A passive anti-disassembly and anti-cheating device, method and electronic scale

Abstract

This application provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, method, and electronic scale, belonging to the field of metrology and anti-counterfeiting technology. The invention includes a lever mechanism for amplifying pressure to pierce a chip module with a pressure pin; a pull rod for pressing a position switch, which in turn activates the lever mechanism; a pressure pin for physically damaging the chip module; the chip module includes a contactless smart card chip and a storage chip; the contactless smart card chip stores authentication data and authentication keys from a monitoring platform, and responds to encrypted commands authorized by the monitoring platform; the storage chip stores the identity information of the device to be protected, the platform's unique code, and a session key, for third-party manufacturers to read and for communication services with the monitoring platform; a pre-compression spring provides a preset distance between the pressure pin and the chip module; and a position switch monitors the assembly status of the device and outputs a position status signal from the lever mechanism. This invention provides a method for verifying whether a device is being cheated.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the fields of metrology and anti-counterfeiting technology, and in particular to a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, method, and electronic scale. Background Technology

[0002] In the anti-tampering and anti-cheating measures of devices, active (powered) chips are usually used to store specified data. When the upper and lower shells are separated during disassembly, the power is cut off, causing the chip to lose the stored data. After reassembly, the system can detect the data loss, thereby detecting whether the device has been disassembled and locking the device.

[0003] The disadvantages of this method are as follows:

[0004] 1. Because it requires an uninterrupted power supply, the equipment is prone to short-term abnormalities during transportation or in humid environments, which can trigger the device to be locked.

[0005] 2. The device's built-in battery has a limited lifespan. Once depleted, the chip automatically "forgets" the battery, causing the device to be mistakenly locked. Replacing the battery requires disassembling the device, which can easily trigger the lockout during the replacement process.

[0006] 3. After the device is disassembled, criminals can completely replace the internal circuitry, effectively creating a counterfeit product. For example, with electronic scales, consumers cannot determine whether the scale is being cheated.

[0007] In summary, the technical problems existing in the relevant technologies need to be improved. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The main objective of this application is to propose a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, method, and electronic scale that can physically destroy the device through a passive mechanical structure, thereby achieving dual blocking of disassembly and cheating functions.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, one aspect of this application provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, which includes a lever mechanism, a pull rod, a pressure pin, a chip module, a preload spring, and a position switch;

[0010] The lever mechanism is connected to the traction rod;

[0011] The pressure pin is connected to the lever mechanism;

[0012] The chip module is located below the pressure pin;

[0013] One end of the preloaded spring is connected to the lever mechanism;

[0014] The position switch is mounted on the lever mechanism;

[0015] The lever mechanism is used to amplify the pressure so that the pressure pin pierces the chip module;

[0016] The pull rod is used to press the position switch and actuate the lever mechanism;

[0017] The pressure pin is used to physically destroy the chip module;

[0018] The chip module includes a contactless smart card chip and a storage chip; the contactless smart card chip is used to store the authentication data and authentication key of the regulatory platform and respond to the encryption instructions authorized by the regulatory platform; the storage chip is used to store the identity information of the device to be protected, the platform's unique code and session key, for third-party manufacturers to read and for communication services with the regulatory platform.

[0019] The preload spring is used to provide a preset distance between the pressure pin and the chip module;

[0020] The position switch is used to monitor the assembly status of the equipment and output the position status signal of the lever mechanism.

[0021] In some embodiments, the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device further includes a device housing; the traction rod is also used to be assembled on one side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the device housing is used to be assembled on the other side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the other end of the preload spring is used to be assembled on one side of the device housing.

[0022] In some embodiments, the lever mechanism includes a power arm, a resistance arm, and a fulcrum.

[0023] In some embodiments, the traction rod and the lever mechanism are connected by a bidirectional locking plug-in structure.

[0024] In some embodiments, the traction rod is also used to connect an external actuator to transmit external traction force to pull the lever mechanism.

