A method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium for secure encryption of power privacy data.
By using quantum key distribution and differential synchronization of session keys derived from device feature values, combined with adaptive encryption algorithms and homomorphic encryption technology, the problems of high key rotation transmission overhead and device adaptation in cloud-edge collaborative scenarios are solved, achieving a balance between security and performance, and ensuring the security and accuracy of power data transmission and computation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611286345.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-24
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-10
AI Technical Summary
Existing encryption schemes suffer from high overhead in key rotation and transmission in cloud-edge collaborative scenarios, and their encryption algorithms are difficult to adapt to heterogeneous devices, resulting in weakened anti-cracking capabilities and risks of privacy data leakage, and the calculation results are difficult to verify.
A seed key is generated using a quantum key distribution protocol, and a session key is derived by combining the device's feature value. Only the differential value is transmitted for key rotation. An appropriate encryption algorithm is selected based on the device type. Additive homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proof are used for data aggregation and verification. Threshold secret sharing algorithm and smart contracts are combined for key management.
It enables low-bandwidth transmission with high-frequency key rotation in heterogeneous edge computing environments, balancing the computing power advantages of high-performance devices with the battery life requirements of low-power devices, ensuring data transmission security and the accuracy of calculation results, and preventing privacy leaks and attacks.
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Figure CN123074705A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of power information security technology, and in particular to a method, device, electronic device, and storage medium for encrypting power privacy data. Background Technology
[0002] As a critical national infrastructure, the secure transmission of operational data from the power system directly impacts grid stability and national security. With the advancement of new power system construction, edge computing nodes are being deployed on a large scale in power sites such as substations and distribution rooms. Business data generated by power terminals needs to be frequently transmitted and collaboratively processed between different edge nodes, and between edge nodes and the cloud. In this cloud-edge collaborative scenario, data transmission security faces a series of challenges.
[0003] At the key update level, while existing quantum key distribution technologies can defend against quantum computing attacks, their key generation rate is orders of magnitude slower than the demands of massive data transmission. In practical deployments, this necessitates reducing the key rotation frequency, significantly weakening anti-cracking capabilities. At the device adaptation level, edge computing nodes in the power industry encompass a full spectrum of devices, from battery-powered low-power acquisition devices to high-performance servers with graphics processors. Using a unified encryption algorithm cannot simultaneously address the battery life requirements of low-power devices and the computing power advantages of high-performance devices. Furthermore, when multiple edge nodes participate in encrypted collaborative computation, there is a risk of privacy leaks to the original data from each party, and the correctness of the computation results is difficult to reliably verify. Summary of the Invention
[0004] This application provides a method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium for encrypting power privacy data, solving the problems of high key rotation transmission overhead and difficulty in adapting encryption algorithms to heterogeneous devices in existing encryption schemes under cloud-edge collaborative scenarios. The method is applied to edge nodes and includes: The system acquires the service data to be transmitted; acquires the seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, and derives a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; during key rotation, it calculates the difference between the current session key and the previous session key, and transmits the difference to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can restore the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference; according to the device type, it uses the corresponding encryption algorithm to encrypt the service data to obtain ciphertext; and transmits the ciphertext to the receiving edge node through a secure transmission protocol.
[0005] This application uses edge nodes as the execution entities and derives session keys by combining seed keys generated by a preset quantum key distribution protocol with device feature values, thus binding the keys to specific edge node hardware. During key rotation, only the difference between the current key and the previous key is transmitted, rather than the complete key, which significantly reduces the rotation transmission overhead and enables high-frequency key rotation to be performed even in narrowband transmission environments. By adopting corresponding encryption algorithms according to device type, high-performance devices can leverage their computing power advantages, while low-power devices can adapt to power consumption constraints with lower computational overhead, achieving a balance between performance and security in heterogeneous edge computing environments.
[0006] Further, the step of obtaining a seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, deriving a session key based on the seed key and device feature values, and calculating the difference between the current session key and the previous session key during key rotation, transmitting the difference value to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can reconstruct the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference value, includes: The device feature value is processed and used as a salt value parameter. The current session key is derived based on the seed key and the salt value parameter through a preset key derivation mechanism. The current session key and the previous session key are XORed bitwise, and a preset length of bits is truncated as the difference value. The difference value is transmitted to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can XOR the previous session key and the difference value bitwise to restore the current session key.
[0007] This application binds the session key to the specific edge node hardware by processing the device's characteristic value and using it as a salt value parameter in key derivation. Even if the seed key is leaked, a valid session key cannot be derived. By using bitwise XOR operations to extract a portion of bits as the difference value, key synchronization can be completed by transmitting only a small number of bits, significantly reducing the round-robin bandwidth overhead. The receiver can restore the current key by XORing the previous session key and the difference value, without needing to receive the complete key, further compressing the amount of data transmitted.
[0008] Furthermore, it also includes: The system receives and stores key fragments distributed from the cloud; wherein the fragmentation parameters of the key fragments are determined based on a regional security score calculated from multiple security dimension quantification parameters; the key fragments are obtained by splitting the master key through a threshold secret sharing algorithm and distributed from the cloud to the edge nodes; the encryption key of the corresponding encryption algorithm is derived from the master key after multiple edge nodes storing the key fragments jointly reconstruct the master key.
[0009] This application collects quantitative parameters from multiple security dimensions and calculates regional security scores, enabling key sharding parameters to be dynamically determined based on the security posture of the operating environment. Different security scores correspond to different sharding quantities and threshold values, achieving on-demand matching of key sharding protection strength with security posture. By using a threshold secret sharing algorithm to split and distribute the master key, attackers cannot recover the master key even if they compromise a single edge node. After reconstructing the master key jointly by multiple edge nodes, encryption keys are derived. The encryption keys do not reside on any single node for a long time, reducing the risk of key leakage.
