Electric vehicle charging control method and system, charging control terminal

By broadcasting encrypted vehicle identity information and establishing a TCP communication connection in the electric vehicle charging system, combined with transport layer encryption, the problem of MAC address eavesdropping and forgery is solved, achieving a highly secure and low-latency charging identification process.

CN122211234APending Publication Date: 2026-06-16QIJING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (SHANGHAI) CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202610686171.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-05-19
Publication Date
2026-06-16

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing electric vehicle charging identification schemes based on MAC address whitelists have security vulnerabilities due to the ease with which MAC addresses can be eavesdropped on and forged, making them difficult to defend against attacks.

Method used

The system employs a configuration message carrying vehicle identification information broadcast to the charging pile, which is then encrypted via a PLC link to establish a TCP communication connection. This is further enhanced by a transport layer encryption mechanism, forming a dual-layer security system of link layer authentication and transport layer encryption.

Benefits of technology

It improves the security of the charging communication process, prevents eavesdropping and spoofing attacks, reduces identification latency, reduces the risk of system proliferation, and does not require additional hardware costs.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The application discloses an electric vehicle charging control method and system and a charging control terminal, wherein the method comprises the following steps: broadcasting a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to a charging pile, so that the charging pile analyzes the setting message, extracts the vehicle identity information, and sends identity authentication information to an electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified; in response to the identity authentication information, a TCP communication connection is established between the electric vehicle and the charging pile; and a transport layer encryption mechanism is superimposed on the basis of the TCP communication connection. The application can improve the safety of the electric vehicle in the charging communication process from multiple aspects.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of automotive charging control technology, specifically to an electric vehicle charging control method and system, and a charging control terminal. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, in closed or semi-closed fixed-site charging scenarios, such as urban bus parking lots and corporate internal logistics vehicle charging stations, a "plug-and-charge" mode based on automatic vehicle identification is commonly adopted to improve the automation efficiency of charging management. After the vehicle is plugged into the charging gun, the charging station can automatically identify the vehicle and start charging without manual card swiping or code scanning. The most common implementation method in existing technologies is the identification method based on MAC (Media Access Control) address whitelists. This method utilizes the characteristic that each communication module in the PLC (Power Line Carrier) communication standard (HomePlug AV) has a globally unique MAC address. The specific implementation process includes multiple stages such as pre-configuration, identification, and decision-making. In the pre-configuration stage, the site administrator pre-enters the MAC addresses of the PLC modules of all legitimate vehicles into the whitelist database of the charging pile or local server. In the identification stage, after a vehicle establishes a physical connection with the charging pile via the charging gun, the PLC master station device in the charging pile automatically scans the slave devices on the power line bus, and the charging pile extracts the source MAC address of the scanned PLC module. In the decision-making stage, the charging pile compares the extracted MAC address with the local whitelist. If a match is found, the vehicle is determined to be a legitimate user, the charging circuit is automatically closed, and billing begins. If a match fails, charging is refused, and an abnormal alarm is reported.

[0003] The inventors discovered that the core flaw of the aforementioned MAC address whitelist-based identification scheme lies in the fact that MAC addresses are transmitted in plaintext over power lines, making them extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping. Furthermore, MAC addresses can be arbitrarily modified and forged using software tools. Attackers can easily bypass the whitelist verification by simply changing their device's MAC address to that of a legitimate vehicle, impersonating a legitimate vehicle to solicit free charging or launch other malicious activities. This scheme uses static, plaintext, and tamperable MAC addresses as the sole identity credential, making it difficult to resist eavesdropping, forgery, and replay attacks, posing a serious security vulnerability. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, this application provides an electric vehicle charging control method and system, and a charging control terminal, to improve the safety of the electric vehicle charging control process.

[0005] This application provides a method for controlling the charging of an electric vehicle, comprising the following steps: A setting message carrying vehicle identity information is broadcast to the charging pile so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. In response to the authentication information, a TCP communication connection is established with the charging pile; A transport layer encryption mechanism is added on top of the TCP communication connection.

[0006] Optionally, broadcasting a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile includes: generating a dynamic session key for the current session based on a preset device unique seed key; and encrypting the vehicle identity information using the dynamic session key to obtain the setting message.

[0007] Optionally, the setting message includes a message type identifier and a setting field, wherein the setting field is used to carry encrypted vehicle identity information.

