Safety measure ticket analyzing and checking method based on plant station secondary system digital model

Abstract

The invention discloses a safety measure ticket analyzing and checking method based on a plant station secondary system digital model. Comprising the steps of constructing a large-model-driven safety measure ticket analysis model, establishing a safety measure logic knowledge base in combination with a knowledge graph, adopting a plant station secondary system digital model of a four-level hierarchical structure, and achieving actual safety measure ticket structured analysis through an optical character recognition (OCR) method and the safety measure ticket analysis model. Intelligent positioning of safety measure points is realized based on breadth-first search and multi-condition filtering processing to generate a reference safety measure ticket, and an actual safety measure ticket is automatically checked based on the reference safety measure ticket. According to the method, the safety measure ticket processing precision and efficiency are remarkably improved, the operation risk is effectively reduced, through standardized output of multiple elements and a visual report generation mechanism, full-process digital closed-loop management of safety measures is realized, and intelligent decision support is provided for secondary operation of a power system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of power system safety measure management technology, specifically involving a method for parsing and verifying safety measure tickets based on a digital model of the secondary system of power plants, realizing intelligent semantic parsing, equipment topology correlation analysis and automated verification of safety measure tickets. Background Technology

[0002] Safety measure tickets (hereinafter referred to as safety tickets) for substation secondary systems are important safety assurance documents for on-site operations. Their preparation, interpretation, and verification play a crucial role in ensuring the safety of equipment maintenance and operation. Traditionally, the management of safety ticketing work relies heavily on manual processes, including filling out, verifying, and supervising the implementation of safety measures. Operators must check each item on the paper safety ticket against the equipment number, operating action, and work stage information, manually locating the corresponding equipment and terminals to ensure that each safety measure complies with safety regulations.

[0003] (1) The analysis process relies on experience and lacks standardized tools.

[0004] Traditional safety measure ticket interpretation relies on operators' understanding of textual descriptions and experience-based judgment, lacking a standardized interpretation framework and automated tools. Different personnel may have differing interpretations of safety measure items, leading to inconsistent interpretations and increasing operational risks. Furthermore, paper-based safety measure tickets cannot be digitally stored and intelligently managed, making it difficult to fully track equipment topology and loop connections. This results in the location of safety measure execution points heavily relying on field experience, hindering the rapid and accurate determination of critical operational locations.

[0005] (2) The verification process lacks an automated logic verification mechanism.

[0006] In the verification process, traditional methods rely primarily on manual comparison, lacking systematic logical verification tools. The completeness, accuracy, and rationality of the operational sequence of safety measures are difficult to verify efficiently manually, often requiring secondary review by experienced experts. Manual verification is not only labor-intensive but also prone to omissions and misjudgments due to the lack of automated verification rules, failing to promptly identify missing, redundant, or inconsistent safety measures. This directly impacts the rigor of safety measure certificates and the level of security assurance during implementation.

[0007] (3) Lack of digital device model integration limits intelligent analysis

[0008] Furthermore, traditional safety measure ticket management lacks integration with digital equipment models, making intelligent analysis and decision support based on equipment electrical connections and topology impossible. The unclear correlation between safety operation points on safety measure tickets and field equipment makes it difficult to guarantee the rationality and effectiveness of safety measure execution. Complex equipment circuits and multi-level equipment structures make accurate location of safety measure points and optimization of operation sequences challenging, and manual operation cannot meet the dual requirements of safety and efficiency in modern power systems.

[0009] Existing methods for processing safety measure tickets have many shortcomings and are difficult to adapt to the complex and ever-changing safety management needs of modern power systems. There is an urgent need for a method for importing, parsing, and verifying safety measure tickets based on digital models and intelligent algorithms for substation secondary systems. This method would enable automated parsing, intelligent positioning, and precise verification of safety measure tickets, thereby improving the accuracy, standardization, and efficiency of safety measure management and ensuring the safe and reliable operation of substation secondary systems. Summary of the Invention

[0010] The purpose of this invention is to address the aforementioned deficiencies in existing technologies by providing a method for parsing and verifying safety measure tickets based on a digital model of a substation's secondary system. This aims to improve the accuracy, standardization, and efficiency of safety measure management. Through automated parsing, intelligent positioning, and precise verification of safety measure tickets, the safe and reliable operation of substation secondary systems is ensured.

[0011] The above-mentioned objectives of the present invention are achieved through the following technical means:

[0012] The method for analyzing and verifying safety measures tickets based on the digital model of the plant's secondary system includes the following steps:

[0013] Step 1: Construct a large-scale model-based parsing model for safety measures tickets, which is used to identify the stage division information, the cabinet information under the stage division information, and the safety measures items under the cabinet information in the safety measures tickets.

[0014] The cabinet information includes the cabinet number, the bay it is located in, and the cabinet type name; the safety measure entries include the safety measure operation actions and the corresponding safety measure execution point information;

[0015] Step 2: Establish a safety measure logic knowledge base. The safety measure logic knowledge base includes secondary loop classification, equipment classification in each secondary loop classification, a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment classifications, and safety measure rules for each equipment topology relationship model under each secondary loop classification. The safety measure rules include the selection logic of safety measure equipment objects and corresponding safety measure execution points, as well as safety measure operation actions. Each equipment classification includes the equipment name of the corresponding equipment.

[0016] Step 3: Construct a digital model of the plant's secondary system based on the SPD model file, SCD model file, and SSD model file; the digital model of the plant's secondary system includes the topological relationship of the secondary system equipment in a four-level hierarchical structure of plant-room-cabinet-equipment, realizing the digital representation of cable connections between cabinets and virtual circuits;

[0017] Step 4: Convert the actual safety measure ticket into electronic text using the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) method; call the safety measure ticket parsing model to identify the stage division information, cabinet information and safety measure items in the electronic text, and form a structured data storage format;

[0018] Step 5: Combining the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket with the information of the cabinet and the safety measure logic knowledge base, select the instantiated safety measure execution points from the digital model of the plant secondary system and match the corresponding safety measure operation actions, and generate reference safety measure tickets according to the order of safety measures.

[0019] Step 6: Compare and verify the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket with the information of the reference safety measure ticket.

