An automation equipment operation control anomaly detection method and automation equipment

Abstract

The application provides an automation equipment operation control anomaly detection method and automation equipment. The method comprises the following steps: obtaining a control program of automation equipment, generating anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to servo safety verification logic based on the control program, the configuration information comprising a to-be-detected target, a detection index and a detection means corresponding to the servo safety verification logic, wherein the servo safety verification logic comprises servo interlocking verification logic, stop verification logic and alarm verification logic; generating a detection code based on the to-be-detected target and the detection means of the servo safety verification logic in the configuration information; running the control program, and detecting the to-be-detected target in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result of whether there is an anomaly. The application can automatically detect anomalies of servo safety logic, solve the drawbacks of manual verification, guarantee reliable verification, and improve the operation safety of automation equipment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application belongs to the field of automated equipment operation detection technology, and in particular relates to a method for detecting abnormal operation control of automated equipment and an automated equipment. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of PLC-controlled automation equipment, the verification of servo safety logic mainly relies on manual methods. Technicians need to drive the servo motors to trigger various safety conditions one by one and observe the response status of the corresponding servo axes. This verification method is not only inefficient, but also significantly extends the verification cycle when the number of servo axes is large or the logical relationships are complex. Furthermore, it is very easy to miss some logic nodes due to human error, making it difficult to quickly locate the specific error logic location. At the same time, the verification results are greatly affected by the experience level of the technicians, making it difficult to guarantee the consistency and comprehensiveness of the verification. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This application provides a method and equipment for detecting abnormal operation control of automated equipment, which can significantly reduce human intervention and improve verification efficiency while ensuring the comprehensiveness and accuracy of servo safety logic verification.

[0004] This application provides a method for detecting abnormal operation control of automated equipment, the method comprising: The control program of the automated equipment is obtained, and anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic is generated based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic and alarm verification logic. Based on the target to be detected and the detection method in the servo security verification logic of the configuration information, a detection code is generated; The control program is run, and the detection code is used to detect the target in the control program to obtain a detection result indicating whether there is an anomaly.

[0005] Optionally, the servo safety verification logic is servo interlock verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes a first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and a second set of servo axes that have interlock logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes. The detection index is the motion enable state of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis in the first servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the origin state signal of the first servo axis in the first servo axis set.

[0006] Optionally, the step of detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists includes: Read the first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and the second set of servo axes associated with each axis in the first set of servo axes; Modify the origin state signal of each first servo axis in the first servo axis set to a non-origin state; The motion enable status of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set is checked one by one. If the motion enable status meets the interlock condition, then there is no abnormality.

[0007] Optionally, the first set of servo axes and the second set of servo axes that have interlocking logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes are determined in the following way: Identify all movable servo axes in the control program as first servo axes to form a first servo axis set; For each first servo axis in the first servo axis set, the device module to which it belongs is determined from the control program based on the identifier of the first servo axis; All servo axes within the device module other than the first servo axis, as well as servo axes that have cross-module motion interference with the first servo axis, are designated as second servo axes, forming a second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis.

[0008] Optionally, when it is detected that the motion enable state of any second servo axis in the second servo axis set does not meet the interlock condition, an interlock loss alarm message is output. The alarm message includes the identifier of the abnormal second servo axis and the interlock loss type corresponding to the failure to meet the interlock condition. The interlock loss type includes one or more of the following: origin search interlock loss, forward jog interlock loss, reverse jog interlock loss, and positioning operation interlock loss.

[0009] Optionally, the servo safety verification logic is a stop verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes a set of third servo axes that need to be checked and stopped immediately; The detection index is the motion enable state of the third servo axis in the third servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set.

[0010] Optionally, the step of detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists includes: Read the set of third servo axes that need to be checked and stopped immediately; Modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set to the valid state, and check the motion enable state of each servo axis in the third servo axis set. If the motion enable state meets the emergency stop condition, then there is no abnormality.

[0011] Optionally, the servo safety verification logic is an alarm verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes the full set of servo axes; The detection index is the alarm information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes, and the detection method is to set the alarm trigger information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes.

[0012] Optionally, the step of detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists includes: Read the complete set of servo axes that need to be checked for alarm functions; For each of the full range of servo axes, modify the alarm trigger information of the servo axis to an alarm, and verify whether the corresponding alarm information is generated. If it is generated, then there is no abnormality.

[0013] This application also provides an automated device, equipped with an automated device operation control anomaly detection device, the device comprising: The information configuration module is used to acquire the control program of the automated equipment and generate anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic and alarm verification logic. The code generation module is used to generate detection code based on the target to be detected and the detection method of the servo security verification logic in the configuration information; The program detection module is used to run the control program and detect the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code to obtain the detection result of whether there is an anomaly.

[0014] As can be seen from the above technical solution, the method for detecting abnormalities in the operation control of automated equipment provided in this application can generate abnormal detection configuration information corresponding to servo safety verification logic based on the control program. On this basis, detection code is generated based on the target to be detected and the detection method of the servo safety verification logic. The detection code is used to detect the target to be detected in the control program to obtain the detection result of whether an abnormality exists, replacing the tedious process of manual point-by-point triggering and observation. Finally, the detection result of the abnormality corresponding to the target to be detected is directly output. This application effectively solves the problems of low efficiency and error-proneness of manual verification by generating configuration information based on the control program and inserting detection code to detect the target to be detected, improving verification efficiency while ensuring the comprehensiveness and consistency of verification. Through the servo safety verification logic, potential problems in the logic nodes of the servo safety logic can be quickly identified, improving the operational safety of automated equipment. Attached Figure Description

[0015] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0016] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an abnormality detection method for automated equipment operation control according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the detection result of whether an abnormality exists in the control program of an automated equipment operation control anomaly detection method according to the detection code in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating an abnormality detection method for automated equipment operation control according to an embodiment of this application, based on a first set of servo axes and a second set of servo axes that have interlocking logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting abnormalities in the operation control of automated equipment according to an embodiment of this application. The method involves detecting the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result indicating whether an abnormality exists. Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting abnormalities in the operation control of automated equipment according to an embodiment of this application, in which the detection result is obtained by detecting the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an automated device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0017] In the following description, specific details such as particular system architectures and techniques are set forth for illustrative purposes and not limiting, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of this application. However, those skilled in the art will understand that this application can also be implemented in other embodiments without such specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, apparatuses, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of this application with unnecessary detail.

