Method and system for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playing terminal

Abstract

The application provides a method and system for improving safety of a public electronic screen playing terminal of a railway, and relates to the technical field of information processing, which comprises deploying a password module and configuring a digital certificate at the terminal, making a multi-level authorization trust list based on the certificate, and simultaneously acquiring a media file to be played. The media file is audited and multi-level digitally signed by using an auditing module and the digital certificate, and the authorization trust list is encrypted. The signed media file and the encrypted trust list are delivered to a target terminal in an online or offline manner. After receiving the file package, the terminal parses the data structure, verifies the file signature according to the decrypted trust list, and executes a playing control strategy based on the result. The application establishes an end-to-end trusted verification chain based on a digital certificate, realizes effective management and control of playing content in a complex network environment, and significantly improves the safety and reliability of railway public information release.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information processing technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic screen display terminals. Background Technology

[0002] With the accelerated digitization of railway information systems, electronic displays in public places such as stations and trains have become crucial carriers for disseminating information such as train schedules, emergency notices, and public service announcements. The secure and stable operation of their playback control terminals directly affects the reliability, timeliness, and social order of public information services. However, this scenario is characterized by a complex network environment (often requiring alternation between online and offline modes), widespread terminal distribution with relatively weak physical protection, and diverse sources of playback content that undergoes multiple stages of transfer. This makes ensuring the integrity and source credibility of media files throughout the entire chain from content creation to terminal playback, and preventing unauthorized tampering, replacement, or insertion of content during transmission, storage, or playback, a core security issue that urgently needs to be addressed.

[0003] Currently, the industry generally adopts technologies such as network physical isolation, enhanced terminal access control, and simple file verification to address this issue. These methods have improved the basic protection level to some extent, but their security heavily relies on the robustness of boundary protection. For actual situations such as offline file copying and cross-network domain transmission, it is difficult to establish an end-to-end trusted verification mechanism. In particular, when dealing with the risk of malicious tampering during internal personnel's unauthorized operation or the transfer of transmission media, the lack of cryptographically strong protection and trust anchors for the file itself and its distribution path makes it impossible to effectively verify the authenticity of the content source and ensure that it has not been tampered with in a complex and uncontrollable transmission environment. This constitutes the main defect of the existing technical solutions in ensuring the security of railway public electronic screens. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic display terminals, thereby addressing the aforementioned problems. To achieve this objective, the technical solution adopted by this invention is as follows:

[0005] Firstly, this application provides a method for enhancing the safety of existing railway public electronic display terminals, including:

[0006] Install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and obtain a digital certificate for multi-level verification and signature;

[0007] A multi-level authorization trust list is created based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signing, and the media file to be played is obtained;

[0008] The media files are reviewed based on the preset review module and the digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures to obtain the review results and the approved media files.

[0009] The encrypted media file and the multi-level authorization trust list are encrypted using the encryption module to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list.

[0010] The encrypted media files and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list are distributed to the target terminal via online network or offline storage medium to obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal.

[0011] The data structure of the verifiable file package is parsed and processed, and the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing is used to verify the signature of the verifiable file package. Based on the signature verification result, the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy is executed.

[0012] Secondly, this application also provides a system for enhancing the safety of existing railway public electronic display terminals, including:

[0013] The acquisition unit is used to install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and acquire the digital certificate used for multi-level review and signature.

[0014] The processing unit is used to create a multi-level authorized trust list based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signing, and to obtain the media file to be played;

[0015] The review unit is used to review the media files based on the preset review module and the digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures, and to obtain the review result and the approved media files.

[0016] An encryption unit is used to encrypt the approved media file and the multi-level authorization trust list based on the encryption module, so as to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list.

[0017] The distribution unit is used to distribute encrypted media files and encrypted multi-level authorization trust lists to the target terminal via online network or offline storage medium, and obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal.

[0018] The verification unit is used to perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, verify the signature of the verifiable file package based on the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing, and execute the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy based on the signature verification result.

