Design method and device for function recovery strategy system after nuclear power plant accident

Abstract

The invention discloses a method and device for designing a function recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident, and the method comprises the steps: collecting nuclear power plant data, carrying out the analysis according to the nuclear power plant data, obtaining a key safety function, and constructing a key safety function set; performing priority ranking on the key safety functions according to a priority principle, and screening out symptom parameters from the key safety functions according to a parameter screening principle; constructing a key safety function state tree according to the key safety function set and the symptom parameters; constructing a support supervision state tree according to a nuclear power plant support system; according to the method, the accuracy and the high efficiency of typical accident treatment are guaranteed, meanwhile, the enveloping performance and the flexibility of treatment of superposed working conditions and complex working conditions are also guaranteed, the accident treatment capacity of a unit is improved, and the safety of the unit is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of nuclear safety and reliability engineering, specifically to a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. Background Technology

[0002] Accident operation safety is a crucial component of realizing the defense-in-depth concept for nuclear power plants. Advanced post-accident operation strategies can better ensure unit safety and prevent accident escalation. Currently, there are three main types of accident handling strategies used by nuclear power units to handle accidental operating conditions: event-oriented accident procedures (EOP), state-oriented accident procedures (SOP), and symptom-oriented accident procedures (SEOP). Among them, the symptom-oriented accident handling system can overcome the limitations of the event-oriented accident handling system, effectively handle complex accidents and abnormal operating conditions, including superimposed accidents, improve the unit's accident handling capabilities, and enhance unit safety.

[0003] Due to significant design differences between different reactor types in the nuclear power field, there is currently no SEOP accident handling system specifically for VVER reactor types. The current selection of key safety functions and parameters for the symptom-oriented accident handling strategy for VVER reactor types has the following problems: Due to the significant design differences between different reactor types, there is no publicly available technology that specifically addresses the needs and characteristics of VVER reactor types, starting from the three major safety functions and three safety barriers of the nuclear power plant as a whole, decomposing and screening key safety functions applicable to VVER reactor types layer by layer, and comprehensively analyzing the parameters corresponding to the key safety functions selected for VVER reactor types.

[0004] Patent document CN111612218B discloses a method for optimizing the operational strategy of symptom-oriented accident guidelines, including the following steps: safety function analysis and optimization of the symptom-oriented accident guideline system; optimization of the entry point for the operational strategy of symptom-oriented accident guidelines; optimization of the accident handling strategy framework; compliance calculation and analysis; and verification and confirmation of the optimized guidelines. Utilizing the method for optimizing the operational strategy of symptom-oriented accident guidelines of this invention, the optimal symptom-oriented accident operational strategy can be obtained based on different nuclear power unit designs, better reflecting the advanced nature and safety of the symptom-oriented accident guidelines. However, it does not solve the problem of constructing and restoring a systematic key safety function for VVER reactor types.

[0005] Patent document CN110444300A discloses a design method for a nuclear power plant core cooling function control strategy based on symptoms, including: conducting core cooling symptom limit analysis, identifying instrument combinations characterizing insufficient core cooling, obtaining limit requirements for instrument readings in the core cooling symptom instrument combinations; identifying a list of accidents challenging core cooling; analyzing the core cooling methods of the nuclear power plant, determining a set of core cooling methods, ranking the core cooling methods according to their comprehensive cooling capacity, and determining the optimal core cooling method sequence; verifying and adjusting the core cooling method sequence; and obtaining a core cooling function control strategy designed for nuclear power units with different technical characteristics. However, it does not address the issue of constructing and restoring a systematic critical safety function for VVER reactor types.

[0006] In summary, neither of the two existing patents mentioned above addresses the issue of building and restoring a systematic critical security function for VVER heap types. Summary of the Invention

[0007] Based on the above-mentioned technical problems, this invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident, which solves the problem of building a systematic recovery strategy for critical safety functions for VVER reactors.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, this invention proposes a design method for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident.

[0009] A design method for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident includes: Collect data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions; The critical security functions are prioritized according to the priority principle, and symptom parameters are selected from the critical security functions according to the parameter filtering principle. Construct a state tree for key safety functions based on the set of key safety functions and the symptom parameters; construct a state tree for support and supervision based on the nuclear power plant support system.

