A safety management system of a nuclear power unit and an operation and maintenance management system of a nuclear power plant

Abstract

The application belongs to the technical field of nuclear power plant operation and maintenance, and particularly relates to a safety management system of a nuclear power unit and an operation and maintenance management system of a nuclear power plant, wherein the safety management system comprises: a safety evaluation module, which is used for evaluating the corresponding risk level of auxiliary equipment equipped in the nuclear power unit; an equipment supervision module, which is used for monitoring the whole link of the life cycle of all auxiliary equipment according to the preset supervision strategy of different risk levels, so as to collect the operation data of each auxiliary equipment; and a rectification and maintenance module, which is used for analyzing the corresponding fault reason of the auxiliary equipment according to the operation data of the auxiliary equipment, and generating corresponding rectification suggestions. The application quantitatively evaluates the key attributes of the auxiliary equipment of the nuclear power unit to determine the risk level, realizes the link type monitoring of the whole life cycle according to the differentiated supervision strategy, automatically analyzes the fault reason in combination with the operation data, and generates the rectification suggestions, so that the fine and intelligent level of the risk control of the auxiliary equipment is significantly improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of nuclear power plant operation and maintenance technology, specifically relating to a safety management system for nuclear power units and an operation and maintenance management system for nuclear power plants. Background Technology

[0002] During the construction phase of nuclear power units, although existing equipment management methods adopt a hierarchical control strategy and focus on the source design and manufacturing process, the safe operation of nuclear power units depends not only on the reliability of the main equipment, but also on the stable coordination of a large number of auxiliary equipment. Auxiliary equipment failure may lead to false triggering of main equipment protection signals, loss of cooling function or failure of emergency response, which may in turn lead to unplanned shutdowns or even safety accidents.

[0003] Meanwhile, existing equipment management methods tend to focus on front-end manufacturing quality and main equipment monitoring, lacking the closed-loop management capabilities for dynamic risk classification, operational data monitoring, and intelligent analysis of fault causes for auxiliary equipment throughout its entire life cycle. This makes it difficult to continuously support the safe and stable operation of the unit after commercial operation, and traditional manual classification and inspection methods are difficult to achieve refined management. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art described above, the purpose of this invention is to provide a management strategy for auxiliary equipment of nuclear power units, which can realize closed-loop safety management of auxiliary equipment from static classification to dynamic quantitative evaluation, full-link differentiated monitoring and intelligent fault rectification, and significantly improve the operational reliability and safety of nuclear power units.

[0005] This invention provides a safety management system for nuclear power units, comprising: a safety assessment module for assessing the risk level of auxiliary equipment equipped in the nuclear power unit based on its key attributes, wherein the key attributes of the auxiliary equipment include at least the difficulty of equipment maintenance; an equipment monitoring module for monitoring the entire lifecycle of all auxiliary equipment according to preset monitoring strategies for different risk levels, thereby collecting operational data of each auxiliary equipment; and a rectification and maintenance module for analyzing the causes of failures of auxiliary equipment based on its operational data and generating corresponding rectification suggestions; wherein the rectification and maintenance module prioritizes generating rectification suggestions for high-risk auxiliary equipment and reassesses its corresponding risk level after rectification of the corresponding auxiliary equipment. This allows the equipment monitoring module to monitor the auxiliary equipment according to the monitoring strategy corresponding to the new risk level, forming a dynamic closed-loop management of assessment, monitoring, rectification, and reassessment. The safety assessment module is used to determine the maintenance difficulty of the equipment according to the following operating conditions: when the maintenance of any auxiliary equipment does not require the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be low; when the maintenance of any auxiliary equipment requires the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be medium; when the maintenance of any auxiliary equipment requires the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit needs to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be high.

[0006] In one embodiment of the present invention, the key attributes of the auxiliary equipment also include equipment failure rate, equipment failure consequences, and equipment complexity.

[0007] In one embodiment of the present invention, the safety assessment module is further configured to calculate the safety score of the device according to the following formula, and determine the risk level of the device based on the score: , in, The safety score of the equipment, This is the manufacturer's experience coefficient for the equipment. The value represents the consequences of equipment failure. A value of 1 indicates a failure that affects the nuclear power unit, while a value of 0 indicates a failure that has no impact on the nuclear power unit. For equipment failure rate, This indicates the complexity of the equipment, and is defined as a fixed value when the number of equipment parts exceeds different preset thresholds. This indicates the difficulty of equipment maintenance, and different maintenance difficulties are defined as corresponding fixed values.

