A method and system for security verification of scheduling instructions based on a three-layer linkage mechanism

Abstract

This invention relates to the field of power system automation technology, specifically to a method and system for security verification of dispatch instructions based on a three-layer linkage mechanism. The invention receives dispatch instruction text and parses it into a structured format; performs syntax verification based on a syntax rule base; triggers semantic verification when syntax verification passes, calculates the operational logic conflict coefficient based on the weights of semantic rules and conflict determination values, and compares it with a first threshold; acquires real-time status parameters when the conflict coefficient meets the requirements; calculates the normalized deviation between the target value of the status parameters and the real-time status parameters to obtain the instruction-state matching degree, and compares it with a second threshold; allows the instruction to proceed when all three layers of verification pass, otherwise intercepts it; and generates an encrypted log. This invention achieves three-layer linkage verification of syntax, semantics, and status, significantly improving the security of dispatch instructions.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system automation technology, specifically to a method and system for security verification of dispatch instructions based on a three-layer linkage mechanism. Background Technology

[0002] Power dispatching instructions are the core means of power system operation and control. The accuracy and security of dispatching instructions are directly related to the stable operation of the power grid and the safety of equipment. With the expansion of power system scale and the improvement of automation level, the complexity of dispatching instructions is constantly increasing, which places higher demands on instruction security verification.

[0003] Existing scheduling instruction verification methods primarily rely on simple syntax checks or rule matching, capable of identifying only formatted errors and obvious keyword mistakes. They lack in-depth verification of the logical rationality of instruction operations and the compatibility with real-time equipment status. This single-layer verification mechanism has the following drawbacks: First, it cannot identify logical conflict risks in instructions, such as violations of operational sequence or triggering of equipment protection conditions. Second, it does not consider the matching degree between the real-time operating status of the equipment and the instruction requirements, potentially allowing instructions to be mistakenly released when the equipment status is abnormal. Third, it lacks a quantitative evaluation mechanism, making it difficult to differentiate between issues of different risk levels. These shortcomings result in insufficient security protection capabilities of existing verification methods and the potential for misoperation. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a scheduling instruction security verification method and system based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, which solves the problems of single verification level and insufficient risk identification in the prior art.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0006] This invention provides a scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, comprising:

[0007] S100: Receives scheduling instruction text and parses it into a structured format containing the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters;

[0008] S200: Perform syntax validation on the structured format based on the syntax rule base, and check the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format;

[0009] S300: When the syntax check passes, semantic check is triggered. Multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object are obtained based on the semantic rule base. It is determined whether the structured format triggers the conflict conditions of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule is obtained. The operation logic conflict coefficient is calculated according to the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value. The operation logic conflict coefficient is compared with the first threshold.

[0010] S400: When the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, obtain the real-time status parameters of the operation object;

[0011] S500: Extract the target value of the state parameter corresponding to the structured format based on the state matching rule base, calculate the normalized deviation between the target value of the state parameter and the real-time state parameter, calculate the instruction and state matching degree based on the normalized deviation, and compare the instruction and state matching degree with the second threshold.

[0012] S600: When the syntax check passes, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, and the instruction and state matching degree is greater than or equal to the second threshold, the scheduling instruction is allowed; otherwise, the scheduling instruction is intercepted.

[0013] S700: Records the verification results of each layer, generates structured logs, and stores them.

[0014] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, S100 further includes: receiving equipment parameters from the power dispatch data network and removing outliers from the equipment parameters.

[0015] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step of checking the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format specifically includes:

[0016] Check whether the structured format is missing an operation object or operation type;

[0017] Compare whether the object being operated on is in the list of valid devices in the device parameter library;

[0018] Check whether the operation type is in the preset list of valid operation types.

[0019] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the formula for calculating the operational logic conflict coefficient is as follows:

[0020] ;

[0021] in, For the first The weight of each semantic rule For the first The conflict determination value of the semantic rule, when the structured format triggers the first... When there is a conflict condition in the semantic rules The value is 1 if it is not 1, and 0 otherwise. This represents the total number of semantic rules involved in the computation.

[0022] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, each semantic rule in the semantic rule base is associated with a risk level, which includes high risk, medium risk and low risk, and the weight of each semantic rule is set according to the risk level.

[0023] As a preferred technical solution of the present invention, obtaining the real-time status parameters of the operation object further includes: performing a moving average filtering process on the real-time status parameters to remove instantaneous interference values.

[0024] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the target value of the status parameter includes the target opening / closing state and target electrical parameters of the operating object, and the real-time status parameter includes the current opening / closing state, current electrical parameters and associated protection device status of the operating object.

