Vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method, terminal equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention is suitable for the technical field of vehicle diagnosis, and provides a vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method, terminal equipment and a storage medium, and the method comprises the steps: reading a digital certificate in a new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle is replaced with the new ECU and the new ECU is in a power-on starting state; under the condition that the digital certificate is read, obtaining a vehicle identification code of the vehicle and hardware information of a new ECU, and verifying the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result; and under the condition that the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is normally powered on and started, an access authentication request is sent to a gateway of the vehicle, so that the gateway verifies a digital certificate contained in the access authentication request, and a second verification result is generated. A pirated or unauthorized ECU can be effectively prevented from accessing a vehicle system, and the quality reliability of a vehicle is guaranteed.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application belongs to the technical field of vehicle diagnosis, and particularly relates to a vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method, a terminal device and a storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] A vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) is a core component of an automobile electronic system. The ECU monitors and accurately controls the operation of core components such as an engine, a gearbox and a braking system in real time through a sensor network distributed throughout a vehicle body, and directly determines the performance, emission, fuel economy and safety of the vehicle. Each intelligent function from ignition and fuel injection to advanced driving assistance relies on the collaborative processing of the ECU. The quality reliability of the ECU is related to driving safety, and the performance optimization of the ECU is the key to improving the driving experience and achieving energy saving and emission reduction. With the development of automobile intelligence and networking, the ECU has become a core carrier of technological innovation and value enhancement, and is an indispensable nerve center of a vehicle.

[0003] However, there are some pirated ECUs on the market. When the ECU of a vehicle is replaced, some automobile repair shops may use pirated ECUs for repair due to the low cost of the pirated ECUs. However, the performance and quality of the pirated ECUs may not meet the requirements, which may result in that the quality reliability of the vehicle cannot be guaranteed, and the vehicle may have a safety risk. SUMMARY

[0004] The application embodiment provides a vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method, a terminal device and a storage medium, which can solve the technical problem that the quality reliability of a vehicle cannot be guaranteed due to the use of pirated ECUs instead of genuine ECUs during the replacement of an electronic control unit (ECU) of the vehicle.

[0005] In a first aspect, the application embodiment provides a vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method applied to an electronic control unit (ECU) in a vehicle, wherein the ECU is connected with a gateway in the vehicle, and the method comprises the following steps. reading a digital certificate in the new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle replaces a new ECU and the new ECU is in a power-on start state; acquiring a vehicle identification code of the vehicle and hardware information of the new ECU, and verifying the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result when the digital certificate is read; in a case where the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is normally started up, sending an access authentication request to a gateway of the vehicle, so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request, and generates a second verification result, wherein the access authentication request is used to represent that the new ECU requests to connect to a bus network of the vehicle.

[0006] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the record information recorded in the digital certificate includes vehicle host factory information, ECU hardware information, and a first digital signature. The verification of the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU, and the digital certificate to obtain the first verification result includes: The vehicle identification code of the vehicle is parsed to obtain vehicle manufacturer information of the vehicle. The vehicle manufacturer information of the vehicle is compared with the vehicle host factory information in the digital certificate. In a case where the vehicle manufacturer information of the vehicle is the same as the vehicle host factory information in the digital certificate, the hardware information of the new ECU is compared with the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate. In a case where the hardware information of the new ECU is the same as the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate, a second digital signature is generated according to a preset rule based on the vehicle host factory information and the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate. In a case where the second digital signature is the same as the first digital signature, it is determined that the first verification result is that the new ECU is normally started up. In a case where one of the vehicle identification code or the hardware information is different from the record information in the digital certificate, or the second digital signature is different from the first digital signature, it is determined that the first verification result is that the new ECU is locked and stopped from being started up, and the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

[0007] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a case where the new ECU is detected to be replaced, and the new ECU is in a state of being started up, when the digital certificate in the new ECU is read, the method includes: In a case where the digital certificate is not read, the new ECU is locked and stopped from being started up, and the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

[0008] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a case where the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is normally started up, after the access authentication request is sent to the gateway of the vehicle, the method includes: receive the second verification result sent by the gateway, so as to determine whether the new ECU is connected to the bus network of the vehicle according to the second verification result.

[0009] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the determining whether the new ECU is connected to the bus network of the vehicle according to the second verification result comprises: if the second verification result is an access code, determining to connect the new ECU to the bus network of the vehicle according to the access code, and storing the access code; if the second verification result is a verification failure, prohibiting the new ECU from being connected to the bus network of the vehicle, and displaying that the new ECU is abnormal.

[0010] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the determining whether the new ECU is connected to the bus network of the vehicle according to the second verification result comprises: In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the determining whether the new ECU is connected to the bus network of the vehicle according to the second verification result comprises: uploading, through a remote communication terminal of the vehicle, the digital certificate to a certificate management platform, so that the certificate management platform performs validity verification on the digital certificate to obtain a validity verification result; receiving the validity verification result sent by the certificate management platform; generating a second verification result according to the validity verification result, and sending the second verification result to the new ECU.

[0011] In a possible implementation of the second aspect, the generating a second verification result according to the validity verification result comprises: if the validity verification result is that the digital certificate is invalid, prohibiting the new ECU from being connected to the bus network of the vehicle, and obtaining the second verification result as a verification failure; if the validity verification result is that the digital certificate is valid, generating an access code according to record information in the digital certificate and a vehicle identification code of the vehicle, and obtaining the second verification result as the access code.

