Wireless communication method, vehicle controller, network supply device, medium and vehicle

Abstract

The invention relates to a wireless communication method, a vehicle controller, network supply equipment, a medium and a vehicle, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the authentication of the network supply equipment, and enabling the network supply equipment to provide a wireless access point of a target network in the vehicle; after the network supply equipment passes the authentication, receiving a network certificate sent by the network supply equipment; and sharing the network voucher to a terminal device, so that the terminal device can directly access the wireless access point based on the network voucher, thereby improving the security and convenience of communication between the vehicle and the network supply device.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of wireless communication technology, and more specifically, to a wireless communication method, a vehicle controller, a network supply device, a medium, and a vehicle. Background Technology

[0002] With the popularization of intelligent connected systems and intelligent cockpit platforms, the connection between vehicles and networks has become inseparable. In some special environments and scenarios, the vehicle's own networking capabilities cannot meet the vehicle's functional requirements. The emergence of in-vehicle Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) has solved the problem of vehicle networking capabilities to some extent. Existing in-vehicle Wi-Fi connects to the vehicle using the traditional hotspot method, which is cumbersome to operate. Multiple terminal devices of the car owner and passengers need to enter passwords to access the network, which cannot realize information sharing and collaborative work between different devices under the vehicle network, and makes it difficult to give full play to the potential advantages of intelligent connected systems. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this disclosure is to provide a wireless communication method, a vehicle controller, a network supply device, a medium, and a vehicle.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, this disclosure provides a wireless communication method, the method comprising: The network supply device is authenticated, which is used to provide a wireless access point to the target network within the vehicle; After the network supply device is successfully authenticated, the network credentials sent by the network supply device are received. The network credentials are shared with the terminal device so that the terminal device can directly access the wireless access point based on the network credentials.

[0005] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The authentication of the power supply equipment includes: The vehicle sends an authentication request to the network supply equipment via its wireless communication module. In response to the encrypted handshake command returned by the network supply device, a symmetric key is negotiated with the network supply device based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake command; A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key; Based on the temporary security channel, the second certificate chain of the network supply device is authenticated according to the first certificate chain.

[0006] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle. The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0007] Optionally, the step of authenticating the second certificate chain of the network supply device based on the temporary secure channel and according to the first certificate chain includes: The first certificate chain is sent to the network supply device through the temporary secure channel, and the first verification result and the second certificate chain are received from the network supply device. The first verification result is obtained by the network supply device through the second certificate chain to verify the first certificate chain. Based on the public key of the network supply device, the fourth signature of the second public key certificate is verified to obtain the first signature verification result; If the first signature verification result is successful, the third signature of the second root certificate is verified based on the public key of the vehicle manufacturer to obtain the second signature verification result; If the second signature verification result is successful, the network supply device is deemed to have passed authentication.

[0008] Optionally, receiving the network credentials sent by the authentication network terminal after the network supply device has been successfully authenticated includes: After the network supply device is authenticated, a secure encrypted channel is established between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply device, and the wireless communication module receives the network credentials sent by the network supply device through the secure encrypted channel.

[0009] Optionally, a secure encrypted channel is established between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply equipment; A first temporary key pair is generated, and a shared key is determined based on the first temporary key pair and the second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device. The secure encrypted channel is established based on the shared key.

[0010] Optionally, generating a first temporary key pair and determining a shared key based on the first temporary key pair and a second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device includes: Generate the first temporary key pair, which includes a first temporary public key and a first temporary private key; The first temporary public key is signed using the private key corresponding to the vehicle, and the first temporary public key carrying the signature is sent to the network supply device; Receive a second temporary public key sent by the network supply device, the second temporary public key carrying the signature of the public key corresponding to the network supply device; The signature carried by the second temporary public key is verified based on the public key in the second certificate chain to determine the signature verification result; If the signature verification result is successful, the shared key is determined based on the second temporary public key and the first temporary private key.

[0011] Optionally, sharing the network credential to the terminal device includes: The network credentials are sent to the cloud server through the vehicle's network system, so that the cloud server sends the network credentials to the vehicle owner's terminal device and / or the associated terminal device of the vehicle owner's terminal device.

[0012] Optionally, sharing the network credential to the terminal device includes: In response to the terminal device entering the communication range of the vehicle's wireless communication module, the network credentials are shared to the terminal device through the wireless communication module.

[0013] Optionally, before sending the authentication request to the network supply device via the vehicle's wireless communication module, the process includes: Receive the device identifier sent by the network supply device, and determine that the device identifier is not the identifier of the authenticated network supply device currently stored in the vehicle; The method further includes: After the power supply equipment is authenticated, the equipment identifier is stored as the identifier of the authenticated power supply equipment.

[0014] Optionally, the vehicle includes an assembly of a near-field communication module and a wireless charging module, wherein the wireless communication module is the near-field communication module in the assembly, and the method further includes: After the power supply device is authenticated, it is charged through the wireless charging module in the assembly.

[0015] Optionally, the method further includes: The status information of the power supply equipment is obtained through the vehicle's wireless communication module, and the status information is displayed on the vehicle's in-vehicle display screen.

[0016] This disclosure also provides a wireless communication method applied to a network supply device, the method comprising: The vehicle is authenticated, and the network supply device is used to provide a wireless access point for a target network within the vehicle. After the vehicle is successfully authenticated, a network credential is sent to the vehicle so that the vehicle can share the network credential with the terminal device. The network credential is used by the terminal device to directly access the wireless access point.