[0008] In one embodiment of the present invention, it further includes: a key process traceability module, used to identify and mark the key process nodes of the current auxiliary equipment in the nuclear power plant based on the defect distribution data of the same type of equipment during the life cycle, so that the equipment monitoring module can monitor the operation data of the auxiliary equipment at the key process nodes.

[0009] In one embodiment of the present invention, it further includes: an NCR management module, used to acquire non-conformity records generated by auxiliary equipment throughout the entire lifecycle of the nuclear power plant, as one of the operating data of the auxiliary equipment.

[0010] The present invention also provides an operation and maintenance management system for a nuclear power plant, including the aforementioned safety management system for nuclear power units, and several nuclear power units.

[0011] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: By introducing a maintenance difficulty assessment mechanism based on system coupling for nuclear power unit auxiliary equipment, this invention quantifies the engineering constraints unique to nuclear power, such as whether equipment maintenance requires the shutdown of other equipment or the switching of nuclear power unit operation modes, into calculable risk levels. This solves the technical problem that general equipment supervision schemes cannot handle the deep coupling between nuclear power auxiliary equipment and reactors.

[0012] Meanwhile, by constructing an event-driven dynamic closed-loop management architecture of "assessment, monitoring, rectification, reassessment, and strategy adjustment," this invention enables reassessment and synchronous switching of regulatory strategies after equipment rectification is completed through explicit triggering nodes, thus meeting the process-oriented, node-based, and accountability-based safety management requirements of nuclear power plants.

[0013] This invention also overcomes the technical deficiency of relying on real-time monitoring of physical parameters and historical statistical data to conduct risk assessment from the perspective of engineering attributes (such as equipment maintenance difficulty, system topology constraints, and operational procedure dependence), thus failing to address the lack of historical data for "first-of-its-kind" and "four new" equipment.

[0014] Therefore, this invention significantly improves the precision and intelligence of risk management for auxiliary equipment of nuclear power units, enabling the technical solution to be truly implemented in nuclear power scenarios. At the same time, through deterministic state transition and regulatory strategy linkage, it improves the efficiency of fault diagnosis and rectification processes, reduces reliance on manual inspections and the risk of unplanned shutdowns, and ultimately enhances the overall operational reliability and safety of nuclear power units at the system level. Attached Figure Description

[0015] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application. It is obvious that the drawings described below are merely some embodiments of this application, and those skilled in the art can obtain other drawings based on these drawings without any inventive effort.

[0016] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a safety management system for a nuclear power unit provided in one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0017] To facilitate understanding of this application, a more complete description will be provided below with reference to the accompanying drawings, which illustrate embodiments of the present application. However, the present application can be implemented in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that the disclosure of this application will be thorough and complete.

[0018] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein in the specification of this application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of this application.

[0019] The following specific examples illustrate the implementation of the present invention. Those skilled in the art can easily understand other advantages and effects of the present invention from the content disclosed in this specification. The present invention can also be implemented or applied through other different specific embodiments, and various details in this specification can also be modified or changed based on different viewpoints and applications without departing from the spirit of the present invention. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the following embodiments and features described therein can be combined with each other.

[0020] In the following description, numerous details are explored to provide a more thorough explanation of embodiments of the invention. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that embodiments of the invention may be practiced without these specific details. In other embodiments, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form rather than in detail to avoid obscuring embodiments of the invention.

[0021] Please see Figure 1As shown, a safety management system for a nuclear power unit includes: a safety assessment module 10, an equipment monitoring module 20, and a rectification and maintenance module 30. The safety assessment module 10 conducts safety assessments on the auxiliary equipment of newly built nuclear power units, identifying the key attributes of each auxiliary device to determine its corresponding risk level, thereby achieving hierarchical control. The equipment monitoring module 20 monitors the entire lifecycle of all auxiliary equipment according to preset monitoring strategies for different risk levels and collects the operational data of the auxiliary equipment. Correspondingly, the rectification and maintenance module 30 analyzes the operational data of the auxiliary equipment to identify potential faults and their causes, generating rectification suggestions for maintenance personnel to refer to when maintaining the equipment.

