Aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method and system and storage medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of data processing, in particular to an aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method and system and a storage medium. Comprising the steps of obtaining an initial data record and generating an immutable identifier; acquiring multi-body operation information in a transfer processing link, adding the multi-body operation information into the data block, verifying consistency, and forming an extended data block; an operation historical sequence is extracted and is marked to be abnormal, so that a tamper-proof data chain is formed; receiving a query request, traversing the tamper-proof data link and calculating a hash value; according to an integrity verification result, extracting digital signature information, determining a responsibility locking identifier, and synchronizing distributed account book data to form a shared trust view; and obtaining a tracing path through the shared trust view, analyzing an abnormal source and outputting details of an operation main body. The problem that data tampering and tracing are difficult in traditional aluminum industry solid waste management is solved, and the purposes that the whole aluminum industry solid waste management process based on the block chain is transparent, traceable and clear in responsibility are achieved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of data processing, in particular to an aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method, system and storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the production process of the aluminum industry, the generation, transportation and disposal of solid waste are important components of resource recycling and environmental protection. Aluminum industry solid waste, including red mud and aluminum ash, contains harmful substances, and its disposal methods (such as landfill, incineration, etc.) directly affect the sustainable development of the environment and society. Traditional waste management methods often rely on manual records and centralized management systems, which have problems such as data tampering, information opacity, and difficulty in tracing, and cannot guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the data in the waste treatment process, resulting in low efficiency and accuracy of environmental supervision.

[0003] With the advancement of industrialization, especially the increasingly stringent environmental protection policies, how to realize the transparency of waste management, the non-tamperability of data and the explicitness of responsibility has become a technical problem to be solved. At present, many fields have begun to try to apply blockchain technology to data tracing, especially in the food, medicine and other industries that require high transparency. However, in the management of aluminum industry solid waste, existing technologies often cannot provide effective solutions for multi-agent collaboration, lack of systematic data tamper-proofing methods and cross-link responsibility tracing capabilities.

[0004] In this context, the present application proposes an aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method, system and storage medium, aiming to ensure the accuracy and tamper-proofing of data in each link from generation, transportation to disposal of waste through blockchain technology, and to trace the operation details of each link, thereby improving the efficiency, transparency and security of waste management, and providing strong technical support for environmental protection and resource recycling. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application provides an aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method, which provides an efficient, transparent and tamper-proof waste management system by combining blockchain technology and multi-agent collaboration mechanism, and fully solves the problems of data tampering, operation opacity and unclear responsibility in traditional waste management methods.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides an aluminum industry solid waste informatization supervision and tracing method, comprising: Step S1: In the production process of the aluminum industry, initial data records are obtained from the waste generation link and preliminary data blocks are formed, and an immutable identifier is generated by a hash algorithm; multi-agent operation information is obtained at the transportation and disposal link according to the immutable identifier and is attached to the data block, and an extended data block is formed by verifying consistency through a consensus algorithm; Step S2: extracting an operation history sequence from the extended data block and marking an exception to obtain an anti-tampering data chain; by receiving a query request and traversing the anti-tampering data chain, calculating a current hash value of each data block, comparing the current hash value with a stored original hash value, performing integrity verification to determine a hash value matching result; Step S3: extracting digital signature information according to the matching result and determining a responsibility locking identifier through a public key verification mechanism; synchronizing distributed ledger data according to the responsibility locking identifier to form a shared trust view; Step S4: obtaining a traceability path from the shared trust view and analyzing an abnormal source to output operation subject details.

[0007] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S1, the initial data record is obtained from the waste generation link and a preliminary data block is formed, comprising: Collecting initial data records from the waste generation link through a blockchain network, wherein the initial data records at least include waste generation amount and detection indicators; integrating the initial data records into a preliminary data block; using a hash chain algorithm to calculate the preliminary data block to generate a corresponding hash value as an immutable identifier; storing the immutable identifier and the preliminary data block in association in a blockchain node; Encrypting each part of the preliminary data block through the hash chain algorithm to generate a unique identification code; binding the unique identification code with the preliminary data block to form an initial data unit that cannot be tampered with; broadcasting the initial data unit to each node for storage through the blockchain network; generating initial data confirmation information according to the storage state of the initial data unit; preliminarily verifying the integrity of the preliminary data block through the confirmation information.

[0008] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S1, an extended data block is formed, comprising: Locating the corresponding preliminary data block according to the immutable identifier; obtaining operation information from multi-subject participating nodes of the transfer disposal link, wherein the operation information at least includes transfer time, disposal method and subject identifier; appending the operation information to the preliminary data block to form a temporary data block; verifying the consistency of the temporary data block through a blockchain consensus algorithm; if the temporary data block passes the consistency verification, the temporary data block is confirmed as an extended data block; Calculating and storing the hash value of the extended data block in the blockchain network; performing distributed confirmation of the multi-subject operation information of the extended data block through the consensus algorithm; updating the state of the extended data block according to the confirmation result; synchronizing the state update information to all nodes of the blockchain network.

[0009] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S2, the tamper-proof data chain is obtained, comprising: extracting an operation history sequence from the extended data block, the operation history sequence at least containing operation time and operation content of each link; performing item-by-item analysis on the operation history sequence to determine whether there is a change attempt; if a change attempt is detected, marking the abnormal operation through a timestamp mechanism; storing the marked abnormal operation record in a block chain node; rejecting a modification request for the extended data block according to the marking result; integrating the operation history sequence and the marking result to form a tamper-proof data chain; and encrypting and protecting the operation history through the structure of the tamper-proof data chain; generating tamper-proof confirmation information according to the encryption protection result; and broadcasting the confirmation information to all nodes of the block chain network for storage.

[0010] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S2, the hash value matching result is determined, comprising: receiving a query request for the tamper-proof data chain; traversing the chain structure of the tamper-proof data chain according to the query request; calculating a current hash value for each data block in the chain structure; comparing the current hash value with the stored original hash value; if the current hash value is consistent with the original hash value, determining that the integrity verification is passed; if the current hash value is inconsistent with the original hash value, marking that the integrity verification fails; generating an integrity verification report according to the verification result; storing the integrity verification report in a block chain node; and synchronizing the verification report to a related subject node through the block chain network.