[0010] Furthermore, the step of encrypting the business data using a corresponding encryption algorithm based on the device type includes: When the service data is from an edge server with a graphics processor, a first encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the service data and the data is accelerated by the graphics processor. When the service data comes from a battery-powered device, the service data is encrypted on the device using a second encryption algorithm to obtain the encrypted service data. The computational overhead of the second encryption algorithm is lower than that of the first encryption algorithm. When the service data is in a cross-domain transmission mode, a third encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the service data. The third encryption algorithm is a quantum-resistant encryption algorithm.
[0011] This application enables high-performance servers with graphics processors to leverage their computing power to achieve low-latency encryption by adapting different encryption algorithms according to the hardware capabilities or working modes of edge nodes, while battery-powered devices extend their battery life with lower computational overhead. In cross-domain transmission mode, anti-quantum computing algorithms are used to defend against threats in the post-quantum era, achieving an optimal balance between security, power consumption, and latency in heterogeneous edge computing environments.
[0012] Furthermore, prior to encrypting the business data, the method further includes: The identity of the receiving edge node initiating the communication is authenticated; wherein, the identity authentication of the receiving edge node initiating the communication includes: reading the device feature value of the built-in security chip, obtaining the time data and location coordinates of the preset positioning system, performing a hash operation on the device feature value, the time data, and the location coordinates to generate a spatiotemporal stamp signature; storing the device feature value, the signature private key, and the session key in a local trusted execution environment security domain, wherein the trusted execution environment security domain is physically isolated from the business domain; and performing the identity authentication of the receiving edge node based on the spatiotemporal stamp signature within the trusted execution environment security domain.
[0013] This application generates a spatiotemporal stamp signature by combining chip device feature values, time data, and location coordinates, enabling identity authentication to simultaneously bind device uniqueness, time validity, and geographical location, effectively defending against replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks; core security parameters are isolated and stored in a trusted execution environment security domain, so even if the business domain is compromised, the authentication key will not be leaked, providing end-to-end zero-trust security for cross-domain data transmission.
[0014] Furthermore, after transmitting the ciphertext to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol, the method further includes: The local ciphertext is encrypted using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm. The encrypted homomorphic ciphertext is then uploaded to the cloud, allowing the cloud to aggregate the homomorphic ciphertext uploaded by each edge node in ciphertext mode. A zero-knowledge proof is generated and attached to the homomorphic ciphertext to verify the correctness of the calculation without exposing the business data. After the zero-knowledge proof is verified, the aggregation result is jointly decrypted with other edge nodes using a threshold method, and injected noise is removed to restore the business result.
[0015] This application achieves data aggregation in ciphertext state through additive homomorphic encryption, ensuring that the cloud and intermediate nodes never access the plaintext; it verifies the correctness of the calculation through zero-knowledge proof to prevent malicious nodes from submitting and tampering with the data, thus protecting the privacy of business data of all parties while ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the collaborative calculation results; and through a threshold decryption mechanism, no single node can decrypt the aggregation result alone, further enhancing the security of collaborative computing.
[0016] Furthermore, when the data lifecycle ends, it also includes: The disk sectors storing the business data are physically overwritten, and cascading deletion instructions are sent to other edge nodes that store the key fragments, so that the other edge nodes synchronously delete the key fragments associated with the business data; the key fragments and session keys associated with the business data stored locally are deleted; a hash fingerprint is generated for the deletion operation, the hash fingerprint is uploaded to the consortium blockchain, and automatic auditing is performed through smart contracts to generate an immutable destruction record.
[0017] This application ensures that business data is unrecoverable through physical overwriting; it achieves encrypted erasure by cascading deletion of associated key fragments and session keys, so that even if a ciphertext copy remains, it cannot be mathematically decrypted because the key has been destroyed; and it records the destruction proof through consortium blockchain and smart contracts, ensuring that the audit records are tamper-proof and meet compliance audit requirements.
[0018] This application also provides a power privacy data security encryption device, comprising: The system includes a data acquisition module for acquiring business data to be transmitted; a key rotation module for acquiring a seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, and deriving a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; during key rotation, calculating the difference between the current session key and the previous session key, and transmitting the difference to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can reconstruct the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference; and an encrypted transmission module for encrypting the business data using a corresponding encryption algorithm according to the device type to obtain ciphertext, and transmitting the ciphertext to the receiving edge node through a secure transmission protocol.
[0019] This application also provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the power privacy data security encryption method as described in any of the preceding claims.
[0020] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the power privacy data security encryption method as described in any of the preceding claims. Attached Figure Description
[0021] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for securely encrypting power privacy data according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the session key differential synchronization process provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the encryption, collaborative computing, and data destruction process provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a system architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a power privacy data security encryption device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0022] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0023] In the description of the embodiments of this application, technical terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish different objects and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number, specific order, or primary and secondary relationship of the indicated technical features. In the description of the embodiments of this application, "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly defined.
[0024] In this document, the term "embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment may be included in at least one embodiment of this application. The appearance of this phrase in various places throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it a separate or alternative embodiment mutually exclusive with other embodiments. It will be explicitly and implicitly understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described herein can be combined with other embodiments.
[0025] In the description of the embodiments in this application, the term "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone. In addition, the character " / " in this document generally indicates that the related objects before and after it have an "or" relationship.
[0026] In the description of the embodiments of this application, the term "multiple" refers to two or more (including two), similarly, "multiple sets" refers to two or more (including two sets), and "multiple pieces" refers to two or more (including two pieces).
[0027] This embodiment provides a method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium for encrypting power privacy data. The method is implemented through collaboration between a power terminal, a sending edge node, a receiving edge node, and the cloud.
[0028] Reference Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the system architecture provided in this embodiment. This solution involves four types of devices: cloud, sending edge node, receiving edge node, and power terminal.