[0025] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the formula for calculating the matching degree of the instruction and the state is:

[0026] ;

[0027] in, For the first Target values ​​for each state parameter. For the first The actual values ​​of each state parameter. For the first The maximum value of each state parameter The number of state parameters involved in the matching.

[0028] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the generation and storage of structured logs specifically includes:

[0029] Generate a structured log containing instruction identifiers, verification times, verification results at each level, and reasons for non-compliance;

[0030] The structured logs are encrypted using an encryption algorithm and then stored in the database.

[0031] The structured log can be queried by instruction identifier, verification time, or operation object.

[0032] This invention also proposes a scheduling instruction security verification system based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, comprising:

[0033] The instruction parsing module is used to receive scheduling instruction text and parse it into a structured format containing the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters;

[0034] The syntax verification module is used to perform syntax verification on the structured format based on the syntax rule base, and to check the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format;

[0035] The semantic verification module is used to trigger semantic verification when the syntax verification passes. It obtains multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object based on the semantic rule library, determines whether the structured format triggers the conflict conditions of each semantic rule and obtains the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule, calculates the operation logic conflict coefficient according to the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value, and compares the operation logic conflict coefficient with the first threshold.

[0036] The status acquisition module is used to acquire the real-time status parameters of the operation object when the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold.

[0037] The state matching module is used to extract the target value of the state parameter corresponding to the structured format based on the state matching rule base, calculate the normalized deviation between the target value of the state parameter and the real-time state parameter, calculate the instruction and state matching degree based on the normalized deviation, and compare the instruction and state matching degree with a second threshold.

[0038] The decision execution module is used to allow the scheduling instruction when the syntax check passes, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to a first threshold, and the instruction and state matching degree is greater than or equal to a second threshold; otherwise, it intercepts the scheduling instruction.

[0039] The log storage module is used to record the verification results of each layer, generate structured logs, and store them.

[0040] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0041] 1. This invention creatively constructs a three-layer linkage verification architecture of syntax, semantics, and state, breaking through the limitations of single-layer verification in existing technologies. Through a progressive verification mechanism, it not only quickly screens for format errors at the syntax layer, but also deeply identifies operational logic conflicts at the semantic layer, and accurately matches the real-time status of the device at the state layer, thus achieving three-dimensional prevention and control of instruction security risks.

[0042] 2. This invention introduces two quantitative indicators: the operational logic conflict coefficient and the instruction-state matching degree. Combined with risk level differentiation weights and normalized deviation calculations, it transforms abstract security risks into a calculable numerical evaluation system. This quantitative mechanism realizes the shift from subjective experience-based judgment to objective numerical decision-making, significantly improving the intelligence and accuracy of verification.

[0043] 3. This invention, through outlier removal and moving average filtering in data preprocessing, combined with the full-process recording of encrypted logs, forms a complete closed loop of "data purification – multi-layer verification – decision execution – traceable auditing." This closed-loop mechanism not only ensures the reliability of the verification basis but also achieves transparency in the decision-making process, comprehensively improving the systematicness and credibility of scheduling instruction security management. Attached Figure Description

[0044] The accompanying drawings are provided to further illustrate the invention and form part of the specification. They are used in conjunction with embodiments of the invention to explain the invention and do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings:

[0045] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to the present invention.

[0046] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a scheduling instruction security verification system based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0047] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the preferred embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0048] Example 1: As Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, comprising:

[0049] S100: Receives scheduling instruction text and parses it into a structured format containing the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters;

[0050] Specifically, the system receives dispatch instruction text, which is typically input by the dispatcher through a dispatch terminal or issued from a higher-level dispatch system. Upon receiving the dispatch instruction text, the system parses it, converting the natural language or semi-structured instruction text into a structured format that includes the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters.

[0051] The parsing process employs word segmentation and keyword extraction methods to identify key information in the instruction text. The operation object refers to the electrical equipment being operated on, such as the unique identifier or name of equipment like circuit breakers, disconnectors, and transformers; the operation type refers to the action performed on the equipment, such as closing, opening, engaging, and disengaging commands; and the operation parameters refer to additional information related to the operation, such as operation time, operation mode, and target parameter values.

[0052] After parsing, the system organizes the extracted information into a predefined structured data format. This format includes fields for the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters, facilitating unified processing by the subsequent validation module. The structured format can be stored using key-value pairs or a standardized data structure.

[0053] Furthermore, S100 also includes: receiving equipment parameters from the power dispatch data network and removing outliers from the equipment parameters.

[0054] Specifically, the equipment parameters include information such as the operating status of each power device, electrical measurement values, and the status of protection devices. Because the data in the power dispatch data network may contain outliers due to communication interference, sensor malfunctions, or data transmission errors, the system performs outlier filtering on the received equipment parameters.