[0019] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0020] This invention introduces encryption and decryption modules, combined with a pre-defined review module and a multi-level authorized trust list, to construct a closed-loop method from content review and security processing to terminal verification. This allows media files, after passing review, to be immediately signed by the encryption module using a digital certificate, and then securely distributed to the terminal along with the encrypted authorized trust list. The terminal then uses its local decryption module and the distributed trust relationships to verify the file signature and executes the playback strategy based on the result. In the scenario of railway public electronic screen playback control, this method effectively establishes an end-to-end trusted verification mechanism in a complex network environment, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the played content. Technically, it achieves dynamic protection throughout the entire file transfer process, significantly improving the system's ability to resist risks such as illegal tampering and unauthorized playback.

[0021] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the following description, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing embodiments of the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures particularly pointed out in the written description, claims, and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0022] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0023] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the method for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals as described in this embodiment of the invention;

[0024] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the system structure for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals as described in this embodiment of the invention.

[0025] In the diagram: 701, Acquisition Unit; 702, Processing Unit; 703, Review Unit; 704, Encryption Unit; 705, Distribution Unit; 706, Verification Unit. Detailed Implementation

[0026] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0027] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following figures indicate similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures. Furthermore, in the description of this invention, terms such as "first," "second," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0028] Example 1:

[0029] This embodiment provides a method for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals.

[0030] See Figure 1 The figure shows that the method includes steps S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 and S6.

[0031] Step S1: Install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and obtain a digital certificate for multi-level verification and signature.

[0032] It is understandable that the "media file to be played" obtained in this step typically refers to playback content files produced by the publicity, passenger transport, or operations departments, containing video, images, or text information. These files vary in format and content and are submitted to the review system through a file upload interface or internal content management system. The "digital certificate used for multi-level review and signature" is a digital credential predefined and issued by the system security management center. It clarifies which encryption modules within the railway system and their respective issuing authorities are trusted authoritative sources by the terminal. The generation and pre-setting of this list ensures that the entire security system has a unified and controllable starting point of trust. The simultaneous acquisition of these two elements essentially links the dynamically changing playback content with the relatively static system trust foundation, laying the foundation for verifiability and controllability throughout the entire process from content source to playback terminal in complex railway scenarios where offline transmission may occur.

[0033] Step S2: Create a multi-level authorized trust list based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signature, and obtain the media file to be played;

[0034] Understandably, this step, based on the different review levels within the railway system and the management affiliation of the playback terminals, explicitly specifies which high-level certificates (corresponding to the central review agency) are used to issue content signatures, and which root certificates are used to issue these high-level certificates. It also identifies which terminal decryption modules must trust these authoritative sources, thereby generating a structured, machine-readable trust mapping list. This list essentially defines the complete verification path from the terminal to the highest trust anchor. Subsequently, this list is digitally signed and encrypted using an encryption module, forming a complete and tamper-proof encrypted multi-level authorization trust list. Simultaneously, media files to be played are obtained from the content production or aggregation platform; these files are raw data that has not undergone security processing.

[0035] Step S3: Based on the preset review module and the digital certificate used for multi-level review signature, review the media file to obtain the review result of the media file and the media file that has passed the review;

[0036] It is understandable that the review module in this step does not merely perform simple format checks, but rather conducts a deep review of the substantive content of the media files, including their visual elements, text information, and possible audio elements, combining rule-based automated analysis with necessary manual verification. Its purpose is to identify and filter out any information that does not comply with public safety, ideological security, and railway operation regulations. The final output, the "review result," is a structured judgment conclusion that records the review status, opinions, and responsible parties; while the "approved media files" are the file entities that have obtained broadcast permission and their associated review metadata. This step directly addresses the core challenges of diverse content sources, extremely high political and security requirements, and the potential for significant social impact from erroneous publication in the railway context. It establishes an unavoidable, clearly defined content security gate at the starting point of the technical process, providing a clear and trustworthy operational object for subsequent cryptographic integrity protection. In this step, step S2 includes steps S31 and S32.

[0037] Step S31: The media file is received and preprocessed. The file format, size and integrity are verified and registered by the review module to obtain media file data to be reviewed that can be recognized by the review module.