[0011] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S3, the responsibility locking identifier is determined, comprising: extracting digital signature information of the corresponding subject from the matching result of the integrity verification; decrypting the digital signature information through a preset public key verification mechanism; determining the authenticity of the digital signature information according to the decryption result; if the digital signature information passes the verification, determining the corresponding responsibility locking identifier; storing the responsibility locking identifier in association with the matching result; generating a verification confirmation information through the public key verification mechanism; storing the verification confirmation information in the block chain network; limiting the operation authority of the related subject according to the responsibility locking identifier; and updating the state of the responsibility locking identifier through the limiting result.

[0012] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S3, a shared trust view is formed, comprising: According to the responsibility locking identifier, a corresponding subject node is located; data of the subject node is synchronized to a blockchain network through a distributed ledger technology; consistency verification is performed on the synchronized data to determine whether the data is complete; if the synchronized data passes the verification, the synchronized data is integrated into a shared trust view; the shared trust view is stored in all nodes of the blockchain network; the operation authority of each subject is uniformly managed through the shared trust view; view update information is generated according to the management result; the view update information is broadcast to related nodes; and the availability of the shared trust view is confirmed through the broadcast result.

[0013] As a preferred technical solution of the present application, in step S4, the traceable path is obtained from the shared trust view and the abnormal source is analyzed to output the operation subject details, comprising: The traceable path is extracted from the shared trust view, and the traceable path at least contains the operation records of each link; the traceable path is analyzed through a backtracking algorithm to determine the link where the abnormal operation occurs; the abnormal source is located according to the analysis result; the corresponding operation subject details are extracted from the abnormal source; and the operation subject details are stored in association with the traceable path; An abnormal analysis report is generated through the backtracking algorithm; the abnormal analysis report is stored in the blockchain node; the abnormal operation is marked according to the report content; and the data state of the shared trust view is updated through the marking result.

[0014] In a second aspect, the present application also provides an aluminum industry solid waste informationization supervision and traceability system for realizing the above-mentioned method, the system comprising: A data acquisition unit is configured to obtain initial data records from a waste generation link in an aluminum industry production process and form a preliminary data block, and generate an immutable identifier through a hash algorithm; A data verification unit is configured to obtain multi-subject operation information at a transfer disposal link according to the immutable identifier and attach the operation information to the data block, verify consistency through a consensus algorithm to form an extended data block, and verify the extended data block through a hash algorithm to form a tamper-proof data chain; A hash value matching unit is configured to extract an operation history sequence from the extended data block and mark an abnormality to obtain the tamper-proof data chain, receive a query request and traverse the tamper-proof data chain, calculate a current hash value of each data block, compare the current hash value with a stored original hash value, perform integrity verification to determine a hash value matching result, and extract digital signature information according to the matching result and determine a responsibility locking identifier through a public key verification mechanism; A trust view acquisition unit is configured to synchronize distributed ledger data according to the responsibility locking identifier to form a shared trust view; An abnormal traceability unit is configured to obtain a traceable path from the shared trust view and analyze an abnormal source to output operation subject details.

[0015] Thirdly, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described method.

[0016] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: This invention acquires initial data records from the waste generation stage, forms preliminary data blocks, and generates immutable identifiers using a hash algorithm to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the initial data, laying a solid foundation for subsequent traceability and verification. Based on these immutable identifiers, operational information from multiple stakeholders is acquired during the transfer and disposal stage, and data consistency is verified using a consensus algorithm to form extended data blocks, ensuring data transparency at each stage. Then, by traversing the operation history sequence within the extended data blocks and comparing the hash value of the current data block with the stored original hash value, it determines whether the data has been tampered with. If a hash value inconsistency is found, it is marked as an abnormal operation, ensuring data integrity and tamper-proof characteristics, enabling real-time detection and timely handling of data issues. Finally, digital signature information is extracted and verified using a public key verification mechanism. Decryption is performed to ensure that the responsibilities of the operating entities are clearly defined. If the digital signature verification is successful, the distributed ledger data is synchronized based on the responsibility lock-in identifier to form a shared trust view, ensuring the clarity of the operating permissions and responsibility traceability of each entity in waste management. Finally, by obtaining the traceability path from the shared trust view and analyzing the source of anomalies, detailed information of the operating entities is output, which can quickly locate the problematic links and responsible entities, providing a clear basis for accountability in waste management. Through the cooperation of the above technical solutions, the entire process of waste management, from data collection and transfer to disposal, can be monitored and traced in real time, preventing data tampering and unclear responsibilities. In the management of solid waste in the aluminum industry, this not only improves the transparency and credibility of waste disposal but also enhances trust in multi-entity collaboration, promoting the standardization and informatization of waste management. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an information-based monitoring and traceability method for solid waste in the aluminum industry, as shown in the embodiment. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the tamper-proof data chain in the embodiment; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the responsibility locking identifier confirmation method in the embodiment; Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of an information-based monitoring and traceability system for solid waste in the aluminum industry, as shown in the embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0019] This invention provides an information-based monitoring and traceability method, system, and storage medium for solid waste in the aluminum industry. The terms "first," "second," "third," "fourth," etc. (if applicable) in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments described herein can be implemented in a sequence other than that illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" or "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0020] For ease of understanding, the specific process of the embodiments of the present invention will be described below, such as... Figure 1 As shown in the embodiment of the present invention, the method for information-based supervision and traceability of solid waste in the aluminum industry includes: Step S1: In the aluminum industry production process, initial data records are obtained from the waste generation stage through the blockchain network to form a preliminary data block, and an immutable identifier is generated through a hash algorithm; based on the immutable identifier, multi-entity operation information is obtained in the transfer and disposal stage and attached to the data block, and consistency is verified through a consensus algorithm to form an extended data block; In step S1, initial data records are obtained from the waste generation stage and a preliminary data block is formed, including: Initial data records are collected from the waste generation stage through a blockchain network. These initial data records include at least the amount of waste generated and detection indicators. The initial data records are then integrated into preliminary data blocks. A hash chain algorithm is used to calculate the preliminary data blocks and generate corresponding hash values ​​as immutable identifiers. The immutable identifiers are then associated with the preliminary data blocks and stored in blockchain nodes. Each part of the initial data block is encrypted using the hash chain algorithm to generate a unique identifier; the unique identifier is bound to the initial data block to form an immutable initial data unit; the initial data unit is broadcast to each node for storage through the blockchain network; initial data confirmation information is generated based on the storage status of the initial data unit; and the integrity of the initial data block is initially verified using the confirmation information.

