Vehicle information safety protection system based on combination of national secret algorithm and PUF (Physical Unclonable Function)

Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle information safety protection system based on combination of a national cryptographic algorithm and a PUF (Physical Unclonable Function), which belongs to the field of vehicle information safety and encrypted communication, and comprises a response generation module used for generating a PUF response in a safety chip of a vehicle; the key derivation module is used for generating an encrypted master key through a key derivation function based on the PUF response, the vehicle owner identity and the random number nonce; the encryption and signature module is used for generating a ciphertext and carrying out digital signature on the ciphertext; the state monitoring module is used for monitoring the running state of the vehicle hardware; the key management module is used for triggering a failure operation of the encrypted master key when the state monitoring module detects that the hardware state is abnormal; and the decryption verification module is used for regenerating the PUF response and verifying the consistency of the generated key so as to execute data decryption. According to the method, hardware-level encryption protection of the vehicle data is realized through combination of the PUF and the national cryptographic algorithm, so that the safety of the vehicle owner data is protected in the whole life cycle of the vehicle.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle information security and encrypted communication technology, specifically a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology, vehicles are gradually becoming mobile terminals integrating communication, computing, and data interaction. During operation, vehicles generate a large amount of sensitive data, including owner identity information, driving trajectory, device status, and vehicle control commands. If this data is leaked or forged during transmission and storage, it may lead to serious security problems such as privacy breaches, remote control attacks, and illegal tampering. Current in-vehicle encryption protection mainly uses symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES, SM4, RSA, and SM2. These algorithms offer good security at the data encryption level, but still have the following shortcomings: Insufficient key storage security: Encryption keys are usually stored in software, which makes them vulnerable to leakage when chips are disassembled, vehicles are resold, or parts are reused.

[0003] Weak binding between keys and hardware: Traditional key generation mechanisms are not strongly bound to hardware, allowing attackers to reproduce the key environment on other devices and achieve unauthorized decryption.

[0004] Hardware replacement detection failure: After vehicle hardware components (such as ECU, TCU, sensors, etc.) are replaced, the system cannot automatically recognize the invalid key, which poses a backdoor risk.

[0005] Lack of adaptive failure mechanism: When hardware is disassembled or the environment changes, the system cannot automatically detect and trigger key failure, resulting in the continued existence of security risks.

[0006] Therefore, there is an urgent need for an encryption system that binds keys to hardware, is non-replicable, and possesses adaptive failure capabilities to protect vehicle owner data security throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. To this end, those skilled in the art have provided a vehicle information security protection system based on a combination of Chinese national cryptographic algorithms and PUF (Power-Only Detection and Failure) to address the problems mentioned in the background section. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of this invention is to provide a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF. By combining PUF with national cryptographic algorithms, hardware-level encryption protection of vehicle data is achieved, so as to protect the security of vehicle owner data throughout the vehicle's life cycle and solve the problems mentioned in the background art.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF includes: The response generation module is used to generate a unique physical fingerprint response (PUF) in the vehicle's security chip. The key derivation module is used to generate an encrypted master key based on the PUF response, the vehicle owner's identity identifier, and the random number nonce through a key derivation function; The encryption and signature module is used to encrypt vehicle data using the encryption master key to generate ciphertext, and to digitally sign the ciphertext. The status monitoring module is used to monitor the operating status of the vehicle hardware; The key management module is used to trigger the invalidation operation of the encryption master key when the status monitoring module detects an abnormal hardware status. The decryption verification module is used to regenerate the PUF response and verify the consistency of the generated key in a legitimate hardware environment in order to perform data decryption.

[0009] As a further aspect of the present invention: the response generation module is integrated into the vehicle's safety chip, and the PUF response is generated based on the physical process deviation of the safety chip.

[0010] As a further aspect of the present invention: the key derivation module uses the key derivation function KDF implemented by the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm to combine the PUF response, the vehicle owner identity identifier, and the random number nonce to generate the encryption master key K. The process is as follows: ; in, For PUF response, It serves as an identification for the vehicle owner.

