Sandbox-free environment Vue single file component development and rendering implementation method and system

Abstract

The application provides a sandbox-free environment Vue single file component development and rendering implementation method and system, relates to the technical field of component development, and comprises receiving declarative configuration data containing a component tree, attribute binding and a life cycle hook; constructing a control flow graph and inferring capability requirements through control flow analysis, generating a capability authorization matrix recording path and capability mapping, and allocating a dynamic permission token accordingly; constructing a virtualization layer with a host object image, verifying permissions and synchronizing host status through an interceptor during operation; initializing a component instance and executing a hook, establishing a responsive observation, and triggering local re-rendering when data changes; and submitting updates after performing a security scan on the re-rendered DOM to remove dangerous content. The application realizes safe and efficient component rendering and permission control in a sandbox-free environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of component development technology, and in particular to a method and system for developing and rendering Vue single-file components in a sandbox-free environment. Background Technology

[0002] In existing technologies, single-file component development based on modern front-end frameworks such as Vue.js has been widely adopted. Conventional implementations typically rely on the framework's built-in reactive system and virtual DOM mechanism. Developers write single-file components containing templates, scripts, and styles, which the framework then compiles or executes into executable rendering functions. Component lifecycle hooks are scheduled and executed internally by the framework, and data-view binding is handled through reactive dependency collection and update triggering. For runtime environment isolation and security control, common practices include relying on the browser's native same-origin policy or building an independent iframe sandbox environment to restrict component access to the host page's global objects and sensitive APIs. Regarding permission management, existing solutions mostly employ static, component- or role-based coarse-grained authorization strategies, assigning fixed access permissions during application initialization.

[0003] However, the aforementioned conventional approach has significant drawbacks. On the one hand, relying on sandbox environments such as iframes introduces additional performance overhead and communication complexity, and makes seamless integration and state synchronization with the host application difficult, limiting the flexibility and interactivity of components. On the other hand, static permission allocation mechanisms cannot adapt to the dynamic and complex internal logic of components. Since component lifecycle hooks may contain conditional branches and different execution paths, the actual system capabilities required for each path (such as accessing local storage, calling network interfaces, etc.) may vary drastically. Static authorization often adopts a "one-size-fits-all" strategy, either over-authorizing, causing components to have unnecessary permissions even in simple paths, increasing security risks; or under-authorizing, causing components to malfunction due to missing permissions in certain execution paths. This disconnect between permissions and dynamic execution context makes it difficult to achieve both secure and flexible high-performance component rendering in a sandbox-less environment. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a method and system for developing and rendering Vue single-file components in a sandbox-free environment, which can solve the problems in the prior art.

[0005] A first aspect of this invention provides a method for developing and rendering Vue single-file components in a sandbox-free environment, comprising: The system receives declarative configuration data from view components, which includes component tree structure, attribute binding rules, and lifecycle hook functions. It performs control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook functions, constructs a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, infers capability requirements based on the control flow graph, calculates the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path, generates a capability authorization matrix, which records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types, and assigns dynamic permission tokens to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship. A virtualization layer is constructed and a host object image is created within it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After successful verification, a delayed binding mechanism is used to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment. Component instances are initialized within the virtualization layer, and the lifecycle hook functions are executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered. The DOM structure generated by the re-render is security scanned to identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes. The cleaned DOM structure is then submitted to the host document to complete the view update.

[0006] Perform control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook function to construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, including: Lexical and syntactic analysis are performed on the source code of the lifecycle hook function to generate an abstract syntax tree; the nodes of the abstract syntax tree are traversed to identify multiple syntax statements and extract the entry and exit nodes of each syntax statement; Establish node connection relationships based on the logical relationship between the entry node and the exit node. The node connection relationships include sequential connection, branch connection and loop connection. Construct a directed graph structure based on the node connection relationships. Each node in the directed graph structure corresponds to a code block and each directed edge corresponds to a possible execution transfer. Perform path traversal on the directed graph structure to identify all reachable paths from the function entry point to the function exit point, and record the node sequence traversed by each path; Logical expressions are extracted from the branch conditions of each path to generate path constraints, which describe the preconditions that must be met for the path to be executed. The node sequence, directed edges, and path constraints are organized into a control flow graph data structure, which includes a set of nodes, a set of edges, and a set of paths, wherein each path carries a unique path identifier and a corresponding path constraint.

[0007] Based on the control flow graph, capability requirements are inferred, the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path is calculated, and a capability authorization matrix is ​​generated. This matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. Dynamic permission tokens are assigned to the current execution context according to this mapping relationship, including: Extract the node sequence of each execution path in the control flow graph, and analyze the API call statements and resource access statements in the code block corresponding to each node; Establish a system capability type enumeration table, which defines the type identifiers for file system access capabilities, network request capabilities, local storage access capabilities, DOM manipulation capabilities, and global object access capabilities; Iterate through all API call statements for each execution path, map each API call statement to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table, and generate a capability requirement set for that path; perform deduplication and minimization processing on the capability requirement set, remove redundant capability types, and retain the subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function; The data structure for constructing the capability authorization matrix is ​​defined as follows: the row index of the capability authorization matrix is ​​the execution path identifier, the column index is the system capability type identifier, and the matrix element value indicates whether the path requires the corresponding capability. During component instance initialization, the capability authorization matrix is ​​queried based on the currently active execution path identifier to obtain the capability type subset corresponding to the path, a dynamic permission token containing a list of capability types and a timestamp is generated, and the dynamic permission token is stored in the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context.