[0017] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The authentication of the vehicle includes: In response to an authentication request sent by the vehicle's wireless communication module, an encrypted handshake instruction is sent to the vehicle, and a symmetric key is negotiated with the vehicle based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake instruction. A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key; Based on the temporary security channel, the first certificate chain of the vehicle is authenticated according to the second certificate chain.

[0018] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle. The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0019] Optionally, the step of authenticating the vehicle's first certificate chain based on the second certificate chain using the temporary secure channel includes: The second certificate chain is sent to the vehicle through the temporary secure channel, and the second verification result and the first certificate chain are received from the vehicle. The second verification result is obtained by the vehicle through the first certificate chain and verifying the second certificate chain. Based on the vehicle's public key, the second signature of the first public key certificate is verified to obtain a third signature verification result; If the third signature verification result is successful, the first signature of the first root certificate is verified based on the public key of the network equipment manufacturer to obtain the fourth signature verification result. If the fourth signature verification result is successful, the vehicle is deemed to have passed authentication.

[0020] This disclosure also provides a vehicle controller, including: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the methods provided in this disclosure.

[0021] This disclosure also provides a network supply device, including: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the methods provided in this disclosure.

[0022] This disclosure also provides a vehicle including the vehicle controller provided in this disclosure.

[0023] The above technical solution increases the security of communication between vehicles and network supply equipment, avoids vehicle information leakage, and allows vehicles to share network credentials obtained from network supply equipment with other terminal devices, avoiding duplicate authentication and manual input of network credentials, thereby effectively improving the convenience of using the network provided by network supply equipment.

[0024] Other features and advantages of this disclosure will be described in detail in the following detailed description section. Attached Figure Description

[0025] The accompanying drawings are provided to further illustrate the present disclosure and form part of the specification. They are used together with the following detailed description to explain the present disclosure, but do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a wireless communication method proposed in an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0026] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a certificate chain system proposed in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.

[0027] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a wireless communication method proposed in an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0028] Figure 4This is a schematic diagram illustrating communication between a WIFI terminal device and a vehicle according to an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.

[0029] Figure 5 This is a block diagram of a wireless communication device according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0030] Figure 6 This is a block diagram of a wireless communication device according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0031] The specific embodiments of this disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit this disclosure.

[0032] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a wireless communication method proposed in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure, see [link to flowchart]. Figure 1 As shown, the wireless communication method is applied to a vehicle and includes the following steps.

[0033] S101, certifies the power supply equipment.

[0034] The network supply device is used to provide a wireless access point for the target network inside the vehicle.

[0035] It is worth noting that a network supply device is a wireless network device, such as an in-vehicle Wi-Fi device or a mobile phone with wireless AP (Access Point) functionality. It connects to the target network and can transmit the target network's wireless access point to the outside world via wireless signals, so that other terminals can connect to the target network and access the Internet through the wireless access point. The target network includes at least one of mobile networks, including 4G and 5G networks, satellite networks, and virtual private networks (VPNs).

[0036] In one implementation, the power supply equipment can be authenticated by a vehicle, wherein the authentication between the vehicle and the power supply equipment can be performed via wireless or wired communication.

[0037] For example, the power supply device can connect to the vehicle's USB (Universal Serial Bus) interface via a data cable to establish a communication connection between the vehicle and the power supply device, and perform mutual authentication based on the established communication connection.

[0038] In another example, the vehicle and the power supply equipment have the same type of wireless communication function, thereby establishing a communication connection through the wireless communication function and performing mutual authentication based on the established communication connection. The wireless communication function that can realize the above example includes at least one of NFC (Near Field Communication), RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), Bluetooth, ZigBee, and infrared communication.

[0039] In another implementation, the network equipment can be authenticated via a terminal device, such as a mobile phone with a vehicle digital key.

[0040] For example, first, log in to the vehicle management APP using a mobile phone with the vehicle's digital key. Then, establish a communication connection between the mobile phone and the power supply equipment through the control page of the vehicle management APP. Add an identifier that can be recognized by vehicle authentication to the power supply equipment through the mobile phone, or enter the equipment information of the power supply equipment into a cloud server that the vehicle can access, and complete the authentication between the vehicle and the power supply equipment. Thus, the authentication between the vehicle and the power supply equipment can be realized remotely.

[0041] The authentication methods between vehicles and power supply equipment include at least one of certificate authentication, username and password authentication, token authentication, and multi-factor authentication.

[0042] S102, after the network supply device is authenticated, the network certificate sent by the network supply device is received.

[0043] In one embodiment, the vehicle and the network supply device authenticate each other. After the network supply device successfully authenticates the vehicle, it can send network credentials to the vehicle. After the vehicle successfully authenticates the network supply device, it can receive the network credentials sent by the network supply device.

[0044] The network credentials are used to access the target network. The network credentials include the username, password and IP (Internet Protocol) address of the target network.

[0045] S103, the network credentials are shared with the terminal device so that the terminal device can directly access the wireless access point based on the network credentials.

[0046] In one implementation, the vehicle can share network credentials with other terminal devices via wired or wireless communication. The terminal devices include at least one of an in-vehicle terminal, a vehicle owner terminal with a vehicle digital key, a terminal authorized by the vehicle owner for relatives or friends, and a visitor terminal that allows access to the vehicle.

[0047] In addition, vehicles can upload network credentials to a cloud server, so users can access the cloud server through their terminal devices to obtain network credentials.

[0048] For example, after receiving network credentials from the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device, the vehicle uses these credentials to access the wireless access point provided by the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device and access the target network. The vehicle can also send the received network credentials to other terminal devices, allowing the shared terminal devices to directly access the wireless access point provided by the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device and access the target network without authentication or entering network credentials.