[0029] The cloud-based deployment includes a key management server, a quantum key distribution server, and a blockchain audit server. The key management server is responsible for generating the master key, determining key sharding parameters based on regional security scores, and splitting the master key into several key shards using a threshold secret sharing algorithm before distributing them to each edge node. The quantum key distribution server is responsible for generating a seed key using a pre-defined quantum key distribution protocol and distributing it to each edge node. The blockchain audit server is responsible for receiving full-process operation logs and destruction records, storing them on the blockchain, and executing automatic auditing through smart contracts.
[0030] Power terminals are deployed at power sites such as distribution transformers, power lines, and terminal data collection points. They are responsible for collecting business data, performing privacy desensitization processing on the collected business data, and pre-encrypting the desensitized data using a lightweight encryption algorithm when operating in battery-powered mode.
[0031] The sending edge node is the main implementer of this method and is deployed in locations such as the core computer room of a substation and the regional power edge gateway. The sending edge node receives business data uploaded by the power terminal and performs functions such as identity authentication, key fragment storage, session key derivation and differential synchronization, data encryption and ciphertext transmission.
[0032] The receiving edge node receives the ciphertext transmitted by the sending edge node and performs functions such as session key restoration, channel decryption, and collaborative computing.
[0033] Reference Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the power privacy data security encryption method provided in this embodiment. This embodiment provides a power privacy data security encryption method applied to a sending edge node, including the following steps: Step 101: Obtain the business data to be transmitted.
[0034] In this embodiment, the sending edge node acquires the service data to be transmitted. This service data is collected by a power terminal deployed at the power site, preprocessed locally, and then uploaded. Specifically, it includes the following steps: Step 1011: Data collection and desensitization.
[0035] The power terminal collects raw business data generated at the power site. For static privacy identifiers in the business data, irreversible rule-based hashing is used to replace them, hiding plaintext identity information. These static privacy identifiers include, but are not limited to, device number, terminal ID, user profile number, and transformer area identifier. For continuous numerical privacy data in the business data, adaptive Laplace differential privacy dynamic noise addition is used. This continuous numerical privacy data includes, but is not limited to, power load curves, time-of-use electricity consumption, and voltage and current time-series data. During the noise addition process, the noise coefficient is adjusted according to the amplitude and sensitivity of the power data.
[0036] This step removes identifying information that could pinpoint specific devices and users by de-identifying the data before it enters the encryption process. At the same time, it preserves the statistical characteristics of the data by injecting differential noise, providing a privacy protection foundation for subsequent encrypted collaborative computation.
[0037] Step 1012: Pre-encryption processing of low-power devices.
[0038] When the power terminal is a battery-powered device, after de-identifying the business data, it further pre-encrypts the de-identified data using a second encryption algorithm. The sending edge node obtains the pre-encrypted business data. The computational overhead of the second encryption algorithm is lower than that of the first encryption algorithm used by the sending edge node in subsequent steps. As a specific example of this embodiment, the second encryption algorithm uses the ChaCha20-Poly1305 lightweight encryption algorithm. These power terminals are equipped with milliwatt-level low-power chips, have limited computing power and storage resources, and are extremely sensitive to battery life and power consumption. They are widely deployed in scenarios such as distribution stations, lines, and terminal data collection. The ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm has low computational overhead and does not require complex computing power support. It can reduce the terminal encryption power consumption by about 60%, extending the device's battery life while ensuring encryption security, and avoiding device downtime or battery collapse caused by high-strength encryption. It is understood that in other embodiments, the second encryption algorithm can also be replaced with other lightweight encryption algorithms.
[0039] This step pre-encrypts the data using a low-computational-overhead second encryption algorithm on a battery-powered terminal, enabling low-power devices to encrypt data under extremely low computing power conditions. The sending edge node obtains the encrypted business data during the data acquisition stage, thus balancing terminal battery life and data security.
[0040] Step 1013: Authenticate the identity of the receiving edge node.
[0041] In this embodiment, after acquiring the service data to be transmitted and before encrypting the service data, the sending edge node authenticates the receiving edge node that initiated the communication. Subsequent operations can only be performed after successful authentication; otherwise, communication is blocked. Specifically, this includes the following steps: Step 10131: Device fingerprint generation.
[0042] The sending edge node reads the device characteristic value (i.e., the physical unclonable function characteristic value) from its built-in security chip, obtains the time data and location coordinates of the preset positioning system, performs a hash operation on the aforementioned device characteristic value, time data, and location coordinates, and generates a spatiotemporal stamp signature. This spatiotemporal stamp signature simultaneously binds the device's uniqueness, time validity, and geographical location.
[0043] Step 10132: Trusted Execution Environment Security Domain Storage and Isolation.
[0044] The system of the sending edge node is divided into a business domain and a trusted execution environment (TEE) security domain through a trusted execution environment (TEE) security domain hardware architecture. The two domains achieve complete isolation of memory and computing resources at the physical layer. The aforementioned device characteristics, signature private keys, and subsequently derived session keys are encrypted and stored separately in the TEE security domain, and the business domain has no read or write permissions. All core computational logic for identity authentication and signature verification runs in a closed loop within the TEE security domain.
[0045] Step 10133: Authentication execution.
[0046] Within the aforementioned trusted execution environment security domain, the receiver edge node is authenticated based on the aforementioned spatiotemporal stamp signature. As a specific example of this embodiment, authentication employs a lightweight authentication protocol with a signature generation latency of less than 10ms, supporting 100,000 concurrent authentications per second. It is understood that in other embodiments, the aforementioned performance parameters can be adjusted according to the actual hardware configuration.
[0047] This step generates a spatiotemporal stamp signature by combining device feature values, time data, and location coordinates, enabling identity authentication to simultaneously bind device uniqueness, time validity, and geographical location, effectively defending against replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. By isolating and storing core security parameters within a trusted execution environment security domain, even if the business domain is compromised, the authentication key will not be leaked, providing end-to-end zero-trust security for cross-domain data transmission.