[0020] As described above, step 1 specifically includes the following steps:

[0021] Step 1.1: Add annotations to the information in the historical standardized safety measures tickets. The annotations are divided into three layers: the first layer is the stage division information annotation; the second layer is the cabinet information annotation under each stage division information annotation; and the third layer is the safety measure item annotation under each cabinet information annotation. Each safety measure item annotation includes the safety measure operation action annotation and the corresponding safety measure execution point annotation.

[0022] Step 1.2: Input historical standardized safety measures tickets into the initial safety measures ticket parsing model, use the annotation as the training target for iterative recognition training, and adjust the parameters of the safety measures ticket parsing model so that the safety measures ticket parsing model can accurately identify the stage division information, cabinet information and safety measures items in the historical standardized safety measures tickets and generate the corresponding structured data.

[0023] As mentioned above, the annotations for safety measures entries include the following:

[0024] Terminal operation labeling: Terminal operation includes one of the following: removal, connection, short circuit, bridging, sealing, opening the connecting piece, and connecting the connecting piece;

[0025] The operation of a circuit breaker is indicated by one of the following: disconnecting, closing, or sealing.

[0026] The soft pressure plate operation is labeled as either "exit" or "engage".

[0027] The operation of the hard pressure plate is indicated by one of the following: withdrawal, insertion, or sealing.

[0028] Fiber optic operation refers to one of the following: pulling out, restoring, or sealing.

[0029] As mentioned above, step 2 specifically includes the following:

[0030] Step 2.1: Classify the secondary circuits according to their functions, and set the order in which to execute safety measures for different secondary circuit categories in each safety measure task;

[0031] Step 2.2: Based on the classification of each secondary circuit, divide the equipment in the secondary circuit classification into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment;

[0032] Step 2.3: For each secondary circuit category, construct a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment categories. The set of equipment topology relationship models includes:

[0033] The circuit topology connection model between the maintenance area and the accompanying stop area is denoted as the JX-PT topology connection model.

[0034] The circuit topology connection model between the maintenance area and the operation area is denoted as the JX-YX topology connection model.

[0035] The loop topology connection model between the parking area and the operating area is denoted as the PT-JX topology connection model.

[0036] Wherein, JX represents the maintenance area, PT represents the shutdown area, and YX represents the operation area; the maintenance area includes all maintenance equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, the shutdown area includes all shutdown equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, and the operation area includes all operation equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category;

[0037] Step 2.4: Based on the equipment operating status information, establish a safety measure rule system for each type of secondary circuit. The safety measure rule system includes one or more of the following safety measure rules:

[0038] JX-PT:JX Safety Measures Rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area.

[0039] JX-PT:PT safety measures rule means that for the circuit topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the accompanying shutdown equipment in the accompanying shutdown area.

[0040] The JX-YX:YX safety measure rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area.

[0041] JX-YX:JX safety measures rule means that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area.

[0042] PT-YX:PT safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the accompanying stop area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the accompanying stop equipment side in the accompanying stop area;

[0043] PT-YX:YX safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the parking area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area.

[0044] As mentioned above, the secondary circuit classification includes: DC power supply circuit, AC power supply circuit, AC current circuit, AC current circuit winding grounding terminal related circuit, AC voltage circuit, DC current circuit, DC voltage circuit, hard pressure plate related circuit, functional soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE transmitting soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, SV receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, fiber optic circuit, longitudinal differential channel, input circuit, output circuit, remote control circuit, trip circuit, closing circuit, failure circuit, negative pressure interlocking circuit, functional interlocking circuit, overload start-up cooling circuit, signal circuit, and time synchronization related circuit.

[0045] Each safety measure rule in the secondary loop classification as described above includes the following rule information:

[0046] The specific secondary circuit selected in the corresponding secondary circuit category is then located within that secondary circuit, where the safety measures device object that needs to be implemented is found.

[0047] The non-instantiated safety measure execution point corresponding to the safety measure device object, as well as the corresponding safety measure operation actions and their priorities.

[0048] Among them, the safety measures equipment targets secondary equipment or components, and the safety measures execution points include one or more of terminals, circuit breakers, soft pressure plates, hard pressure plates, and optical fibers.

[0049] The rules for finding the associated information of safety measure execution points include the interval name, cabinet number, cabinet name, device number, device name, associated terminal block number, associated terminal number, associated cable number, associated cable core number, external circuit cable core number, external circuit function description, external circuit number, internal circuit number, internal circuit function description, associated soft pressure plate name, associated hard pressure plate number, associated hard pressure plate name, associated circuit breaker number, associated circuit breaker name, and associated optical port number.

[0050] As described above, step 5 specifically includes the following steps:

[0051] Step 5.1: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all loops in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into different types;

[0052] Step 5.2: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all equipment in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment;

[0053] Step 5.3: Based on the set of equipment topology relationship models in the Ancuo logic knowledge base, generate JX-PT topology connections, JX-YX topology connections, and PT-JX topology connections for the maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment divided in the digital model of the plant's secondary system;

[0054] Step 5.4 Based on the secondary circuit classification in the Ancuo logic knowledge base and the interval in the cabinet information obtained in Step 4, locate the associated secondary cabinets and secondary equipment in the digital model of the plant secondary system according to the corresponding secondary circuit classification.

[0055] Step 5.5: For each secondary loop category corresponding to the interval, according to the order of the secondary loop categories in the safety management logic knowledge base, the loops of each secondary loop category are selected according to the corresponding safety management rules, and the corresponding instantiated safety management execution points are selected.

[0056] Step 5.6: Based on the implementation points of safety measures, find related information and combine the safety measure implementation point information and the related information of safety measure implementation points to form a safety measure implementation point dataset;

[0057] Step 5.7: For each secondary loop classification, based on the sequential requirements of safety operation actions in the safety operation logic knowledge base, generate an instantiated safety entry sequence from the corresponding safety execution point datasets and corresponding safety operation actions.

[0058] Step 5.8: Display the instantiated safety measure entry sequence corresponding to all secondary circuit categories in the current interval according to three levels: stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measure entry, and output the reference safety measure ticket.

[0059] As described above, step 6 specifically includes the following steps:

[0060] Step 6.1: Perform cosine similarity calculation on the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket and the stage division information in the reference safety measure ticket generated in Step 5, and match the stage information; determine whether the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket is missing, whether the stages are redundant, and whether the stage order and the description of the stage division information are standardized.