[0022] Specifically, the key attributes of the auxiliary equipment mentioned in this embodiment refer to the engineering attributes of the equipment, such as the equipment failure rate and consequences of equipment failure, equipment complexity and equipment maintenance difficulty, so as to determine its risk level based on the inherent attributes of the equipment in the nuclear power scenario.

[0023] First, the safety assessment module 10 can calculate the safety score of the auxiliary equipment according to the following formula. : , in, This refers to the manufacturer's experience coefficient; for example, if the manufacturer has certain engineering experience, the coefficient can be reduced accordingly. Parameter values ​​(such as) It can be defined as 0.3), but those without engineering experience can... Defined as 1; This indicates the consequences of equipment failure. A failure that affects the nuclear power unit can be defined as 1 (e.g., equipment failure can lead to a nuclear power unit tripping or reactor tripping), while a failure that has no impact on the nuclear power unit can be defined as 0. For equipment failure rate; This indicates the complexity of the equipment, and is defined as a fixed value when the number of equipment parts exceeds different preset thresholds. For example, when the number of equipment parts does not exceed 50, it can be... Defined as 1, when the number of parts in the equipment is between 50 and 150. Defined as 2, when the number of parts in the equipment exceeds 150. Defined as 3; This indicates the difficulty of equipment maintenance, and different maintenance difficulties are defined as corresponding fixed values.

[0024] Secondly, the safety assessment module 10 will also determine the maintenance difficulty of each auxiliary device based on the actual situation of the nuclear power unit and other equipment. For example, if the maintenance of any auxiliary device does not require the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary device can be considered low; if the maintenance of any auxiliary device requires the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary device can be considered medium; if the maintenance of any auxiliary device requires the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit needs to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary device can be considered high.

[0025] Therefore, when the equipment is difficult to repair, it can be... Defined as 3, when the equipment's maintenance difficulty is medium, it can be... Defined as 2, when the equipment's maintenance difficulty is low, it can be... Defined as 1, or similar configuration.

[0026] It is understood that the specific parameter values ​​shown above are for reference only, so that those skilled in the art can understand how the safety assessment module 10 calculates the safety scores of each auxiliary device. In practical applications, the specific values ​​of each parameter can be customized and adjusted without making too many restrictions. Modifications and refinements made by those skilled in the art to the embodiments of the present invention without departing from the spirit of the present invention still fall within the scope of the invention application patent of the present invention.

[0027] Finally, after determining the safety score of each auxiliary device, the risk level of each auxiliary device can be determined based on its score and the preset score level.

[0028] Furthermore, the risk level of auxiliary equipment can be comprehensively assessed by taking into account the redundancy and substitutability of the equipment, combined with the aforementioned key equipment attributes.

[0029] Specifically, the safety assessment module 10 can calculate the safety score of the auxiliary equipment according to the following formula. : , in, This indicates the redundancy of equipment; for example, when one device fails, there are other redundant devices that can serve as backups, supplements, or mitigations. Defined as 1, if there is no corresponding redundant device, it can be... Defined as 02; This indicates the substitutability of equipment; if there are alternative options for parts of the equipment or the entire equipment, then... Defined as 1, if no corresponding alternative device can be used. Defined as 2.

[0030] Correspondingly, the safety score of each auxiliary device can be calculated comprehensively. Simultaneously, when the safety score of an auxiliary device exceeds a preset first threshold, such as... The auxiliary equipment can be considered a complex complete set of equipment with a high historical failure rate (Class A), such as the main pump motor and CRF pump; when the safety score of the auxiliary equipment is between the preset first threshold and the preset second threshold, such as The auxiliary equipment can be considered a first-of-its-kind, new-equipment (Class B) device, such as an RCV pump; when the safety score of the auxiliary equipment does not exceed the preset second threshold, such as... Therefore, the auxiliary equipment can be considered to be equipment other than Class A and Class B (Class C).

[0031] In one specific embodiment, the risk level classification of various auxiliary equipment of a nuclear power unit can be referred to in the table below.

[0032] Table 1,

[0033] Among them, "first set" refers to equipment that is first applied to the nuclear safety grade equipment in the nuclear power field in engineering practice, or equipment body first application or drive device first application, or equipment model scale-up, etc.; "four new" refers to equipment that is newly introduced, new scheme, new material, and new process; CCM2 refers to equipment that enters LCO (operational constraint condition) due to a single failure and must be unplanned forced shutdown to restore or verify its usability.