[0048] Step 102: Derive the session key based on the seed key and device feature value, calculate the differential value and transmit it to the receiving edge node.
[0049] In this embodiment, the sending edge node obtains a seed key issued by the cloud, derives a session key based on the seed key and device feature values, calculates the difference between the current session key and the previous session key during key rotation, and transmits this difference to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can reconstruct the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference. Specifically, this includes the following steps: Step 1021: Receive the key fragments distributed from the cloud.
[0050] In this embodiment, the sending edge node receives and stores key fragments distributed from the cloud. The fragmentation parameters of these key fragments are determined based on a regional security score calculated from multiple security dimension quantification parameters. The key fragments are obtained by splitting the master key using a threshold secret sharing algorithm and are distributed from the cloud to each edge node. The encryption key for the encryption algorithm is derived from the reconstructed master key by multiple edge nodes storing the key fragments.
[0051] Specifically, key sharding is generated and managed by a key management server in the cloud. The cloud collects quantitative parameters from five security dimensions: physical security, network threat, data sensitivity, compliance requirements, and dynamic risk. The physical security dimension assesses the region's physical protection capabilities, including but not limited to device protection levels and access control stringency; its quantitative parameters are obtained from security audit reports and device specifications. The network threat dimension quantifies the network attack risks faced by the region, including but not limited to attack frequency, number of vulnerabilities, and peak DDoS attack traffic; its quantitative parameters are collected in real-time from intrusion detection systems and vulnerability scanning tools. The data sensitivity dimension assigns values based on data type and access permission complexity; its quantitative parameters are generated based on data classification strategies and access control lists. The compliance requirements dimension reflects the stringency of regulatory standards that the region must meet; its quantitative parameters are determined through compliance assessment reports and audit records. The dynamic risk dimension consists of real-time event-driven adjustment items, including but not limited to APT attack warnings and holiday security level upgrades; its quantitative parameters are dynamically obtained from threat intelligence platforms and security information event management systems.
[0052] The cloud platform performs weighted fusion of the quantitative parameters from the above five dimensions to obtain the regional security score, calculated using the following formula: In the formula, For safety rating, For the first The rating of each parameter For the first The weighting coefficients of each parameter score, The total number of parameters is given. Based on the range of the regional security score, the number of shards N and the threshold value K in the key sharding parameters are determined. As a specific example of this embodiment: when the regional security score is greater than or equal to 0.8, it belongs to a high-sensitivity region, requiring N=5 shards and at least K=3 nodes to collaboratively reconstruct the key; when the regional security score is greater than or equal to 0.6 and less than 0.8, it belongs to a medium-sensitivity region, requiring N=3 shards and at least K=2 nodes to collaboratively reconstruct the key; when the regional security score is less than 0.6, it belongs to a low-sensitivity region, requiring N=2 shards and at least K=1 nodes to collaboratively reconstruct the key. It is understood that in other embodiments, the above-mentioned threshold values and parameter values can be adjusted according to actual needs.
[0053] The cloud generates a 256-bit master key based on elliptic curve cryptography, and generates a random number seed in combination with the physical unclonable function of the device to enhance key randomness. The shard density is divided according to the regional security level, and the shard positions are dynamically updated through the blockchain smart contract, ensuring that the shard distribution is strongly bound to the geographic location. According to the above key shard parameters, the cloud splits the master key into N shards through a threshold secret sharing algorithm, which are distributively stored in each edge node, and at least K nodes are required to cooperate to reconstruct the key (K<N). When an edge node needs to perform data encryption, multiple edge nodes storing key shards jointly reconstruct the master key, and derive an encryption key based on the reconstructed master key.
[0054] In this step, quantitative parameters are collected from multiple security dimensions and the regional security score is calculated, so that the key shard parameters can be dynamically determined according to the security posture of the operating environment, and different security scores correspond to different numbers of shards and threshold values, realizing on-demand matching of the key shard protection strength and the security posture; the master key is split and distributively stored through the threshold secret sharing algorithm, so that an attacker cannot restore the master key even if a single edge node is compromised; the encryption key is derived after multiple edge nodes jointly reconstruct the master key, and the encryption key does not reside in any single node for a long time, reducing the risk of key leakage.
[0055] Step 1022: Obtain a seed key, and derive the current session key using the device characteristic value as a salt value.
[0056] In this embodiment, the sender edge node processes the local device characteristic value as a salt parameter, and derives the current session key based on the above seed key and the above salt parameter through a preset key derivation mechanism.
[0057] Specifically, refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 which is a schematic flowchart of session key differential synchronization provided in this embodiment, and the step of deriving the session key corresponds to step 201 in Figure 2 . The sender edge node obtains the seed key generated by the quantum key distribution server in the cloud through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, processes the local device characteristic value as a salt parameter, uses the seed key as the key root and the above salt parameter as the salt value through a preset key derivation mechanism, performs multiple rounds of iterative expansion, and derives the 128-bit seed key into a 256-bit session key. This derivation process is independently executed locally on the sender edge node, without the need for the cloud to participate in secondary operations, which reduces the cloud computing power pressure and transmission delay. As a specific example of this embodiment, the cloud generates 128-bit seed keys in batches every 30 seconds and distributes them to each edge node. It is understandable that in other embodiments, the generation period and key length can be adjusted according to actual security requirements.
[0058] This step involves processing the device's characteristic values and using them as salt parameters in key derivation, thus binding the session key to the specific edge node hardware. Even if the seed key is leaked during transmission, attackers will not be able to derive a valid session key.
[0059] Step 1023: Perform a bitwise XOR operation on the current session key and the previous session key, and extract a preset length of bits as the difference value.
