p′,q′ to calculate p′q′ during the factorization process.

[0052] After obtaining the public parameters (N, g) and the management key msk, the public parameters (N, g) can be made public in the blockchain so that all participants can see the public parameters. The management key msk is only managed by the manager and is only visible to the manager m.

[0053] The above initialization process can be executed by a designated node in the blockchain. Of course, it can also be executed through other objects such as network configuration tools, external services or APIs. This manual does not specifically limit this.

[0054] In this specification, the receiver t maintains a composite modulus group The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0055] For any participant i, a randomly selected integer u can be i As its corresponding private key sk i , and generate participation sk based on the private key and public parameters i Matching public key pk i , where sk i =u i ,

[0056] Thus, the public and private key pair (pk i ,sk i ), and then use its public key pk i Publicly upload to the chain and save the private key sk locally i .

[0057] Furthermore, based on the above blockchain management system architecture, this specification also provides a schematic diagram of the interaction process of a blockchain management system, such as Figure 2 As shown, the interactive process of the task scheduling system may include the following steps:

[0058] S200: Generate the recipient's hidden address based on the obtained modulus, generator and recipient's public key, and use it as the recipient's address to initiate a blockchain transaction.

[0059] Any participant in the blockchain can be the sender or receiver of a transaction. Since the public key of each participant is published in the blockchain in advance, when the sender s initiates a transaction to the receiver t, the public key pk of the receiver can be directly obtained from the blockchain. t .

[0060] Alternatively, the receiver s can select from the composite modulus group The sender's random number r is selected internally

[0061] The sender s can use the random number The recipient's public key pk t and public parameters (N, g), generate the hidden address Y of the receiver t.

[0062] Specifically, the hidden address of the receiver t includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The check factor R (R = g r mod N 2 ), and, with the sender's random number r as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing modular exponentiation operation on the public key pk of the recipient t The Cainteger address can be expressed as Y=(R,T).

[0063] After determining the hidden address of the receiver t, the sender s can carry the hidden address in the receiver address field of the current transaction to initiate a transaction in the blockchain.

[0064] It should be pointed out that each time the sender s submits a transaction on the blockchain, the random number generated is different, thus ensuring that a different hidden address is used for each transaction, thereby further ensuring the privacy and security of the receiver t.

[0065] In addition, when the sender s initiates a transaction on the blockchain, he can use his own private key sk s Sign the transaction, and then verify it through the verification party v in the blockchain based on the sender's public key pk t After the signature verification is passed, the transaction will be officially recorded in the distributed ledger and the status confirmation will be completed.

[0066] For example, the sender s can calculate the hash value of the transaction data and use its own private key sk s Generate the corresponding signature, the verifier v can use the sender's public key The signature is parsed to obtain the hash value of the transaction data. At the same time, the hash value of the transaction data is calculated using the same calculation method, and it is determined whether the hash value parsed by the public key matches the calculated hash value. If they match, the verification passes, otherwise the verification fails.

[0067] S202: Obtain the transactions to be managed in the blockchain;

[0068] S204: Calculate the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key to recover the virtual private key through factor decomposition.

[0069] In practical applications, the administrator m can obtain transactions to be managed from the blockchain at various times. For example, when the administrator m detects an anomaly, it can obtain the hidden addresses of each transaction from the blockchain. This anomaly can include detecting an anomaly with a participant in a transaction, such as high-frequency exploratory transactions, rapid inflows and outflows of funds in a cluster of linked accounts, abnormal address entropy, or interaction with a known blacklisted address. Alternatively, the transaction itself may be an anomaly, such as an unusual transaction amount, a transaction occurring during an unusual transaction window, or a double-spend attack. In this case, the administrator needs to locate the recipient of the transaction based on the hidden address, thereby promptly implementing risk control measures for the abnormal participant or transaction to protect the financial security of the participants. For another example, when a new transaction to be managed is generated in the blockchain, or when a preset management interval is reached, the transaction to be managed can be obtained from the blockchain.