[0011] As a further aspect of the present invention: the encryption and signature module includes: The encryption unit is used to perform symmetric encryption on the vehicle data Data using the national cryptographic SM4 algorithm and the encryption master key K to generate ciphertext C. The process is represented as follows: ; The signature unit is used to calculate the hash digest of the ciphertext C using the national cryptographic SM3 algorithm, and to digitally sign the hash digest using the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm based on the private key corresponding to the vehicle owner's identity identifier. The process is as follows: ; in, The hash digest calculated from the ciphertext. For car owner's private key and with correspond, For digital signatures.

[0012] As a further aspect of the present invention, the hardware status monitored by the status monitoring module includes: the connection status of the electronic control unit (ECU), the system power supply status, the position continuity of the GPS signal, and the hardware integrity verification result.

[0013] As a further aspect of the present invention: the key management module triggers the invalidation operation of the encrypted master key when the status monitoring module detects any of the following situations: ECU connection is disconnected, power interruption duration exceeds a preset threshold, GPS location experiences discontinuous jumps, or hardware integrity verification fails.

[0014] As a further aspect of the present invention: when the decryption verification module performs decryption, it regenerates the PUF response in the security chip. and based on The vehicle owner's identity identifier and the random number nonce are used to recalculate the verification key. Only when the verification key is used When it matches the encrypted master key K, use Decrypt the ciphertext.

[0015] As a further aspect of the present invention, the system further includes a hardware replacement processing module, which is used to generate a new encryption master key based on the PUF response of the new hardware after the vehicle hardware components are replaced, and to invalidate the encryption master key of the original hardware.

[0016] As a further aspect of the present invention, the system also includes a vehicle owner change processing module, which is used to generate a new encrypted master key based on the new vehicle owner identity and the PUF response after the change of vehicle ownership, and invalidate the encrypted master key bound to the original vehicle owner identity.

[0017] As a further embodiment of the present invention: the response generation module uses at least one of the following structures to generate the PUF response: SRAM PUF, ring oscillator PUF, or capacitor array PUF.

[0018] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: 1. Hardware Binding Security: PUF ensures that each vehicle has a unique key, and no physical copying or simulation can reproduce the key, fundamentally solving the key leakage problem.

[0019] 2. Dynamic self-destruct mechanism: When the vehicle hardware is abnormal, the system automatically invalidates the key to prevent secondary use and protect the owner's privacy and data security.

[0020] 3. Compliant with national cryptographic standards: Adopting SM2, SM3, and SM4 algorithms, it is fully compatible with domestic information security policy requirements and is suitable for domestically produced vehicles and vehicle networking platforms.

[0021] 4. Performance-friendly: The encryption operation has low complexity, and the SM4 symmetric encryption is fast, making it suitable for real-time processing in automotive embedded environments without affecting the normal functions of the vehicle.

[0022] 5. High scalability: It can be integrated with V2X communication protocols, security chips, and cloud authentication systems, supporting a variety of application scenarios. Attached Figure Description

[0023] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of Chinese cryptographic algorithms and PUF. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the data encryption process in a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of data decryption verification in a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF. Detailed Implementation

[0024] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0025] As mentioned in the background section of this application, research has found that existing vehicle encryption protection mainly uses symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES, SM4, RSA, and SM2. These algorithms have good security at the data encryption level, but still have the following shortcomings: (1) Insufficient key storage security: Encryption keys are usually stored in software, which can easily be leaked when the chip is disassembled, the vehicle is resold, or the parts are reused. (2) Weak key-hardware binding: Traditional key generation mechanisms have no strong binding relationship with hardware, and attackers can reproduce the key environment on other devices to achieve illegal decryption. (3) Lack of hardware replacement detection: After the vehicle hardware components (such as ECU, TCU, sensors, etc.) are replaced, the system cannot automatically identify key failure, which poses a backdoor risk. (4) Lack of adaptive failure mechanism: When the hardware is disassembled or the environment changes, the system cannot automatically detect and trigger key failure, resulting in the continued existence of security risks and certain defects.