[0034] Based on the above, the equipment monitoring module 20 will implement tiered management of auxiliary equipment with different risk levels. Preferably, the rectification and maintenance module 30 will generate rectification suggestions for high-risk (Level A) auxiliary equipment based on the operational data collected by the equipment monitoring module 20, so that maintenance personnel can promptly maintain high-risk auxiliary equipment and reduce the occurrence of safety accidents. At the same time, the safety assessment module 10 will also reassess the corresponding risk level of the auxiliary equipment through explicit trigger nodes after rectification, forming a closed-loop management, and then switching the monitoring strategy to meet the process-oriented, node-oriented, and accountability-oriented safety management requirements of nuclear power plants.

[0035] It should be noted that the operational data not only refers to the various parameters of the equipment during operation, and key indicators such as testing efficiency, production capacity, and stability, but also includes the equipment's appearance data (such as the degree of damage to the equipment's appearance, rust, clarity of markings, structure, etc.), safety data (such as whether the equipment's protection, grounding, insulation, etc. meet safety standards), and packaging data (such as the stability of the equipment packaging, moisture-proof and shock-proof measures, etc.). No excessive restrictions are imposed on these aspects. Modifications and refinements made by those skilled in the art to the embodiments of the present invention without departing from the spirit of the present invention still fall within the scope of the invention application patent of the present invention.

[0036] In addition, the system also includes: The critical process traceability module 40 can identify and mark the critical process nodes of the current auxiliary equipment in the nuclear power plant based on the defect distribution data of the same type of equipment during its life cycle, so that the equipment monitoring module 20 can focus on monitoring the operation data of the auxiliary equipment at the critical process nodes.

[0037] The NCR management module 50 acquires non-conformity records generated by auxiliary equipment throughout the entire lifecycle of the nuclear power plant, and uses these records as part of the auxiliary equipment's operational data.

[0038] In summary, this invention significantly improves the precision and intelligence of risk management for auxiliary equipment of nuclear power units, enabling the technical solutions to be truly implemented in nuclear power scenarios. At the same time, through deterministic state transition and linkage of regulatory strategies, it improves the efficiency of fault diagnosis and rectification processes, reduces reliance on manual inspections and the risk of unplanned shutdowns, and ultimately enhances the overall operational reliability and safety of nuclear power units at the system level.

[0039] The above embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles and effects of the present invention and are not intended to limit the invention. Any person skilled in the art can modify or alter the above embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Therefore, all equivalent modifications or alterations made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and technical concept disclosed in the present invention should still be covered by the claims of the present invention.

[0040] Throughout this description, numerous specific details, such as examples of components and / or methods, are provided to provide a complete understanding of embodiments of the invention. However, those skilled in the art will recognize that embodiments of the invention may be practiced without one or more of these specific details or by other devices, systems, components, methods, parts, materials, components, etc. In other instances, well-known structures, materials, or operations have not been specifically shown or described in detail to avoid obscuring aspects of embodiments of the invention.

[0041] Throughout this specification, the terms "an embodiment," "embodiment," or "specific embodiment" refer to a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment that is included in at least one embodiment of the invention, but not necessarily in all embodiments. Therefore, the various representations of the phrases "in one embodiment," "in an embodiment," or "in a specific embodiment" in different places throughout the specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, a particular feature, structure, or characteristic of any specific embodiment of the invention can be combined with one or more other embodiments in any suitable manner. It should be understood that other variations and modifications of the embodiments of the invention described and illustrated herein may be based on the teachings herein and will be considered part of the spirit and scope of the invention.

[0042] It should also be understood that one or more of the elements shown in the figures may be implemented in a more separate or more integrated manner, or may even be removed because they are inoperable in certain circumstances or provided because they may be useful for a particular application.

[0043] Furthermore, unless otherwise expressly stated, any arrows in the accompanying drawings should be considered illustrative only and not limiting. Additionally, unless otherwise stated, the term "or" as used herein is generally intended to mean "and / or". Where a term is anticipated to provide a separation or combination capability that is unclear, a combination of components or steps will also be considered as indicated.

[0044] As used herein and throughout the claims below, unless otherwise specified, “a” and “the” include the plural references. Similarly, as used herein and throughout the claims below, unless otherwise specified, “in” means “in” and “on”.