[0038] Understandably, the format verification in this preprocessing step ensures that the file conforms to the system's specified encoding and packaging specifications, avoiding subsequent analysis failures or security vulnerabilities due to compatibility issues. Size verification ensures reasonable control over resource consumption, preventing individual excessively large files from affecting the overall system processing capacity and storage planning. Integrity verification typically uses methods such as hash comparison to verify whether bit errors or human tampering have occurred during file transmission or temporary storage. The registration operation assigns a unique tracking identifier to the file and records its source, time, basic attributes, and other original metadata. These operations collectively transform the original "media file" into a formatted, complete, reliable, and clearly identified "media file data to be reviewed," thus providing a reliable working foundation for subsequent content analysis algorithms and manual review interfaces that rely on the stability of this data. This step, from a technical perspective, achieves the initial screening and standardization of massive, multi-source files entering the database, and is a necessary prerequisite for building an efficient and reliable review pipeline.

[0039] Step S32: Perform in-depth content compliance review on the media file data to be reviewed. Use preset image recognition and speech recognition algorithms to perform multimodal analysis on the images, text and speech of the media file, and compare and analyze them with preset manual review results. If they are consistent, the media file that has passed the review is obtained; if they are inconsistent, the media file that has failed the review is obtained.

[0040] Understandably, this step utilizes pre-set image recognition and speech recognition algorithms to perform simultaneous multimodal analysis and feature extraction on the visual images, embedded text information, and audio streams contained in media files. This aims to automatically identify potentially sensitive elements or illegal content from different dimensions. This technical approach is designed to address the complex situation where illegal information may exist hidden within multimedia files in single or compound forms in real-world scenarios. Based on this, the automatic identification results of the algorithm are systematically compared and logically analyzed with pre-set human review results. The consistency between human and machine conclusions becomes the key basis for the final decision. This design does not simply use human judgment as the sole standard, but establishes a cross-validation and accountability mechanism. When the two conclusions are consistent, it indicates that the review conclusion has high reliability, thus efficiently producing approved media files. When the conclusions are inconsistent, a higher-level review process is automatically triggered or the file is directly judged as unapproved. Essentially, this combines human experience and the objective detection capabilities of machines to form a composite defense against risks arising from algorithmic misjudgments, omissions, or new and unknown illegal content, ensuring that while pursuing review efficiency, the ultimate control accuracy of the core requirement of content security is not sacrificed.

[0041] The image recognition algorithm uses the YOLO recognition model, and the speech recognition uses the Seq2Seq (sequence-to-sequence based on attention mechanism) recognition model.

[0042] Step S4: Encrypt the approved media file and the multi-level authorization trust list based on the encryption module to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list;

[0043] It is understandable that this step is not a single encryption operation, but rather a differentiated process implemented based on the different security requirements of media files and authorized trust lists. For approved media files, the encryption module mainly performs asymmetric cryptographic operations based on digital certificates, i.e., digital signature processing. This ensures the integrity of the file and the authenticity and non-repudiation of its source. Its output is a digital signature certificate attached to the file. For multi-level authorized trust lists, the encryption module performs encryption processing primarily to ensure confidentiality. It typically uses a key that uniquely corresponds to the target terminal's cryptographic module for encryption, ensuring that even if the list is intercepted during transmission, it cannot be deciphered by irrelevant parties, thereby protecting the structure of the system's trust relationships from being leaked. In this step, step S4 includes steps S41 and S42.

[0044] Step S41: Analyze and process the multi-level authorization trust relationship based on the preset multi-level authorization trust list. By integrating and defining the certificate correspondence between the encryption module and the decryption module that need to be mutually trusted in the audit module, a structured draft of the multi-level authorization trust relationship to be signed is obtained.

[0045] It is understandable that this step, by integrating and defining the certificate correspondence between mutually trusted encryption and decryption modules within the audit module, essentially creates a global trust mapping blueprint. This blueprint clarifies which encryption module certificates, acting as issuing sources, are recognized by which decryption modules, acting as verification ends. The resulting "draft of multi-level authorization trust relationships to be signed" is a structured, plaintext data set that precisely describes the trust transfer path and scope from the root certificate to the terminal certificate, providing a deterministic object for subsequent tamper-proof digital signing.

[0046] Step S42: Based on the draft of the multi-level authorization trust relationship to be signed, perform trust relationship issuance and transmission reinforcement processing, digitally sign it by calling the root certificate of the encryption module, and then encrypt the signed list using the key corresponding to the target decryption module to obtain the encrypted authorization trust list.