[0055] Outlier removal employs a combination of threshold judgment and statistical analysis. First, reasonable upper and lower thresholds are set based on the physical characteristics of the equipment parameters; data exceeding these thresholds are marked as outliers. Second, statistical analysis is performed on the time-series data to identify abrupt changes or isolated points that significantly deviate from historical data. Once an outlier is detected, it is removed from the system, and the most recent valid value or interpolation methods are used to repair the data, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the equipment parameters used in subsequent verification processes.

[0056] Through the above analysis and data preprocessing, standardized instruction data and reliable device parameter foundations are provided for the subsequent three-layer verification mechanism, thereby improving the overall accuracy and reliability of the verification.

[0057] S200: Perform syntax validation on the structured format based on the syntax rule base, and check the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format;

[0058] Furthermore, the check of the integrity of the instruction format and the validity of the keywords in the structured format specifically includes:

[0059] Check whether the structured format is missing an operation object or operation type;

[0060] Compare whether the object being operated on is in the list of valid devices in the device parameter library;

[0061] Check whether the operation type is in the preset list of valid operation types.

[0062] Specifically, the system performs syntax validation on the structured format generated in step S100 based on a pre-established syntax rule base to ensure the legality of the scheduling instructions at the format and keyword levels. The syntax rule base stores the basic format specifications and a list of legal keywords that the scheduling instructions must follow, providing a basis for judgment for the first-level validation.

[0063] Syntax validation primarily checks the integrity of structured instruction formats and the validity of keywords, specifically including the following three aspects:

[0064] First, the system checks if the structured format is missing any operation objects or operation types. It iterates through each field in the structured format, determining if the operation object and operation type fields exist and are not empty. Operation objects and operation types are core elements of scheduling instructions; the absence of either field will prevent instruction execution. Therefore, once the system detects a missing field, it immediately determines that the syntax validation has failed.

[0065] Secondly, the system compares the target device with the list of legitimate devices in the device parameter database. The system reads the list of legitimate devices from the database, which contains unique identifiers for all operable power equipment within the dispatch system's jurisdiction. The system compares the target device in the structured format with the list of legitimate devices one by one. If the target device is not in the list, it is determined to be illegitimate, indicating that the instruction may be directed to a non-existent device or a device outside the system's jurisdiction.

[0066] Next, the system compares the operation type with the preset list of valid operation types. The system maintains a list of valid operation types, which includes all standard operation types supported by the scheduling system, such as closing, opening, connecting, disconnecting, voltage boosting, and voltage reduction. The system compares the operation type in the structured format with the list of valid operation types. If the operation type is not in the list, it is determined to be invalid, indicating that the instruction contains an operation that the system cannot recognize or does not support.

[0067] Through the above three checks, the system completes the syntax-level verification of the scheduling instruction. Only when the structured format is complete and all keywords are valid will the syntax verification pass, and the system can trigger subsequent semantic verification; otherwise, the syntax verification will fail, the system will intercept the scheduling instruction and record the reason for the failure.

[0068] Syntax validation, as the first layer of the three-layer linkage mechanism, quickly screens for obvious format errors and illegal keywords at the forefront of instruction execution, preventing invalid instructions from entering subsequent complex logic validation stages and improving overall validation efficiency.

[0069] S300: When the syntax check passes, semantic check is triggered. Multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object are obtained based on the semantic rule base. It is determined whether the structured format triggers the conflict conditions of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule is obtained. The operation logic conflict coefficient is calculated according to the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value. The operation logic conflict coefficient is compared with the first threshold.

[0070] Specifically, after the syntax verification in step S200 passes, the system automatically triggers semantic verification to perform a deeper level of logical rationality check on the dispatching instructions. Semantic verification is based on a pre-established semantic rule base, which stores various operational logic rules in the field of power dispatching and is used to identify unreasonable operations that may lead to equipment damage, system failure, or safety risks.

[0071] The system first retrieves multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object in the structured format from the semantic rule base. Different types of power equipment have different operational constraints. For example, circuit breakers must follow the time interval rule of opening before closing, busbar operations must follow the rule of preventing voltage loss, and transformer operations must follow the load limitation rule, etc. The system extracts all semantic rules applicable to the equipment through the equipment type index of the operation object.