[0049] The above technical solution increases the security of communication between vehicles and network supply equipment, avoids vehicle information leakage, and allows vehicles to share network credentials obtained from network supply equipment with other terminal devices, avoiding duplicate authentication and manual input of network credentials, thereby effectively improving the convenience of using the network provided by network supply equipment.

[0050] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain, wherein the first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer.

[0051] It is worth noting that if vehicles and power grid equipment authenticate each other through certificate authentication, a certificate chain system needs to be established based on the trust relationship between the vehicle manufacturer and the power grid equipment manufacturer to verify whether the identity is trustworthy during the authentication process of the power grid equipment and vehicles.

[0052] In one implementation, vehicle authentication of the power supply equipment can be achieved through the following steps.

[0053] The first step is to send an authentication request to the network supply device through the vehicle's wireless communication module.

[0054] The second step involves responding to the encrypted handshake command returned by the network supply device, and negotiating a symmetric key with the network supply device based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake command.

[0055] The third step is to determine a temporary secure channel based on the symmetric key.

[0056] The fourth step is to authenticate the second certificate chain of the network supply device based on the temporary security channel and the first certificate chain.

[0057] In one embodiment, if the vehicle detects that the network supply device has entered the communication range of the wireless communication module, the vehicle will send an authentication request to the network supply device through the wireless communication module. After receiving the authentication request, the network supply device will send an APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) instruction to the vehicle, which is an encrypted handshake instruction. Based on the SPAKE2+ (Simple Password Authenticated Key Exchange) corresponding to the encrypted handshake instruction, an encrypted secure channel is established. The encrypted secure channel is used to transmit network credentials. Before establishing the encrypted secure channel, the certificates in the vehicle and the network supply device need to be mutually verified to ensure the security of data transmission.

[0058] First, the vehicle negotiates a symmetric key with the power supply equipment through the wireless communication module. The symmetric key is used to determine a temporary secure channel. The negotiation of the symmetric key can be achieved through key exchange.

[0059] For example, the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply device each generate a random number as their private key, and determine their respective public keys based on the function corresponding value of their private keys. Further, the vehicle and the network supply device exchange their public keys. The vehicle uses its private key and the network supply device's public key to calculate a first shared key using the ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange) algorithm. The network supply device uses its private key and the vehicle's public key to calculate a second shared key that is identical to the first shared key using the ECDH algorithm. A symmetric key is determined based on the first and second shared keys to achieve encrypted and decrypted communication.

[0060] Then, based on the negotiated symmetric key, temporary secure channels are discretized, which are used to transmit certificate data.

[0061] For example, the vehicle encrypts a random number using a symmetric key and then sends the encrypted random number to the network supply terminal. The network supply terminal decrypts the random number using the symmetric key. The vehicle and the network supply terminal have the same random number, which is used as the key for the temporary secure channel, thereby determining the temporary secure channel.

[0062] Finally, the vehicles and power supply equipment exchange certificate data corresponding to the certificate chain through a temporary secure channel to verify whether the other party is trustworthy.

[0063] The certificate data includes certificate metadata, public key, and digital signature. The certificate metadata includes certificate issuer information, address information, issuance time information, and expiration information.

[0064] By using the above methods to perform mutual authentication between vehicles and power supply equipment, the security of communication between vehicles and power supply equipment is increased, and the risk of information leakage is reduced.

[0065] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first root certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first root certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle.

[0066] The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0067] In one embodiment, the network supply device is an in-vehicle Wi-Fi device, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 2 As shown, the certificate chain system between the WIFI device and the vehicle is established based on the trust relationship between the WIFI device manufacturer and the vehicle manufacturer. It is used to verify whether the identities of both parties are trustworthy during the authentication process of the in-vehicle WIFI device and the vehicle. Based on this trust relationship, all in-vehicle WIFI devices produced by this manufacturer can communicate and connect with the vehicle.

[0068] In addition, the WIFI device manufacturer's CA (Certification Authority) 201 and the car manufacturer's CA 211 sign each other's CA root certificates to indicate trust in each other's identities. Then, the root certificates sign their respective public key certificates to perform multiple verifications and ensure the security of certificate verification.

[0069] The establishment and realization of trust relationships between manufacturers rely on the issuance of root certificates. The vehicle-side certificate chain 21 includes the vehicle manufacturer's CA issuing authority 211 and the first certificate chain (212 and 213). The vehicle manufacturer's CA issuing authority 211 holds the vehicle manufacturer's public key and private key. The first certificate chain includes the first root certificate 212 issued by the vehicle manufacturer's CA issuing authority 211 and the first public key certificate 213 issued by the first root certificate.

[0070] The first certificate 212 is the CA certificate of the car manufacturer. The public key of the first certificate inherits the public key of the CA issuing authority 211 of the car manufacturer, and the first certificate contains the private key signature generated by the encryption of the CA certificate of the WIFI device manufacturer, that is, the first signature.

[0071] The first public key certificate 213 is the vehicle-side public key certificate, which includes the vehicle-side public key and the private key signature of the first root certificate 212, i.e., the second signature.

[0072] Similarly, the WIFI device certificate chain 20 includes the WIFI device manufacturer's CA issuing authority 201 and a second certificate chain (202 and 203). The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate 202 issued by the WIFI device manufacturer's CA issuing authority 201 and a second public key certificate 203 issued by the second certificate.

[0073] The second certificate 202 is the CA certificate of the WIFI device manufacturer. The public key of the second certificate 202 inherits the public key of the CA issuing authority 201 of the WIFI device manufacturer, and the second certificate 202 contains the private key signature of the car manufacturer's CA certificate, that is, the third signature.