[0008] Optionally, the vehicle identification information includes a unique vehicle identifier, a timestamp, and a random number.

[0009] Optionally, the charging pile parses the setting message to extract the vehicle identity information, including: the charging pile parses the setting message to obtain the setting field and decryption identification information, locates the key information corresponding to the decryption identification information from the local key management unit, generates a session key, and uses the session key to decrypt the setting message to obtain the vehicle unique identifier, the timestamp, and the random number.

[0010] Optionally, the process of the charging pile verifying the vehicle identity information includes: matching the decrypted vehicle unique identifier with the local authorized database; verifying whether the timestamp is within a preset time window; and performing a uniqueness check on the random number.

[0011] Optionally, the process of the charging pile verifying the vehicle identity information further includes: comparing the MAC address corresponding to the setting message with historical records.

[0012] Optionally, after superimposing a transport layer encryption mechanism on the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: deriving a data transmission key based on the current dynamic session key, and periodically updating the transmission key to perform dynamic parameter negotiation based on the transmission key.

[0013] Optionally, after superimposing a transport layer encryption mechanism on the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: dividing the charging process into multiple time intervals or energy intervals, and generating corresponding billing summary information for each time interval or energy interval.

[0014] This application also provides an electric vehicle charging control system, including: The broadcast module is used to broadcast a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile, so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. The response module is used to respond to the identity authentication information and establish a TCP communication connection with the charging pile; The overlay module is used to overlay a transport layer encryption mechanism on top of the TCP communication connection.

[0015] This application also provides a charging control terminal, which includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores an electric vehicle charging control program, and when the electric vehicle charging control program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of any of the above-described electric vehicle charging control methods.

[0016] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any of the above-described electric vehicle charging control methods.

[0017] The electric vehicle charging control method and system, and charging control terminal described in this application, broadcast a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile. The charging pile then parses the setting message, extracts the vehicle identity information, verifies it, and sends authentication information to the electric vehicle after verification. This allows the electric vehicle to respond to the authentication information and establish a TCP communication connection with the charging pile. In subsequent communication, this proprietary TCP communication protocol is used for data interaction, enhancing security during data exchange. Furthermore, a transport layer encryption mechanism is superimposed on the TCP communication connection, forming a two-layer security system of "link layer authentication + transport layer encryption." The authentication process is placed before the establishment of the proprietary communication connection, using out-of-band messages for pre-authentication before deciding whether to establish a subsequent communication connection. This decouples authentication from communication, reducing the risk of system attack propagation at the architectural level. Therefore, this application can improve the security of electric vehicles during charging communication in multiple ways. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a schematic flowchart of an electric vehicle charging control method according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electric vehicle charging control system according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the charging control terminal structure according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this application, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application. In the absence of conflict, the following embodiments and their technical features can be combined with each other.

[0021] The first aspect of this application provides an electric vehicle charging control method. The electric vehicle charging control method can be executed by a charging control terminal that needs to perform charging control such as electric vehicle charging identity authentication. The charging control terminal can be located in the electric vehicle's power supply equipment communication controller or other equipment to control the charging process of the electric vehicle.

[0022] Specifically, refer to Figure 1 As shown, the electric vehicle charging control method includes the following steps S110 to S130.

[0023] S110, a setting message (such as a Vendor Specific message) carrying vehicle identity information is broadcast to the charging pile, so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. This completes the identity authentication process at the initial stage of PLC link establishment, without relying on IP layer communication, realizing pre-processing of identity recognition and low latency processing, reducing recognition latency and system resource consumption, and is applicable to high-frequency charging scenarios.

[0024] Optionally, electric vehicles can broadcast configuration messages via the PLC link after the charging connection is established, enabling the charging pile to obtain vehicle authentication data such as vehicle identity information without relying on IP layer communication.

[0025] Specifically, the electric vehicle includes a PLC module, which constructs configuration messages such as Vendor Specific messages according to a configuration standard (such as the HomePlug AV standard). The configuration message may include a message type identifier and a configuration field (such as VendorData), which carries encrypted vehicle identity information. Optionally, the configuration message may also include a vendor organization unique identifier (such as Vendor OUI). In this case, the structure of the configuration message can be referenced in Table 1, including a message type identifier, Vendor OUI, Vendor Data, and Vendor Data Length (the length of the Vendor Data configuration field).