[0072] After acquiring the semantic rules, the system checks each structured format to determine if it triggers a conflict condition for that semantic rule, and then obtains the conflict determination value for each semantic rule. Each semantic rule defines specific conflict conditions, such as prohibiting operation when equipment is under maintenance, prohibiting the commissioning of new equipment when the system load exceeds limits, and prohibiting operation when the protection device malfunctions. The system compares the operation type, operation parameters, and current equipment status in the structured format with the conflict conditions of each semantic rule. If a conflict condition of a semantic rule is triggered, the conflict determination value of that rule is... The value is 1; if the conflict condition is not triggered, the conflict determination value is... The value is 0.

[0073] Furthermore, after obtaining the conflict determination values ​​of all semantic rules, the system calculates the operational logic conflict coefficient based on the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict determination value. The formula for calculating the operational logic conflict coefficient C is:

[0074] ;

[0075] in, For the first The weight of each semantic rule For the first The conflict determination value of the semantic rules. This represents the total number of semantic rules involved in the calculation. This formula, through a weighted summation, integrates the conflicts among multiple semantic rules into a single quantitative indicator, reflecting the severity of conflicts in the scheduling instruction's triggering operation logic.

[0076] Furthermore, each semantic rule in the semantic rule base is associated with a risk level, which includes high risk, medium risk, and low risk. The weight of each semantic rule is set according to the risk level.

[0077] Specifically, high-risk rules correspond to serious conflicts that may lead to equipment damage or system accidents, such as performing maintenance operations while the equipment is energized or performing high-risk operations when the protection device is deactivated; medium-risk rules correspond to general conflicts that may affect system stability, such as uneven load distribution or improper operation timing; low-risk rules correspond to minor conflicts that are not standardized but have little impact, such as incomplete operation records or operation time deviating from the plan.

[0078] The weights of each semantic rule are set according to the risk level. Specifically, high-risk rules are assigned larger weights, such as 0.8 to 1.0; medium-risk rules are assigned medium weights, such as 0.4 to 0.6; and low-risk rules are assigned smaller weights, such as 0.1 to 0.3. Through differentiated weight settings, the system can highlight the impact of high-risk conflicts when calculating the operational logic conflict coefficient, ensuring the effective identification of serious security risks.

[0079] Calculate the operational logic conflict coefficient The system then compares it with a preset first threshold. This first threshold is determined based on power dispatch safety requirements and historical experience data, and is typically set to a value between 0.3 and 0.5. If the operational logic conflict coefficient... If the logical conflict coefficient of the scheduling instruction is less than or equal to the first threshold, it indicates that the degree of logical conflict is within an acceptable range, the semantic verification passes, and the system continues to execute subsequent state matching verification; if the logical conflict coefficient of the operation is less than or equal to the first threshold, it indicates that the degree of logical conflict is within an acceptable range, the semantic verification passes, and the system continues to execute subsequent state matching verification; If the value exceeds the first threshold, it indicates that the scheduling instruction has a significant risk of logical conflict, the semantic verification fails, and the system intercepts the scheduling instruction.

[0080] Through the semantic verification process described above, the system further identifies logical rationality issues in scheduling instructions based on syntax verification, effectively preventing equipment damage or system failures caused by operational logic errors, and improving the intelligence level of scheduling instruction security verification.

[0081] S400: When the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, obtain the real-time status parameters of the operation object;

[0082] Specifically, when the operational logic conflict coefficient calculated in step S300 is less than or equal to the first threshold, it indicates that the dispatching instruction has passed semantic verification, and the system enters the preparation stage of the third-level verification, namely the state matching verification, to obtain the real-time status parameters of the operated object. The system collects the current operating status information of the operated object in real time through the power dispatching data network or SCADA system. The real-time status parameters include multiple operating data of the operated object, such as the current open / closed position of the circuit breaker, electrical parameters such as current and voltage, equipment temperature, the on / off status of associated protection devices, and the operating mode of the equipment. The system queries and extracts the corresponding real-time status parameters from the data acquisition system based on the equipment type and unique identifier of the operated object.

[0083] Furthermore, obtaining the real-time status parameters of the operation object also includes: performing a moving average filtering process on the real-time status parameters to remove instantaneous interference values.

[0084] Specifically, the system sets a time window length, such as the most recent 5 to 10 sampling periods, and performs an arithmetic average of the sampled values ​​within the time window to obtain a filtered and smoothed value as the effective value of the real-time state parameter.

[0085] The moving average filtering process is performed sequentially over time. Whenever a new sample value arrives, the system removes the oldest sample value from the time window, adds the new sample value to the time window, and recalculates the average value. This moving window mechanism effectively suppresses high-frequency interference and random noise while maintaining the ability to track the true changes in state parameters and avoiding excessive lag.