[0018] The control program, or PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), is widely used in motion control scenarios for various industrial automation equipment. It controls the automated equipment by executing pre-written control programs. Automated equipment typically has multiple servo axes, which can adjust their position, speed, and torque under the control of the program. Servo safety logic is used to prevent accidents such as collisions and personnel injuries during equipment movement. It mainly includes interlock logic to prevent motion interference, stop verification logic to stop the equipment in emergencies, and alarm logic to handle servo drive response failures. Currently, the verification of servo safety logic primarily relies on manual verification combined with actual hardware operation. Technicians need to first download the control program and drive the servo motor. Then, they manually trigger various safety conditions, such as manually moving the lifting axis to a non-origin position, actually pressing the emergency stop button, manually blocking the light curtain, or even artificially creating a servo drive failure, and then observe the actual physical response of the equipment to determine if the safety logic is correct. This verification method is not only inefficient—the verification cycle is significantly extended when the number of servo axes is large or the logical relationships are complex—but it is also prone to overlooking some logical nodes due to human error. Furthermore, the verification results are greatly affected by the experience level of the technicians, making it difficult to guarantee consistency and comprehensiveness. In addition, existing methods pose risks such as collisions and equipment damage when actually driving equipment movement. When anomalies occur, it is difficult to quickly locate the specific logical error, leading to untimely identification of safety hazards during equipment debugging and maintenance, thus affecting the operational safety and reliability of automated equipment.

[0019] In this embodiment, the method for detecting abnormalities in the operation control of automated equipment generates abnormality detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program of the automated equipment. It generates detection code to detect the target in the control program and obtains a detection result indicating whether an abnormality exists, thus completing the verification of the servo safety logic. This application integrates complete verification logic by adding detection code to the control program. The servo safety verification logic completes the verification of the servo safety logic. Users only need to fill in the input parameters corresponding to the detection code to start automatic verification without modifying the internal program logic of the detection code, thus exhibiting high versatility and portability. The method provided in this embodiment can promptly detect logical errors in the control program, ensuring the operational safety of automated equipment.

[0020] To address at least one of the problems existing in the prior art, this embodiment discloses a method for detecting abnormalities in the operation control of automated equipment, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the method includes: S100: Obtain the control program of the automated equipment, and generate anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index, and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic, and alarm verification logic.

[0021] S200: Generate detection code based on the target to be detected and the detection method in the servo security verification logic in the configuration information.

[0022] S300: Run the control program and, based on the detection code, detect the target to be detected in the control program to obtain a detection result indicating whether there is an anomaly.

[0023] In this embodiment, the generation of anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program includes three different implementation methods, each suitable for different application scenarios and user needs. The manual input method is suitable for situations where the control program structure is relatively simple or the user has already prepared the relevant information for the servo safety verification logic. The user can input configuration information by adding a function block to the control program and filling in the input parameters of that function block. The function block has multiple input parameter arrays to receive different types of configuration information; for example, the array for the lifting axis number to be checked stores the numbers of the lifting servo axes that need interlock verification.

[0024] Specifically, the model inference method processes the control program based on a pre-trained analysis model, automatically outputting configuration information. The sample set used to train the analysis model contains a large number of control programs with different programming, each sample labeled with servo axis information interlocking relationships, emergency stop relationships, and alarm relationships. The model adopts a deep learning architecture, capable of learning the structural features of the control program and common patterns of servo safety logic. During training, the model continuously adjusts its internal parameters to minimize the error between the output configuration information and the labeled information when inputting a control program. When processing a new control program, the model can automatically identify the servo safety logic structure in the program and extract the corresponding configuration information.

[0025] It should be noted that the above verification process is implemented by constructing an independent functional block within the control program in this embodiment. The functional block integrates complete verification logic, and the user only needs to fill in the corresponding input parameters to start automatic verification without modifying the program code inside the functional block.

[0026] In an optional implementation, the servo safety verification logic is a servo interlock verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes a first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and a second set of servo axes that have interlock logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes.

[0027] The detection index is the motion enable state of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis in the first servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the origin state signal of the first servo axis in the first servo axis set.

[0028] Specifically, the first set of servo axes consists of the lifting servo axes that require interlock verification, corresponding to each axis in the array of lifting axis numbers to be investigated. The second set of servo axes consists of other servo axes that have interlock logic with the first servo axes, including other servo axes within the same device module and mobile platform servo axes that have cross-module motion interference relationships with the first servo axis.

[0029] All variables within the function block are initialized upon block startup, ensuring each verification process is independent and unaffected by previous verification results. When the test run button parameter is set, the function block first resets all elements of the output array to false, then resets the internal loop counter variable to 0. Next, the function block enters the servo interlock verification phase. The function block uses the first loop counter variable to iterate through each lifting axis in the array of lifting axis numbers to be checked; the number of iterations is controlled by the number of lifting axes to be checked. In each iteration, the function block first reads the current lifting axis number and then queries the device module number to which that axis belongs. The device module number is queried through a predefined servo axis attribute array in the control program, which stores basic information for each servo axis, including its device module number and axis type. The function block reads the corresponding device module number from the servo axis attribute array using the current lifting axis number as an index. Then, the function block uses the second loop counter variable to iterate through all servo axes, searching for servo axes with the same device module number as the current lifting axis. After excluding the current lifting axis, the function block stores the numbers of these servo axes in the associated axis variable array within the module.