[0010] Further, a key security function state tree is constructed based on the key security function set and the symptom parameters, including: The security function status is determined based on the set of critical security functions and the symptom parameters, and a critical security function status tree is constructed based on the set of critical security functions, the corresponding security function status, and the symptom parameters.

[0011] Further, determining the security function status based on the set of critical security functions and the symptom parameters includes: Accident simulation is performed on the symptom parameters based on the key safety functions to obtain preset values ​​for the symptom parameters. Based on the preset values ​​for the symptom parameters and nuclear safety criteria, the safety function status of the key safety functions is determined.

[0012] Furthermore, a support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system, including: The nuclear power plant support system is determined, and the support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system and nuclear safety guidelines.

[0013] Furthermore, the nuclear power plant data includes: Accident data, structural data, and functional data.

[0014] Furthermore, based on the analysis of the nuclear power plant data, key safety functions are obtained, and a set of key safety functions is constructed, including: Nuclear safety objectives are determined by the three major safety functions of a nuclear power plant and the data of those functions. Key safety functions are obtained by analyzing the nuclear safety objectives, the three-layer barrier, and the structural data. The set of key safety functions is then constructed based on these key safety functions.

[0015] Furthermore, the set of critical security functions is constructed based on the critical security functions, including: Based on the accident data, determine the accident safety function set affected by the accident data, and verify the key safety function set based on the accident safety function set. If the key safety function set includes all the accident safety function sets, proceed to the next step; if the key safety function set does not include all the accident safety function sets, reconstruct the key safety function set.

[0016] Furthermore, the priority principle includes: The critical safety functions are prioritized for operating conditions that lead to serious consequences; multiple critical safety functions with causal logical relationships follow the causal order; and conform to the order of the three major safety functions and the three safety barriers of nuclear power.

[0017] Furthermore, the parameter selection principles include: The candidate parameters are explicit and identifiable; the candidate parameters are measurable in accident environments; the candidate parameters are representative under accident conditions to avoid confusion with normal operation; and the candidate parameters are representative in characterizing safety functions and can encompass multiple accident scenarios.

[0018] Furthermore, the security function status includes: Dangerous, severely damaged, functionally unmet, and functionally met.

[0019] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention also proposes a design device for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident.

[0020] A design apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident, characterized in that it includes: The data acquisition and construction module is used to collect data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions. The functional decision module is used to prioritize the key security functions according to the priority principle and filter out symptom parameters of the key security functions according to the parameter filtering principle. The strategy construction module is used to construct a key safety function state tree based on the key safety function set and the symptom parameters; and to construct a support supervision state tree based on the nuclear power plant support system.

[0021] Based on the above technical solution, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: 1. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By constructing a set of key safety functions, prioritizing and filtering parameters, and combining accident data, structural data, and functional data to construct a state tree of key safety functions and a support and supervision state tree, a recovery strategy after an accident is formed. This approach is specifically designed for VVER reactor types, ensuring the accuracy and efficiency of handling typical accidents. At the same time, it also ensures the envelope and flexibility for handling superimposed and complex operating conditions, improving the unit's accident handling capabilities and enhancing the unit's safety.

[0022] 2. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By combining accident analysis and functional analysis, key safety functions in nuclear power plant operation are further screened to obtain the core functions that directly affect the safe recovery of the nuclear power plant. This avoids the strategy complexity caused by functional redundancy in traditional methods, making the recovery strategy more focused and efficient. Furthermore, it customizes the screening of key safety functions and symptom parameters based on the design characteristics of VVER reactors, avoiding misjudgments or delays caused by generalized methods and improving the engineering applicability of the strategy.

[0023] 3. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By selecting support systems within the nuclear power plant, these systems serve as auxiliary decision-making tools for key safety functions. During nuclear power plant operation, especially in complex accident scenarios, these support systems can provide operators with critical safety data and decision support, thereby significantly improving the efficiency of handling overlapping accidents. Through this optimized decision support mechanism, this invention can effectively reduce the risk of nuclear power unit deterioration in accident situations, enhancing the overall safety and reliability of the nuclear power plant. This method not only improves accident response capabilities but also provides a more scientific and systematic guarantee for the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Attached Figure Description

[0024] The accompanying drawings, which form part of this specification, are used to provide a further understanding of the invention. The illustrative embodiments of the invention and their descriptions are used to explain the invention and do not constitute an undue limitation of the invention. In the drawings: Figure 1 A flowchart is shown as an embodiment of a design method for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system. Figure 2 The diagram illustrates detailed steps of a design method for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system according to one embodiment. Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating the analysis of a set of critical security features in one embodiment is shown; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the state tree of key security functions in one embodiment is shown; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a supported supervised state tree embodiment is shown; Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the design apparatus for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system is shown in one embodiment. Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the structure of a design product for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system is shown in one embodiment. Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0025] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0026] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments, which should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection claimed by the present invention.