[0026] Table 1

[0027] Specifically, vehicle identity information includes a unique vehicle identifier, timestamp, and random number, etc., to construct a multi-dimensional authentication system that includes identity consistency verification, timestamp verification, and random number verification. Compared with a single identity credential scheme, this significantly improves the protection against forgery and replay attacks. After receiving the setting message, the charging pile can parse the message, extract the vehicle identity information, and verify it. Once the vehicle identity information passes verification, it sends identity authentication information to the electric vehicle to inform it that its identity authentication information has been verified and a corresponding communication connection can be established.

[0028] S120: In response to the authentication information, a TCP communication connection is established with the charging pile. This allows for data interaction via a custom proprietary TCP communication protocol, independent of public charging communication protocols. The proprietary protocol includes custom command codes, data encapsulation formats, and interaction timing, used to implement charging control and information exchange functions.

[0029] S130, a transport layer encryption mechanism is superimposed on the TCP communication connection to form a two-layer security system of "link layer authentication + transport layer encryption", which improves the overall anti-attack capability and further enhances the security of the charging communication process.

[0030] Optionally, the transport layer encryption mechanism includes a TLS session. In step S130, regarding identity authentication, the charging pile and the electric vehicle, based on the established trusted identity relationship, skip the traditional TLS two-way certificate verification process and instead establish an encrypted channel based on a handshake using a pre-shared key (PSK). The pre-shared key can be generated from a dynamic session key or its derivatives. During the TLS handshake process, both the charging pile and the electric vehicle complete identity verification and key negotiation based on the pre-shared key, thereby reducing the communication overhead caused by certificate exchange and verification processes and achieving low-latency encrypted connection establishment.

[0031] The aforementioned electric vehicle charging control method broadcasts a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile. The charging pile then parses the setting message, extracts the vehicle identity information, verifies it, and sends authentication information to the electric vehicle after successful verification. This allows the electric vehicle to respond to the authentication information and establish a TCP communication connection with the charging pile. In subsequent communication, this proprietary TCP communication protocol is used for data interaction, enhancing security. Furthermore, a transport layer encryption mechanism is superimposed on the TCP connection, forming a two-layer security system of "link layer authentication + transport layer encryption." The authentication process is placed before the establishment of the proprietary communication connection, using out-of-band messages for pre-authentication before deciding whether to establish a subsequent communication connection. This decouples authentication from communication, reducing the risk of system attack propagation at the architectural level. Therefore, the aforementioned electric vehicle charging control method can improve the security of electric vehicles during charging communication in multiple ways.

[0032] In some embodiments, broadcasting a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile includes: generating a dynamic session key for the current session based on a preset device unique seed key; and encrypting the vehicle identity information using the dynamic session key to obtain the setting message.

[0033] In this embodiment, the electric vehicle can generate a dynamic session key for the current session based on a preset unique seed key of the device through a key derivation function, and use this dynamic session key to encrypt the identity information to obtain the set message. The encryption algorithm used in the encryption process may include a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES-128) to achieve key isolation between different charging sessions and prevent the reuse of historical messages.

[0034] In some embodiments, the charging pile parses the setting message to extract the vehicle identity information, including: the charging pile parses the setting message to obtain the setting field and decryption identification information, locates the key information corresponding to the decryption identification information from the local key management unit, generates a session key, and uses the session key to decrypt the setting message to obtain the vehicle unique identifier, the timestamp, and the random number.

[0035] Optionally, the charging pile may include a PLC module. The PLC module can monitor the power line communication channel, receive setting messages, and parse out setting fields and decryption identification information. Based on the identification information carried in the setting message, the charging pile quickly locates the corresponding key information from the local key management unit, generates the corresponding session key, and decrypts the message to obtain the vehicle identity plaintext data. The vehicle identity plaintext data may include the vehicle's unique identifier, timestamp, and random number.