[0030] Next, the function block simulates modifying the origin status signal of the current lifting axis. The address of the origin status signal is also obtained through the servo axis attribute array. The function block reads the corresponding origin status signal address in the servo axis attribute array by using the current lifting axis number as an index, and then modifies the boolean value of that address to false, indicating that the lifting axis is not at the origin position. Then, the function block uses the third loop counter variable to traverse each associated servo axis in the associated axis variable array within the module. In each loop, the function block reads the number of the current associated servo axis, and then sequentially reads the addresses of the origin search enable signal, forward jog enable signal, reverse jog enable signal, and automatic positioning enable signal of that servo axis. These addresses are also obtained through the servo axis attribute array. The function block sequentially judges the status of these four signals. If any signal is true, it indicates an error in the interlock logic. The function block then checks the position of the corresponding current lifting axis index and the current associated servo axis index in the arm interlock check and loss alarm array. After completing the verification of the associated axes within the module, the function block reads the mobile platform axis number corresponding to the current lifting axis index in the corresponding platform number array. If the moving platform axis number is not 0, it indicates a cross-module interlock relationship, and the function block continues to verify the motion permission of that moving platform axis. The function block reads the status of the four motion permission enable signals for that moving platform axis. If any signal is true, it indicates an error in the cross-module interlock logic. The function block then checks the position of the corresponding current lifting axis index and moving platform axis index in the platform interlock check and loss alarm array. After completing the interlock verification for the current lifting axis, the function block restores the origin state signal of the current lifting axis to its original state to avoid affecting the normal operation of the control program. Then, the function block increments the first loop counter variable by 1 and enters the next loop until the interlock verification for all lifting axes is completed.

[0031] In this application, the motion enable state of the servo axis includes the motion permission enable signals corresponding to each motion mode of the servo axis, such as origin search, forward jogging, reverse jogging, and automatic positioning. When any motion permission enable signal is true, the motion enable state is considered true, even if the ability is not cut off; when all motion permission enable signals are false, the motion enable state is considered false, even if the ability is cut off.

[0032] In alternative implementations, such as Figure 2 As shown, step S200, based on the detection code, detects the target to be detected in the control program to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists, including: S210: Read the first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and the second set of servo axes associated with each axis in the first set of servo axes.

[0033] S220: Modify the origin state signal of each first servo axis in the first servo axis set to a non-origin state.

[0034] S230: Check the motion enable status of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set one by one. If the motion enable status meets the interlock condition, there is no abnormality.

[0035] Specifically, each equipment module is an independent unit within an automated device that performs a specific function. It typically consists of multiple cooperating servo axes. These servo axes within the same module have close motion coordination, making them more prone to motion interference. For example, a material handling arm module usually consists of a lifting axis, a translation axis, and a rotary axis. The lifting axis raises the workpiece from the hopper to the working height, the translation axis transports the workpiece to different positions, and the rotary axis adjusts the workpiece's angle. When the lifting axis is in the descending position, the movement paths of the translation and rotary axes are blocked by the lifting axis. If the translation or rotary axis moves at this time, a collision will occur, leading to equipment damage. Therefore, interlocking logic must be set in the control program to prohibit all movement of the translation and rotary axes when the lifting axis is not in its origin position.

[0036] For example, in the application scenario of the material handling arm in module 1, there are four servo axes: SV1 (material handling X-axis), SV2 (material handling Y-axis), SV3 (material handling R-axis), and SV4 (material handling Z-axis). SV4 is the lifting servo axis, and SV1, SV2, and SV3 are associated servo axes within the same module. When SV4 is not at the origin, SV1, SV2, and SV3 must be in an interlocked state and cannot move. During interlock verification, the user first enters the number 4 (SV4) in the first position of the array of lifting axis numbers to be checked in the function block, and enters 1 in the quantity parameter of lifting axes to be checked. After the function block starts running, it first queries the device module number to which the servo axis numbered 4 belongs; assuming the query result is module 1. Then, the function block searches for all servo axes within module 1, obtaining SV1, SV2, SV3, and SV4. After excluding the current lifting axis SV4, it obtains the associated servo axes SV1, SV2, and SV3, and stores the numbers of these three axes in the associated axis variable array within the module. Next, the function block simulates modifying the origin state signal of SV4, changing it from the origin state to a non-origin state, triggering the interlock condition. Then, the function block sequentially checks the status of all motion permission enable signals of SV1, SV2, and SV3 to determine if they are all in the off state. If a motion permission enable signal of a certain associated servo axis is still in the on state, it indicates an error in the interlock logic, and the function block will set the corresponding output array bit to generate an interlock anomaly detection result. For example, if the forward jog enable signal of SV1 is detected to be in the on state, the function block will set the corresponding bit of SV4 and SV1 in the arm interlock check loss alarm array to prompt the user that there is an error in the interlock logic between SV1 and SV4. If the origin search enable signal of SV2 is detected to be in the on state, the function block will set the corresponding bit of SV4 and SV2 in the arm interlock check loss alarm array to prompt the user that there is an error in the interlock logic between SV2 and SV4. If the automatic positioning enable signal of SV3 is detected to be on, the function block will check the position bits of SV4 and SV3 in the arm interlock loss alarm array and prompt the user that there is an error in the interlock logic between SV3 and SV4.

[0037] In alternative implementations, such as Figure 3 As shown, step S300 determines the first set of servo axes and the second set of servo axes that have interlocking logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes in the following way: S310: Identify all movable servo axes in the control program as first servo axes to form a first servo axis set.

[0038] S320: For each first servo axis in the first servo axis set, determine the device module to which it belongs from the control program based on the identifier of the first servo axis.

[0039] S330: Take all servo axes in the device module other than the first servo axis and the servo axes that have cross-module motion interference with the first servo axis as the second servo axes, and form a second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis.

[0040] In this application, the second set of servo axes includes two categories: first, other servo axes within the same device module as the first servo axis; and second, mobile platform servo axes specified by a corresponding platform number array that have cross-module motion interference relationships with the first servo axis. In a specific example, the mobile platform servo axis is a servo axis used to achieve a large range of horizontal movement, typically used for transporting workpieces between different device modules. In some cases, the lifting servo axis not only has interlocking relationships with servo axes within the same module but also with mobile platform servo axes in other modules. For example, when the lifting axis descends to the working position, the mobile platform cannot enter the area where the lifting axis is located; otherwise, a collision will occur. This application, by setting a corresponding platform number array, allows the user to explicitly input the number of the mobile platform servo axis that has interlocking constraints with each lifting axis. The function block automatically verifies these cross-module interlocking relationships to avoid omissions.

