Data transmission method and device for equipment in transformer substation, computer equipment, readable storage medium and program product

Abstract

The invention relates to a data transmission method and device for equipment in a transformer substation, computer equipment, a computer readable storage medium and a computer program product. Comprising the following steps: judging abnormity when a security terminal is disconnected with a server, and if the server is abnormal, sending original data to a backup terminal by a control terminal, generating a check code and uploading the check code to a key service platform; after a key updating event is detected, the backup terminal obtains key encryption data and generates and uploads a data identifier; and after the terminal is reconnected with the server, the server obtains the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal, the corresponding secret key and the check code are matched from the secret key service platform, a first check code is generated after decryption, and the data are stored if the first check code and the second check code are consistent through comparison. The method can prevent data loss when the communication link is disconnected.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of data transmission in a substation, and in particular to a data transmission method and device for equipment in a substation, computer equipment, a computer readable storage medium, and a computer program product. BACKGROUND

[0002] New power systems are rapidly developing towards high proportions of new energy access and high levels of power electronics. A large number of new energy terminals and power electronic devices are deeply integrated into the power grid operation system due to their large scale, wide geographical distribution, and scattered characteristics. Due to the scattered deployment of equipment, the transmission of core business data (such as device operating status, dispatching instructions, monitoring data, etc.) inevitably relies on public networks, and such data often involves power grid safety and operation privacy, which puts strict requirements on the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of the transmission process. To ensure data transmission security, the existing technology generally uses a transmission architecture of "quantum secure terminal - quantum secure gateway - business system server". Specifically, each substation is configured with a dedicated quantum secure gateway, and all business data generated by the quantum encryption and decryption terminals in the station need to be collected and forwarded through the quantum secure gateway, and finally transmitted to the remote business system server. The quantum secure gateway, as a key intermediary, plays a crucial role in establishing communication links between terminals and servers.

[0003] However, the existing architecture has a significant risk of data loss in actual application: when the communication link between the quantum secure terminal and the business system server is disconnected due to network fluctuations, equipment failures, or other reasons, the data generated by the quantum secure terminal and the server cannot interact; and the cache capacity of the quantum secure gateway is limited, and it is difficult to achieve long-term and large-capacity cache storage in the face of massive data generated by large-scale terminals, which easily causes data overflow and loss. SUMMARY

[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a data transmission method, device, computer equipment, computer readable storage medium, and computer program product for equipment in a substation, which can prevent data overflow and loss when the communication link between the quantum secure terminal and the business system server is disconnected.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides a data transmission method for equipment in a substation, comprising:

[0006] When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is determined, and if the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to a backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform;

[0007] detecting whether a key update event exists in the key service platform, if the key update event exists, controlling the backup terminal to acquire a key from the key service platform, and using the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; and controlling the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data, and sending the identifier to the key service platform;

[0008] when the secure terminal and the server are reconnected, controlling the server to acquire the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal, and controlling the server to acquire a key and a check code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform;

[0009] controlling the server to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data, and controlling the server to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, if the first check code is the same as the check code, the result is that the data is not tampered, and controlling the server to save the decrypted data.

[0010] In one of the embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0011] if the abnormal condition is that the secure terminal is abnormal, controlling the server to send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal, and controlling the server to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to the key service platform; detecting whether a key update event exists in the key service platform, if the key update event exists, controlling the backup terminal to acquire a key from the key service platform, and using the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; and controlling the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data, and controlling the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0012] In one of the embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0013] when the secure terminal and the server are reconnected, controlling the secure terminal to acquire the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal, and controlling the secure terminal to acquire a key and a check code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; controlling the secure terminal to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data, and controlling the secure terminal to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, if the first check code is the same as the check code, the result is that the data is not tampered, and controlling the secure terminal to save the decrypted data.

[0014] In one of the embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0015] if the key update event does not exist, using the current key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data.

[0016] In one of the embodiments, the detecting whether there is a key update event in the key service platform comprises:

[0017] determining whether a preset key update time is reached, if yes, determining that there is a key update event; and / or determining whether an accumulated data amount sent by the secure terminal to the backup terminal reaches a preset data amount threshold, if yes, determining that there is a key update event, and after determining that there is the key update event, re-counting the data amount sent by the secure terminal to the backup terminal.

