Method and system for realizing safe management and whole-process trusted method based on double-cycle trusted verification

Abstract

The application provides a kind of based on double cycle trusted verification implementation security control and whole process trusted method and system, by responding to trigger computing node execution service, execute inner loop trusted verification, through the way of USBKEY+BIOS trusted enhancement, realize the whole life cycle dynamic trusted verification of computer node from device start to service operation;On the basis of completing inner loop trusted verification of node, execute outer loop trusted verification, including by security control center to the computing node that passes through inner loop trusted verification is authenticated, and according to node trusted state, issue the security policy corresponding to service to computing node;Control computing node executes security policy in the process of executing service, and the dynamic trusted information when service execution is fed back to security control center, to maintain the trusted and controllable of service whole process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of cyberspace security and trusted computing technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for achieving security control and end-to-end trust based on dual-loop trusted verification. Background Technology

[0002] In today's digital age, railway passenger ticketing network systems face increasingly complex and diverse security threats and potential risks, such as information leaks, which may lead to criminals obtaining passengers' personal privacy and travel information; weak passwords, which make accounts easy to crack and increase the risk of system intrusion; SQL injection attacks, which can maliciously tamper with database data and affect the normal operation of the ticketing system; unauthorized access and unauthorized access may result in illegal viewing and manipulation of data; and brute-force login attempts to obtain legitimate user privileges through brute-force methods.

[0003] Cybersecurity is currently facing dual threats from both internal and external sources. Traditional security defense systems, based on the core concept of "boundary protection + static rules," have fundamental flaws: First, they are unable to defend against internal attacks such as malicious operations and abuse of privileges by internal personnel; second, they lack dynamic awareness of covert attacks such as advanced persistent threats (APTs), allowing attackers to move freely laterally after breaching the boundary; and third, security policies are disconnected from business processes, creating a governance problem of "security and business operating on separate skins."

[0004] Trusted computing technology improves system security to some extent by introducing hardware-level roots of trust (such as TPM and TPCM chips) to build trust chains. However, it has significant shortcomings in practical applications: 1. Single-machine trust silos: Existing TPM / TPCM solutions build trust systems around single machines, with each device's trust chain operating independently. This lack of a network-wide collaborative verification mechanism makes it impossible to build a unified trust system across nodes or form a unified network-wide trust domain, hindering the collaborative protection needs of distributed network environments. 2. Incomplete verification coverage: Traditional trust chains only cover static measurements during system startup, stopping at this stage and lacking dynamic verification capabilities during runtime. This includes a lack of continuous verification of application states and user behavior during runtime, making them vulnerable to new threats such as runtime memory attacks and failing to guarantee the continuous trustworthiness of application operations and user behavior. 3. Insufficient offline adaptability: Most solutions rely on network connections for authentication, making trusted verification and authorization impossible in offline scenarios, impacting business continuity. 4. Low business coupling: Insufficient linkage between trusted state and access control policies prevents dynamic adjustment of business permissions based on real-time trust levels, causing security protection to lag behind business operations. 5. Security and business processes are disconnected: Security policies are separated from business processes, making it impossible to implement precise access control based on real-time trusted status, which restricts the secure flow of data elements.

[0005] To address the aforementioned issues, existing technologies urgently need improvement. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this application is to provide a method and system for security control and end-to-end trust based on dual-loop trusted verification. It has the advantages of breaking down trust silos on single machines and building a unified trusted system across the network with the security control center as the root node; realizing dynamic trusted verification throughout the entire lifecycle from device startup to business operation, covering environment, application and user dimensions; and establishing a dynamic linkage mechanism between trusted status and business permissions to achieve deep coupling between security and business.

[0007] Firstly, this application provides a method for achieving security control and end-to-end trust based on dual-loop trusted verification, used for trusted verification of computing nodes and security control centers, including:

[0008] In response to triggering the execution of services by the computing node, an inner loop trusted verification is performed; the inner loop trusted verification includes dynamic trusted verification of the computing node's environment from startup to service operation based on the USBKEY and the trusted enhanced BIOS, so as to establish the node's trusted state;

[0009] Performing outer loop trusted verification includes the security control center authenticating the identity of the computing node that has passed the inner loop trusted verification, and issuing the security policy corresponding to the service to the computing node according to the trusted status of the node;

[0010] The system controls the computing nodes to execute the security policy during business operations and feeds back dynamic trust information during business execution to the security management center to maintain the trust and control of the entire business process.

[0011] Furthermore, the execution of the inner loop trusted verification includes:

[0012] Perform trusted USB key availability and matching checks to achieve trusted USB key detection;

[0013] Verify the PIN code entered by the user to confirm the legitimacy of the user's identity and achieve user authentication;

[0014] Perform integrity verification on the operating system kernel file to achieve operating system kernel file verification;

[0015] By comparing the baseline values ​​in the list configuration file, the integrity of critical operating system files is verified, thus realizing the verification of the integrity of the verification table and files.

[0016] After the trusted verification is passed during the startup phase of the above-mentioned node system, the operating system is loaded;

[0017] During the operation of the operating system, executable files and behaviors are dynamically measured and monitored to achieve trusted dynamic verification of applications.

[0018] Furthermore, the process of performing trusted USB key availability detection and matching detection to achieve trusted USB key detection includes:

[0019] The loaded USBKEY driver detects whether the USBKEY is inserted and whether its status is normal and usable. If it is not usable, the startup process is terminated.

[0020] Verify that the signature stored in the USBKEY matches the signature saved on the hard drive of the current compute node. If they do not match, terminate the startup process.

[0021] Furthermore, the dynamic measurement and monitoring of executable files and behaviors during the operation of the operating system to achieve trusted dynamic verification of the application includes:

[0022] After the operating system starts, the process monitoring system works in conjunction with the trusted software base. When an executable file or script is called, it calculates its actual hash value and compares it with the valid hash value in the trusted software base to obtain a dynamic measurement result. If the comparison is successful, the executable file or script is allowed to be loaded and executed.