[0008] Iterate through all API call statements for each execution path, mapping each API call statement to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table, generating a capability requirement set for that path; perform deduplication and minimization processing on the capability requirement set, removing redundant capability types and retaining a subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function, including: Extract the node sequence corresponding to the execution path from the control flow graph, parse the code block in each node to obtain the list of API call statements; perform lexical analysis on each API call in the list of API call statements, extract the namespace, object name and method name of the API, and construct an API call feature descriptor; Establish a mapping rule base for API features and capability types. The mapping rule base defines the correspondence between pattern matching conditions of API call feature descriptors and system capability type identifiers. Use the API call feature descriptors to perform pattern matching queries in the mapping rule base to obtain the system capability type identifiers that match successfully. Add the system capability type identifier to the temporary capability requirement set, traverse all API calls in the API call statement list to complete the mapping operation, and perform a set deduplication operation on the temporary capability requirement set to remove duplicate capability type identifiers. Analyze the inclusion relationships between capability types in the temporary capability requirement set, identify capability type groups with transitive dependencies; retain the highest-level capability type from the capability type group, remove the lower-level capability types contained in it, and generate a simplified subset of capability types as the minimum permission set for the execution path.

[0009] A virtualization layer is constructed, and a host object image is created within it. This host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted, and the permission token is verified using the capability authorization matrix. Upon successful verification, a delayed binding mechanism is employed to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment, including: Create a virtualization layer container object, initialize an empty host object image in the virtualization layer container object, configure a proxy processor for each attribute of the host object image, and the proxy processor intercepts read and write operations of the attribute; When an attribute read operation is detected, the proxy processor extracts the currently executing code position from the call stack information, determines the current execution path identifier based on the mapping relationship between the code position and the nodes of the control flow graph, uses the execution path identifier to query the capability authorization matrix, obtains a list of capability types that the execution path is allowed to access, and reads the dynamic permission token from the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context. Verify whether the timestamp of the dynamic permission token is within the validity period, and determine whether the system capability type corresponding to the target attribute is included in the capability type list; if the verification fails, the access operation is terminated and a security default value is returned; if the verification is successful, the delayed binding process is triggered, the actual value of the corresponding attribute is read from the host environment and cached in the host object image; When an attribute write operation is detected, the same permission verification process is executed. After successful verification, the new value is synchronized to the corresponding attribute in the host environment, and the cached value of the host object image is updated.

[0010] Within the virtualization layer, component instances are initialized and the lifecycle hook functions are executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered. Specifically, this includes: Component instance objects are allocated within the virtualization layer, initial state data from the declarative configuration data is injected into the component instance objects, the attribute binding rules are traversed, the binding relationship between data attributes and view nodes is extracted, and a dependency collector is created for each data attribute. A reactive proxy is set for each data property of the component instance object. The reactive proxy registers the current rendering context with the corresponding dependency collector when the property is read, and notifies the dependency collector when the property is modified. The initialization hook function, the pre-mount hook function, and the post-mount hook function are called sequentially according to the execution order of the lifecycle hook functions. During the execution process, the dependency collector records the data attributes accessed by each hook function. When a data attribute change is detected, the identifiers of all view nodes that depend on the attribute are obtained from the corresponding dependency collector, an affected node set is constructed, the least common ancestor node of the affected node set is calculated according to the component tree structure, and the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes are determined as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered. Perform virtual DOM difference calculation on the nodes within the component subtree range, generate a list of DOM operation instructions, and submit the list of DOM operation instructions to the rendering queue to complete the local view update.

[0011] Calculate the least common ancestor node of the affected node set based on the component tree structure, and determine the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered, including: Extract the parent node reference and depth information of each node from the component tree structure, sort the nodes in the affected node set in descending order according to the depth information, and select the node with the largest depth as the initial candidate node; Starting from the initial candidate node, traverse upwards along the parent node reference, recording all ancestor nodes on the traversal path until the root node is reached. Then, check each other node in the affected node set to determine whether each node is located on the traversal path or is a descendant node of the path node. If all nodes in the affected node set are within the subtree range of a node in the traversal path, then that node is determined as the least common ancestor node. If a node does not meet the above conditions, move up one level along the traversal path, select a higher-level ancestor node as a new candidate least common ancestor node, and repeat the checking process. After determining the least common ancestor node, a depth-first traversal algorithm is used to traverse all descendant nodes of that node. The traversed node set is merged with the least common ancestor node to form a complete component subtree range. Each node in the component subtree range is marked as a state to be re-rendered.

[0012] A second aspect of this invention provides a sandbox-free environment for developing and rendering Vue single-file components, comprising: A configuration receiving unit is used to receive declarative configuration data of view components, wherein the declarative configuration data includes component tree structure, property binding rules and lifecycle hook functions; The permission analysis unit is used to perform control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook function, construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, infer capability requirements based on the control flow graph, calculate the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path, generate a capability authorization matrix, the capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types, and allocates dynamic permission tokens to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship; The virtualization interception unit is used to build a virtualization layer and create a host object image in it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After verification, the corresponding state of the host environment is synchronized using a delayed binding mechanism. The responsive rendering unit is used to initialize component instances and execute the lifecycle hook function within the virtualization layer, establish a responsive data observation mechanism based on the attribute binding rules, calculate the affected component subtree range and trigger local re-rendering when data changes. The security update unit is used to perform a security scan on the DOM structure generated by the re-render, identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes, and submit the cleaned DOM structure to the host document to complete the view update.

[0013] A third aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the aforementioned method.

[0014] A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the aforementioned method.

[0015] This method enables secure development and efficient rendering of Vue single-file components in a sandbox-less environment. By receiving declarative configuration data containing component trees, attribute binding rules, and lifecycle hooks, the system can perform structured parsing and secure preprocessing of component logic. Control flow analysis is performed on lifecycle hook functions to construct a control flow graph covering all execution paths and branch conditions, laying the foundation for subsequent fine-grained permission control. Based on the control flow graph, capability requirements are inferred, calculating the minimum set of permissions required for each possible execution path, and generating a capability authorization matrix that records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. This matrix serves as the core basis for permission management; the system dynamically allocates permission tokens to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship, achieving fine-grained, on-demand permission granting and fundamentally limiting the ability of code to perform unauthorized operations.