[0070] After obtaining the transaction to be managed, the manager m can identify the hidden address (R, T) of the transaction, and then calculate the hidden address (R, T) according to the public parameters msk = (p′q′, k -1 mod N), calculate the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed, and recover the virtual private key through factor decomposition.

[0071] Specifically, the manager m can use p′q′ as the exponent to perform a power operation on the verification reference factor T in the recipient's stealth address in the transaction to be managed, thereby obtaining: A=T p′q′ mod N 2 .

[0072] Then the conditions satisfied by the generator g and the recipient's public key pk i and private key sk i The operational relationship between the verification reference factor T and the recipient's public key sk i Substituting the operational relationship between , we can get:

[0073]

[0074] This can get the first result data

[0075] The first result data is equivalent to the modulus N of the product of the recipient's private key and the random number r, that is:

[0076]

[0077] In addition, the management party m can use p′q′ as the exponent to perform a power operation on the verification factor R in the recipient's stealth address, thereby obtaining: B = R p′q′ mod N 2 ;

[0078] Then, substituting the conditions satisfied by the generator g and the operational relationship between the generator g and the verification factor R, we can obtain:

[0079] R p′q′ mod N 2 =g rp′q′ mod N 2 =(1+kN) r mod N 2

[0080] The second result data can be obtained from this

[0081] The second result data is equivalent to the modulus result of the random number r with respect to the modulus N, that is:

[0082]

[0083] Afterwards, the management party m can perform elimination processing on the random numbers in the first result data and the second result, eliminating the random number r, thereby obtaining the virtual private key α=u i mod N. The virtual private key is the recipient's private key u maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed. i The result of taking the modulus of the modulus N is t′=i.

[0084] S206: Using the virtual private key as the exponent, perform a power operation on the generator g to obtain a virtual public key, and then The consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient's public key pk is verified internally to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

[0085] After obtaining the virtual private key, the verifier m can use the virtual private key as the exponent to perform a power operation on the generator g to obtain the virtual public key g α . Then in the composite modular group Internally verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient's public key pk.

[0086] Specifically, since the hidden address is a composite modulus group The element on this group has the property that the subgroup discrete logarithm is partially solvable. That is, given any element g a′ , although the factor decomposition p′q′ cannot completely restore the value of a′, the value of a′mod N can be obtained. For the public key element pk i =g a′ , according to the hidden address element The management party m can recover r mod N and a′r mod N, and thus calculate a = a′ mod N. According to the basic properties of modular arithmetic, a′ = kN + a, where k is an integer. So we can get:

[0087]

[0088] because The order of is N·p′q′, so:

[0089]

[0090] Therefore, the management party can verify the virtual public key g α Whether it meets:

[0091]

[0092] If it satisfies, then u i =u t , at this time, it can be determined that the real recipient t′ of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

[0093] After determining the recipient of the current transaction, the server can manage it according to the recipient.

[0094] For example, when an abnormality occurs on a transaction participant (when an abnormality occurs on the sender of a transaction, it can be assumed that an abnormality also occurs on the receiver), the administrator can perform the following management operations:

[0095] Immediately mark the recipient's address as risky and include it in the high-risk account pool management;

[0096] Trigger the on-chain permission control mechanism and temporarily freeze the recipient's transaction permissions;

[0097] Deploy on-chain monitoring probes to conduct real-time audits of the recipient’s transaction behavior within a specified timeframe in the future;

[0098] Start a cross-chain tracking protocol to analyze the recipient’s historical related transactions on other networks.

[0099] When the abnormal situation is due to an abnormality in the transaction itself, the administrator can perform the following management operations:

[0100] The transaction is automatically intercepted through smart contracts and put into an isolated review pool;

[0101] Call the freeze function of the management contract to temporarily lock the ownership of the tokens involved in the transaction;

[0102] Perform transaction graph analysis to trace the input and output address clusters and fund sources of the transaction;

[0103] Add transaction signatures (such as transaction hash prefixes) to the blacklist rule base to achieve synchronized defense for all network nodes;

[0104] Generate structured management reports and synchronize them to the law enforcement agency’s digital forensics system through the oracle channel.

[0105] It should be noted that the above management operations are only described as examples. In actual applications, there may be other abnormal situations and management operation methods, which are not specifically limited in this specification.