[0074] The second public key certificate 203 is a public key certificate for the WIFI device. This certificate includes the public key of the WIFI device and the private key signature of the second root certificate 202, which is the fourth signature.

[0075] Optionally, the step of authenticating the second certificate chain of the network supply device based on the temporary security channel according to the first certificate chain includes: First, the first certificate chain is sent to the network supply device through the temporary secure channel, and the first verification result and the second certificate chain are received from the network supply device. The first verification result is obtained by the network supply device through the second certificate chain to verify the first certificate chain.

[0076] Then, based on the public key of the network supply device, the fourth signature of the second public key certificate is verified to obtain the first signature verification result.

[0077] Secondly, if the first signature verification result is successful, the third signature of the second root certificate is verified based on the public key of the vehicle manufacturer to obtain the second signature verification result.

[0078] Finally, if the second signature verification result is successful, the network supply device is confirmed to be successfully authenticated.

[0079] In one implementation, the vehicle and the network supply equipment exchange certificate data and perform mutual verification through an established temporary secure channel. Taking the vehicle's certificate authentication process for the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device as an example, the vehicle sends its first certificate chain to the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device for verification, and receives a second certificate chain from the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device, including a second root certificate 202 and a second public key certificate 203. First, the vehicle verifies the signature of the Wi-Fi device manufacturer's CA certificate in the second public key certificate 203 using the public key of the Wi-Fi device manufacturer in the received second root certificate 202. Then, if the signature verification of the second public key certificate is successful, the vehicle verifies the second certificate 202 using the first root certificate 212 in the first certificate chain, that is, it verifies the signature of the vehicle manufacturer's CA certificate in the second certificate 202 using the public key of the vehicle manufacturer in the first root certificate 212. If the verification of the second certificate 202 is successful, the authentication of the network supply equipment is confirmed to be successful.

[0080] By using the above method, authentication based on a certificate chain established on the trust relationship between vehicle manufacturers and power supply equipment manufacturers can improve the security and convenience of communication between vehicles and power supply equipment.

[0081] Optionally, receiving the network credentials sent by the authentication network terminal after the network supply device has been successfully authenticated includes: After the network supply device is authenticated, a secure encrypted channel is established between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply device, and the wireless communication module receives the network credentials sent by the network supply device through the secure encrypted channel.

[0082] For example, the network supply device is an in-vehicle Wi-Fi device, and the vehicle's wireless communication module is an NFC module. The in-vehicle Wi-Fi device supports NFC functionality, and the vehicle's NFC module communicates with the NFC module using APDU format. Before accessing the network, the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device and the NFC module derive and exchange keys, establish a temporary secure channel, and exchange certificate chain data based on the temporary secure channel for mutual authentication. After successful authentication, the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device shares its IP address, Wi-Fi password, and other network credentials with the NFC module through a secure encrypted channel based on NFC communication. The NFC module sends the received network credentials and the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device's device information to the vehicle's network system. The vehicle's network system can connect to the network provided by the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device based on the received network credentials, or share the network credentials with other mobile terminals. Furthermore, the vehicle can display the in-vehicle Wi-Fi device's device information, OTA (Over-the-Air) updates, Wi-Fi network key modifications, network connection status, and other information on the in-vehicle display's HMI (Human Machine Interface).

[0083] Optionally, establishing a secure encrypted channel between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply equipment includes: A first temporary key pair is generated, and a shared key is determined based on the first temporary key pair and the second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device.

[0084] In one implementation, the vehicle and the power supply equipment generate their own temporary key pairs using the same key algorithm and send their own temporary public keys to each other. Then, based on the received temporary public key and their own temporary private key, they determine a shared key. Since the vehicle and the power supply equipment exchange the determined shared key in the same way, they obtain the same shared key, which can then be used for encrypted communication.

[0085] The secure encrypted channel is established based on the shared key.

[0086] The secure encryption channel includes a secure channel for data transmission, a secure channel key for encrypted communication, and a long-term key for long-term secure communication.

[0087] For example, after the certificate chain authentication between the vehicle and the network supply equipment is successful, a temporary key pair is generated to establish an SCP03 (Global Platform Technology Secure Channel Protocol 03) secure channel. A shared key is negotiated using the temporary key pair, and a secure channel key and a long-term key are discretized based on this. These are used to transmit network credentials and network status information of the network supply equipment to ensure that data transmission between the vehicle and the equipment is secure.

[0088] By utilizing certificate chain verification and the generation and verification process of temporary keys, both parties can establish a secure encrypted channel to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communication.

[0089] Optionally, generating a first temporary key pair and determining a shared key based on the first temporary key pair and a second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device includes: The first step is to generate the first temporary key pair, which includes a first temporary public key and a first temporary private key.

[0090] In one embodiment, a shared key can be determined through a key exchange protocol. The vehicle and the power supply equipment first negotiate a public prime number and a generator. Each party generates a temporary private key and determines the temporary public key corresponding to its temporary private key based on the negotiated prime number and generator, thereby generating their respective temporary key pairs, namely the vehicle's first temporary public key and first temporary private key, and the power supply equipment's second temporary public key and second temporary private key.

[0091] The second step is to sign the first temporary public key using the private key corresponding to the vehicle, and then send the first temporary public key carrying the signature to the network supply device.

[0092] The third step is to receive the second temporary public key sent by the network supply device, which carries the signature of the public key corresponding to the network supply device.

[0093] The fourth step is to verify the signature carried by the second temporary public key based on the public key in the second certificate chain, and determine the signature verification result.