[0041] For example, in the above application scenario of the picking arm, module 2 is a mobile platform used to receive the workpiece placed by the picking arm. When the SV4 lifting axis of the picking arm is not at its origin position, the mobile platform cannot move, otherwise it will collide with the picking arm. Therefore, there is a cross-module interlock relationship between SV4 and the servo axis of the mobile platform of module 2. When performing interlock verification, in addition to filling in the array of lifting axis numbers to be checked, the user also needs to fill in the number of the mobile platform servo axis in the first position of the corresponding platform number array, assuming that the number of the mobile platform servo axis is 5. After the function block starts running, after completing the verification of the associated axes within the module, it will read the mobile platform axis number 5 corresponding to SV4 in the corresponding platform number array. Then, the function block also simulates modifying the origin state signal of SV4 to a non-origin state, triggering the cross-module interlock condition. Next, the function block verifies the status of all motion permission enable signals of the mobile platform servo axis 5 to determine whether they are all in the off state. If a motion permission enable signal for servo axis 5 of the mobile platform remains enabled, it indicates an error in the cross-module interlocking logic. The function block will check the corresponding bit positions of SV4 and mobile platform axis 5 in the platform interlocking check and loss alarm array, prompting the user that there is an error in the interlocking logic between mobile platform axis 5 and SV4. It should be noted that in this application, "set" refers to setting the value of a Boolean variable or data bit to logical true (i.e., 1), and "reset" refers to setting it to logical false (i.e., 0).

[0042] In an optional implementation, when it is detected that the motion enable state of any second servo axis in the second servo axis set does not meet the interlock condition, an interlock loss alarm message is output. The alarm message includes the identifier of the abnormal second servo axis and the interlock loss type corresponding to the failure to meet the interlock condition. The interlock loss type includes one or more of the following: origin search interlock loss, forward jog interlock loss, reverse jog interlock loss, and positioning operation interlock loss.

[0043] In this embodiment, origin search is the motion mode where the servo axis searches for the mechanical origin after power-on, used to establish the servo axis's position coordinate system. Forward jogging is the mode where the servo axis moves continuously at low speed in the positive direction, typically used for equipment debugging and manual operation. Reverse jogging is the mode where the servo axis moves continuously at low speed in the opposite direction, also used for equipment debugging and manual operation. Automatic positioning is the mode where the servo axis automatically moves to a specified position according to a preset target position and motion parameters; this is the most commonly used motion mode during normal equipment production. Each motion permission needs to be verified to ensure that all motion modes are prohibited when the interlock trigger condition is met. Verifying only some motion modes may overlook logical errors, leading to safety hazards. For example, if the engineer only adds an interlock condition to the enable circuit of the automatic positioning mode but not to the enable circuit of the origin search mode, then when the lifting axis is not at the origin position, the operator can still activate the origin search mode of the associated servo axis, causing equipment collision.

[0044] In this embodiment, the interlock condition is that when the origin state signal of the first servo axis is not in the origin state, all motion enable signals of the second servo axis that has interlock logic with the first servo axis should be false, i.e., closed or disabled. If any motion enable signal is true, even if the enable is not cut off, it is considered that the interlock condition is not met.

[0045] For example, in the aforementioned application scenario of the material handling arm, when verifying the movement permission of SV1, the function block sequentially reads the status of SV1's origin search enable signal, forward jog enable signal, reverse jog enable signal, and automatic positioning enable signal. If any of these four signals is in the open state, it indicates an error in the interlock logic. For instance, if the origin search enable signal of SV1 is detected to be in the open state, then when SV4 is not in the origin position, the operator can still initiate the origin search of SV1, causing SV1 and SV4 to collide. The function block will record the corresponding positions of SV4 and SV1 in the arm interlock check loss alarm array, and simultaneously record the incorrect movement permission type. For example, if the origin search enable signal is true, the interlock loss type is recorded as origin search interlock loss; if the forward jog enable signal is true, it is recorded as forward jog interlock loss, and so on. This facilitates user modification. If the reverse jog enable signal of SV1 is detected as being on, then even when SV4 is not in the origin position, the operator can still initiate the reverse jog of SV1, causing SV1 and SV4 to collide. The function block will check the corresponding positions of SV4 and SV1 in the arm interlock check and loss alarm array. If the automatic positioning enable signal of SV1 is detected as being on, then even when SV4 is not in the origin position, the device will still send the automatic positioning command of SV1 during automatic operation, causing SV1 and SV4 to collide. The function block will check the corresponding positions of SV4 and SV1 in the arm interlock check and loss alarm array. Only when all four motion permission enable signals are off is the interlock logic between SV1 and SV4 considered correct.

[0046] In an optional implementation, the servo safety verification logic is a stop verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes a set of third servo axes that need to be investigated and stopped immediately.

[0047] The detection index is the motion enable state of the third servo axis in the third servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set.

[0048] In this embodiment, when an emergency occurs, such as personnel accidentally entering a dangerous area or equipment malfunction, the triggered safety signal should be able to immediately stop the movement of all motion axes to prevent the occurrence or escalation of an accident. Any error in the stop verification logic may lead to a serious safety accident, therefore a comprehensive and rigorous verification is required. The function block internally contains an array of servo numbers requiring immediate stop verification, used to store the servo axis number corresponding to each safety trigger signal that needs emergency stop verification. When the function block starts running, it first reads the information from the array of servo numbers requiring immediate stop verification and the array of safety trigger signals. Then, the function block sequentially simulates and modifies the state of each safety trigger signal, changing it from an invalid state to an valid state, triggering the emergency stop condition. Next, the function block checks the stop signal state of the corresponding servo axis to determine if all are set. If the stop signal of a certain servo axis is not set, it indicates an error in the stop verification logic of that servo axis. The function block will then remove the corresponding servo axis position from the servo axis immediate stop verification alarm array, generating an anomaly detection result for the stop verification logic.

[0049] In this embodiment, the emergency stop condition is that when a safety trigger signal, such as an emergency stop button, light curtain, or safety door, is simulated and modified to an active state, all motion enable signals of the third servo axis controlled by that safety trigger signal should be false, i.e., cut off or stopped. If any motion enable signal is true, the emergency stop condition is considered not met.