[0018] In one of the embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0019] if the determination result is that the data has been tampered, controlling the server to delete the encrypted data and reporting that the backup terminal has a risk.

[0020] In a second aspect, the application further provides a data transmission device of equipment in a substation, comprising:

[0021] a judging module, configured to judge an abnormal condition when the secure terminal cannot connect with the server, if the abnormal condition is that the server has an abnormality, controlling the secure terminal to send original data sent to the server to a backup terminal, controlling the secure terminal to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform;

[0022] a detecting module, configured to detect whether there is a key update event in the key service platform, if there is a key update event, controlling the backup terminal to acquire a key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data, controlling the backup terminal to generate an identity corresponding to the encrypted data and controlling the backup terminal to send the identity to the key service platform;

[0023] a reading module, configured to, when the secure terminal and the server are re-connected, controlling the server to acquire the encrypted data and the identity from the backup terminal, controlling the server to acquire a key and a check code corresponding to the identity from the key service platform;

[0024] a decrypting module, configured to control the server to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data, controlling the server to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, if the first check code and the check code are the same, the determination result is that the data has not been tampered, and controlling the server to save the decrypted data.

[0025] In a third aspect, the present application also provides a computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:

[0026] When the security terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is determined, if the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the security terminal is controlled to send original data sent to the server to a backup terminal; the security terminal is controlled to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform;

[0027] If there is a key update event, the backup terminal is controlled to obtain a key from the key service platform, and the original data is encrypted using the key to obtain encrypted data; the backup terminal is controlled to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data, and the backup terminal is controlled to send the identifier to the key service platform;

[0028] When the security terminal and the server are reconnected, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is controlled to obtain a key and a check code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform;

[0029] The server is controlled to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, if the first check code and the check code are the same, the result is that the data is not tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0030] In a fourth aspect, the present application also provides a computer readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the following steps:

[0031] When the security terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is determined, if the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the security terminal is controlled to send original data sent to the server to a backup terminal; the security terminal is controlled to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform;

[0032] If there is a key update event, the backup terminal is controlled to obtain a key from the key service platform, and the original data is encrypted using the key to obtain encrypted data; the backup terminal is controlled to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data, and the backup terminal is controlled to send the identifier to the key service platform;

[0033] When the secure terminal and the server re-connect, the server is controlled to acquire the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is controlled to acquire the identifier corresponding key and the check code from the key service platform;

[0034] The server is controlled to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, and if the first check code and the check code are the same, the result is that the data is not tampered, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0035] In a fifth aspect, the present application also provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the following steps:

[0036] When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is determined, and if the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to a backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform;

[0037] A key update event is detected in the key service platform, and if the key update event exists, the backup terminal is controlled to acquire a key from the key service platform and encrypt the original data using the key to obtain encrypted data; the backup terminal is controlled to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and send the identifier to the key service platform;

[0038] When the secure terminal and the server re-connect, the server is controlled to acquire the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is controlled to acquire the identifier corresponding key and the check code from the key service platform;

[0039] The server is controlled to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, and if the first check code and the check code are the same, the result is that the data is not tampered, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0040] The data transmission method, device, computer equipment, computer readable storage medium and computer program product of the equipment in the substation can determine an abnormal condition when a security terminal cannot connect to a server, control the security terminal to send original data sent to the server to a backup terminal if the abnormal condition is that the server is abnormal, control the security terminal to generate a check code of the original data and send the check code to a key service platform, detect whether there is a key update event in the key service platform, control the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and encrypt the original data using the key to obtain encrypted data if there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform, control the server to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal when the security terminal and the server are reconnected, control the server to obtain a key and a check code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform, control the server to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data, control the server to generate a first check code corresponding to the decrypted data, and control the server to save the decrypted data if the first check code and the check code are the same. Through the bidirectional data bottom storage of the backup terminal, quantum-level key encryption protection, and identification-key-check code three-tuple binding verification, zero-loss backup of core data of the substation in the server abnormal scenario can be realized, data stealing risk is blocked through dynamic key update and encrypted key destruction mechanism, and the integrity of the data transmission and storage process is ensured through check code comparison, the data loss problem caused by link disconnection and insufficient cache in the traditional transmission architecture is completely solved, the high security and high reliability requirements of sensitive data transmission of the new power system are met, and the continuous and stable operation of the power grid business is ensured. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0041] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the related art, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments of the present application or the related art will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and other related drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor.