[0094] It is worth noting that during the certificate authentication process between the vehicle and the power supply equipment, since the certificate chain sent by the other end contains the public key of the other end, after the authentication is successful, the vehicle stores the public key of the power supply equipment manufacturer, while the power supply equipment stores the public key of the vehicle manufacturer.

[0095] In one embodiment, the vehicle signs the generated first temporary public key using its private key and sends the signed first temporary public key to the network supply device. The network supply device verifies the signature of the first temporary public key using the public key of the car manufacturer stored during the certificate authentication process, thereby ensuring the correctness of the public key of the car manufacturer stored during the certificate authentication process.

[0096] Similarly, the vehicle receives a second temporary public key signed with a private key from the power supply equipment. It then uses the public key of the power supply equipment manufacturer stored in the certificate authentication process to verify the signature of the second temporary public key signed with the private key, thereby ensuring the correctness of the public key of the power supply equipment manufacturer stored in the certificate authentication process.

[0097] Fifth, if the signature verification result is successful, determine the shared key based on the second temporary public key and the first temporary private key.

[0098] In one implementation, after the vehicle passes the verification of the public key of the network supply device, it determines a shared key based on the received second temporary public key and the first temporary private key generated by the vehicle. Similarly, the network supply device also determines the same shared key based on the received first temporary public key and the second temporary private key generated by the network supply device, so as to realize encrypted communication between the vehicle and the network supply device.

[0099] The above methods can further enhance communication security and prevent the use of forged temporary key pairs.

[0100] Optionally, step S103 above can be implemented in the following way.

[0101] The network credentials are sent to the cloud server through the vehicle's network system, so that the cloud server sends the network credentials to the vehicle owner's terminal device and / or the associated terminal device of the vehicle owner's terminal device.

[0102] For example, after the vehicle obtains the network credential, the user does not need to perform network searches or enter passwords through the in-vehicle display. The vehicle's network system can directly access the network provided by the network supply device. The network system can also send the network credential to the cloud server. Through the cloud service, the device status and network credential of the network supply device are synchronized to the mobile APP of the car owner, relatives and friends who have the vehicle's digital key. The user's mobile phone can also connect directly to the network provided by the network supply device with one click through the APP, which effectively improves the convenience of the in-vehicle network supply device.

[0103] Alternatively, step S103 can be implemented in another way.

[0104] In response to the terminal device entering the communication range of the vehicle's wireless communication module, the network credentials are shared to the terminal device through the wireless communication module.

[0105] In one implementation, the vehicle can send network credentials to the vehicle authentication terminal device via a wireless communication module. For example, the wireless communication module is a near-field communication module. When the owner's mobile phone with the vehicle's digital key enters the communication range of the near-field communication module, a communication connection can be established between the near-field communication module and the near-field communication module in the owner's mobile phone to send the network credentials to the owner's mobile phone. In other words, the owner can obtain the network credentials of the network supply device by bringing the mobile phone close to the near-field communication module, and then directly connect to the network provided by the network supply device. This skips the process of searching for the network and entering the password, and directly connects to the network, effectively improving the convenience of the in-vehicle network supply device.

[0106] Optionally, before sending the authentication request to the network supply device via the vehicle's wireless communication module, the process includes: The device identifier sent by the network supply device is received, and it is determined that the device identifier is not the identifier of the certified network supply device currently stored in the vehicle.

[0107] The method further includes: After the power supply equipment is authenticated, the equipment identifier is stored as the identifier of the authenticated power supply equipment.

[0108] It is worth noting that the vehicle stores the device identifier of the authenticated network supply equipment to avoid duplicate authentication between the vehicle and the network supply equipment. Whenever the network supply equipment enters the communication range of the vehicle's wireless communication module, the vehicle obtains its device identifier from the network supply equipment to determine whether the network supply equipment has been authenticated. If the authentication has been completed, the vehicle receives the network credentials sent by the network supply equipment. In this way, even if the network supply equipment modifies the network credentials, the vehicle does not need to perform duplicate authentication to obtain the modified network credentials and connect to the network provided by the network supply equipment.

[0109] Optionally, the vehicle includes an assembly of a near-field communication module and a wireless charging module, wherein the wireless communication module is the near-field communication module in the assembly, and the method further includes: After the power supply device is authenticated, it is charged through the wireless charging module in the assembly.

[0110] In one implementation, the wireless charging module and the near-field communication module each have their own main control chip and coil, and can be connected to the vehicle's CAN network through the physical interface of the two assemblies. The vehicle's intelligent networking system can control the function switching and data processing of the assembly.

[0111] For example, after the vehicle completes the authentication process with the grid-connected equipment, the vehicle's wireless charging module uses the Qi (Wireless Power Consortium) protocol to charge the grid-connected equipment. Optionally, the method further includes: The status information of the power supply equipment is obtained through the vehicle's wireless communication module, and the status information is displayed on the vehicle's in-vehicle display screen.

[0112] The status information of the power supply equipment includes at least one of the following: wireless charging signal strength, charging power, and charging status.

[0113] For example, during the charging process, the power supply device sends its status information to the wireless charging module via the Qi protocol data link. The wireless charging module then sends the information to the vehicle's network system via the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus. The network system uploads the status information to a cloud server for storage and displays the power supply device's status information on the vehicle's in-vehicle display screen, allowing users to access the cloud server via the in-vehicle display screen or their mobile phones to view the power supply device's status information.

[0114] This disclosure also provides a wireless communication method applied to a network supply device, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 4 As shown, the method includes the following steps.

[0115] S201, Authenticate the vehicle.

