Physical layer transmission method and related equipment
By sending composite signals to drone nodes and using cooperative nodes to interfere with eavesdropping nodes, the vulnerability of drone communication to attacks was solved, achieving efficient transmission security and performance improvement.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202511792660.2
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-12-01
- Publication Date
- 2026-03-27
AI Technical Summary
Drone communication is vulnerable to attacks caused by the line-of-sight characteristics of air-to-ground channels. How can we improve communication confidentiality to combat malicious eavesdropping?
By sending composite signals to UAV nodes, including confidential information signals with transmission power modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio and artificial noise signals, and instructing cooperating nodes to interfere with eavesdropping nodes, the optimal power allocation ratio is obtained by solving the first objective function of the target security rate as the optimization objective using the security interruption probability as a constraint.
It improves the differentiation between legitimate channels and eavesdropping channels, effectively avoids eavesdropping, reduces complexity and resource consumption, and enhances the transmission security and performance of UAV wireless communication networks.
Smart Images
Figure CN121751339A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to wireless communication technology, and in particular to a physical layer transmission method and related equipment. Background Technology
[0002] Drones have broad application prospects in the field of wireless communication, but the line-of-sight characteristics of air-to-ground channels make them vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, how to improve the confidentiality of drone communications to effectively combat malicious eavesdropping is a problem that urgently needs to be solved by those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention
[0003] This application provides a physical layer transmission method and related equipment, which can effectively improve the security of physical layer transmission.
[0004] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, this application is implemented as follows: In a first aspect, a physical layer transmission method is provided, applied to a legitimate transmitting node. The method includes: sending a composite signal to a drone node and instructing a cooperating node to interfere with an eavesdropping node through an interference signal, wherein the composite signal includes a confidential information signal and an artificial noise signal whose transmission power is modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio; determining a security interruption probability based on a target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the drone node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; solving a first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective, using the security interruption probability as a constraint, to obtain an adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate; and modulating the transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal according to the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
[0005] Secondly, a physical layer transmission device is provided, comprising: a transmitting module for transmitting a composite signal to a drone node and instructing a cooperating node to interfere with an eavesdropping node through an interference signal, wherein the composite signal includes a confidential information signal and an artificial noise signal whose transmission power is modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio; a determining module for determining a security interruption probability based on a target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the drone node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; a calculating module for solving a first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective, using the security interruption probability as a constraint, to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate; and a modulation module for modulating the transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal according to the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
[0006] Thirdly, an electronic device is provided, including a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a program or instructions executable on the processor, the program or instructions, when executed by the processor, perform the steps of the method described in the first aspect.
[0007] Fourthly, a readable storage medium is provided, on which a program or instructions are stored, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the method described in the first aspect.
[0008] Fifthly, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product comprising a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the computer program comprising program instructions that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the steps of the method described in the first aspect.
[0009] In this embodiment, a composite signal is sent to the UAV node, and cooperating nodes are instructed to interfere with the eavesdropping node using jamming signals. The composite signal includes a confidential information signal modulated by a preset power allocation ratio and an artificial noise signal. Based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal at the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal at the eavesdropping node, the security interruption probability is determined. Using the security interruption probability as a constraint, a first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective is solved to obtain an adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate. Modulating the transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal according to this adjustable power allocation ratio improves the difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel, effectively preventing eavesdropping, and reducing complexity and resource overhead. Furthermore, in the UAV wireless communication network, considering the resource and energy constraints of the transmitting node, an adaptive power allocation scheme is obtained by solving the security rate maximization problem under the security interruption probability constraint, further improving transmission security and ensuring transmission performance.
[0010] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and do not limit this application. Attached Figure Description
[0011] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.
[0012] Figure 1 This invention illustrates a flowchart of a physical layer transmission method provided in an exemplary embodiment of this application. Figure 2 This illustration shows a schematic diagram of a drone-assisted collaborative secure transmission architecture provided in an exemplary embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This illustration shows another flowchart of a physical layer transmission method provided in an exemplary embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This invention provides a schematic diagram of a physical layer transmission apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an exemplary embodiment of this application is shown. Detailed Implementation
[0013] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with this application. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of this application as detailed in the appended claims.