[0042] Figure 1 An application environment diagram of the data transmission method of the equipment in the substation in an embodiment;

[0043] Figure 2 A flowchart of the data transmission method of the equipment in the substation in an embodiment;

[0044] Figure 3This is a structural block diagram of a data transmission device in a substation according to one embodiment;

[0045] Figure 4 This is an internal structural diagram of a computer device in one embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0046] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0047] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., used in this application can be used to describe various elements, but these elements are not limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the first element from the second element. The terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, used in this application, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. The term "multiple" used in this application refers to two or more. The term "and / or" used in this application refers to one of the embodiments, or any combination of multiple embodiments.

[0048] The data transmission method for equipment in a substation provided in this application embodiment can be applied to, for example... Figure 1In the application environment shown, the secure terminal 102 communicates with the server 106 via the secure gateway 104; the secure terminal 102 is connected to the backup terminal 108. The key service platform 110 communicates with both the server 106 and the backup terminal 108. When the secure terminal 102 cannot connect to the server 106, an abnormal situation is identified. If the abnormal situation is that the server 106 is malfunctioning, the secure terminal 102 is controlled to send the original data intended for the server 106 to the backup terminal 108; the secure terminal 102 is controlled to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform 110; a key update event is detected on the key service platform 110; if a key update event exists, the backup terminal 108 is controlled to obtain a key from the key service platform 110 and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; the backup terminal 108 is controlled to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data. The system controls the backup terminal 108 to send the identifier to the key service platform 110. When the secure terminal 102 and the server 106 reconnect, the system controls the server 106 to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal 108; the system controls the server 106 to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform 110; the system controls the server 106 to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; the system controls the server 106 to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the system controls the server 106 to save the decrypted data. The secure terminal 102 can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, laptops, smartphones, tablets, drones, low-altitude aircraft, IoT devices, and portable wearable devices. IoT devices can be smart speakers, smart TVs, smart air conditioners, smart in-vehicle devices, projection devices, etc. Portable wearable devices can be smartwatches, smart bracelets, head-mounted devices, etc. Headset devices can be virtual reality (VR) devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, smart glasses, etc. Server 106 can be a standalone physical server, a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers, or a cloud server providing cloud computing services.

[0049] In one exemplary embodiment, such as Figure 2 As shown, a data transmission method for equipment in a substation is provided, which is used for control. Figure 1 The system includes a security terminal 102, a security gateway 104, a server 106, a backup terminal 108, and a key service platform 110, comprising the following steps 202 to 208. Wherein:

[0050] Step 202: When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, determine the abnormal situation. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, control the secure terminal to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; control the secure terminal to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform.

[0051] Optionally, the secure terminal is a quantum secure terminal, the server is a business system server, and the key service platform is a quantum key service platform. The server and the quantum secure terminal communicate through a quantum secure gateway. If the server malfunctions, i.e., it cannot connect to the quantum secure gateway for various reasons, it will be unable to communicate with the quantum secure terminal.

[0052] Among them, the quantum-secure terminal is the core data acquisition and transmission terminal in the substation, with basic quantum key encryption and decryption capabilities, ensuring the initial security of raw data during local generation and transmission to the backup terminal; the business system server is the aggregation and processing center of the core business data of the power grid, carrying out key functions such as data storage, analysis and command issuance, and its failure will directly lead to the interruption of the terminal data upload link; the quantum key service platform is a dedicated security support node, with high-security key generation, distribution and storage capabilities, and can also provide security keys through a quantum key dynamic management mechanism.