[0061] Step 6.2: For information segmented in the same stage, calculate the cosine similarity based on the cabinet type name, and match the cabinet information according to the cabinet number matching; determine whether the cabinet information is missing, whether the cabinet information is redundant, and whether the order of the cabinet information and the cabinet name are standardized.

[0062] Step 6.3: For the same cabinet information, for each safety measure item, based on whether all safety measure execution point information and safety measure operation actions are completely identical, perform safety measure item pairing and judgment: whether safety measure execution points are redundant, whether safety measure execution points are missing, whether safety measure operation actions are correct, and whether the order of safety measure execution points is correct.

[0063] As mentioned above, step 6.2 involves pairing the cabinet information, specifically as follows:

[0064] For screen cabinet information with a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket, the screen cabinet number is matched with the corresponding screen cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket. For screen cabinet information without a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket, the screen cabinet type name is extracted, and the cosine similarity calculation method is used to evaluate the text matching degree between the screen cabinet type name in the reference safety ticket and the screen cabinet type name in the structured data of the actual safety ticket, thereby achieving the matching of screen cabinet information without a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket with screen cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket.

[0065] As mentioned above, step 6 also includes the following operations:

[0066] Output a visual verification report, which marks all discrepancies and abnormal safety measures, provides descriptions of the discrepancy type and location, and offers targeted correction suggestions and operational guidance based on the safety measure logic knowledge base.

[0067] The beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention compared with the prior art are as follows:

[0068] This invention constructs a large-scale model-driven safety measure ticket parsing model, establishes a regional safety measure logical knowledge base using a knowledge graph, and constructs a power plant secondary system topology model using a four-level hierarchical digital modeling structure. Structured parsing of safety measure tickets is achieved through Optical Character Recognition (OCR) conversion and deep semantic analysis. Intelligent positioning of safety measure execution points is achieved based on breadth-first search and multi-condition filtering. Automated verification is implemented by combining multi-layer verification rules and sequence comparison algorithms. This method significantly improves the processing accuracy and efficiency of safety measure tickets, effectively reduces operational risks, and achieves full-process digital closed-loop management of safety measures through standardized output of multiple elements and a visual report generation mechanism. It provides intelligent decision support for secondary operations in power systems, and can be used not only for regeneration but also for retraining, indicating where problems exist for the writers.

[0069] Existing digital models of plant secondary systems built solely based on SCD model files do not include cabinets and boxes typically absent in conventional stations, such as control cabinets, PT terminal boxes, and mechanism boxes. Furthermore, SCD model files describe virtual loop connections but not cable loop connections, such as which terminal a specific voltage loop is connected to. This invention, however, constructs a digital model of the plant secondary system based on SPD, SCD, and SSD model files, which can include cable loops. Therefore, the generated reference safety ticket includes more comprehensive loop coverage.

[0070] For digital models of plant secondary systems constructed from SCD model files, it is sufficient to distinguish between maintenance equipment and operating equipment. However, for cable loop connections with more complex relationships than virtual loop connections, it is necessary to consider maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment. A one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate; setting up three types of equipment will make the identification of safety measure execution points more accurate. Attached Figure Description

[0071] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the implementation process of the safety measure ticket parsing and verification method based on the digital model of the secondary system of the power plant provided in this embodiment of the invention;

[0072] Figure 2 This is a framework diagram of the implementation process of the safety ticket parsing and verification method based on the digital model of the secondary system of the power plant provided in this embodiment of the invention; wherein, OCR represents the optical character recognition method;

[0073] Figure 3 This is a diagram of the Ancuo ticket. Detailed Implementation

[0074] To facilitate understanding and implementation of the present invention by those skilled in the art, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to implementation examples. It should be understood that the implementation examples described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0075] Example 1

[0076] This invention provides a method for parsing and verifying safety measure tickets based on a digital model of a power plant's secondary system, such as... Figure 1-2 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0077] Step 1: Construct a large-scale model-based parsing model for safety measures tickets, which is used to identify the stage division information in the safety measures tickets, the cabinet information under each stage division information, and the safety measures items under each cabinet information.

[0078] The information on the control panel includes: control panel number, location in the bay, and control panel type name; the safety measures entries include the safety measures operation actions and the corresponding safety measures execution point information.

[0079] Step 1.1: Add multi-level and multi-dimensional annotations to the information in the historical standardized safety measures tickets according to the information type. The annotations are divided into three layers: the first layer is the stage division information annotation (such as the pre-operation stage annotation, the in-operation stage annotation, and the post-operation stage annotation); the second layer is the cabinet information annotation under each stage division information annotation; and the third layer is the safety measure item annotation under each cabinet information annotation. Each safety measure item annotation includes the safety measure operation action annotation and the corresponding safety measure execution point annotation.

[0080] In the third-level safety measure item annotations, the safety measure operation actions are labeled as follows:

[0081] Terminal operation labeling: Terminal operation includes one of the following: removal, connection, short circuit, bridging, sealing, opening the connecting piece, and connecting the connecting piece;

[0082] The operation of a circuit breaker is indicated by one of the following: disconnecting, closing, or sealing.

[0083] The soft pressure plate operation is labeled as either "exit" or "engage".

[0084] The operation of the hard plate is indicated by the following: withdrawal, insertion, and sealing.

[0085] Fiber optic operation refers to one of the following: pulling out, restoring, or sealing.

[0086] Step 1.2: Input historical standardized safety measures tickets (in Word document, PDF document, or photo format) into the safety measures ticket parsing model, and use the annotations as the training target for iterative recognition training. Manually adjust the parameters of the safety measures ticket parsing model multiple times so that the model can accurately identify the stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measures items contained in the historical standardized safety measures tickets and generate the corresponding structured data.

[0087] Among them, Ancuo tickets (such as Figure 3 The information shown includes the following:

[0088] First level: Stage division information (e.g., pre-task stage, in-task stage, post-task stage);

[0089] Second level: Screen cabinet information (screen cabinet information includes: screen cabinet number, location in the bay, screen cabinet type name);

[0090] The third level: safety measure items, including safety measure operation actions and corresponding safety measure execution point information. The safety measure execution point information includes the safety measure execution point name and safety measure execution point number, that is, the specific safety measure execution steps under a certain panel cabinet, such as: disconnect XX circuit breaker xx, open XX terminal connection piece xx.