[0036] During the identity authentication process, the charging pile can execute a multi-dimensional verification mechanism. In some examples, this multi-dimensional verification mechanism, i.e., the process by which the charging pile verifies the vehicle's identity information, includes: matching the decrypted unique vehicle identifier with the local authorized database; verifying whether the timestamp is within a preset time window; and performing a uniqueness check on the random number. If the decrypted unique vehicle identifier matches the identifier information stored in the local authorized database, the timestamp is within the preset time window, and the random number passes the uniqueness check, then the vehicle's identity information can be determined to have passed verification. At this point, the charging pile can send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle. The uniqueness check on the random number can be achieved by maintaining a random number cache list or hash set and deduplicating used random numbers.

[0037] In some examples, the source MAC address in the PLC link can be used for auxiliary comparison to enhance identity credibility. Accordingly, the process of the charging pile verifying the vehicle identity information also includes: comparing the MAC address corresponding to the setting message with historical records. In this example, if the decrypted vehicle unique identifier matches the identifier information stored in the local authorized database, the timestamp is within a preset time window, the random number passes the uniqueness test, and the MAC address corresponding to the setting message matches the relevant information in the historical records, then the corresponding electric vehicle identity can be confirmed as legitimate, and the vehicle identity information passes verification; otherwise, authentication fails and communication is rejected.

[0038] In some embodiments, after superimposing a transport layer encryption mechanism on the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: deriving a data transmission key based on the current dynamic session key and periodically updating the transmission key to perform dynamic parameter negotiation based on the transmission key, thereby improving the forward security of the communication process.

[0039] This embodiment associates the link layer out-of-band authentication result with the transport layer encryption mechanism, enabling the inheritance of authentication results across different protocol layers, thereby constructing a unified secure and trusted link. The transport layer encryption process relies on the link layer authentication result to generate a session key. Entities that fail link layer authentication cannot participate in the key negotiation process, thus fundamentally blocking the possibility of unauthenticated devices establishing communication connections. Furthermore, by introducing a unique seed key and key derivation functions, an independent session key is generated for each charging session, achieving key isolation between different sessions, effectively preventing key reuse and historical message attacks, and improving the overall system security.

[0040] In some embodiments, after overlaying a transport layer encryption mechanism on top of the TCP communication connection, electric vehicles and charging piles can interact with each other based on the above communication connection. The corresponding interaction process and authentication results can be strongly bound, thereby ensuring that subsequent communication behaviors all originate from the authenticated entity. The data interaction content includes at least: charging parameter negotiation, charging status reporting, billing information transmission, and equipment control commands, etc.

[0041] In some examples, the charging parameter negotiation process can adopt a multi-round interactive approach, dynamically adjusting the charging parameters according to the electric vehicle's capability range and the charging pile's operating status to achieve optimal matching, rather than a one-time fixed configuration.

[0042] In some examples, in addition to traditional periodic reporting, an abnormal event triggering mechanism can be introduced to report immediately when a sudden change in a key parameter is detected, thereby improving the system response speed.

[0043] In some examples, after superimposing a transport layer encryption mechanism on the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: dividing the charging process into multiple time intervals or energy intervals, and generating corresponding billing summary information for each time interval or energy interval, so as to reduce the amount of communication data while ensuring data integrity.

[0044] In some examples, after superimposing a transport layer encryption mechanism on the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: classifying different security levels according to the instruction type, adding authentication verification to key control instructions (such as start, stop, upgrade) to improve the system's resistance to attacks.

[0045] In some examples, when an abnormal interruption occurs during communication, the communication state is automatically restored while the link layer remains active, reducing the impact on the charging process.

[0046] In some examples, taking a bus charging station with 20 DC charging piles and 50 electric buses as an example, all devices having built-in PLC communication modules compliant with the HomePlug AV standard, the above electric vehicle charging control method is illustrated. During the deployment phase of the corresponding charging control system, a unique device seed key can be pre-set for each vehicle, and a corresponding key management table can be established on the charging pile side. The corresponding electric vehicle charging control method includes the following steps S201 to S203.

[0047] S201: The electric bus connects to the charging gun, and the vehicle-side PLC module establishes a physical communication link with the charging pile-side PLC module. Based on a preset device seed key, the vehicle-side generates a dynamic session key for the current charging session using a key derivation algorithm and constructs a Vendor Specific message. The encrypted vehicle identity information, including the vehicle ID, current timestamp, and nonce, is written into the Vendor Data field. After encryption, the Vendor Specific message is broadcast via the PLC link.