[0023] During the execution of an executable file or script, its behavior information is continuously monitored and judged, and the behavior information is matched with a preset security policy to identify unauthorized behavior; the behavior information includes system call events, network connection events, and file access events;

[0024] The dynamic measurement results and behavioral information are encrypted and written into the security log, and then reported to the security control center to maintain the continuous trust and controllability of applications and behaviors during the operation of the operating system.

[0025] Furthermore, the execution of the outer loop trusted verification includes:

[0026] System initialization and global root of trust establishment: The security management center loads the hardware cryptography and calls the national cryptographic service to generate root certificate key pairs, and initializes the global policy library and trust chain database to establish the global root of trust for the entire system;

[0027] Trusted authentication of network nodes: For new devices accessing the trusted network, the security management center verifies the authenticity of the device credentials and issues a device certificate. Then, before each session, a two-way certificate authentication mechanism is used to complete the mutual trust verification between the device and the security management center.

[0028] Policy generation and distribution: After successful device trusted authentication, the security management center generates a device-level security policy based on the device identity, real-time trusted status and security policy library, signs it to ensure its integrity, and then distributes it to the trusted security agent for execution;

[0029] Application dynamic monitoring: The trusted security agent calls the security and trusted policy library to continuously collect system behavior, perform dynamic measurement and compare it with the policy, so as to block and report abnormal behavior;

[0030] Log database traceability and retention: The log database records authentication, policy, and behavior log information across the entire network, and provides a visual interface to centrally display device trust status, security posture, and alarm events, supporting the tracing and auditing analysis of security events.

[0031] Furthermore, the trusted authentication of network nodes also includes:

[0032] Based on the device corresponding to the computing node, a registration request is sent to the security management center. After verifying its credentials, the security management center issues a device digital certificate.

[0033] Before the device connects to the network, it undergoes two-way authentication with the security management center based on random numbers and digital certificates to ensure the trustworthiness of both parties' identities.

[0034] Furthermore, the application dynamic monitoring also includes:

[0035] Based on the trusted security agent, system calls and network access behaviors are continuously collected and compared with the benchmark values ​​in the security and trusted policy library.

[0036] When abnormal or illegal behavior is detected, the trusted security agent blocks it locally and reports it to the security control center;

[0037] The trusted security agent receives and executes access control decisions issued by the security management center.

[0038] Secondly, a security management and end-to-end trust system based on dual-loop trusted verification is proposed for trusted verification of computing nodes and security management centers, including:

[0039] The inner loop trusted verification module is used to perform inner loop trusted verification in response to the triggering of the computing node to execute business; the inner loop trusted verification includes dynamic trusted verification of the computing node's environment from startup to business operation based on USBKEY and Trust Enhanced BIOS, so as to establish the node's trusted state;

[0040] The outer loop trusted verification module performs outer loop trusted verification, including the security control center authenticating the computing node that has passed the inner loop trusted verification, and issuing a security policy corresponding to the service to the computing node based on the trusted status of the node.

[0041] The control and feedback module is used to control the computing nodes to execute the security policy during the execution of business operations, and to feed back dynamic trust information during business execution to the security management center in order to maintain the trust and controllability of the entire business process.

[0042] Thirdly, a trusted diffusion outer loop system for network nodes based on a security management center is proposed. This system includes a security management center, a secure transmission platform, a trusted security proxy, a security policy library, and a log database; wherein:

[0043] The security control center is used to generate system root certificates based on hardware cryptographic modules; receive registration requests from network computing nodes, verify their credentials and issue device digital certificates for them; and perform two-way certificate authentication with the trusted security agent through the secure transmission platform before establishing a connection with the network computing node.

[0044] A secure transmission platform is used to establish an end-to-end encrypted communication link between the security control center and the trusted security agent based on national cryptographic algorithms; after two-way certificate authentication is completed, a session key is dynamically generated to ensure the independence and forward security of the communication.

[0045] A trusted security agent is used to monitor the runtime behavior of the network computing nodes it resides in, collect security metrics and report them to the security management center through the secure transmission platform; receive and verify security policies issued by the security management center, and perform access control, process isolation and file permission management operations locally; when it detects behavior that deviates from the security baseline, it performs local blocking and reports it.

[0046] The security policy library is used to store and manage security policy rules, including integrity metric baselines, mandatory access control rules, and abnormal behavior response mechanisms.

[0047] The log database is used to record device certificates, trust status, authentication logs, and policy execution logs, and provides a visual display of the overall network trust status and security posture.

[0048] Fourthly, a trusted inner-loop trust chain diffusion system based on a USB key is also proposed. This system includes a USB key and BIOS module, a USB key driver, a boot authentication module, a trusted boot module, and a runtime monitoring module; wherein:

[0049] The USBKEY and BIOS module is used to form the hardware root of trust together with the trusted enhanced BIOS, wherein the BIOS is set as a trusted measurement root, and the USBKEY is set as a trusted reporting root and a trusted storage root;

[0050] The USBKEY driver is used to encapsulate the interface for interacting with the USBKEY (100) and to provide call support for other modules, including the real-mode driver that works in the early stage of system startup and the operating system environment driver that works after the operating system is loaded.

[0051] The power-on authentication module is used to verify the PIN code entered by the user and perform two-way authentication with the USBKEY, and allow the system to start after successful authentication;

[0052] The trusted boot module is used to call the USBKEY to perform integrity measurement on the system kernel file and key components before loading the operating system kernel, and compare the measurement result with the baseline value stored in the USBKEY. The operating system will only continue to be loaded after the verification is passed.

[0053] The monitoring module is used to generate an integrity benchmark library for critical system processes after the system's first trusted boot and to sign it using the certificate of the USBKEY; during system operation, it continuously monitors the integrity of critical processes and compares them with the integrity benchmark library.

