A digital car key authorization method, device, medium and product
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611543093.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-10-08
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-03
AI Technical Summary
Existing digital car key solutions suffer from degradation attacks and ranging spoofing, resulting in poor security and reliability. UWB ranging is not bound to the cryptographic decision logic for unlocking and authorization, allowing attackers to bypass UWB verification and leading to insufficient security and reliability.
By establishing a connection between the authorized terminal and the vehicle, a session context and authorization token are generated, secure ranging is performed, multimodal consistency adjudication is conducted using the vehicle-side security unit, ranging commitment is generated and authorization signature verification is performed, and cryptographic strong binding between ranging results and authorization decisions is achieved. Offline fine-grained authorization and immediate revocation are performed by combining attributed authorization tokens and cryptographic accumulators.
It effectively resists downgrade attacks and ranging spoofing, improves the security and reliability of digital car keys, achieves strong binding between ranging results and authorization decisions, supports offline authorization and instant revocation, and is suitable for vehicle sharing scenarios.
Smart Images
Figure CN123035463A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle network information security technology, and in particular to a digital car key authorization method, device, medium and product. Background Technology
[0002] Digital keys allow users to use smartphones or other mobile devices to replace traditional physical keys, enabling seamless unlocking, locking, and starting of vehicles. Currently, mainstream digital key solutions employ a multi-protocol architecture combining Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Ultra Wide Band (UWB). BLE handles device discovery and connection establishment, while UWB uses the physical time-of-flight of radio waves for secure ranging, theoretically resisting relay attacks based on signal amplification.
[0003] However, the existing technology has the following technical problems: First, there's the issue of downgrade attacks. In actual mass-produced systems, some models only use UWB ranging as an auxiliary reference and don't integrate it into the cryptographic decision-making logic for unlocking and authorization. Attackers can bypass UWB, forcing the system to revert to a verification path that relies solely on BLE, rendering UWB secure ranging ineffective and resulting in poor security.
[0004] Second, there is the problem of ranging spoofing. Existing solutions only verify the time-of-flight distance while ignoring the angle of arrival. Attackers can inject physical layer signals to make the receiver incorrectly estimate the time of arrival, thereby spoofing the actual distance from more than ten meters to within a few meters; or they can use a directional antenna to send UWB signals from the wrong direction, so the distance verification passes but the key is not actually in the authorized area, resulting in poor reliability. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The purpose of this application is to provide a digital car key authorization method, device, medium, and product to solve the problems of poor security and reliability.
[0006] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solution.
[0007] In one aspect, this application provides a digital car key authorization method, including the following steps.
[0008] The authorized terminal establishes a connection with the vehicle, generating a session context and an authorization token.
[0009] Based on the session context, secure ranging is performed between the authorized terminal and N ultra-wideband anchor points on the vehicle body to obtain ranging records; N≥3.
[0010] Based on the vehicle-side safety unit, a multimodal consistency decision is made on the ranging record to obtain the decision result.
[0011] Based on the ruling result and the session context, a ranging commitment is generated, and the data containing the ranging commitment is sent as a signature field to the vehicle owner's terminal for authorization signature verification to obtain the verification result.
[0012] Based on the verification result and the authorization token, the digital car key authorization operation is completed, and the corresponding vehicle operation is executed.
[0013] Secondly, this application provides a computer device, including: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the digital car key authorization method described above.
[0014] Thirdly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described digital car key authorization method.
[0015] Fourthly, this application provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described digital car key authorization method.