[0021] Specifically, the process of acquiring initial data records from the waste generation stage and forming preliminary data blocks through a blockchain network ensures the transparency, immutability, and traceability of data in waste management. First, sensor devices deployed at industrial production sites collect initial data records from the waste generation stage in real time. These initial data records include at least the amount of waste generated and detection indicators such as heavy metal content and pH value. The collected data is transmitted through the blockchain network to ensure timeliness and accuracy, and the decentralized nature of the blockchain network avoids the trust issues associated with a single data source. These initial data records are then integrated into preliminary data blocks in a structured format. Each data block contains a timestamp and source identifier, ensuring the traceability of each data entry and providing a foundation for subsequent traceability and verification. After the preliminary data blocks are generated, a hash chain algorithm is used to calculate the corresponding hash value as an immutable identifier. This hash value is then associated with the preliminary data block and stored in the blockchain node, ensuring the immutability of the data. Once a hash value is generated, any minor modification will cause a change in the hash value, thus enabling rapid detection of data changes and preventing unauthorized tampering.

[0022] During implementation, the initial data block will be further decomposed into multiple parts, including waste generation and detection indicators. Each part will be processed using a hash chain algorithm to calculate its hash value. Then, the hash values ​​of all parts will be combined using a Merkle tree algorithm to generate a unique identifier. The use of the Merkle tree ensures that even if a part of the data changes, it can be detected, thus providing a higher level of protection for the integrity of the entire data block. Through this encryption protection, data can be protected at a fine-grained level, and tampering points can be quickly located in multi-party collaboration, further enhancing the trust mechanism in the waste management system. The generated unique identifier is bound to the initial data block to form an immutable initial data unit. This initial data unit is then broadcast to each node via the blockchain network for storage, ensuring that each node has a complete copy of the data. The distributed nature of the storage process guarantees data reliability and avoids the risks that may arise from the failure of a single node. As the data unit is broadcast, each node confirms its successful storage status and generates initial data confirmation information to further verify the integrity of the data. During the confirmation process, nodes compare hash values ​​to ensure data consistency. If the hash values ​​match, it indicates that the data has not been modified; if they do not match, the data is marked as abnormal and rejected.

[0023] Through the above technical solutions, blockchain technology effectively realizes the functions of tamper-proof, reliable storage and traceability of waste management data in the aluminum industry production process. It not only ensures the traceability of waste data from generation to treatment, but also provides technical support for accountability in waste management. This enables the waste management system to maintain efficient supervision and strong tamper-proof capabilities when faced with large-scale data and complex operations.

[0024] Further, in step S1, forming an extended data block includes: The initial data block is located based on the immutable identifier; operation information is obtained from the multi-participant nodes in the transfer and disposal process, the operation information including at least transfer time, disposal method and subject identifier; the operation information is appended to the initial data block to form a temporary data block; the consistency of the temporary data block is verified by a blockchain consensus algorithm; if the temporary data block passes the consistency verification, the temporary data block is confirmed as an extended data block; The hash value of the extended data block is calculated and stored in the blockchain network; the multi-agent operation information of the extended data block is distributedly confirmed through the consensus algorithm; the state of the extended data block is updated according to the confirmation result; and the state update information is synchronized to all nodes of the blockchain network.

[0025] Specifically, through the blockchain network query interface, the aforementioned immutable identifier is used as a key to directly locate the corresponding preliminary data block, thereby achieving rapid location and making subsequent data processing more efficient. Based on this, operational information is obtained from the multiple participating nodes in the transfer and disposal process. This operational information includes at least transfer time, disposal method, and entity identifier, identifying the multiple participating nodes in the transfer and disposal process, such as nodes of waste generating enterprises, transfer companies, and disposal plants. The aforementioned entity identifiers include enterprise digital certificates; for medical waste scenarios, the multiple participating nodes include hospitals, logistics companies, and incineration plants. The operational information is extended to include waste classification codes, ensuring that the operation of each link in the entire waste management process can be traced and verified. The information is then appended to the initial data block to form a temporary data block. Operational information such as transfer time, disposal method, and entity identifier are stored along with the original data record and combined with the initial data block in a structured format. Next, a blockchain consensus algorithm verifies the consistency of the temporary data block, such as a proof-of-work algorithm, where nodes verify the temporary data block by solving mathematical problems. The temporary data block is then broadcast to the network, and all nodes check the data consistency, including the integrity and tamper-proof nature of the operational information. If a majority of nodes agree, the verification passes. For example, in a medical waste disposal scenario, consensus verification can detect discrepancies between the transfer time and GPS data, marking them as inconsistent and thus identifying potential anomalies, improving the overall system's tamper-proof capability.

[0026] If the temporary data block passes the consistency verification, it is confirmed as an extended data block. The hash value of the extended data block is calculated using the SHA-256 algorithm and used as its unique identifier. This hash value is stored in the blockchain network to ensure the data's persistence and immutability. A consensus algorithm is used to distribute the confirmation of multi-party operation information within the extended data block. Specifically, consensus algorithms such as Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake are used to verify the authenticity and consistency of the data. During the consensus verification process, each node independently verifies the digital signature and consistency of the operation information, collects confirmation votes, and confirms the validity of the extended data block after reaching a preset confirmation threshold, such as 2 / 3 of the nodes agreeing. Particularly important in this verification process is the verification of the entity identifier. Public key infrastructure is used to check the validity of the signature to ensure the legitimacy of each operating entity and the authenticity and reliability of the operation information. For example, assuming the extended data block contains a signature of a transfer company's identifier, the distributed confirmation process will verify whether the signature matches the public key. If they match, the operation information is confirmed as authentic, thus forming a reliable traceability chain. This not only helps to trace the responsible parties but also improves the tamper-proof capabilities and data security of the waste management system.