[0054] As can be seen from the above, the method and system for achieving security control and end-to-end trust based on dual-loop trusted verification provided in this application take trusted verification as the central hub and a trusted USBKEY and security control center as support. Through an innovative dual-trust chain diffusion mechanism of "outer loop" and "inner loop", it aims to break down the trust silos of single machines and build a unified trusted system covering all nodes in the network with the security control center as the root of trust. It adopts the USBKEY+BIOS trusted enhancement method to realize dynamic trusted verification of computer nodes throughout the entire lifecycle from device startup to business operation, ensuring the continuous trust of the operating environment, application operation, and user behavior. It achieves deep coupling between security and business, implements precise access control and security policy execution based on real-time trusted status, and ultimately achieves the goal of end-to-end trust in business and manageable and controllable security. Attached Figure Description

[0055] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0056] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a security control and end-to-end trusted system based on dual-loop trusted verification disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 2This is a flowchart of the steps of the security control and end-to-end trust method based on dual-loop trusted verification disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the trusted inner loop trust chain diffusion system disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the inner loop trusted verification method disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0060] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of the steps for external loop trusted verification disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 6 This is a flowchart of the outer loop trust chain diffusion handling process disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0062] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the network trusted extension outer loop system structure based on the security management center disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0063] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a trusted inner-loop trust chain diffusion system architecture based on USBKEY disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0064] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which these embodiments belong; the terminology used herein and in the specification of the application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit these embodiments; the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, in the specification of these embodiments and the foregoing drawings, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. The terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification of these embodiments and the foregoing drawings are used to distinguish different objects, not to describe a particular order.

[0065] The implementation details of the technical solution in this embodiment are described in detail below:

[0066] like Figure 1The diagram illustrates the dual-loop trusted verification architecture of this embodiment. It establishes trust in local computing nodes through an "internal node loop" and trust in global network devices through an "external network loop," ultimately achieving end-to-end trust for services through "dual-loop collaboration." Using a USBKey and BIOS as the root of trust, startup metrics are first performed on the computing nodes. Subsequently, during operating system operation, process monitoring and trusted software continuously perform executable file hash verification and behavior monitoring, forming an internal loop of "metric-compare-block-record" within the node. Simultaneously, each node encrypts and reports the dynamic metric results to the security control center. After analysis, the center uniformly distributes policies, achieving cross-node policy synchronization and trust chain diffusion, forming the external network loop. This establishes end-to-end trust and security control from startup to operation, and from a single point to the entire network.

[0067] This embodiment proposes a method for achieving security control and end-to-end trust based on dual-loop trusted verification, used for trusted verification of computing nodes and security control centers, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the method includes:

[0068] S201, in response to triggering the computing node to execute services, perform inner loop trusted verification; the inner loop trusted verification includes dynamic trusted verification of the computing node's environment from startup to service operation based on USBKEY and Trusted Enhanced BIOS, so as to establish the node's trusted state;

[0069] S202, Perform outer loop trusted verification, including the security control center authenticating the identity of the computing node that has passed the inner loop trusted verification, and issuing the security policy corresponding to the service to the computing node according to the trusted status of the node;

[0070] S203, control the computing node to execute the security policy during the execution of business, and feed back the dynamic trust information during business execution to the security management center to maintain the trust and control of the entire business process.

[0071] Specifically, in this embodiment, in step S201, when the computing node is triggered to execute a service, an inner loop trusted verification is performed. The purpose of the inner loop is to ensure the trustworthiness of the operating environment of a single computing node, from the underlying hardware to the upper-layer applications. Its core is to enhance trust by using an external card and combining it with a trusted upgrade of the motherboard BIOS. A USBKEY with trusted verification functionality replaces the TPM, and the USBKEY + BIOS serves as the root of trust. Based on this, the security and trustworthiness of the entire computing environment are further extended through boot authentication, trusted boot, trusted software base, and supporting systems.

[0072] like Figure 3The diagram shown is a flowchart of the trusted inner loop trust chain diffusion system in this embodiment. Its core is that when the operating system is booted via GRUB, a boot authentication and integrity measurement process is incorporated into the startup process, effectively constructing a complete and uninterrupted trust chain from the root of trust (USBKEY) to the loading of the operating system. This ensures the security and trustworthiness of the system startup. Furthermore, the trusted dynamic verification of applications is achieved through a software trusted base, thus completing the transmission and expansion of the entire inner loop trust chain.

[0073] Furthermore, the method for performing inner loop trust verification in this embodiment is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, it includes:

[0074] S401 performs trusted USBKEY availability and matching checks to achieve trusted USBKEY detection.

[0075] Furthermore, the trusted USBKEY availability detection and matching detection are performed to achieve trusted USBKEY detection, including: detecting whether the USBKEY has been inserted and whether its status is normal and usable through the loaded USBKEY driver; if it is unavailable, the startup is terminated; verifying whether the signature stored in the USBKEY matches the signature saved on the hard disk of the current computing node; if they do not match, the startup is terminated.

[0076] Specifically, in this embodiment, upon system startup, the BIOS power-on self-test (completing basic hardware self-test) is performed first; then, the USBKEY driver is loaded to provide program support for USBKEY authentication. The verification function in the driver checks whether the USBKEY is inserted and confirms its normal and usable status. If any abnormality occurs, such as the USBKEY not being inserted or the inserted USBKEY failing to read data, the startup process will be immediately terminated.

[0077] After the USB key insertion detection and verification pass, the system checks the signature stored on the hard drive to verify whether the USB key matches the current computer. If they do not match, it indicates that the USB key is not software-bound to the computer and is not its trusted extension module. Ultimately, an error message is displayed and the computer is shut down (handled in conjunction with other error branches), ending the process.

[0078] S402, verify the PIN code entered by the user to confirm the legitimacy of the user's identity and realize user identity authentication;

[0079] Specifically, in this embodiment, after the USBKEY matching test, user authentication will be performed, and the system will prompt the user to enter a PIN code to log in to the operating system. If the entered PIN code is incorrect, the system will determine the remaining number of incorrect attempts. After the maximum number of incorrect attempts is reached, the system will report an error and lock the USBKEY, terminating the startup process; if the maximum number of attempts has not been reached, the user will be prompted to re-enter the PIN code until verification is successful or the USBKEY is locked.