[0047] Understandably, this step first invokes the root certificate private key, representing the highest trust anchor in the system, within the encryption module to perform a digital signature operation on the structured multi-level authorized trust relationship draft. This signing process is akin to affixing an authoritative seal to an important policy document; the generated signature value can independently verify the integrity and authenticity of the draft's content, ensuring it remains untampered with in any subsequent stages. Subsequently, the system uses a key uniquely corresponding to the specific target decryption module to encrypt this signed list. This operation aims to ensure that this sensitive list, containing all trust mapping relationships, will not be spied on or stolen by unauthorized third parties, even during distribution through uncontrolled networks or offline storage media. By sequentially executing signing and encryption, step S32 ultimately produces an encrypted authorized trust list that is both tamper-proof and leak-proof, enabling it to securely leave the protected environment in which it was generated, traverse potentially untrusted transmission channels, and reach the target terminal. This provides a trusted and confidential input for the terminal to subsequently build a local trust chain.

[0048] It is understood that in this step, step S4 also includes steps S43, S44 and S45.

[0049] Step S43: Based on the approved media file output by the review module, perform digital fingerprint extraction processing, and generate a unique digital certificate private key for the media file by calling the hash algorithm of the encryption module;

[0050] Understandably, this step invokes a cryptographic hash algorithm within the encryption module, such as a cryptographic hash function conforming to national standards, to perform a one-way hash calculation on the entire media file data as input. This process generates a fixed-length, seemingly random string, which serves as the file's digital fingerprint and possesses two key cryptographic properties: collision resistance, meaning it is computationally nearly impossible to find two different files that produce the same digest; and sensitivity, meaning that any minor modification to the original file content will cause unpredictable and drastic changes in the generated digest. The digital certificate private key obtained through this step uniquely represents the complete bit state of the media file at that moment.

[0051] Step S44: Perform signature processing in accordance with the railway large file transmission scenario based on the digital certificate private key. By calling the digital certificate private keys of at least two levels in the encryption module, the digital certificate private key is encrypted sequentially to obtain the signature value of the multi-level digital signature.

[0052] Understandably, this step involves a hierarchical signature process adapted to the railway security governance structure, based on the private key of the digital certificate representing the integrity of the media file. By invoking the private keys of at least two levels of digital certificates representing different issuing entities (e.g., the private key representing the file creator and the private key representing the reviewing and authorizing party), stored in the encryption module, asymmetric cryptographic operations are sequentially performed on the digital digest. First, the digest is signed using the first-level private key, generating a first-level signature value; then, a higher-level private key is used to sign the previous signature result (or a data combination containing the digest and the primary signature) again. Through this chained or nested signature process, a multi-level digital signature value carrying multi-layered authorization information is ultimately obtained.

[0053] Step S45: Based on the signature value of the multi-level digital signature and the corresponding certificate chain, perform structured encapsulation processing of the signature file. By packaging the signature value, certificate chain and the identification information of the original media file in a predetermined format, an audit signature file that can be independently distributed and verified is obtained. The audit signature file and the audited media file together constitute the encrypted media file.

[0054] Understandably, this step involves structurally encapsulating the signature file based on the signature value of the multi-level digital signature carrying multi-level authorization information and its corresponding complete certificate chain capable of verifying the signature's legitimacy. By packaging and serializing the aforementioned signature value, certificate chain, and uniquely associated identification information (such as file hash, number, version, etc.) into a predefined, unambiguous data format (such as standardized or custom encapsulation formats like PKCS#7 and XML Signature), an independently distributable and verifiable audit signature file is obtained. This encapsulation process binds all the elements required for signing and verification (evidence and verification path) together, forming an independent verification credential that does not rely on external databases or online services. Ultimately, this audit signature file is logically linked to the original approved media file, together constituting a complete content entity, namely, the "encrypted media file."

[0055] Step S5: The encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list are distributed to the target terminal via online network or offline storage medium to obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal.

[0056] It is understandable that the "file distribution processing" in this step is not a simple file copy, but an adaptive and secure transmission scheduling process. The encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorized trust list together constitute the main body of the distributed data. The system needs to intelligently select the appropriate transmission channel based on the actual connection status of the target terminal (such as an online railway intranet or an offline physically isolated environment). When using an online network, data is transmitted through an encrypted tunnel; when using offline storage media, the mobile storage device itself needs to be securely formatted and access controlled, and a strict media handover and transfer log needs to be established. Regardless of the channel used, this process must ensure the integrity of the data packets, and after transmission, a logical set containing all received data and its metadata, which can be directly processed by subsequent verification processes, is generated on the terminal side—the "verifiable file packet."