[0027] Example

[0028] To address the issue of building and restoring systematic critical safety functions for VVER reactors, this invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident.

[0029] In this invention, "nuclear safety guidelines" refer to the basic safety requirements and standards that must be met during the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. These guidelines are mandatory and constitute the core of nuclear safety regulations, used to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities, prevent the release of radioactive materials, and protect the public and the environment.

[0030] In this invention, the "Nuclear Safety Guidelines" are recommended documents formulated and issued by the National Nuclear Safety Administration to guide nuclear facility operators and other relevant entities in implementing the requirements of higher-level laws, regulations, and rules. The Nuclear Safety Guidelines provide specific technical guidance and operational suggestions to help nuclear facility operators and managers better understand and implement nuclear safety principles.

[0031] In this invention, the "three major safety functions of nuclear power" refer to reactivity control, core cooling, and radioactive containment. Reactivity control ensures that the reactor is in a subcritical state through techniques such as control rod insertion and boron concentration adjustment, preventing uncontrollable chain reactions. Core cooling continuously removes core decay heat through the safety injection system and residual heat removal system, preventing fuel cladding failure. Radioactive containment limits the release of radioactive materials through physical barriers and monitoring systems.

[0032] In this invention, the "three safety barriers" are based on the "Safety Evaluation and Verification of Nuclear Power Plants" issued by the National Nuclear Safety Administration and include fuel pellets and cladding, pressure vessel and pressure boundary, and containment.

[0033] To achieve the above objectives, this invention also proposes a design method for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident.

[0034] like Figure 1 The present invention illustrates a design method for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system, which mainly includes the following steps: S101: Collect data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions.

[0035] Furthermore, such as Figure 2 The diagram shows the method flow of this embodiment. First, nuclear power plant data is collected, including accident data, structural data, and functional data. Then, functional analysis and task analysis are performed. In this embodiment, considering the specific needs and characteristics of the VVER reactor type, starting from the three major safety functions and three barriers of the nuclear power plant as a whole, key safety functions suitable for the VVER reactor type are decomposed and screened layer by layer. For example... Figure 3 As shown, the reactivity control function for the VVER reactor type is selected in the functional data. The purpose of the reactivity control function is to terminate the criticality reaction after an accident, avoiding continuous large heat release or even more serious accidents. The corresponding nuclear safety objective is determined to be preventing radioactive release into the environment. The nuclear safety objective is analyzed one by one using the fuel cladding, primary coolant integrity, and containment integrity in the three-layer barrier of the structural data. The requirement for the reactivity control function is that the reactor core is in a subcritical state after an accident and maintains sufficient subcriticality. Therefore, subcriticality is selected as one of the important safety functions. The integrity of the fuel cladding and primary coolant is also related to the subcriticality function. Repeating the above steps, the relevant safety functions obtained by decomposing the functions in sequence include subcriticality, core cooling, secondary heat sinks, primary coolant water load, primary coolant integrity, and containment status.

[0036] Furthermore, such as Figure 2 The task analysis shown in the figure determines the accident classification, operating condition, hypothetical initiating event, and affected accident safety functions through accident data, as shown in the accident data table in Table 1 below. The accident classification is secondary side heat exhaust increase, the operating condition is expected operating event, and there are two hypothetical initiating events: feedwater system malfunction leading to increased feedwater flow or decreased feedwater temperature and increased turbine steam flow. The corresponding affected accident safety functions are subcriticality and core cooling. At this time, the accident safety function set includes subcriticality and core cooling. In other embodiments, other accident types may also be included, and the affected safety functions are not limited to subcriticality and core cooling.

[0037] Table 1 Accident Data Table

[0038] Furthermore, the critical safety function set is verified based on the accident safety function set obtained above. If the critical safety function set includes all of the accident safety function set, proceed to the next step; if the critical safety function set does not include all of the accident safety function set, repeat the above steps to reconstruct the critical safety function set.