[0012] In a possible implementation of the second aspect, after the generating an access code according to record information in the digital certificate and a vehicle identification code of the vehicle, and obtaining the second verification result as the access code, the method comprises: The access code is stored in the gateway so that when a second access authentication request is received from the new ECU, the access code is compared with the second access code in the second access authentication request; wherein, the second access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU is requesting to connect to the vehicle's bus network again, and the second access code is the access code stored by the new ECU when it first requested to connect to the vehicle's bus network; If the access code is the same as the second access code, it is determined that the new ECU will be connected to the vehicle's bus network.

[0013] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU), which is connected to a gateway in the vehicle. The vehicle electronic control unit includes: The certificate reading module is used to read the digital certificate in the new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in the power-on state. The first verification module is used to obtain the vehicle identification code of the vehicle and the hardware information of the new ECU when the digital certificate is read, and to verify the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result. The request sending module is configured to send an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway when the first verification result indicates that the new ECU has been powered on and started normally, so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request and generates a second verification result, wherein the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network.

[0014] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a vehicle gateway, which is connected to an electronic control unit (ECU) in the vehicle. The vehicle gateway includes: The request receiving module is configured to receive an access authentication request sent by the new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in a power-on state; wherein, the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network, and the access authentication request contains the digital certificate of the new ECU. The certificate upload module is used to upload the digital certificate to the certificate management platform through the vehicle's remote communication terminal, so that the certificate management platform can verify the validity of the digital certificate and obtain the validity verification result. The result receiving module is used to receive the validity verification result sent by the certificate management platform; The second verification module is used to generate a second verification result based on the validity verification result, and send the second verification result to the new ECU.

[0015] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a terminal device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the anti-counterfeiting method for the vehicle electronic control unit described above.

[0016] Sixthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method described in any of the preceding claims.

[0017] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of this application provide a computer program product that, when run on a terminal device, causes the terminal device to execute the vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method described in any of the first aspects above.

[0018] The beneficial effects of the embodiments in this application compared with the prior art are: This application provides an anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU). When a new ECU is detected in the vehicle and is in a power-on state, the method reads the digital certificate from the new ECU. Upon receiving the digital certificate, the method obtains the vehicle identification number (VIN) and the hardware information of the new ECU, and verifies the VIN, the hardware information, and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result. If the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is in a normal power-on state, the method sends an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway. The gateway then verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request, generating a second verification result. The access authentication request indicates that the new ECU is requesting connection to the vehicle's bus network. By detecting whether the replaced ECU stores a digital certificate and verifying the digital certificate twice, this method effectively prevents pirated or unauthorized ECUs from accessing the vehicle system, avoiding security risks such as system failures and data leaks caused by pirated devices, and ensuring the reliability of the vehicle. Attached Figure Description To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit according to another embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle electronic control unit according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle gateway provided in one embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0020] In the following description, specific details such as particular system architectures and techniques are set forth for illustrative purposes and not for limitation, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of this application. However, those skilled in the art will understand that this application may also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, apparatuses, circuits, and methods have been omitted so as not to obscure the description of this application with unnecessary detail.

[0021] It should be understood that, when used in this application specification and the appended claims, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or a collection thereof.

[0022] It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used in this application specification and the appended claims means any combination of one or more of the associated listed items and all possible combinations, and includes such combinations.

[0023] As used in this application specification and the appended claims, the term "if" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as "when," "once," "in response to determination," or "in response to detection." Similarly, the phrase "if determined" or "if detected [the described condition or event]" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as meaning "once determined," "in response to determination," "once detected [the described condition or event]," or "in response to detection [the described condition or event]."

[0024] Furthermore, in the description of this application and the appended claims, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0025] References to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" as described in this specification mean that one or more embodiments of this application include a specific feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment. Therefore, the phrases "in one embodiment," "in some embodiments," "in other embodiments," "in still other embodiments," etc., appearing in different parts of this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but rather mean "one or more, but not all, embodiments," unless otherwise specifically emphasized. The terms "comprising," "including," "having," and variations thereof mean "including but not limited to," unless otherwise specifically emphasized.

[0026] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) according to an embodiment of this application. As an example and not a limitation, this method is applied to an electronic control unit (ECU) in a vehicle, where the ECU is connected to a gateway in the vehicle. The method includes: S11. If a new ECU is detected in the vehicle and the new ECU is powered on, read the digital certificate in the new ECU.

[0027] S12. Upon reading the digital certificate, obtain the vehicle identification code and the hardware information of the new ECU, and verify the vehicle identification code, the hardware information of the new ECU, and the digital certificate to obtain the first verification result.

[0028] S13. If the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is powered on and started normally, an access authentication request is sent to the vehicle's gateway so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request and generates a second verification result. The access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network.

[0029] It should be noted that the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is the core control component of an automotive electronic system. It controls the normal operation of various automotive systems (such as the engine and transmission) by collecting, processing, and analyzing signals from various sensors. The vehicle gateway is a communication interface device between different networks within the vehicle. It is responsible for connecting different types and speeds of network buses within the vehicle, enabling data exchange and communication between different subsystem ECUs. It also allows for access control and security management of devices within the network. In this embodiment, the ECU is the object of this anti-counterfeiting method. When a new ECU is installed in a vehicle, anti-counterfeiting verification is required to ensure that the new ECU is a genuine device.