[0106] Furthermore, for the recipient t of the transaction, when a new transaction (i.e., a transaction to be verified) is detected in the blockchain, the recipient t can obtain the transaction from the blockchain and identify the hidden address (R, T′) of the transaction, where The hidden address is then verified based on the public parameters and its own private key.

[0107] Specifically, the receiver t uses its own private key as the exponent to perform a power operation on the verification factor R of the hidden address in the transaction to be verified, and obtains the information to be verified

[0108] Then in the composite modular group Internally verify the consistency between the information to be verified and the verification reference factor T' of the hidden address in the transaction to be verified to determine whether the transaction to be verified is a transaction for itself.

[0109] Among them, due to There are R = g r mod N 2 , therefore, when hour, At this point, we can get u i =u t , that is, the participant corresponding to the hidden address of the current transaction is itself.

[0110] Therefore, the receiver t can verify whether To verify whether the transaction to be verified is for itself. And execute the transaction if it is determined that the transaction to be verified is for itself.

[0111] And if This means that the current transaction does not belong to itself, so the recipient can terminate the current transaction and obtain other transactions from the blockchain for address verification.

[0112] It should be noted that in a blockchain, there are often multiple transactions initiated by multiple senders in the same period. Therefore, when verifying the hidden address of a transaction, the recipient can obtain the hidden addresses of multiple transactions from the blockchain and verify them simultaneously until the transaction belonging to the recipient is determined, thereby improving the efficiency of address verification. The number of hidden addresses verified simultaneously can be adjusted in real time based on the performance parameters of the recipient's node (such as current computing power, remaining memory, etc.). Of course, it can also be a pre-set fixed value, which is not specifically limited in this specification.

[0113] In the above process, the recipient address system uses a three-layer encryption architecture to achieve anonymous transactions: first, a one-time hidden address is dynamically generated through an encryption algorithm template. A unique address is generated based on a random number algorithm for each transaction, forming an isolated address space. Secondly, an asymmetric verification system is constructed, and the address verification factor R is embedded in the address structure as a public verification parameter. At the same time, the reference verification information T is derived from the random number and the recipient's public key. The two follow the same encryption template to generate a verification pair. Finally, in the transaction verification phase, when the information to be verified and the reference information T complete a cryptographic match, it can be proved that the transaction belongs to the recipient. This mechanism implements three core privacy protections: the public key plaintext is not transmitted throughout the transaction, the address generation algorithm and verification mechanism are completely decoupled, and a new address is generated for each transaction using an irreversible random number. While ensuring privacy security, address privacy protection is elevated to a cryptographically provable security level, which can effectively resist privacy attacks such as timing analysis and traffic analysis.

[0114] Throughout the entire process, the stealth address can be viewed as a data lock that hides the user's identity. The address verification factor R can be viewed as the keyhole of the data lock, the verification reference factor T can be viewed as the lock core of the data lock, and the recipient's private key can be viewed as the key to the data lock. When the information to be verified generated based on the private key and address verification factor matches the reference verification information, the recipient can unlock the data lock with their own private key, thereby proving that the current transaction belongs to them. For other participants, since they cannot match the reference verification information, they cannot unlock the data lock.

[0115] In addition, this manual also provides a blockchain management method, such as Figure 3 and Figure 4 shown.

[0116] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a blockchain management method applied to a sender, shown as an exemplary embodiment of this specification, including the following steps:

[0117] S300: Generate a recipient hidden address based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, and use it as the recipient address to initiate a blockchain transaction, so that the manager m can obtain the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculate the recipient hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by it, and recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N modulo the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; perform a power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent to obtain a virtual public key, and in the composite modulus group Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein:

[0118] The management key includes a key for the composite module group To implement factorization parameters within the receiver's implicit address, the receiver's implicit address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0119] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a blockchain management method applied to a management party, shown as an exemplary embodiment of this specification, including the following steps:

[0120] S400: Obtaining transactions to be managed in the blockchain;

[0121] S402: Calculate the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the self-maintained management key to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient's private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; wherein the management key includes the virtual private key for the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization;

[0122] S404: Using the virtual private key as the exponent, perform a power operation on the generator g to obtain a virtual public key, and then Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein:

[0123] The receiver's hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0124] Furthermore, this specification also provides a blockchain business process diagram, such as Figure 5 shown.