[0016] According to the specific embodiments provided in this application, this application has the following technical effects: This application establishes a connection between the authorized terminal and the vehicle, generating a session context and an authorization token; based on the session context, secure ranging is performed on the authorized terminal and N ultra-wideband anchor points on the vehicle body to obtain ranging records; based on the vehicle-side security unit, multimodal consistency adjudication is performed on the ranging records to obtain an adjudication result; based on the adjudication result and the session context, a ranging commitment is generated, and the data containing the ranging commitment is used as the signature field for authorization signature verification to obtain a verification result; This application achieves strong cryptographic binding between the ranging result and the authorization decision by using the data containing the ranging commitment as the signature field for authorization signature verification, making downgrade attacks that bypass UWB inevitably fail in the signature verification stage, thus solving the security vulnerability caused by UWB ranging only being used as an auxiliary reference in the prior art from a mechanism perspective; at the same time, by performing multimodal consistency adjudication on the ranging records, distance reduction attacks and direction blind zone attacks can be effectively detected, raising the implementation threshold of ranging spoofing attacks; based on the verification result and the authorization token, the authorization operation of the digital car key is completed, and the corresponding vehicle operation is executed, ensuring the security and reliability of the digital car key. Attached Figure Description
[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly described below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic flowchart of a digital car key authorization method provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0019] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating a multimodal conformity decision-making process is provided for one embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the timing of offline authorization and offline revocation as provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0020] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0021] To make the objectives, features and advantages of this application more apparent and understandable, the application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0022] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, this application provides a digital car key authorization method, including the following steps.
[0023] S1, instructs the authorized terminal to establish a connection with the vehicle, and generates a session context and authorization token.
[0024] S2, based on the session context, perform secure ranging between the authorized terminal and N ultra-wideband anchor points on the vehicle body to obtain ranging records; N≥3. Ultra-wideband: transmit signal -10dB, bandwidth not less than 500MHz, operating frequency 7163MHz–8812MHz.
[0025] S3, based on the vehicle-side safety unit, performs multimodal consistency adjudication on the ranging record to obtain the adjudication result.
[0026] S4. Based on the ruling result and the session context, a ranging commitment is generated, and the data containing the ranging commitment is sent as a signature field to the vehicle owner's terminal for authorization signature verification to obtain the verification result.
[0027] S5. Based on the verification result and the authorization token, complete the authorization operation of the digital car key and execute the corresponding vehicle operation.
[0028] This application incorporates the ranging commitment generated from the ranging record into the signature field of the unlock authorization signature, realizing a strong cryptographic binding of "ranging as a prerequisite for authorization"; and uses an attributed authorization token in conjunction with a cryptographic accumulator to achieve offline fine-grained authorization and instant revocation.
[0029] In one exemplary embodiment, S1 specifically includes the following steps.
[0030] S11, the authorized terminal establishes a connection with the vehicle and completes two-way authentication, negotiating to obtain the session context; the session context includes a session random number, a timestamp, and a request operation type. The authorized terminal is a mobile terminal, including smartphones and wearable devices, etc.
[0031] S12, obtain the permission attributes and validity period submitted by the authorized terminal.
[0032] S13, based on the vehicle-side security unit, assign an identifier to the authorized key, add the identifier to the valid authorization set, update the accumulator root of the password accumulator, and generate member witnesses according to the accumulator rules.
[0033] S14, use the vehicle master key to sign the identifier, the permission attribute, the validity period and the member witness, assemble the authorization token, and write it into the authorized terminal; the authorization token contains the authorized key allocation identifier, permission attribute, validity period and member witness.
[0034] In practical applications, the authorized terminal and the vehicle-side security unit establish a connection and complete two-way authentication via BLE, and the two parties negotiate a session context (BLE). context , ctx ), including session random numbers nonce_s timestamp t Request operation type op (Unlocking / starting / opening the trunk, etc.) and the authorization token held by the authorized terminal. token The vehicle-side safety unit is based on... ctx Generate challenge random numbers ( challenge , chal ).
[0035] in, kid Assign an identifier to the authorized key. attrs The permission attributes include information such as validity period, mileage, vehicle speed limit, drivable parts, and geofence. exp For the expiration date, witMember witness (used to prove that the key is still recognized as valid by the vehicle-side security unit; generated by the vehicle-side security unit, which can use a hash accumulator). Merkle Methods such as bilinear accumulators). For vehicle-side safety unit token The signature of the information.