[0050] It should be noted that when executing the emergency stop verification logic, the function block also processes each safety trigger signal sequentially using a loop. The function block uses a fourth loop counter variable to iterate through each safety trigger signal in the safety trigger signal array, with the number of loops controlled by the number of safety trigger signals. In each loop, the function block first reads the address of the current safety trigger signal and then modifies the boolean value of that address to true, indicating that the safety trigger signal is valid. Then, the function block uses a fifth loop counter variable to iterate through all servo axis numbers in the servo number array that need to be checked immediately, corresponding to the index of the current safety trigger signal. In each loop, the function block reads the number of the current servo axis and then reads the stop signal address of that servo axis, which is obtained through the servo axis attribute array. The function block judges the status of the stop signal; if it is false, it indicates an error in the stop verification logic, and the function block immediately stops the servo axis to check the missing bit in the alarm array corresponding to the current servo axis number. After completing the verification of all servo axes corresponding to the current safety trigger signal, the function block restores the status of the current safety trigger signal to its original state to avoid affecting the normal operation of the control program. Then, the function block increments the fourth loop counter variable by 1 and enters the next loop until all security trigger signals have been verified.

[0051] For example, in an application scenario at a detection station, there are three servo axes: SV1 (upper platform Y-axis), SV2 (lower platform Y-axis), and SV3 (lower lifting Z-axis). This station is equipped with a light grating to detect if personnel have accidentally entered a hazardous area. When the light grating is triggered, axes SV1, SV2, and SV3 must immediately stop moving. During emergency stop verification, the user first enters the address of the light grating signal in the first position of the safety trigger signal array, and then enters the numbers 1, 2, and 3 of SV1, SV2, and SV3 in the first row of the array of servo numbers to be checked for immediate stop. After the function block starts running, it first reads this input information. Then, the function block simulates modifying the state of the light grating signal, changing it from an invalid state to a valid state, triggering the emergency stop condition. Next, the function block checks the stop signal status of SV1, SV2, and SV3 in sequence. If the stop signal of a certain servo axis is not set, it indicates an error in the stop verification logic of that servo axis. For example, if the stop signal of SV2 is not set, SV2 will continue to move when the light grating is triggered, potentially causing personal injury or equipment damage. The function block will immediately stop the servo axis and check the bit at position 2 in the lost alarm array, indicating an error in the SV2 stop verification logic. If the SV3 stop signal is not set, SV3 will continue to descend when the raster is triggered, potentially causing personal injury or equipment damage. The function block will immediately stop the servo axis and check the bit at position 3 in the lost alarm array, indicating an error in the SV3 stop verification logic. Only when the stop signals of SV1, SV2, and SV3 are all set is the raster stop verification logic considered correct.

[0052] In alternative implementations, such as Figure 4 As shown, the S400 method, based on the detection code, detects the target to be detected in the control program to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists, including: S410: Read the set of third servo axes that need to be checked and stopped immediately.

[0053] S420: Modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set to the valid state, and check the motion enable state of the third servo axis that is in the emergency stop state. If the motion enable state meets the emergency stop condition, then there is no abnormality.

[0054] In this embodiment, simulating the modification of the safety trigger signal's state to generate an emergency stop condition includes simulating the modification of the safety trigger signal to a valid trigger state to generate an emergency stop trigger condition. The safety trigger signal includes a trigger signal corresponding to an emergency stop button grating or a safety door. An emergency stop button is a commonly used safety trigger device, typically installed on the equipment's control panel and in prominent locations in various hazardous areas for easy access by operators in emergencies. A grating is a photoelectric protection device consisting of a transmitter and a receiver. When an object blocks the light beam between the transmitter and receiver, it outputs a valid safety trigger signal, typically used to protect open areas of equipment and prevent accidental entry. A safety door is an openable door installed on the equipment's guardrail. When the safety door is opened, it triggers an internal safety switch, outputting a valid safety trigger signal to stop the movement of the internal motion axes, ensuring the safety of personnel entering the equipment for maintenance. Different types of safety trigger signals may control different ranges of servo axes; therefore, each servo axis corresponding to a safety trigger signal needs to be individually verified. For example, an emergency stop button on the main control panel typically controls all servo axes of the equipment, while a safety door in a certain area may only control the servo axes within that area. The function blocks in this application support the input of multiple safety trigger signals, each of which corresponds to a different servo axis.

[0055] For example, an automated device is equipped with three emergency stop buttons, two light gates, and three safety gates. Emergency stop button 1 is installed on the main control panel and controls all servo axes of the device. Emergency stop button 2 is installed at the rear of the device and controls the servo axes of the rear processing module. Emergency stop button 3 is installed in the loading / unloading area and controls the servo axes of the loading / unloading module. Light gate 1 is installed at the entrance of the loading / unloading area and controls the servo axes of the loading / unloading module. Light gate 2 is installed at the entrance of the cleaning area and controls the servo axes of the cleaning module. Safety gate 1 is installed on the guardrail of the processing module and controls the servo axes of the processing module. Safety gate 2 is installed on the guardrail of the cleaning module and controls the servo axes of the cleaning module. Safety gate 3 is installed on the guardrail of the transport module and controls the servo axes of the transport module. During emergency stop verification, the user needs to sequentially enter the addresses of the eight safety trigger signals in the safety trigger signal array, and sequentially enter the servo axis number corresponding to each safety trigger signal in each row of the array of servo numbers requiring immediate stop. The function block sequentially simulates and modifies the state of each safety trigger signal, checking the stop signal state of the corresponding servo axis to ensure that each safety trigger signal correctly controls the motion enable state of its corresponding servo axis. For example, when verifying emergency stop button 1, the function block simulates and modifies the safety trigger signal of emergency stop button 1 to an active state, and then checks whether the motion enable state of all servo axes of the device is a stop signal state. When verifying safety door 1, the function block simulates and modifies the safety trigger signal of safety door 1 to an active state, and then checks whether the motion enable state of all servo axes of the machining module is a stop signal state.

[0056] In an optional implementation, the servo safety verification logic is an alarm verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes the full set of servo axes.