[0014] Figure 1 This illustration shows a flowchart of a physical layer transmission method provided in an exemplary embodiment of this application. The method can be executed by a legitimate sending node, which may include a terminal device and a network-side device. In other words, the method can be executed by software or hardware installed on an electronic device, and the method may include the following steps: S110: Sends a composite signal to the drone node and instructs the cooperating node to interfere with the eavesdropping node through jamming signals.
[0015] The composite signal includes a confidential information signal whose transmission power is modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio and an artificial noise signal.
[0016] In a Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) cooperative interference scenario corresponding to an embodiment of this application, the legitimate sending node plans to send confidential messages to a legitimate drone in the presence of an eavesdropping node and a cooperative node. It is assumed that the legitimate sending node, the eavesdropping node, and the cooperative node are all fixed on the ground, while the legitimate drone hovers at a constant height above the cooperative node. The location (the minimum height required to avoid ground obstacles) is given, and the location information of each of the above nodes is prior information. Furthermore, it is assumed that the number of transmit antennas of a legitimate transmitting node is... Number of transmit antennas of the cooperating nodes Both eavesdropping nodes and legitimate drones are equipped with a single receiving antenna. In some embodiments, such as Figure 2As shown, a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system can be used to describe the positional information of each node in the system. The coordinates of the legitimate sending node, the drone node, the cooperating node, and the eavesdropping node are assumed to be as follows: , , and .also, This represents the channel between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node. This indicates that the channels between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node are all independent quasi-static flat Rayleigh fading channels. This represents the channel between a legitimate transmitting node and a legitimate drone. This represents the channel between the collaborating node and the authorized drone. In urban scenarios, communication between the drone and ground nodes is easily blocked by buildings. Therefore, the air-to-ground channel is described using a line-of-sight (LOS) channel with certain generalizations, without considering channel correlation. The path loss exponent between the LOS channel and the non-line-of-sight (NLoS) channel between the drone and ground nodes is expressed as:
[0017] in, Furthermore, the general concept of air-to-ground channels as non-line-of-sight channels is determined by the distance between the UAV and various ground nodes, the elevation angle, and the environment. Therefore, it can be expressed as:
[0018] in, and For environmental constants, elevation angle , Furthermore, assuming the air-to-ground line-of-sight channel experiences Ricean fading, the Ricean coefficients are respectively... and The non-line-of-sight channel experiences quasi-static flat Rayleigh fading.
[0019] In this step, to achieve secure transmission from the legitimate transmitting node to the UAV, the transmitting node employs an artificial noise-assisted beamforming transmission scheme. The transmission signal representing a legitimate transmitting node can be represented as:
[0020] in, This indicates the transmit power of a legitimate transmitting node. This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal, that is, the power ratio used by the legitimate transmitting node for the confidential signal. This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the confidential information signal. , representing the artificial noise signal; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal.
[0021] To avoid interfering with drone nodes, cooperating nodes can design the transmission of interference signals based on the Zero Forcing (ZF) criterion. The interference signal It can be represented as:
[0022] in, This represents the transmit power of the cooperating nodes. Represents a Gaussian noise vector. express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space.
[0023] In this step, the legitimate transmitting node and the cooperating node work together to increase the difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel, thus preventing eavesdropping from an information theory perspective, and with low complexity and low resource consumption. It also implements a dual security mechanism: even if the legitimate transmitting node's artificial noise is not perfectly aligned with the eavesdropper due to channel estimation errors, the external cooperating node can still independently suppress the eavesdropper's signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, thereby preventing eavesdropping.
[0024] In some embodiments, the received signal corresponding to the drone node for:
[0025] in, This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the confidential information signal; This represents independent first additive complex Gaussian white noise; The received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node for:
[0026] in, This represents the path loss index corresponding to the eavesdropping channel, where the eavesdropping channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , representing the artificial noise signal; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaborating node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space, Represents a Gaussian noise vector. This represents independent second-order additive complex Gaussian white noise.