[0116] The network supply device is used to provide a wireless access point for the target network within the vehicle.

[0117] S202, after the vehicle is successfully authenticated, a network credential is sent to the vehicle so that the vehicle can share the network credential with the terminal device. The network credential is used by the terminal device to directly access the wireless access point.

[0118] In one embodiment, see Figure 4 As shown, the network supply device is a WIFI terminal device 102, i.e., an in-vehicle WIFI device. The WIFI terminal device 102 is connected to the Internet and has NFC functionality. The vehicle includes a wireless charging / NFC assembly 101 and an intelligent network system. The wireless charging / NFC assembly 101 integrates a wireless charging module and an in-vehicle NFC module. The terminal device is a mobile phone with an NFC data key.

[0119] The communication channels between vehicles, power supply equipment, and terminal equipment include the following types.

[0120] The first communication channel 104 is the communication between the in-vehicle NFC module and the WIFI terminal device 102.

[0121] For example, when a WIFI terminal device enters the near-field communication range of the in-vehicle NFC module, after receiving the authentication request from the in-vehicle NFC module, the WIFI terminal device 102 sends an APDU command to the vehicle to initiate the establishment of an encrypted secure channel, and sends the network credentials and the device information of the WIFI terminal device to the in-vehicle NFC module through the established secure encrypted system channel.

[0122] The second communication channel 103 is used for communication between the wireless charging module and the WIFI terminal device 102.

[0123] For example, if a Wi-Fi terminal device enters the wireless charging range of the wireless charging module, the wireless charging module charges the Wi-Fi terminal device based on the Qi protocol, and the wireless charging module obtains the power information of the Wi-Fi terminal device during the charging process.

[0124] The third communication channel 105 is used for communication between the vehicle's intelligent network system and the WIFI terminal device 102.

[0125] For example, after the in-vehicle NFC module and the WIFI terminal device 102 complete mutual authentication, the wireless charging / NFC assembly 101 receives the network credentials sent by the WIFI terminal device 102 through the established encrypted secure channel, and sends the network credentials to the vehicle's intelligent network system through the CAN bus. The intelligent network system accesses the Internet provided by the WIFI terminal device 102 based on the received network credentials.

[0126] The fourth communication channel 106 is used for communication between the mobile phone and the WIFI terminal device 102.

[0127] For example, the intelligent network system can upload network credentials to a cloud server. Users can access the cloud server to obtain network credentials via their mobile phones, or obtain network credentials based on the NFC digital key in their mobile phones when their mobile phones enter the communication range of the NFC module in the vehicle, so that the mobile phones can access the Internet provided by the WIFI terminal device 102 based on the network credentials.

[0128] The above solution provides a more secure and effective connection between the network supply equipment and the vehicle, avoids the leakage of vehicle information, and allows network credentials to be shared with other terminal devices, thereby improving the convenience for users to use the network supply equipment.

[0129] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The authentication of the vehicle includes: In response to an authentication request sent by the vehicle's wireless communication module, an encrypted handshake instruction is sent to the vehicle, and a symmetric key is negotiated with the vehicle based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake instruction.

[0130] A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key.

[0131] The first certificate chain of the vehicle is authenticated based on the temporary security channel according to the second certificate chain.

[0132] By using the above methods to perform mutual authentication between vehicles and power supply equipment, the security of communication between vehicles and power supply equipment is increased, and the risk of information leakage is reduced.

[0133] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first root certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first root certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle.

[0134] The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0135] Optionally, the step of authenticating the vehicle's first certificate chain based on the temporary secure channel according to the second certificate chain includes: The second certificate chain is sent to the vehicle through the temporary secure channel, and the second verification result and the first certificate chain are received from the vehicle. The second verification result is obtained by the vehicle through the first certificate chain and by verifying the second certificate chain.

[0136] Based on the vehicle's public key, the second signature of the first public key certificate is verified to obtain a third signature verification result.

[0137] If the third signature verification result is successful, the first signature of the first root certificate is verified based on the public key of the network equipment manufacturer to obtain the fourth signature verification result.

[0138] If the fourth signature verification result is successful, the vehicle is deemed to have passed authentication.

[0139] The aforementioned certificate authentication method ensures the security of communication and the integrity of data transmission between the vehicle and the power supply equipment.

[0140] See Figure 5 As shown, this disclosure also provides a wireless communication device 300, which includes: The first authentication module 301 is configured to authenticate the network supply device, which is used to provide a wireless access point for the target network within the vehicle.

[0141] The receiving module 302 is configured to receive the network credentials sent by the network supply device after the network supply device has been authenticated.

[0142] The sharing module 303 is configured to share the network credentials to the terminal device so that the terminal device can directly access the wireless access point based on the network credentials.

[0143] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The first authentication module 301 is configured as follows: The vehicle sends an authentication request to the network supply equipment via its wireless communication module.

[0144] In response to the encrypted handshake command returned by the network supply device, a symmetric key is negotiated with the network supply device based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake command.

[0145] A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key.

[0146] Based on the temporary security channel, the second certificate chain of the network supply device is authenticated according to the first certificate chain.

[0147] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first root certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first root certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle.

[0148] The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0149] Optionally, the first authentication module 301 is configured as follows: The first certificate chain is sent to the network supply device through the temporary secure channel, and the first verification result and the second certificate chain are received from the network supply device. The first verification result is obtained by the network supply device through the second certificate chain to verify the first certificate chain.

[0150] Based on the public key of the network supply device, the fourth signature of the second public key certificate is verified to obtain the first signature verification result.

