Tamper-proof control method and system for tower crane equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses a tamper-proof control method and system for tower crane equipment, and the method comprises the steps: constructing a tamper-proof control system for the tower crane equipment, and embedding a handshake program in a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller); when the tower crane system is electrified and started for the first time, the PLC is in communication connection with the frequency converter and the display screen through a preset bus communication network; in the initialized communication handshake process, the PLC, the frequency converter and the display screen are mutually identified according to unique equipment codes pre-solidified in respective hardware and are uploaded to the Internet of Things platform; and the Internet of Things platform compares and verifies the equipment coding information with the legally recorded white list codes of the tower crane in the platform database, and when all the identified equipment coding information is completely consistent with the platform recorded information and the communication process accords with a security protocol, handshake verification is successfully passed, and the tower crane is not identified. All functions of the tower crane system can be completely unlocked; otherwise, the handshake verification is not passed, and a platform alarm and a hierarchical locking and limiting strategy are triggered.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of tower crane equipment safety, and in particular relates to a tower crane equipment tamper-proof control method and system. Background Art

[0002] In the tower crane (tower crane) industry, due to the high value of the equipment, buyers generally adopt an installment payment business model. Under this model, tower crane manufacturers bear greater financial risks. When the repayment date stipulated in the contract expires and the buyer fails to fulfill its payment obligations after repeated reminders, the manufacturer will usually adopt the technical means of remote locking the machine to protect its own legitimate rights and interests and reduce the risk of bad debts. Its core purpose is to exert effective economic pressure, by prohibiting the tower crane from continuing to put it into production and operation, forcing the defaulting buyer to return to the negotiation table to fulfill the contract agreement or renegotiate the repayment plan. However, even in normal use scenarios where the equipment payment has been settled, there are still potential risks. If the core control components of the tower crane - such as PLC controllers, inverters or display screens - fail due to aging or accidents, some buyers may choose to privately replace them with third-party equipment that is not authorized, certified or matched by the manufacturer for cost, time or convenience reasons. This behavior has buried huge safety hazards:

[0003] 1) Lack of safety logic: Original equipment (especially PLC controllers) has multiple, rigorously tested and verified safety control logic embedded within it (such as torque limiting, wind speed protection, collision avoidance, and area restrictions). Non-certified equipment often lacks or is unable to fully implement these critical protection functions, resulting in tower cranes losing their protective barriers under conditions such as overload, excessive wind speeds, and hazardous areas.

[0004] 2) Compatibility and stability risks: Uncertified devices may differ from the original system in terms of electrical characteristics, communication protocols, and software compatibility, resulting in unstable system operation, malfunction, or abnormal function, increasing the probability of accidents.

[0005] 3) Dilemma in Defining Liability: If a safety incident occurs due to unauthorized equipment replacement, the investigation becomes extremely complex. The equipment manufacturer can prove the safety and integrity of the original system, but the unauthorized replacement becomes the primary cause or a significant contributing factor to the accident, making it difficult to clearly determine responsibility. This leads to lengthy legal disputes and ultimately harms the interests of all parties involved (including users, operators, manufacturers, and insurance companies).

[0006] Currently, the technical focus of remote locking measures implemented by tower crane manufacturers is primarily on the PLC controller. This is because the PLC controller, as the "brain" of the tower crane, is responsible for receiving, processing, and outputting all key control signals and is typically integrated with a remote communication module (such as 4G / 5G or GPS). There are two main locking triggering mechanisms:

[0007] 1) Command lock: The manufacturer sends an encrypted lock command to the target PLC controller through the remote platform.

[0008] 2) Loss of connection and locking the machine: The PLC controller continuously detects the GPS signal or the heartbeat connection with the server. If the signal is lost for more than a preset time (such as 72 hours), the locking logic is automatically triggered.