[0057] Step S6: Perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, and verify the signature of the verifiable file package based on the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing, and execute the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy based on the signature verification result.

[0058] It is understandable that this step is not a simple "yes / no" verification, but a complete process that calls local cryptographic resources, follows preset trust logic for verification, and triggers corresponding control actions. The terminal calls its decryption module and performs cryptographic verification of the digital signature in the verifiable file package based on the trust relationship between the securely obtained encryption module and decryption module (i.e., the trust chain defined by the multi-level authorized trust list). This verification process includes checking the signature validity, verifying whether the issuer's certificate is in the trusted list, and confirming the integrity of the trust chain. The binary result (success / failure) generated by the verification is the sole basis for triggering subsequent operations. Based on this result, the terminal will execute the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy: if the verification is successful, playback is authorized and the content is added to the playback queue; if the verification fails, a security handling process is triggered, with typical measures including immediately switching to the preset security backup screen or a black screen, and recording security event logs locally and remotely. In this step, step S6 includes steps S61, S62, S63, and S64.

[0059] Step S61: Perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, and separate the audit signature file, the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list from the verifiable file package based on the decryption module, to obtain a copy of the audit signature file to be verified, a copy of the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list.

[0060] Understandably, this step involves parsing the data structure of the arriving verifiable file packet, which contains various security elements. Following a predefined data specification that strictly corresponds to the sender's encapsulation format, the decryption module extracts three key logical components from the file packet: an audited signature file representing the digital signature and credential chain; the original audited and approved media file whose integrity needs to be verified; and an encrypted authorized trust list used to establish the foundation of trust. This parsing process yields three independent and clearly structured components: the audited signature file to be verified, a copy of the audited and approved media file, and the encrypted authorized trust list.

[0061] Step S62: Decrypt the encrypted authorized trust list and the preset key, and verify the copy of the audit signature file to be verified and the copy of the approved media file based on the decrypted authorized trust list to obtain the verification result;

[0062] Understandably, this step first decrypts the authorized trust list, which is in an encrypted state and separated in step S51, and a preset key securely stored locally on the terminal. This preset key is paired with the key used during encryption, and the decryption process successfully restores the plaintext authorized trust list carrying the root certificate signature. Subsequently, based on the certificate trust relationships defined in this decrypted authorized trust list, a complete verification process is performed on the audit signature file to be verified and the copy of the verified media file. This verification includes using the trust list to verify the validity of the certificate chain in the audit signature file and using the corresponding public key to verify whether the digital signature matches the digital digest of the media file copy. Through this series of coherent cryptographic checks, a clear binary verification result is finally obtained, representing whether the content is complete and the source is legitimate.

[0063] Step S63: If the verification result is successful, immediately add the approved media file to the playback queue;

[0064] It is understandable that when the verification result generated in step S52 is clearly a successful signature verification, this result is considered the final confirmation of the integrity and legality of the document's source, indicating that the media file has not been tampered with and its issuer is within a trusted authorization chain. This immediately triggers a predefined automatic response process, adding the approved media file to the playback queue of the playback terminal. "Immediately adding" here is not a simple file copy, but rather means that after verification, the system, in a programmatic and unmanned manner, according to a predetermined priority and playback plan, includes the file in the ordered sequence to be played. This operation ensures seamless integration and automated processing between security verification and business execution, meeting the timeliness requirements for information dissemination on railway public electronic screens while strictly adhering to the security principle of "no playback without verification."

[0065] Step S64: If the verification result is a signature failure, immediately mark the approved media file as not allowed to be played.

[0066] Understandably, when step S62 results in a verification failure, the system will immediately update the status of the approved media file according to the security policy, marking it as unplayable. This "marking" operation is a system-level mandatory status setting, meaning the file will be isolated from the normal playable file set, and its status will be recognized and strictly adhered to by the playback scheduler, ensuring it will not be selected for playback in any playback plan or manual trigger. This step directly addresses the need for deterministic handling in verification failure scenarios. Its design is not merely a status record, but also a proactive intervention and control instruction, aiming to eliminate broadcast accidents and security risks that may be caused by file corruption, unknown origin, or malicious tampering.