[0091] The safety ticket parsing model used in this embodiment is based on a multimodal fusion deep neural network architecture. Its core is a Transformer encoder combined with a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to extract image features, fusing electronic text and image information. Using a dataset containing a large number of historical standardized safety tickets and corresponding annotations, a language model based on the Transformer architecture is pre-trained, outputting corresponding stage division information, cabinet information, and safety item recognition results. During adaptive fine-tuning, the parameters of the word embedding layer and multi-head self-attention layer of the safety ticket parsing model are mainly adjusted, incorporating professional terminology and operational logic knowledge in the safety field. This allows the model to more accurately understand the semantics and contextual relationships of safety terms, improving classification and recognition performance, thereby achieving synergistic optimization of semantic understanding and structural parsing.

[0092] In this embodiment, a dynamic attention weight adjustment method based on task characteristics is designed for the parsing and verification of safety check tickets. Compared with existing technologies, by introducing contextual information between the text structure of the safety check ticket and the annotation of key elements, dynamic weighted attention is paid to key information such as the cabinet number, safety check execution point, and safety check operation actions, thereby improving the accuracy of key element extraction. This method is particularly suitable for the diverse formats and ambiguous expressions of safety check tickets, enhancing the model's parsing capabilities in complex scenarios.

[0093] This embodiment uses the network parameters of a pre-trained language model as initialization and fine-tunes the model using a specific dataset of anticupper ticket (Ancuo Piao) data. This process preserves the general language understanding ability of the pre-trained model while learning professional knowledge about anticupper ticket through domain data, achieving targeted parameter optimization (such as improving classification accuracy) and enhancing the model's accuracy in classifying anticupper ticket operation actions.

[0094] In this embodiment, the addition of multi-level and multi-dimensional annotations is completed before training. As a data preprocessing step before training, this subdivided structure helps the model learn detailed hierarchical relationships and achieve more granular recognition of safety operation actions.

[0095] Step 2: Establish a regional safety measure logic knowledge base. The knowledge base includes: secondary loop classification, equipment classification within each secondary loop classification (each equipment classification includes the equipment name of the corresponding equipment), a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment classifications, and safety measure rules for each equipment topology relationship model under each secondary loop classification. The safety measure rules include the safety measure equipment object selection logic and safety measure operation actions, thus forming a digitally executable safety measure decision tree. Specifically, this includes the following steps:

[0096] Step 2.1: Classify the secondary circuits according to their functions and set the order of execution of safety measures for different secondary circuit categories in each safety measure task. In this embodiment, the secondary circuit classification includes: DC power supply circuit, AC power supply circuit, AC current circuit, AC current circuit winding grounding terminal related circuit, AC voltage circuit, DC current circuit, DC voltage circuit, hard pressure plate related circuit, functional soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE transmitting soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, SV receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, fiber optic circuit, longitudinal differential channel, input circuit, output circuit, remote control circuit, tripping circuit, closing circuit, failure circuit, negative pressure interlocking circuit, functional interlocking circuit, overload start-up cooling circuit, signal circuit, time synchronization related circuit, and other circuits. The secondary circuit classification is based on the analysis of typical operation scenarios of substation secondary field operations, industry standards, and actual operating experience.

[0097] Step 2.2: For each secondary circuit category, the equipment within that category is divided into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment. This classification is based on the typical work processes and equipment relationships of various safety measures in the substation secondary system field.

[0098] In this embodiment, for a certain region, the safety measure ticket task is set as "first type of work ticket scheduled inspection". Based on the user's safety measure rules and typical safety measure tickets, for a given interval, the corresponding safety measure logic knowledge base information is defined, and the corresponding equipment is classified as follows:

[0099] Protection and control devices, protection devices, measurement and control devices, integrated intelligent devices, merging units, intelligent terminals, fiber optic interface devices, and multiplexing interface devices are classified as maintenance equipment.

[0100] Relay control boxes, voltage switching devices, intelligent control cabinets, distribution control cabinets, switch cabinets, terminal boxes, and mechanism boxes are classified as auxiliary equipment.

[0101] Other objects are running devices.

[0102] Step 2.3: For each secondary circuit category, construct a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment categories. The set of equipment topology relationship models includes:

[0103] The loop topology connection model between the maintenance area and the accompanying stop area (denoted as the JX-PT topology connection model, where JX represents the maintenance area and PT represents the accompanying stop area).

[0104] The loop topology connection model between the maintenance area and the operation area (denoted as JX-YX topology connection model, where YX represents the operation area).

[0105] And the loop topology connection model between the parking area and the operating area (denoted as PT-JX topology connection model);

[0106] The maintenance area includes all maintenance equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, the shutdown area includes all shutdown equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, and the operation area includes all operation equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category. Step 2.3 clarifies the electrical and functional connection characteristics between various types of equipment. In different regions, for the same circuit, due to different safety measures requirements, the same equipment in the secondary circuit is an operation equipment under one safety measure task and a shutdown equipment under another safety measure requirement. The specific classification is set by user needs, with the secondary circuit information flow as the core and the maintenance safety impact as the criterion.

[0107] Step 2.4: Based on the equipment operating status information, establish a safety measure rule system for each type of secondary circuit. The safety measure rule system includes one or more of the following safety measure rules:

[0108] JX-PT:JX Safety Measures Rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area.

[0109] JX-PT:PT safety measures rule means that for the circuit topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the accompanying shutdown equipment in the accompanying shutdown area.

[0110] The JX-YX:YX safety measure rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area.

[0111] JX-YX:JX safety measures rule means that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area.

[0112] PT-YX:PT safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the accompanying stop area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the accompanying stop equipment side in the accompanying stop area;

[0113] PT-YX:YX safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the parking area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area.

[0114] For each type of safety measure rule in each secondary loop category, the corresponding rule information includes the following:

[0115] (1) Safety device object selection logic, including selecting the specific secondary circuit in the corresponding secondary circuit category, and finding the safety device object that needs to be implemented in the specific secondary circuit. The safety device object is a secondary device or component.