[0060] In this embodiment, during key rotation, the sending edge node performs a bitwise XOR operation on the current session key and the previous session key, extracting a preset length of bits as the difference value. Figure 2 Step 202. Specifically, let K be the session key from the previous round stored locally at the sending edge node, and K' be the newly derived session key for this round. Perform a 256-bit global bitwise XOR operation on K and K' to obtain the key difference sequence. Truncate a preset length of bits from this key difference sequence as the difference value. As a specific example of this embodiment, the highest 16 valid bits of the key difference sequence are truncated as the difference value. It is understood that in other embodiments, the truncated bit length can be adjusted according to the balance requirements of security and bandwidth.
[0061] This step extracts a subset of bits as the differential value using a bitwise XOR operation. Only a small number of bits need to be transmitted to represent key changes, providing a foundation for efficient transmission of subsequent differential synchronization.
[0062] Step 1024: Transmit the differential value to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can restore the current session key based on the previous session key and the differential value.
[0063] In this embodiment, the sending edge node transmits the aforementioned differential value to the receiving edge node, so that the receiving edge node can reconstruct the current session key based on the previous round session key and the aforementioned differential value. Figure 2 Steps 203 to 204 are described below. Specifically, the sending edge node only transmits the truncated differential value to the receiving edge node, without transmitting the complete session key. The receiving edge node retains the previous round's session key K, keeps the lower 240 bits of K locally, replaces the higher differential bits with the received differential value, and reconstructs the complete 256-bit key differential sequence. Based on the XOR reversibility property, the current round's session key K' is restored. Bandwidth usage is reduced by approximately 70% compared to transmitting the complete session key.
[0064] This step significantly reduces the bandwidth overhead of key rotation by transmitting only the differential value instead of the complete key, enabling high-frequency key rotation to be performed even in narrowband transmission environments. The receiver can restore the current key by XORing the previous session key and the differential value, making the synchronization process simple and efficient.
[0065] Step 103: Encrypt the business data using the corresponding encryption algorithm according to the device type, and transmit the encrypted data to the receiving edge node.
[0066] In this embodiment, the sending edge node encrypts the aforementioned service data using a corresponding encryption algorithm based on the device type, obtaining ciphertext, and then transmits the ciphertext to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol. The sending edge node selects an appropriate encryption algorithm based on its own hardware capabilities or operating mode. Specifically, this includes the following steps: Step 1031: Encryption of high-performance server.
[0067] When the sending edge node is a high-performance edge server with a graphics processing unit (GPU), the first encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the business data, and the GPU is used for acceleration. As a specific example of this embodiment, the first encryption algorithm uses the CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme, combined with a GPU acceleration library to achieve an encryption latency of less than 50ms. Such high-performance edge servers are equipped with industrial-grade GPUs and multi-core high-performance processors, possessing sufficient computing power and no strict power consumption limitations. Deployed in substation core computer rooms or regional power edge gateways, they can handle large-scale floating-point operations with fully homomorphic encryption. It is understood that in other embodiments, the CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be replaced with other fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
[0068] This step, by employing a fully homomorphic encryption scheme on a high-performance edge server and utilizing a graphics processor for hardware acceleration, controls the encryption latency to within 50ms, meeting the low-latency encryption requirements of scenarios such as substation core computer rooms.
[0069] Step 1032: Encrypt low-power devices.
[0070] When the service data comes from a power terminal that operates on battery power, the service data has been pre-encrypted on the power terminal side using the second encryption algorithm. The sending edge node obtains the pre-encrypted ciphertext. The specific implementation of the second encryption algorithm has been described in step 1012 and will not be repeated here.
[0071] Step 1033: Encrypt cross-domain transmission.
[0072] When the sending edge node is in cross-domain transmission mode, a third encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the service data. This third encryption algorithm is a quantum-resistant encryption algorithm. As a specific example of this embodiment, the third encryption algorithm adopts the NTRU post-quantum encryption algorithm, which can resist quantum cracking attacks, meet the requirements of cross-domain long-distance, high-security power core data transmission, and is suitable for cross-regional collaborative computing scenarios. It is understood that in other embodiments, the NTRU post-quantum encryption algorithm can also be replaced with other post-quantum encryption algorithms.
[0073] This step employs a third encryption algorithm resistant to quantum computing in the cross-domain transmission working mode, which can resist quantum cracking attacks and meet the requirements of cross-domain, long-distance, high-security power core data transmission.
[0074] The above steps adapt different encryption algorithms according to the hardware capabilities or working modes of edge nodes, enabling high-performance servers with graphics processors to leverage their computing power to achieve low-latency encryption, battery-powered devices to extend battery life with lower computational overhead, and quantum-resistant computing algorithms to defend against post-quantum era threats in cross-domain transmission modes, thus achieving an optimal balance between security, power consumption, and latency in heterogeneous edge computing environments.
[0075] Step 1034: Double-layer security packaging.
[0076] In this embodiment, the master key and session key are nested in a hierarchical relationship to achieve two-layer security encapsulation. Specifically, after privacy desensitization, business data is encrypted using the encryption key derived from the master key jointly reconstructed by multiple edge nodes to generate business ciphertext. The business ciphertext is then further encapsulated and encrypted using the session key to generate transmission ciphertext, which is decrypted layer by layer after cross-domain transmission. The master key and its derived encryption keys are used for encryption of the business data body, ciphertext calculation, and cross-domain data content protection, belonging to the application layer data content; the session key is used for encapsulating and encrypting the network transmission packet header and overall payload, belonging to the transport layer encapsulation behavior. The keys for the CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme, the ChaCha20-Poly1305 lightweight encryption algorithm, and the NTRU post-quantum encryption algorithm all originate from the encryption keys derived from the master key fragmentation reconstruction. The session key does not participate in the business data encryption process of the above three encryption algorithms; it is only used for encryption protection of the transmission link.