[0080] S403 performs integrity verification on the operating system kernel file, thus enabling operating system kernel file verification.

[0081] Specifically, in this embodiment, the system verifies the legitimacy of the "operating system kernel file" (whether it meets the trust standard): if the verification fails, an error is displayed and the computer is shut down (handled in the same way as other error branches), and the process ends; if the verification passes, the "read list configuration file" is executed to obtain the list of files to be verified and the rules.

[0082] S404 verifies the integrity of critical operating system files by comparing them with baseline values ​​in the list configuration file, thus verifying the integrity of the verification table and files.

[0083] Specifically, in this embodiment, the verification table correctness is verified by comparing the read list configuration file with the baseline value of the trusted list configuration file pre-stored in the trusted software base of the USBKEY to determine whether the "verification table is correct". If the verification table indicates an error and the computer is shut down (handled in the same way as other error branches), the process ends; if it is correct, proceed to the next step to verify the "file integrity in the verification table".

[0084] File integrity verification: This involves calculating the hash value of the corresponding file in the read list configuration file and comparing it with the hash value pre-stored in the trusted list configuration file in the trusted software base of the USBKEY. If the file integrity verification fails, an error message is displayed and the computer is shut down (handled in the same way as other error branches), ending the process; if it succeeds, proceed to the next step.

[0085] S405: After the trusted verification is passed during the startup phase of the above-mentioned node system, the operating system is loaded.

[0086] Specifically, in this embodiment, after the above verification is passed, the inner loop completes the trusted verification of the system startup phase, the system loads the operating system normally, and the process enters the trusted verification phase of the application.

[0087] S406, During the operation of the operating system, the executable file and behavior are dynamically measured and monitored to achieve trusted dynamic verification of the application.

[0088] Furthermore, the dynamic measurement and monitoring of executable files and behaviors during the operation of the operating system to achieve application trust dynamic verification includes: after the operating system starts, the process monitoring system and the trusted software base work together to calculate the actual hash value of the executable file or script when it is called and compare it with the legitimate hash value in the trusted software base to obtain a dynamic measurement result; if the comparison is successful, the executable file or script is allowed to be loaded and executed; during the execution of the executable file or script, its behavior information is continuously monitored and judged, and the behavior information is matched with the preset security policy to identify unauthorized behavior; the behavior information includes system call events, network connection events, and file access events; the dynamic measurement result and behavior information are encrypted and written into the security log and reported to the security management center to maintain the continuous trust and controllability of applications and behaviors during the operation of the operating system.

[0089] Specifically, in this embodiment, after the operating system starts, dynamic measurement is the continuation and diffusion of the trust chain during the operation of the operating system. It is mainly executed by the process monitoring system in conjunction with the trusted software base, verifying the hash values ​​of all executable files and scripts to be loaded, and monitoring behaviors such as system calls, network connections, and file access. Finally, this dynamic information is recorded in the security log, ensuring the continuous trustworthiness of applications and behaviors.

[0090] Executable file / script metrics: When an application (such as ls, java) or script is invoked for execution, the process monitoring system intercepts the execution request, calculates the hash value of the executable file, and compares it with the legitimate hash values ​​stored in the trusted software base. Only after successful verification is the executable file allowed to load and execute. Simultaneously, pre-load metrics are performed on the application's dependent configuration files and startup scripts to prevent malicious tampering of the configuration.

[0091] Behavioral Monitoring: For dynamic metrics, the process monitoring system will monitor application behavior, including system calls, network connections, and file access. For system call monitoring, it will monitor system calls initiated by the application (such as file operations and process creation) to determine if the behavior complies with security policies. For network connection monitoring, it will record and analyze the process's network connection behavior to determine if it connects to unauthorized addresses or ports. For file access monitoring, it will monitor the software application's access to critical system files and sensitive data.

[0092] Security log generation: The process monitoring system encrypts the hash values ​​of all metrics, system behavior events (including success, failure, and exception), and related context information and records them in the security log, and sends them to the security management center for analysis, evidence collection, and policy decision-making.

[0093] The aforementioned trusted inner loop runs through the entire lifecycle of a computer node, from hardware to application, ensuring that even during operation, the node's execution environment is under continuous monitoring and verification, thus realizing the complete diffusion of the trust chain from static startup to dynamic maintenance.

[0094] Furthermore, such as Figure 5 The diagram shown is a flowchart of the outer loop trust verification process in this embodiment. The outer loop trust verification process includes:

[0095] S501, System Initialization and Global Trust Root Establishment: The security management center loads the hardware cryptography and calls the national cryptographic service to generate the root certificate key pair, and initializes the global policy library and trust chain database to establish the global trust root of the entire system;

[0096] S502, Trusted Authentication of Network Nodes: For new devices accessing a trusted network, the security management center verifies the authenticity of the device credentials and issues a device certificate. Subsequently, before each session, a two-way certificate authentication mechanism is used to complete the mutual trust verification between the device and the security management center.

[0097] S503, Policy Generation and Distribution: After successful trusted authentication of the device, the security management center generates a device-level security policy based on the device identity, real-time trusted status and security policy library, signs it to ensure its integrity, and then distributes it to the trusted security agent for execution.

[0098] S504, Application Dynamic Monitoring: The trusted security agent calls the security and trusted policy library to continuously collect system behavior, perform dynamic measurement and compare it with the policy, and realize the blocking and reporting of abnormal behavior.

[0099] S505, Log Database Tracing and Retention: The log database records authentication, policy, and behavior log information across the entire network, providing a visual interface to centrally display device trust status, security posture, and alarm events, and supporting the tracing and auditing analysis of security events.

[0100] Furthermore, the trusted authentication of network nodes also includes: sending a registration request to the security management center based on the device corresponding to the computing node; the security management center issuing a device digital certificate after verifying its credentials; and conducting two-way authentication with the security management center based on random numbers and digital certificates before the device accesses the network to ensure the trustworthiness of both parties' identities.