[0053] Step 204: Detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain the key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0054] The triggering logic for key update events needs to be dynamically set based on data security requirements and transmission scenarios. Specifically, it includes two core triggering modes: First, time-triggered, where a preset key update cycle is reached, periodically rotating keys to avoid security risks caused by long-term key use; second, data volume-triggered, where the cumulative data volume transmitted from the secure terminal to the backup terminal reaches a preset threshold, updating the key based on data volume to reduce the risk of leakage from encrypting too much data with a single key. These two modes can be configured individually or used in combination. The key acquisition process for the backup terminal must be completed through an encrypted communication link to ensure that the key is not stolen during transmission. After generating a high-security quantum key, the quantum key service platform distributes it only through a dedicated secure channel bound to the backup terminal. Furthermore, the key only temporarily resides in the backup terminal's memory during encryption operations and is completely destroyed immediately after encryption, without local storage, thus physically blocking key leakage paths.

[0055] Step 206: When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, control the server to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; control the server to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform.

[0056] When the server obtains encrypted data and identifiers from the backup terminal, it needs to establish a transmission link through a preset secure communication protocol to prevent the data from being intercepted or tampered with during the acquisition process. The acquisition scope can be accurately located to the target data backed up during the server's abnormal period. The backup terminal can quickly filter out the encrypted data and associated identifiers for the corresponding time period through filtering conditions such as timestamps and terminal numbers, ensuring that the server only obtains the required data and improving transmission efficiency.

[0057] Step 208: Control the server to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; control the server to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and control the server to save the decrypted data.

[0058] The server employs a symmetric decryption algorithm (such as AES-256 combined with quantum key distribution) corresponding to the encryption process of the backup terminal, ensuring the algorithm compatibility between the key and the encrypted data. During decryption, the decryption operation must strictly adhere to the key's bit length and encryption mode to avoid decryption failure or data corruption due to mismatched algorithm parameters. The entire decryption process is executed within the server's secure memory area; decrypted data is not stored locally, and checksum generation and comparison are only performed in memory, reducing the risk of data leakage. The generation rule for the first checksum is completely consistent with the rule for generating the original checksum on the secure terminal (such as using a hash algorithm), and is directly calculated based on the decrypted data content, ensuring the consistency of the verification logic and the accuracy of the comparison results. During verification and comparison, the server performs a byte-level precise comparison between the locally generated first checksum and the original checksum obtained from the quantum key distribution platform. If they are completely identical, it proves that the data has not been tampered with during backup storage, transmission, and decryption, and data integrity is guaranteed. If the comparison is inconsistent, a security alarm is immediately triggered, the decrypted data is refused to be saved, and an anomaly log is recorded for subsequent investigation.

[0059] The data transmission method for equipment in the aforementioned substation involves determining an anomaly when the security terminal cannot connect to the server. If the anomaly is a server malfunction, the security terminal sends the original data intended for the server to a backup terminal. The security terminal then generates a verification code for the original data and sends it to a key service platform. The platform checks for key update events; if an update event exists, the backup terminal retrieves the key from the platform and uses it to encrypt the original data, obtaining encrypted data. The backup terminal generates an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends it to the key service platform. When the security terminal and server reconnect, the server retrieves the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal. It then retrieves the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform. The server uses the key to decrypt the encrypted data, obtaining decrypted data. Finally, the server generates a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code matches the original verification code, the data is considered unaltered, and the server saves the decrypted data. By employing bidirectional data backup storage at the backup terminal, quantum-level key encryption protection, and triplet binding verification of identifier-key-checksum, zero-loss backup of substation core data can be achieved in the event of server anomalies. At the same time, dynamic key updates and encrypted key destruction mechanisms prevent data theft risks, and checksum comparison ensures the integrity of data transmission and storage processes. This completely solves the data loss problem caused by link disconnection and insufficient buffering in traditional transmission architectures, meets the high security and high reliability requirements of new power systems for sensitive data transmission, and ensures the continuous and stable operation of power grid services.