[0025] In some embodiments, the chip module further includes a protection circuit.

[0026] In some embodiments, the device further includes a near-field communication antenna; the near-field communication antenna is used to form a contactless CPU card with the contactless smart card chip, and to perform data interaction through an NFC card reader in a passive environment to transmit the identity and configuration information of the device to be protected.

[0027] In some embodiments, the device further includes a self-destruct mechanism base; the self-destruct mechanism base is used to place the chip module and provide travel space for the pressure pin.

[0028] To achieve the above objectives, another aspect of this application proposes a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating method, which is implemented using the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device as described above. The method includes the following steps:

[0029] When the device to be protected is disassembled, the pull rod is activated to activate the lever mechanism, causing the pressure pin to pierce the chip module and obtain a self-destruct signal.

[0030] The control circuit will self-lock based on the self-destruct status signal.

[0031] To achieve the above objectives, another aspect of this application provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating electronic scale, wherein the electronic scale is a device to be protected, and the device installed in the inner shell of the electronic scale includes the aforementioned passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device.

[0032] The embodiments of this application include at least the following beneficial effects: This application provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, method, and electronic scale. The invention includes a lever mechanism, a pulling rod, a pressure pin, a chip module, a pre-compression spring, and a position switch. The lever mechanism amplifies the pressure so that the pressure pin pierces the chip module. The pulling rod presses the position switch, actuating the lever mechanism. The pressure pin physically damages the chip module. The chip module includes a contactless smart card chip and a storage chip. The contactless smart card chip stores authentication data and authentication keys from the monitoring platform and responds to encrypted commands authorized by the monitoring platform. The storage chip stores the identity information of the device to be protected, the platform's unique code, and the session key, for third-party manufacturers to read and for communication services with the monitoring platform. The pre-compression spring provides a preset distance between the pressure pin and the chip module. The position switch monitors the assembly status of the device and outputs the position status signal of the lever mechanism. This invention provides a method for verifying whether a device is being cheated. Attached Figure Description

[0033] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device provided in this application embodiment being assembled in the device to be protected;

[0035] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram showing the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device provided in the embodiments of this application beginning to separate;

[0036] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the moment when the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device provided in the embodiments of this application is completely separated;

[0037] Figure 5This is a flowchart of the self-destruction and external control circuit self-locking process of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0038] Reference numerals: 1. Lever mechanism; 11. Fulcrum; 2. Pulling rod; 3. Pressure pin; 4. Chip module; 5. Preload spring; 6. Position switch; 7. Near-field communication antenna; 8. Self-destruct mechanism base; 9. One side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; 10. The other side of the inner housing of the device to be protected. Detailed Implementation

[0039] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of this application and are not intended to limit it. In the following description, when referring to the accompanying drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with those of this application; they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of the embodiments of this application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0040] It is understood that the terms “first,” “second,” etc., used in this application may be used herein to describe various concepts, but unless otherwise stated, these concepts are not limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one concept from another. For example, without departing from the scope of the embodiments of this application, first information may also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information. Depending on the context, the words “if,” “when,” or “in response to a determination” as used herein may be interpreted as “when…” or “when…” or “in response to a determination.”

[0041] As used in this application, the terms "at least one", "multiple", "each", "any", etc., "at least one" includes one, two or more, "multiple" includes two or more, "each" refers to each of the corresponding multiples, and "any" refers to any one of the multiples.

[0042] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing embodiments of this application only and is not intended to limit this application.

[0043] Before providing a detailed description of the embodiments of this application, some of the nouns and terms involved in the embodiments of this application will be explained first. The nouns and terms involved in the embodiments of this application are subject to the following interpretations.