[0027] in, This refers to the confidential signal portion received by the eavesdropping node. This refers to the portion of the artificial noise signal received by the eavesdropping node from the legitimate sending node. Interference signals received by the eavesdropping node from cooperating nodes.
[0028] S120: Determine the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node.
[0029] It is understandable that the security interruption probability refers to the probability that the SINR of the eavesdropping node is higher than the security threshold. The security interruption probability can be used to determine the risk level of information leakage under the current eavesdropper density and channel conditions, thereby providing an optimized target direction for subsequent power resource allocation.
[0030] S130: Using the security interruption probability as a constraint, solve the first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective, and obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
[0031] In other words, by optimizing the adjustable power allocation ratio to maximize the target security rate while satisfying the security interruption probability constraint, an adaptive power allocation scheme is obtained. It is understandable that, to improve anti-eavesdropping capabilities, legitimate transmitting nodes can allocate more power to transmit artificial noise signals to suppress the signal-to-noise ratio of eavesdropping nodes. However, excessively strong artificial noise signals not only weaken the strength of confidential signals but also interfere with UAV nodes due to beamforming errors, leading to communication link disconnection. Therefore, by solving for the adjustable power allocation ratio, the optimal balance point can be determined that effectively drowns out eavesdropping signals while keeping self-interference to UAV nodes within an acceptable range.
[0032] S140: Modulate the transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal according to the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
[0033] Understandably, legitimate transmitting nodes precisely configure the power used for transmitting confidential signals and the power used for transmitting artificial noise signals based on the optimal adjustable power allocation ratio, ultimately achieving optimized secure high-speed communication.
[0034] In this embodiment, a composite signal is sent to the UAV node, and cooperating nodes are instructed to interfere with the eavesdropping node using jamming signals. The composite signal includes a confidential information signal modulated by a preset power allocation ratio and an artificial noise signal. Based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal at the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal at the eavesdropping node, the security interruption probability is determined. Using the security interruption probability as a constraint, a first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective is solved to obtain an adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate. The transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal is modulated according to this adjustable power allocation ratio, achieving full utilization of various resources of the wireless channel through signal processing technology. This improves the difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel, effectively preventing eavesdropping, and has low complexity and low resource overhead. Furthermore, in the UAV wireless communication network, considering the resource and energy constraints of the transmitting node, an adaptive power allocation scheme is obtained by solving the security rate maximization problem under the security interruption probability constraint, further improving transmission security and ensuring transmission performance.
[0035] In some embodiments, determining the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node includes: determining the main channel capacity based on the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node; determining the eavesdropping channel capacity based on the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; and determining the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the main channel capacity, and the eavesdropping channel capacity.
[0036] Understandably, according to secure coding theory, when the capacity of the eavesdropping channel exceeds the capacity of the main channel, optimal secure transmission cannot be achieved, resulting in a security interruption. The secure rate is the theoretical upper limit of the secure transmission rate under specific channel conditions. However, due to the time-varying nature of wireless channels, the secure rate is actually a random variable. If the communication system uses a fixed transmission rate, if channel conditions deteriorate and cause the instantaneous secure rate to fall below this fixed value, secure transmission will be interrupted. Therefore, by calculating the probability that the secure rate will fall below the target rate—that is, the security interruption probability—the confidentiality risk during transmission can be quantitatively assessed and controlled. Based on this security interruption probability, within a preset security interruption probability tolerance, the highest possible transmission rate can be selected, thereby achieving a balance between security performance and transmission efficiency.
[0037] In some embodiments, the main channel capacity for:
[0038] in, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the drone node. , This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes. This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; The eavesdropping channel capacity for:
[0039] in, The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node
[0040] in, This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the eavesdropping channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaborating node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space.
[0041] Furthermore, in some other embodiments, the security interruption probability for:
[0042] in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the capacity of the main channel. This indicates the capacity of the eavesdropping channel.