[0101] Furthermore, the application dynamic monitoring also includes: continuously collecting system calls and network access behaviors based on the trusted security agent, and comparing and measuring them with benchmark values ​​in the trusted security policy library; when abnormal or illegal behavior is detected, the trusted security agent blocks it locally and reports it to the security control center; and the trusted security agent receives and executes access control decisions issued by the security control center.

[0102] Specifically, in this embodiment, the outer loop trust chain diffusion uses the security control center as the global root of trust and employs a two-way certificate authentication mechanism to diffuse trust to all network devices. The outer loop trust chain diffusion process is as follows: Figure 6 As shown.

[0103] First, system initialization and establishment of the global root of trust. This step aims to determine the root of trust for the entire system by initializing the root of trust in the security management center and the parameters of the SQY20 cryptosystem. Specific steps include: powering on the security management center and starting its built-in hardware cryptographic module; calling the SQY20 service to generate a key pair for the root certificate (Root CA) based on the root seed; initializing the global policy library and log database; and the security management center completing a self-check, confirming its own trustworthiness and becoming the global root of trust.

[0104] Second, trusted network node authentication. The purpose of trusted network node authentication is to securely extend the trust of the security control center to every device in the network. This is achieved through two-way certificate authentication.

[0105] (1) Device Registration and Certificate Issuance: To ensure the security of the computing network, any device (compute node or network device) must register with the security management center before accessing the network. First, the device sends a registration request to the security management center, which includes its TPCM endorsement certificate and public key. After verifying the authenticity of the endorsement certificate, the security management center issues a digital certificate for the device using its root private key. At the same time as issuing the device certificate to the device, the device is recorded in the log database and its status is marked as "registered".

[0106] (2) Two-way authentication: Before each attempt to access the network or establish a secure session, the device must complete a two-way authentication with the security management center. First, the device sends a connection request to the security management center, containing a random number Nonce_C. Then, the security management center sends its own certificate and a new random number Nonce_S to the device. After receiving the certificate from the security management center, the device verifies its signature and encrypts the random number (Nonce_C+Nonce_S) using the public key in the security management center to obtain ciphertext C1, and sends it along with its own device certificate to the security management center. After receiving the ciphertext and the device certificate, the security management center first verifies the device certificate, and at the same time decrypts the ciphertext C1 using its own private key to obtain Nonce_C*+Nonce_S*. If Nonce_S* = Nonce_S, the device's identity is genuine and the authentication is successful.

[0107] Third, policy generation and distribution. After successful authentication between the device and the security management center, the security management center will generate and distribute trusted response policies. The specific sub-steps are as follows:

[0108] (1) Policy generation: The security management center will generate device-level security policies based on device identity, real-time trusted status and security policy library.

[0109] (2) Policy distribution: After generating the security policy, the security management center signs it to ensure its integrity, and distributes it to the trusted security agent using the session key to receive and load the policy.

[0110] Fourth, application dynamic monitoring. The trusted security agent will continuously monitor and dynamically process the application's trusted state, including the following sub-steps:

[0111] (1) Behavior monitoring: The trusted security agent continuously collects system behaviors, including system calls and network access, and continuously measures whether there are unauthorized or illegal actions by combining the trusted benchmark values ​​in the security and trusted policy library.

[0112] (2) Anomaly reporting: When the system behavior is abnormal or illegal, the trusted security agent will block the abnormal behavior and report it to the security management center for decision-making. At the same time, it will receive the comprehensive trust assessment and decision-making from the security management center.

[0113] (3) Enforce security policies: When the decision results are sent to the trusted security agent, it will perform specific control actions to allow or deny access at the local and network levels respectively.

[0114] Fifth, log database traceability and retention. The log database will record authentication, policy, and behavior logs from across the network, providing a visual interface to centrally display device trust status, security posture, and alarm events, supporting the tracing and auditing analysis of security events.

[0115] Secondly, a security management and end-to-end trust system based on dual-loop trusted verification is proposed for trusted verification of computing nodes and security management centers, including:

[0116] The inner loop trusted verification module is used to perform inner loop trusted verification in response to the triggering of the computing node to execute business; the inner loop trusted verification includes dynamic trusted verification of the computing node's environment from startup to business operation based on USBKEY and Trust Enhanced BIOS, so as to establish the node's trusted state;

[0117] The outer loop trusted verification module performs outer loop trusted verification, including the security control center authenticating the computing node that has passed the inner loop trusted verification, and issuing a security policy corresponding to the service to the computing node based on the trusted status of the node.

[0118] The control and feedback module is used to control the computing nodes to execute the security policy during the execution of business operations, and to feed back dynamic trust information during business execution to the security management center in order to maintain the trust and controllability of the entire business process.

[0119] Thirdly, a trusted diffusion outer loop system for network nodes based on a security management center is proposed. This system includes a security management center, a secure transmission platform, a trusted security proxy, a security policy library, and a log database; wherein:

[0120] The security control center is used to generate system root certificates based on hardware cryptographic modules; receive registration requests from network computing nodes, verify their credentials and issue device digital certificates for them; and perform two-way certificate authentication with the trusted security agent through the secure transmission platform before establishing a connection with the network computing node.

[0121] A secure transmission platform is used to establish an end-to-end encrypted communication link between the security control center and the trusted security agent based on national cryptographic algorithms; after two-way certificate authentication is completed, a session key is dynamically generated to ensure the independence and forward security of the communication.

[0122] A trusted security agent is used to monitor the runtime behavior of the network computing nodes it resides in, collect security metrics and report them to the security management center through the secure transmission platform; receive and verify security policies issued by the security management center, and perform access control, process isolation and file permission management operations locally; when it detects behavior that deviates from the security baseline, it performs local blocking and reports it.

[0123] The security policy library is used to store and manage security policy rules, including integrity metric baselines, mandatory access control rules, and abnormal behavior response mechanisms.