[0044] 1) ISO 12100, the basic standard for machinery safety published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), specifies the principles for risk assessment and design of protective measures for machinery and equipment;

[0045] 2) N, Newton, the unit of force;

[0046] 3) GB / T 3098 specifies the mechanical properties (such as tensile strength) of fasteners such as bolts and screws, which are used for the strength design of tie rods;

[0047] 4) JB / T 7992, Mechanical Industry Standard / Technical Conditions for Cemented Carbide Products, specifies the hardness, wear resistance and other indicators of cemented carbide (such as ejector pin materials);

[0048] 5) PCB, Printed Circuit Board, is a substrate that carries electronic components, such as the carrier of chip modules. Weak areas are made destructible through cutout design.

[0049] 6) GB / T 1239.2, Technical Conditions for Helical Springs, specifies the dimensions, loads and test methods for springs (such as preloaded springs);

[0050] 7) NO / NC, normally open / normally closed contacts, are two contact forms of position switches used for dual-channel signal detection of assembly status;

[0051] 8) IP67, protection rating 67 (Ingress Protection), indicates dustproof (level 6 for complete dustproof) and waterproof (level 7 for short-term immersion), the switch can operate reliably in humid environments;

[0052] 9) ISO / IEC 14443, Near Field Communication (NFC) international standard;

[0053] 10 MHz, megahertz, the operating frequency of NFC communication;

[0054] 11) NFC, Near Field Communication, is a short-range wireless communication technology;

[0055] 12) CPU, Central Processing Unit;

[0056] 13) GM / T 0045, Cryptographic Industry Standard / Technical Specification for Smart Cryptographic Keys, specifies the hardware security level and encryption algorithm requirements for national cryptographic security chips.

[0057] This invention takes into account that in the anti-tampering and anti-cheating of devices, active (powered) chips are usually used to store specified data. By separating the upper and lower shells during disassembly, the power is cut off, causing the chip to lose the stored data. After reassembly, the system can detect the data loss, thereby detecting whether the device has been disassembled and locking the device.

[0058] The disadvantages of this method are as follows:

[0059] 1. Because it requires an uninterrupted power supply, the equipment is prone to short-term abnormalities during transportation or in humid environments, which can trigger the device to be locked.

[0060] 2. The device's built-in battery has a limited lifespan. Once depleted, the chip automatically "forgets" the battery, causing the device to be mistakenly locked. Replacing the battery requires disassembling the device, which can easily trigger the lockout during the replacement process.

[0061] 3. After the device is disassembled, criminals can completely replace the internal circuitry, effectively creating a counterfeit product. For example, with electronic scales, consumers cannot determine whether the scale is being cheated.

[0062] There is a need to avoid the above-mentioned drawbacks, and this invention adopts a passive (no continuous power supply required) approach. This invention is designed based on the premise of being passive, and it provides consumers with a way to verify whether a device is being used fraudulently.

[0063] On one hand, embodiments of the present invention provide a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, referencing... Figure 1 The device includes a lever mechanism 1, a pulling rod 2, a pressure pin 3, a chip module 4, a preload spring 5, and a position switch 6;

[0064] Lever mechanism 1 is connected to pull rod 2;

[0065] The pressure pin 3 is connected to the lever mechanism 1;

[0066] Chip module 4 is located below pressure pin 3;

[0067] One end of the preload spring 5 is connected to the lever mechanism 1;

[0068] Position switch 6 is mounted on lever mechanism 1;

[0069] Lever mechanism 1 is used to amplify the pressure so that pressure pin 3 pierces chip module 4;

[0070] The pull rod 2 is used to press the position switch 6, which in turn activates the lever mechanism 1.

[0071] Pressure pin 3 is used to physically destroy chip module 4;

[0072] Chip module 4 includes a contactless smart card chip and a storage chip; the contactless smart card chip is used to store the authentication data and authentication key of the regulatory platform and respond to the encryption instructions authorized by the regulatory platform; the storage chip is used to store the identity information of the device to be protected, the platform's unique code and session key, for third-party manufacturers to read and for communication services with the regulatory platform;

[0073] The preload spring 5 is used to provide a preset gap between the pressure pin 3 and the chip module 4;

[0074] Position switch 6 is used to monitor the assembly status of the equipment and outputs the position status signal of lever mechanism 1.