[0116] Find the corresponding safety device object for the safety rule from the secondary circuit classification; for example: for a certain circuit JX-YX:JX safety rule, perform safety measures on the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area, and the specific side to perform the safety measures can be flexibly configured according to the regional requirements.

[0117] (2) The non-instantiated safety measure execution point corresponding to the safety measure device object, and the corresponding safety measure operation action and the priority of the safety measure operation action. The safety measure execution point includes one or more of the following: terminal, circuit breaker, soft pressure plate, hard pressure plate and optical fiber.

[0118] (3) Rules for finding related information of safety control points: These rules are used to find related information of safety control points so that safety control personnel can quickly locate safety control points through related information;

[0119] The associated information for the safety measure execution point includes: the interval name, cabinet number, cabinet name, device number, device name, associated terminal block number, associated terminal number, associated cable number, associated cable core number, external circuit cable core number, external circuit function description, external circuit number, internal circuit number, internal circuit function description, associated soft pressure plate name, associated hard pressure plate number, associated hard pressure plate name, associated circuit breaker number, associated circuit breaker name, and associated optical port number.

[0120] In this embodiment, the safety operation set for the interval selected under the safety measure ticket task "first type of work ticket inspection" includes:

[0121] (1) For the tripping / closing / functional interlocking / failure / re-pressure unlocking circuits in operation, if it is necessary to seal the tripping / closing / functional interlocking / failure / re-pressure unlocking circuits in operation, then construct the JX-YX:JX safety measure rule, and in the maintenance area, seal the terminals of the terminal blocks in the tripping / closing / functional interlocking / failure / re-pressure unlocking circuits; construct the PT-YX:PT safety measure rule, which indicates that in the accompanying shutdown area, seal the terminals of the terminal blocks in the tripping / closing / functional interlocking / failure / re-pressure unlocking circuits, and output the terminal block number and terminal number; based on the found safety measure execution point, search and output the association information of the non-instantiated safety measure execution point;

[0122] (2) For DC voltage circuits, it is necessary to seal the terminals before voltage switching, the terminals before the circuit breaker after voltage switching, the voltage output terminals after switching, and the terminals before the circuit breaker without voltage switching. Construct JX-PT:JX safety rules and JX-YX:JX safety rules. On the side of the equipment under maintenance, seal specific terminals of the voltage circuit. Based on the found safety execution points, find the association information of the output non-instantiated safety execution points.

[0123] (3) For DC current loops, the terminal connection pieces of the current loop need to be opened, and JX-PT:JX safety rules and JX-YX:JX safety rules need to be constructed. On the maintenance side, the maintenance terminals on the maintenance equipment side of the DC current loop are searched, and the information on opening the connection pieces is output. Based on the found safety execution points, the association information of non-instantiated safety execution points is searched and output.

[0124] (4) For AC voltage circuits, it is necessary to open the terminal connection piece of the circuit breaker after voltage switching and the terminal connection piece of the circuit breaker without voltage switching, construct the JX-PT:JX safety measure rule and the JX-YX:JX safety measure rule, and on the side of the object under maintenance, search for the terminal connection piece of the circuit breaker on the side of maintenance and output the information of opening the connection piece. Based on the found safety measure execution point, search for and output the association information of the non-instantiated safety measure execution point.

[0125] The aforementioned rules and logic are integrated to form a digital safety measure decision tree, enabling automated and precise safety measure decision support. Furthermore, the safety measure logic knowledge base continuously incorporates on-site operational feedback and anomaly handling cases, employing ontology modeling and knowledge graphs to enhance the expressive power and scalability of the rules. This ensures good adaptability and maintainability across different plant sites and operational environments, effectively assisting in logical judgment and decision-making during the safety measure ticket verification process. Subsequently, based on maintenance, shutdown, and operation settings, the knowledge base can automatically retrieve instantiated safety measure information and its related information.

[0126] Step 3: Construct a digital model of the plant's secondary system based on the SPD, SCD, and SSD model files. This model includes a four-level hierarchical structure of secondary system equipment topology, from the plant itself to individual rooms, cabinets, and equipment. Modeling inter-cabinet circuit connections enables the digital representation of cable connections and virtual circuits between cabinets. Using a cabinet-within-cabinet circuit connection modeling method, equipment models containing electrical connection attributes are established for components such as circuit breakers, pressure plates, and terminal blocks within the cabinets. A graph database is used to store and manage circuit connection relationships, supporting multi-dimensional relational queries.

[0127] Preferably, step 3 includes:

[0128] A four-level hierarchical structure is adopted, consisting of plant, small room, cabinet, and equipment, establishing a complete equipment topology network. Fine-grained modeling of the attributes and relationships of equipment at each level enables systematic management of equipment within the plant. Based on the modeling of inter-cabinet circuit connections, cable connection information between cabinets is collected and digitally represented. Using the cabinet-within-cabinet circuit connection modeling method, equipment models containing the electrical connection attributes of key components within the cabinet, such as air switches, pressure plates, and terminal blocks, are constructed, supporting accurate description and analysis of internal circuits. A graph database is introduced to store and manage the aforementioned circuit connections, utilizing the multi-dimensional relational query capabilities of the graph database to support rapid retrieval and visualization of complex relationships between equipment. The model supports dynamic updates and expansion to meet the equipment change requirements at different stages of the plant, and a permission management mechanism ensures data security and access control. The digital model of the plant's secondary system provides an accurate data foundation and system support for subsequent intelligent positioning of safety measure execution points and verification of safety measure content.

[0129] The SPD model file contains all the cable connection relationships and modeling objects of the secondary system. Therefore, the SPD model file contains bay modeling and the relationship between bays and cabinets and equipment. The SCD model file contains the logical modeling of the secondary system IED equipment and the virtual loop connection relationship, virtual loop soft pressure plate, etc. The SSD model file contains the topology connection relationship of the primary equipment.

[0130] The intervals in the SPD model file are consistent with those in the SSD model file, so the interval name is also the primary equipment name, such as: 220kV Beijie A line.

[0131] Subsequently, the corresponding interval name can be found in the secondary system digital model through the cabinet and equipment, thereby obtaining the name of the primary equipment.