[0060] In one exemplary embodiment, the method further includes:

[0061] If the abnormal situation is due to an anomaly in the secure terminal, the control server will send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal; control the server to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform; detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain the key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0062] For example, an anomaly in a secure terminal specifically refers to a situation where the quantum secure terminal, due to its own malfunction, temporary offline status, change of deployment location, or hardware / software abnormalities, is unable to receive core information such as instruction data and configuration parameters issued by the business system server. For instance, a hardware malfunction (such as a damaged communication module or power failure) prevents the establishment of a network connection, or a temporary offline status due to maintenance needs or a change in substation deployment location leads to communication interruption with the quantum secure gateway. These are all scenarios of an anomaly in a secure terminal. In this scenario, the server must first identify the source of the anomaly through a communication link detection mechanism: if the server sends a connection test packet to the quantum secure terminal and receives no response multiple times, and the quantum secure gateway reports "terminal not connected to the network" or "terminal communication link interrupted," then the anomaly is determined to originate from the secure terminal, thus triggering a targeted backup process. When the server sends the raw data to be issued (such as device control instructions, parameter configuration information, etc.) to the backup terminal, it must transmit it through an encrypted communication channel to prevent data leakage between the server and the backup terminal. Simultaneously, the server uses the same checksum generation algorithm as the quantum secure terminal to calculate the checksum based on the raw data content and reports it to the quantum key service platform.

[0063] In this embodiment, by constructing a reverse data backup link of "server → backup terminal", a unified abnormal subject judgment mechanism, and a security process of dynamic updating of reuse keys and binding of identifier-verification code, bidirectional full-scenario coverage of substation data transmission can be achieved, completely solving the defect of traditional architecture that only supports terminal uplink data backup and ignores server downlink command data retention.

[0064] In one exemplary embodiment, the method further includes:

[0065] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; the secure terminal is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the secure terminal is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0066] For example, the reconnection process between the secure terminal and the server requires two-way verification: After the secure terminal resumes normal operation, it proactively sends an online notification to the quantum security gateway. The gateway synchronizes this status to the business system server, and the server then sends a connection request packet containing authentication information to the secure terminal. After the secure terminal verifies the connection, it sends a confirmation response. Both parties then determine that the connection has been restored and trigger the subsequent data recovery process. When the secure terminal obtains encrypted data and identifiers from the backup terminal, it needs to initiate a precise retrieval request based on its own device number and the timestamp of the abnormal period. After the backup terminal passes the permission verification, it only transmits the encrypted data and corresponding unique identifiers issued by the server during the abnormal period through the encrypted link to avoid redundant transmission of irrelevant data. After the secure terminal sends the obtained unique identifier to the quantum key service platform, the platform quickly matches and returns the corresponding encryption key and original verification code based on the preset "identifier-key-verification code" triplet binding relationship. When the secure terminal decrypts, it uses the same algorithm and parameters as the backup terminal's encryption process to ensure that the decrypted data is completely consistent with the original data sent by the server. Subsequently, the secure terminal uses the same hash algorithm as the server and backup terminal to generate the first checksum of the decrypted data, and compares it byte-by-byte with the original checksum obtained from the key service platform. If the two are completely consistent, it is determined that the data has not been tampered with during backup, storage, and transmission. The secure terminal stores the decrypted data in the local secure storage area and synchronizes it to its own business module for execution. If the comparison is inconsistent, a local alarm is immediately triggered, the data is refused to be saved, and the abnormal information is reported to the server and the operation and maintenance management platform for technical personnel to investigate data tampering or transmission abnormalities.

[0067] In this embodiment, by employing a connection recovery two-way verification mechanism, an identifier-based key-check code precise matching scheme, and a same-source algorithm verification and comparison process, the complete and secure retrieval of server-sent data can be achieved after a secure terminal recovers from an anomaly. This completely solves the problem of lost downlink commands and untraceable data caused by terminal anomalies in traditional architectures. At the same time, by leveraging encrypted transmission links and data integrity verification, the risk of data tampering and leakage during the recovery process is effectively prevented. This further improves the end-to-end data security assurance system of "anomaly backup - secure recovery - verification closed loop," meeting the high reliability and high security requirements of new power systems for bidirectional data transmission from substation terminals.