[0075] In some embodiments, the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device disclosed in this invention further includes a device housing; the pull rod 2 is also used to be assembled on one side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the device housing is used to be assembled on the other side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the other end of the preload spring 5 is used to be assembled on one side of the device housing.

[0076] In some embodiments, the lever mechanism 1 disclosed in this invention includes a power arm, a resistance arm, and a fulcrum 11.

[0077] As an optional implementation, the ratio of the power arm to the resistance arm of the lever mechanism 1 can be 3:1.

[0078] In some embodiments, the traction rod 2 disclosed in this invention is connected to the lever mechanism 1 using a bidirectional locking plug-in structure.

[0079] In some embodiments, the traction rod 2 disclosed in this invention is also used to connect an external actuator to transmit external traction force to pull the lever mechanism 1.

[0080] In some embodiments, the chip module 4 disclosed in this invention further includes a protection circuit.

[0081] As an optional implementation, the chip module 4 in this embodiment of the invention adopts a hollow PCB board design, which makes it easy for the chip module 4 to be destroyed by the pressure pin 3.

[0082] In some embodiments, the apparatus disclosed in this invention further includes a near-field communication antenna 7; the near-field communication antenna 7 is used to form a contactless CPU card with the contactless smart card chip, and to perform data interaction through an NFC card reader in a passive environment, transmitting the identity and configuration information of the device to be protected.

[0083] In some embodiments, the apparatus disclosed in this invention further includes a self-destruct mechanism base 8; the self-destruct mechanism base 8 is used to place the chip module 4 and provide travel space for the pressure pin 3.

[0084] This application also provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating method, which is implemented using the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device described above. The method includes the following steps:

[0085] Step S100: When the device to be protected is disassembled, pull rod 2 pulls lever mechanism 1, causing pressure pin 3 to pierce chip module 4 and obtain self-destruct status signal;

[0086] Step S200: Lock the control circuit according to the self-destruct status signal.

[0087] The position switch 6 in this embodiment of the invention provides an assembly status. When the chip module 4 is damaged, it refuses to serve the peripheral control circuit, using this as a self-destruct signal, which the peripheral control circuit uses to sense that the device has been damaged.

[0088] This application also provides a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating electronic scale. The electronic scale is a device to be protected, and the device installed in the inner shell of the electronic scale includes the aforementioned passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device.

[0089] As an optional implementation, the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention includes: a lever mechanism 1, a pulling rod 2, a pressure pin 3, a chip module 4, a preload spring 5, a position switch 6, a near-field communication antenna 7, and a self-destruct mechanism base 8. (See reference) Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention being assembled on the upper and lower shells of the device to be protected. The pull rod 2 is installed on the upper shell (one side of the inner shell of the device to be protected) 9, and the device housing is installed on the lower shell (the other side of the inner shell of the device to be protected) 10. One end of the preload spring 5 is installed on the lever mechanism 1, and the other end of the preload spring 5 and the self-destruct mechanism base 8 are both installed on one side of the device housing. When the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention is installed in place, as... Figure 1 The lever mechanism 1 and the pulling rod 2 are connected by a bidirectional locking plug-in structure. The pulling rod 2 is also used to connect an external control circuit (external actuator). The external control circuit is not a circuit within this device, but refers to any external circuit connected to this device. The composition structure of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment is defined in Table 1 below.

[0090] Table 1. Definition of the Composition and Structure of the Device

[0091]

[0092]

[0093] As an optional implementation method, refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4 The self-destruct process of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention when it is disassembled:

[0094] When the pull rod 2 is subjected to a vertical upward traction force, it drives the lever mechanism 1 to rotate around the fulcrum 11 through the hinge point. When the rotation angle reaches the critical value θ = 15° ± 5°, the limiting boss on the lever mechanism 1 disengages from the locking groove of the pull rod 2, realizing mechanical decoupling.