[0124] The log database is used to record device certificates, trust status, authentication logs, and policy execution logs, and provides a visual display of the overall network trust status and security posture.

[0125] Specifically, in this embodiment, as Figure 7 The diagram shows the architecture of the network trusted extension outer loop system based on the security management center in this embodiment. The system uses the security management center as the root of trust, the secure transmission platform as the foundation, and the security policy library as support. It employs two-way certificate authentication for network computing nodes to achieve the diffusion of the trusted chain in the computing network space. The system mainly consists of components such as the security management center, the security policy library, the secure transmission platform, the log database, and the trusted security proxy.

[0126] The security management center, acting as the system's global root of trust and command center, is responsible for the unified management, policy distribution, and dynamic decision-making of the entire trusted network. Its core functions include: generating root certificates based on the hardware-based national cryptographic module (SQY20) to ensure the trustworthiness of the entire system's starting point; receiving device registration requests, verifying the authenticity of their digital credentials, and issuing device digital certificates; performing two-way certificate authentication with devices before network access or session establishment to ensure mutual trust between devices and the security management center; and finally, generating and signing security policies based on device identity, internal loop measurement results, and the global policy library, and distributing them to network devices or terminal agents for execution.

[0127] The secure transmission platform: The secure transmission platform provides a secure communication framework that guarantees the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system, mainly including:

[0128] An end-to-end encrypted communication link is constructed based on national cryptographic algorithms to prevent data eavesdropping and tampering; and after two-way authentication is completed, a session key is dynamically generated to ensure the independence and forward security of each communication.

[0129] The Trusted Security Agent: The Trusted Security Agent is a software agent deployed on the terminal computing node, responsible for the construction and maintenance of the local trusted environment. Its functions include: monitoring application loading, system calls, network connections, file operations and other behaviors, collecting and reporting metrics in real time; receiving and verifying the issued security policies, performing network access control, process isolation, file permission management and other operations locally, and blocking and reporting to the security management center when deviating from the baseline behavior is detected locally.

[0130] The security and trust policy library is a core database that stores and manages all security policy rules. It contains a systematic security solution, which includes baseline values ​​(such as expected hash values) for integrity measurement of system bootloaders, critical applications and sensitive data, permission rules for mandatory access control, and response mechanisms (such as alarms, blocking or recovery) for abnormal behavior.

[0131] The log database records the certificates, public keys, registration time, most recent authentication time, and trust status (such as "registered", "authenticated", "suspicious", "revoked", etc.) of all registered devices. It also stores all authentication, policy distribution, and access decision logs and provides a visual interface to display the overall trust status and security posture of the network.

[0132] The dual-certificate authentication module is a core security component in the outer-loop trust chain diffusion process, responsible for achieving high-strength, two-way identity authentication between the security control center and access network devices. Based on public key infrastructure, this module uses national cryptographic algorithms to generate and verify digital certificates, ensuring the legitimacy and trustworthiness of both communicating parties.

[0133] Fourthly, a trusted inner-loop trust chain diffusion system based on a USB key is also proposed. This system includes a USB key and BIOS module, a USB key driver, a boot authentication module, a trusted boot module, and a runtime monitoring module; wherein:

[0134] The USBKEY and BIOS module is used to form the hardware root of trust together with the trusted enhanced BIOS, wherein the BIOS is set as a trusted measurement root, and the USBKEY is set as a trusted reporting root and a trusted storage root;

[0135] The USBKEY driver is used to encapsulate the interface for interacting with the USBKEY (100) and to provide call support for other modules, including the real-mode driver that works in the early stage of system startup and the operating system environment driver that works after the operating system is loaded.

[0136] The power-on authentication module is used to verify the PIN code entered by the user and perform two-way authentication with the USBKEY, and allow the system to start after successful authentication;

[0137] The trusted boot module is used to call the USBKEY to perform integrity measurement on the system kernel file and key components before loading the operating system kernel, and compare the measurement result with the baseline value stored in the USBKEY. The operating system will only continue to be loaded after the verification is passed.

[0138] The monitoring module is used to generate an integrity benchmark library for critical system processes after the system's first trusted boot and to sign it using the certificate of the USBKEY; during system operation, it continuously monitors the integrity of critical processes and compares them with the integrity benchmark library.

[0139] like Figure 8 The diagram illustrates the trusted inner-loop trust chain diffusion system architecture based on a USB key in this embodiment. This architecture innovatively uses a USB key to replace the traditional TPM (Trusted Platform Module), forming a more flexible and powerful root of trust in conjunction with the BIOS. Users verify their identity by entering a PIN code and successfully passing boot authentication. Subsequently, the trusted boot mechanism performs strict integrity checks on the system kernel file, ensuring that every step of the system startup process remains trustworthy, thus seamlessly extending the trust chain to every corner of the entire computer system.

[0140] The hardware root of trust consists of a USB key and a trust-enhanced BIOS. The BIOS acts as the root of trust measurement, while the USB key serves as the root of trust reporting and the root of trust storage. The USB key, acting as the root of trust, is a smart card with a USB interface, offering high security.

[0141] The overall architecture of the USBKEY consists of two core components: a smart card and a Flash CD-ROM area. The smart card has a built-in independent CPU and System-on-a-Chip (COS), capable of autonomously performing complex computational tasks including encryption, decryption, and digital signatures. This ensures that key information is always kept internal to the device, rather than exposed in computer memory, effectively preventing external attackers from directly stealing keys through the computer system. The COS not only regulates the information interaction process with the external environment but also manages the use of internal memory and directly processes various operation instructions within the device. The Flash CD-ROM area serves as the data storage carrier. The data within it is not directly accessible; it requires reading and writing through a specific interface program, enhancing data security. In this embodiment, this area is mainly used to store various critical files, including but not limited to the USBKEY driver, trusted boot authentication program, trusted bootloader, and pre-stored digest values. These files collectively support the secure boot, authentication process, and efficient operation of the USBKEY.