[0039] S102: Prioritize the key security functions according to the priority principle, and filter out symptom parameters for the key security functions according to the parameter filtering principle.

[0040] Furthermore, the priority principles include: priority is given to operating conditions where the concentration of critical safety functions leads to serious consequences; multiple critical safety functions with causal logical relationships follow the causal order; and the order conforms to the three major safety functions and three safety barriers of nuclear power.

[0041] Specifically, in this embodiment, based on the order of the three radioactive barriers, ensuring the integrity of the fuel cladding of the first barrier should be prioritized after an accident. Therefore, the safety functions related to the fuel cladding have the highest priority. Furthermore, the greatest threat to the fuel cladding is the core fission energy exceeding the thermal capacity of the dedicated safety facilities; therefore, subcriticality is the highest priority safety function. Based on this principle, the priority ranking of key safety functions is shown in Table 2 below. The first column represents the key safety functions, and the second column represents the priority ranking. The key safety functions, in order of priority, are subcriticality and reactor cooling.

[0042] Table 2 Priority Order Table

[0043] Specifically, the parameter selection principles include: the candidate parameters are clear and identifiable; the candidate parameters are measurable in an accident environment; the candidate parameters are representative under accident conditions to avoid confusion with normal operation; and the candidate parameters are representative in characterizing safety functions and can cover multiple accident scenarios.

[0044] Specifically, based on the parameter selection principle, the characterization parameters of each key safety function are analyzed. Taking subcriticality and core cooling as examples, VVER reactor types do not have direct parameters, but representative indirect parameters such as power and neutron period can be selected to characterize subcriticality. For each key safety function, the corresponding symptom parameters are shown in Table 3 below, where the first column is the key safety function and the second column is the symptom parameters. In Table 3, the symptom parameters for subcriticality are unit power and neutron period; the symptom parameters for reactor cooling include core outlet temperature and core thermal power.

[0045] Table 3 Symptom Parameter Table

[0046] S103: Construct a critical safety function state tree based on the critical safety function set and the symptom parameters; construct a support and supervision state tree based on the nuclear power plant support system.

[0047] The key safety function set is further divided into functional states. The safety function state is determined based on the key safety function set and the above-mentioned symptom parameters. The key safety function state tree is constructed based on the key safety function set, the corresponding safety function state, and the symptom parameters.

[0048] Furthermore, the safety function status includes dangerous, severely damaged, functionally unmet, and functionally met.

[0049] Specifically, in this invention, by simulating the symptom parameters of the subcritical value, and judging from nuclear safety criteria that when the unit power meter exceeds 5% after simulation, it will pose a risk to the maintenance of fuel cladding integrity, it is set as a dangerous state, and the unit power is set to 5% as the preset value of the symptom parameter. The above steps are repeated, and simulation is performed based on nuclear safety standards and neutron cycles. The starting range neutron cycle 0 and the original range neutron cycle 0 are further set as the preset values ​​of the symptom parameter. Simultaneously, its safety functional states are obtained as severely damaged, functionally unmet, and functionally met, respectively. Based on the above-obtained symptom parameters, preset values ​​of symptom parameters, and safety functional states, a system is constructed as follows: Figure 4 The critical security function state tree shown is constructed, and a critical security function state tree is constructed for each critical security function in the critical security function set.

[0050] Furthermore, the nuclear power plant support system is determined, and the support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system and nuclear safety guidelines.

[0051] In this embodiment, based on the analysis of the VVER unit, its important support systems include critical power supplies and equipment cooling water systems. These support systems are typically in operation or energized, therefore, it is not necessary to determine the commissioning conditions; their operational status can be directly monitored. When a support system failure is detected, it is crucial to identify the affected safety functions and equipment. If it is uncertain whether support functions can be restored, alternative functions and methods should be determined as quickly as possible. The restoration of support functions is primarily handled by the corresponding anomaly handling strategies for support function loss. In this embodiment, the power supply is taken as an example, such as... Figure 5 As shown, the instrumentation and control power distribution panel is normal, the emergency bus BEA, BEB, BEC, and BED are all available, and all four series of KAA are available. In accordance with nuclear safety guidelines, a monitoring status tree has been built.

[0052] Furthermore, the critical safety function state tree and the support and supervision state tree operate simultaneously, together forming a functional recovery strategy system for nuclear power plants after an accident.

[0053] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, as some steps may be performed in other orders or simultaneously according to this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to this application.