[0009] When locked, the PLC controller will enter a preset safety restriction mode, which usually allows only "unilateral action" instructions to be output: hook: only allowed to descend (no rising, to prevent overloading); luffing: only allowed to change the luffing direction inward (the trolley runs toward the tower body to prevent excessive torque); slewing: only allowed to slew to the left (or locked in a single safe direction according to the design to prevent collision). This mode is designed to freeze the main production functions of the equipment while retaining limited, relatively safe movement capabilities (such as lowering the hook to the ground and retracting the trolley), forcing the purchaser to contact the original manufacturer for authorization to unlock. Faced with the production stagnation and economic losses caused by the locked machine, some buyers will take evasive measures - that is, to purchase third-party PLC controllers on the market that are not certified by the manufacturer and are not embedded with the original safety logic and lock response program, and directly replace the locked original PLC controller. Although this replacement may restore the tower crane's basic lifting, luffing, slewing and other operating functions, making it appear to be "normal use", the harm is extremely far-reaching:

[0010] 1) Core safety logic bypass: The PLC controller is the execution center for the tower crane's multiple safety protection mechanisms (such as torque limiters, zone limits, and wind speed protection). Non-original PLC controllers often lack or are unable to correctly execute these complex, customized safety algorithms and control logic. This can cause the tower crane to completely lose its automatic protection capabilities under dangerous operating conditions (such as overload, excessive wind speed, or entering restricted areas), dramatically increasing the risk of accidents.

[0011] 2) Construction safety out of control: On-site operators and surrounding personnel are exposed to huge and uncontrollable safety threats, which can easily lead to major safety accidents such as machine destruction and loss of life.

[0012] 3) Manufacturers’ rights and interests are double damaged:

[0013] Economic losses: Locking the machine as a debt collection method is ineffective, and manufacturers are unable to effectively guarantee debt recovery through technical means, facing direct economic losses.

[0014] Brand and liability risks: Even if the user is held responsible for an accident caused by non-original equipment, this can often lead to collateral damage to the manufacturer's brand reputation. When liability isn't clearly defined, the manufacturer may also be embroiled in unnecessary legal disputes and compensation liabilities.

[0015] Therefore, it is urgent and valuable to design and implement a comprehensive "tower crane equipment anti-tampering control system and method": Summary of the Invention

[0016] Purpose of the Invention: This invention aims to provide a tamper-proof control method and system for tower crane equipment. This system creates a three-dimensional, impenetrable security network, effectively addressing the vulnerability of existing single-PLC controller locking solutions and providing strong technical support for the financial, equipment, and operational safety of the tower crane industry.

[0017] Technical solution: A tower crane equipment anti-tampering control method of the present invention comprises the following steps:

[0018] Step 1: Build a tamper-proof control system for tower crane equipment, including a PLC controller, inverter, display screen, and IoT platform, and embed a handshake program in the PLC controller;

[0019] Step 2: When the tower crane system is powered on for the first time, the PLC controller establishes a communication connection with the inverter and the display screen through the preset bus communication network;

[0020] Step 3: During the initial communication handshake, the PLC controller, inverter, and display screen identify each other based on the unique device codes pre-set in their respective hardware. The PLC controller collects and summarizes all identified device code information and uploads it to the IoT platform.

[0021] Step 4. After receiving the device coding information, the IoT platform will compare and verify the device coding information with the legally registered "white list" code of the tower crane in the platform database. When all the identified device coding information is completely consistent with the platform registration information and the communication process complies with the security protocol, the handshake verification will be successfully passed and the various functions of the tower crane system will be fully unlocked; otherwise, the handshake verification will fail, triggering the platform alarm and hierarchical locking and restriction strategy.

[0022] Furthermore, in step 4, the triggering of the platform alarm is specifically: the change or loss of device coding information triggers the platform alarm: when the PLC controller, inverter, and display screen are replaced without permission, the coding of the new device must be inconsistent with the platform filing information, or the communication is completely interrupted, resulting in the platform not receiving any coding; the Internet of Things platform monitors the device status and coding information in real time. Once a coding change is detected or the communication times out and the coding cannot be obtained, the platform will immediately trigger the alarm mechanism; the alarm form includes a pop-up window on the platform interface and sending SMS / email notifications to administrators or maintenance personnel.