[0026] To address the aforementioned deficiencies, this application discloses a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF. By combining PUF with national cryptographic algorithms, hardware-level encryption protection of vehicle data is achieved, thereby protecting the security of vehicle owner data throughout the vehicle's lifecycle.

[0027] The following will describe in detail, with reference to the accompanying drawings, how the solution of this application solves the above-mentioned technical problems.

[0028] Please see Figure 1 This invention discloses a vehicle information security protection system based on a combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF (Physical Fingerprint Array) technology. The system includes: a response generation module for generating a unique physical fingerprint response (PUF) in the vehicle's security chip; a key derivation module for generating an encryption master key based on the PUF response, the vehicle owner's identity identifier, and a random number (nonce) using a key derivation function; an encryption and signature module for encrypting vehicle data using the encryption master key to generate ciphertext and digitally signing the ciphertext; a status monitoring module for monitoring the operating status of the vehicle hardware; a key management module for triggering the encryption master key's invalidation operation when the status monitoring module detects an abnormal hardware status; and a decryption verification module for regenerating the PUF response and verifying the consistency of the generated key in a legitimate hardware environment to perform data decryption. By integrating five functional modules—key derivation, encryption signing, status monitoring, key management, and decryption verification—the system achieves hardware-bound encryption and dynamic security control throughout the entire process of vehicle data generation, transmission, storage, and access, providing a systematic solution for vehicle information security.

[0029] In this embodiment, the response generation module is integrated into the vehicle's security chip, and the PUF response is generated based on the physical process variations of the security chip. The encryption key is uniquely bound to the physical process variations of the vehicle's security chip. This hardware-dependent response generation mechanism ensures the key's non-copyability and uniqueness, physically eliminating the risk of key counterfeiting or cross-device migration, thus laying the foundation for system hardware-level security.

[0030] In this embodiment, the key derivation module uses the key derivation function KDF, implemented using the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm, to combine the PUF response, vehicle owner identification, and random number nonce to generate the encryption master key K. The process is as follows: ; in, For PUF response, It serves as an identification for the vehicle owner.

[0031] The SM3 algorithm, a national cryptographic standard, integrates the PUF response, vehicle owner identification, and random number into a unified encryption master key. This process not only enhances the randomness and entropy of the key but also achieves session independence and identity association of the key by introducing the vehicle owner's identity and random number, thereby improving the key's resistance to replay and prediction.

[0032] In this embodiment, the encryption and signature module includes: The encryption unit is used to perform symmetric encryption on vehicle data Data using the national cryptographic SM4 algorithm and encryption master key K to generate ciphertext C. The process is represented as follows: ; The signature unit is used to calculate the hash digest of ciphertext C using the national cryptographic SM3 algorithm, and to digitally sign the hash digest using the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm based on the private key corresponding to the vehicle owner's identity. The process is represented as follows: ; in, The hash digest calculated from the ciphertext. For car owner's private key and with correspond, For digital signatures.

[0033] The system employs the national standard SM4 algorithm for efficient symmetric encryption, and utilizes SM3 and SM2 algorithms for data integrity verification and authentication. This combination of encryption and signature mechanisms ensures both data confidentiality and the reliability and immutability of the data source, meeting the dual requirements of data security and trusted communication in the connected vehicle environment.

[0034] In this embodiment, the hardware status monitored by the status monitoring module includes: the connection status of the Electronic Control Unit (ECU), the system power supply status, the location continuity of the GPS signal, and the hardware integrity verification results. It performs real-time, multi-dimensional monitoring of the operational status of key vehicle hardware (such as the ECU, power supply system, and GPS). This comprehensive status awareness capability is a prerequisite for the system to achieve dynamic security response and adaptive key management, providing a basis for triggering the subsequent key expiration mechanism.

