Railway Internet of Things terminal equipment safety management method and system

Abstract

The invention discloses a railway Internet of Things terminal equipment safety management method and system, and the method comprises the steps: calculating a first hash value of the equipment identity information of railway terminal equipment to be accessed, and carrying out the bidirectional registration of the equipment identity in an alliance chain and the equipment based on the first hash value and the equipment identity information; when secret key updating is carried out in the equipment life cycle, a second asymmetric secret key pair is generated, and a secret key updating request transaction is generated based on a second public key in the second asymmetric secret key pair; and broadcasting the key update request transaction to a network of the alliance chain, and associating and recording the second public key and the first hash value after a key management smart contract of the alliance chain is triggered to obtain a tamper-resistant key update record. According to the technical scheme provided by the embodiment of the invention, the key security management of the railway terminal equipment in the whole life cycle can be completed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of railway transportation safety technology, specifically to a method and system for safety management of railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment. Background Technology

[0002] Railway IoT terminal equipment is responsible for monitoring the entire life cycle of infrastructure, and the monitoring period often lasts for decades.

[0003] Currently, railway IoT terminal equipment faces security risks in two phases: In the initialization phase, the reliance on a centralized database to store device identifiers poses a single point of failure and the risk of tampering. Furthermore, simple identifiers are easily copied, leading to the access of counterfeit devices. In the lifecycle management phase, after the terminal equipment leaves the factory, its security credentials (such as keys) are difficult to update securely. Traditional centralized key management systems are single targets for attacks, and the key update process is opaque and difficult to audit. Once the initial key is leaked, security risks will exist throughout the entire lifecycle of the device.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive solution that can establish a decentralized root of trust, prevent identity cloning of terminal devices from the source, and provide trusted and auditable dynamic management capabilities throughout the entire lifecycle. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention provides a method and system for the security management of railway IoT terminal devices, so as to realize the registration of non-clonable and trusted identities, full life-cycle key security management, and auditable traceability of railway IoT terminal devices.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for security management of railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment, comprising:

[0007] Calculate the first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected, and perform bidirectional registration of the device identity within the consortium blockchain and the device based on the first hash value and the device identity information; wherein, the device identity information of the railway terminal device includes: the first public key in the first asymmetric key pair;

[0008] When a key is updated during the device's lifecycle, a second asymmetric key pair is generated, and a key update request transaction is generated based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair.

[0009] The key update request transaction is broadcast to the consortium blockchain network, and after the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain is triggered, the second public key is associated with and recorded with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record.

[0010] Furthermore, the bidirectional registration of device identity within the consortium blockchain and within the device includes:

[0011] Write the metadata of the first hash value and the device identity information into a consortium blockchain constructed by the blockchain;

[0012] Furthermore, the first hash value is permanently written into the hardware security module inside the railway terminal equipment.

[0013] Furthermore, the equipment identification information of the railway terminal equipment also includes: equipment serial number, equipment type, and the code of the line to which it belongs.

[0014] Furthermore, generating a key update request transaction includes:

[0015] Call the first private key in the first asymmetric key pair;

[0016] Based on the first private key, the second public key and the current timestamp in the second asymmetric key pair are signed to generate the key update request transaction.

[0017] Furthermore, after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, associating and recording the second public key with the first hash value includes:

[0018] Based on the device serial number in the key update request transaction, retrieve the first public key stored on the consortium blockchain;

[0019] The digital signature of the key update request transaction is verified using the first public key.

[0020] After the digital signature verification is successful, the second public key and the first hash value are associated and recorded through the key management smart contract.

[0021] Furthermore, it also includes: pre-setting a key update strategy in the key management smart contract;

[0022] The key update strategy is set to: periodically check whether the key update frequency is compliant, and update the key after the compliance is detected; and / or, update the key only after the digital signatures of the multi-party transactions have been verified.

[0023] Furthermore, this also includes: building a key lifecycle profile;

[0024] The key lifecycle archive stores the entire key history recorded on the consortium blockchain.

[0025] Secondly, the present invention provides a railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management system, comprising:

[0026] An identity registration unit is used to calculate a first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected, and to perform bidirectional registration of the device identity within the consortium blockchain and the device based on the first hash value and the device identity information; wherein, the device identity information of the railway terminal device includes: a first public key in a first asymmetric key pair;

[0027] The key generation unit is used to generate a second asymmetric key pair when a key update is performed during the device's lifecycle, and to generate a key update request transaction based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair.