[0068] In one exemplary embodiment, the method further includes:

[0069] If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

[0070] For example, if the preset key update period has not been reached and the cumulative amount of data sent from the security terminal or server to the backup terminal has not reached the set threshold, it is determined that there is no key update event. At this time, the backup terminal does not need to apply for a new key from the key service platform, but instead uses the currently active key to perform the encryption operation. This current key is the key obtained from the key service platform and temporarily stored in the encrypted memory area of ​​the backup terminal after the last key update event was triggered, and it is only activated and used in this encryption process.

[0071] In this embodiment, the standardized reuse of the data encryption process is achieved in both scenarios where there is a key update event and where there is no key update event, by using the dual-condition triggering judgment of the key update event and the unified management logic of "continuation of the effective status of the key and destruction upon use", thus avoiding the fragmentation of encryption logic due to differences in scenarios.

[0072] In an exemplary embodiment, detecting whether a key update event exists on the key service platform includes:

[0073] Determine whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event exists; and / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold; if so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

[0074] For example, the key update event is triggered using a dual parallel determination mechanism of time-triggered and data volume-triggered mechanisms. These two triggering conditions can be activated individually or in combination to ensure the flexibility and security of key updates: Time-triggered determination: Maintenance personnel can preset the key update cycle based on the security level of the substation data. For example, for highly sensitive data involving power grid dispatch instructions, a key update can be set to trigger every hour; for routine equipment monitoring data, a key update can be set to trigger at 2:00 AM daily. When the preset time node is reached, the key service platform will automatically mark "a key update event exists" and generate a new quantum key, waiting for the backup terminal to acquire it. Data volume-triggered determination: The system will continuously count the total amount of raw data sent from the security terminal to the backup terminal. When the accumulated data volume reaches a preset threshold (e.g., 500MB, 1000 data records), a key update event is immediately determined. Simultaneously, the system will automatically reset the accumulated data volume counter, starting from 0 to re-count the subsequent transmitted data volume, preventing the key from remaining unupdated for an extended period due to continuous data accumulation.

[0075] In this embodiment, a flexible and controllable key dynamic update strategy is constructed through a dual parallel determination mechanism of time-triggered and data volume-triggered. It can not only preset a fixed update cycle according to the data security level to meet the high-frequency key rotation requirements of highly sensitive data, but also trigger updates based on the data transmission volume to avoid the problem of key and data volume mismatch under the single time-triggered mode.

[0076] In one exemplary embodiment, the method further includes:

[0077] If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

[0078] For example, when the server performs a byte-level comparison between the locally generated first verification code and the original verification code obtained from the key service platform, if there is a significant difference between the two, it is directly determined that the decrypted data has been tampered with. At this time, the server will immediately execute the risk handling process: on the one hand, it will trigger a local data cleanup command to completely delete the encrypted data obtained from the backup terminal without any form of local caching or retention, thus preventing the tampered data from flowing into the business system and causing risks; on the other hand, the server will report risk alarm information through the encrypted communication link. The alarm content includes key information such as the identifier of the abnormal data, the backup timestamp, the terminal source, and details of the verification code comparison difference. At the same time, it will simultaneously send a risk warning to the corresponding backup terminal, notifying the backup terminal to conduct self-checking and verification of the data stored in the same batch.

[0079] In this embodiment, a closed-loop defense system for data tampering is constructed through a risk handling mechanism that includes immediate data cleanup after verification code anomalies, multi-node risk reporting, and full-process log retention. This system can block the flow of risky data as soon as it is detected that the data has been tampered with, and prevent the tampered data from entering the business system and affecting core tasks such as the execution of power grid operation instructions and equipment status monitoring.

[0080] In an exemplary embodiment, a data transmission method for equipment in a substation includes: determining an abnormal situation when a security terminal cannot connect to a server; if the abnormal situation is a server malfunction, controlling the security terminal to send the original data intended for the server to a backup terminal; controlling the security terminal to generate a verification code for the original data and sending the verification code to a key service platform; determining whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determining that a key update event exists; and / or determining whether the cumulative data volume sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data volume threshold; if so, determining that a key update event exists, and recounting the data volume sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal after determining the existence of the key update event. If no key update event exists, encrypting the original data using the current key to obtain encrypted data. If a key update event occurs, the backup terminal is controlled to obtain a key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The backup terminal is then controlled to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and send the identifier to the key service platform. When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal. The server is controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform. The server is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data. The server is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server saves the decrypted data. If the result is that the data has been tampered with, the server deletes the encrypted data and reports a risk to the backup terminal. If the abnormal situation is that the secure terminal is abnormal, the execution process is similar and will not be described further here.