[0086] For switch status parameters, such as the open / closed position of circuit breakers and the on / off status of protection devices, the system uses a majority voting method for filtering. Specifically, the status values ​​are statistically analyzed within a time window, and the status value that occurs most frequently is selected as the valid status to eliminate instantaneous status jumps caused by contact bounce or communication errors.

[0087] Through the above-mentioned moving average filtering process, the system obtains reliable real-time state parameters, providing an accurate data basis for the state matching degree calculation in the subsequent step S500, avoiding false interception or false release caused by instantaneous interference, and improving the robustness and reliability of the scheduling instruction security verification.

[0088] S500: Extract the target value of the state parameter corresponding to the structured format based on the state matching rule base, calculate the normalized deviation between the target value of the state parameter and the real-time state parameter, calculate the instruction and state matching degree based on the normalized deviation, and compare the instruction and state matching degree with the second threshold.

[0089] Furthermore, the target value of the status parameter includes the target opening / closing state and target electrical parameters of the operated object, and the real-time status parameter includes the current opening / closing state, current electrical parameters, and associated protection device status of the operated object.

[0090] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the matching degree between the instruction and the state is:

[0091] ;

[0092] in, For the first Target values ​​for each state parameter. For the first The actual values ​​of each state parameter. For the first The maximum value of each state parameter The number of state parameters involved in the matching.

[0093] Specifically, based on a pre-established state matching rule base, the system performs a matching verification between scheduling instructions and the real-time state of the operation object to determine whether the current device state meets the preconditions for instruction execution. The state matching rule base stores the device state requirements corresponding to different operation types, providing a basis for judgment for the third-layer verification.

[0094] The system first extracts the corresponding target values ​​of state parameters from the state matching rule base based on the operation object and operation type in the structured format. The target values ​​of state parameters define the ideal state or permissible range of states that the equipment should be in when performing a specific operation. The target values ​​of state parameters include the target open / closed state of the operation object and the target electrical parameters. The target open / closed state refers to the open / closed position that the equipment should be in before performing the operation; for example, when performing a closing operation on a circuit breaker, the target open / closed state should be in the open position. The target electrical parameters refer to the electrical quantity requirements that the equipment should meet when performing the operation, such as the bus voltage being within the rated range and the line current being below the safety threshold.

[0095] Correspondingly, the real-time status parameters acquired in step S400 include the current open / closed state of the operated object, current electrical parameters, and the status of associated protection devices. The current open / closed state reflects the actual open / closed position of the equipment; the current electrical parameters include real-time electrical measurements such as voltage, current, power, and frequency of the equipment; and the status of associated protection devices reflects the on / off status and operating condition of relay protection devices and automatic safety devices related to the operated object. The system compares and analyzes these real-time status parameters with the target values ​​of the status parameters.

[0096] Next, the system calculates the normalized deviation between the target value and the real-time state parameters. Since different types of state parameters have different dimensions and numerical ranges—for example, voltage is measured in kilovolts, current in amperes, and open / closed states are discrete values—the system uses a normalization method to unify the deviations of each parameter to the same numerical scale. The normalized deviation is calculated by dividing the difference between the target value and the actual value of each state parameter by the maximum range of that parameter, resulting in a dimensionless deviation value between 0 and 1.

[0097] After obtaining the normalized deviations of each state parameter, the system calculates the command-state matching degree based on the normalized deviations. The formula for calculating the command-state matching degree M is:

[0098] ;

[0099] in, For the first Target values ​​for each state parameter. For the first The actual values ​​of each state parameter. For the first The maximum value of each state parameter This represents the number of state parameters involved in the matching process. The formula calculates the average of the normalized deviations of all state parameters and subtracts this average deviation from 1 to obtain the matching degree. (Instruction and State Matching Degree) The value ranges from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the closer the real-time state is to the target state, and the more the preconditions for instruction execution are met. The closer the value is to 0, the greater the state deviation, and the greater the risk of instruction execution.

[0100] For discrete state parameters such as open / closed states, the system quantifies the state differences during calculation. For example, when the target open / closed state matches the current open / closed state, the normalized deviation of the parameter is 0; when they do not match, the normalized deviation is 1. For the status of associated protection devices, the system checks whether the protection device is in a normal operating state. If the protection device is abnormal or deactivated, the normalized deviation of the corresponding parameter is set to a larger value to reduce the matching degree.

[0101] The matching degree between instructions and states is calculated. The system then compares it with a preset second threshold. The second threshold is determined based on the safety margin requirements of power dispatching and actual operational experience, and is typically set to a value between 0.7 and 0.9. If the command and status matching degree M is greater than or equal to the second threshold, it indicates that the real-time status of the operated object highly matches the command execution requirements, and the status matching verification passes; if the command and status matching degree M is less than or equal to the second threshold, it indicates that the real-time status of the operated object highly matches the command execution requirements, and the status matching verification passes. If the value is less than the second threshold, it indicates that the current device status does not meet the conditions for instruction execution, posing an operational risk, and the status matching verification fails.