[0036] In one exemplary embodiment, S2 specifically includes the following steps.
[0037] S21, based on the session context, perform bidirectional secure ranging based on scrambling timestamp sequences on the UWB transceiver of the authorized terminal and N UWB anchor points distributed on the vehicle body, and determine the result record of each UWB anchor point; the result record includes flight time distance, angle of arrival, and scrambling timestamp sequence number used in this ranging.
[0038] S22, record the results measured at each ultra-wideband anchor point as a distance measurement record.
[0039] In practical applications, after the authorized terminal securely connects to the vehicle-mounted security unit, the vehicle-mounted security unit performs bidirectional secure ranging based on a scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) using N (N≥3) UWB anchors distributed on its own vehicle. Different UWB modules of the vehicle-mounted security unit obtain the distance and direction of the authorized terminal relative to the vehicle and record them as: Time of Flight (ToF) distance. Angle of Arrival (AoA) The STS serial number used in this ranging measurement .
[0040] The vehicle-side safety unit records the results of this measurement at each UWB anchor point as the distance measurement record R.
[0041] In one exemplary embodiment, S3 specifically includes the following steps.
[0042] S31, based on the vehicle-side safety unit, calculate the fused distance according to the flight time distance in the ranging record.
[0043] S32, determine whether the fusion distance is less than the authorized threshold, and obtain the distance verification result.
[0044] S33. Based on the flight time distance of each ultra-wideband anchor point and the known installation coordinates, geometric intersection positioning is performed to obtain the relative position error and the key position.
[0045] S34, determine whether the relative position error is less than the distance threshold, and obtain the geometric intersection result.
[0046] S35, calculate the desired angle of arrival based on the key position.
[0047] S36, determine whether the difference between the measured angle of arrival and the expected angle of arrival is less than the angle window, and obtain the orientation verification result.
[0048] S37, when the distance verification result, the geometric intersection result, and the orientation verification result are all yes, the fused distance and fused orientation are obtained, and the decision result is determined to be pass; otherwise, the decision result is determined to be reject.
[0049] In practical applications, such as Figure 2 As shown, after establishing a Bluetooth connection negotiation session, the vehicle-side safety unit performs multi-anchor point multimodal safety ranging to acquire ranging record results. And the known installation locations of each UWB anchor point on the vehicle body. (Using...) Distance in Calculate the key's position relative to the car, then use the steering wheel. Verify that it is the side with the door open. The vehicle-side safety unit sequentially performs the following steps to perform multimodal consistency determination.
[0050] (1) Distance threshold verification: based on In Calculate the fusion distance (using methods such as the shortest distance), and determine whether the fusion distance is less than the authorized threshold. (Preset by the car manufacturer); if the fusion distance is greater than or equal to the authorized threshold If the key is not authorized, the door will be refused to open, the distance will be exceeded, and the anomaly will be recorded.
[0051] (2) Geometric intersection consistency: based on each UWB anchor point Geometric intersection positioning is performed with known anchor point coordinates, requiring the relative positional error of the distance measurement of each UWB anchor point to be less than a distance threshold. (e.g., 0.3 m) If the distance of a certain ranging point is shortened, it will be removed. If there are not enough remaining anchor points after removal, or the relative position error is still not less than the distance threshold, or the fused distance of the remaining points is still not less than the authorized threshold, the gate will be refused, the distance will be exceeded and an anomaly will be recorded.
[0052] (3) Orientation Consistency: Based on the key position obtained from the intersection in the above steps and the known installation positions of each UWB anchor point on the vehicle body, calculate the expected angle of arrival of the ranging signal to each UWB anchor point; based on Measured angle of arrival Determine whether the difference between the measured angle of arrival and the expected angle of arrival is less than the angle window. (Preset by the car manufacturer); if the difference is greater than or equal to If the directions are inconsistent, the door will be refused to open and the anomaly will be recorded.