[0151] If the first signature verification result is successful, the third signature of the second root certificate is verified based on the vehicle manufacturer's public key to obtain the second signature verification result.

[0152] If the second signature verification result is successful, the network supply device is deemed to have passed authentication.

[0153] Optionally, the receiving module 302 is configured to: After the network supply device is authenticated, a secure encrypted channel is established between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply device, and the wireless communication module receives the network credentials sent by the network supply device through the secure encrypted channel.

[0154] Optionally, the receiving module 302 is configured to: A first temporary key pair is generated, and a shared key is determined based on the first temporary key pair and the second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device.

[0155] The secure encrypted channel is established based on the shared key.

[0156] Optionally, the receiving module 302 is configured to: Generate the first temporary key pair, which includes a first temporary public key and a first temporary private key.

[0157] The first temporary public key is signed using the private key corresponding to the vehicle, and the first temporary public key carrying the signature is sent to the network supply device.

[0158] Receive a second temporary public key sent by the network supply device, the second temporary public key carrying the signature of the public key corresponding to the network supply device.

[0159] The signature carried by the second temporary public key is verified based on the public key in the second certificate chain to determine the signature verification result.

[0160] If the signature verification result is successful, the shared key is determined based on the second temporary public key and the first temporary private key.

[0161] Optionally, the sharing module 303 is configured as follows: The network credentials are sent to the cloud server through the vehicle's network system, so that the cloud server sends the network credentials to the vehicle owner's terminal device and / or the associated terminal device of the vehicle owner's terminal device.

[0162] Optionally, the sharing module 303 is configured as follows: In response to the terminal device entering the communication range of the vehicle's wireless communication module, the network credentials are shared to the terminal device through the wireless communication module.

[0163] Optionally, the first authentication module 301 is configured as follows: The device identifier sent by the network supply device is received, and it is determined that the device identifier is not the identifier of the certified network supply device currently stored in the vehicle.

[0164] After the power supply equipment is authenticated, the equipment identifier is stored as the identifier of the authenticated power supply equipment.

[0165] Optionally, the vehicle includes an assembly of a near-field communication module and a wireless charging module, wherein the wireless communication module is the near-field communication module in the assembly, and the first authentication module 301 is configured to: After the power supply device is authenticated, it is charged through the wireless charging module in the assembly.

[0166] Optionally, the sharing module 303 is configured as follows: The status information of the power supply equipment is obtained through the vehicle's wireless communication module, and the status information is displayed on the vehicle's in-vehicle display screen.

[0167] See Figure 6 As shown, this disclosure also provides a wireless communication device 400, applied to a network supply equipment, the wireless communication device 400 comprising: The second authentication module 401 is configured to authenticate the vehicle, and the network supply device is used to provide a wireless access point for the target network within the vehicle.

[0168] The sending module 402 is configured to send network credentials to the vehicle after the vehicle is authenticated, so that the vehicle can share the network credentials with the terminal device. The network credentials are used by the terminal device to directly access the wireless access point.

[0169] Optionally, the vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The second authentication module 401 is configured as follows: In response to an authentication request sent by the vehicle's wireless communication module, an encrypted handshake instruction is sent to the vehicle, and a symmetric key is negotiated with the vehicle based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake instruction.

[0170] A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key.

[0171] Based on the temporary security channel, the first certificate chain of the vehicle is authenticated according to the second certificate chain.

[0172] Optionally, the first certificate chain includes a first root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first root certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first root certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle.

[0173] The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

[0174] Optionally, the second authentication module 401 is configured as follows: The second certificate chain is sent to the vehicle through the temporary secure channel, and the second verification result and the first certificate chain are received from the vehicle. The second verification result is obtained by the vehicle through the first certificate chain and by verifying the second certificate chain.

[0175] Based on the vehicle's public key, the second signature of the first public key certificate is verified to obtain a third signature verification result.

[0176] If the third signature verification result is successful, the first signature of the first root certificate is verified based on the public key of the network equipment manufacturer to obtain the fourth signature verification result.

[0177] If the fourth signature verification result is successful, the vehicle is deemed to have passed authentication.

[0178] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0179] This disclosure also provides a vehicle controller, including: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the methods provided in this disclosure.

[0180] This disclosure also provides a network supply device, including: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the methods provided in this disclosure.

[0181] This disclosure also provides a vehicle including the vehicle controller provided in this disclosure.

[0182] The preferred embodiments of this disclosure have been described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, this disclosure is not limited to the specific details of the above embodiments. Within the scope of the technical concept of this disclosure, various simple modifications can be made to the technical solutions of this disclosure, and these simple modifications all fall within the protection scope of this disclosure.

[0183] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, this disclosure will not describe the various possible combinations separately.

[0184] Furthermore, various different embodiments of this disclosure can be combined in any way, as long as they do not violate the spirit of this disclosure, they should also be regarded as the content disclosed in this disclosure.