[0048] In step S202, after receiving the Vendor Specific message, the PLC module on the charging pile side parses the message and extracts the Vendor Data field. Based on the decryption identifier information carried in the message, it locates the seed key for the corresponding vehicle from the local key management table, generates the corresponding session key, and decrypts the Vendor Specific message. After successful decryption, the vehicle identity plaintext information is obtained; then, the following verification process is executed: the vehicle ID (unique vehicle identifier) ​​is matched with the local authorized whitelist; the deviation between the timestamp and the current system time is checked to see if it is within a preset threshold range (e.g., ±5 seconds); the nonce value is checked to prevent message replay; and auxiliary consistency verification is performed using the source MAC address obtained from the PLC link. When all the above verifications pass, the corresponding vehicle is determined to be a legitimate device. If at least one verification fails, the vehicle authentication is deemed to have failed, and charging of the vehicle can be refused.

[0049] S203: After successful authentication, the charging pile's control unit and other components establish a TCP connection with the vehicle and initiate a private communication protocol for subsequent interaction. For example, the interaction between the charging pile and the vehicle may include: the charging pile sending a capacity request command (CMD_REQ_CAP, command code 0x10); the vehicle returning battery parameters (CMD_RSP_CAP, command code 0x11), including a rated voltage of 600V and a maximum allowable current of 200A; during charging, the charging pile periodically sending a status query command (CMD_REQ_STATUS, command code 0x20); the vehicle returning current battery level, temperature, and charging status information; after charging is complete, the charging pile sending a billing data command (CMD_SEND_BILL, command code 0x30) to complete the billing information exchange; and so on. During the above communication process, a TLS encryption mechanism can be superimposed on the TCP connection to further ensure data transmission security.

[0050] In this example, even if an attacker obtains communication messages by monitoring the PLC link, the data in the Vendor Data field is encrypted with a dynamic session key and includes timestamps and random number information, preventing the attacker from constructing legitimate messages. Furthermore, the verification of the time window and random number at the stub effectively prevents replay attacks, thus ensuring the security of the authentication process.

[0051] The above electric vehicle charging control method constructs an out-of-band encrypted identification channel through a PLC link and combines it with subsequent communication mechanisms to achieve secure and reliable vehicle identification and data interaction. Out-of-band communication refers to completing the identification process through custom messages at the link layer during the PLC link establishment phase, without relying on the upper-layer IP protocol stack. This results in the following technical effects: (1) High security: Vehicle identity information is transmitted in the Vendor Data field after being encrypted, so attackers cannot eavesdrop or forge it; timestamps and random numbers effectively prevent replay attacks and significantly reduce the probability of successful attacks.

[0052] (2) Fast recognition speed: No need to wait for IP allocation and TLS handshake. Vendor Specific messages are sent immediately after the PLC link is established. The recognition time is only 0.3-0.5 seconds, which is about 10 times faster than certificate authentication schemes (3-5 seconds).

[0053] (3) Low implementation cost: No need to add hardware security modules, it can be achieved only through software upgrades, and it is fully compatible with existing HomePlug AV hardware. The cost of single pile modification is close to zero.

[0054] (4) Flexible expansion: The private TCP protocol supports vendor-defined commands and interaction processes, which facilitates subsequent function expansion.

[0055] A second aspect of this application provides an electric vehicle charging control system, which can be located at a charging control terminal for controlling electric vehicle charging. (Reference) Figure 2 As shown, the above-mentioned electric vehicle charging control system includes: The broadcast module 110 is used to broadcast a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile, so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. Response module 120 is used to respond to the identity authentication information and establish a TCP communication connection with the charging pile; The overlay module 130 is used to overlay a transport layer encryption mechanism on the basis of the TCP communication connection.

[0056] Specific limitations regarding the electric vehicle charging control system can be found in the limitations of the electric vehicle charging control method described above, and will not be repeated here. Each module in the aforementioned electric vehicle charging control system can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in hardware or independent of the computing modules in relevant computer equipment, or stored in software within the memory of the computer equipment, so that the computing modules can call and execute the operations corresponding to each of the above units.