[0102] Through the aforementioned state matching and verification process, the system further verifies the executability of instructions from the perspective of the actual operating state of the equipment, based on syntax and semantic verification. This achieves deep integration and verification of instruction logic and field status, effectively preventing misoperation accidents caused by abnormal or mismatched equipment status, and ensuring the safety and reliability of scheduling instruction execution.

[0103] S600: When the syntax check passes, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, and the instruction and state matching degree is greater than or equal to the second threshold, the scheduling instruction is allowed; otherwise, the scheduling instruction is intercepted.

[0104] Specifically, the system first summarizes the syntax verification results of step S200, the operation logic conflict coefficient calculated in step S300, and the instruction-state matching degree calculated in step S500. The system then sequentially determines whether the following three conditions are all met: First, the syntax verification passes, meaning the structured format is complete and the keywords are valid; second, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, meaning the degree of logical conflict of the instruction is within an acceptable range; third, the instruction-state matching degree is greater than or equal to the second threshold, meaning the real-time state of the device meets the prerequisites for instruction execution.

[0105] When all three conditions above are met, the system determines that the dispatch instruction is safe and reliable and executes the release operation. The release operation specifically includes: the system marking the dispatch instruction as "verification passed" and transmitting the instruction to the dispatch execution module or issuing it to the field execution unit, allowing actual operation on the target object. Simultaneously, the system displays a release prompt to the dispatcher on the dispatch monitoring interface, informing the dispatcher that the instruction has passed all security checks and can be executed.

[0106] If any one or more of the above three conditions are not met, the system determines that the scheduling instruction poses a security risk and executes an interception operation. The interception operation specifically includes: marking the scheduling instruction as "verification failed," preventing the instruction from entering the execution process, and ensuring that no actual operation is performed on the target object. Simultaneously, the system displays an instruction interception warning to the dispatcher on the scheduling monitoring interface, clearly indicating the verification level at which the instruction failed, such as "syntax verification failed," "operation logic conflict coefficient exceeded limit," or "state matching degree insufficient," and prompting the dispatcher to check the instruction content or wait for the device status to recover before re-issuing the instruction.

[0107] Through the aforementioned decision-making mechanism for granting or blocking orders, the system achieves comprehensive security oversight of dispatch instructions. The three-layer linkage mechanism ensures that dispatch instructions are only executed if the format is correct, the logic is sound, and the status matches, thus eliminating the risk of misoperation due to instruction errors, logical conflicts, or abnormal statuses. Compared to traditional single-verification methods, this three-layer linkage mechanism significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of dispatch instruction security verification through a progressive and mutually supportive verification approach, providing strong support for the safe and stable operation of the power system.

[0108] S700: Records the verification results of each layer, generates structured logs, and stores them.

[0109] Specifically, the system first records the verification results at each level, including detailed verification information for three levels: syntax verification, semantic verification, and state matching verification. For syntax verification, the system records the results of the instruction format integrity check, the operation object legality check, and the operation type legality check. For semantic verification, the system records the triggered list of semantic rules, the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule, the calculated operation logic conflict coefficient, and the comparison result with the first threshold. For state matching verification, the system records the target value of the state parameter, the real-time state parameter, the normalized deviation of each state parameter, the calculated instruction and state matching degree, and the comparison result with the second threshold.

[0110] Based on the recorded verification results at each layer, the system generates a structured log containing instruction identifiers, verification times, verification results at each layer, and reasons for non-compliance. The structured log is organized using a unified data format for easy subsequent querying and analysis. Instruction identifiers uniquely identify each scheduling instruction, typically generated by a combination of timestamp and sequence number; verification times record the start and end times of instruction verification, accurate to the second or millisecond; verification results at each layer record the pass or fail status of syntax verification, semantic verification, and state matching verification; reasons for non-compliance record the specific reasons for verification failure, such as "operation object is not in the list of legal devices," "operation logic conflict coefficient 0.65 exceeds the first threshold of 0.5," or "instruction and state matching degree 0.62 is lower than the second threshold of 0.8," etc.

[0111] After generating structured logs, the system encrypts the logs using an encryption algorithm before storing them in the database. The encryption process employs either symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES or RSA, to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of log data during storage and transmission, preventing unauthorized access and tampering. The system uses a pre-configured encryption key to encrypt the log content, generating ciphertext which is then stored in a dedicated log database. The log database uses either a relational database or a time-series database, supporting efficient storage and fast retrieval of massive amounts of log data.