Claims

1. A wireless communication method, characterized in that, The method includes: The network supply device is authenticated, which is used to provide a wireless access point to the target network within the vehicle; After the network supply device is successfully authenticated, the network credentials sent by the network supply device are received. The network credentials are shared with the terminal device so that the terminal device can directly access the wireless access point based on the network credentials.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The authentication of the power supply equipment includes: The vehicle sends an authentication request to the network supply equipment via its wireless communication module. In response to the encrypted handshake command returned by the network supply device, a symmetric key is negotiated with the network supply device based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake command; A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key; Based on the temporary security channel, the second certificate chain of the network supply device is authenticated according to the first certificate chain.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The first certificate chain includes a first certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle. The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The step of authenticating the second certificate chain of the network supply device based on the temporary security channel and according to the first certificate chain includes: The first certificate chain is sent to the network supply device through the temporary secure channel, and the first verification result and the second certificate chain are received from the network supply device. The first verification result is obtained by the network supply device through the second certificate chain to verify the first certificate chain. Based on the public key of the network supply device, the fourth signature of the second public key certificate is verified to obtain the first signature verification result; If the first signature verification result is successful, the third signature of the second root certificate is verified based on the public key of the vehicle manufacturer to obtain the second signature verification result; If the second signature verification result is successful, the network supply device is deemed to have passed authentication.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of receiving network credentials sent by the authentication network terminal after the network supply device has been successfully authenticated includes: After the network supply device is authenticated, a secure encrypted channel is established between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply device, and the wireless communication module receives the network credentials sent by the network supply device through the secure encrypted channel.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process involves establishing a secure encrypted channel between the vehicle's wireless communication module and the network supply equipment. A first temporary key pair is generated, and a shared key is determined based on the first temporary key pair and the second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device. The secure encrypted channel is established based on the shared key.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of generating a first temporary key pair and determining a shared key based on the first temporary key pair and the second temporary key pair generated by the network supply device includes: Generate the first temporary key pair, which includes a first temporary public key and a first temporary private key; The first temporary public key is signed using the private key corresponding to the vehicle, and the first temporary public key carrying the signature is sent to the network supply device; Receive a second temporary public key sent by the network supply device, the second temporary public key carrying the signature of the public key corresponding to the network supply device; The signature carried by the second temporary public key is verified based on the public key in the second certificate chain to determine the signature verification result; If the signature verification result is successful, the shared key is determined based on the second temporary public key and the first temporary private key.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The step of sharing the network credentials to the terminal device includes: The network credentials are sent to the cloud server through the vehicle's network system, so that the cloud server sends the network credentials to the vehicle owner's terminal device and / or the associated terminal device of the vehicle owner's terminal device.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The step of sharing the network credentials to the terminal device includes: In response to the terminal device entering the communication range of the vehicle's wireless communication module, the network credentials are shared to the terminal device through the wireless communication module.

10. The method according to any one of claims 2-4, characterized in that, Before sending an authentication request to the network supply device via the vehicle's wireless communication module, the process includes: Receive the device identifier sent by the network supply device, and determine that the device identifier is not the identifier of the authenticated network supply device currently stored in the vehicle; The method further includes: After the power supply equipment is authenticated, the equipment identifier is stored as the identifier of the authenticated power supply equipment.

11. The method according to any one of claims 2-7, characterized in that, The vehicle includes an assembly of a near-field communication module and a wireless charging module, wherein the wireless communication module is the near-field communication module in the assembly, and the method further includes: After the power supply device is authenticated, it is charged through the wireless charging module in the assembly.

12. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The method further includes: The status information of the power supply equipment is obtained through the vehicle's wireless communication module, and the status information is displayed on the vehicle's in-vehicle display screen.

13. A wireless communication method, characterized in that, Applied to power grid equipment, the method includes: The vehicle is authenticated, and the network supply device is used to provide a wireless access point for a target network within the vehicle. After the vehicle is successfully authenticated, a network credential is sent to the vehicle so that the vehicle can share the network credential with the terminal device. The network credential is used by the terminal device to directly access the wireless access point.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that, The vehicle stores a first certificate chain, and the power supply equipment stores a second certificate chain. The first certificate chain and the second certificate chain are jointly issued by a mutually trusted power supply equipment manufacturer and a vehicle manufacturer. The authentication of the vehicle includes: In response to an authentication request sent by the vehicle's wireless communication module, an encrypted handshake instruction is sent to the vehicle, and a symmetric key is negotiated with the vehicle based on the key exchange protocol carried in the encrypted handshake instruction. A temporary secure channel is determined based on the symmetric key; Based on the temporary security channel, the first certificate chain of the vehicle is authenticated according to the second certificate chain.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The first certificate chain includes a first certificate issued by the certificate authority of the vehicle manufacturer, the public key of the vehicle manufacturer, a first signature of the first certificate by the private key of the network equipment manufacturer, a first public key certificate signed by the first certificate, the public key of the vehicle, and a second signature of the first public key certificate by the private key of the vehicle. The second certificate chain includes a second root certificate issued by the certificate authority of the network supply equipment manufacturer, the public key of the network supply equipment manufacturer, a third signature of the second root certificate by the private key of the vehicle manufacturer, a second public key certificate signed by the second root certificate, the public key of the network supply equipment, and a fourth signature of the second public key certificate by the private key of the network supply equipment.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that, The authentication of the vehicle's first certificate chain based on the temporary security channel and the second certificate chain includes: The second certificate chain is sent to the vehicle through the temporary secure channel, and the second verification result and the first certificate chain are received from the vehicle. The second verification result is obtained by the vehicle through the first certificate chain and verifying the second certificate chain. Based on the vehicle's public key, the second signature of the first public key certificate is verified to obtain a third signature verification result; If the third signature verification result is successful, the first signature of the first root certificate is verified based on the public key of the network equipment manufacturer to obtain the fourth signature verification result. If the fourth signature verification result is successful, the vehicle is deemed to have passed authentication.

17. A vehicle controller, characterized in that, include: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the method of any one of claims 1-12.

18. A power supply device, characterized in that, include: A memory on which computer programs are stored; A processor for executing the computer program in the memory to implement the method of any one of claims 13-16.

19. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the method described in any one of claims 1-16.

20. A vehicle, characterized in that, Includes the vehicle controller as described in claim 17.

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