[0095] As an optional implementation method, refer to Figure 1 The process of assembling the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention into the housing:

[0096] The main body of the device is usually assembled in the lower housing, and the traction rod 2 is usually assembled in the upper housing. When the traction rod 2 and the lever mechanism 1 are assembled using a two-way locking plug-in structure, the traction rod 2 in the upper housing and the two-way locking plug-in structure of the main body of the device in the lower housing are directionally locked together.

[0097] When the lever mechanism 1 and the traction rod 2 are engaged, the traction rod 2 presses against the position switch 6, and the external control circuit obtains the status output of the position switch 6 to determine the assembly status of the lever mechanism 1 and the traction rod 2.

[0098] As an optional implementation, the device (passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device) of this invention can be issued to equipment manufacturers by the regulatory platform. The regulatory platform has a certain degree of credibility.

[0099] To prevent their equipment from being maliciously modified in the market, equipment manufacturers need to connect to this device to ensure they are monitored by the regulatory platform.

[0100] Because the device has anti-cheating features, the platform needs to provide security detection for the device, and the external control circuit is the application circuit that each equipment manufacturer integrates into the device.

[0101] Manufacturers that connect to the platform can register the usage of their devices with the platform via the unique code provided by the device.

[0102] The device of this embodiment provides the following two components on the chip module 4:

[0103] 1. Built-in storage module: Stores the device's unique code, session key, and other information on the platform. Specific information is provided by the actual platform application. Its main purpose is to enable external control circuits to obtain platform information in order to provide business services.

[0104] 2. Secure chip card: Contactless smart card chip, hardware-level anti-attack, standard GM / T 0045.

[0105] The process of distributing the device of this invention on the platform:

[0106] 1. Write the unique code, session key and other information of the storage device to the platform, so that the connected manufacturers can obtain relevant information and can communicate and interact securely with the regulatory platform.

[0107] 2. Read the security chip card number, randomly generate a key based on the card number (ensuring one key per card), and store the key in the platform's private database:

[0108] (1) Data for platform authentication is written to the secure chip card via a key. The characteristics of the "contactless smart card chip" are used to ensure the uniqueness, security, and non-copyability of the device issuance.

[0109] (2) Session Key: Used for encryption of communication between the device and the monitoring platform over the Internet. Asymmetric encryption is used, and the platform generates two keys, one public and one private. The session key is the public key and is mainly used for encrypting information. Each time the device communicates, it generates a random password, encrypts it with the session key, and sends it to the platform. The platform decrypts the random password using the private key. Subsequent communications can then use this random password.

[0110] The embodiments of the present invention can solve the problem of illegal shell and brand imitation activities:

[0111] 1. Because the device has a built-in "contactless smart card chip", ordinary consumers can use a mobile phone with NFC to verify it.

[0112] 2. Specific inspection process for consumers:

[0113] (1) The issuing platform releases an official mini-program with NFC capabilities.

[0114] (2) Consumers use the official mini-program of the issuing platform to interact with data within the device's antenna range.

[0115] (3) After the mini-program senses the CPU card, it sends a verification command to the platform with the card number.

[0116] (4) If the mini program cannot detect the CPU card, it indicates that the device is highly suspicious and has been disassembled.

[0117] (5) The platform follows up on the card number to obtain the key for each card, generates verification instructions for the card and replies to the mini program to avoid key leakage.

[0118] (6) After the mini-program executes the verification command, it sends the data returned by the CPU card to the platform for verification.

[0119] (7) The platform uses a key to verify and informs the mini-program of the result. If the CPU card is not issued by the platform, the device is considered to have engaged in cheating.

[0120] (8) The mini-program prompts consumers with information about the instrument, such as the instrument manufacturer, instrument model, pictures, etc.