[0016] Building a virtualization layer and creating a host object image within it is a crucial step in achieving secure isolation. The host object image, through the deployment of attribute access interceptors, can capture all read and write operations on the host environment. Upon interception, the system extracts the current execution path identifier and queries the capability authorization matrix to verify the validity of the dynamic permission token. After successful permission verification, the system employs a delayed binding mechanism to synchronize the operation to the real state of the host environment. This mechanism ensures that only operations within the authorized scope are effective, effectively preventing malicious code from unauthorized access to and tampering with the host environment. Attached Figure Description

[0017] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the process of developing and rendering Vue single-file components in a sandbox-less environment. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0019] The technical solution of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments. These specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be described again in some embodiments.

[0020] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the development and rendering process of Vue single-file components in a sandbox-less environment, as shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes: Receive declarative configuration data from view components, the declarative configuration data including component tree structure, property binding rules, and lifecycle hook functions; Control flow analysis is performed on the lifecycle hook function to construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions. Based on the control flow graph, capability requirements are inferred, the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path is calculated, and a capability authorization matrix is ​​generated. The capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. Dynamic permission tokens are assigned to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship. A virtualization layer is constructed and a host object image is created within it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After successful verification, a delayed binding mechanism is used to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment. Component instances are initialized within the virtualization layer and the lifecycle hook function is executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered. Perform a security scan on the DOM structure generated by the re-rendering, identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes, and submit the cleaned DOM structure to the host document to complete the view update.

[0021] In one optional implementation, control flow analysis is performed on the lifecycle hook function to construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, including: Lexical and syntactic analysis are performed on the source code of the lifecycle hook function to generate an abstract syntax tree; Traverse the nodes of the abstract syntax tree, identify multiple syntax statements, and extract the entry node and exit node of each syntax statement; Establish node connection relationships based on the logical relationship between the entry node and the exit node. The node connection relationships include sequential connection, branch connection and loop connection. A directed graph structure is constructed based on the node connection relationship. Each node in the directed graph structure corresponds to a code block, and each directed edge corresponds to a possible execution transition. Perform path traversal on the directed graph structure to identify all reachable paths from the function entry point to the function exit point, and record the node sequence traversed by each path; Logical expressions are extracted from the branch conditions of each path to generate path constraints, which describe the preconditions that must be met for the path to be executed. The node sequence, directed edges, and path constraints are organized into a control flow graph data structure, which includes a set of nodes, a set of edges, and a set of paths, wherein each path carries a unique path identifier and a corresponding path constraint.

[0022] When performing lexical analysis on the source code of lifecycle hook functions, the code string is first segmented into a sequence of lexical units. The lexical analyzer scans the source code character by character, identifying keywords such as if, while, and return; identifiers such as variable names and function names; operators and delimiters; and filtering comments and whitespace characters. Each identified lexical unit carries a type label and position information. The type label includes keyword type, identifier type, literal type, and operator type, and the position information records the line number and column number of the unit in the source code.

[0023] The parser receives a sequence of lexical units and performs top-down recursive descent parsing according to JavaScript syntax rules. The parser identifies statement structure, resolving function declarations into FunctionDeclaration nodes, if statements into IfStatement nodes, and loop statements into WhileStatement or ForStatement nodes. Each syntax node contains a node type property, an array of child nodes, and a source position range, forming an abstract syntax tree with hierarchical relationships.

[0024] A depth-first strategy is used when traversing the abstract syntax tree. For each statement node, its entry and exit nodes are determined. The entry and exit nodes of a simple assignment statement are the same node. The entry node of an if statement is the condition judgment node, and its exit node is the merging point of the then branch and the else branch. The entry node of a loop statement is the loop condition judgment node, and its exit node is the merging point after the loop body has been executed.

[0025] When establishing node connections, sequential connections are created for statements executed sequentially, with the exit node of the current statement directly connected to the entry node of the next statement. For if statements, branch connections are created, with condition evaluation nodes connected to the entry points of the then and else branches, and the exit nodes of both branches connected to the common merging node. For while loops, loop connections are created, with condition evaluation nodes connected to the loop body entry and exit points, and the loop body exit node connected back to the condition evaluation node, forming a backward edge.

[0026] When constructing a directed graph structure, a unique node identifier is assigned to each code block. The node data structure includes an identifier field, a code block content field, and a node type field. The node type field distinguishes between ordinary statement nodes, conditional decision nodes, and merge nodes. The edge data structure includes a source node identifier, a target node identifier, and an edge type field. The edge type field indicates whether the edge is a true branch edge, a false branch edge, or a sequential edge.

[0027] The path traversal employs a depth-first search algorithm, starting from the function entry node and proceeding along directed edges, recording visited nodes to avoid infinite loops. When the function exit node is reached, the currently visited node sequence is recorded as a complete path. For paths containing loops, the number of loop unrolls is limited to a fixed value, such as 2, and the path after a finite number of loop unrolls is recorded as an independent path.

[0028] When extracting the logical expressions for branch conditions, the expression tree of the condition nodes in the if statement is parsed. Condition expressions may contain comparison operators, logical AND operators, and logical OR operators; the expressions are converted to standard logical form. For all branch nodes traversed by a path, the branch conditions selected by that path are collected. Conditions for true branches are left as is, and conditions for false branches are logically negated. All conditions are then connected using a logical AND to form the path constraints.

[0029] When organizing the control flow graph data structure, JSON format is used for storage. The node set is an array, with each element containing a node identifier and a code snippet; the edge set is an array, with each element containing a source node, a target node, and an edge type; the path set is an array, with each path object containing a path identifier, an array of node sequences, and a constraint string. Path identifiers are generated using hash values, and a hash calculation is performed on the node sequences and constraints to ensure that the same path generates the same identifier.