[0030] A digital certificate is an electronic document used to verify identity and ensure the security of data transmission. It contains the certificate holder's identity information, public key, and certificate validity period. It's important to note that genuine ECU samples require a digital certificate to be programmed before leaving the factory. This digital certificate is stored in the ECU's chip and cannot be modified after the ECU leaves the factory. The digital certificate contains information about the OEM (such as the OEM's name and code) and the ECU's hardware information (such as a unique hardware serial number, part number, and unique chip serial number). Simultaneously, a digital signature generated from this information is written into the digital certificate (first, the information is hashed using the MD / SHA algorithm, then the hash is encrypted to generate the digital signature). This digital signature can be used to verify that the information in the digital certificate has not been tampered with. After the digital certificate is programmed into the ECU, it is also simultaneously uploaded to the certificate management platform. In this embodiment, the new ECU stores a digital certificate, which can be used to prove the legitimacy and authenticity of the new ECU, ensuring that it is an authorized and trustworthy device.

[0031] The Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) is a unique identifier for a vehicle, typically consisting of 17 characters. It contains information such as the vehicle's manufacturer, year of manufacture, model, body type and code, engine code, and assembly location. The VIN accurately identifies a vehicle and provides relevant information. In this embodiment, the vehicle's VIN is obtained to verify its compatibility with the new ECU's hardware information and digital certificate, ensuring that the new ECU is compatible with the vehicle.

[0032] A bus network is a communication network used for data transmission between electronic control systems within a vehicle. Common automotive bus protocols include CAN (Controller Area Network) and LIN (Local Interconnect Network). Through the bus network, individual ECUs can exchange information, enabling collaborative operation of the vehicle.

[0033] Specifically, firstly, when the vehicle detects a new ECU has been installed and the new ECU is in a power-on startup state, the system automatically reads the digital certificate stored in the new ECU. The power-on startup state refers to the state where the ECU, after being powered on, begins initialization operations, self-test procedures, and loads necessary software and parameters, preparing for normal operation. In this embodiment, reading the digital certificate is for subsequent verification of the digital certificate to confirm the legitimacy of the new ECU. If the digital certificate can be successfully read, it indicates that the new ECU stores the digital certificate.

[0034] After successfully reading the digital certificate from the new ECU, the vehicle's VIN and the new ECU's hardware information are further obtained. In this embodiment, the vehicle's VIN can be obtained from other systems within the vehicle. Simultaneously, the hardware information of the new ECU can be obtained by querying the hardware-related information stored internally within the ECU. The hardware information may include the new ECU's hardware serial number, part number, chip serial number, etc., which can uniquely identify the ECU's hardware characteristics.

[0035] Next, the obtained VIN, the new ECU's hardware information, and the digital certificate are subjected to a series of verifications to obtain the first verification result. The purpose of the verification is to confirm whether the digital certificate matches the actual situation of the vehicle and the ECU, that is, to determine whether the new ECU is a legitimate device equipped in this specific vehicle. The first verification result can determine whether the new ECU is a legitimate ECU suitable for the vehicle. If the new ECU is determined to be a legitimate ECU suitable for the vehicle, and the vehicle's ECU can be powered on and started normally, then the first verification result indicates that the new ECU can be powered on and started normally.

[0036] Then, when the initial verification result shows that the new ECU has powered on and started normally, meaning it has passed the preliminary verification, the new ECU will send an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway. This access authentication request is a request sent by the new ECU to the vehicle's gateway, indicating that the new ECU wishes to connect to the vehicle's bus network. This request includes information such as the new ECU's digital certificate. The vehicle's gateway verifies this information to determine whether to allow the new ECU to access the bus network.

[0037] After receiving the access authentication request, the gateway will re-verify the digital certificate. The gateway's verification process may be more rigorous and comprehensive, checking the authenticity, integrity, and compliance with the vehicle network's security requirements of the digital certificate. For example, the gateway may communicate with a certificate management platform to verify the validity of the digital certificate and may also check the permission information within the digital certificate to ensure that the new ECU has the authority to access the vehicle's bus network. Based on the gateway's verification, a second verification result is generated. Then, based on this second verification result, it is determined whether the new ECU can access the vehicle's bus network.

[0038] It is understood that the anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit provided in this application includes: upon detecting that a new ECU has been installed in the vehicle and that the new ECU is in a power-on state, reading the digital certificate in the new ECU; upon reading the digital certificate, obtaining the vehicle identification code and the hardware information of the new ECU, and verifying the vehicle identification code, the hardware information of the new ECU, and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result; and, if the first verification result indicates that the new ECU is in a normal power-on state, sending an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway, so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request and generates a second verification result, wherein the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network. By detecting whether the replaced new ECU stores a digital certificate and verifying the digital certificate twice, pirated or unauthorized ECUs can be effectively prevented from accessing the vehicle system, avoiding security risks such as system failures and data leaks caused by the access of pirated devices, and ensuring the quality and reliability of the vehicle.