[0057] The detection index is the alarm information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes, and the detection method is to set the alarm trigger information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes.

[0058] In this embodiment, the full set of servo axes refers to all servo axes in the device, corresponding to all axes covered by the total number of servo axes parameter. The alarm verification logic includes simulating and generating servo drive fault error signals corresponding to each servo axis based on the total number of servo axes information, determining whether the alarm output signal of each servo axis is triggered, and generating a detection result for an alarm logic anomaly corresponding to that servo axis if the alarm output signal of any servo axis is not triggered. Various faults may occur during servo drive operation, such as overcurrent, overvoltage, undervoltage, overload, encoder fault, and communication fault. If these faults are not handled in time, they may lead to damage to the servo drive or loss of control of the device. Therefore, the control program needs to set corresponding alarm handling logic. When a servo drive fault signal is received, the movement of the corresponding servo axis is immediately stopped, and an alarm prompt is issued to notify the operator to handle the situation. The function block internally sets a total number of servo axes parameter to specify the total number of servo axes in the project. When the function block starts running, it will sequentially perform alarm logic verification on each servo axis according to the total number of servo axes parameter. The function block simulates and generates servo drive fault error signals by modifying the fault bit of the corresponding servo drive status word inside the PLC. Then, the function block checks whether the PLC outputs the corresponding alarm output signal. If the alarm output signal of a certain servo axis is not triggered, it means that there is an error in the alarm logic of that servo axis. The function block will check the servo axis alarm and find the missing bit in the alarm array corresponding to the servo axis, and generate a detection result of alarm logic abnormality.

[0059] In this embodiment, the alarm information refers to one or more response signals that the control program should output when the alarm trigger information of the servo axis is set, simulating a servo drive failure. These signals include, but are not limited to, active stop output, torque cut-off output, shutdown protection output, and fault indication output. Outputting at least one of these signals is considered as generating alarm information.

[0060] It should be noted that when executing the alarm verification logic, the function block also uses a loop to process each servo axis sequentially. The function block uses a sixth loop counter variable to iterate through all servo axes, with the number of loops controlled by the total number of servo axes. In each loop, the function block first reads the current servo axis number, and then reads the address of the servo driver status word corresponding to that servo axis, which is obtained through the servo axis attribute array. The function block modifies the fault bit in the status word to true, indicating a servo driver failure. Then, the function block waits for one scan cycle to ensure the control program can handle the fault signal. Next, the function block checks whether the control program outputs the corresponding alarm output signal. If the alarm output signal is not triggered, it indicates an error in the alarm logic, and the function block checks the position of the corresponding servo axis number in the servo axis alarm array. After completing the alarm verification for the current servo axis, the function block restores the fault bit of the servo driver status word to its original state to avoid affecting the normal operation of the control program. Then, the function block increments the sixth loop counter variable by 1 and enters the next loop, until the alarm verification for all servo axes is completed.

[0061] For example, in the above-mentioned detection station application scenario, there are three servo axes SV1, SV2, and SV3. When performing alarm logic verification, the user first enters 3 in the total number of servo axes parameter. After the function block starts running, it first verifies SV1. The function block modifies the fault bit of the servo driver status word corresponding to SV1, simulating the generation of a driver fault error signal. Then, the function block checks whether the PLC outputs the alarm output signal corresponding to SV1. If the alarm output signal is not triggered, it indicates that there is an error in the alarm logic of SV1. For example, if an engineer mistakenly writes the alarm signal address of SV1 as the alarm signal address of SV2 when writing the program, then when the driver of SV1 fails, the control program will not trigger the alarm output of SV1, and the operator will not be able to detect the fault in time, which may lead to damage to the driver of SV1 or loss of control of the equipment. The function block will check the missing bit in the alarm array of the servo axis alarms, indicating to the user that there is an error in the alarm logic of SV1. Next, the function block will perform the same verification on SV2 and SV3 in sequence to ensure that the alarm logic of all servo axes is correct. For example, when calibrating SV3, if the alarm output signal is not triggered, it indicates an error in the SV3 alarm logic. The function block will check the servo axis alarms and find the missing bit number 3 in the alarm array, prompting the user that there is an error in the SV3 alarm logic.

[0062] In this embodiment, determining whether the alarm output signal of each servo axis is triggered includes detecting whether the corresponding servo drive's active stop output torque cut-off or shutdown protection control signal is output, and triggering the corresponding servo drive's fault indication. When the servo drive fails, the control program should output multiple control signals to ensure equipment safety. Active stop output is a stop command sent by the control program to the servo drive, causing the servo motor to stop moving according to a preset deceleration curve. Torque cut-off is the control program controlling the servo drive to immediately stop outputting torque, causing the servo motor to enter a free-stop state. Shutdown protection is the control program cutting off the servo drive's main power supply, completely stopping the servo drive's operation. Fault indication is the control program displaying fault information through indicator lights, buzzers, or a human-machine interface, alerting the operator to a servo alarm and its specific content. All these output signals need to be detected to ensure the integrity and correctness of the alarm processing logic. Detecting only some output signals may miss logical errors, leading to safety hazards. For example, if the engineer only writes the logic for active stop output but not the logic for torque cut-off, then when the servo drive experiences a serious fault, active stop may not be able to stop the servo motor in time, leading to equipment damage. It should be noted that the alarm verification logic only verifies the alarm response logic within the program, and does not verify the actual fault detection function of the driver.

[0063] In alternative implementations, such as Figure 5 As shown, S500 performs detection on the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result indicating whether an anomaly exists, including: S510: Reads the full set of servo axes that need to be checked for alarm functions.

[0064] S520: For each servo axis in the full range of servo axes, modify the alarm trigger information of the servo axis to alarm, and verify whether the corresponding alarm information is generated. If it is generated, then there is no abnormality.

[0065] In this embodiment, all anomaly detection results generated during the verification process are summarized and then output to the user in an appropriate manner. The output method may include real-time display of anomaly information on a human-machine interface or the generation of a complete verification report file. The anomaly information includes the servo axis number of each anomaly and the corresponding error safety logic type. Based on the output anomaly information, the user can quickly locate the error in the control program and perform targeted modifications and debugging. After modification, the verification method of this application can be run again to re-verify the modified logic until all anomalies are eliminated, ensuring the correctness of the servo safety logic.