[0023] Furthermore, in step 4, the hierarchical locking and restriction strategy is specifically as follows:

[0024] If the PLC controller is replaced without authorization, the new PLC controller will fail the handshake verification. If the verification fails, the system will execute the lock strategy: the display screen will forcibly show a prominent lock prompt screen; at the same time, the inverter will be restricted to the "single direction operation only" state, including only allowing the hook to drop, the trolley to change the length inward, and the left rotation in the safe direction, and cannot perform full function operation;

[0025] If the display screen is replaced without authorization, the new display screen will fail device code verification. The PLC controller will enter a partially function-locked state, only able to output control signals for the three basic and relatively safe directions of lifting and lowering, inward luffing, and left rotation. Other directions, including lifting and rising, outward luffing, right rotation, and more complex compound actions, will be prohibited. At the same time, the inverter will also be restricted to "only one direction of operation," responding to limited commands from the PLC controller.

[0026] When the inverter is replaced without permission: the new inverter device code verification fails; the system takes combined locking measures: the PLC controller is restricted to output only control instructions for lifting and lowering, inward amplitude change, and left rotation; the display screen shows a prompt screen of "The device is locked, please contact the customer service center"; and the newly replaced inverter, because its identity has not been verified, is strictly restricted to the "only one direction operation" mode, even if it receives limited instructions from the PLC controller.

[0027] The present invention also discloses a tamper-proof control system for tower crane equipment, comprising a PLC controller, a frequency converter, a display screen and an Internet of Things platform; the PLC controller is communicatively connected to the Internet of Things platform; the PLC controller is communicatively connected to the frequency converter and the display screen bus respectively; a handshake program is embedded in the PLC controller, and the handshake program identifies three sets of device codes of the PLC controller, the display screen and the frequency converter and uploads them to the Internet of Things platform.

[0028] Furthermore, the frequency converter includes a lifting frequency converter, a slewing frequency converter, an amplitude variable frequency converter and a traveling frequency converter.

[0029] Furthermore, the bus communication includes EtherCAT and Modbus.

[0030] The present invention further discloses a computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method of the present invention.

[0031] The present invention further discloses a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program / instruction stored thereon, which implements the steps of the method of the present invention when the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor.

[0032] The present invention further discloses a computer program product, comprising a computer program / instruction, which implements the steps of the method of the present invention when executed by a processor.

[0033] Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following significant advantages:

[0034] By expanding the verification mechanism from a single PLC controller to the joint authentication of key components such as inverters and display screens, and combining it with dynamic monitoring of the Internet of Things platform, unique device code binding, and hierarchical function locking strategies (as mentioned above), the present invention can build a three-dimensional protection network that is difficult to crack easily, effectively solving the vulnerability problem of the existing single PLC controller locking solution, and providing strong technical support for the financial security, equipment safety, and operational safety of the tower crane industry.

[0035] This invention innovatively proposes a tamper-proof control system and supporting method for tower crane equipment, fundamentally addressing the security risks of traditional equipment being susceptible to unauthorized tampering and substitution. The core of this solution lies in the system's continuous execution of a dynamic security handshake procedure during the initialization phase and even during operation. This procedure, rather than a one-time verification, proactively detects and verifies the unique device codes of the three core subsystems—the PLC controller, the inverter, and the display—in real time or periodically. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the present invention, wherein 1 is a PLC controller, 2 is a frequency converter, 3 is a display screen, and 4 is an Internet of Things platform. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] The technical solution of the present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0038] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention proposes a control system and method for preventing tampering of tower crane equipment. The device includes: 1-PLC controller, 2-frequency converter, 3-display screen, 4-Internet of Things platform. The control method for preventing tampering of tower crane equipment is as follows:

[0039] When the tower crane system is powered on for the first time, its core control unit - the programmable logic controller (PLC controller) 1 will actively establish a communication connection with key subsystems, namely the key equipment inverter 2 for driving motor control and the display screen 3 of the human-machine interface through a preset bus communication network (such as EtherCAT, Modbus, etc.).