[0030] In one optional implementation, capability requirement inference is performed based on the control flow graph. The minimum set of permissions required for each execution path is calculated, and a capability authorization matrix is ​​generated. This capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. Dynamic permission tokens are assigned to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship, including: Extract the node sequence of each execution path in the control flow graph, and analyze the API call statements and resource access statements in the code block corresponding to each node; Establish a system capability type enumeration table, which defines the type identifiers for file system access capabilities, network request capabilities, local storage access capabilities, DOM manipulation capabilities, and global object access capabilities; Iterate through all API call statements for each execution path, map each API call statement to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table, and generate the capability requirement set for that path. The set of capability requirements is deduplicated and minimized, removing redundant capability types and retaining the subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function; The data structure for constructing the capability authorization matrix is ​​defined as follows: the row index of the capability authorization matrix is ​​the execution path identifier, the column index is the system capability type identifier, and the matrix element value indicates whether the path requires the corresponding capability. During component instance initialization, the capability authorization matrix is ​​queried based on the currently active execution path identifier to obtain the capability type subset corresponding to the path, a dynamic permission token containing a list of capability types and a timestamp is generated, and the dynamic permission token is stored in the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context.

[0031] When inferring capability requirements from the control flow graph, a depth-first traversal is performed on the node sequence for each execution path. An abstract syntax tree parser performs lexical analysis on the code blocks corresponding to the nodes, identifying characteristic API calls such as `fetch()`, `localStorage.setItem()`, and `document.createElement()`. Simultaneously, path parameters and URL strings in resource access statements are examined to determine whether the access target belongs to the file system, a network endpoint, or browser storage.

[0032] The system capability type enumeration table is stored using a hash table structure. The key is a capability type identifier string, and the value is a structure containing priority weights and dependencies. File system access capabilities are identified by `fs_access`, network request capabilities by `net_request`, local storage access capabilities by `storage_rw`, DOM manipulation capabilities by `dom_modify`, and global object access capabilities by `global_access`. Each capability type is appended with a risk level parameter, used for subsequent calculation of the permission token's validity period.

[0033] When traversing the execution path, a temporary set of capability requirements is maintained. When an `XMLHttpRequest` or `fetch` call is detected, the `net_request` flag is added to the set; when a `document.getElementById` or `innerHTML` assignment operation is parsed, the `dom_modify` flag is added. For nested function calls, the control flow subgraph of the called function needs to be recursively analyzed, and its capability requirements are merged into the current path set. Deduplication is handled using a bitmap compression algorithm, mapping capability types to binary bits, and set merging is achieved through bitwise OR operations. Minimization is achieved through dependency graph pruning, removing redundant types that can be implicitly included by other capabilities.

[0034] The capability authorization matrix uses a sparse matrix storage format, recording only the coordinates of matrix elements with true values. Execution path identifiers are represented by hash values, generated as unique identifiers from the MD5 digest of the path node sequence. During matrix construction, for the minimum set of capabilities for each path, the corresponding column is marked with a Boolean value of true at the corresponding row index position. The matrix supports incremental updates; when a component's declarative configuration changes leading to a control flow graph refactoring, only the affected subset of paths is recalculated.

[0035] During component instance initialization, the execution context carries the call stack information of the currently active path. The path identifier is obtained by backtracking through the stack frame and used as the key to query the capability authorization matrix. The subset of capability types returned by the query is converted into an array format, serialized together with the current timestamp and random salt value into a JSON structure, and then a signature is generated using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to form a complete dynamic permission token. The token is stored in the execution context's WeakMap structure, using the context object as the key, ensuring that the token's lifecycle is bound to the context. The token's validity period is dynamically calculated based on the highest risk level of the capability type. High-risk capability tokens are only valid within a single function call cycle, while low-risk capability tokens can persist until the component instance is destroyed. When verifying the token, the access interceptor must simultaneously verify the signature integrity and timestamp validity to prevent the token from being forged or replayed.

[0036] In one alternative implementation, all API call statements for each execution path are traversed, and each API call statement is mapped to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table to generate a capability requirement set for that path. The set of capability requirements is deduplicated and minimized, removing redundant capability types and retaining a subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function, including: Extract the node sequence corresponding to the execution path from the control flow graph, and parse the code block in each node to obtain the list of API call statements; Lexical analysis is performed on each API call in the API call statement list to extract the API's namespace, object name, and method name, and to construct an API call feature descriptor; Establish a mapping rule base for API features and capability types. The mapping rule base defines the correspondence between the pattern matching conditions of API call feature descriptors and the system capability type identifiers. Use the API call feature descriptor to perform pattern matching query in the mapping rule base to obtain the system capability type identifier of the successful match; Add the system capability type identifier to the temporary capability requirement set, and iterate through all API calls in the API call statement list to complete the mapping operation; Perform a set deduplication operation on the temporary capability requirement set to remove duplicate capability type identifiers; Analyze the inclusion relationships between capability types in the temporary capability requirement set to identify groups of capability types with transitive dependencies; The highest-level capability type is retained from the capability type group, and the lower-level capability types contained within it are removed, generating a simplified subset of capability types as the minimum permission set for this execution path.

[0037] When inferring capability requirements for each execution path, the first step is to extract all nodes corresponding to that path from the control flow graph. Each node records an abstract syntax tree representation of the code block, and function call expressions and member access expressions are identified by traversing the abstract syntax tree. When a call of the form `window.fetch` or `document.createElement` is detected, it is marked as a potential API call statement and added to the pending list.

[0038] When performing lexical analysis on identified API calls, the parser extracts the complete structure of the call chain. For example, for the call `navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition`, the namespace `navigator`, object name `geolocation`, and method name `getCurrentPosition` are extracted and combined to form the feature descriptor `navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition`. For dynamic call forms such as `obj['method']()`, static analysis is also needed to reconstruct the actual call target as much as possible.

[0039] The system maintains a predefined mapping rule library, stored in JSON format, containing hundreds of mapping rules. Each rule includes a matching pattern and a capability type identifier. For example, the rule `{"pattern": "^fetch|XMLHttpRequest", "capability": "NETWORK_ACCESS"}` defines all network request-related APIs as mappings to network access capabilities. Rules support both regular expression matching and exact matching; the system prioritizes exact matching to improve query efficiency.