[0035] In this embodiment, the key management module triggers the encryption master key invalidation operation when the status monitoring module detects any of the following situations: ECU connection disconnection, power interruption duration exceeding a preset threshold, discontinuous GPS location jumps, or hardware integrity verification failure. This transforms the abstract concept of "hardware status anomaly" into a detectable and identifiable concrete event. By setting explicit failure trigger conditions (such as connection disconnection, power timeout, location jumps, etc.), the system can automatically activate the key protection mechanism when a potential physical attack or fault is detected, preventing the key from being used in an insecure environment.

[0036] In this embodiment, when the decryption verification module performs decryption, it regenerates the PUF response in the security chip. and based on The vehicle owner's identity and a random number (nonce) are used to recalculate the verification key. Only when the verification key is used When it matches the encryption master key K, use The encrypted data is decrypted. By regenerating the PUF response and comparing key consistency, the system implements hardware-bound decryption access control, effectively preventing encrypted data from being ported to other devices for cracking and enhancing the hardware dependence of data access.

[0037] In this embodiment, the system also includes a hardware replacement processing module, which generates a new encryption master key based on the PUF response of the new hardware after the vehicle hardware components are replaced, and invalidates the encryption master key of the original hardware. This mechanism ensures that the new hardware uses the new key and the old key becomes invalid immediately, realizing the synchronization of the key and hardware lifecycle, avoiding the risk of historical data leakage caused by hardware transfer, and supporting the secure operation and maintenance of the system throughout the entire vehicle lifecycle.

[0038] In this embodiment, the system also includes a vehicle owner change processing module, which generates a new encrypted master key based on the new vehicle owner's identity and PUF response after a change of vehicle ownership, and invalidates the encrypted master key bound to the original vehicle owner's identity. By rebinding the key to the vehicle owner's identity, the system can achieve logical isolation between the old and new vehicle owner's data, ensuring that the original vehicle owner's privacy data is not accessed by the new vehicle owner, while supporting the new vehicle owner's legitimate use of the newly generated data, thus realizing the accompanying transfer of data permissions.

[0039] In this embodiment, the response generation module uses at least one structure selected from SRAM PUF, ring oscillator PUF, or capacitor array PUF to generate the PUF response. Multiple optional PUF physical implementations (such as SRAM PUF, ring oscillator PUF, etc.) are provided. This flexibility allows the system to select the appropriate PUF type based on the process characteristics and cost requirements of different security chips, ensuring security while also considering the feasibility and adaptability of system implementation.

[0040] To further illustrate the present invention, the following describes in detail, with reference to embodiments, a vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF provided by the present invention.

[0041] Example 1: Data encryption process; The data encryption process after the vehicle is powered on is as follows: Before the above process begins, this embodiment first performs initialization calibration on the embedded PUF circuit. The PUF generates challenge-response pairs based on random process differences such as transistor threshold, resistor-capacitor deviation, and metal interconnect roughness. Each time it is powered on, it will provide a response to the same challenge that is bound to the chip fingerprint, thus making the key naturally bound to the hardware.

[0042] A PUF (Programmable Component Array) is a physical device that randomly maps an excitation signal to a response signal. This random mapping arises from variations in the components' properties caused by random process deviations and environmental changes during manufacturing. These inherent differences in physical structure are difficult to predict and control. In practice, even PUF instances produced under the same process and batch, based on the same design structure, will still have different mapping methods. Therefore, it is impossible to physically replicate or recreate two completely identical PUF instances; that is, they are physically unclonable.

[0043] The random mapping provided by PUF is essentially a random oracle mapping. Given a PUF instance, for an unqueried stimulus input, its corresponding response is equivalent to a randomly selected response; while for a queried stimulus, its corresponding response will be uniquely determined based on the initial query. The working principle of PUF exhibits characteristics of a random function to some extent, but this randomness, stemming from differences in physical fabrication, often results in a small number of error bits in its output response. Therefore, PUF usually needs to be used in combination with error correction schemes such as fuzz extractors to generate identical responses under the same stimulus. On the one hand, even with a known internal structure, the PUF response is difficult to calculate directly from the input stimulus; on the other hand, different PUF instances based on the same algorithm will produce different responses under the same stimulus.