[0081] It should be understood that although the steps in the flowcharts of the embodiments described above are shown sequentially according to the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless explicitly stated herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and they can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some steps in the flowcharts of the embodiments described above may include multiple steps or multiple stages. These steps or stages are not necessarily completed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be performed alternately or in turn with other steps or at least some of the steps or stages in other steps. It is understood that the steps in different embodiments can be freely combined as needed, and all non-contradictory solutions formed by such combinations are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0082] In one exemplary embodiment, such as Figure 3 As shown, a data transmission device for equipment in a substation is provided, comprising: a judgment module 301, a detection module 302, a reading module 303, and a reading module 304, wherein:

[0083] The judgment module is used to judge abnormal situations when the security terminal cannot connect to the server. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the module controls the security terminal to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; and controls the security terminal to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform.

[0084] The detection module is used to detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, it controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; it controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and controls the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0085] The reading module is used to control the server to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal when the secure terminal and the server reconnect; and to control the server to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform.

[0086] The decryption module is used to control the server to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; control the server to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0087] In an exemplary embodiment, the determination module is further configured to: if the abnormal situation is that the security terminal is abnormal, control the server to send the original data sent to the security terminal to the backup terminal; control the server to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform;

[0088] The detection module is also used to: detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform; if there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0089] In an exemplary embodiment, the reading module is further configured to: when the secure terminal and the server reconnect, control the secure terminal to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal;

[0090] The decryption module is also used to: control the security terminal to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; control the security terminal to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; control the security terminal to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and control the security terminal to save the decrypted data.

[0091] In one exemplary embodiment, the detection module is further configured to:

[0092] If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

[0093] In one exemplary embodiment, the detection module is further configured to:

[0094] Determine whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event exists; and / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold; if so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

[0095] In one exemplary embodiment, the decryption module is further configured to:

[0096] If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

[0097] The various modules in the data transmission devices of the equipment in the aforementioned substation can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in the processor of a computer device in hardware form or independent of it, or stored in the memory of a computer device in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to each module.

[0098] In one exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a server, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 4As shown, this computer device includes a processor, memory, input / output (I / O) interfaces, and a communication interface. The processor, memory, and I / O interfaces are connected via a system bus, and the communication interface is also connected to the system bus via the I / O interfaces. The processor provides computational and control capabilities. The memory includes non-volatile storage media and internal memory. The non-volatile storage media stores the operating system, computer programs, and a database. The internal memory provides the environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage media. The database stores decrypted data. The I / O interfaces are used for exchanging information between the processor and external devices. The communication interface is used for communication with external terminals via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements a data transmission method for equipment in a substation.

[0099] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 4 The structure shown is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the present application is applied. Specific computer devices may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0100] In one exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to perform the following steps:

[0101] When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is identified. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform.

[0102] The system detects whether a key update event exists on the key service platform. If a key update event exists, the system controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The system then controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends the identifier to the key service platform.

[0103] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is also controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform.

[0104] The server is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0105] In one embodiment, the processor, when executing a computer program, also performs the following steps:

[0106] If the abnormal situation is due to an anomaly in the secure terminal, the control server will send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal; control the server to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform; detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain the key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0107] In one embodiment, the processor, when executing a computer program, also performs the following steps:

[0108] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; the secure terminal is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the secure terminal is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0109] In one embodiment, the processor, when executing a computer program, also performs the following steps:

[0110] If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

[0111] In one embodiment, the processor, when executing a computer program, also performs the following steps:

[0112] Determine whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event exists; and / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold; if so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

[0113] In one embodiment, the processor, when executing a computer program, also performs the following steps:

[0114] If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

[0115] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, the computer program performing the following steps when executed by a processor:

[0116] When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is identified. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform.