[0039] In one possible implementation, the information recorded in the digital certificate includes: vehicle OEM information, ECU hardware information, and a first digital signature.

[0040] The vehicle identification number, the new ECU hardware information, and the digital certificate are verified to obtain the first verification result, including: The vehicle identification number (VIN) of a vehicle is parsed to obtain the vehicle's manufacturer information.

[0041] The vehicle manufacturer information is compared with the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate.

[0042] If the vehicle manufacturer information matches the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate, the hardware information of the new ECU will be compared with the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate.

[0043] If the hardware information of the new ECU is completely identical to the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate, a second digital signature will be generated from the vehicle manufacturer information and ECU hardware information in the digital certificate according to preset rules.

[0044] If the second digital signature is the same as the first digital signature, then the first verification result is determined to be a normal power-on start-up of the new ECU.

[0045] If there is a discrepancy between the vehicle identification code or hardware information and the information recorded in the digital certificate, or if the second digital signature is different from the first digital signature, the first verification result is determined to be locked and the startup of the new ECU is stopped, and the status of the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

[0046] It should be noted that the information recorded in the digital certificate includes vehicle OEM information, ECU hardware information, and a first digital signature. These records together constitute a credential that can be used to verify the legitimacy of the ECU and its compatibility with the vehicle. The vehicle OEM information refers to information related to the manufacturer of the complete vehicle, which may include the OEM's name and logo. This information identifies the vehicle's origin and production entity. The ECU hardware information includes hardware characteristics such as the ECU's hardware serial number, part number, and chip serial number, uniquely identifying each ECU hardware device.

[0047] The first digital signature is a unique identifier generated from the vehicle manufacturer information and ECU hardware information in the digital certificate according to a preset encryption algorithm and rules. The first digital signature can be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the digital certificate content, ensuring that the digital certificate has not been tampered with during transmission and storage. The first digital signature is a unique identifier generated when the digital certificate is burned into the ECU sample before it leaves the factory.

[0048] The second digital signature is a digital identifier generated during the verification process based on the currently obtained vehicle OEM information and ECU hardware information, following the same preset rules as those used to generate the first digital signature. By comparing the second digital signature with the first digital signature, it can be further confirmed whether the information in the digital certificate is consistent with the actual situation. The preset rules are pre-defined rules for generating digital signatures. For example, the preset rules could be to concatenate the OEM information and ECU hardware information in a fixed order, and then encrypt the concatenated information using an encryption algorithm to obtain the digital signature.

[0049] Specifically, firstly, a specific parsing algorithm is used to extract manufacturer information such as the vehicle manufacturer's name and logo from the VIN. This manufacturer information is then compared with the vehicle OEM information recorded in the digital certificate to confirm whether the actual manufacturer of the vehicle matches the manufacturer declared in the digital certificate. If they match, it means the vehicle's production origin matches the OEM identified in the digital certificate, and further verification can proceed. If they do not match, it indicates a possible mismatch between the digital certificate and the vehicle, in which case the new ECU is directly deemed abnormal, and startup is stopped.

[0050] Once the vehicle manufacturer's information is verified, the hardware information of the new ECU (such as the ECU's hardware serial number, part number, and chip serial number) is compared one by one with the ECU hardware information recorded in the digital certificate. Only when the hardware information of the new ECU is completely consistent with the ECU hardware information recorded in the digital certificate is the new ECU considered a compliant hardware device and can continue with subsequent verification; if any hardware information is inconsistent, the verification fails, the new ECU is deemed abnormal, and startup is stopped. This step is to ensure that the new ECU hardware is completely consistent with the hardware corresponding to the digital certificate, preventing the use of illegal or incorrect ECUs to replace the original genuine ECU.

[0051] Once the hardware information of the new ECU is verified, the system will combine and calculate the vehicle manufacturer information and ECU hardware information from the obtained digital certificate according to pre-set rules to generate a new digital signature, namely the second digital signature. This second digital signature is a unique identifier for the currently verified information.

[0052] Then, the generated second digital signature is compared with the original first digital signature in the digital certificate. If the first and second digital signatures are identical, it means that the information in the digital certificate has not been tampered with during transmission and verification, and the new ECU matches the vehicle information, indicating that the new ECU has passed verification. The first verification result can be determined as a normal power-on start of the new ECU, allowing the new ECU to continue starting and interacting with the vehicle system. If the first and second digital signatures are different, it means that the information in the digital certificate has been tampered with during transmission and verification, indicating that the new ECU verification has failed. The new ECU is deemed abnormal, and the startup is stopped.

[0053] During the preceding verification process, if the vehicle manufacturer information is inconsistent with the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate, or if any aspect of the new ECU's hardware information differs from the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate, or if the first digital signature differs from the second digital signature, the system will immediately determine the first verification result as locked and stop the new ECU from starting, indicating verification failure and that the new ECU may be pirated. Simultaneously, the vehicle's human-machine interface will display the new ECU's status as abnormal, allowing users or maintenance personnel to promptly understand that the new ECU has a problem and requires further inspection and handling.