[0053] (4) After all three items above have passed, the key location obtained from step (2) and Calculate fusion distance With integration direction The UWB multimodal decision result is recorded as valid=1; otherwise, it is rejected and an exception is recorded. Here, valid=1 indicates that the UWB multimodal decision passed this time, and the ranging result can be used to generate a ranging commitment; fused distance... The distance of this location relative to the vehicle reference point (origin of the vehicle coordinate system or authorized unlock reference point), fused with orientation. This is the azimuth angle of the location relative to the vehicle's reference orientation. Record the information and generate a ranging commitment and signature authentication in S4.
[0054] In one exemplary embodiment, S4 specifically includes the following steps.
[0055] S41, the fusion distance, fusion orientation, scrambling timestamp sequence number of each ultra-wideband anchor point, and the session context are concatenated and hashed using a cryptographic hash function to obtain the ranging commitment.
[0056] S42, based on the vehicle-side security unit, generate a challenge random number according to the session context.
[0057] S43, the challenge random number, the ranging commitment, and the authorization token are concatenated to obtain the data to be signed.
[0058] S44, based on the vehicle owner terminal, use the private key to sign the data to be signed to obtain an authorization signature, and use the public key to verify the authorization signature to obtain the verification result.
[0059] In practical applications, after the ruling is passed, the vehicle-side safety unit generates a ranging commitment. .
[0060] in, Here is the password hash function, and || indicates concatenation in sequence. Use a serial number for this distance measurement to indicate that it is a current measurement and not an old result.
[0061] The vehicle-side safety unit will challenge random numbers. chal Distance measurement commitment C With authorization token token By combining the data, complete verification data can be obtained: The vehicle-side safety unit will store the complete verification data. The digital car key on the owner's terminal is sent to the owner's terminal, where the owner's digital car key signs it using their private key, thus obtaining... In the future The message is sent back to the vehicle-side security unit. The vehicle-side security unit then uses the public key or certificate corresponding to this key (i.e., the authorized key allocation identifier kid) to... verify Can the driver confirm whether the visa verification is successful? If successful, the driver will open the door; if unsuccessful, the driver will not open the door. Sign in for this session where the door is open. To perform digital signature using the private key sk.
[0062] In one exemplary embodiment, S5 specifically includes the following steps.
[0063] S51, verify that the signature of the authorization token is valid and has not expired.
[0064] S52, extract the identifier and member witness from the authorization token and verify them with the accumulator root stored in the vehicle-side security unit.
[0065] S53, compare the permission attributes to determine whether the current context is within the authorized scope.
[0066] S54. When the signature is valid, the member witness verification is successful, the current context is within the authorized scope, and the authorized signature verification is successful, the corresponding vehicle operation is executed.
[0067] In one exemplary embodiment, after S5, the following steps are also included.
[0068] S6, obtain the vehicle owner token and signature revocation request presented by the vehicle owner terminal.
[0069] S7. After the vehicle-side security unit verifies the signature, it removes the corresponding identifier from the password accumulator and updates the accumulator root, causing the member whose authorization token was revoked to witness the failure of the verification of the relatively updated accumulator root.
[0070] like Figure 3 As shown, the vehicle owner terminal, the vehicle-side security unit, and the authorized terminal cooperate to sequentially complete multimodal security verification, issue shared tokens, and revoke offline, as detailed below.
[0071] Step 1: The vehicle owner's terminal establishes a Bluetooth connection with the vehicle's security unit and initiates a negotiation session. After successful session negotiation, the vehicle owner's terminal sends an authorization token. token , op For issuing sharing authorization. Vehicle-side security unit storage. ctx , token , op The information is sent and a success message is returned to the vehicle owner's terminal.