[0027] Once an extended data block is verified and confirmed, its status will be updated to verified. If any issues are found, it will be marked as pending review. This status update information will be synchronized to all nodes through the blockchain network to ensure that all nodes in the network maintain data consistency and timely updates. The system can effectively avoid data silos and ensure that even if there are network partitions, the final data will remain consistent. Through the above technical solution, in the process of solid waste management in the aluminum industry, it is possible to ensure that data at every stage of waste generation, transportation, and disposal can be traced and verified. Whether it is the transportation time of industrial waste or the disposal method such as incineration or landfill, it can be strictly verified and confirmed through extended data blocks and blockchain consensus mechanisms, ensuring the transparency and compliance of waste management. This not only improves the efficiency of waste management but also provides strong technical support for the implementation of environmental protection policies, ensuring accurate identification of responsibilities and timely handling of anomalies in the waste disposal process.

[0028] Step S2: Extract the operation history sequence from the extended data block and mark anomalies to obtain a tamper-proof data chain; perform integrity verification on the tamper-proof data chain to determine the hash value matching result; In step S2, obtaining the tamper-proof data chain includes: The operation history sequence is extracted from the extended data block, and each operation history sequence is analyzed to determine whether there is a change attempt; if a change attempt is detected, the abnormal operation is marked by a timestamp mechanism. The marked abnormal operation records are stored in the blockchain node; the modification request of the extended data block is rejected based on the marking result; the operation history sequence is integrated with the marking result to form a tamper-proof data chain; the operation history is encrypted and protected by the structure of the tamper-proof data chain. Based on the encryption protection result, an tamper-proof confirmation message is generated; the confirmation message is broadcast to all nodes of the blockchain network for storage.

[0029] Specifically, the aforementioned operation history sequence includes at least the operation time and content of each stage in the solid waste management process of the aluminum industry production process. Through the query interface of the blockchain node, extended data blocks are accessed and their internal structure is parsed to obtain the aforementioned operation history data. This ensures that the extracted sequence covers the entire chain of time points and operation content records from waste generation to disposal. Each extracted operation history sequence is analyzed item by item to determine if any change attempts exist, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the data. Specifically, for each operation record, the hash value of the current data is compared with the initial hash value. If the hash values ​​do not match, it is marked as a potential change attempt. The operation time is also checked to ensure it follows a logical order, avoiding changes that are out of order or jump to avoid unrealistic changes. If an unreasonable operation time sequence is found, the record is marked as an anomaly, thus enabling early detection of abnormal data and improving the reliability of the data chain. For example, in a solid waste transfer scenario, the sequence records the operations from the initial data of the generation stage to the disposal stage. If the analysis finds that the transfer time is earlier than the generation time, it is judged as a change attempt. This allows for early detection of anomalies and improves the reliability of the data chain.

[0030] When an attempt to change an event is detected, the abnormal operation is marked using a timestamp mechanism to ensure the mark is irreversible. Specifically, a global timestamp for the current blockchain network is generated and combined with the hash value of the abnormal operation to form a unique identifier. This identifier is appended to the abnormal record, thus pinpointing the time of the anomaly for subsequent accountability and preventing denial of responsibility. Furthermore, the network consistency of the timestamp is verified to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the mark. The marked abnormal operation record is stored in blockchain nodes. Through the blockchain's distributed storage mechanism, the marked record is redundantly stored across multiple nodes, avoiding the risk of single points of failure. If the marking result indicates an anomaly, the smart contract mechanism automatically rejects any attempts to extend the operation. Any modification requests to the data block are prevented, thus maintaining the integrity and tamper-proof properties of the data block. Next, the operation history sequence is integrated with the marking results, that is, the marking results are embedded in the corresponding positions of the sequence to form a tamper-proof data chain, ensuring that the integrity of the operation history is not compromised throughout the entire data chain. The integrated operation history is encrypted and protected by a hash chain algorithm, ensuring the security and privacy of the data during storage and transmission. Specifically, the hash link in the chain is used as the key basis, and a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES is applied to encrypt the integrated sequence content, and the overall hash value after encryption is recalculated to ensure the structural integrity of the data. If necessary, the encryption key is stored in authorized nodes to restrict access permissions for unauthorized users, thereby further enhancing data security. Figure 2 As shown, for multi-entity scenarios such as collaboration between producers and disposeers, integration can cover different parameters. For example, integrating the sequence and tags of solid waste with a production volume of 100 tons can generate a structure with a chain length of 6 links.

[0031] After encryption protection, tamper-proof confirmation information is generated. A short confirmation code is generated based on the encrypted hash value as proof of successful data protection. This confirmation information is broadcast to all nodes in the blockchain network through a consensus algorithm such as proof-of-work, ensuring that all nodes in the network reach a consensus on the data protection result and store it, forming a network-level confirmation. This ensures the tamper-proof nature of the data and the integrity of the data transmission process. The above technical solution can realize full data traceability in the management of solid waste in the aluminum industry. Any changes in operation can be detected and marked in a timely manner, ensuring that every link in the waste treatment process is transparent, traceable, and tamper-proof. It also strengthens the trust among the participating entities, ensures compliance and accountability in the waste treatment process, helps improve the regulatory efficiency of waste management, and provides strong technical support for environmental protection and resource recycling.

[0032] Further, in step S2, determining the hash value matching result includes: For the tamper-proof data link, a query request is received; the chain structure of the tamper-proof data link is traversed according to the query request; the current hash value is calculated for each data block in the chain structure; the current hash value is compared with the stored original hash value; if the current hash value is consistent with the original hash value, the integrity verification is determined to be successful; if the current hash value is inconsistent with the original hash value, the integrity verification is marked as failed. An integrity verification report is generated based on the verification results; the integrity verification report is stored on a blockchain node; and the verification report is synchronized to relevant subject nodes through the blockchain network.