[0132] Step 4: Convert the actual safety measure ticket into electronic text using the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) method; call the safety measure ticket parsing model constructed in Step 1 to identify the stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measure items in the electronic text corresponding to the actual safety measure ticket, and form a structured data storage format;

[0133] Preferably, step 4 includes:

[0134] First, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is used to convert the actual safety measure tickets into electronic text with high precision, ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the text content. Then, a safety measure ticket parsing model trained on a large model is invoked to automatically identify the stage division information in the electronic text of the actual safety measure ticket, extracting the fixed text descriptions corresponding to each stage division information to achieve a structured understanding of the work process. Deep learning methods from the safety measure ticket parsing model are used to perform fine-grained semantic parsing on the safety measure item groups under the control cabinet, decomposing the text information to obtain the control cabinet information and the corresponding set of safety measure items. Semantic analysis is further performed on each safety measure item to accurately extract the safety measure execution point information and specific operation actions corresponding to the safety measure equipment object, forming a unified structured data storage format for subsequent processing. Through iterative optimization of the trained model, the parsing accuracy and robustness are continuously improved, adapting to changes in different plants and safety measure ticket formats, providing a reliable data foundation for subsequent verification.

[0135] Step 5: Perform intelligent positioning of safety points in the digital model of the plant's secondary system and output reference safety tickets.

[0136] Based on the cabinet information in the structured data parsed in step 4 (where the cabinet information refers to the primary equipment under maintenance, such as the name of the primary equipment during maintenance of a 220kV line) and the safety measure logic knowledge base, valid instantiated safety measure execution points are selected from the digital model of the substation secondary system and matched with corresponding safety measure operation actions. Reference safety measure tickets are generated according to the order of safety measures. Specifically, the following operations are included:

[0137] Step 5.1: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all loops in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into different types;

[0138] Step 5.2: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all equipment in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment;

[0139] Step 5.3: Based on the set of equipment topology relationship models in the Ancuo logic knowledge base, generate JX-PT topology connections, JX-YX topology connections, and PT-JX topology connections for the maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment divided in the digital model of the plant's secondary system;

[0140] Step 5.4 Based on the secondary circuit classification in the safety control logic knowledge base and the location interval in the cabinet information obtained in Step 4, locate the associated secondary cabinets and secondary equipment in the digital model of the plant's secondary system according to the corresponding secondary circuit classification, and realize the correspondence between the maintenance equipment and the digital model; Based on the safety control logic knowledge base in Step 2, in the digital model of the plant's secondary system in Step 3, implement the breadth-first search algorithm along the circuit connection relationship to determine the electrical path between the maintenance equipment, the shutdown equipment, and the operating equipment, and ensure that the electrical association relationship of the safety control points is complete and accurate;

[0141] Step 5.5: Use multi-condition filtering to screen valid instantiated safety measure execution points: For each secondary circuit category in the corresponding bay, according to the order of the secondary circuit categories in the safety measure logic knowledge base constructed in Step 2, the circuits of each secondary circuit category are screened out based on the corresponding safety measure rules, taking into account factors such as equipment status and circuit type, and the corresponding valid instantiated safety measure execution points that meet the safety and operation specifications. Safety measure execution points include one or more of terminals, circuit breakers, soft pressure plates, hard pressure plates, and optical fibers.

[0142] Step 5.6: Based on the instantiated safety measure execution points, find the associated information and construct the safety measure execution point dataset by combining the safety measure execution point information and the associated information of the safety measure execution points;

[0143] For example: To locate a malfunctioning circuit, the 220kV line protection panel only has maintenance equipment, and the 220kV bus protection panel only has operating equipment. Locate the malfunctioning circuit between the maintenance equipment in the line protection panel and the operating equipment in the bus protection panel. Implement safety measures on the line protection panel, locate the corresponding cabinet terminal number (instantiated safety measure execution point), ensure the terminal connection tab is open (safety measure operation action), and based on the circuit connection relationship, find the outlet pressure plate number and outlet pressure plate name in the line protection panel corresponding to that circuit.

[0144] Step 5.7: For each secondary loop classification, based on the sequential requirements of safety operation actions in the safety operation logic knowledge base, generate an instantiated safety operation item sequence that conforms to the actual safety operation process from the corresponding safety operation point datasets and corresponding safety operation actions.

[0145] Step 5.8: Display the instantiated safety measure entry sequence corresponding to all secondary circuit categories in the current interval according to three levels: stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measure entry, and output the reference safety measure ticket.

[0146] Step 6: Implement automated verification of safety measures content: Compare and verify the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket in Step 4 with the information in the reference safety measure ticket generated in Step 5.

[0147] Step 6 includes project matching and verification prompts. Project matching involves pairing the items to be matched in the digital model of the plant's secondary system with the items to be matched in the structured data of the actual safety measure tickets. The items to be matched include stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measure entries. Verification prompts specifically include sequence verification and content verification. The specific process for project matching and verification prompts for each item to be matched is as follows:

[0148] Step 6.1: Match and verify the stage division information:

[0149] The cosine similarity of the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measures ticket and the stage division information in the reference safety measures ticket generated in step 5 is calculated, and the stage information is matched; it is determined whether the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measures ticket is missing, whether the stages are redundant, and whether the stage order and the description of the stage division information are standardized.

[0150] Step 6.2: Pair and verify the information of the display cabinets:

[0151] For information segmented within the same stage, cosine similarity is calculated based on the cabinet type name, and cabinet information is paired in conjunction with cabinet number matching; it is then determined whether cabinet information is missing, redundant, or whether the order of cabinet information and cabinet name are standardized.

[0152] In this embodiment, for cabinet information with cabinet numbers in the reference safety ticket, the cabinet numbers are matched with the corresponding cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket; for cabinet information without cabinet numbers in the reference safety ticket, the cabinet type name is extracted, and the cosine similarity calculation method is used to evaluate the text matching degree between the cabinet type name in the reference safety ticket and the cabinet type name in the structured data of the actual safety ticket, so as to achieve high-precision matching between cabinet information without cabinet numbers in the reference safety ticket and cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket.

[0153] Step 6.3: Match and verify the safety measures items:

[0154] For the same cabinet information, for each safety measure item, based on whether all safety measure execution point information and safety measure operation actions are completely identical, the safety measure items are aligned and matched, and the following judgments are made: whether the safety measure execution points are redundant, whether the safety measure execution points are missing, whether the safety measure operation actions are correct, and whether the order of the safety measure execution points is correct.