[0054] It should be understood that by comparing the vehicle manufacturer information with the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate, it is possible to effectively prevent unauthorized ECUs from accessing the vehicle system, thus blocking intrusion by illegal devices at the source and ensuring the security of the vehicle's internal network. Simultaneously, comparing the ECU hardware information item by item with the information recorded in the digital certificate can prevent the ECU hardware information from being tampered with and accessing the vehicle. Furthermore, comparing digital signatures can verify the integrity and authenticity of the digital certificate, preventing ECUs based on fake certificates from accessing the system, further enhancing system security.

[0055] In one possible implementation, when a new ECU is detected in the vehicle and the new ECU is in a power-on state, the method for reading the digital certificate in the new ECU includes: If the digital certificate is not read, the system will lock and stop the startup of the new ECU, and display the new ECU status as abnormal.

[0056] When a new ECU is detected in a vehicle and is being powered on, the system needs to read the digital certificate stored in the new ECU for authentication and legitimacy verification. If no digital certificate is found, it indicates that the new ECU does not store a digital certificate and may be a pirated ECU. To prevent potential damage to the vehicle system from a pirated ECU, the system will immediately lock the new ECU, preventing it from starting and operating. Simultaneously, the vehicle's human-machine interface will display an abnormal status for the new ECU, allowing users or maintenance personnel to be promptly informed that there is a problem with the new ECU and further inspection and handling are required.

[0057] It should be understood that when a new ECU is detected in a vehicle and the new ECU is in the power-on state, the digital certificate in the new ECU is read. By locking the ECU and preventing power-on when the digital certificate is not read, it is possible to effectively prevent a pirated ECU from being connected to the vehicle system.

[0058] In one possible implementation, after sending an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway if the first verification result indicates that the new ECU has a normal power-on start-up, the method includes: The system receives a second verification result from the gateway to determine whether the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the second verification result.

[0059] After the new ECU sends an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway, it enters a waiting state, continuously listening for responses from the gateway. Once the gateway has completed its access authentication verification of the new ECU, it sends a second verification result to the new ECU via a pre-defined communication protocol (such as the CAN bus protocol). The new ECU receives this second verification result and determines whether it can connect to the vehicle's bus network based on it.

[0060] In one possible implementation, determining whether the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the second verification result includes: If the second verification result shows an access code, then the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the access code, and the access code is stored.

[0061] If the second verification result shows that the verification failed, the new ECU will be prohibited from being connected to the vehicle's bus network, and the new ECU will be displayed as abnormal.

[0062] An access code is a specific code generated by the gateway when a new ECU is authenticated and verified for access. This access code contains the permission information and configuration parameters required for the new ECU to access the vehicle's bus network. Only ECUs with the correct access code are allowed to connect to the vehicle's bus network, thereby communicating and exchanging data with other subsystems of the vehicle, ensuring the security and orderliness of the vehicle network.

[0063] The new ECU determines its ability to connect to the vehicle's bus network based on the second verification result. If the gateway sends an access code as the second verification result, it indicates that the new ECU has passed all verifications and is recognized as a legitimate and vehicle-compatible device. This means the new ECU is allowed to access the vehicle's bus network. The system then performs a connection operation based on this access code, connecting the new ECU to the vehicle's bus network. The new ECU can then communicate and exchange data with other subsystems of the vehicle. Simultaneously, for subsequent management purposes, the new ECU stores this access code. During subsequent startup processes, the new ECU can directly read the stored access code without requesting it from the gateway again, thus speeding up the connection process and facilitating the querying and updating of the access code when needed.

[0064] If the second verification result sent by the gateway shows verification failure, it indicates that the new ECU does not meet the requirements and may be pirated (e.g., the ECU's hardware information does not match the digital certificate, or the verification signature fails). To ensure the safe and stable operation of the vehicle system, the system will immediately prohibit the new ECU from connecting to the vehicle's bus network to prevent it from interfering with the normal operation of other subsystems. Simultaneously, the new ECU's status will be displayed as abnormal on the vehicle's human-machine interface, allowing users or maintenance personnel to promptly understand that the new ECU has a problem and requires further inspection and handling.

[0065] It should be understood that by strictly judging the results of the second verification, it is possible to effectively prevent pirated or problematic ECUs from accessing the vehicle's bus network, thus ensuring the security and stability of the vehicle's bus network and improving the security of the vehicle system.

[0066] It should be understood that the sequence number of each step in the above embodiments does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0067] Please see Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating another embodiment of an anti-counterfeiting method for a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU). As an example and not a limitation, this method can be applied to a gateway in a vehicle, the gateway being connected to the vehicle's electronic control unit (ECU). The method includes: S21. When it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in the power-on state, an access authentication request is received from the new ECU; wherein, the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network, and the access authentication request contains the digital certificate of the new ECU.

[0068] S22. Upload the digital certificate to the certificate management platform through the vehicle's remote communication terminal so that the certificate management platform can verify the validity of the digital certificate and obtain the validity verification result.

[0069] S23. Receive the validity verification result sent by the certificate management platform.

[0070] S24. Based on the validity verification result, generate a second verification result and send the second verification result to the new ECU.

[0071] It should be noted that a certificate management platform is a system specifically designed for managing and verifying digital certificates. The platform stores a large amount of legitimate digital certificate information and can verify the validity of received digital certificates, determining whether they have expired, been revoked, or were issued by a legitimate authority, and returning the verification results.