[0125] Figure 5 This is a business process diagram of a blockchain as shown in an exemplary embodiment of this specification;

[0126] The public parameters are visible to the participants, while the public parameters are only visible to the management party. The public keys of the participants and the public parameters are generated from the same source, thus ensuring that the recipient can execute the transaction without revealing its own address. The management party can resolve the actual recipient of the transaction based on the underlying management key when necessary.

[0127] As can be seen from the above, the technical solution provided in this specification achieves dynamic adaptation of privacy protection and compliance requirements through cryptographic protocols. A dynamic address obfuscation mechanism is employed, where the transaction initiator generates a one-time hidden address based on the recipient's public key and a temporary random number. This address is then bound to the blockchain's basic public parameters via a zero-knowledge proof protocol. In conventional transaction scenarios, address verification only requires verifying the public address format parameters, ensuring the complete anonymity of the counterparty's identity and forming a privacy barrier for the transaction address.

[0128] In addition, all address generation parameters are derived based on the public parameters of the underlying logic. When the abnormal monitoring rules are triggered, the management can initiate the parameter traceability process: the hidden address is controllably decrypted through the public parameters, and finally a mapping relationship between the hidden address and the real identity of the recipient is established.

[0129] Throughout the entire process, regular transactions remain anonymous, while abnormal transactions are managed in a penetrating manner. Through this architectural design, this solution builds a flexible boundary between the UTXO model and the account model, ensuring that on-chain transactions comply with the principle of data minimization while ensuring that management agencies have controllable penetration capabilities under the AML / CTF framework, forming a secure closed loop for digital asset transactions.

[0130] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in an exemplary embodiment. Figure 6 At the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor, an internal bus, a network interface, memory, and non-volatile storage, and may also include other necessary hardware. The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile storage into the memory and then runs it, forming a device for hiding the recipient's address or verifying the ownership of the transaction at the logical level. Of course, in addition to software implementation, this specification does not exclude other implementation methods, such as logic devices or a combination of software and hardware. In other words, the execution subject of the following processing flow is not limited to individual logic units and can also be hardware or logic devices.

[0131] Corresponding to the embodiment of the blockchain management method in the aforementioned blockchain management system, this specification also provides an embodiment of a blockchain management device, such as Figure 7 and Figure 8 shown.

[0132] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a blockchain management device applied to a sender in an exemplary embodiment of this specification. The device may include:

[0133] The initiating module 700 is used to generate a recipient hidden address based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, and use it as the recipient address to initiate a blockchain transaction, so that the manager m obtains the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculates the recipient hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by it, and recovers the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N modulo the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t′ of the transaction to be managed; performs a power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent to obtain a virtual public key, and generates a virtual public key in the composite modulus group. Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk in the virtual public key to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: the management key includes a key for the composite modulus group To implement factorization parameters within the receiver's implicit address, the receiver's implicit address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0134] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a blockchain management device applied to a management party in an exemplary embodiment of this specification. The device may include:

[0135] An acquisition module 800 is used to acquire transactions to be managed in the blockchain;

[0136] The parsing module 802 is used to calculate the hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by itself, so as to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; wherein the management key includes the virtual private key used in the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization;

[0137] Verification module 804 is used to perform power operation on generator g with the virtual private key as exponent to obtain a virtual public key, and Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: the recipient hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

[0138] Optionally, the modulus N=pq, where p and q are respectively safe prime numbers, and the generator g satisfies: g p′q′ mod N2 = 1 + kN, and the integer k satisfies: 1 ≤ k < N, where p' and q' are auxiliary prime numbers respectively, and the values of p' and q' are factors of the Euler function values of p and q;

[0139] The management key includes parameters for implementing factorization within the composite modulus group including: p', q', k -1 mod N.