[0142] The USBKEY driver meticulously encapsulates all core interfaces for interacting with the USBKEY device, providing a convenient and secure calling method for other modules within the system. Based on different application scenarios, the USBKEY driver is cleverly divided into two main categories: real-mode drivers and operating system environment drivers. The former begins working during the initial boot phase of the system, directly calling through the BIOS interface to ensure a security defense is established at the lowest level of the system; while the latter is activated after the operating system kernel is successfully loaded and running, utilizing the operating system's internal USB protocol stack to communicate with the USBKEY, providing stable and efficient security support for advanced functions such as system process libraries and monitoring systems.

[0143] The enhanced BIOS employs a strategy of embedding GRUB (GRand Unified Bootloader) into the USB key as a bridge to boot the operating system. To achieve trusted boot, this embodiment has customized the GRUB source code, enabling GRUB to seamlessly integrate boot authentication and a trusted bootloader during the boot process. This ensures that every step from the trusted USB key to operating system loading is subject to strict security control. Specific modifications include the following:

[0144] Trusted boot functionality is integrated into GRUB's Stage2 main function. Before loading the system kernel, Stage2 invokes the trusted bootloader as a critical step. This program is responsible for performing integrity checks on the system kernel file, configuration files, and other critical system components. Only after these components pass integrity verification—confirming they have not been tampered with or corrupted—will GRUB continue execution and load the operating system. This mechanism effectively enhances the security of the system boot process, preventing potential security threats and malware intrusion.

[0145] The main purpose of the power-on authentication module is to verify the legitimacy of the user and the USB key device. It verifies the user's identity via a PIN code, while the USB key authenticates the computer; this dual verification ensures the user's legitimacy. The computer can only boot successfully if the correct USB key is inserted and the correct PIN code is entered.

[0146] The primary responsibility of the trusted boot module is to verify the integrity of the system kernel files, a crucial step in ensuring the system's core security. It employs a data integrity-based trust model, which simplifies the trust state to "trust" and "untrust," assuming that trust will not weaken or be lost during transmission. For efficient integrity verification, the module uses the domestically developed SM3 digest algorithm to calculate the digest value of the components to be loaded; this process is assisted by the real-mode driver on the USBKEY.

[0147] The Trusted Software Base, as a core component for the trusted inner loop trust extension delivery, collaborates with device drivers and other software infrastructure to ensure that upper-layer applications can efficiently utilize the rich trusted computing capabilities provided by the USBKEY, while also compensating for the USBKEY's limitations in computing and storage capabilities, thus jointly supporting the trusted computing needs of the entire platform. As an extension of the USBKEY, the Trusted Software Base provides upper-layer applications with an interface to access the USBKEY, not only supporting application access but also managing the USBKEY.

[0148] The trusted support subsystem starts running after the system core environment is ready (i.e., the kernel is loaded and all system processes are successfully initialized). Its main functions include:

[0149] (1) Ensure that the system follows a strict trusted boot process for secure loading and maintain the secure state of the system during operation. Specifically, it uses GRUB as a boot tool to integrate boot authentication and trusted boot functions, ensuring that the system follows a preset trust chain from the beginning of boot, and only allows the operating system to load after passing authentication and boot verification.

[0150] (2) Construct and maintain a system benchmark library. This library is not limited to integrity verification at startup, but also continuously monitors the integrity of each process during system operation. After the first trusted startup and initialization of all system processes, the subsystem captures a snapshot of the current state of these processes and uses the SM3 algorithm to generate a unique digest value based on the process name, path, and executable file, forming the system benchmark library. This benchmark library is then securely signed using the identity certificate of the USBKEY and uploaded to the security management platform by a trusted security agent for subsequent comparison and monitoring, thereby achieving comprehensive hardening of system security.

[0151] The process monitoring system employs a dual-process protection technology. This system operates while the operating system is running, its primary task being to monitor system processes and verify their integrity to prevent malicious tampering and ensure computer security. To ensure the monitoring process is always running, dual-process protection technology is used to prevent accidental termination. The monitoring and protection processes listen to each other; if one process is terminated, the other immediately takes measures to restore it.

[0152] The above description is merely an embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. A method for realizing secure management and full-process trusted verification based on double-cycle trusted verification, used for trusted verification of a computing node and a secure management center, characterized in that, Comprise: In response to triggering the computing node to perform the service, an inner loop trusted verification is performed; The inner loop trusted verification comprises dynamic trusted verification of the computing node from startup to service running by the USBKEY and the trusted enhanced BIOS to establish a node trusted state; An outer loop trusted verification is performed, comprising identity authentication of the computing node passing the inner loop trusted verification by the security management center, and according to the node trusted state, a security policy corresponding to the service is issued to the computing node; The security policy is controlled by the computing node in the process of executing the service, and the dynamic trusted information during the service execution is fed back to the security management center to maintain the trusted and controllable of the service throughout the process.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is implemented by a dual-cycle trusted verification to achieve security management and end-to-end trust. The inner loop trusted verification comprises: Performing trusted USBKEY availability detection and matching detection to realize trusted USBKEY detection; Verifying the PIN code input by the user to confirm the legality of the user identity to realize user identity authentication; Performing integrity check on the operating system kernel file to realize operating system kernel file verification; Verifying the integrity of the operating system key file by comparing the reference value of the list configuration file to realize verification table and file integrity check; After the above node system startup phase trusted verification passes, the operating system is loaded; During the operation of the operating system, executable files and behaviors are dynamically measured and monitored to realize application program trusted dynamic verification.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method is implemented by a dual-cycle trusted verification to achieve security management and full-cycle trustworthiness. The trusted USBKEY availability detection and matching detection realizes trusted USBKEY detection, comprising: Through the loaded USBKEY driver, it is detected whether the USBKEY has been inserted and whether the state is normal and available, and if not, the startup is terminated; Verify whether the signature stored in the USBKEY matches the signature saved in the current computing node hard disk, and if not, terminate the startup.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein the method is based on a dual-cycle trusted verification to achieve security management and end-to-end trust. During the operation of the operating system, executable files and behaviors are dynamically measured and monitored to realize application program trusted dynamic verification, comprising: After the operating system is started, the process monitoring system and the trusted software base work together to calculate the actual hash value of the executable file or script when it is called and compare it with the legal hash value in the trusted software base to obtain a dynamic measurement result; After the comparison passes, the executable file or script is allowed to load and execute; During the operation of the executable file or script, its behavior information is continuously monitored and judged, and the behavior information is matched with the preset security policy to identify unauthorized behavior; The behavior information includes system call events, network connection events and file access events; The dynamic measurement result and the behavior information are encrypted and written into a security log, and are reported to the security management center to maintain the continuous trusted and controllable of the application program and behavior during the operation of the operating system.