[0054] Based on another aspect of the embodiments of this application, the present invention also provides a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the device includes: The data acquisition and construction module 601 is used to acquire data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions. The functional decision module 602 is used to prioritize the key security functions according to the priority principle and filter out symptom parameters of the key security functions according to the parameter filtering principle. The strategy construction module 603 is used to construct a key safety function state tree based on the key safety function set and the symptom parameters; and to construct a support and supervision state tree based on the nuclear power plant support system.

[0055] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used to: determine the security function status according to the key security function set and the symptom parameters, and construct a key security function status tree according to the key security function set, the corresponding security function status, and the symptom parameters.

[0056] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used to: simulate an accident based on the symptom parameters according to the key safety functions, obtain preset values ​​for the symptom parameters, and determine the safety function status of the key safety functions based on the preset values ​​for the symptom parameters and nuclear safety criteria.

[0057] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned apparatus is also used to: determine the nuclear power plant support system, and construct the support monitoring state tree based on the nuclear power plant support system and nuclear safety guidelines.

[0058] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used for: the nuclear power plant data, including: accident data, structural data and functional data.

[0059] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used to: determine nuclear safety objectives through the three major safety functions of a nuclear power plant and the functional data; analyze the nuclear safety objectives, the three-layer barrier, and the structural data to obtain key safety functions; and construct the key safety function set based on the key safety functions.

[0060] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is further configured to: determine the set of accident safety functions affected by the accident data based on the accident data; verify the set of critical safety functions based on the set of accident safety functions; if the set of critical safety functions includes all of the accident safety functions, proceed to the next step; if the set of critical safety functions does not include all of the accident safety functions, reconstruct the set of critical safety functions.

[0061] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used for: the priority principle, including: prioritizing the conditions where the concentration of the key safety functions leads to serious consequences; multiple key safety functions with causal logical relationships following the causal order; and conforming to the order of the three major safety functions and the three safety barriers of nuclear power.

[0062] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used for: the parameter screening principles include: the candidate parameter is clear and identifiable; the candidate parameter is measurable in an accident environment; the candidate parameter is representative under accident conditions to avoid confusion with normal operation; the candidate parameter is representative in characterizing safety functions and can cover multiple accident scenarios.

[0063] As an optional solution, the above-mentioned device is also used for: the safety function state, including: danger, serious damage, function not satisfied, and function satisfied.

[0064] In this application embodiment, the terms "module" or "unit" refer to a computer program or part of a computer program that has a predetermined function and works with other related parts to achieve a predetermined goal, and can be implemented wholly or partially using software, hardware (such as processing circuitry or memory), or a combination thereof. Similarly, a processor (or multiple processors or memory) can be used to implement one or more modules or units. Furthermore, each module or unit can be part of an overall module or unit that includes the functionality of that module or unit.

[0065] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0066] According to one aspect of this application, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product comprising a computer program.

[0067] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0068] Figure 7 A schematic block diagram of a computer system architecture for implementing an electronic device according to embodiments of the present application is shown.

[0069] It should be noted that, Figure 7 The computer system 700 of the electronic device shown is merely an example and should not impose any limitation on the functionality and scope of use of the embodiments of this application.

[0070] like Figure 7As shown, the computer system 700 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 701, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on programs stored in read-only memory (ROM) 702 or programs loaded from storage section 708 into random access memory (RAM) 703. The RAM 703 also stores various programs and data required for system operation. The CPU 701, ROM 702, and RAM 703 are interconnected via a bus 704. An input / output interface 705 (I / O interface) is also connected to the bus 704.

[0071] The following components are connected to the input / output interface 705: an input section 706 including a keyboard, mouse, etc.; an output section 707 including a cathode ray tube (CRT), liquid crystal display (LCD), etc., and speakers, etc.; a storage section 708 including a hard disk, etc.; and a communication section 709 including a network interface card such as a local area network card, modem, etc. The communication section 709 performs communication processing via a network such as the Internet. A drive 710 is also connected to the input / output interface 705 as needed. A removable medium 73, such as a disk, optical disk, magneto-optical disk, semiconductor memory, etc., is installed on the drive 710 as needed so that computer programs read from it can be installed into the storage section 708 as needed.