[0028] The key update unit is used to broadcast the key update request transaction to the network of the consortium blockchain, and after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, associate and record the second public key with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record.

[0029] Thirdly, embodiments of the present invention provide an electronic device, the electronic device comprising:

[0030] At least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor;

[0031] The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by at least one processor, such that the at least one processor is able to perform the steps of the method according to any embodiment of the present invention.

[0032] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of a method according to any embodiment of the present invention.

[0033] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0034] The technical solution in this embodiment of the invention first calculates a first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected. Based on the first hash value and the device identity information, bidirectional registration of the device identity is performed within the consortium blockchain and within the device. Then, when a key update is performed during the device's lifecycle, a second asymmetric key pair is generated. Based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair, a key update request transaction is generated. Finally, the key update request transaction is broadcast to the consortium blockchain network. After triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, the second public key is associated with and recorded with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record. Through the technical solution of this embodiment of the invention, key security management of railway terminal devices throughout their entire lifecycle can be achieved. Attached Figure Description

[0035] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only preferred embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0036] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management method provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a two-way device identity registration process provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a smart contract broadcast triggering process provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management system provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0041] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a railway IoT terminal equipment safety management method provided in an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is particularly applicable to situations where safety management is carried out throughout the entire lifecycle of railway IoT terminal equipment. The method can be executed by a railway IoT terminal equipment safety management system, which can be implemented in software and / or hardware and can be configured in electronic devices.

[0043] like Figure 1 As shown, the method specifically includes:

[0044] S1, calculate the first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected, and perform bidirectional registration of the device identity in the consortium blockchain and within the device based on the first hash value and the device identity information.

[0045] Railway terminal equipment includes stress sensors, strain sensors, and disaster monitoring equipment. This equipment enables monitoring of the entire lifecycle of infrastructure.

[0046] Specifically, firstly, a unique device identity information is generated for each railway terminal device to be connected. This device identity information contains the first public key of the first asymmetric key pair, denoted as PK_initial. Then, through hash calculation, the metadata in the device identity information is mapped to a fixed-length first hash value, denoted as H1. Finally, the first hash value and the device identity information are stored as root identity evidence and written into the consortium blockchain operated by the railway management agency and the internal system of the railway terminal device, respectively, to achieve a strong binding between the physical device and the on-chain digital identity.

[0047] In this embodiment, hash calculation is used to protect the integrity of the equipment identity information of the railway terminal equipment. Hash calculation refers to using a hash function to map an input of arbitrary length (such as a string, file, etc.) to a fixed-length output value, also known as a message digest, i.e., a hash value.

[0048] Furthermore, Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a two-way device identity registration process provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the process of two-way registration of device identity within the consortium blockchain and within the device includes:

[0049] S1011, write the metadata of the first hash value and device identity information into a consortium blockchain built by the blockchain;

[0050] S1012, the first hash value is permanently written into the hardware security module inside the railway terminal equipment.

[0051] On the one hand, the first hash value H1 and related metadata of the device identity information are written into the consortium blockchain operated by the railway management agency, forming a globally unique and tamper-proof root identity certificate (i.e., the first hash value) for the railway terminal device within the railway system, and this root identity certificate serves as the trusted starting point for all subsequent operations.

[0052] On the other hand, the first hash value H1 is also permanently written into the hardware security module inside the railway terminal equipment, completing the strong binding between the physical device and the on-chain digital identity.

[0053] This embodiment uses blockchain as a trust anchor to establish an unclonable initial identity for railway IoT devices, and utilizes blockchain smart contracts to automate, reliably update, and trace security credentials throughout their subsequent lifecycle.

[0054] The equipment identity information of the railway terminal equipment includes: equipment serial number, equipment type, line code, and the first public key in the first asymmetric key pair.

[0055] It should be noted that the first asymmetric key pair includes: a first public key PK_initial and a first private key SK_initial. The first public key, as part of the device's identity information, is written into the consortium blockchain in the form of a hash value; the first private key is accessed by the railway terminal device at any time to complete key updates throughout the device's lifecycle.