[0072] Step 2: The vehicle-mounted safety unit performs multi-anchor point ranging and generates ranging records. R Then, a multimodal consistency decision is made to generate a ranging commitment. C A successful ruling returns the data to be signed (TBS); a failure returns an exception.
[0073] Step 3: The vehicle owner's terminal uses the vehicle owner's key to sign and returns the session signature. σ The vehicle-side security unit verifies the signature result and returns the verification result to the vehicle owner's terminal.
[0074] Step 4: The vehicle owner submits the proposed grant on their terminal. attrs and exp Vehicle-side safety unit incorporated kid ,renew Acc_root ,generate wit Then, vehicle master key signature. σ_T Assembly token .
[0075] Step 5: The vehicle-side security unit writes data to the authorized terminal in the near field. token The authorized terminal returns the write result, and the vehicle-side security unit returns the result to the vehicle owner's terminal.
[0076] Step 6: The vehicle owner's terminal sends an authorization token. token , op To revoke. The vehicle-side security unit verifies the owner's token and signature.
[0077] Step 7: After verification and confirmation, the vehicle-side safety unit is removed. kid ,renew Acc_root The system then returns a message to the vehicle owner's terminal indicating that the cancellation has been completed.
[0078] In practical applications, (1) Attributed authorization token issuance: When a car owner wants to lend his car to someone else, he / she will... op Set up to issue a shared license. After S1-S4 are completed, the vehicle owner submits the license to be granted to the other party. attrs , exp The vehicle-mounted security unit assigns an identifier to the authorized key. kid Add it to the valid authorization set and update. Acc_root (The commitment root of the valid authorization set), generate member witnesses according to the accumulator rules. wit The vehicle-side security unit uses the vehicle master key pair ( kid , attrs , exp , wit Signature, get Finally, it is assembled into a shared authorization token. token It is written to the other party's mobile terminal via near field (NFC / BLE).
[0079] (2) Offline revocation: The password accumulator of the "valid authorization set" is maintained locally on the vehicle, and the root of the accumulator is Acc_root (The root of the valid authorization set). When a vehicle owner revokes a key, they must appear in person at the vehicle, present the owner's token, and sign the revocation request with the owner's private key. After the vehicle-side security unit verifies the signature and confirms the owner's identity, the in-vehicle security unit will... kid Remove from accumulator and update Acc_root No cloud access required.
[0080] (3) Offline verification: When the other party approaches the vehicle to open the door, complete steps one to four first. After the signature is verified, check the following three items in sequence. Only after all three items are verified can the operation be performed.
[0081] a. Signature issued using a vehicle public key verification token Valid and not expired. .
[0082] b. The vehicle-mounted security unit retrieves the token. kid and wit , and stored within the security unit Acc_root Perform verification.
[0083] c. Comparison attrs Determine whether the current conditions are all within the authorized scope.
[0084] This application applies to shared scenarios such as lending vehicles to family members, designated drivers, and logistics personnel, and does not go through a cloud platform.
[0085] The technical solution of this application will be further elaborated below, starting from specific practical application scenarios.
[0086] Practical application scenario 1: Sharing digital car keys in the home.
[0087] Scenario: The car owner lends the vehicle to a family member temporarily, only on weekdays from 8:00 to 20:00, with a speed not exceeding 80km / h, a mileage not exceeding 200km, and the trunk cannot be opened.
[0088] After the vehicle owner approaches the vehicle to complete the distance measurement and conversation verification, the above settings are configured. attrs Permission attributes; the vehicle-side security unit generates a shared token, which is then written to family members' mobile terminals in the near field.
[0089] When a family member opens the door, an initial shared token is used to perform multi-anchor distance measurement. Once the distance measurement is successful, If you request to open the trunk, it exceeds... attrs They were rejected.
[0090] After the vehicle owner approaches the vehicle again to complete the authentication and signature verification, the authorization is revoked and the update is performed. Acc_root When a family member tried to open the door again, the member verification failed and the door was refused.
[0091] Practical application scenario 2: Defending against relay + downgrade combined attacks.