[0040] During this initial communication handshake, PLC controller 1, inverter 2, and display screen 3 identify each other based on the unique device codes pre-programmed into their respective hardware. PLC controller 1, acting as the master control node, collects and aggregates all identified device codes (including its own) and uploads this complete device identity information to the remote monitoring and management IoT platform 4.

[0041] After receiving these device codes, the IoT platform 4 compares and verifies them against the legally registered "whitelist" codes for the tower crane in the platform's database. This is a key security handshake procedure designed into the system. The handshake verification will only succeed if all identified device codes are identical to those registered on the platform and the communication process complies with the security protocol. Only after this handshake verification is successfully passed will the tower crane's functions be fully unlocked, allowing the operator to perform normal, fully functional lifting operations.

[0042] The core purpose of this mechanism is to prevent malicious or unauthorized replacement of critical equipment, thereby ensuring equipment security and preventing illegal use:

[0043] 1. Device code changes or missing trigger platform alarms: Whether the PLC controller 1, inverter 2, or display 3 have been replaced without authorization, the new device code will inevitably be inconsistent with the platform's registered information (or a complete communication interruption will prevent the platform from receiving any code). The IoT platform 4 monitors device status and code information in real time. If a code change is detected or a communication timeout prevents code acquisition, the platform will immediately trigger an alarm. Alarms may include pop-up windows on the platform interface, SMS / email notifications to administrators and maintenance personnel, and other means to promptly alert them to the risk of device tampering.

[0044] 2. Hierarchical locking and restriction strategies:

[0045] PLC 1 was replaced without authorization: The new PLC failed handshake verification. Upon verification failure, the system implemented a lockout policy: Display 3 would display a prominent lockout message, such as "Device locked, please contact customer service," preventing normal operation. Inverter 2 would also be restricted to "single-direction operation only" (for example, allowing only safe directions such as hook lowering, trolley inwards, and left rotation to prevent dangerous movements), preventing full operation.

[0046] Display 3 was replaced without authorization: the new display failed device code verification. At this point, PLC controller 1 enters a partially functional lock state: it can only output control signals for three basic and relatively safe directions: lifting and lowering, inward amplitude adjustment, and left rotation. Other directions (such as lifting and raising, outward amplitude adjustment, and right rotation) or more complex compound actions are prohibited. At the same time, inverter 2 is also restricted to "single-direction operation only" (the same as when the PLC controller was replaced), responding to limited commands from the PLC controller. Although the new display may display, it cannot obtain full control or display the normal operating interface because it has not passed verification.

[0047] Inverter 2 was replaced without authorization: The new inverter's device code verification failed. The system will implement a combination lockout measure: PLC controller 1, just like when the display was replaced, will be restricted to outputting only control commands for lifting and lowering, inward amplitude change, and left rotation. Display 3 will display a prompt stating "Device locked, please contact customer service." Furthermore, since the replaced inverter 2's identity has not been verified, it will be strictly restricted to "single-direction operation only" mode. Even if it receives limited commands from the PLC controller, its ability to execute them will be greatly restricted.

[0048] The significant advantages of the present invention are embodied in the following aspects:

[0049] 1) Dynamic detection and high security:

[0050] Unlike simple static binding or single verification, this method uses a dynamic handshake procedure that greatly increases the difficulty of cracking. Attackers cannot cheat by simply copying static information or bypassing the initial verification.

[0051] During operation, the system can continuously monitor the device status and the validity of the code (for example, through heartbeat packets, command response verification, etc.). Once a coding anomaly or communication interruption is detected, the safety mechanism can be quickly triggered to form a multiple dynamic protection barrier.