[0121] 3. Inspection of the equipment by the inspectors:

[0122] The process of discovering the device of the present invention is the same as that of the previous platform.

[0123] As an optional implementation, the device of this embodiment provides an interface for an external control circuit:

[0124] 1. Assembly status signal of the device (provided via position switch 6);

[0125] 2. Built-in data reading of the device (provided via the storage chip of security chip module 4);

[0126] 3. External control circuit self-locking signal (the external control circuit receives a self-locking signal and enters self-locking mode);

[0127] 4. Power input interface (external control circuit input power for communication with the device).

[0128] The external control circuit reads device information through the device data reading interface in order to generate business data or display it to inspectors.

[0129] As an optional implementation, the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment of the invention achieves self-destruction by physically damaging the chip module, and the device can be recycled by replacing the chip module PCB.

[0130] When disassembling, refer to Figure 5 The self-destruction and external control circuit self-locking process of the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this invention includes:

[0131] Damage signal trigger: When the equipment housing is illegally disassembled, the pull rod 2 is driven by tension.

[0132] Lever-based pressure conversion: Lever mechanism 1 converts the pulling force into the impact force of the pressure pin 3;

[0133] Physical damage execution: The pressure pin 3 pierces the weak area of ​​the PCB of the chip module 4, causing damage to the contactless smart card chip and making the stored data unrecoverable;

[0134] If the equipment is powered on, the self-destruct process also includes:

[0135] Power supply link disconnection: The protection circuit immediately disconnects the external power supply to prevent short circuit;

[0136] System Lock: The self-destruct status signal is transmitted to the external control circuit, causing the circuit to lock and forcing the device (electronic scale) to lock the weighing function.

[0137] In the above process, the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment can operate in a scenario without power. When the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment is powered on by an external control circuit, the protection circuit and self-destruct signal will be activated.

[0138] As an optional implementation, the device to be protected in this embodiment of the invention can be, in addition to an electronic scale, an electricity meter, a gas meter, a medicine transport box, etc., and the device to be protected includes:

[0139] I. Metering equipment for daily life

[0140] 1. Smart water meters / electricity meters / gas meters

[0141] Anti-tampering requirements: To prevent users from disassembling the meter and tampering with the readings (e.g., magnetic interference, inverted meter installation).

[0142] Adaptive design: Install the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment of the invention, install the lever mechanism at the sealed part of the watch case, and automatically destroy the chip module after it is damaged.

[0143] 2. POS cash register

[0144] Anti-cheating measures: Preventing the replacement of motherboards to forge transaction records.

[0145] Solution: Install the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment of the invention; the transaction key will be erased upon disassembly.

[0146] II. High-Value Logistics Supervision

[0147] 1. Medicine / Cold Chain Transport Box

[0148] Problem: Unauthorized opening and replacement of goods during transportation.

[0149] Solution: Install the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment of the invention. When the box is closed, it presses and pulls the lever. When the box is opened, it triggers self-destruction and reports the GPS location.

[0150] 2. Anti-counterfeiting packaging boxes for luxury goods

[0151] Method for verifying requirements: By installing the passive anti-tampering and anti-fraud device of this embodiment of the invention, consumers can verify the authenticity of the product and whether it has been opened via NFC.

[0152] III. Industrial Control Equipment

[0153] 1. Power meters (such as instrument transformers)

[0154] Problem: Illegally adjusting electrical parameters to steal electricity.

[0155] Protection method: The self-destruct device (a passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device) is linked to the metering lead seal. If it is destroyed, an abnormal signal is output to the power grid platform.

[0156] 2. Intelligent Manufacturing Controller

[0157] Protection parameters: Install the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of this embodiment of the invention to prevent malicious modification of PLC programs or process thresholds.

[0158] IV. Automobiles and Transportation

[0159] 1. In-vehicle meter (taxi)

[0160] Anti-cheating measures: A self-destruct device is connected to the pricing chip to prevent hardware modification.