[0040] When querying the rule base using API feature descriptors, a hash index is first built for all exact match rules to achieve constant-time lookups. If an exact match fails, regular expression rules are then tried sequentially. For example, if the feature descriptor `localStorage.setItem` matches the rule `{"pattern": "localStorage|sessionStorage", "capability": "STORAGE_ACCESS"}`, a storage access capability identifier is returned. If an API call does not match any rules, an alert is logged but the processing flow is not interrupted.

[0041] After traversing all API calls in the execution path, the temporary capability requirement set can contain `["NETWORK_ACCESS", "DOM_MANIPULATION", "STORAGE_ACCESS", "NETWORK_ACCESS"]`. After performing deduplication on the set, we get `["NETWORK_ACCESS", "DOM_MANIPULATION", "STORAGE_ACCESS"]`.

[0042] Predefined containment relationships exist between capability types; for example, the `FILE_SYSTEM_WRITE` capability contains the `FILE_SYSTEM_READ` capability. The system loads a directed acyclic graph model of capability types, where edges represent containment relationships. When performing topology analysis on the deduplicated capability set, a depth-first search is performed starting from each capability node, marking all reachable contained nodes. When capability type A and capability type B coexist and A contains B, B is marked as redundant. After completing all traversals, the marked capability types are removed, and the remaining set is the minimum permission set for that path, which serves as the record value for the corresponding row in the capability authorization matrix.

[0043] A virtualization layer is constructed, and a host object image is created within it. This host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted, and the permission token is verified using the capability authorization matrix. Upon successful verification, a delayed binding mechanism is employed to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment, including: Create a virtualization layer container object, initialize an empty host object image in the virtualization layer container object, configure a proxy processor for each attribute of the host object image, and the proxy processor intercepts read and write operations of the attribute; When an attribute read operation is detected, the proxy processor extracts the currently executing code position from the call stack information and determines the current execution path identifier based on the mapping relationship between the code position and the nodes of the control flow graph; The execution path identifier is used to query the capability authorization matrix to obtain a list of capability types that the execution path is allowed to access, and a dynamic permission token is read from the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context. Verify whether the timestamp of the dynamic permission token is within the validity period, and determine whether the system capability type corresponding to the target attribute is included in the capability type list; If the verification fails, the access operation is terminated and a safe default value is returned. If the verification succeeds, the delayed binding process is triggered, the actual value of the corresponding attribute is read from the host environment and cached in the host object image. When an attribute write operation is detected, the same permission verification process is executed. After successful verification, the new value is synchronized to the corresponding attribute in the host environment, and the cached value of the host object image is updated.

[0044] During the construction of the virtualization layer, a virtualization layer container object is created using JavaScript's Proxy API. This container object serves as the execution environment for the component code. During the initialization phase, an empty mirror object is created for the host object that needs to be mirrored (such as browser global objects like `window` and `document`). Initially, the mirror object does not contain any actual property values, only retaining metadata information such as property names. A proxy handler is configured for each property of the mirror object. The proxy handler intercepts read and write operations on the property by defining `get` and `set` trap functions, respectively.

[0045] When component code attempts to read a property of the mirror object, the `get` trap function is triggered. The proxy handler first obtains the current call stack information through the `stack` property of the `Error` object, parses the function name and line number from the stack frame, and matches this location information with a pre-built node mapping table in the control flow graph. Each node in the control flow graph is marked with its corresponding code location range during construction. By finding the node containing the current code location, the current execution path identifier can be determined. This identifier uses the format "function name-branch number", for example, "onMounted-branch2" represents the second branch path in the `onMounted` hook function.

[0046] The execution path identifier is used as the key to query the capability authorization matrix, which is stored in a hash table structure. The matrix returns an array of system capability types that are allowed to be accessed by that path. The capability types include predefined categories such as "DOM manipulation", "network request", and "local storage". At the same time, a dynamic permission token is read from the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context object. This token is generated by the control flow analysis module during component initialization and contains a token generation timestamp, expiration time, and a digital signature of the authorized capability set.

[0047] The authorization verification phase first checks the token's timestamp field, comparing the current system time with the expiration time. If the token has expired, verification fails. Next, it determines the system capability type corresponding to the target attribute. For example, accessing the `document.cookie` attribute corresponds to the "local storage" capability, and matches this capability type against the list of authorized capability types in the token. If any verification condition is not met, the proxy processor immediately aborts the access operation and returns a safe default value based on the attribute type: an empty string for string types, 0 for numeric types, and an empty object for object types.

[0048] Upon successful verification, a delayed binding process is triggered, at which point the corresponding attribute in the host environment is actually accessed. The actual value of the attribute is obtained by directly accessing the original, unpromoted host object, and this value is stored in a cache mapping table within the image object. The cache entry contains the attribute name, attribute value, and cache timestamp. Subsequent read operations on the same attribute can preferentially retrieve it from the cache; the host environment is only accessed again when the cache expires or the attribute value may change, thus reducing the performance overhead of cross-boundary calls.

[0049] The processing flow for property write operations is similar to that of read operations. When the `set` trap function catches a write operation, it executes the same execution path extraction, permission token lookup, and verification logic. After successful verification, the proxy processor synchronously writes the new value to the corresponding property in the host environment; for example, setting the `document.title` property directly modifies the title of the actual DOM. Simultaneously, it updates the corresponding entry in the mirror object cache mapping table, recording the new value and the current timestamp in the cache to ensure the mirror state remains consistent with the host environment. If the capability type involved in the write operation is not in the authorization list, the write operation is intercepted and a permission denial exception is thrown. The exception information records the name of the denied property and the required capability type, facilitating developer debugging of permission configuration issues.