[0052] Device codes are usually solidified in hardware (such as chip unique ID, secure storage area), and supplemented by encrypted transmission and verification protocols (such as asymmetric encryption, digital signatures), making it extremely difficult to illegally read, copy or forge the code, which significantly improves the overall tamper-proof level of the system from a technical perspective.

[0053] 2) Economic deterrence and effective prevention of substitution:

[0054] This method requires that the PLC controller, inverter, and display screen all pass system verification and have matching codes to achieve full tower crane operation. This means that any attempt by a malicious user to circumvent control by replacing a single or partial core device (for example, simply replacing a locked PLC controller or display screen) will be completely thwarted.

[0055] The only way to completely "unlock" the equipment is to simultaneously replace the three core components: the PLC controller, inverter, and display screen. However, this complete replacement is not only complex, involving physical connections between devices, parameter configuration, and program matching, but more importantly, it is extremely expensive (often accounting for a significant proportion of the total value of the tower crane). This huge economic cost creates a strong deterrent, making unauthorized replacement economically unfeasible or even unprofitable, effectively protecting the tower crane manufacturer's core commercial rights, such as equipment ownership and rental income rights.

[0056] 3) Intelligent remote monitoring and efficient operation and maintenance:

[0057] The system dynamically uploads all core device codes detected in real time to the IoT platform for centralized management and verification. The platform serves not only as a verification center but also as a remote monitoring and diagnostic hub. When the platform detects device code anomalies (such as code mismatches, missing codes, or communication timeouts), it immediately triggers a multi-level alarm mechanism (e.g., platform interface alerts, SMS / email push notifications to administrators, and app notifications), enabling instant notification of abnormalities.

[0058] The remote access and data analysis capabilities provided by the IoT platform allow technicians to remotely retrieve device status logs, communication records, alarm details, and other information without having to visit the site in person, allowing them to conduct preliminary or even in-depth analysis of the cause of an anomaly (for example, distinguishing between hardware failure, communication interruption, or malicious tampering). This significantly reduces the frequency and cost of dispatching personnel to the site to investigate device anomalies (whether malicious or not), significantly improving the efficiency of full-lifecycle operation and maintenance management of the equipment.

[0059] In summary, the tower crane equipment anti-tampering control system and method provided by the present invention performs high-intensity continuous verification of the core equipment coding through a dynamic handshake program, building a difficult-to-break technical defense line; by forcing the three core devices to be legally matched at the same time, the high cost of replacing a full set is used to form a strong economic barrier, effectively preventing unauthorized replacement; and relying on the remote monitoring, intelligent alarm and diagnostic analysis capabilities of the Internet of Things platform, it greatly improves the abnormal response speed and significantly reduces operation and maintenance costs. This solution has outstanding technological advancement and practical value in ensuring the safe use of tower cranes (preventing safety accidents caused by illegal operations), safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of tower crane manufacturers (preventing illegal transfer or theft of equipment), and improving the level of intelligent equipment management.

[0060] When the tower crane is powered on, the PLC controller, the inverter, and the display screen communicate via the bus. The PLC, inverter, and display screen identify their respective device codes and upload them to the IoT platform. The identified device codes are then verified through a handshake procedure. Only after passing the handshake verification can the crane be used normally. If the PLC controller, inverter, or display screen are replaced without authorization, the replaced device will fail the handshake verification. The IoT platform will detect the device code change or fail to receive the device code and issue an alarm. If the PLC controller is replaced without authorization, the handshake verification fails and the display screen displays the message "Locked, please contact customer service." The inverter will only operate in one direction. If the display screen is replaced without authorization, the PLC controller will only be able to output lifting, lowering, inward luffing, and left slewing movements. If the inverter is replaced without authorization, the display screen will display the message "Locked, please contact customer service." The remaining inverters will only operate in one direction.