[0077] This step uses a two-layer security encapsulation of the master key and the session key to separate the encryption of the business data body from the encryption of the transmission link. Attackers need to crack both layers of encryption to obtain the plaintext, which significantly improves the security of the data transmission process.
[0078] Step 1035, Secure Transmission.
[0079] The sending edge node transmits the encrypted ciphertext to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol. Specifically, the secure transmission protocol is based on a 0-RTT encrypted handshake mechanism, combined with a ticketing mechanism to achieve rapid connection recovery. The connection establishment latency is reduced from approximately 200ms to approximately 20ms. It supports session reuse and forward secrecy, and is used to support the high-frequency interaction requirements of dynamic key rotation and ciphertext computation, while reducing latency and packet loss rate during data transmission.
[0080] This step reduces the connection establishment latency from approximately 200ms to approximately 20ms through a 0-RTT encrypted handshake using a secure transport protocol, supporting the high-frequency interaction requirements of dynamic key rotation and ciphertext computation.
[0081] As can be seen, this application embodiment uses the sending edge node as the execution subject, and derives the session key by combining the seed key generated by the preset quantum key distribution protocol with the device feature value, thus binding the session key to the specific edge node hardware; during key rotation, only the difference between the current session key and the previous session key is transmitted, rather than the complete key, which greatly reduces the rotation transmission overhead and enables high-frequency key rotation to be performed in narrowband transmission environments; by adopting the corresponding encryption algorithm according to the device type, the high-performance server with graphics processor can leverage its computing power advantage to achieve low-latency encryption, the battery-powered device adapts to power consumption constraints with lower computational overhead, and the anti-quantum computing algorithm is used in the cross-domain transmission mode to defend against post-quantum era threats, thus achieving a balance between performance and security in a heterogeneous edge computing environment.
[0082] Reference Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the encryption, collaborative computing, and data destruction process provided in this embodiment. Figure 3 exist Figure 1 Based on steps 101 to 103, steps 301 and 302 are also included. The specific contents of steps 301 and 302 are as follows: Step 301: Encrypt the local ciphertext using additive homomorphic encryption, generate a zero-knowledge proof, decrypt using a joint threshold, and restore the business result.
[0083] In this embodiment, after the ciphertext is transmitted to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol, each edge node performs secure multi-party computation based on the ciphertext. Specifically, an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the local ciphertext, and the encrypted homomorphic ciphertext is uploaded to the cloud so that the cloud can aggregate the homomorphic ciphertext uploaded by each edge node in ciphertext state; a zero-knowledge proof is generated and attached to the homomorphic ciphertext to verify the correctness of the computation without exposing business data; after the zero-knowledge proof is verified, the aggregation result is jointly decrypted with other edge nodes using a threshold, and injected noise is removed to restore the business result. The specific steps include: Step 3011: Homomorphic encryption and cloud aggregation.
[0084] Each edge node encrypts its local ciphertext using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm and uploads the encrypted homomorphic ciphertext to the cloud. The cloud then aggregates the homomorphic ciphertext uploaded by each edge node in ciphertext mode. As a specific example of this embodiment, the additive homomorphic encryption algorithm described above uses the Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm. The cloud only receives the aggregation result and does not access the plaintext of the original business data. It is understood that in other embodiments, the above additive homomorphic encryption algorithm can be replaced with other additive homomorphic encryption algorithms.
[0085] This step achieves data aggregation in ciphertext state through additive homomorphic encryption. The cloud and intermediate nodes never come into contact with the plaintext, thus protecting the privacy of business data for all parties.
[0086] Step 3012: Generate zero-knowledge proofs.
[0087] Each edge node generates a zero-knowledge proof and attaches it to homomorphic ciphertext to verify the correctness of the cloud-based aggregation computation process without exposing business data. As a specific example of this embodiment, the zero-knowledge proof is implemented using the zk-SNARKs protocol, which effectively prevents malicious nodes from submitting data tampering. It is understood that in other embodiments, the zero-knowledge proof protocol can be replaced with other zero-knowledge proof protocols.
[0088] This step verifies the correctness of the calculation using zero-knowledge proofs, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the cloud-based aggregation results without exposing the original business data of all parties.
[0089] Step 3013: Threshold decryption and result restoration.
[0090] After the zero-knowledge proof is verified, each edge node, in conjunction with other edge nodes, performs threshold decryption on the aggregation result, removes injected noise, and restores the business result. The removed noise is the noise injected in step 1011 using adaptive Laplacian differential privacy dynamic noise addition. The restored business result is uploaded to cloud storage, and no single node can decrypt the aggregation result independently.
[0091] This step uses a threshold decryption mechanism to prevent any single node from decrypting the aggregated result alone; by removing differential noise injected during the data anonymization stage, the business result is restored, ensuring the accuracy and usability of the final result while protecting the privacy of business data of all parties.
[0092] Step 302: Physically overwrite the disk sectors, cascade delete the associated key fragments and session keys, generate hash fingerprints and upload them to the consortium blockchain.
[0093] In this embodiment, when the data lifecycle ends, the disk sectors storing the business data are physically overwritten, and a cascading deletion command is sent to other edge nodes storing key fragments, so that other edge nodes synchronously delete the key fragments associated with the business data; the locally stored key fragments associated with the business data and session keys are deleted; a hash fingerprint is generated for the deletion operation, and the hash fingerprint is uploaded to the consortium blockchain for automatic auditing through smart contracts, generating an immutable destruction record. Specifically, the following steps are included: Step 3021: Physical overwrite.
[0094] The disk sectors storing business data are physically overwritten to ensure that the business data is unrecoverable. As a specific example of this embodiment, the corresponding sectors of the disk are overwritten multiple times, and disk recovery tools verify that the data cannot be recovered.