[0050] In one optional implementation, component instances are initialized within the virtualization layer and the lifecycle hook function is executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered, including: Component instance objects are allocated within the virtualization layer, initial state data from the declarative configuration data is injected into the component instance objects, the attribute binding rules are traversed, the binding relationship between data attributes and view nodes is extracted, and a dependency collector is created for each data attribute. A reactive proxy is set for each data property of the component instance object. The reactive proxy registers the current rendering context with the corresponding dependency collector when the property is read, and notifies the dependency collector when the property is modified. The initialization hook function, the pre-mount hook function, and the post-mount hook function are called sequentially according to the execution order of the lifecycle hook functions. During the execution process, the dependency collector records the data attributes accessed by each hook function. When a data attribute change is detected, the identifiers of all view nodes that depend on the attribute are obtained from the corresponding dependency collector, an affected node set is constructed, the least common ancestor node of the affected node set is calculated according to the component tree structure, and the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes are determined as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered. Perform virtual DOM difference calculation on the nodes within the component subtree range, generate a list of DOM operation instructions, and submit the list of DOM operation instructions to the rendering queue to complete the local view update.

[0051] When initializing component instances within the virtualization layer, an isolated instance object space is first created using the `Object.create` method. The `data` field in the declarative configuration data is parsed into key-value pairs and injected into this instance object. For example, if the configuration data contains `{count: 0, message: 'hello'}`, the system assigns these properties one by one to the property slots of the instance object. Next, binding directives in the template, such as `v-bind: text="message"` or `{{count}}`, are parsed to extract the mapping between data property names and DOM node paths. Dep dependency collector objects are then created for `message` and `count` respectively. Internally, this collector maintains an array of subscribers to store references to rendering functions that depend on these properties.

[0052] The reactive proxy implementation uses a Proxy object to wrap instance data. In the get trap function, it checks whether there is an active rendering context. If the global variable Dep.target points to a Watcher object, it calls the dep.depend method to add the Watcher to the subscriber array of the dependency collector. In the set trap function, it compares the old and new values. When the value changes, it calls the dep.notify method to traverse the subscriber array and trigger the update method of each Watcher.

[0053] In the specific process, reading the count property will trigger `return Reflect.get(target, key)`, and at the same time execute `currentDep.addSub(activeWatcher)`; modifying the count property will execute `Reflect.set(target, key, value)` and immediately call `subs.forEach(watcher =>watcher.update())`.

[0054] Lifecycle hooks are executed in the order of beforeCreate, created, beforeMount, and mounted. When the created hook is called, the system has already completed reactive proxy setup; accessing `this.count` within this hook will automatically trigger dependency collection. During the mounted hook execution phase, the rendering function has completed its first execution, and the dependency collector has recorded the complete property-node mapping. Each hook function is executed within a try-catch block, and caught exceptions are logged with the hook name and component identifier.

[0055] When a user action causes the count to change from 0 to 1, the `set` trap is triggered. The dependency collector returns an array containing node paths, such as `['root / div / span', 'root / div / button']`. The system resolves these paths into tree node references and finds the common ancestor by traversing upwards through the parent node pointers. Assuming that the parent node of both `span` and `button` is the same `div`, that `div` is marked as the least common ancestor, and its entire subtree is added to the `pendingUpdates` queue. At this point, the actual DOM is not immediately manipulated; instead, the dirty flag (`dirtyFlag`) is set to `true`.

[0056] The virtual DOM difference calculation is performed in batches in the next microtask. The system calls the `patch` function to compare the old virtual node tree `oldVNode` and the new virtual node tree `newVNode`. The comparison process uses a same-level comparison strategy, checking node type, tag name, and key attribute. When the text content of a `span` node changes from "0" to "1", an operation instruction `{type: 'TEXT', node: `spanRef`, value: '1'}` is generated; if the `button` node's `class` attribute adds the `disabled` class, then `{type: 'ATTR', node: `btnRef`, `attr: 'class', value: 'btn disabled'}` is generated. All instructions are collected into the `diffQueue` array and applied uniformly to the actual DOM nodes in the next frame via the `requestAnimationFrame` API, completing a minimal view update and avoiding the performance loss caused by full rendering.

[0057] In one optional implementation, the least common ancestor node of the affected node set is calculated based on the component tree structure, and the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes are determined as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered, including: Extract the parent node reference and depth information of each node from the component tree structure, sort the nodes in the affected node set in descending order according to the depth information, and select the node with the largest depth as the initial candidate node; Starting from the initial candidate node, traverse upwards along the parent node reference, recording all ancestor nodes on the traversal path until the root node is reached. Then, check each other node in the affected node set to determine whether each node is located on the traversal path or is a descendant node of the path node. If all nodes in the affected node set are within the subtree range of a node in the traversal path, then that node is determined as the least common ancestor node. If a node does not meet the above conditions, move up one level along the traversal path, select a higher-level ancestor node as a new candidate least common ancestor node, and repeat the checking process. After determining the least common ancestor node, a depth-first traversal algorithm is used to traverse all descendant nodes of that node. The traversed node set is merged with the least common ancestor node to form a complete component subtree range. Each node in the component subtree range is marked as a state to be re-rendered.

[0058] When determining the scope of the component subtree that needs to be re-rendered, the necessary information is first extracted from the node storage object of the component tree structure. Each component node internally maintains a memory reference to its parent node (parentRef) and stores a depth field representing its level depth in the tree, with the root node having a depth value of 0. After obtaining the set of affected nodes, the nodes in the set are sorted in descending order by their depth values, and the node with the largest depth value, i.e., the one closest to a leaf node, is selected as the initial candidate node.

[0059] Starting from the initial candidate node, the traversal proceeds upwards by repeatedly reading the `parentRef` property. An array `ancestorPath` is created to record references to all ancestor nodes visited during the traversal, and the current node itself is also added to this array. The traversal continues until `parentRef` becomes null, at which point the root node of the tree is reached. After the traversal is complete, `ancestorPath` contains the complete path from the initial node to the root node.