5. The dual-cycle based trusted verification implementation security management and end-to-end trusted method according to claim 1, wherein, The outer loop trusted verification comprises: System initialization and establishment of global trusted root: The security management center loads the hardware password and calls the national secret service to generate a root certificate key pair, initializes the global policy library and trust chain database, and establishes the global trusted root of the whole system; Network node trusted authentication: for accessing a trusted network new device, the security management center verifies the authenticity of the device certificate and issues a device certificate, and then completes the identity mutual trust verification between the device and the security management center before each session through a two-way certificate authentication mechanism; Policy generation and delivery: after the successful authentication of the device, the security management center generates the device-level security policy according to the device identity, real-time trusted state and security policy library, signs the policy to ensure its integrity, and then delivers it to the trusted security agent for execution; Application dynamic monitoring: the trusted security agent continuously collects system behavior and performs dynamic measurement by calling the security trusted policy library, and compares it with the policy to achieve abnormal behavior blocking and reporting; Log database trace retention: the log library records the authentication, policy, behavior log information of the whole network, provides a visual interface to display the device trust state, security situation and alarm events, and supports security event tracing and audit analysis.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the method is based on a dual-cycle trusted verification to achieve security management and end-to-end trust. The network node trusted authentication further comprises: Based on the device corresponding to the computing node, a registration request is sent to the security management center, and the security management center verifies the certificate and issues a device digital certificate for it; Before the device accesses the network, two-way authentication based on random numbers and digital certificates is performed with the security management center to ensure the identity of both parties.

7. The dual-cycle based trusted verification implementation security management and end-to-end trusted method according to claim 5, wherein, The application dynamic monitoring further comprises: Based on the trusted security agent, system calls and network access behaviors are continuously collected and compared with the benchmark values in the security trusted policy library; When abnormal or illegal behavior is detected, the trusted security agent performs local blocking and reports to the security management center; Based on the trusted security agent, the access control decisions issued by the security management center are received and executed.

8. A secure management and trusted system based on double-cycle trusted verification for trusted verification of computing nodes and secure management centers, characterized in that, It includes: An inner loop trusted verification module for performing inner loop trusted verification in response to triggering the computing node to perform a business; The inner loop trusted verification includes dynamic trusted verification of the environment of the computing node from startup to business operation based on USBKEY and trusted enhanced BIOS to establish a node trusted state; An outer loop trusted verification module performs outer loop trusted verification, including identity authentication of the computing node passing the inner loop trusted verification by the security management center, and issuing a security policy corresponding to the business to the computing node according to the node trusted state; A control and feedback module for controlling the computing node to execute the security policy during the execution of the business, and feeding back dynamic trusted information during the execution of the business to the security management center to maintain the trust and controllability of the business throughout the process. 9.A network node trusted diffusion outer loop system based on a security management center, characterized in that, The system includes a security management center, a secure transmission platform, a trusted security agent, a security policy library and a log database; wherein: The security management center is used for generating a system root certificate based on a hardware password module; receiving a registration request of a network computing node, verifying its certificate and issuing a device digital certificate for it; before establishing a connection with the network computing node, performing two-way certificate authentication with the trusted security agent through the secure transmission platform; A secure transmission platform is configured to establish an end-to-end encrypted communication link between the secure management center and the trusted security agent based on a national cryptographic algorithm; after two-way certificate authentication is completed, a session key is dynamically generated to ensure independence and forward security of the communication; The trusted security agent is configured to monitor runtime behavior of a network computing node where the trusted security agent is located, collect security metric values, and report the security metric values to the secure management center through the secure transmission platform; receive and verify a security policy issued from the secure management center, and perform local access control, process isolation, and file permission management operations; when a behavior deviating from a security baseline is detected, perform local blocking and reporting; A security policy library is configured to store and manage security policy rules, including integrity metric baseline values, mandatory access control rules, and abnormal behavior response mechanisms; A log database is configured to record device certificates, trust states, authentication logs, and policy execution logs, and provide visual display of a network-wide trust state and security posture.

10. A USBKEY-based trusted inner loop trust chain propagation system, characterized in that, The system includes a USBKEY and BIOS module, a USBKEY driver, a startup authentication module, a trusted boot module, and a runtime monitoring module; wherein: The USBKEY and BIOS module is configured to jointly constitute a hardware trusted root with the USBKEY and a trusted enhanced BIOS, wherein the BIOS is set as a trusted measurement root, and the USBKEY is set as a trusted reporting root and a trusted storage root; The USBKEY driver is configured to encapsulate an interface for interacting with the USBKEY, and provide calling support for other modules, including a real mode driver working at the initial stage of system startup and an operating system environment driver working after the operating system is loaded; The startup authentication module is configured to verify a PIN code input by a user and perform two-way authentication with the USBKEY, and allow system startup after the authentication is passed; The trusted boot module is configured to, before loading an operating system kernel, call the USBKEY to perform integrity measurement on system kernel files and key components, and compare the measurement result with a baseline value stored in the USBKEY, and only continue to load the operating system after verification is passed; The runtime monitoring module is configured to, after the system is first trusted to start, generate an integrity baseline library of system key processes, and sign the integrity baseline library using a certificate of the USBKEY; during system runtime, continuously monitor integrity of the key processes, and compare the integrity with the integrity baseline library.

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