[0161] 2. Smart locks for shared bicycles

[0162] Anti-theft method: The self-destruct device is connected to the inner shell. When the lock is forcibly removed, the control panel is damaged, and the vehicle will automatically report the fault.

[0163] The passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device of the present invention, through the core design of passive mechanical self-destruction + chip authentication, can cover all devices that need to prevent physical tampering or logical cheating.

[0164] The embodiments described in this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of technology and the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0165] Those skilled in the art will understand that the technical solutions shown in the figures do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of this application, and may include more or fewer steps than shown, or combine certain steps, or different steps.

[0166] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0167] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or some of the steps in the methods disclosed above, as well as the functional modules / units in the systems and devices, can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or appropriate combinations thereof.

[0168] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc. (if present) in the specification and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms “comprising” and “having,” and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0169] It should be understood that in this application, "at least one (item)" means one or more, and "more than" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and both A and B exist simultaneously, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one (item) of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one (item) of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0170] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of the units described above is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0171] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0172] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0173] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes multiple instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing programs, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0174] The preferred embodiments of the present application have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, but this does not limit the scope of the claims of the present application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and substance of the embodiments of the present application shall be within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device, characterized in that, The device includes a lever mechanism, a pull rod, a pressure pin, a chip module, a preload spring, a position switch, and a near-field communication antenna; The lever mechanism is connected to the traction rod; The pressure pin is connected to the lever mechanism; The chip module is located below the pressure pin; One end of the preloaded spring is connected to the lever mechanism; The position switch is mounted on the lever mechanism; The lever mechanism is used to amplify the pressure so that the pressure pin pierces the chip module; The pull rod is used to press the position switch and actuate the lever mechanism; The pressure pin is used to physically destroy the chip module; The chip module includes a contactless smart card chip and a storage chip; the contactless smart card chip is used to store the authentication data and authentication key of the regulatory platform and respond to the encryption instructions authorized by the regulatory platform; the storage chip is used to store the identity information of the device to be protected, the platform's unique code and session key, for third-party manufacturers to read and for communication services with the regulatory platform. The preload spring is used to provide a preset distance between the pressure pin and the chip module; The position switch is used to monitor the assembly status of the equipment and output the position status signal of the lever mechanism; The near-field communication antenna is used to form a contactless CPU card with the contactless smart card chip, and to perform data interaction through an NFC card reader in a passive environment to transmit the identity and configuration information of the device to be protected. The device provides inspection information to consumers and inspectors, prompts consumers with instrument information, including instrument manufacturer, instrument model and picture information, provides an interface for external control circuits, performs data reading through the storage chip of the chip module, and displays the business to inspectors.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device also includes a device housing; the traction rod is also used to be assembled on one side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the device housing is used to be assembled on the other side of the inner housing of the device to be protected; the other end of the preload spring is used to be assembled on one side of the device housing.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The lever mechanism includes a power arm, a resistance arm, and a fulcrum.

4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The traction rod and the lever mechanism are connected by a two-way locking plug-in structure.

5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The traction rod is also used to connect to an external actuator to transmit external traction force to pull the lever mechanism.

6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The chip module also includes a protection circuit.

7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, The device also includes a self-destruct mechanism base; the self-destruct mechanism base is used to place the chip module and provide travel space for the pressure pin.

8. A method for passive tamperproofing and fraudproofing, for implementation by means of a device for passive tamperproofing and fraudproofing according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: When the device to be protected is disassembled, the pull rod is activated to activate the lever mechanism, causing the pressure pin to pierce the chip module and obtain a self-destruct signal. The control circuit will self-lock based on the self-destruct status signal.

9. A passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating electronic scale, characterized in that, The electronic scale is a device to be protected, and the device installed in the inner shell of the electronic scale includes the passive anti-tampering and anti-cheating device as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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