[0140] Optionally, the verification module 804 is specifically configured to perform a power operation on the verification factor R in the recipient's hidden address in the to-be-managed transaction with p'q' as the exponent, and determine the first result data based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g and the operation relationship between the generator g and the verification factor R, and perform a power operation on the verification reference factor T in the recipient's hidden address in the to-be-managed transaction, and determine the second result data based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g, the operation relationship between the recipient's public key pk and the private key sk, and the operation relationship between the verification reference factor T and the recipient's public key pk; wherein, the first result data is equivalent to the modulo result of the product of the recipient's private key and a random number with respect to the modulus N, and the second result data is equivalent to the modulo result of the random number with respect to the modulus N; perform an elimination process on the random number in the first result data and the second result to obtain the virtual private key.

[0141] Optionally, the order of the generator g in the composite modulus group is the dot product result of the modulus N and the management key p'q' controlled by the management party;

[0142] The verification module 804 is specifically configured to verify whether the virtual public key g α satisfies:

[0143]

[0144] If so, determine whether the true recipient t' of the to-be-managed transaction is the recipient t.

[0145] The implementation processes of the functions and roles of each unit in the above device are specifically described in detail in the implementation processes of the corresponding steps in the above method, and will not be elaborated here.

[0146] Based on the same concept as the above method, this specification also provides an electronic device, including: a processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; wherein, the processor runs the executable instructions to implement the steps of the method as described in any one of the above embodiments.

[0147] Based on the same concept as the above method, this specification also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which computer instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0148] Based on the same concept as the above method, this specification also provides a computer program product, including a computer program / instruction, which implements the steps of the method described in any of the above embodiments when executed by a processor.

Claims

1. A blockchain management system, including a sender s, a receiver t, and a manager m; The receiver t maintains a composite modulus group The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The result of performing modular exponentiation on the generator g of ; The management party m maintains a management key, which contains the key for the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization; in: The sender s is used to generate a recipient hidden address based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, and use it as the recipient address to initiate a blockchain transaction; wherein the recipient hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification factor T obtained by performing modular exponentiation on the recipient's public key pk; The management party m is used to: obtain the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculate the hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed according to the management key, and recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; perform power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent to obtain the virtual public key, and in the composite modulus group The consistency between the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk is verified internally to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

2. The blockchain management system according to claim 1, wherein the modulus N = pq, p and q are respectively safe primes, and the generator g satisfies: g p′q′ mod N 2 = 1 + kN, and the integer k satisfies: 1 ≤ k < N, where p′ and q′ are auxiliary prime numbers, and the values ​​of p′ and q′ are factors of the Euler function values ​​of p and q; The management key includes the The parameters of internal factor decomposition include: p′q′,k - 1 mod N.

3. The blockchain management system according to claim 2, wherein the management party m is specifically used to: Using p′q′ as the exponent, a power operation is performed on the verification reference factor T in the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed, and based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g, the operational relationship between the recipient's public key pk and the private key sk, and the operational relationship between the verification reference factor T and the recipient's public key pk, first result data is determined; and, a power operation is performed on the verification factor R in the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed, and based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g and the operational relationship between the generator g and the verification factor R, second result data is determined; wherein, The first result data is equivalent to the modulus N obtained by multiplying the recipient's private key and the random number, and the second result data is equivalent to the modulus N obtained by multiplying the random number by the modulus N; Elimination processing is performed on the random numbers in the first result data and the second result to obtain the virtual private key.

4. The blockchain management system according to claim 2, wherein the generator g in the composite modulus group has an order equal to the dot product of the modulus N and the management key p′q′ controlled by the management party; The management method m is specifically used to: Verify virtual public key g α Whether it meets: If so, it is determined that the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

5. The blockchain management system according to claim 1, wherein the receiver t is used to: Obtain the transaction to be verified in the blockchain, and perform a power operation on the verification factor R of the hidden address in the transaction to be verified using its own private key as the exponent to obtain the information to be verified; In the composite module group Internally verify the consistency of the information to be verified with the verification reference factor of the hidden address in the transaction to be verified to determine whether the transaction to be verified is a transaction for itself.