[0066] For example, a certain automotive parts inspection equipment consists of a No. 1 material handling arm module, a No. 2 moving platform module, and a No. 3 inspection station module, containing a total of 7 servo axes. The No. 1 material handling arm module includes SV1 (material handling X-axis), SV2 (material handling Y-axis), SV3 (material handling R-axis), and SV4 (material handling Z-axis). The No. 2 moving platform module includes SV5 (moving platform Y-axis). The No. 3 inspection station module includes SV6 (upper platform Y-axis) and SV7 (lower lifting Z-axis). The equipment is equipped with a main emergency stop button that controls all 7 servo axes. A light grating is installed at the entrance of the inspection station, controlling servo axes SV6 and SV7 of the No. 3 inspection station module. A safety gate is installed on the guardrail of the material handling arm module, controlling servo axes SV1, SV2, SV3, and SV4 of the No. 1 material handling arm module. Each servo axis is equipped with an independent servo driver. The driver communicates with the control program via a fieldbus, sending its own status information to the control program and receiving control commands from the control program. Before verifying the servo safety logic, the user needs to fill in the input parameters of each function block in the control program. In the array of lifting axis numbers to be checked, the first position should be filled with the number 4 of the SV4 material picking Z-axis, and the second position should be filled with the number 7 of the SV7 lower lifting Z-axis. The number of lifting axes to be checked should be filled with 2. In the corresponding platform number array, the first position should be filled with the number 5 of the SV5 moving platform Y-axis, which has an interlock constraint with SV4, and the second position should be filled with 0, indicating that SV7 does not have a corresponding cross-module moving platform axis. In the safety trigger signal array, the first position should be filled with the signal address of the main emergency stop button, the second position with the signal address of the grating, and the third position with the signal address of the safety door. In the array of servo numbers to be checked for immediate stop, the first row should be filled with 1234567, indicating that the main emergency stop button controls all 7 servo axes. The second row should be filled with 670000, indicating that the grating controls the SV6 and SV7 servo axes. The third row should be filled with 123400, indicating that the safety door controls the SV1, SV2, SV3, and SV4 servo axes. Enter 7 in the total number of servo axes parameter. Enter 0 in the test run button parameter to indicate that the function block is not started in the initial state.

[0067] After the function block starts running, it first executes the servo interlock verification logic. The function block first reads 4 and 7 from the array of lifting axis numbers to be checked, and the number of lifting axes to be checked is 2. Then, the function block queries the device module number to which the servo axis numbered 4 belongs, and the query result is module 1. Next, the function block searches for all servo axes within module 1, obtaining SV1, SV2, SV3, and SV4. After excluding SV4, it obtains the associated servo axes SV1, SV2, and SV3, and stores the numbers of these three axes in the associated axis variable array within the module. Next, the function block simulates modifying the origin state signal of SV4, changing it from the origin state to a non-origin state, triggering the interlock condition. Then, the function block sequentially checks the status of the motion permission enable signals of SV1, SV2, and SV3. Assuming that the reverse jog enable signal of SV2 is detected to be in the open state, it indicates an error in the interlock logic between SV2 and SV4. The function block then checks the position bits corresponding to SV4 and SV2 in the arm interlock check and loss alarm array. After completing the interlock verification within the module, the function block reads the number 5 of SV5 corresponding to SV4 from the corresponding platform number array. Then, the function block verifies the status of all motion permission enable signals for SV5. If the automatic positioning enable signal of SV5 is detected as being on, it indicates an error in the cross-module interlock logic between SV5 and SV4. The function block then checks the position bits of SV4 and SV5 in the platform interlock check and alarm array. Next, the function block performs interlock verification on the second lifting axis SV7. The function block queries the device module number to which the servo axis numbered 7 belongs, and the result is module 3. Then, the function block searches for all servo axes within module 3, obtaining SV6 and SV7. After excluding SV7, the associated servo axis SV6 is obtained, and its number is stored in the associated axis variable array within the module. Then, the function block simulates modifying the origin state signal of SV7 to a non-origin state, triggering the interlock condition. Next, the function block verifies the status of all motion permission enable signals for SV6. If all signals are off, it indicates that the interlock logic between SV6 and SV7 is correct. The function block will not set any alarm bits.

[0068] After completing the servo interlock verification logic, the function block begins executing the emergency stop verification logic. The function block first reads the addresses of the three safety trigger signals in the safety trigger signal array, and the corresponding servo axis number in the servo number array that needs to be checked for immediate stop. Then, the function block simulates modifying the state of each safety trigger signal sequentially. First, the function block simulates modifying the state of the main emergency stop button to the active state, triggering the emergency stop condition. Then, the function block checks the stop signal states of SV1 to SV7 sequentially. Assuming that the stop signals of all servo axes are set, it indicates that the stop verification logic of the main emergency stop button is correct. Next, the function block simulates modifying the state of the raster to the active state, triggering the emergency stop condition. Then, the function block checks the stop signal states of SV6 and SV7. Assuming that the stop signal of SV7 is not set, it indicates that there is an error in the raster stop verification logic of SV7. The function block immediately stops the servo axis and sets the bit number 7 in the missing alarm array. Then, the function block simulates modifying the state of the safety door to the active state, triggering the emergency stop condition. Then, the function block checks the stop signal states of SV1 to SV4. If all signals are set, it means that the stop verification logic of the safety gate is correct.

[0069] After completing the emergency stop verification logic, the function block begins executing the alarm verification logic. The function block reads the total number of servo axes parameter 7, and then performs alarm verification on each servo axis sequentially. First, the function block modifies the fault bit of the servo driver status word corresponding to SV1, simulating a driver fault error signal. Then, the function block checks the status of SV1's active stop output torque cut-off stop protection and fault indication signal. Assuming all signals are triggered, it indicates that SV1's alarm logic is correct. Next, the function block performs the same verification on SV2 to SV6 sequentially, assuming that the alarm logic of all servo axes is correct. Finally, the function block performs alarm verification on SV7. The function block modifies the fault bit of the servo driver status word corresponding to SV7, simulating a driver fault error signal. Then, the function block checks the status of SV7's alarm output signal. Assuming the fault indication signal is not triggered, it indicates that SV7's alarm indication logic has an error. The function block then checks the missing bit in the servo axis alarm array for missing alarms, specifically bit number 7.