[0092] Scenario: An attacker sets up a BLE relay between the car owner (actually located in an office 30m away) and the vehicle, and attempts to bypass UWB.
[0093] Bluetooth connection can be established successfully, but without actual UWB ranging, the vehicle-side security unit cannot obtain the measured results and cannot make a ranging commitment consistent with the local field. The ranging commitment C forged by the attacker does not match the value that the vehicle-side security unit should have, and the session verification fails. Operation denied.
[0094] Practical application scenario 3: Resisting distance reduction and direction deception.
[0095] (1) If the distance from a certain anchor point is shortened, the geometric intersection will eliminate that point, and the remaining positioning will still exceed the limit. Therefore, they refused.
[0096] (2) The distance measurement signal was sent from the rear of the vehicle. The distance was close enough, but the angle of arrival was inconsistent with the expected azimuth and was therefore rejected.
[0097] This application can achieve the following effects.
[0098] 1. Mechanism-level anti-downgrade: The ranging commitment C is incorporated into the authorized signature domain, and downgrade attacks that bypass UWB will inevitably fail during the signature verification stage, thus solving the security vulnerability of the existing system where "UWB is only used as an auxiliary reference".
[0099] 2. Multimodal anti-ranging spoofing: Time of flight (ToF) + angle of arrival (AoA) + multi-anchor geometric intersection consistency joint adjudication can detect distance reduction attacks (outlier anchor removal) and direction blind zone attacks (angle of arrival orientation verification), significantly raising the threshold for ranging spoofing attacks.
[0100] 3. Offline fine-grained authorization and instant revocation: Attributed tokens + password accumulator enable fully offline fine-grained authorization at the time / mileage / vehicle speed / location / fence level. Revoked keys become invalid immediately, eliminating dependence on the cloud and adapting to weak network / no network scenarios.
[0101] 4. High compatibility: Compatible with the Car Connectivity Consortium (CCC) digital key, ultra-wideband (UWB) + Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) + Secure Element (SE) hardware ecosystem, and can be deployed as its security enhancement layer.
[0102] 5. Auditability: Abnormal ranging and authorized events are stored locally, supporting post-event evidence collection.
[0103] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps in the above-described method embodiments. The computer device can be a server or a terminal. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, an input / output interface (I / O), and a communication interface. The processor, memory, and I / O interface are connected via a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus via the I / O interface. The processor of the computer device provides computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device stores data to be processed. The I / O interface of the computer device is used to exchange information between the processor and external devices. The communication interface of the computer device is used to connect and communicate with an external terminal via a network. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the above-described methods.
[0104] In one exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above-described method embodiments.
[0105] In one exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above-described method embodiments.
[0106] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of the relevant data must comply with relevant regulations.
[0107] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by computer program instructions and related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the above method embodiments. Any references to memory, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM).
[0108] The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, etc., and are not limited to these.
[0109] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.
[0110] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and core ideas of this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of this application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.
Claims
1. A digital car key authorization method, characterized in that, include: The authorized terminal establishes a connection with the vehicle, generating a session context and an authorization token. Based on the session context, secure ranging is performed between the authorized terminal and N ultra-wideband anchor points on the vehicle body to obtain ranging records; N≥3; Based on the vehicle-side safety unit, a multimodal consistency decision is made on the ranging record to obtain the decision result; Based on the ruling result and the session context, a ranging commitment is generated, and the data containing the ranging commitment is sent as a signature field to the vehicle owner's terminal for authorization signature verification to obtain the verification result; Based on the verification result and the authorization token, the digital car key authorization operation is completed, and the corresponding vehicle operation is executed.
2. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The authorized terminal establishes a connection with the vehicle, generating a session context and authorization token, specifically including: The authorized terminal establishes a connection with the vehicle and completes two-way authentication, negotiating to obtain the session context; the session context includes a session random number, a timestamp, and a request operation type. Obtain the permission attributes and validity period submitted by the authorized terminal; Based on the vehicle-side security unit, an identifier is assigned to the authorized key, the identifier is added to the valid authorization set, the accumulator root of the password accumulator is updated, and member witnesses are generated according to the accumulator rules. The vehicle master key is used to sign the identifier, the permission attribute, the validity period, and the member witness to assemble the authorization token, which is then written to the authorized terminal. The authorization token contains the authorized key allocation identifier, permission attribute, validity period, and member witness.
3. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the session context, secure ranging is performed between the authorized terminal and N ultra-wideband anchor points on the vehicle body to obtain ranging records, specifically including: Based on the session context, bidirectional secure ranging based on scrambling timestamp sequences is performed between the authorized terminal's ultrawideband transceiver and N ultrawideband anchor points distributed on the vehicle body, and the result records measured at each ultrawideband anchor point are determined; the result records include flight time distance, angle of arrival, and scrambling timestamp sequence number used in this ranging. The results measured at each ultra-wideband anchor point are recorded as distance measurement records.
4. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the vehicle-mounted safety unit, a multimodal consistency decision is made on the ranging records to obtain the decision result, which specifically includes: Based on the vehicle-mounted safety unit, the fused distance is calculated according to the flight time distance in the ranging record; Determine whether the fusion distance is less than the authorized threshold to obtain the distance verification result; Geometric intersection positioning is performed based on the flight time distance of each ultra-wideband anchor point and the known installation coordinates to obtain the relative position error and the key position; Determine whether the relative position error is less than a distance threshold to obtain the geometric intersection result; Calculate the desired angle of arrival based on the key position; Determine whether the difference between the measured angle of arrival and the expected angle of arrival is less than the angle window to obtain the azimuth verification result; When the distance verification result, the geometric intersection result, and the orientation verification result are all yes, the fused distance and fused orientation are obtained, and the decision result is determined to be pass; otherwise, the decision result is determined to be reject.
5. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Based on the ruling and the session context, a ranging commitment is generated, and data containing the ranging commitment is sent as a signature field to the vehicle owner's terminal for authorization signature verification, resulting in a verification result, specifically including: The ranging commitment is obtained by concatenating and hashing the fusion distance, fusion orientation, scrambling timestamp sequence number of each ultra-wideband anchor point and the session context using a cryptographic hash function. Based on the vehicle-side security unit, a challenge random number is generated according to the session context; The challenge random number, the ranging commitment, and the authorization token are concatenated to obtain the data to be signed; Based on the vehicle owner's terminal, the authorized signature is obtained by signing the data to be signed using a private key, and the authorized signature is verified using a public key to obtain the verification result.
6. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the verification result and the authorization token, after completing the digital car key authorization operation and executing the corresponding vehicle operation, the process further includes: Obtain the vehicle owner's token and signature revocation request displayed on the vehicle owner's terminal; Once the vehicle-side security unit verifies the signature, it removes the corresponding identifier from the password accumulator and updates the accumulator root, causing the member whose authorization token was revoked to witness the failure of the verification of the relatively updated accumulator root.
7. The digital car key authorization method according to claim 6, characterized in that, Based on the verification result and the authorization token, the digital car key authorization operation is completed, and the corresponding vehicle operation is executed, specifically including: Verify that the signature of the authorization token is valid and has not expired; Extract the identifier and member witness from the authorization token and verify them against the accumulator root stored in the vehicle-side security unit; By comparing the aforementioned permission attributes, determine whether the current context is within the authorized scope; When the signature is valid, the member witness verification passes, the current context is within the authorized scope, and the authorized signature verification passes, the corresponding vehicle operation is executed.
8. A computer device, comprising: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that the processor executes the computer program to implement the digital car key authorization method according to any one of claims 1-7.
9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the digital car key authorization method as described in any one of claims 1-7.
10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the digital car key authorization method as described in any one of claims 1-7.