[0067] Example 2:

[0068] like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment provides a system for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals. See [link to documentation]. Figure 2 The system includes an acquisition unit 701, a processing unit 702, an auditing unit 703, an encryption unit 704, a distribution unit 705, and a verification unit 706.

[0069] The acquisition unit 701 is used to install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and acquire the digital certificate used for multi-level review and signature.

[0070] Processing unit 702 is used to create a multi-level authorized trust list based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signature, and to obtain the media file to be played;

[0071] The review unit 703 is used to review the media file based on a preset review module and a digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures, and to obtain the review result of the media file and the media file that has passed the review.

[0072] Encryption unit 704 is used to encrypt the approved media file and the multi-level authorization trust list based on the encryption module, so as to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list;

[0073] The distribution unit 705 is used to distribute the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list to the target terminal via an online network or offline storage medium, and obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal.

[0074] The verification unit 706 is used to perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, verify the signature of the verifiable file package based on the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing, and execute the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy based on the signature verification result.

[0075] It should be noted that the specific methods by which each module performs operations in the system described in the above embodiments have been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated here.

[0076] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0077] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for improving the safety of existing railway public electronic display terminals, characterized in that, include: Install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and obtain a digital certificate for multi-level verification and signature; A multi-level authorization trust list is created based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signing, and the media file to be played is obtained; The media files are reviewed based on the preset review module and the digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures to obtain the review results and the approved media files. The encrypted media file and the multi-level authorization trust list are encrypted using the encryption module to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list. The encrypted media files and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list are distributed to the target terminal via online network or offline storage medium to obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal. The data structure of the verifiable file package is parsed and processed, and the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing is used to verify the signature of the verifiable file package. Based on the signature verification result, the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy is executed.

2. The method for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 1, characterized in that... The media files are reviewed based on a preset review module and a digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures, resulting in review results and approved media files, including: The media files are received and preprocessed, and the file format, size and integrity are verified and registered by the review module to obtain media file data to be reviewed that can be recognized by the review module. The system performs in-depth content compliance review on the media files to be reviewed. It uses preset image recognition and speech recognition algorithms to perform multimodal analysis on the images, text, and speech of the media files, and compares the results with preset manual review results. If they match, the media files are approved; if they do not match, the media files are rejected.

3. The method for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 1, characterized in that... The encryption module performs encryption processing on the approved media files and the multi-level authorized trust list, including: Based on the preset multi-level authorization trust list, the analysis and processing of multi-level authorization trust relationships are carried out. By integrating and defining the certificate correspondence between the encryption module and the decryption module that need to be mutually trusted in the audit module, a structured draft of multi-level authorization trust relationship to be signed is obtained. Based on the draft of the multi-level authorization trust relationship to be signed, the trust relationship is issued and transmission is strengthened. The root certificate of the encryption module is called to digitally sign it, and then the signed list is encrypted using the key corresponding to the target decryption module to obtain the encrypted authorization trust list.

4. The method for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 1, characterized in that... The encryption module encrypts the approved media files and the multi-level authorized trust list, and further includes: Based on the approved media files output by the review module, digital fingerprint extraction is performed, and a unique digital certificate private key for the media file is generated by calling the hash algorithm of the encryption module. The signature processing is performed according to the private key of the digital certificate in the context of large file transmission in railways. By calling the private keys of at least two levels of digital certificates in the encryption module, the private keys of the digital certificates are encrypted sequentially to obtain the signature value of the multi-level digital signature. Based on the signature value and corresponding certificate chain of the multi-level digital signature, the signature file is structurally encapsulated. By packaging the signature value, certificate chain and the identification information of the original media file in a predetermined format, an audit signature file that can be independently distributed and verified is obtained. The audit signature file and the audited media file together constitute the encrypted media file.