[0070] After all verification logic is executed, the function block stops running and outputs all abnormal information to the corresponding alarm arrays. Users can view the output abnormal information through the human-machine interface, including the position bits corresponding to SV4 and SV2 in the arm interlocking check and loss alarm array, the position bits corresponding to SV4 and SV5 in the platform interlocking check and loss alarm array, the position bit number 7 in the servo axis immediate stop check and loss alarm array, and the position bit number 7 in the servo axis alarm check and loss alarm array. Based on this abnormal information, users locate and modify the corresponding logic network. For interlocking logic errors between SV2 and SV4, users check the reverse jog enable circuit of SV2 and find that the origin signal contact of SV4 is missing; this contact is then added to the enable circuit. For cross-module interlocking logic errors between SV5 and SV4, users check the automatic positioning enable circuit of SV5 and find that the origin signal contact of SV4 is missing; this contact is then added to the enable circuit. For the SV7's raster stop verification logic error, the user checked the SV7's emergency stop control loop and found that a contact for the raster signal was missing. This contact was then added to the emergency stop control loop. For the SV7's alarm indication logic error, the user checked the SV7's alarm handling logic and found that a fault indication code for the HMI was missing. The corresponding fault indication code was then added. After all modifications were completed, the user restarted the control program for verification. During this verification process, none of the bits in the alarm array were set, indicating that all servo safety logic was correct. The user can reset the test run button parameters to complete the entire servo safety logic verification process.

[0071] This application also provides an automated device, such as... Figure 6 As shown, an automated equipment operation control anomaly detection device is provided, the device comprising: The information configuration module 11 is used to acquire the control program of the automated equipment and generate anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index, and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic, and alarm verification logic.

[0072] The code generation module 12 is used to generate detection code based on the target to be detected and the detection method of the servo security verification logic in the configuration information.

[0073] The program detection module 13 is used to run the control program and detect the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code to obtain a detection result of whether there is an anomaly.

[0074] Based on the same principle, the specific implementation of the automated equipment of this application can be found in the implementation of the above method, and this application does not limit it.

[0075] This application uses specific embodiments to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the embodiments above are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, based on the ideas of this application, there may be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.

[0076] The above description is merely an embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. An automated equipment operation control abnormality detection method characterized by comprising: The method includes: The control program of the automated equipment is obtained, and anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic is generated based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic and alarm verification logic. Based on the target to be detected and the detection method in the servo security verification logic of the configuration information, a detection code is generated; The control program is run, and the detection code is used to detect the target in the control program to obtain a detection result indicating whether there is an anomaly.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The servo safety verification logic is the servo interlock verification logic. The target to be detected in the configuration information includes a first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and a second set of servo axes that have interlock logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes. The detection index is the motion enable state of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis in the first servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the origin state signal of the first servo axis in the first servo axis set.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The step of detecting whether an anomaly exists by detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code includes: Read the first set of servo axes that need to be checked for interlocks and the second set of servo axes associated with each axis in the first set of servo axes; Modify the origin state signal of each first servo axis in the first servo axis set to a non-origin state; The motion enable status of each second servo axis in the second servo axis set is checked one by one. If the motion enable status meets the interlock condition, then there is no abnormality.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first set of servo axes and the second set of servo axes that have interlocking logic with each axis in the first set of servo axes are determined in the following way: Identify all movable servo axes in the control program as first servo axes to form a first servo axis set; For each first servo axis in the first servo axis set, the device module to which it belongs is determined from the control program based on the identifier of the first servo axis; All servo axes within the device module other than the first servo axis, as well as servo axes that have cross-module motion interference with the first servo axis, are designated as second servo axes, forming a second servo axis set corresponding to the first servo axis.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein, When it is detected that the motion enable state of any second servo axis in the second servo axis set does not meet the interlock condition, an interlock loss alarm message is output. The alarm message includes the identifier of the abnormal second servo axis and the interlock loss type corresponding to the failure to meet the interlock condition. The interlock loss type includes one or more of the following: origin search interlock loss, forward jog interlock loss, reverse jog interlock loss, and positioning operation interlock loss.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, The servo safety verification logic is a stop verification logic, and the targets to be detected in the configuration information include the set of third servo axes that need to be checked and stopped immediately; The detection index is the motion enable state of the third servo axis in the third servo axis set, and the detection method is to modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of detecting whether an anomaly exists by detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code includes: Read the set of third servo axes that need to be checked and stopped immediately; Modify the safety trigger signal corresponding to each servo axis in the third servo axis set to the valid state, and check the motion enable state of each servo axis in the third servo axis set. If the motion enable state meets the emergency stop condition, then there is no abnormality.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The servo safety verification logic is an alarm verification logic, and the target to be detected in the configuration information includes the full set of servo axes. The detection index is the alarm information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes, and the detection method is to set the alarm trigger information of the servo axes in the full set of servo axes.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The step of detecting whether an anomaly exists by detecting the target in the control program based on the detection code includes: Read the complete set of servo axes that need to be checked for alarm functions; For each of the full range of servo axes, modify the alarm trigger information of the servo axis to an alarm, and verify whether the corresponding alarm information is generated. If it is generated, then there is no abnormality.

10. An automated device, characterized in that, An automated equipment operation control anomaly detection device is provided, the device comprising: The information configuration module is used to acquire the control program of the automated equipment and generate anomaly detection configuration information corresponding to the servo safety verification logic based on the control program. The configuration information includes the target to be detected, the detection index and the detection method corresponding to the servo safety verification logic. The servo safety verification logic includes servo interlock verification logic, stop verification logic and alarm verification logic. The code generation module is used to generate detection code based on the target to be detected and the detection method of the servo security verification logic in the configuration information; The program detection module is used to run the control program and detect the target to be detected in the control program based on the detection code to obtain the detection result of whether there is an anomaly.

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