[0112] The system supports querying structured logs by command identifier, verification time, or operation object. Dispatchers or administrators can input query conditions through the log query interface. The system retrieves the corresponding encrypted logs from the database based on the query conditions, decrypts them, and displays them to the user. Querying by command identifier allows tracing the complete verification process of a specific command; querying by verification time allows statistics on command verification within a certain time period, analyzing the pass rate and interception rate; querying by operation object allows understanding the historical verification records of commands related to specific devices, identifying high-frequency interception devices and potential risk points.

[0113] Through the generation, encrypted storage, and flexible query functions of the aforementioned structured logs, the system provides a complete instruction verification and audit trail for power dispatch management, supports post-event analysis, fault diagnosis, and security assessment, enhances the manageability and maintainability of the dispatch instruction security verification system, and meets the stringent requirements of the power industry for full-process recording and traceability of dispatch operations.

[0114] Example 2: Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment employs a dispatch instruction security verification system based on a three-layer linkage mechanism. This system is deployed in a provincial power dispatch center and is used to perform security verification on substation equipment operation instructions. The system includes an instruction parsing module, a syntax verification module, a semantic verification module, a status acquisition module, a status matching module, a decision execution module, and a log storage module.

[0115] One day, the dispatcher issued an operation instruction: "Perform a closing operation on circuit breaker No. 2 of a 110kV substation." After receiving the instruction, the instruction parsing module parsed it into a structured format, extracted the operation object as "circuit breaker No. 2", and the operation type as "closing".

[0116] The syntax verification module checks the structured format, confirms that the operation object and operation type fields are complete, and that circuit breaker No. 2 is in the list of valid devices, and the closing operation is in the list of valid operation types. The syntax verification passes.

[0117] After the semantic verification module is started, it retrieves four semantic rules related to circuit breaker closing from the semantic rule base. The system determines that the line protection device corresponding to circuit breaker No. 2 is under maintenance, triggering the rule "Prohibit closing when protection device is off" (high risk, weight 0.9), with a conflict judgment value of 1. The operational logic conflict coefficient is calculated as follows: The value exceeds the first threshold of 0.2. The system determines that the instruction has an operational logic conflict and fails the semantic verification.

[0118] After comprehensively verifying the results, the decision execution module intercepted the instruction and displayed the following message on the dispatch interface: "Instruction interception: The protection device of circuit breaker No. 2 is currently under maintenance. Performing the closing operation carries a high risk. The operation logic conflict coefficient of 0.225 exceeds the safety threshold of 0.2. Please restore the protection device before proceeding with the operation."

[0119] The dispatcher contacted on-site personnel as instructed and confirmed that the protection device maintenance work had been completed but not yet put back into operation. After the on-site personnel put the protection device back into normal operation, the dispatcher reissued the closing command. At this time, the semantic verification module recalculated, and no conflicts were triggered in any semantic rules, with the conflict coefficient remaining unchanged. It passes semantic validation.

[0120] The status acquisition module obtains the real-time status of circuit breaker No. 2 from the SCADA system: current position is open, line voltage is 110.2kV, and protection device status is normal. The status matching module extracts the target values ​​of the status parameters for the closing operation: target position is open, target voltage range is 105-115kV, and target protection status is normally engaged. The system calculates the command and status matching degree. The value is greater than the second threshold of 0.8, and the state matching verification is passed.

[0121] The decision execution module determined that all three layers of verification had passed, and the system released the instruction and issued it for execution. Circuit breaker No. 2 successfully completed the closing operation.

[0122] The log storage module fully records the two instruction verification processes. The first instruction (CMD20250715-008) was blocked due to an excessive operation logic conflict coefficient. The second instruction (CMD20250715-009) was allowed after passing the three-layer verification. The encrypted logs are stored in the database for easy subsequent querying and auditing.

[0123] This embodiment demonstrates the system's ability to identify anomalies in protection devices through semantic verification, effectively avoiding the risk of equipment damage that may result from unprotected circuit breaker closing. The three-layer linkage mechanism achieves comprehensive verification from format and logic to status. Compared with traditional methods that only check the instruction format, this significantly improves the security protection level of dispatch instructions and provides a reliable guarantee for the safe operation of the power system.