[0044] The non-replicability of PUF is reflected in the following aspects: (1) the random noise of the production process is unpredictable, and the same mask and process line cannot replicate completely identical physical characteristics; (2) the response space is huge, and even if an attacker intercepts a small amount of CRP, they cannot build an accurate model; (3) the system adopts fuzzy error correction and replay detection mechanisms such as BCH / LDPC to limit the number of external probes while ensuring stable output in a legitimate environment. The above measures ensure that only the original hardware can stably restore the key.

[0045] To further enhance security, this embodiment combines SRAM PUF, ring oscillation PUF, and capacitor array PUF to sample initial power-on values, frequency distribution, and charge / discharge time, respectively, and derives the master key through an entropy pool and KDF. Multi-source heterogeneous entropy input significantly improves key entropy and anti-prediction capabilities. The system also maintains a PUF challenge scheduling table in the security controller, randomly selecting and counting the lifetime of each key-derived challenge to prevent external side-channel modeling on fixed challenges, ensuring from a process perspective that PUF responses are non-replayable and non-replicable. Figure 2 As shown, the specific process is as follows: Step 1: Power on the vehicle; The safety module (MCU / TPM) activates the PUF circuit.

[0046] Step 2: Generate PUF response; Generate a unique physical fingerprint response (For example: a 128-bit binary string); Will Stored in a secure area, not exposed to the outside world.

[0047] Step 3: Read the vehicle owner's identity information; The ECU reads the vehicle owner's ID from the vehicle management system: ; verify The validity and integrity of.

[0048] Step 4: Generate random numbers; Generate a random number nonce (64 bits).

[0049] Step 5: Key Derivation; Execute the key derivation function: ; Implement KDF using the SM3 algorithm and output a 128-bit master key K.

[0050] Step 6: Read vehicle data; Read vehicle operation log data (including timestamp, GPS coordinates, vehicle speed, engine status, etc.).

[0051] Step 7: SM4 encryption; Encryption using the SM4 algorithm: ; Generate ciphertext C.

[0052] Step 8: SM3 summary; Compute the ciphertext digest: .

[0053] Step 9: SM2 Signature; Use the vehicle owner's private key Perform SM2 signing: .

[0054] Step 10: Upload data; Constructing the upload data packet: ; Uploaded to the cloud server via 4G / 5G network; Data is stored after the signature is verified in the cloud.

[0055] The national cryptographic algorithm has the following comprehensive advantages in data encryption and signature in this system: (1) Compliance and mutual recognition: SM2 / SM3 / SM4 are all certified by the State Cryptography Administration and can directly meet the regulatory audit of scenarios such as vehicle networking and car companies going overseas, avoiding the connection risks brought about by dual algorithm systems.

[0056] (2) Performance-friendly: The SM4 adopts a 32-wheel Feistel structure, which can be pipelined and accelerated on automotive-grade MCUs through hardware instructions or FPGAs to meet millisecond-level encryption and decryption latency.

[0057] (3) Non-repudiation of signature: SM2 is bound to the device certificate chain, supporting the construction of multi-level trust roots between the vehicle, service station and cloud, which not only ensures the non-repudiation of messages, but also facilitates hierarchical permission.

[0058] (4) End-to-cloud collaboration: The SM series algorithms share a unified interface between the cloud-based KMS and the vehicle-side security unit, making it easy to implement operation and maintenance operations such as key escrow, certificate revocation, and remote auditing.

[0059] (5) Quantum-resistant preparation: By combining PUF derived key and multi-session key rotation strategy, an interface can be reserved for smooth upgrade of future quantum-resistant algorithms.