5. The method for improving safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 1, characterized in that... The system performs data structure parsing on the verifiable file package, verifies the signature of the verifiable file package based on the obtained multi-level authorization trust list, and executes the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy based on the signature verification result, including: Data structure parsing is performed on the verifiable file package. Based on the decryption module, the audit signature file, the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list are separated from the verifiable file package to obtain the audit signature file to be verified, a copy of the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list. The encrypted authorized trust list and preset key are decrypted, and the copy of the audit signature file to be verified and the approved media file are verified based on the decrypted authorized trust list to obtain the verification result. If the verification result is successful, the approved media file will be added to the playback queue immediately. If the verification result is a signature failure, immediately mark the approved media files as not allowed to be played.

6. A system for enhancing safety of existing railway public electronic display terminals, characterized in that, include: The acquisition unit is used to install a preset password module on the existing railway public electronic screen playback control terminal and acquire the digital certificate used for multi-level review and signature. The processing unit is used to create a multi-level authorized trust list based on the digital certificate used for multi-level audit signing, and to obtain the media file to be played; The review unit is used to review the media files based on the preset review module and the digital certificate used for multi-level review signatures, and to obtain the review result and the approved media files. An encryption unit is used to encrypt the approved media file and the multi-level authorization trust list based on the encryption module, so as to obtain the encrypted media file and the encrypted multi-level authorization trust list. The distribution unit is used to distribute encrypted media files and encrypted multi-level authorization trust lists to the target terminal via online network or offline storage medium, and obtain a verifiable file package received by the terminal. The verification unit is used to perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, verify the signature of the verifiable file package based on the multi-level authorized trust list obtained from the parsing, and execute the preset railway public electronic screen playback strategy based on the signature verification result.

7. The system for enhancing safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 6, characterized in that, The review unit includes: The first review subunit is used to receive and preprocess the media file, and to verify and register the file format, size and integrity through the review module to obtain media file data to be reviewed that can be recognized by the review module. The second review subunit is used to perform in-depth content compliance review of the media file data to be reviewed. It uses preset image recognition and speech recognition algorithms to perform multimodal analysis on the images, text and speech of the media file, and compares them with preset manual review results. If they match, the media file is approved; if they do not match, the media file is rejected.

8. The system for enhancing safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 6, characterized in that, The encryption unit includes: The first encryption subunit is used to analyze and process multi-level authorization trust relationships based on a preset multi-level authorization trust list. By integrating and defining the certificate correspondence between the encryption modules and decryption modules that need to be mutually trusted in the audit module, a structured draft of multi-level authorization trust relationships to be signed is obtained. The second encryption subunit is used to issue and strengthen the transmission of the trust relationship based on the draft of the multi-level authorization trust relationship to be signed. It digitally signs the trust relationship by calling the root certificate of the encryption module, and then encrypts the signed list using the key corresponding to the target decryption module to obtain the encrypted authorization trust list.

9. The system for enhancing safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 6, characterized in that, The encryption unit further includes: The third encryption subunit is used to perform digital fingerprint extraction processing on the media file that has passed the review output by the review module, and generate a unique digital certificate private key for the media file by calling the hash algorithm of the encryption module. The fourth encryption subunit is used to perform signature processing in accordance with the railway large file transmission scenario based on the digital certificate private key. By calling the digital certificate private keys of at least two levels in the encryption module, the digital certificate private key is encrypted sequentially to obtain the signature value of the multi-level digital signature. The fifth encryption subunit is used to perform structured encapsulation processing of the signature file based on the signature value of the multi-level digital signature and the corresponding certificate chain. By packaging the signature value, certificate chain and the identification information of the original media file in a predetermined format, an audit signature file that can be independently distributed and verified is obtained. The audit signature file and the audited media file together constitute the encrypted media file.

10. The system for enhancing safety of existing railway public electronic screen playback terminals according to claim 6, characterized in that, The verification unit includes: The first verification subunit is used to perform data structure parsing processing on the verifiable file package, and to separate the audit signature file, the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list from the verifiable file package based on the decryption module, so as to obtain a copy of the audit signature file to be verified, the approved media file and the encrypted authorized trust list. The second verification subunit is used to decrypt the encrypted authorized trust list and the preset key, and to verify the copy of the audit signature file to be verified and the copy of the approved media file based on the decrypted authorized trust list, so as to obtain the verification result. The third verification subunit is used to immediately add the approved media file to the playback queue if the verification result is successful. The fourth verification subunit is used to immediately mark the approved media files as not allowed to be played if the verification result is a signature failure.

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