[0124] Finally, it should be noted that the above descriptions are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, characterized in that, include: S100: Receives scheduling instruction text and parses it into a structured format containing the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters; S200: Perform syntax validation on the structured format based on the syntax rule base, and check the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format; S300: When the syntax check passes, semantic check is triggered. Multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object are obtained based on the semantic rule base. It is determined whether the structured format triggers the conflict conditions of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule is obtained. The operation logic conflict coefficient is calculated according to the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value. The operation logic conflict coefficient is compared with the first threshold. The formula for calculating the operational logic conflict coefficient is as follows: ； in, The coefficient for operational logic conflict. For the first The weight of each semantic rule For the first The conflict determination value of the semantic rule, when the structured format triggers the first... When there is a conflict condition in the semantic rules The value is 1 if it is not 1, and 0 otherwise. The total number of semantic rules involved in the calculation; S400: When the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, obtain the real-time status parameters of the operation object; S500: Extract the target value of the state parameter corresponding to the structured format based on the state matching rule base, calculate the normalized deviation between the target value of the state parameter and the real-time state parameter, calculate the instruction and state matching degree based on the normalized deviation, and compare the instruction and state matching degree with the second threshold. The formula for calculating the matching degree between the instruction and the state is as follows: ； in, For the degree of matching between instructions and states, For the first Target values ​​for each state parameter. For the first The actual values ​​of each state parameter. For the first The maximum value of each state parameter The number of state parameters involved in the matching; S600: When the syntax check passes, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold, and the instruction and state matching degree is greater than or equal to the second threshold, the scheduling instruction is allowed; otherwise, the scheduling instruction is intercepted. S700: Records the verification results of each layer, generates structured logs, and stores them.

2. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, The S100 further includes: receiving equipment parameters from the power dispatch data network and removing outliers from the equipment parameters.

3. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, The check of the integrity of the instruction format and the validity of the keywords in the structured format specifically includes: Check whether the structured format is missing an operation object or operation type; Compare whether the object being operated on is in the list of valid devices in the device parameter library; Check whether the operation type is in the preset list of valid operation types.

4. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, Each semantic rule in the semantic rule base is associated with a risk level, which includes high risk, medium risk, and low risk. The weight of each semantic rule is set according to the risk level.

5. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, Obtaining the real-time status parameters of the operation object further includes: performing a moving average filtering process on the real-time status parameters to remove instantaneous interference values.

6. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, The target value of the status parameter includes the target opening / closing state and target electrical parameters of the operated object, and the real-time status parameter includes the current opening / closing state, current electrical parameters, and associated protection device status of the operated object.

7. The scheduling instruction security verification method based on a three-layer linkage mechanism according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation and storage of structured logs specifically includes: Generate a structured log containing instruction identifiers, verification times, verification results at each level, and reasons for non-compliance; The structured logs are encrypted using an encryption algorithm and then stored in the database. The structured log can be queried by instruction identifier, verification time, or operation object.

8. A scheduling instruction security verification system based on a three-layer linkage mechanism, characterized in that, include: The instruction parsing module is used to receive scheduling instruction text and parse it into a structured format containing the operation object, operation type, and operation parameters; The syntax verification module is used to perform syntax verification on the structured format based on the syntax rule base, and to check the integrity of the instruction format and the legality of the keywords in the structured format; The semantic verification module is used to trigger semantic verification when the syntax verification passes. It obtains multiple semantic rules corresponding to the operation object based on the semantic rule library, determines whether the structured format triggers the conflict conditions of each semantic rule and obtains the conflict judgment value of each semantic rule, calculates the operation logic conflict coefficient according to the weight of each semantic rule and the conflict judgment value, and compares the operation logic conflict coefficient with the first threshold. The formula for calculating the operational logic conflict coefficient is as follows: ； in, The coefficient for operational logic conflict. For the first The weight of each semantic rule For the first The conflict determination value of the semantic rule, when the structured format triggers the first... When there is a conflict condition in the semantic rules The value is 1 if it is not 1, and 0 otherwise. The total number of semantic rules involved in the calculation; The status acquisition module is used to acquire the real-time status parameters of the operation object when the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to the first threshold. The state matching module is used to extract the target value of the state parameter corresponding to the structured format based on the state matching rule base, calculate the normalized deviation between the target value of the state parameter and the real-time state parameter, calculate the instruction and state matching degree based on the normalized deviation, and compare the instruction and state matching degree with a second threshold. The formula for calculating the matching degree between the instruction and the state is as follows: ； in, For the degree of matching between instructions and states, For the first Target values ​​for each state parameter. For the first The actual values ​​of each state parameter. For the first The maximum value of each state parameter The number of state parameters involved in the matching; The decision execution module is used to allow the scheduling instruction when the syntax check passes, the operation logic conflict coefficient is less than or equal to a first threshold, and the instruction and state matching degree is greater than or equal to a second threshold; otherwise, it intercepts the scheduling instruction. The log storage module is used to record the verification results of each layer, generate structured logs, and store them.

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