[0117] The system detects whether a key update event exists on the key service platform. If a key update event exists, the system controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The system then controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends the identifier to the key service platform.

[0118] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is also controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform.

[0119] The server is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0120] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0121] If the abnormal situation is due to an anomaly in the secure terminal, the control server will send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal; control the server to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform; detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain the key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0122] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0123] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; the secure terminal is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the secure terminal is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0124] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0125] If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

[0126] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0127] Determine whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event exists; and / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold; if so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

[0128] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0129] If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

[0130] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, performs the following steps:

[0131] When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is identified. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform.

[0132] The system detects whether a key update event exists on the key service platform. If a key update event exists, the system controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The system then controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends the identifier to the key service platform.

[0133] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is also controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform.

[0134] The server is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0135] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0136] If the abnormal situation is due to an anomaly in the secure terminal, the control server will send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal; control the server to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform; detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, control the backup terminal to obtain the key from the key service platform and use the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; control the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and control the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform.

[0137] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0138] When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform; the secure terminal is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data. If the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the secure terminal is controlled to save the decrypted data.

[0139] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0140] If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

[0141] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0142] Determine whether a preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event exists; and / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold; if so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

[0143] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0144] If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

[0145] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. Any references to memory, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile memory and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM). The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, artificial intelligence (AI) processors, etc., and are not limited to these.

[0146] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this application.

[0147] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this patent application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A data transmission method for equipment in a substation, characterized in that, The method includes: When the secure terminal cannot connect to the server, an abnormal situation is identified. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the secure terminal is controlled to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform. The system detects whether a key update event exists on the key service platform. If a key update event exists, the system controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The system then controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends the identifier to the key service platform. When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the server is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the server is also controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform. The server is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the server is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the abnormal situation is due to an anomaly in the secure terminal, the control server will send the original data sent to the secure terminal to the backup terminal; the control server will generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform; The system detects whether a key update event exists on the key service platform. If a key update event exists, the system controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data. The system then controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and sends the identifier to the key service platform.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the secure terminal and the server reconnect, the secure terminal is controlled to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal; the secure terminal is also controlled to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform. The secure terminal is controlled to use the key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain decrypted data; the secure terminal is controlled to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the secure terminal is controlled to save the decrypted data.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The method further includes: If no key update event occurs, the original data is encrypted using the current key to obtain encrypted data.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The detection of whether a key update event exists on the key service platform includes: Determine if the preset key update time has been reached; if so, determine that a key update event has occurred. And / or, determine whether the cumulative amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal has reached a preset data amount threshold. If so, determine that a key update event exists, and after determining that the key update event exists, recount the amount of data sent by the security terminal to the backup terminal.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the determination result indicates that the data has been tampered with, the control server deletes the encrypted data and reports that the backup terminal is at risk.

7. A data transmission device for equipment in a substation, characterized in that, The device includes: The judgment module is used to judge abnormal situations when the security terminal cannot connect to the server. If the abnormal situation is that the server is abnormal, the module controls the security terminal to send the original data sent to the server to the backup terminal; and controls the security terminal to generate a verification code for the original data and send the verification code to the key service platform. The detection module is used to detect whether there is a key update event on the key service platform. If there is a key update event, it controls the backup terminal to obtain a key from the key service platform and uses the key to encrypt the original data to obtain encrypted data; it controls the backup terminal to generate an identifier corresponding to the encrypted data and controls the backup terminal to send the identifier to the key service platform. The reading module is used to control the server to obtain the encrypted data and the identifier from the backup terminal when the secure terminal and the server reconnect; and to control the server to obtain the key and verification code corresponding to the identifier from the key service platform. The decryption module is used to control the server to decrypt the encrypted data using the key to obtain decrypted data; control the server to generate a first verification code corresponding to the decrypted data; if the first verification code and the verification code are the same, the result is that the data has not been tampered with, and the server is controlled to save the decrypted data.

8. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

Images