[0033] Specifically, when the initial data record of a certain link in the waste management process needs to be traced, the system will automatically detect the query signal from the transfer and disposal entity and parse the preliminary data block identifier contained in the signal to initiate the verification process. This ensures that the query request can be directly linked to the tamper-proof data chain in the blockchain network, avoiding the risk of external interference and tampering, and ensuring the accuracy and authenticity of the query. According to the query request, the system traverses the chain structure of the tamper-proof data chain, accessing the extended data blocks formed from the waste generation stage to the final disposal stage one by one. Using the immutable identifier generated by the hash chain algorithm as a guide, the system extracts the operation history sequence in each data block. The above traversal process ensures the continuity of the data chain and avoids data breakage or tampering. During the traversal, the system checks the timestamp of each data block to determine if there are any anomalies. If the timestamp does not conform to the predetermined logical order, such as the transfer time being earlier than the waste generation time, the data is marked as a potential change attempt, and access to the current data block is suspended. The location is recorded for subsequent review. In this way, anomalies can be detected early in any link of the data chain, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the data in the waste management process.

[0034] Furthermore, a hash value is calculated for each data block in the aforementioned chain structure. The hash chain algorithm is used to recalculate the content of each data block, including waste generation, detection indicators, and additional operational information, to generate the current hash value. The hash value calculation for each data block is based not only on its own content but also on the hash value of the previous data block, thus forming a chain structure. This ensures that even minor changes in data content will lead to changes in the hash values ​​of all subsequent data blocks, effectively identifying any tampering. If the currently calculated hash value matches the original hash value stored in the blockchain, the integrity verification is considered successful, and the process continues. If the hash values ​​of the data verification and operations are inconsistent, it is marked as an integrity verification failure, triggering an alarm and isolating the abnormal data block to prevent further propagation of erroneous data. Based on the above verification results, an integrity verification report is generated. The report contains all comparison results, anomaly markers, and timestamp details, forming a structured report document. The report will record each link in the data chain in detail, analyze the source of the anomaly, and trace back to the relevant operating entity through a backtracking algorithm to ensure the accuracy and credibility of the report content. For reports that pass verification, a public key verification result with a responsibility lock identifier is also attached to enhance the trustworthiness of the report and ensure clear attribution of responsibility.

[0035] The aforementioned integrity verification report is stored on a blockchain node and synchronized to relevant entity nodes through the blockchain network, ensuring that all relevant parties can obtain the verification results in real time and update the shared trust view of the data. In this way, in multi-entity collaborative scenarios, anomalies can be responded to in real time, and the responsible entity can be quickly located. This ensures that data in every link of the solid waste management process in aluminum industry production can be accurately traced, ensuring the immutability and integrity of the data. At the same time, it improves the transparency and data security in multi-entity collaboration and provides technical support for environmental protection and resource recycling.

[0036] Step S3: Extract digital signature information based on the matching result and determine the responsibility lock identifier through a public key verification mechanism; synchronize distributed ledger data based on the responsibility lock identifier to form a shared trust view; In step S3, the responsibility lock identifier is determined, such as... Figure 3 As shown, it includes: The digital signature information of the corresponding subject is extracted from the matching result of the integrity verification; the digital signature information is decrypted through a preset public key verification mechanism; the authenticity of the digital signature information is determined based on the decryption result; if the digital signature information passes verification, the corresponding responsibility lock identifier is determined; the responsibility lock identifier is associated with the matching result and stored; verification confirmation information is generated through the public key verification mechanism; the verification confirmation information is stored in the blockchain network; the operation permissions of the relevant subject are restricted according to the responsibility lock identifier; the status of the responsibility lock identifier is updated based on the restriction result.

[0037] Specifically, the digital signature information of the corresponding entity is extracted from the matching results of the above integrity verification. This digital signature information can accurately identify the entities involved in each stage of the solid waste management process in the aluminum industry. Specifically, by traversing the data blocks in the matching results, the portion containing the entity identifier is located. The entity identifier corresponds to the operator in the waste generation or transfer stage. The extracted digital signature information is decrypted using a preset public key verification mechanism. The decryption process includes first obtaining the public key of the corresponding entity, which is retrieved from the shared trust view of the blockchain network to ensure that the identity of all entities can be verified. The shared trust view is described in detail below. Then, the digital signature information is decrypted using the public key to recover the hash value of the original message. The authenticity of the digital signature information is determined by comparing the hash value of the current data block with the hash value obtained from decryption. If the hash value obtained from decryption matches the hash value of the current data block, the signature information is verified successfully; otherwise, it is marked as invalid, thus confirming the authenticity of the entity's operation.

[0038] After confirming the validity of the digital signature information, a unique responsibility lock identifier is generated based on the verified signature. This responsibility lock identifier combines the entity identifier and a timestamp, providing clear attribution of responsibility for subsequent traceability and ensuring that the responsibility of each operating entity can be accurately traced. For example, in the process of solid waste disposal in the aluminum industry, if an abnormal change in operation is detected, such as a change in waste generation or detection indicators, the responsibility lock identifier can be traced back to the specific operating entity, ensuring that the problem can be dealt with in a timely manner. Next, the responsibility lock identifier is associated with the matching result and stored. The hash value of the responsibility lock identifier is calculated using a hash chain algorithm and appended to the data block of the matching result. Utilizing the immutability of the blockchain, the permanent storage of the responsibility lock identifier and the verification result is ensured, thereby ensuring that the responsibility identifier in each data block is tightly bound to the operation data, thus achieving the immutability of the operation data and the accurate traceability of responsibility.