[0072] Specifically, according to embodiments of this application, the processes described in the various method flowcharts can be implemented as computer software programs. For example, embodiments of this application include a computer program product comprising a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, the computer program containing program code for performing the methods shown in the flowcharts. In such embodiments, the computer program can be downloaded and installed from a network via communication section 709, and / or installed from removable medium 73. When the computer program is executed by central processing unit 701, it performs various functions defined in the system of this application.

[0073] In such an embodiment, the computer program can be downloaded and installed from a network via the communication section 709, and / or installed from the removable medium 73. When the computer program is executed by the central processing unit 701, it performs various functions provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0074] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, an electronic device is also provided for a design method of a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. This embodiment uses this electronic device as an example of a terminal device. Figure 8 As shown, the electronic device includes a memory 802 and a processor 804. The memory 802 stores a computer program, and the processor 804 is configured to execute the steps in any of the above method embodiments via the computer program.

[0075] Optionally, in this embodiment, the aforementioned electronic device may be located in at least one of a plurality of network devices in a computer network.

[0076] Optionally, in this embodiment, the processor may be configured to execute the methods in the embodiments of this application via a computer program.

[0077] Alternatively, as those skilled in the art will understand, Figure 8 The structure shown is for illustrative purposes only. Figure 8 This does not limit the structure of the aforementioned electronic devices. For example, the electronic device may also include components that are more... Figure 8 The more or fewer components shown (such as network interfaces, etc.), or having the same Figure 8 The different configurations shown.

[0078] The memory 802 can be used to store software programs and modules, such as the program instructions / modules corresponding to the design method and apparatus for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system in this embodiment. The processor 804 executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and modules stored in the memory 802, thereby realizing the aforementioned design method for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system. The memory 802 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some instances, the memory 802 may further include memory remotely located relative to the processor 804, and these remote memories can be connected to the terminal via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, corporate intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof. Specifically, the memory 802 may be used, but is not limited to, to store collected operational data or cleaned data. As an example, such as... Figure 8 As shown, the memory 802 may include, but is not limited to, the data acquisition module 601, the function decision module 602, and the strategy construction module 603 from the design device for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system described above. Furthermore, it may include, but is not limited to, other module units from the aforementioned device, which will not be elaborated upon in this example.

[0079] Optionally, the transmission device 806 described above is used to receive or send data via a network. Specific examples of the network described above may include wired networks and wireless networks. In one example, the transmission device 806 includes a Network Interface Controller (NIC), which can be connected to other network devices and a router via a network cable to communicate with the Internet or a local area network. In another example, the transmission device 806 is a Radio Frequency (RF) module, used for wireless communication with the Internet.

[0080] In addition, the aforementioned electronic device also includes: a display 808 for displaying the aforementioned operating data or cleaning data; and a connection bus 810 for connecting the various module components in the aforementioned electronic device.

[0081] In other embodiments, the aforementioned terminal device or server can be a node in a distributed system, wherein the distributed system can be a blockchain system, which is a distributed system formed by connecting multiple nodes through network communication. The nodes can form a peer-to-peer network, and any form of computing device, such as a server, terminal, or other electronic device, can become a node in the blockchain system by joining this peer-to-peer network.

[0082] According to one aspect of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein a processor of an electronic device reads computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer instructions, causing the electronic device to perform a design method for a nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system provided in various alternative implementations of the design aspect of the above-described nuclear power plant post-accident functional recovery strategy system.

[0083] Optionally, in this embodiment, the computer-readable storage medium described above may be configured to store methods for performing the embodiments of this application.

[0084] Optionally, in this embodiment, those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing the hardware related to the terminal device. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which may include: flash drive, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disk or optical disk, etc.

[0085] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0086] If the integrated units in the above embodiments are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in the aforementioned computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause one or more electronic devices to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application.

[0087] In the above embodiments of this application, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0088] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed application can be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for example, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the displayed or discussed mutual couplings, direct couplings, or communication connections may be through some interfaces; indirect couplings or communication connections between units or modules may be electrical or other forms.

[0089] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0090] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0091] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0092] In summary, as can be seen from the above description, the embodiments of the present invention achieve the following technical effects: 1. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By constructing a set of key safety functions, prioritizing and filtering parameters, and combining accident data, structural data, and functional data to construct a state tree of key safety functions and a support and supervision state tree, a recovery strategy is formed after the accident. This design is specifically tailored to VVER reactor types, ensuring the accuracy and efficiency of typical accident handling. At the same time, it ensures the envelope and flexibility of handling superimposed and complex operating conditions, improving the unit's accident handling capability and enhancing the unit's safety.