[0045] The above description of the embodiments shown in this invention (including the content set forth in the abstract of the specification) is not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration or to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed herein. Although specific embodiments and examples of the invention have been described herein for illustrative purposes only, various equivalent modifications are possible within the spirit and scope of the invention, as will be recognized and understood by those skilled in the art. As indicated, these modifications can be made to the invention in accordance with the above description of the embodiments described herein, and such modifications will be within the spirit and scope of the invention.

[0046] This document has generally described the systems and methods in detail to aid in understanding the invention. Furthermore, various specific details have been set forth to provide a general understanding of embodiments of the invention. However, those skilled in the art will recognize that embodiments of the invention can be practiced without one or more specific details, or using other means, systems, accessories, methods, components, materials, parts, etc. In other instances, well-known structures, materials, and / or operations have not been specifically shown or described in detail to avoid obscuring aspects of embodiments of the invention.

[0047] Therefore, although the invention has been described herein with reference to specific embodiments thereof, freedom of modification, various changes and substitutions are also within the scope of the foregoing disclosure, and it should be understood that in some cases, certain features of the invention may be adopted without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention and without corresponding use of other features. Thus, many modifications can be made to adapt a particular environment or material to the essential scope and spirit of the invention. The invention is not intended to be limited to the specific terminology used in the following claims and / or the specific embodiments disclosed as the best mode for carrying out the invention, but the invention will include any and all embodiments and equivalents falling within the scope of the appended claims. Therefore, the scope of the invention will be defined only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A safety management system for a nuclear power unit, characterized in that, include: The safety assessment module is used to assess the risk level of the auxiliary equipment equipped in the nuclear power unit based on its key attributes, and the key attributes of the auxiliary equipment include at least the difficulty of equipment maintenance. The equipment monitoring module is used to monitor the entire lifecycle of all auxiliary equipment according to the preset monitoring strategies for different risk levels, in order to collect the operating data of each auxiliary equipment. The rectification and maintenance module is used to analyze the corresponding fault causes based on the operating data of auxiliary equipment and generate corresponding rectification suggestions; The rectification and maintenance module is used to prioritize generating rectification suggestions for high-risk auxiliary equipment, and reassess the corresponding risk level after the corresponding auxiliary equipment is rectified, so that the equipment supervision module can monitor the auxiliary equipment according to the supervision strategy corresponding to the new risk level, forming a dynamic closed-loop management of assessment, monitoring, rectification, and reassessment. The safety assessment module is used to determine the maintenance difficulty of the equipment based on the following operating conditions: When the maintenance of any auxiliary equipment does not require the shutdown of other equipment and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be low. When maintenance of any auxiliary equipment requires other equipment to be taken out of operation, and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit does not need to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be medium. When maintenance of any auxiliary equipment requires other equipment to be taken out of operation, and the operating mode of the nuclear power unit needs to be switched, the maintenance difficulty of the auxiliary equipment is determined to be high.

2. The safety management system for nuclear power units according to claim 1, characterized in that, Key attributes of auxiliary equipment also include equipment failure rate, consequences of equipment failure, and equipment complexity.

3. The safety management system for nuclear power units according to claim 2, characterized in that, The safety assessment module is also used to calculate the safety score of the equipment according to the following formula, and to determine the risk level of the equipment based on it: ， in, The safety score of the equipment, This is the manufacturer's experience coefficient for the equipment. The value represents the consequences of equipment failure. A value of 1 indicates a failure that affects the nuclear power unit, while a value of 0 indicates a failure that has no impact on the nuclear power unit. For equipment failure rate, This indicates the complexity of the equipment, and is defined as a fixed value when the number of equipment parts exceeds different preset thresholds. This indicates the difficulty of equipment maintenance, and different maintenance difficulties are defined as corresponding fixed values.

4. The safety management system for nuclear power units according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The critical process traceability module is used to identify and mark the critical process nodes of the current auxiliary equipment in the nuclear power plant based on the defect distribution data of the same type of equipment during its life cycle, so that the equipment monitoring module can monitor the operation data of the auxiliary equipment at the critical process nodes.

5. The safety management system for nuclear power units according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The NCR management module is used to acquire non-conformity records generated by auxiliary equipment throughout the entire lifecycle of a nuclear power plant, as one of the operational data of the auxiliary equipment.

6. A nuclear power plant operation and maintenance management system, characterized in that, It includes the safety management system for nuclear power units as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, and a plurality of nuclear power units.

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