[0056] It is understandable that this embodiment adopts a two-way anchoring method, which can prevent the identity information of terminal devices from being cloned from the source. Through the two-way anchoring of "on-chain hash value combined with hardware storage" and combined with the public key recorded on the blockchain, the global uniqueness and non-cloning of the device's physical entity and digital identity are ensured.

[0057] S2, when a key update is performed during the device's lifecycle, a second asymmetric key pair is generated, and a key update request transaction is generated based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair.

[0058] In some embodiments, generating a key update request transaction includes:

[0059] S2011, call the first private key in the first asymmetric key pair;

[0060] S2012, based on the first private key, the second public key and the current timestamp in the second asymmetric key pair are signed to generate a key update request transaction.

[0061] Specifically, during the device's lifecycle, when a key update is required, the device generates a new asymmetric key pair locally, namely the second asymmetric key pair. The railway terminal device uses the first private key SK_initial from the first asymmetric key pair to sign the second public key PK_new from the second asymmetric key pair with the current timestamp, generating a key update request transaction.

[0062] The second asymmetric key pair includes: the second public key PK_new and the second private key SK_new.

[0063] Understandably, this embodiment employs dynamic keys to address the security dilemma of "one key per device for life." The blockchain-based trust system allows for secure and seamless key rotation, ensuring device security can be restored even if the initial key is leaked through a trusted process.

[0064] S3 broadcasts the key update request transaction to the consortium blockchain network, and after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, associates and records the second public key with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record.

[0065] For example, taking the key update of a railway bridge stress sensor as an example, the railway bridge stress sensor is first initially registered. Specifically, when a railway bridge stress sensor leaves the factory, its identity hash H1 and initial public key PK_initial are recorded on the railway security consortium blockchain, and the identity hash H1 is simultaneously burned onto its security chip. Then, an update is triggered during the device's lifecycle. Specifically, when the railway bridge stress sensor deteriorates and needs repair, according to the security policy, the sensor automatically generates a new key pair (i.e., a second public key and a second private key). Next, the railway bridge stress sensor initiates an on-chain request. Specifically, the railway bridge stress sensor uses its first private key to sign the second public key and sends an "UpdateKey" transaction (i.e., a key update request transaction) to the consortium blockchain. Then, the consortium blockchain automatically executes the smart contract. Specifically, the transaction calls a smart contract named KeyManager. After the contract verifies the signature's validity, it binds the second public key to the railway bridge stress sensor's on-chain identity. The entire process does not require the participation of a centralized key management server. Finally, regarding the effectiveness and traceability of the new key, specifically: the railway bridge stress sensor operates using the new key, and any party can query the complete key change history of the railway bridge stress sensor on the blockchain explorer.

[0066] Furthermore, Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a smart contract broadcast triggering process provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 3 As shown, after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, the second public key is associated with and recorded with the first hash value, including:

[0067] S3011, based on the device serial number in the key update request transaction, retrieve the first public key stored on the consortium blockchain;

[0068] S3012, verify the digital signature of the key update request transaction using the first public key;

[0069] S3013: After the digital signature verification is successful, the second public key and the first hash value are associated and recorded through the key management smart contract.

[0070] In this embodiment, the digital signature of the key update request transaction is verified using the first public key PK_initial to confirm that the request indeed originates from a device holding the legitimate first private key. After successful verification, the second public key and the first hash value are associated and recorded. This operation creates a new, immutable key update record on the blockchain.

[0071] After the key update is successful and recorded on the blockchain, the railway terminal equipment is authorized to use the second asymmetric key pair (PK_new, SK_new) for all subsequent communication and authentication.

[0072] In some embodiments, a key update strategy is pre-set in the key management smart contract;

[0073] The key update policy is set to periodically check whether the key update frequency is compliant, and update the key after the compliance is detected; and / or, update the key only after the digital signatures of the multi-party transactions have been verified.

[0074] In this embodiment, frequency compliance detection and multi-party signature verification are used to achieve hierarchical management of smart contracts.

[0075] In some embodiments, a key lifecycle profile is constructed;

[0076] The key lifecycle archive preserves the entire key history recorded on the consortium blockchain.

[0077] The technical solution in this invention embodiment utilizes blockchain as the single trusted source of identity for all devices, replacing the fragile and non-interoperable centralized database, fundamentally avoiding single points of failure and internal tampering risks. On the other hand, it achieves automated, trusted updates and traceability of security credentials throughout the subsequent lifecycle through smart contracts that automatically execute key update verification and recording. The smart contract process is transparent, the rules are definite, and the results are tamper-proof, requiring no manual intervention, which greatly improves operational efficiency and credibility.