[0095] This step physically overwrites disk sectors, ensuring that business data is unrecoverable at the physical level and eliminating the risk of data residue.
[0096] Step 3022: Cascade delete key.
[0097] The sending edge node sends a cascading delete command to other edge nodes that store key fragments, causing these other edge nodes to synchronously delete the key fragments associated with the business data; simultaneously, they delete the locally stored key fragments associated with the business data and the session key. After the key is deleted, even if a ciphertext copy remains, it is mathematically impossible to decrypt because the key has been destroyed.
[0098] This step uses a cascading deletion mechanism to simultaneously clear associated key fragments and local session keys distributed across each edge node, achieving encrypted erasure and ensuring that the ciphertext is mathematically undecryptable.
[0099] Step 3023: Blockchain audit.
[0100] The sending edge node generates a hash fingerprint for the aforementioned deletion operation, uploads the hash fingerprint to the consortium blockchain, and performs automatic auditing through a smart contract to generate an immutable destruction record. Furthermore, in this embodiment, the sending edge node continuously collects operation logs throughout the entire process, synchronously uploading the hash fingerprints of the operation logs to the blockchain for evidence storage, rather than only recording them during the data destruction phase. It is understood that in other embodiments, the aforementioned consortium blockchain can be replaced with other blockchain platforms.
[0101] This step generates an immutable destruction record by uploading the hash fingerprint of the deletion operation to the consortium blockchain and having it automatically audited by the smart contract. At the same time, the entire process operation log is synchronized to the blockchain for evidence storage, ensuring that the data destruction process is traceable and auditable.
[0102] This step ensures that business data is unrecoverable through physical overwriting; it achieves encrypted erasure by cascading the deletion of associated key fragments and session keys, so that even if a ciphertext copy remains, it cannot be mathematically decrypted because the key has been destroyed; and it records the destruction proof through the consortium blockchain and smart contracts and continuously collects operation logs for on-chain evidence storage, ensuring that the audit records are tamper-proof and meet compliance audit requirements.
[0103] To verify this method, the effectiveness of the technical solution in this application is verified through simulation experiments.
[0104] Experiment 1: Verify the effect of the geographical location and security level partitioning binding strategy on the security of key fragmentation.
[0105] A hybrid power edge environment was simulated, comprising a substation production control area (highly sensitive area), a substation operation and maintenance management area (medium sensitive area), and a substation information management area (low sensitive area). Five key shards were deployed in the high-sensitive area, three in the medium-sensitive area, and two in the low-sensitive area. Tests were conducted using the local attack cost escalation rate and quantum attack resistance time as metrics. The local attack cost escalation rate is the ratio of the number of nodes an attacker needs to penetrate to the total number of shards. Attacks were simulated using the Metasploit penetration testing tool, and the minimum number of nodes required to successfully obtain the master key was recorded. The quantum attack resistance time is the time required for a quantum computer to crack the key; attacks were simulated using the IBM Q System One quantum simulator based on the NIST standard.
[0106] The results showed that the attack cost of the traditional static sharding scheme (sharding density=2) is 40%, while the proposed solution improves it to 75% in highly sensitive areas. The traditional AES-256 key can be cracked within 8 hours under quantum attack, while the proposed solution shortens the effective key lifespan to within 30 seconds through quantum differential synchronization, extending the cracking time to a theoretically infeasible level.
[0107] Experiment 2: Verify the latency and accuracy of the edge-secure multi-party computation framework.
[0108] In a wide-area measurement system scenario, three edge nodes are deployed (located in a 500kV substation, a 220kV substation, and the WAMS master station system, respectively). The input data consists of 1000 real-time PMU phasor data points (sampling rate 50 times / second). Testing is conducted using computation latency and model accuracy as metrics. Computation latency is the end-to-end latency from encrypted data upload to receiving the final computation result, measured using Wireshark packet capture to measure the timestamp difference. Model accuracy is the consistency of classification accuracy between ciphertext and plaintext computation results. A ResNet-50 model is trained on the ImageNet dataset, and the Top-5 accuracy of ciphertext inference and plaintext inference is compared.
[0109] The results showed that the latency of the traditional centralized computing scheme was 1200ms, while the latency of the scheme of this invention was 48ms under FHE+GPU acceleration; the accuracy of the traditional homomorphic encryption scheme decreased by 15%, while the accuracy of this invention was maintained at 98.2% through the mask protection mechanism.
[0110] Experiment 3: Verify the effectiveness of the dynamic authentication mechanism based on hardware root of trust in defending against man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0111] This study simulates a communication scenario between substation automation terminals and the master station system, with 100 automation terminals engaging in high-frequency authentication interactions with a substation edge gateway. Authentication latency and replay attack resistance success rate are used as indicators. Authentication latency is the total time from device fingerprint generation to authentication completion, captured using a high-precision time meter (such as PicoScope 6404D) to capture the security chip's output signal. Replay attack resistance success rate is the ratio of successfully defended replay attacks to the total number of attacks, initiated using Burp Suite, and the number of times intercepted by the blockchain audit module is counted.
[0112] The results showed that the traditional PKI authentication latency was 150ms, while the proposed solution compressed it to 8ms using device signature technology; the traditional transmission protocol had a 60% success rate against replay attacks, while the proposed solution improved this to 95% using spatiotemporal stamp signatures.
[0113] Experiment 4: Verify the non-repudiation of blockchain anchor destruction proof.
[0114] The user electricity data destruction process was simulated on the provincial power cloud platform, generating 1,000 destruction records (including sensitive data such as time-of-use electricity prices and load curves). The audit efficiency improvement rate and data residue risk were used as indicators. The audit efficiency improvement rate was the time ratio between traditional log auditing and blockchain auditing. Hyperledger Caliper was used for stress testing, recording the query time for 100,000 records. Data residue risk was the probability of recovering data after destruction using disk recovery tools (such as Recuva). The destruction operation was performed in a sandbox environment, and forensic tools were used to scan the storage media.