6. A blockchain management method, the method being applied to a sender s, comprising: According to the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, the recipient hidden address is generated, and the blockchain transaction is initiated using the recipient address, so that the manager m obtains the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, and calculates the recipient hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by it, so as to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N modulo the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; the generator g is exponentially operated with the virtual private key to obtain the virtual public key, and the virtual public key is obtained in the composite modulus group. Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: The management key includes a key for the composite module group To implement factorization parameters within the receiver's implicit address, the receiver's implicit address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

7. A blockchain management method, the method being applied to a management party m, comprising: Get the pending transactions in the blockchain; The hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed is calculated based on the self-maintained management key to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; wherein the management key includes the virtual private key for the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization; The virtual public key is obtained by performing a power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent, and then Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: The receiver's hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the modulus N = pq, where p and q are safe primes respectively, and the generator g satisfies: g p′q′ mod N 2 = 1 + kN, and the integer k satisfies: 1 ≤ k < N, where p′, q′ are auxiliary prime numbers, and the values ​​of p′ and q′ are factors of the Euler function values ​​of p and q; The management key includes the The parameters of internal factor decomposition include: p′q′,j - 1 modN.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the step of recovering the virtual private key by factoring the virtual private key comprises: Using p′q′ as the exponent, perform a power operation on the verification factor R in the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed, and determine first result data based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g and the operational relationship between the generator g and the verification factor R. Furthermore, perform a power operation on the verification reference factor T in the recipient's hidden address in the transaction to be managed, and determine second result data based on the conditions satisfied by the generator g, the operational relationship between the recipient's public key pk and private key sk, and the operational relationship between the verification reference factor T and the recipient's public key pk. The first result data is equivalent to the modulus N of the product of the recipient's private key and the random number, and the second result data is equivalent to the modulus N of the random number. Elimination processing is performed on the random numbers in the first result data and the second result to obtain the virtual private key.

10. The method according to claim 8, wherein the order of the generator g in the composite modular group is the point product of the modulus N and the management key p′q′ controlled by the management party; In the composite module group Verifying the consistency of the virtual public key with the recipient public key pk includes: Verify virtual public key g α Whether it meets: If so, it is determined whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t.

11. A blockchain management device, applied to a sender s, comprising: The initiation module is used to generate a recipient hidden address based on the obtained modulus N, generator g and recipient public key pk, and use it as the recipient address to initiate a blockchain transaction, so that the manager m obtains the transaction to be managed in the blockchain, calculates the recipient hidden address in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by it, and recovers the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N modulo the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; the generator g is exponentially operated with the virtual private key to obtain a virtual public key, and is used in the composite modulus group Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk in the virtual public key to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: the management key includes a key for the composite modulus group To implement factorization parameters within the receiver's implicit address, the receiver's implicit address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

12. A blockchain management device, applied to a management party m, comprising: The acquisition module is used to obtain the transactions to be managed in the blockchain; The parsing module is used to calculate the hidden address of the recipient in the transaction to be managed based on the management key maintained by itself, so as to recover the virtual private key by factor decomposition. The virtual private key is the modulus N of the recipient private key maintained by the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed; wherein the management key includes the virtual private key used in the composite modulus group Parameters of internal factorization; The verification module is used to perform a power operation on the generator g with the virtual private key as the exponent to obtain a virtual public key, and Verify the consistency of the virtual public key and the recipient public key pk to determine whether the real recipient t' of the transaction to be managed is the recipient t; wherein: the recipient hidden address includes: The random number r selected by the sender is the exponent, N 2 The verification factor R is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the generator g, and the random number r of the sender is used as the exponent, N 2 The verification reference factor T is obtained by performing a modular exponentiation operation on the recipient's public key pk; the recipient t maintains a verification reference factor T ... The recipient's private key sk is selected from the public key, and the corresponding recipient's public key pk is made public. The recipient's public key pk is based on the recipient's private key sk as the exponent, N 2 The composite modulus group is the modulus pair The generator g of is obtained by performing modular exponentiation.

13. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 6 to 10 when executing the program.

14. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein when the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 6 to 10 are implemented.

15. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 6 to 10.

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