Claims

1. A tower crane equipment anti-tampering control method, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: Build a tamper-proof control system for tower crane equipment, including a PLC controller, inverter, display screen, and IoT platform, and embed a handshake program in the PLC controller; Step 2: When the tower crane system is powered on for the first time, the PLC controller establishes a communication connection with the inverter and the display screen through the preset bus communication network; Step 3: During the initial communication handshake, the PLC controller, inverter, and display screen identify each other based on the unique device codes pre-set in their respective hardware. The PLC controller collects and summarizes all identified device code information and uploads it to the IoT platform. Step 4. After receiving the device coding information, the IoT platform will compare and verify the device coding information with the "white list" coding of the tower crane legally registered in the platform database. When all the identified device coding information is completely consistent with the platform registration information and the communication process complies with the security protocol, the handshake verification will be successfully passed and the various functions of the tower crane system will be fully unlocked; otherwise, the handshake verification will fail, triggering the platform alarm and hierarchical locking and restriction strategy.

2. A tower crane equipment anti-tampering control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 4, the triggering of the platform alarm is specifically: the change or loss of device coding information triggers the platform alarm: when the PLC controller, inverter, or display screen is replaced without permission, the coding of the new device must be inconsistent with the platform filing information, or the communication is completely interrupted, resulting in the platform not receiving any coding; the Internet of Things platform monitors the device status and coding information in real time. Once a coding change is detected or the communication times out and the coding cannot be obtained, the platform will immediately trigger the alarm mechanism; the alarm form includes a pop-up window on the platform interface and sending SMS / email notifications to administrators or maintenance personnel.

3. The tower crane equipment anti-tampering control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 4, the hierarchical locking and restriction strategy is specifically as follows: If the PLC controller is replaced without authorization, the new PLC controller will fail the handshake verification. If the verification fails, the system will execute the lock strategy: the display screen will forcibly show a prominent lock prompt screen; at the same time, the inverter will be restricted to the "single direction operation only" state, which includes only allowing the hook to drop, the trolley to change the luffing direction inward, and the left rotation direction, and cannot perform full function operation. If the display screen is replaced without authorization, the new display screen's device code verification fails. The PLC controller enters a partially function-locked state, only outputting control signals for the three basic and relatively safe directions of lifting and lowering, inward luffing, and left rotation. Other directions, including lifting and raising, outward luffing, right rotation, and more complex compound actions, are prohibited. Simultaneously, the inverter is also restricted to "single-direction operation only," responding to limited commands from the PLC controller. When the inverter is replaced without authorization: the new inverter's device code verification fails; the system takes combined locking measures: the PLC controller is restricted to outputting only control commands for lifting and lowering, inward amplitude change, and left rotation; the display screen shows a prompt screen of "Device locked, please contact customer service center"; and the newly replaced inverter, because its identity has not been verified, is strictly restricted to "only one direction operation" mode, even if it receives limited commands from the PLC controller.

4. A tower crane equipment tamper-proof control system, used to implement the method according to claim 1, characterized in that: It includes a PLC controller, a frequency converter, a display screen and an Internet of Things platform; the PLC controller is communicatively connected to the Internet of Things platform; the PLC controller is communicatively connected to the frequency converter and the display screen bus respectively; a handshake program is embedded in the PLC controller, and the handshake program identifies three sets of device codes of the PLC controller, the display screen and the frequency converter and uploads them to the Internet of Things platform.

5. The tamper-proof control system for tower crane equipment according to claim 4, characterized in that: The frequency converter includes a lifting frequency converter, a slewing frequency converter, an amplitude variable frequency converter and a traveling frequency converter.

6. The anti-tampering control system for tower crane equipment according to claim 4, characterized in that: The bus communication includes EtherCAT and Modbus.

7. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein: The processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method according to claim 1.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program / instruction stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program / instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to claim 1 are implemented.

9. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that When the computer program / instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to claim 1 are implemented.

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