[0039] To further enhance the credibility of the verification process and data, a public-key verification mechanism is used to generate verification confirmation information. This involves signing the verified signature details using a public key, generating confirmation information, and storing this confirmation information in the blockchain network. This ensures that all nodes in the blockchain network can share the verification result, further enhancing the reliability of the shared trust view and ensuring data consistency and transparency in a multi-party environment. Furthermore, based on a defined responsibility lock-in identifier, the operational permissions of relevant entities are restricted. Specifically, if an anomaly is detected in the operation of a certain entity, such as in waste transfer where the transfer time is earlier than the waste generation time, this restriction applies. By restricting the entity's data modification permissions within the blockchain network, further data tampering is prevented. In the aluminum industry solid waste management scenario, if an entity's signature verification fails, its operations in subsequent stages will be restricted, prohibiting its participation in subsequent waste disposal stages, thus ensuring the integrity of the data chain and the compliance of the waste management process. These restrictions not only apply to immediate abnormal operations but can also be adjusted according to the severity of the anomaly. For example, for minor anomalies, the entity's operational permissions can be restricted for a period of time, while for severe anomalies, its operational permissions can be permanently restricted, ensuring that every link in waste management can be strictly monitored and effectively managed.

[0040] Finally, the status of the responsibility lock-in identifier is updated based on the results of operational restrictions. This involves synchronizing the updated status information to all nodes via a consensus algorithm, ensuring that all nodes in the entire blockchain network receive the latest status and that all relevant parties are aware of changes in responsibility information and operational permissions in waste management in real time. This ensures the accuracy of responsibility traceability and the efficient operation of the waste management system. The aforementioned technical solution, while ensuring data tamper-proofing and traceability, accurately locks in the responsibility of each operating entity. Through permission management and real-time status updates, it achieves efficient supervision and data security in multi-entity collaboration, further enhancing the transparency and compliance of solid waste management in the aluminum industry and providing a solid technical guarantee for environmental protection and resource recycling.

[0041] Further, in step S3, forming a shared trust view includes: The corresponding principal node is located based on the responsibility locking identifier; the data of the principal node is synchronized to the blockchain network using distributed ledger technology; the synchronized data undergoes consistency verification to determine its completeness; if the synchronized data passes the verification, it is integrated into a shared trust view; the shared trust view is stored on all nodes of the blockchain network; the operation permissions of each principal are uniformly managed through the shared trust view; view update information is generated based on the management results; the view update information is broadcast to relevant nodes; and the availability of the shared trust view is confirmed through the broadcast results.

[0042] Specifically, the process begins by locating the corresponding key nodes based on responsibility identification markers, thereby enabling data synchronization across all stages of waste management. Specifically, based on these responsibility identification markers, key nodes related to waste generation, transfer, or disposal are identified. Using distributed ledger technology, the data from these key nodes is synchronized to the blockchain network, ensuring accurate data synchronization at each stage and preventing data loss or tampering, thus guaranteeing data transparency and reliability. During synchronization, consistency checks are performed on the synchronized data to verify its completeness. Once the check passes, the data is integrated into a shared trust view, which is stored across all nodes in the blockchain network. This ensures that all relevant nodes can access and maintain the same data copy in real time. By using blockchain technology to achieve distributed data storage, the single point of failure that can occur with traditional centralized storage is avoided. This addresses the issues and significantly improves the system's availability and robustness. The resulting shared trust view provides unified management of the operational permissions of each entity. Furthermore, based on the need for responsibility locking in multi-entity collaboration scenarios, a distributed ledger is applied to synchronize data across all nodes, thereby obtaining a unified shared trust view. Access control rules are embedded within this shared trust view, such as generating access control lists based on the entity's digital signature, to precisely manage read and write permissions for the aluminum industry solid waste data chain. For example, in a waste transfer scenario, the entity generating the waste only has permission to read its own data, while the disposal entity can write to the final disposal record. This refined permission control not only enhances system security and reduces the risk of unauthorized access but also ensures that every step of the waste management process complies with relevant laws and regulations.

[0043] After completing the above management, based on the current management results, view update information is generated, reflecting the changes in the operational permissions of each entity in the shared trust view. This update information is then broadcast to relevant nodes in the blockchain network, ensuring that all nodes receive the view update information and synchronize their local copies, thereby guaranteeing the consistency of node data throughout the entire blockchain network. Furthermore, the broadcast results are used to confirm the availability of the shared trust view. In practical applications of waste management, a backtracking algorithm is used to analyze the synchronization results reported by each node to determine whether the view is consistent. If a majority of nodes confirm the view's consistency... Figure 1If the shared trust view is confirmed, it will be marked as available, and subsequent waste tracing tasks will continue. In some cases, if the shared trust view confirmation process fails to complete within a set time, a resynchronization operation will be triggered to ensure the reliability and consistency of the view in a multi-node environment, thereby ensuring the compliance of waste management and the accuracy of the tracing path. Through the above technical solution, the data is made transparent and tamper-proof throughout the entire process of solid waste management in the aluminum industry, ensuring that every link from waste generation to disposal can be traced in real time. At the same time, it improves the data security and transparency in multi-entity collaboration. By utilizing the distributed ledger and smart contract technology of blockchain, responsibility can be accurately identified and anomalies can be responded to quickly, improving the efficiency and reliability of the waste management system and providing strong technical support for environmental protection and resource recycling.

[0044] Step S4: Obtain the tracing path from the shared trust view and analyze the source of the anomaly to output the details of the operation subject; specifically including: The traceability path is extracted from the shared trust view, and the traceability path contains at least the operation records of each step; the traceability path is analyzed using a backtracking algorithm to determine the step in which the abnormal operation occurred; the source of the abnormality is located based on the analysis results; the corresponding operation subject details are extracted from the source of the abnormality; and the operation subject details are associated with and stored in the traceability path. An anomaly analysis report is generated using the backtracking algorithm; the anomaly analysis report is stored on a blockchain node; abnormal operations are marked according to the report content; and the data status of the shared trust view is updated based on the marking results.