[0078] The technical solution in this embodiment achieves end-to-end trusted identity and security status management for railway IoT terminal equipment from manufacturing to decommissioning through on-chain-hardware two-way binding, smart contract-driven full lifecycle key management, and auditable on-chain logs. The entire process of railway terminal equipment registration and each key update is permanently recorded with a timestamp on the blockchain, providing irrefutable evidence for security audits, accident investigations, and liability determination. Through two-way anchoring of "on-chain hashes and hardware storage," combined with the public key recorded on the blockchain, the global uniqueness and cloning resistance of the device's physical entity and digital identity are ensured. Compared to traditional centralized solutions, this solution significantly improves anti-cloning capabilities, resistance to single points of failure, automation of operation and maintenance, and regulatory traceability, possessing technical and economic value for large-scale deployment in critical infrastructure sectors such as railways and rail transit.

[0079] Based on the same inventive concept Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management system provided in an embodiment of the present invention is shown below. Figure 4As shown, the system specifically includes:

[0080] The identity registration unit 410 is used to calculate the first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be accessed, and to perform bidirectional registration of the device identity within the consortium blockchain and the device based on the first hash value of the key pair and the device identity information of the key pair; wherein, the device identity information of the railway terminal device includes: the first public key in the first asymmetric key pair;

[0081] The key generation unit 420 is used to generate a second asymmetric key pair when a key update is performed during the device's lifecycle, and to generate a key update request transaction based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair.

[0082] The key update unit 430 is used to broadcast the key pair key update request transaction to the key pair consortium chain network, and after triggering the key management smart contract of the key pair consortium chain, associate and record the second public key of the key pair with the first hash value of the key pair to obtain an immutable key update record.

[0083] Based on the same inventive concept Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device that implements the railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management method according to an embodiment of the present invention. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processors, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices (such as helmets, glasses, watches, etc.), and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the invention described and / or claimed herein.

[0084] like Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device 10 includes at least one processor 11 and a memory, such as a read-only memory (ROM) 12 or a random access memory (RAM) 13, communicatively connected to the at least one processor 11. The memory stores computer programs executable by the at least one processor. The processor 11 can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on the computer program stored in the ROM 12 or loaded from storage unit 18 into the RAM 13. The RAM 13 can also store various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 10. The processor 11, ROM 12, and RAM 13 are interconnected via a bus 14. An input / output (I / O) interface 15 is also connected to the bus 14.

[0085] Multiple components in electronic device 10 are connected to I / O interface 15, including: input unit 16, such as keyboard, mouse, etc.; output unit 17, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; storage unit 18, such as disk, optical disk, etc.; and communication unit 19, such as network card, modem, wireless transceiver, etc. Communication unit 19 allows electronic device 10 to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0086] Processor 11 can be a variety of general-purpose and / or special-purpose processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of processor 11 include, but are not limited to, central processing unit (CPU), graphics processing unit (GPU), various special-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various processors running machine learning model algorithms, digital signal processors (DSPs), and any suitable processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. Processor 11 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as the railway Internet of Things terminal equipment safety management method.

[0087] In some embodiments, the railway IoT terminal device security management method can be implemented as a computer program tangibly contained in a computer-readable storage medium, such as storage unit 18. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program can be loaded and / or installed on electronic device 10 via ROM 12 and / or communication unit 19. When the computer program is loaded into RAM 13 and executed by processor 11, one or more steps of the railway IoT terminal device security management method described above can be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, processor 11 can be configured to perform the railway IoT terminal device security management method by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0088] Various embodiments of the systems and techniques described above herein can be implemented in digital electronic circuit systems, integrated circuit systems, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application-specific standard products (ASSPs), systems-on-a-chip (SoCs), payload-programmable logic devices (CPLDs), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various embodiments may include implementations in one or more computer programs that can be executed and / or interpreted on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which may be a dedicated or general-purpose programmable processor, capable of receiving data and instructions from a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device, and transmitting data and instructions to the storage system, the at least one input device, and the at least one output device.