[0072] A remote communication terminal is a device in a vehicle that communicates with an external network. It typically has wireless communication capabilities, such as an in-vehicle T-Box. The remote communication terminal can transmit data from inside the vehicle to a remote server, and can also receive instructions and information from the remote server. In this embodiment, the remote communication terminal is responsible for uploading the digital certificate of the new ECU to the certificate management platform.

[0073] Specifically, firstly, when a new ECU is detected in the vehicle and is powered on, the new ECU proactively sends an access authentication request to the gateway in order to connect to the vehicle's bus network and interact with other in-vehicle devices. This access authentication request contains the new ECU's digital certificate, which is the key evidence for verifying the legitimacy of the new ECU.

[0074] Upon receiving the access authentication request, the gateway uses the vehicle's remote communication terminal to upload the new ECU's digital certificate to the certificate management platform. The remote communication terminal then sends the digital certificate to the server hosting the certificate management platform via a wireless communication network, allowing the platform to verify its validity. This verification may include checking the certificate's validity period, the legitimacy of the issuing authority, and the correctness of the signature. After verifying the digital certificate's validity, the certificate management platform sends the result to the vehicle's gateway. The gateway then uses this result to determine the validity of the new ECU's digital certificate.

[0075] After receiving the certificate management platform's validity verification result, the gateway generates a second verification result and sends it to the new ECU. This second verification result indicates whether the new ECU can access the vehicle's bus network. Upon receiving the second verification result, the new ECU performs corresponding operations. If it receives an access code, it configures itself according to the code's requirements and connects to the vehicle's bus network; if it receives a verification failure message, it stops the connection operation and displays the new ECU's status as abnormal.

[0076] It should be understood that this application embodiment, by introducing a certificate management platform to verify the validity of the digital certificate of the new ECU, can ensure that the ECU accessing the vehicle bus network is legitimate and authentic, effectively preventing illegal or counterfeit ECUs from accessing the vehicle system, thereby improving vehicle security and stability. Simultaneously, by using the vehicle's remote communication terminal to upload the digital certificate to the certificate management platform for verification, remote verification functionality is achieved. This allows for timely verification of the digital certificate of the new ECU regardless of geographical location, improving verification efficiency and convenience.

[0077] In one possible implementation, a second verification result is generated based on the validity verification result, including: If the validity verification result indicates that the digital certificate is invalid, the new ECU is prohibited from connecting to the vehicle's bus network, resulting in a second verification result of verification failure.

[0078] If the validity verification result indicates that the digital certificate is valid, an access code is generated based on the recorded information in the digital certificate and the vehicle identification number of the vehicle, resulting in the second verification result being the access code.

[0079] If the validity verification result indicates that the digital certificate is invalid, the second verification result will also fail, prohibiting the new ECU from connecting to the vehicle's bus network. This is because an invalid digital certificate may indicate that the new ECU poses a security risk, potentially being a counterfeit or unauthorized ECU. Allowing such an ECU to access the vehicle's bus network could lead to problems such as malicious attacks on the vehicle system, data breaches, or malfunctions.

[0080] When the validity verification result indicates that the digital certificate is valid, the gateway generates an access code based on the information recorded in the digital certificate and the vehicle's VIN. This access code is used as a second verification result for authentication of new ECUs accessing the vehicle's bus network. The vehicle's VIN is its unique identifier, and the information recorded in the digital certificate uniquely identifies the ECU. Combining the information recorded in the digital certificate with the vehicle's VIN to generate the access code ensures its uniqueness and security.

[0081] After receiving the access code, the new ECU will parse and verify it. If the access code is valid, it will be configured according to the requirements of the access code, thereby successfully connecting to the vehicle's bus network and performing normal data interaction with other vehicle devices.

[0082] It should be noted that appropriate encryption algorithms and encoding methods can be used to generate secure and reliable access codes. For example, a hash algorithm can be used to process the record information in the digital certificate and the vehicle VIN to generate a fixed-length hash value. Then, this hash value can be converted into an access code using other encryption techniques. This ensures the uniqueness and forgery resistance of the access code.

[0083] In one possible implementation, after generating an access code based on the information recorded in the digital certificate and the vehicle identification number of the vehicle, and obtaining a second verification result as the access code, the method includes: The access code is stored in the gateway so that when a second access authentication request is received from a new ECU, the access code is compared with the second access code in the second access authentication request; wherein, the second access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU is requesting to connect to the vehicle's bus network again, and the second access code is the access code stored by the new ECU when it first requested to connect to the vehicle's bus network.

[0084] If the access code is the same as the second access code, it is determined that the new ECU will be connected to the vehicle's bus network.

[0085] After generating the access code, the gateway will initially verify the generated access code and store it in a specific storage area of ​​the gateway (such as non-volatile memory) for comparison when a new ECU initiates a second access authentication request. This avoids repeated verification of digital certificates, improves system response efficiency, and ensures that the access code remains valid after the vehicle is powered off and restarted.

[0086] The second access authentication request refers to a request to reconnect to the vehicle's bus network triggered by a system restart, network fluctuations, or active reconnection after the new ECU has been powered on and started for the first time and connected to the vehicle's bus network for the first time. In this case, the second access authentication request carries the access code (i.e., the second access code) stored when the connection was first requested.