[0045] Specifically, the process involves obtaining a traceability path from the shared trust view and analyzing the source of the anomaly. First, the traceability path is extracted from the shared trust view. This path contains operation records for each stage, covering every step of the waste management process from waste generation to disposal. Then, the distributed ledger data in the blockchain network is traversed to identify and extract the sequence of operation records for the generation, transfer, and disposal of solid waste from the aluminum industry. These records are expanded based on the hash values ​​of the initial data blocks, ensuring the integrity and consistency of the data chain. As the traceability path is extracted, a backtracking algorithm is used to analyze it, gradually determining whether there are any abnormal operations in each stage. This involves traversing the operation records of each stage backwards from the end of the traceability path, comparing the hash values ​​in the records with the original values. The backtracking algorithm is a method of verifying consistency block by block from the tail to the head of the chain, commonly used in blockchain data auditing. If a hash value mismatch is detected, the stage is marked as the point of abnormal operation, thus identifying the specific stage where the abnormal operation occurred. Further analysis and location of the source of the anomaly are then performed, and detailed information about the relevant operating entity is extracted from the source of the anomaly.

[0046] The system associates and stores the details of the aforementioned operational entities with their traceability paths. A hash chain algorithm is used to calculate a new hash value after association, ensuring that the behavior of each operational entity accurately corresponds to its operation record. An anomaly analysis report is then generated progressively using a backtracking algorithm. This report covers all verified anomalies, change details, and their impact on the waste management process. During report generation, a timestamp mechanism ensures the immutability of the report content, guaranteeing that all updated reports reflect the latest operational history and maintain data integrity in subsequent queries.

[0047] Once the report is generated, the anomaly analysis report is stored on the blockchain nodes via the blockchain network and broadcast to all relevant nodes through a consensus algorithm, ensuring that each node can obtain the report synchronously, thereby further enhancing data consistency and transparency. For abnormal operations marked in the report, the abnormal operations are marked according to the report's conclusions, and the data status of the shared trust view is updated using this marking information to ensure that the view contains the latest abnormal marking information, thereby achieving traceability and accountability in multi-party collaboration. At each stage of the process, the hash value of each data block is calculated according to the backtracking algorithm and compared with the stored original hash value. If the comparison result is consistent, the data is considered valid and passes verification; otherwise, the system will trigger an alarm and mark it as abnormal. This not only ensures the tamper-proof nature of the waste management data chain but also effectively tracks the source of anomalies, providing data support for every stage of the waste management system. The above technical solution can accurately achieve full-process traceability and anomaly detection of waste in the aluminum industry solid waste management process through blockchain technology, ensuring that each operation can be accurately recorded and traced, while improving the transparency and trust in waste management. Furthermore, by utilizing distributed ledger technology, it can ensure data consistency and compliance of operation permissions among various entities in multi-party collaboration, thereby improving the overall efficiency and security of waste management and ensuring that each stage meets the requirements of environmental protection and resource recycling.

[0048] This invention also provides an information-based monitoring and traceability system for solid waste in the aluminum industry, used to implement the above-mentioned methods, such as... Figure 4 As shown, the system includes: The data acquisition unit is used to acquire initial data records from the waste generation stage and form preliminary data blocks during the aluminum industry production process, and generate immutable identifiers through a hash algorithm; The data verification unit is used to obtain multi-entity operation information in the transfer and disposal process based on the immutable identifier and attach it to the data block, and verify the consistency through a consensus algorithm to form an extended data block; The hash value matching unit is used to extract the operation history sequence from the extended data block and mark anomalies to obtain an anti-tampering data chain; by receiving query requests and traversing the anti-tampering data chain, it calculates the current hash value of each data block, compares the current hash value with the stored original hash value, and performs integrity verification to determine the hash value matching result; The trust view acquisition unit is used to extract digital signature information based on the matching result and determine the responsibility lock identifier through a public key verification mechanism; and to synchronize distributed ledger data to form a shared trust view based on the responsibility lock identifier. The anomaly tracing unit is used to obtain the tracing path from the shared trust view and analyze the source of the anomaly to output the details of the operation subject.

[0049] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described method.

[0050] In summary, this invention acquires initial data records from the waste generation stage, forms preliminary data blocks, and generates immutable identifiers using a hash algorithm to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the initial data, laying a solid foundation for subsequent traceability and verification. Based on these immutable identifiers, operational information from multiple stakeholders is acquired during the transfer and disposal stage, and data consistency is verified using a consensus algorithm to form extended data blocks, ensuring data transparency at each stage. Then, by traversing the operation history sequence within the extended data blocks and comparing the hash value of the current data block with the stored original hash value, it determines whether the data has been tampered with. If a hash value inconsistency is found, it is marked as an abnormal operation, ensuring data integrity and tamper-proof characteristics, enabling real-time detection and timely handling of data issues. Furthermore, by extracting digital signature information and utilizing a public key verification machine… The system decrypts the data to ensure clear accountability of the operating entities. If the digital signature verification is successful, the distributed ledger data is synchronized based on the responsibility lock-in identifier to form a shared trust view, ensuring clear operational permissions and accountability for each entity in waste management. Finally, by obtaining the traceability path from the shared trust view and analyzing the source of anomalies, detailed information about the operating entities is output, enabling rapid identification of problematic links and responsible entities, providing a clear basis for accountability in waste management. Through the synergy of the above technical solutions, the entire waste management process, from data collection and transfer to disposal, can be monitored and traced in real time, preventing data tampering and unclear responsibilities. In the management of solid waste in the aluminum industry, this not only improves the transparency and credibility of waste disposal but also enhances trust in multi-entity collaboration, promoting the standardization and informatization of waste management. Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0051] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0052] The above-described embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for information-based supervision and traceability of solid waste from the aluminum industry, characterized in that, include: Step S1: In the aluminum industry production process, initial data records are obtained from the waste generation stage and a preliminary data block is formed. An immutable identifier is generated through a hash algorithm. Based on the immutable identifier, multi-entity operation information is obtained in the transfer and disposal process and attached to the data block. Consistency is verified through a consensus algorithm to form an extended data block. Step S2: Extract the operation history sequence from the extended data block and mark the anomalies to obtain the tamper-proof data chain; by receiving query requests and traversing the tamper-proof data chain, calculate the current hash value of each data block, compare the current hash value with the stored original hash value, and perform integrity verification to determine the hash value matching result; Step S3: Extract digital signature information based on the matching results and determine the responsibility lock identifier through a public key verification mechanism; A shared trust view is formed by synchronizing distributed ledger data based on responsibility lockout identifiers; Step S4: Obtain the traceability path from the shared trust view and analyze the source of the anomaly to output the details of the operation subject.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, initial data records are obtained from the waste generation stage and a preliminary data block is formed, including: Initial data records are collected from the waste generation stage through a blockchain network. These initial data records include at least the amount of waste generated and detection indicators. The initial data records are then integrated into preliminary data blocks. A hash chain algorithm is used to calculate the preliminary data blocks and generate corresponding hash values ​​as immutable identifiers. The immutable identifiers are then associated with the preliminary data blocks and stored in blockchain nodes. Each part of the initial data block is encrypted using the hash chain algorithm to generate a unique identifier; the unique identifier is bound to the initial data block to form an immutable initial data unit; the initial data unit is broadcast to each node for storage through the blockchain network; initial data confirmation information is generated based on the storage status of the initial data unit; and the integrity of the initial data block is initially verified using the confirmation information.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, an extended data block is formed, including: The initial data block is located based on the immutable identifier; operation information is obtained from the multi-participant nodes in the transfer and disposal process, the operation information including at least transfer time, disposal method and subject identifier; the operation information is appended to the initial data block to form a temporary data block; the consistency of the temporary data block is verified by a blockchain consensus algorithm; if the temporary data block passes the consistency verification, the temporary data block is confirmed as an extended data block; The hash value of the extended data block is calculated and stored in the blockchain network; the multi-agent operation information of the extended data block is distributedly confirmed through the consensus algorithm; the state of the extended data block is updated according to the confirmation result; and the state update information is synchronized to all nodes of the blockchain network.

4. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, the tamper-proof data chain is obtained, including: The operation history sequence is extracted from the extended data block. The operation history sequence includes at least the operation time and operation content of each step. The operation history sequence is analyzed item by item to determine whether there is a change attempt. If a change attempt is detected, the abnormal operation is marked by a timestamp mechanism. The marked abnormal operation records are stored in the blockchain node; modification requests to the extended data block are rejected based on the marking results; the operation history sequence is integrated with the marking results to form a tamper-proof data chain; the operation history is encrypted and protected through the structure of the tamper-proof data chain. Based on the encryption protection result, tamper-proof confirmation information is generated; the confirmation information is broadcast to all nodes of the blockchain network for storage.

5. The method as described in claim 4, characterized in that, In step S2, the hash value matching result is determined, including: For the tamper-proof data link, a query request is received; the chain structure of the tamper-proof data link is traversed according to the query request; the current hash value is calculated for each data block in the chain structure; the current hash value is compared with the stored original hash value; if the current hash value is consistent with the original hash value, the integrity verification is determined to be successful; if the current hash value is inconsistent with the original hash value, the integrity verification is marked as failed. An integrity verification report is generated based on the verification results; the integrity verification report is stored on a blockchain node; and the verification report is synchronized to relevant subject nodes through the blockchain network.

6. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, the responsibility lockout indicator is determined, including: The digital signature information of the corresponding subject is extracted from the matching result of the integrity verification; the digital signature information is decrypted through a preset public key verification mechanism; the authenticity of the digital signature information is determined based on the decryption result; if the digital signature information passes verification, the corresponding responsibility lock identifier is determined; the responsibility lock identifier is associated with the matching result and stored; verification confirmation information is generated through the public key verification mechanism; the verification confirmation information is stored in the blockchain network; the operation permissions of the relevant subject are restricted according to the responsibility lock identifier; the status of the responsibility lock identifier is updated based on the restriction result.

7. The method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, In step S3, a shared trust view is formed, including: The corresponding principal node is located based on the responsibility locking identifier; the data of the principal node is synchronized to the blockchain network using distributed ledger technology; consistency verification is performed on the synchronized data to determine its completeness; if the synchronized data passes the verification, it is integrated into a shared trust view; the shared trust view is stored on all nodes of the blockchain network; the operation permissions of each principal are uniformly managed through the shared trust view; view update information is generated based on the management results; the view update information is broadcast to relevant nodes; and the availability of the shared trust view is confirmed through the broadcast results.

8. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4, the traceability path is obtained from the shared trust view and the source of the anomaly is analyzed to output the details of the operation subject, including: The traceability path is extracted from the shared trust view, and the traceability path contains at least the operation records of each step; the traceability path is analyzed using a backtracking algorithm to determine the step in which the abnormal operation occurred; the source of the abnormality is located based on the analysis results; the corresponding operation subject details are extracted from the source of the abnormality; and the operation subject details are associated with and stored in the traceability path. An anomaly analysis report is generated using the backtracking algorithm; the anomaly analysis report is stored on a blockchain node; abnormal operations are marked according to the report content; and the data status of the shared trust view is updated based on the marking results.

9. An information-based monitoring and traceability system for solid waste in the aluminum industry, used to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-8, characterized in that, The system includes: The data acquisition unit is used to acquire initial data records from the waste generation stage and form preliminary data blocks during the aluminum industry production process, and generate immutable identifiers through a hash algorithm; The data verification unit is used to obtain multi-entity operation information in the transfer and disposal process based on the immutable identifier and attach it to the data block, and verify the consistency through a consensus algorithm to form an extended data block; The hash value matching unit is used to extract the operation history sequence from the extended data block and mark anomalies to obtain an anti-tampering data chain; by receiving query requests and traversing the anti-tampering data chain, it calculates the current hash value of each data block, compares the current hash value with the stored original hash value, and performs integrity verification to determine the hash value matching result; The trust view acquisition unit is used to extract digital signature information based on the matching result and determine the responsibility lock identifier through a public key verification mechanism; and to synchronize distributed ledger data to form a shared trust view based on the responsibility lock identifier. The anomaly tracing unit is used to obtain the tracing path from the shared trust view and analyze the source of the anomaly to output the details of the operation subject.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions thereon, characterized in that, When the instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-8.

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