[0089] Computer programs used to implement the methods of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These computer programs may be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, such that when executed by the processor, the computer programs cause the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be performed. The computer programs may be executed entirely on a machine, partially on a machine, or as a standalone software package, partially on a machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0090] In the context of this invention, a computer-readable storage medium can be a tangible medium that may contain or store a computer program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. A computer-readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatus, or devices, or any suitable combination thereof. Alternatively, a computer-readable storage medium may be a machine-readable signal medium. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media include electrical connections based on one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0091] To provide interaction with a user, the systems and techniques described herein can be implemented on an electronic device having: a display device (e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor) for displaying information to the user; and a keyboard and pointing device (e.g., a mouse or trackball) through which the user provides input to the electronic device. Other types of devices can also be used to provide interaction with the user; for example, feedback provided to the user can be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user can be received in any form (including sound input, voice input, or tactile input).

[0092] The systems and technologies described herein can be implemented in computing systems that include backend components (e.g., as data servers), or middleware components (e.g., application servers), or frontend components (e.g., user computers with graphical user interfaces or web browsers through which users can interact with implementations of the systems and technologies described herein), or any combination of such backend, middleware, or frontend components. The components of the system can be interconnected via digital data communication of any form or medium (e.g., communication networks). Examples of communication networks include local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), blockchain networks, and the Internet.

[0093] A computing system can include clients and servers. Clients and servers are generally located far apart and typically interact through communication networks. The client-server relationship is created by computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship with each other. The server can be a cloud server, also known as a cloud computing server or cloud host, which is a hosting product within the cloud computing service system to address the shortcomings of traditional physical hosts and VPS services, such as high management difficulty and weak business scalability.

[0094] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used, with steps reordered, added, or deleted. For example, the steps described in this invention can be executed in parallel, sequentially, or in different orders, as long as the desired result of the technical solution of this invention can be achieved, and no limitation is imposed herein.

[0095] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for safety management of railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment, characterized in that, include: Calculate the first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected, and perform bidirectional registration of the device identity within the consortium blockchain and the device based on the first hash value and the device identity information; wherein, the device identity information of the railway terminal device includes: the first public key in the first asymmetric key pair; When a key is updated during the device's lifecycle, a second asymmetric key pair is generated, and a key update request transaction is generated based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair. The key update request transaction is broadcast to the consortium blockchain network, and after the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain is triggered, the second public key is associated with and recorded with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of performing two-way registration of device identity within the consortium blockchain and within the device includes: Write the metadata of the first hash value and the device identity information into a consortium blockchain constructed by the blockchain; Furthermore, the first hash value is permanently written into the hardware security module inside the railway terminal equipment.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The equipment identification information of the railway terminal equipment also includes: equipment serial number, equipment type, and the code of the line to which it belongs.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of a key update request transaction includes: Call the first private key in the first asymmetric key pair; Based on the first private key, the second public key and the current timestamp in the second asymmetric key pair are signed to generate the key update request transaction.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of associating and recording the second public key with the first hash value after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain includes: Based on the device serial number in the key update request transaction, retrieve the first public key stored on the consortium blockchain; The digital signature of the key update request transaction is verified using the first public key. After the digital signature verification is successful, the second public key and the first hash value are associated and recorded through the key management smart contract.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The key update strategy is pre-set in the key management smart contract; The key update strategy is set to periodically check whether the key update frequency is compliant, and update the key after the compliance is detected; And / or, the key is updated if and only if the digital signatures of all transactions by multiple parties have been verified.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Build a key lifecycle profile; The key lifecycle archive stores the entire key history recorded on the consortium blockchain.

8. A railway Internet of Things (IoT) terminal equipment safety management system, characterized in that, The system is configured to implement the method according to any one of claims 1-7, the system comprising: An identity registration unit is used to calculate a first hash value of the device identity information of the railway terminal device to be connected, and to perform bidirectional registration of the device identity within the consortium blockchain and the device based on the first hash value and the device identity information; wherein, the device identity information of the railway terminal device includes: a first public key in a first asymmetric key pair; The key generation unit is used to generate a second asymmetric key pair when a key update is performed during the device's lifecycle, and to generate a key update request transaction based on the second public key in the second asymmetric key pair. The key update unit is used to broadcast the key update request transaction to the network of the consortium blockchain, and after triggering the key management smart contract of the consortium blockchain, associate and record the second public key with the first hash value to obtain an immutable key update record.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes: At least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to said at least one processor; The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions that cause a processor to perform the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

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