[0057] This application also provides a charging control terminal, as shown in the reference. Figure 3 As shown, the charging control terminal may include: a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores an electric vehicle charging control program, and when the electric vehicle charging control program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the electric vehicle charging control method as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0058] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the electric vehicle charging control method as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0059] Although this application has been shown and described with respect to one or more implementations, equivalent variations and modifications will occur to those skilled in the art based on a reading and understanding of this specification and the accompanying drawings. This application includes all such modifications and variations and is limited only by the scope of the appended claims. In particular, with respect to the various functions performed by the aforementioned components, the terminology used to describe such components is intended to correspond to any component (unless otherwise indicated) that performs the specified function of said component (e.g., is functionally equivalent to it), even if structurally not equivalent to the disclosed structure performing the functions in the exemplary implementations of this specification shown herein.

[0060] That is, the above description is only an embodiment of this application and does not limit the patent scope of this application. Any equivalent structural or procedural changes made using the content of this application’s specification and drawings, such as the combination of technical features between different embodiments, or direct or indirect application in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of this application.

[0061] Furthermore, it should be understood that in the description of this application, the terms "center," "longitudinal," "lateral," "length," "width," "thickness," "upper," "lower," "front," "rear," "left," "right," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inner," and "outer," etc., indicating the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, are only for the convenience of describing this application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be construed as a limitation of this application. Additionally, for structural elements with the same or similar characteristics, this application may use the same or different reference numerals for identification. Moreover, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, features defined with "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more features. In the description of this application, "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0062] In this application, the term "exemplary" is used to mean "serving as an example, illustration, or description." Any embodiment described as "exemplary" in this application is not necessarily to be construed as more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments. This application has been provided above to enable any person skilled in the art to implement and use it. Various details have been set forth in the above description for purposes of explanation. It should be understood that those skilled in the art will recognize that this application can be implemented without using these specific details. In other embodiments, well-known structures and processes will not be described in detail to avoid obscuring the description of this application with unnecessary detail. Therefore, this application is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown, but is consistent with the broadest scope of the principles and features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method for controlling the charging of an electric vehicle, characterized in that, The electric vehicle charging control method includes: A setting message carrying vehicle identity information is broadcast to the charging pile so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. In response to the authentication information, a TCP communication connection is established with the charging pile; A transport layer encryption mechanism is added on top of the TCP communication connection.

2. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The setting message carrying vehicle identity information broadcast to the charging pile includes: A dynamic session key for the current session is generated based on a preset device-unique seed key; The vehicle identity information is encrypted using the dynamic session key to obtain the set message.

3. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The setting message includes a message type identifier and a setting field, the setting field being used to carry encrypted vehicle identity information; And / or, the vehicle identity information includes a unique vehicle identifier, a timestamp, and a random number.

4. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The charging pile parses the setting message and extracts the vehicle identity information, including: The charging pile parses the setting message to obtain the setting field and decryption identification information, locates the key information corresponding to the decryption identification information from the local key management unit, generates a session key, and uses the session key to decrypt the setting message to obtain the vehicle unique identifier, the timestamp, and the random number.

5. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The process by which the charging pile verifies the vehicle's identity information includes: The decrypted vehicle identifier is matched with the local authorized database; Verify whether the timestamp is within the preset time window range; Perform uniqueness checks on random numbers.

6. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of the charging pile verifying the vehicle identity information also includes: The MAC address corresponding to the configured message is compared with the historical records for consistency.

7. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 5, characterized in that, After adding a transport layer encryption mechanism to the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: A data transmission key is derived from the current dynamic session key, and the transmission key is updated periodically to perform dynamic parameter negotiation based on the transmission key.

8. The electric vehicle charging control method according to claim 7, characterized in that, After adding a transport layer encryption mechanism to the TCP communication connection, the electric vehicle charging control method further includes: The charging process is divided into multiple time intervals or energy intervals, and corresponding billing summary information is generated for each time interval or energy interval.

9. An electric vehicle charging control system, characterized in that, include: The broadcast module is used to broadcast a setting message carrying vehicle identity information to the charging pile, so that the charging pile can parse the setting message, extract the vehicle identity information, and send identity authentication information to the electric vehicle after the vehicle identity information is verified. The response module is used to respond to the identity authentication information and establish a TCP communication connection with the charging pile; The overlay module is used to overlay a transport layer encryption mechanism on top of the TCP communication connection.

10. A charging control terminal, characterized in that, include: A memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores an electric vehicle charging control program, and when the processor executes the electric vehicle charging control program, it implements the steps of the electric vehicle charging control method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.