[0115] The results showed that traditional MySQL database auditing takes 120 seconds, while this invention reduces it to 8 seconds through smart contracts; the residual risk of traditional soft deletion schemes is 35%, while this invention reduces it to 0.02% through physical erasure plus blockchain proof.
[0116] The experimental results are shown in the table below: Table 1 shows the comparison of experimental results. The simulation results show that the advantages of the present invention in terms of security, performance and compliance have been verified by quantitative indicators. All key indicators meet or exceed the requirements of domestic and international standards such as NIST and Cybersecurity Classified Protection 2.0, providing a replicable security encryption paradigm for power information security.
[0117] This application also provides a power privacy data security encryption device. Referring to FIG5, FIG5 is a structural schematic diagram of the power privacy data security encryption device provided in this embodiment, the device comprising: Data acquisition module 501 is used to acquire business data to be transmitted; The key rotation module 502 is used to obtain a seed key generated by a preset quantum key distribution protocol, derive a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; during key rotation, it calculates the difference between the current session key and the previous session key, transmits the difference to the receiving edge node, so that the receiving edge node can restore the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference. The encrypted transmission module 503 is used to encrypt the business data according to the device type using the corresponding encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext; and to transmit the ciphertext to the receiving edge node through a secure transmission protocol.
[0118] It is understood that the specific functions and implementation methods of the above modules can be found in the detailed descriptions in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.
[0119] This application also provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the power privacy data security encryption method as described in any of the preceding claims.
[0120] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the power privacy data security encryption method as described in any of the preceding claims.
[0121] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above descriptions are merely specific embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for securely encrypting electricity privacy data, applied to edge nodes, characterized in that, include: Obtain the business data to be transmitted; Obtain a seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, and derive a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; During key rotation, the difference between the current session key and the previous session key is calculated, and the difference is transmitted to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can restore the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference. Based on the device type, the corresponding encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the business data to obtain ciphertext; the ciphertext is then transmitted to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol.
2. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The steps include: obtaining a seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol; deriving a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; and calculating the difference between the current session key and the previous session key during key rotation, transmitting the difference to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can reconstruct the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference, including: The device feature value is processed and used as a salt value parameter. The current session key is derived based on the seed key and the salt value parameter through a preset key derivation mechanism. Perform a bitwise XOR operation on the current session key and the previous session key, and extract a preset number of bits as the difference value; The difference value is transmitted to the receiving edge node, so that the receiving edge node performs a bitwise XOR operation on the previous session key and the difference value to restore the current session key.
3. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Receive and store key fragments distributed from the cloud; The key sharding parameters are determined based on the regional security score calculated from multiple security dimension quantification parameters. The key shards are obtained by splitting the master key through a threshold secret sharing algorithm and distributed from the cloud to the edge nodes. The encryption key of the corresponding encryption algorithm is derived from the reconstructed master key by multiple edge nodes that store the key fragments.
4. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of encrypting the business data using a corresponding encryption algorithm based on the device type includes: When the data is an edge server with a graphics processor, the first encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the business data, and the data is accelerated by the graphics processor. When the business data comes from a device operating on battery power, the business data is encrypted on the device using a second encryption algorithm to obtain the encrypted business data. The computational overhead of the second encryption algorithm is lower than that of the first encryption algorithm. When in cross-domain transmission mode, the business data is encrypted using a third encryption algorithm, which is a quantum-resistant encryption algorithm.
5. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before encrypting the business data, the method further includes: Authenticate the identity of the receiving edge node that initiates the communication; The authentication of the receiving edge node that initiates the communication includes: Read the device feature value of the built-in security chip, obtain the time data and location coordinates of the preset positioning system, perform a hash operation on the device feature value, the time data and the location coordinates, and generate a spatiotemporal stamp signature; The device feature value, signature private key, and session key are stored in a local Trusted Execution Environment security domain, which is physically isolated from the business domain. Within the trusted execution environment security domain, the identity authentication of the receiving edge node is performed based on the spatiotemporal stamp signature.
6. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, After transmitting the ciphertext to the receiving edge node via a secure transmission protocol, the method further includes: The local ciphertext is encrypted using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the encrypted homomorphic ciphertext is uploaded to the cloud so that the cloud can aggregate the homomorphic ciphertext uploaded by each edge node in ciphertext state; Generate a zero-knowledge proof and attach the zero-knowledge proof to the homomorphic ciphertext to verify the correctness of the calculation without exposing the business data; After the zero-knowledge proof is verified, the aggregation result is jointly decrypted with other edge nodes using a threshold, and the injected noise is removed to restore the business result.
7. The method for secure encryption of power privacy data according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the data lifecycle ends, it also includes: The disk sectors storing the business data are physically overwritten, and a cascading deletion command is sent to other edge nodes that store the key fragments, so that the other edge nodes synchronously delete the key fragments associated with the business data. Delete the key fragments and session keys associated with the business data stored locally; A hash fingerprint is generated for each deletion operation, and the hash fingerprint is uploaded to the consortium blockchain. The smart contract performs automatic auditing to generate an immutable destruction record.
8. A power privacy data security encryption device, characterized in that, include: The data acquisition module is used to acquire the business data to be transmitted. The key rotation module is used to obtain a seed key generated through a preset quantum key distribution protocol, and derive a session key based on the seed key and device feature values; during key rotation, it calculates the difference between the current session key and the previous session key, and transmits the difference to the receiving edge node so that the receiving edge node can restore the current session key based on the previous session key and the difference. The encrypted transmission module is used to encrypt the business data according to the device type using the corresponding encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext; and to transmit the ciphertext to the receiving edge node through a secure transmission protocol.
9. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, It stores a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