[0060] Example 2: Data decryption verification, such as Figure 3 As shown; Data decryption and verification are performed on the vehicle or authorized server: Step 1: Receive data packets: ; Step 2: Calculate the summary: ; Step 3: Verify the signature; Verification failed; decryption request rejected. Step 4: Regenerate the PUF response; 1. Restart the PUF circuit within the vehicle's original hardware environment; 2. Generate PUF response verify Stability (compared to the initial response); Step 5: Calculate the key; Calculate the key using the same parameters: ; Step 6: Key verification; If the hardware has not been disassembled, then ,therefore ; Step 7: Decrypt the data; 1. If Using a key Decrypting the data: ; 2. If If the device is deemed unauthorized, decryption will be refused, and the data will remain encrypted. Step 8: Hardware status monitoring; 1. The system continuously monitors hardware status; 2. If an abnormal ECU connection, power interruption, or GPS location abnormality is detected, the key erasure will be triggered immediately; 3. After the key is erased, historical data cannot be decrypted, thus protecting data security.

[0061] Example 3: Hardware replacement scenario; When vehicle hardware components such as the ECU are replaced: Scenario description: The vehicle ECU needs to be replaced due to a malfunction, and the new ECU integrates a new PUF circuit.

[0062] The processing flow is as follows: 1. The system detected an ECU hardware replacement (by comparing hardware IDs). 2. The new ECU generates a new PUF response. ; 3. Generate a new key using the new PUF response and vehicle owner identity information. ; 4. Key to the old ECU Automatically expired; 5. Historical data uses the old key. Encrypted; the new ECU cannot decrypt it. 6. New data uses a new key. encryption; 7. If historical data is required, the original ECU hardware must be used.

[0063] Security benefits: Ensures that after hardware replacement, old data cannot be accessed by the new hardware, preventing data leakage.

[0064] When a repair shop or vehicle owner applies for the replacement of critical hardware such as the ECU, the system executes the following key update process: 1) Replacement application: The service station uploads the vehicle VIN, old security chip serial number and PUF digest to the trusted work station, which is then verified by the Cloud Key Management Center (KMC); 2) Old key freeze: KMC issues a freeze command, the vehicle controller operates with reduced privileges, retaining only data export and diagnostic permissions, and prohibiting the continued use of the old key for signing; 3) New hardware initialization: The new security chip activates PUF in the shielded box, collects multiple sets of CRP and writes fuzzy error correction parameters, and at the same time applies for a new SM2 device certificate; 4) Key migration and verification: If legitimate data needs to be migrated, the old hardware is encrypted with a one-time SM4 session key and transmitted to the new hardware. KMC performs consistency verification on the new PUF response and certificate chain. 5) Service recovery: After successful verification, the cloud will unfreeze the chip and synchronize the key version record. The old chip will be marked as obsolete and will not be able to access the network again.

[0065] Example 4: Vehicle resale scenario; When the vehicle is resold: Scenario description: The original owner sells the vehicle to a new owner, and the new owner needs to access the vehicle data.

[0066] Processing flow: 1. The vehicle management system updates the vehicle owner's identity information: ; 2. Generate a new key using the new vehicle owner's identity information: ; 3. Old key Automatically expired; 4. The original owner's data is encrypted using the old key, and the new owner cannot access it; 5. New data is encrypted with a new key and can only be accessed by the new vehicle owner.

[0067] Security benefits: Ensures that after a vehicle is resold, the original owner's data cannot be accessed by the new owner, protecting privacy.

[0068] For scenarios involving vehicle resale and ownership transfer, the system has established the following key reset and acceptance procedures: 1) Resale Statement: The original owner submits the transfer materials through the car manufacturer's service platform and triggers the key reset process. KMC records the operation subject and timestamp. 2) Data erasure: With the original owner's authorization, the vehicle executes a security erasure script to clear local accounts, driving log cache and third-party application keys, and at the same time revoke the old user's binding to the cloud service; 3) Key Reset: The vehicle enters factory reset mode to resample the PUF, regenerates the master key based on the new owner's identity information, and applies for a new SM2 certificate; 4) New owner activation: After completing real-name authentication, the new owner obtains the access control list through a one-time SM2 two-way authentication between the vehicle and the cloud, and completes policy synchronization before the first time the vehicle is driven on the road; 5) Audit Evidence: The above operations are written into an unalterable audit log, which includes the key ID, certificate serial number and operation fingerprint, to facilitate subsequent traceability or dispute resolution.