[0060] Next, we verify each of the other nodes in the affected node set. For each node in the set, we check if it exists in the ancestorPath array. If the node is not on the path, we further check if the node is a descendant of a node on the path: starting from the node, we traverse its ancestor chain upwards. If any node in ancestorPath is encountered during the traversal, the descendant relationship is considered to be valid.

[0061] When all affected nodes satisfy the condition of being located within a subtree of a node in ancestorPath, the search in ancestorPath starts from the node with the greatest depth and proceeds towards the root node to find the shallowest node that covers all affected nodes. This node is the Least Common Ancestor (LCA). If, during the check, an affected node is found to be neither on the path nor a descendant of a path node, it indicates that the current candidate node is too deep. In this case, a higher-level ancestor node is selected as a new candidate node in ancestorPath, and the coverage check of all affected nodes is re-executed until an LCA that meets the condition is found.

[0062] After determining the LCA (Local Child Node), all its descendant nodes need to be collected to form the complete re-rendering scope. A stack structure is used to implement depth-first traversal: the LCA node is pushed onto the stack, and the following operations are performed iteratively: pop the top node from the stack, read the node's `children` property to obtain the list of direct child nodes, and push all child nodes onto the stack in reverse order. During the traversal, a reference to each visited node is stored in the result set `subtreeNodes`. After the traversal, `subtreeNodes` contains the LCA node and all its descendant nodes.

[0063] Finally, the internal state flags of each node in `subtreeNodes` are modified. The `needsRerender` boolean field in the node object is set to true, while the `renderVersion` version number is recorded for subsequent rendering scheduling. These flags ensure that the rendering engine can recognize and process all nodes within the subtree range when performing updates, achieving accurate local re-rendering without updating the entire component tree.

[0064] A second aspect of this invention provides a sandbox-free environment for developing and rendering Vue single-file components, comprising: A configuration receiving unit is used to receive declarative configuration data of view components, wherein the declarative configuration data includes component tree structure, property binding rules and lifecycle hook functions; The permission analysis unit is used to perform control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook function, construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, infer capability requirements based on the control flow graph, calculate the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path, generate a capability authorization matrix, the capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types, and allocates dynamic permission tokens to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship; The virtualization interception unit is used to build a virtualization layer and create a host object image in it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After verification, the corresponding state of the host environment is synchronized using a delayed binding mechanism. The responsive rendering unit is used to initialize component instances and execute the lifecycle hook function within the virtualization layer, establish a responsive data observation mechanism based on the attribute binding rules, calculate the affected component subtree range and trigger local re-rendering when data changes. The security update unit is used to perform a security scan on the DOM structure generated by the re-render, identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes, and submit the cleaned DOM structure to the host document to complete the view update.

[0065] A third aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the aforementioned method.

[0066] A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the aforementioned method.

[0067] This invention can be a method, apparatus, system, and / or computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions loaded thereon for performing various aspects of the invention.