[0155] For safety measure entries under the cabinet information, precise matching is performed based on the two elements of "safety measure execution point information + operation" to ensure that the safety measure entries are completely consistent in both safety measure execution point information and safety measure operation actions, achieving fine-grained verification at the item level; for the safety measure sequence verification function, the compliance of the operation process is detected by sequence comparison.

[0156] In this embodiment, for missing content in the safety measure ticket, a missing alarm is automatically generated to remind the user to supplement the corresponding safety measures; for redundant content in the structured data of the reference safety measure ticket or the actual safety measure ticket, a redundancy alarm is triggered to indicate the presence of unnecessary or erroneous content; for inconsistent operation actions, a difference alarm is generated to indicate possible operation errors or mismatches.

[0157] Furthermore, step 6 also includes: outputting a visual verification report, which marks all discrepancies and abnormal safety measures, provides clear descriptions of the types and locations of discrepancies, and offers targeted correction suggestions and operational guidance based on the safety measure logic knowledge base. This report supports export in multiple formats for easy archiving and subsequent review.

[0158] Example 2

[0159] The safety measure ticket parsing and verification system based on the digital model of the plant secondary system, and the safety measure ticket parsing and verification method based on the digital model of the plant secondary system described in Example 1, include:

[0160] Ancuo ticket parsing model storage module is used to store the ancuo ticket parsing model constructed in step 1 of embodiment 1;

[0161] Ancologic Logic Knowledge Base Storage Module is used to store the Ancologic Logic Knowledge Base constructed in step 2 of Example 1;

[0162] The digital model construction module for the secondary system of the power plant is used to implement step 3 of embodiment 1;

[0163] The security ticket parsing module is used to implement step 4 of embodiment 1;

[0164] Refer to the safety ticket generation module for implementing step 5 of embodiment 1;

[0165] The verification module is used to implement step 6 of embodiment 1.

[0166] Example 3

[0167] A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps performed in the safety ticket parsing model storage module, safety logic knowledge base storage module, plant secondary system digital model construction module, safety ticket parsing module, reference safety ticket generation module, and verification module of the safety ticket parsing and verification system in Embodiment 2 above.

[0168] Example 4

[0169] A computer program product includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps performed in the safety ticket parsing model storage module, safety logic knowledge base storage module, plant secondary system digital model construction module, safety ticket parsing module, reference safety ticket generation module, and verification module of the verification system in Embodiment 2 above.

[0170] The above-described embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should all be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for analyzing and verifying safety measures tickets based on a digital model of a plant's secondary system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Construct a large-scale model-based parsing model for safety measures tickets, which is used to identify the stage division information, the cabinet information under the stage division information, and the safety measures items under the cabinet information in the safety measures tickets. The cabinet information includes the cabinet number, the bay it is located in, and the cabinet type name; the safety measure entries include the safety measure operation actions and the corresponding safety measure execution point information; Step 2: Establish a safety measure logic knowledge base. The safety measure logic knowledge base includes secondary loop classification, equipment classification in each secondary loop classification, a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment classifications, and safety measure rules for each equipment topology relationship model under each secondary loop classification. The safety measure rules include the selection logic of safety measure equipment objects and corresponding safety measure execution points, as well as safety measure operation actions. Each equipment classification includes the equipment name of the corresponding equipment. Step 3: Construct a digital model of the plant's secondary system based on the SPD model file, SCD model file, and SSD model file; the digital model of the plant's secondary system includes the topological relationship of the secondary system equipment in a four-level hierarchical structure of plant-room-cabinet-equipment, realizing the digital representation of cable connections between cabinets and virtual circuits; Step 4: Convert the actual safety measure ticket into electronic text using the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) method; call the safety measure ticket parsing model to identify the stage division information, cabinet information and safety measure items in the electronic text, and form a structured data storage format; Step 5: Combining the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket with the information of the cabinet and the safety measure logic knowledge base, select the instantiated safety measure execution points from the digital model of the plant secondary system and match the corresponding safety measure operation actions, and generate reference safety measure tickets according to the order of safety measures. Step 6: Compare and verify the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket with the information of the reference safety measure ticket.

2. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant's secondary system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 1 specifically includes the following steps: Step 1.1: Add annotations to the information in the historical standardized safety measures tickets. The annotations are divided into three layers: the first layer is the stage division information annotation; the second layer is the cabinet information annotation under each stage division information annotation; and the third layer is the safety measure item annotation under each cabinet information annotation. Each safety measure item annotation includes the safety measure operation action annotation and the corresponding safety measure execution point annotation. Step 1.2: Input historical standardized safety measures tickets into the initial safety measures ticket parsing model, use the annotation as the training target for iterative recognition training, and adjust the parameters of the safety measures ticket parsing model so that the safety measures ticket parsing model can accurately identify the stage division information, cabinet information and safety measures items in the historical standardized safety measures tickets and generate the corresponding structured data.

3. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on the digital model of the secondary system of a power plant, as described in claim 2, is characterized in that... The safety measure entry annotations include the following: Terminal operation labeling: Terminal operation includes one of the following: removal, connection, short circuit, bridging, sealing, opening the connecting piece, and connecting the connecting piece; The operation of a circuit breaker is indicated by one of the following: disconnecting, closing, or sealing. The soft pressure plate operation is labeled as either "exit" or "engage". The operation of the hard pressure plate is indicated by one of the following: withdrawal, insertion, or sealing. Fiber optic operation refers to one of the following: pulling out, restoring, or sealing.

4. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant secondary system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 specifically includes the following: Step 2.1: Classify the secondary circuits according to their functions, and set the order in which to execute safety measures for different secondary circuit categories in each safety measure task; Step 2.2: Based on the classification of each secondary circuit, divide the equipment in the secondary circuit classification into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment; Step 2.3: For each secondary circuit category, construct a set of equipment topology relationship models between different equipment categories. The set of equipment topology relationship models includes: The circuit topology connection model between the maintenance area and the accompanying stop area is denoted as the JX-PT topology connection model. The circuit topology connection model between the maintenance area and the operation area is denoted as the JX-YX topology connection model. The loop topology connection model between the parking area and the operating area is denoted as the PT-JX topology connection model. Wherein, JX represents the maintenance area, PT represents the shutdown area, and YX represents the operation area; the maintenance area includes all maintenance equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, the shutdown area includes all shutdown equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category, and the operation area includes all operation equipment in the corresponding secondary circuit category; Step 2.4: Based on the equipment operating status information, establish a safety measure rule system for each type of secondary circuit. The safety measure rule system includes one or more of the following safety measure rules: JX-PT:JX Safety Measures Rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area. JX-PT:PT safety measures rule means that for the circuit topology connection between the maintenance area and the accompanying shutdown area, safety measures are only implemented on the side of the accompanying shutdown equipment in the accompanying shutdown area. The JX-YX:YX safety measure rule indicates that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area. JX-YX:JX safety measures rule means that for the loop topology connection between the maintenance area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the side of the maintenance equipment in the maintenance area. PT-YX:PT safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the accompanying stop area and the operating area, safety measures are only performed on the accompanying stop equipment side in the accompanying stop area; PT-YX:YX safety measures rule indicates that for the loop topology connection relationship between the parking area and the operating area, safety measures are only implemented on the operating equipment side of the operating area.

5. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant's secondary system according to claim 4, characterized in that, The secondary circuits are classified as follows: DC power supply circuit, AC power supply circuit, AC current circuit, AC current circuit winding grounding terminal related circuit, AC voltage circuit, DC current circuit, DC voltage circuit, hard pressure plate related circuit, functional soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE transmitting soft pressure plate related circuit, GOOSE receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, SV receiving soft pressure plate related circuit, fiber optic circuit, longitudinal differential channel, input circuit, output circuit, remote control circuit, trip circuit, closing circuit, failure circuit, negative pressure interlocking circuit, functional interlocking circuit, overload start-up cooling circuit, signal circuit, and time synchronization related circuit.

6. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on the digital model of the secondary system of a power plant, as described in claim 4, is characterized in that... Each safety measure rule in each of the aforementioned secondary loop classifications includes the following rule information: The specific secondary circuit selected in the corresponding secondary circuit category is then located within that secondary circuit, where the safety measures device object that needs to be implemented is found. The non-instantiated safety measure execution point corresponding to the safety measure device object, as well as the corresponding safety measure operation actions and their priorities. Among them, the safety measures equipment objects are secondary equipment or components, and the safety measures execution points include one or more of terminals, circuit breakers, soft pressure plates, hard pressure plates, and optical fibers; The rules for finding the associated information of safety measure execution points include the interval name, cabinet number, cabinet name, device number, device name, associated terminal block number, associated terminal number, associated cable number, associated cable core number, external circuit cable core number, external circuit function description, external circuit number, internal circuit number, internal circuit function description, associated soft pressure plate name, associated hard pressure plate number, associated hard pressure plate name, associated circuit breaker number, associated circuit breaker name, and associated optical port number.

7. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant secondary system according to claim 6, characterized in that, Step 5 specifically includes the following steps: Step 5.1: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all loops in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into different types; Step 5.2: Based on the Ancuo logic knowledge base, classify all equipment in the digital model of the plant's secondary system into maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment; Step 5.3: Based on the set of equipment topology relationship models in the Ancuo logic knowledge base, generate JX-PT topology connections, JX-YX topology connections, and PT-JX topology connections for the maintenance equipment, shutdown equipment, and operating equipment divided in the digital model of the plant's secondary system; Step 5.4 Based on the secondary circuit classification in the Ancuo logic knowledge base and the interval in the cabinet information obtained in Step 4, locate the associated secondary cabinets and secondary equipment in the digital model of the plant secondary system according to the corresponding secondary circuit classification. Step 5.5: For each secondary loop category corresponding to the interval, according to the order of the secondary loop categories in the safety management logic knowledge base, the loops of each secondary loop category are selected according to the corresponding safety management rules, and the corresponding instantiated safety management execution points are selected. Step 5.6: Based on the implementation points of safety measures, find related information and combine the safety measure implementation point information and the related information of safety measure implementation points to form a safety measure implementation point dataset; Step 5.7: For each secondary loop classification, based on the sequential requirements of safety operation actions in the safety operation logic knowledge base, generate an instantiated safety entry sequence from the corresponding safety execution point datasets and corresponding safety operation actions. Step 5.8: Display the instantiated safety measure entry sequence corresponding to all secondary circuit categories in the current interval according to three levels: stage division information, cabinet information, and safety measure entry, and output the reference safety measure ticket.

8. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant secondary system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 6 specifically includes the following steps: Step 6.1: Perform cosine similarity calculation on the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket and the stage division information in the reference safety measure ticket generated in Step 5, and match the stage information; determine whether the stage division information in the structured data of the actual safety measure ticket is missing, whether the stages are redundant, and whether the stage order and the description of the stage division information are standardized. Step 6.2: For information segmented in the same stage, calculate the cosine similarity based on the cabinet type name, and match the cabinet information according to the cabinet number matching; determine whether the cabinet information is missing, whether the cabinet information is redundant, and whether the order of the cabinet information and the cabinet name are standardized. Step 6.3: For the same cabinet information, for each safety measure item, based on whether all safety measure execution point information and safety measure operation actions are completely identical, perform safety measure item pairing and judgment: whether safety measure execution points are redundant, whether safety measure execution points are missing, whether safety measure operation actions are correct, and whether the order of safety measure execution points is correct.

9. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant secondary system according to claim 8, characterized in that, Step 6.2 involves pairing the cabinet information, specifically as follows: For screen cabinet information with a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket, the screen cabinet number is matched with the corresponding screen cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket. For screen cabinet information without a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket, the screen cabinet type name is extracted, and the cosine similarity calculation method is used to evaluate the text matching degree between the screen cabinet type name in the reference safety ticket and the screen cabinet type name in the structured data of the actual safety ticket, thereby achieving the matching of screen cabinet information without a screen cabinet number in the reference safety ticket with screen cabinet information in the structured data of the actual safety ticket.

10. The method for parsing and verifying safety tickets based on a digital model of a plant secondary system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 6 also includes the following operations: Output a visual verification report, which marks all discrepancies and abnormal safety measures, provides descriptions of the discrepancy type and location, and offers targeted correction suggestions and operational guidance based on the safety measure logic knowledge base.

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