[0087] Specifically, when the gateway receives a second access authentication request from a new ECU, it compares the stored access code with the second access code in the second access authentication request to confirm the consistency of the device identity. If the access code and the second access code are completely identical, the gateway determines that the new ECU is a legitimate device and allows the new ECU to reconnect to the bus network. If the comparison fails, the gateway will immediately trigger a security policy: prohibiting network connection and locking the new ECU's communication interface. Simultaneously, the new ECU's status will be displayed as abnormal on the vehicle's human-machine interface, allowing users or maintenance personnel to promptly understand that the new ECU has a problem and requires further inspection and handling.

[0088] It should be understood that by reusing access codes, the need for remote verification of digital certificates for each connection can be avoided, greatly shortening the authentication time and improving authentication efficiency.

[0089] In practical applications, firstly, genuine original ECU samples need to have a digital certificate burned into them before leaving the factory. This digital certificate is stored in the ECU's chip and cannot be modified after the ECU leaves the factory. The digital certificate contains information about the OEM, the ECU's hardware information, and a digital signature. After the digital certificate is burned into the ECU, it is also simultaneously uploaded to the certificate management platform. Then, after the vehicle's ECU is replaced, when the new ECU is powered on, the firmware in the new ECU first verifies the digital certificate. If it is determined that the new ECU does not have a digital certificate, the verification fails directly. The new ECU is disabled, and the vehicle displays a message indicating that the ECU status is normal. If it is determined that the new ECU has a digital certificate, the firmware in the new ECU reads the OEM information from the digital certificate, parses the vehicle's manufacturer information using the current vehicle's VIN code, and determines whether the parsed manufacturer information matches the OEM information in the digital certificate. If the manufacturer information matches the OEM information in the digital certificate, then the hardware information of the new ECU (hardware serial number, part number, chip serial number) is read and compared with these three pieces of information recorded in the digital certificate. The information in the digital certificate is recalculated using the same method as when the ECU was manufactured to generate its original digital signature. A new digital signature is then compared with the original digital signature in the certificate. If they do not match, the certificate has been tampered with. The new ECU will only function properly if its hardware information is completely identical to the three pieces of information recorded in the digital certificate, and the digital signature is also the same. If any one of these is inconsistent, the new ECU will be disabled, and the vehicle will display a warning that the new ECU is malfunctioning.

[0090] To prevent an ECU from being successfully authenticated on one vehicle and then used on another, a new ECU needs to undergo access authentication with the vehicle's gateway after connecting to the vehicle's bus network. The new ECU sends an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway, containing its internal digital certificate. Upon receiving the request, the gateway parses the digital certificate and uploads it to the certificate management platform via the vehicle's TBOX. The certificate management platform then verifies the certificate's validity and returns the result to the gateway. If the certificate is invalid, the gateway prevents the new ECU from accessing the vehicle bus, preventing communication with other ECUs. If the certificate is valid, the gateway generates an access code based on the information in the certificate and the vehicle's VIN. This access code is sent to the new ECU and stored within the gateway. The new ECU also receives and stores this access code. This ensures that subsequent new ECUs only need to send the access code to the gateway for authentication before accessing the vehicle's bus network. After receiving the access code, the new ECU can be configured according to its requirements, thus successfully connecting to the vehicle's bus network and exchanging data normally with other onboard devices. This allows the vehicle to verify the replaced ECU, preventing the use of counterfeit ECUs and protecting vehicle security.

[0091] It should be understood that the sequence number of each step in the above embodiments does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0092] Corresponding to the above embodiment, a method for preventing counterfeiting of vehicle electronic control units, Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a vehicle electronic control unit according to an embodiment of this application is shown. For ease of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiment of this application are shown.

[0093] Reference Figure 3 The vehicle electronic control unit 3 in this embodiment includes: The certificate reading module 31 is used to read the digital certificate in the new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in the power-on state.

[0094] The first verification module 32 is used to obtain the vehicle identification code of the vehicle and the hardware information of the new ECU when the digital certificate is read, and to verify the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU and the digital certificate to obtain the first verification result.

[0095] The request sending module 33 is used to send an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway when the first verification result indicates that the new ECU has been powered on and started normally, so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request and generates a second verification result. The access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network.

[0096] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the modules in the above-mentioned vehicle electronic control unit 3 are based on the same concept as the method embodiment of this application. For details on their specific functions and technical effects, please refer to the method embodiment section, and they will not be repeated here.

[0097] A method for preventing counterfeiting of a vehicle electronic control unit, corresponding to another embodiment described above. Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a vehicle gateway provided in one embodiment of this application is shown. For ease of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiment of this application are shown.

[0098] Reference Figure 4 The vehicle gateway 4 in this embodiment includes: The request receiving module 41 is used to receive an access authentication request sent by the new ECU when it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in the power-on state; wherein, the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network, and the access authentication request contains the digital certificate of the new ECU.

[0099] The certificate upload module 42 is used to upload digital certificates to the certificate management platform through the vehicle's remote communication terminal, so that the certificate management platform can verify the validity of the digital certificates and obtain the validity verification results.

[0100] Result receiving module 43 is used to receive the validity verification results sent by the certificate management platform.

[0101] The second verification module 44 is used to generate a second verification result based on the validity verification result and send the second verification result to the new ECU.