[0068] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for developing and rendering Vue single-file components in a sandbox-less environment, characterized by: include: Receive declarative configuration data from view components, the declarative configuration data including component tree structure, property binding rules, and lifecycle hook functions; Control flow analysis is performed on the lifecycle hook function to construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions. Based on the control flow graph, capability requirements are inferred, the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path is calculated, and a capability authorization matrix is ​​generated. The capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. Dynamic permission tokens are assigned to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship. A virtualization layer is constructed and a host object image is created in it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After verification, a delayed binding mechanism is used to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment. Component instances are initialized within the virtualization layer, and the lifecycle hook functions are executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered. The DOM structure generated by the re-render is security scanned to identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes. The cleaned DOM structure is then submitted to the host document to complete the view update.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Perform control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook function to construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, including: Lexical and syntactic analysis are performed on the source code of the lifecycle hook function to generate an abstract syntax tree; the nodes of the abstract syntax tree are traversed to identify multiple syntax statements and extract the entry and exit nodes of each syntax statement; Establish node connection relationships based on the logical relationship between the entry node and the exit node. The node connection relationships include sequential connection, branch connection and loop connection. Construct a directed graph structure based on the node connection relationships. Each node in the directed graph structure corresponds to a code block and each directed edge corresponds to a possible execution transfer. Perform path traversal on the directed graph structure to identify all reachable paths from the function entry point to the function exit point, and record the node sequence traversed by each path; Logical expressions are extracted from the branch conditions of each path to generate path constraints, which describe the preconditions that must be met for the path to be executed. The node sequence, directed edges, and path constraints are organized into a control flow graph data structure, which includes a set of nodes, a set of edges, and a set of paths, wherein each path carries a unique path identifier and a corresponding path constraint.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the control flow graph, capability requirements are inferred, the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path is calculated, and a capability authorization matrix is ​​generated. This matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types. Dynamic permission tokens are assigned to the current execution context according to this mapping relationship, including: Extract the node sequence of each execution path in the control flow graph, and analyze the API call statements and resource access statements in the code block corresponding to each node; Establish a system capability type enumeration table, which defines the type identifiers for file system access capabilities, network request capabilities, local storage access capabilities, DOM manipulation capabilities, and global object access capabilities; Iterate through all API call statements for each execution path, map each API call statement to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table, and generate a capability requirement set for that path; perform deduplication and minimization processing on the capability requirement set, remove redundant capability types, and retain the subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function; The data structure for constructing the capability authorization matrix is ​​defined as follows: the row index of the capability authorization matrix is ​​the execution path identifier, the column index is the system capability type identifier, and the matrix element value indicates whether the path requires the corresponding capability. During component instance initialization, the capability authorization matrix is ​​queried based on the currently active execution path identifier to obtain the capability type subset corresponding to the path, a dynamic permission token containing a list of capability types and a timestamp is generated, and the dynamic permission token is stored in the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Iterate through all API call statements for each execution path, map each API call statement to the corresponding capability type in the system capability type enumeration table, and generate the capability requirement set for that path. The set of capability requirements is deduplicated and minimized, removing redundant capability types and retaining a subset of capability types necessary for the execution path to complete its function, including: Extract the node sequence corresponding to the execution path from the control flow graph, parse the code block in each node to obtain the list of API call statements; perform lexical analysis on each API call in the list of API call statements, extract the namespace, object name and method name of the API, and construct an API call feature descriptor; Establish a mapping rule base for API features and capability types. The mapping rule base defines the correspondence between pattern matching conditions of API call feature descriptors and system capability type identifiers. Use the API call feature descriptors to perform pattern matching queries in the mapping rule base to obtain the system capability type identifiers that match successfully. Add the system capability type identifier to the temporary capability requirement set, traverse all API calls in the API call statement list to complete the mapping operation, and perform a set deduplication operation on the temporary capability requirement set to remove duplicate capability type identifiers. Analyze the inclusion relationships between capability types in the temporary capability requirement set, identify capability type groups with transitive dependencies; retain the highest-level capability type from the capability type group, remove the lower-level capability types contained in it, and generate a simplified subset of capability types as the minimum permission set for the execution path.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, A virtualization layer is constructed, and a host object image is created within it. This host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted, and the permission token is verified using the capability authorization matrix. Upon successful verification, a delayed binding mechanism is employed to synchronize the corresponding state of the host environment, including: Create a virtualization layer container object, initialize an empty host object image in the virtualization layer container object, configure a proxy processor for each attribute of the host object image, and the proxy processor intercepts read and write operations of the attribute; When an attribute read operation is detected, the proxy processor extracts the currently executing code position from the call stack information, determines the current execution path identifier based on the mapping relationship between the code position and the nodes of the control flow graph, uses the execution path identifier to query the capability authorization matrix, obtains a list of capability types that the execution path is allowed to access, and reads the dynamic permission token from the isolated storage area of ​​the execution context. Verify whether the timestamp of the dynamic permission token is within the validity period, and determine whether the system capability type corresponding to the target attribute is included in the capability type list; if the verification fails, the access operation is terminated and a security default value is returned; if the verification is successful, the delayed binding process is triggered, the actual value of the corresponding attribute is read from the host environment and cached in the host object image; When an attribute write operation is detected, the same permission verification process is executed. After successful verification, the new value is synchronized to the corresponding attribute in the host environment, and the cached value of the host object image is updated.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Within the virtualization layer, component instances are initialized and the lifecycle hook functions are executed. A reactive data observation mechanism is established based on the attribute binding rules. When data changes, the affected component subtree range is calculated and a local re-render is triggered, including: Component instance objects are allocated within the virtualization layer, initial state data from the declarative configuration data is injected into the component instance objects, the attribute binding rules are traversed, the binding relationship between data attributes and view nodes is extracted, and a dependency collector is created for each data attribute. A reactive proxy is set for each data property of the component instance object. The reactive proxy registers the current rendering context with the corresponding dependency collector when the property is read, and notifies the dependency collector when the property is modified. The initialization hook function, the pre-mount hook function, and the post-mount hook function are called sequentially according to the execution order of the lifecycle hook functions. During the execution process, the dependency collector records the data attributes accessed by each hook function. When a data attribute change is detected, the identifiers of all view nodes that depend on the attribute are obtained from the corresponding dependency collector, an affected node set is constructed, the least common ancestor node of the affected node set is calculated according to the component tree structure, and the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes are determined as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered. Perform virtual DOM difference calculation on the nodes within the component subtree range, generate a list of DOM operation instructions, and submit the list of DOM operation instructions to the rendering queue to complete the local view update.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, Calculate the least common ancestor node of the affected node set based on the component tree structure, and determine the least common ancestor node and all its descendant nodes as the component subtree range that needs to be re-rendered, including: Extract the parent node reference and depth information of each node from the component tree structure, sort the nodes in the affected node set in descending order according to the depth information, and select the node with the largest depth as the initial candidate node; Starting from the initial candidate node, traverse upwards along the parent node reference, recording all ancestor nodes on the traversal path until the root node is reached. Then, check each other node in the affected node set to determine whether each node is located on the traversal path or is a descendant node of the path node. If all nodes in the affected node set are within the subtree range of a node in the traversal path, then that node is determined as the least common ancestor node. If a node does not meet the above conditions, move up one level along the traversal path, select a higher-level ancestor node as a new candidate least common ancestor node, and repeat the checking process. After determining the least common ancestor node, a depth-first traversal algorithm is used to traverse all descendant nodes of that node. The traversed node set is merged with the least common ancestor node to form a complete component subtree range. Each node in the component subtree range is marked as a state to be re-rendered.

8. A sandbox-free environment Vue single-file component development and rendering system, used to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, include: A configuration receiving unit is used to receive declarative configuration data of view components, wherein the declarative configuration data includes component tree structure, property binding rules and lifecycle hook functions; The permission analysis unit is used to perform control flow analysis on the lifecycle hook function, construct a control flow graph containing all execution paths and branch conditions, infer capability requirements based on the control flow graph, calculate the minimum set of permissions required for each execution path, generate a capability authorization matrix, the capability authorization matrix records the mapping relationship between execution path identifiers and system capability types, and allocates dynamic permission tokens to the current execution context according to the mapping relationship; The virtualization interception unit is used to build a virtualization layer and create a host object image in it. The host object image captures all read and write operations through an attribute access interceptor. During interception, the current execution path identifier is extracted and the permission token is verified by querying the capability authorization matrix. After verification, the corresponding state of the host environment is synchronized using a delayed binding mechanism. The responsive rendering unit is used to initialize component instances and execute the lifecycle hook function within the virtualization layer, establish a responsive data observation mechanism based on the attribute binding rules, calculate the affected component subtree range and trigger local re-rendering when data changes. The security update unit is used to perform a security scan on the DOM structure generated by the re-render, identify and remove script injection vectors and dangerous attributes, and submit the cleaned DOM structure to the host document to complete the view update.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having computer program instructions stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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