[0043] In some embodiments, such as Figure 3 As shown, the process of solving a first objective function with the target safety rate as the optimization objective, using the safety interruption probability as a constraint, to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate, includes the following steps: S132: Based on the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel, the adjustable power allocation ratio, and the interruption probability threshold, establish a first objective function with safe rate as the optimization objective.
[0044] The main channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the UAV node, and the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel is determined based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node.
[0045] In some embodiments, the first objective function is:
[0046] in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the adjustable power distribution ratio. This represents the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel. ; This represents the interruption probability threshold. , This indicates the capacity of the main channel.
[0047] S134: Based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node and the interruption probability threshold, establish a constraint condition that the security interruption probability does not exceed a preset threshold.
[0048] In some embodiments, the constraint conditions are:
[0049] in, This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; This refers to the preset threshold.
[0050] S136: Based on the constraints, solve the first objective function to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safe rate.
[0051] In some embodiments, S136 may include the following step: optimizing the first objective function through objective parameters to obtain a second objective function, wherein the second objective function is: The target parameter is , Based on the first derivative corresponding to the second objective function Determine the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate.
[0052] Understandably, to simplify the analysis, we can let Then the second objective function can be expressed as:
[0053] Among them, the target security rate Also depends on the parameters and Furthermore, it can be verified. .
[0054] The process of solving the above objective function is as follows: calculate The first derivative is:
[0055] because It is about It is a monotonically decreasing function, therefore we can obtain According to the second-order criterion in convex optimization theory, For about A strictly concave function. When hour, It is about A monotonically decreasing function. When hour, It is about It is a monotonically increasing function.
[0056] Therefore, in some embodiments, determining the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safe rate based on the first derivative of the second objective function includes one of the following: (1) In In the case of [condition], the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate is determined to be 1.
[0057] In other words, when , For about The monotonically increasing function can yield the optimal adjustable power allocation ratio, which is the adjustable power allocation ratio at which the target safe rate reaches its maximum value. This means that all transmit power from legitimate sending nodes is used to transmit confidential signals. In this case, it can be guaranteed that... That is, to achieve a positive safe rate.
[0058] (2) In In the case of [the target safety rate], the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate is determined to be 0.
[0059] In other words, when Safe speed For about The monotonically decreasing function yields the optimal adjustable power allocation ratio as follows: The corresponding safe rate .
[0060] (3) In and In the case of determining the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate, for: .
[0061] From the above analysis, it can be seen that, for It is a strictly concave function. Therefore, there must exist a unique optimal solution. ,satisfy Furthermore, if , can be obtained Therefore, we can obtain This achieves a positive safety rate. In high signal-to-noise ratio regions (e.g.,...) When the data is very large, secure transmission can be achieved. Approximate solution:
[0062] Figure 4 This application provides a schematic diagram of the physical layer transmission apparatus according to one embodiment, as shown below. Figure 4 As shown, the physical layer transmission device 400 may include: a transmission module 410, a determination module 420, a calculation module 430, and a modulation module 440.
[0063] In this embodiment, the transmitting module 410 is used to transmit a composite signal to the UAV node and instruct the cooperating node to interfere with the eavesdropping node through interference signals. The composite signal includes a confidential information signal and an artificial noise signal whose transmission power is modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio. The determining module 420 is used to determine the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node. The calculating module 430 is used to solve a first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective, using the security interruption probability as a constraint, to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate. The modulation module 440 is used to modulate the transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal according to the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
[0064] In some embodiments, the determining module 420 is specifically configured to: determine the main channel capacity based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node; determine the eavesdropping channel capacity based on the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; and determine the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the main channel capacity, and the eavesdropping channel capacity.
[0065] In some embodiments, the calculation module 430 is specifically configured to: establish a first objective function with a secure rate as the optimization objective based on the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel, the adjustable power allocation ratio, and the interruption probability threshold, wherein the main channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the UAV node, and the equivalent SNR of the main channel is determined based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node; establish a constraint condition that the secure interruption probability does not exceed a preset threshold based on the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node and the interruption probability threshold; and solve the first objective function based on the constraint condition to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target secure rate.