[0093] 2. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By combining accident analysis and functional analysis, key safety functions in nuclear power plant operation are further screened to obtain the core functions that directly affect the safe recovery of the nuclear power plant. This avoids the strategy complexity caused by functional redundancy in traditional methods, making the recovery strategy more focused and efficient. Furthermore, it customizes the screening of key safety functions and symptom parameters based on the design characteristics of VVER reactors, avoiding misjudgments or delays caused by generalized methods and improving the engineering applicability of the strategy.

[0094] 3. This invention proposes a design method and apparatus for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident. By selecting support systems within the nuclear power plant, these systems serve as auxiliary decision-making tools for key safety functions. During nuclear power plant operation, especially in complex accident scenarios, these support systems can provide operators with critical safety data and decision support, thereby significantly improving the efficiency of handling overlapping accidents. Through this optimized decision support mechanism, this invention can effectively reduce the risk of nuclear power unit deterioration in accident situations, enhancing the overall safety and reliability of the nuclear power plant. This method not only improves accident response capabilities but also provides a more scientific and systematic guarantee for the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

[0095] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0096] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used merely to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes the element.

[0097] It should be noted that, in the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of different embodiments or examples.

Claims

1. A design method for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident, characterized in that, include: Collect data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions; The critical security functions are prioritized according to the priority principle, and symptom parameters are selected from the critical security functions according to the parameter filtering principle. Construct a state tree of key security functions based on the set of key security functions and the symptom parameters; A support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Constructing a critical security function state tree based on the critical security function set and the symptom parameters includes: The security function status is determined based on the set of critical security functions and the symptom parameters, and a critical security function status tree is constructed based on the set of critical security functions, the corresponding security function status, and the symptom parameters.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Determining the security function status based on the set of critical security functions and the symptom parameters includes: Accident simulation is performed on the symptom parameters based on the key safety functions to obtain preset values ​​for the symptom parameters. Based on the preset values ​​for the symptom parameters and nuclear safety criteria, the safety function status of the key safety functions is determined.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the nuclear power plant support system, a support monitoring state tree is constructed, including: The nuclear power plant support system is determined, and the support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system and nuclear safety guidelines.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The nuclear power plant data includes: Accident data, structural data, and functional data.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, Based on the analysis of the nuclear power plant data, key safety functions are obtained, and a set of key safety functions is constructed, including: Nuclear safety objectives are determined by the three major safety functions of a nuclear power plant and the data of those functions. Key safety functions are obtained by analyzing the nuclear safety objectives, the three-layer barrier, and the structural data. The set of key safety functions is then constructed based on these key safety functions.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The set of critical security functions is constructed based on the aforementioned critical security functions, including: Based on the accident data, determine the accident safety function set affected by the accident data, and verify the key safety function set based on the accident safety function set. If the key safety function set includes all the accident safety function sets, proceed to the next step; if the key safety function set does not include all the accident safety function sets, reconstruct the key safety function set.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The priority principle includes: Prioritize critical safety functions that lead to severe consequences in operating conditions. The multiple key security functions described herein have a causal logical relationship and follow the causal sequence. It conforms to the order of the three major safety functions and the three safety barriers of nuclear power.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The parameter selection principles include: The candidate parameters are explicit and can be determined; The candidate parameters described in the accident environment are measurable; The candidate parameters described under accident conditions are representative and should be kept from confusion with normal operation. The candidate parameters described are representative in characterizing safety functions and can encompass multiple accident scenarios.

10. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The security function status includes: Dangerous, severely damaged, functionally unmet, and functionally met.

11. A design device for a functional recovery strategy system after a nuclear power plant accident, characterized in that, include: The data acquisition and construction module is used to collect data from nuclear power plants, analyze the data to obtain key safety functions, and construct a set of key safety functions. The functional decision module is used to prioritize the key security functions according to the priority principle and filter out symptom parameters of the key security functions according to the parameter filtering principle. The strategy construction module is used to construct a key security function state tree based on the key security function set and the symptom parameters; A support monitoring state tree is constructed based on the nuclear power plant support system.

12. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein the computer program can be executed by an electronic device to perform the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

13. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program performs the steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

14. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, characterized in that, The memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to execute the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10 through the computer program.

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