[0069] In summary, this invention achieves hardware-level encryption protection for vehicle data by combining PUF with national cryptographic algorithms, and has the following technical effects: Key security: The key is strongly bound to the hardware PUF, making it impossible to copy or emulate, thus fundamentally solving the key leakage problem.

[0070] Adaptive failure: The key is automatically invalidated when the hardware malfunctions or is replaced, preventing secondary use and unauthorized access.

[0071] Standards and Compliance: It adopts the national cryptographic algorithm system, meets national standards, and is applicable to domestically produced vehicles and vehicle networking platforms.

[0072] Performance optimization: The encryption operation has low complexity, making it suitable for automotive embedded environments and does not affect the normal functions of the vehicle.

[0073] Wide range of applications: It can be applied to various scenarios such as V2X communication encryption, used car data erasure, ECU hardware authentication, and cloud-based vehicle privacy protection.

[0074] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Therefore, if these modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this invention and their equivalents, this invention also intends to include these modifications and variations.

[0075] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any equivalent substitutions or modifications made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, based on the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF, characterized in that, include: The response generation module is used to generate a unique physical fingerprint response (PUF) in the vehicle's security chip. The key derivation module is used to generate an encrypted master key based on the PUF response, the vehicle owner's identity identifier, and the random number nonce through a key derivation function; The encryption and signature module is used to encrypt vehicle data using the encryption master key to generate ciphertext, and to digitally sign the ciphertext. The status monitoring module is used to monitor the operating status of the vehicle hardware; The key management module is used to trigger the invalidation operation of the encryption master key when the status monitoring module detects an abnormal hardware status. The decryption verification module is used to regenerate the PUF response and verify the consistency of the generated key in a legitimate hardware environment in order to perform data decryption.

2. The vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The response generation module is integrated into the vehicle's safety chip, and the PUF response is generated based on the physical process deviation of the safety chip.

3. The vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The key derivation module uses the key derivation function KDF, implemented by the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm, to combine the PUF response, the vehicle owner's identity identifier, and the random number nonce to generate the encrypted master key K.

4. The vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The encryption and signature module includes: The encryption unit is used to perform symmetric encryption on the vehicle data Data using the national cryptographic SM4 algorithm and the encryption master key K to generate ciphertext C; The signature unit is used to calculate the hash digest of the ciphertext C using the national cryptographic SM3 algorithm, and to digitally sign the hash digest using the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm based on the private key corresponding to the vehicle owner's identity identifier.

5. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The hardware status monitored by the status monitoring module includes: the connection status of the electronic control unit (ECU), the system power supply status, the position continuity of the GPS signal, and the hardware integrity verification results.

6. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The key management module triggers the invalidation operation of the encrypted master key when the status monitoring module detects any of the following situations: ECU connection is disconnected, power interruption duration exceeds a preset threshold, GPS location experiences discontinuous jumps, or hardware integrity verification fails.

7. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 6, characterized in that, When the decryption verification module performs decryption, it regenerates the PUF response in the security chip. and based on The vehicle owner's identity identifier and the random number nonce are used to recalculate the verification key. Only when the verification key is used When it matches the encrypted master key K, use Decrypt the ciphertext.

8. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The system also includes a hardware replacement processing module, which generates a new encryption master key based on the PUF response of the new hardware after the vehicle hardware components are replaced, and invalidates the encryption master key of the original hardware.

9. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 8, characterized in that, The system also includes a vehicle owner change processing module, which is used to generate a new encrypted master key based on the new vehicle owner identity and the PUF response after the vehicle ownership changes, and to invalidate the encrypted master key bound to the original vehicle owner identity.

10. A vehicle information security protection system based on the combination of national cryptographic algorithms and PUF as described in claim 9, characterized in that, The response generation module generates the PUF response using at least one of the following structures: SRAM PUF, ring oscillator PUF, or capacitor array PUF.

Images