[0066] In some embodiments, the received signal corresponding to the drone node for:
[0067] in, This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the confidential information signal; This represents independent first additive complex Gaussian white noise; The received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node for:
[0068] in, This represents the path loss index corresponding to the eavesdropping channel, where the eavesdropping channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , representing the artificial noise signal; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaboration and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space, Represents a Gaussian noise vector. This represents independent second-order additive complex Gaussian white noise.
[0069] In some embodiments, the main channel capacity for:
[0070] in, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the drone node. , This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes. This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; The eavesdropping channel capacity for:
[0071] in, The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node
[0072] in, This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the eavesdropping channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaborating node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space.
[0073] In some embodiments, the security interruption probability for:
[0074] in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the capacity of the main channel. This indicates the capacity of the eavesdropping channel.
[0075] In some embodiments, the first objective function is:
[0076] in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the adjustable power distribution ratio. This represents the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel. ; This represents the interruption probability threshold. , This indicates the capacity of the main channel; The constraints are as follows:
[0077] in, This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; This refers to the preset threshold.
[0078] In some embodiments, the calculation module 430 is further configured to: optimize the first objective function through objective parameters to obtain a second objective function, wherein the second objective function is: The target parameter is , Based on the first derivative corresponding to the second objective function Determine the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate.
[0079] In some embodiments, the computing module 430 is further specifically used for one of the following: In the case where the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate is determined to be 1; In the case where the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate is determined to be 0; and In the case of determining the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate, for: .
[0080] The physical layer transmission device provided in this application embodiment can achieve... Figures 1-3 The various processes implemented in the method embodiments shown will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
[0081] The physical layer transmission device in the embodiments of this application can be a device, or it can be a component, integrated circuit, or chip in an electronic device. The embodiments of this application are not specifically limited.
[0082] One physical layer transmission device in this application embodiment can be a device with an operating system. The operating system can be Android, iOS, or other possible operating systems; this application embodiment does not specifically limit the specific operating system.
[0083] like Figure 5 As shown, this application embodiment also provides an electronic device 500, including a processor 510 and a memory 520. The memory 520 stores a program or instructions that can run on the processor 510. When the program or instructions are executed by the processor 510, they implement the above-mentioned... Figures 1 to 3 The various processes in the illustrated embodiments can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
[0084] This application embodiment also provides a readable storage medium storing a program or instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described functionality. Figures 1 to 3 The various processes in the illustrated embodiments can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
[0085] The processor mentioned above is the processor in the terminal described in the above embodiments. The readable storage medium includes computer-readable storage media, such as computer read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk, or optical disk. In some examples, the readable storage medium may be a non-transient readable storage medium.
[0086] This application embodiment also provides a chip, the chip including a processor and a communication interface, the communication interface being coupled to the processor, the processor being used to run programs or instructions to implement the above. Figures 1 to 3 The various processes in the illustrated embodiments can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
[0087] It should be understood that the chip mentioned in the embodiments of this application may also be referred to as a system-on-a-chip, system chip, chip system, or system-on-a-chip, etc.
[0088] This application embodiment also provides a computer program / program product, the computer program product including a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the computer program including program instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the above-described actions. Figures 1 to 3 The various processes in the illustrated embodiments can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
[0089] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element. Furthermore, it should be noted that the scope of the methods and apparatuses in the embodiments of this application is not limited to performing functions in the order shown or discussed, but may also include performing functions substantially simultaneously or in the reverse order, depending on the functions involved. For example, the described methods may be performed in a different order than described, and various steps may be added, omitted, or combined. Additionally, features described with reference to certain examples may be combined in other examples.
[0090] From the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of computer software products plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, they can also be implemented by hardware. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM, RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc.) and includes several instructions to cause the terminal or network-side device to execute the methods described in the various embodiments of this application.