[0102] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the modules in the above-mentioned vehicle gateway 4 are based on the same concept as the method embodiment of this application. For details on their specific functions and technical effects, please refer to the method embodiment section, which will not be repeated here.

[0103] This application also provides a terminal device, such as... Figure 5 As shown, Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal device provided in an embodiment of this application. (Refer to...) Figure 5The terminal device 5 in this embodiment includes a memory 51, a processor 52, and a computer program stored in the memory 51 and executable on the processor 52. When the processor 52 executes the computer program, it implements the steps in the vehicle electronic control unit anti-counterfeiting method embodiment described above.

[0104] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps described in the various method embodiments above.

[0105] This application provides a computer program product that, when run on a mobile terminal, enables the mobile terminal to implement the steps described in the above-described method embodiments.

[0106] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments of this application can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include at least: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code to a photographic device / terminal device, a recording medium, a computer memory, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), an electrical carrier signal, a telecommunication signal, and a software distribution medium. Examples include USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0107] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0108] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0109] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus / network devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus / network device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0110] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0111] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and should all be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for preventing counterfeiting of a vehicle electronic control unit, characterized in that, An electronic control unit (ECU) is used in a vehicle, the ECU being connected to a gateway in the vehicle, the method comprising: If it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in a power-on state, read the digital certificate in the new ECU; Upon reading the digital certificate, the vehicle identification code of the vehicle and the hardware information of the new ECU are obtained, and the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU and the digital certificate are verified to obtain a first verification result. If the first verification result indicates that the new ECU has a normal power-on start-up, an access authentication request is sent to the vehicle's gateway so that the gateway verifies the digital certificate contained in the access authentication request and generates a second verification result. The access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network.

2. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The information recorded in the digital certificate includes: vehicle OEM information, ECU hardware information, and a first digital signature; The step of verifying the vehicle identification number of the vehicle, the hardware information of the new ECU, and the digital certificate to obtain a first verification result includes: The vehicle identification number of the vehicle is parsed to obtain the manufacturer information of the vehicle; The vehicle manufacturer information is compared with the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate; If the vehicle manufacturer information is the same as the vehicle OEM information in the digital certificate, the hardware information of the new ECU is compared with the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate. If the hardware information of the new ECU is completely identical to the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate, the vehicle OEM information and the ECU hardware information in the digital certificate are used to generate a second digital signature according to preset rules. If the second digital signature is the same as the first digital signature, then the first verification result is determined to be a normal power-on start-up of the new ECU; If either the vehicle identification code or the hardware information is different from the information recorded in the digital certificate, or if the second digital signature is different from the first digital signature, then the first verification result is determined to be locked and the startup of the new ECU is stopped, and the status of the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

3. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 1, characterized in that, When a new ECU is detected in the vehicle and the new ECU is in a power-on state, the method for reading the digital certificate in the new ECU includes: If the digital certificate is not read, the new ECU is locked and startup is stopped, and the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

4. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 1, characterized in that, If the first verification result indicates that the new ECU has a normal power-on start-up, after sending an access authentication request to the vehicle's gateway, the method includes: The system receives the second verification result sent by the gateway to determine whether the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the second verification result.

5. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The step of determining whether the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the second verification result includes: If the second verification result shows an access code, then the new ECU is connected to the vehicle's bus network based on the access code, and the access code is stored. If the second verification result shows that the verification failed, then the new ECU is prohibited from being connected to the vehicle's bus network, and the status of the new ECU is displayed as abnormal.

6. A method for preventing counterfeiting of a vehicle electronic control unit, characterized in that, A gateway used in a vehicle, the gateway being connected to an electronic control unit (ECU) in the vehicle, the method comprising: When it is detected that the vehicle has been replaced with a new ECU and the new ECU is in the power-on state, an access authentication request is received from the new ECU; wherein, the access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU requests to connect to the vehicle's bus network, and the access authentication request contains the digital certificate of the new ECU. The digital certificate is uploaded to the certificate management platform via the vehicle's remote communication terminal, so that the certificate management platform can verify the validity of the digital certificate and obtain the validity verification result. Receive the validity verification result sent by the certificate management platform; Based on the validity verification result, a second verification result is generated and sent to the new ECU.

7. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The step of generating a second verification result based on the validity verification result includes: If the validity verification result is that the digital certificate is invalid, then the new ECU is prohibited from connecting to the vehicle's bus network, and the second verification result is a verification failure. If the validity verification result indicates that the digital certificate is valid, then an access code is generated based on the record information in the digital certificate and the vehicle identification code of the vehicle, and the second verification result is the access code.

8. The anti-counterfeiting method for vehicle electronic control units as described in claim 7, characterized in that, After generating an access code based on the recorded information in the digital certificate and the vehicle identification number of the vehicle, and obtaining the second verification result as the access code, the method includes: The access code is stored in the gateway so that when a second access authentication request is received from the new ECU, the access code is compared with the second access code in the second access authentication request; wherein, the second access authentication request is used to indicate that the new ECU is requesting to connect to the vehicle's bus network again, and the second access code is the access code stored by the new ECU when it first requested to connect to the vehicle's bus network; If the access code is the same as the second access code, it is determined that the new ECU will be connected to the vehicle's bus network.

9. A terminal device, characterized in that, The method includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the computer program, implements the method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 5, 6 to 8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, 6 to 8.

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