[0091] The embodiments of this application have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, this application is not limited to the specific embodiments described above. The specific embodiments described above are merely illustrative and not restrictive. Those skilled in the art can make many other implementations under the guidance of this application without departing from the spirit and scope of the claims. All of these implementations are within the protection scope of this application.
Claims
1. A physical layer transmission method, applied to a legitimate sending node, characterized in that, include: A composite signal is sent to the drone node, and the cooperating node is instructed to interfere with the eavesdropping node through jamming signals. The composite signal includes a confidential information signal whose transmission power is modulated according to a preset power allocation ratio and an artificial noise signal. The security interruption probability is determined based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node. Using the security interruption probability as a constraint, solve the first objective function with the target security rate as the optimization objective to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate; The transmission power of the confidential information signal and the artificial noise signal is modulated according to the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target security rate.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the security interruption probability based on the target security rate, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node, and the SIR of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node includes: The main channel capacity is determined based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node. The eavesdropping channel capacity is determined based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node. The security interruption probability is determined based on the target security rate, the main channel capacity, and the eavesdropping channel capacity.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of solving a first objective function with the target safety rate as the optimization objective, using the safety interruption probability as a constraint, to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate includes: Based on the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel, the adjustable power allocation ratio, and the interruption probability threshold, a first objective function is established with the safe rate as the optimization objective. The main channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the UAV node, and the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel is determined based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the UAV node. Based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node and the interruption probability threshold, a constraint condition is established that the security interruption probability does not exceed a preset threshold. Based on the constraints, the first objective function is solved to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safe rate.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The received signal corresponding to the drone node for: in, This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the confidential information signal; This represents independent first additive complex Gaussian white noise; The received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node for: in, This represents the path loss index corresponding to the eavesdropping channel, where the eavesdropping channel is the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , representing the artificial noise signal; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaborating node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space, Represents a Gaussian noise vector. This represents independent second-order additive complex Gaussian white noise.
5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The main channel capacity for: in, This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the confidential information signal; This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the drone node. , This represents the total transmit power of the legitimate transmitting nodes. This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the main channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the drone node; , indicating the main channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; The eavesdropping channel capacity for: in, The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node in, This represents the path loss exponent corresponding to the eavesdropping channel. This represents the Euclidean distance between the legitimate sending node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the eavesdropping channel; This represents the beamforming vector corresponding to the legitimate transmitting node; This indicates the preset power allocation ratio corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the legitimate transmitting node; , represents the precoding matrix corresponding to the artificial noise signal; This indicates the transmit power of the cooperating node; The path loss index represents the path loss index corresponding to the interference channel, wherein the interference channel is the channel between the cooperating node and the eavesdropping node; This represents the Euclidean distance between the collaborating node and the eavesdropping node; , indicating the interference channel, This indicates the number of transmit antennas of the cooperating node; express A set of orthonormal bases in the null space.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The probability of security interruption for: in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the capacity of the main channel. This indicates the capacity of the eavesdropping channel.
7. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The first objective function is: in, This represents the target security rate. This indicates the adjustable power distribution ratio. This represents the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel. ; This represents the interruption probability threshold. , This indicates the capacity of the main channel; The constraints are as follows: in, This represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the received signal corresponding to the eavesdropping node; This refers to the preset threshold.
8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The step of solving the first objective function based on the constraints to obtain the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safe rate includes: By optimizing the first objective function with objective parameters, a second objective function is obtained, wherein the second objective function is: The target parameter is , ; Based on the first derivative of the second objective function Determine the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The step of determining the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safe rate based on the first derivative of the second objective function includes one of the following: exist In the case where the target safety rate is maximized, the adjustable power allocation ratio is determined to be 1. exist In the case where the target safety rate is maximized, the adjustable power allocation ratio is determined to be 0. exist and In the case of determining the adjustable power allocation ratio that maximizes the target safety rate, for: .
10. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor, a memory, and a program or instructions stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the program or instructions, when executed by the processor, implement the steps of the physical layer transport method as described in any one of claims 1-9.