Communication methods, communication equipment, communication systems, storage media and software products

By deriving temporary keys in wireless communication systems and using key derivation functions to generate MAC layer protection keys, the problem of insufficient information security protection at the MAC layer is solved, ensuring the security of MAC CE messages in different scenarios and preventing privacy leaks and spoofing attacks.

CN123077149APending Publication Date: 2026-11-10BEIJING XIAOMI MOBILE SOFTWARE CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202680001842.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-06-18
Publication Date
2026-11-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In wireless communication systems, the lack of security protection for critical information at the MAC layer makes it difficult to prevent privacy leaks and spoofing attacks. In particular, the protection mechanism for MAC CE messages has not been effectively solved in scenarios such as UE state transitions, mobility, and dual connectivity.

Method used

By deriving temporary keys between network devices and terminals, and using key derivation functions to generate encryption and integrity protection keys for the MAC layer, the security of MAC CE messages is ensured, adapting to the needs of different communication scenarios.

Benefits of technology

It achieves effective protection of MAC CE messages in different communication scenarios, prevents privacy leaks and spoofing attacks, and improves the security and reliability of wireless communication systems.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This disclosure relates to communication methods, communication devices, communication systems, storage media, and program products. Performed by a first device, the method includes: receiving or sending a first message, the first message being used to activate Media Access Control (MAC) security; and securing a second message based on a first key, the second message being a MAC message or a MAC control unit. Thus, MAC security can be activated and maintained during terminal state switching scenarios.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to communication methods, communication devices, communication systems, storage media, and program products. Background Technology

[0002] In wireless communication systems, critical information at the medium access control (MAC) layer must be protected to prevent privacy breaches and spoofing attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This disclosure provides communication methods, communication devices, communication systems, storage media, and program products.

[0004] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a communication method is provided, performed by a first device, the method comprising:

[0005] Receive or send a first message, the first message being used to activate media access control layer security;

[0006] The second message is secured based on a first key, which includes at least one of a key for media access control layer encryption protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection. The second message is a media access control layer message or a media access control layer control unit.

[0007] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication device that may include at least one of a transceiver module and a processing module; wherein the communication device may be used to perform an optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0008] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, a communication device is provided that can be used to perform the method described in an optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0009] According to a fourth aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a communication device is provided, comprising:

[0010] One or more processors;

[0011] The communication device can be used to execute the method described in the optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0012] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, a communication system is provided, including a first device, wherein the first device is configured to perform the method as described in an optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0013] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a storage medium is provided that stores instructions which, when executed on a communication device, cause the communication device to perform the method as described in an optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0014] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, a program product is provided, including at least one of a program and instructions, wherein the program and instructions, when executed by a communication device, implement the method described in the optional implementation of the first aspect.

[0015] It should be understood that the description in this summary section is merely illustrative and is not intended to limit the key or essential features of the embodiments of this disclosure, nor is it intended to restrict the scope of this disclosure. Other features of this disclosure will become readily apparent from the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0016] The above and other features, advantages and aspects of the embodiments of this disclosure will become more apparent when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description.

[0017] Figure 1A This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0018] Figure 1B This is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of a centralized unit-distributed unit separation architecture according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0019] Figure 1C This is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of a centralized unit-distributed unit separation architecture according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0020] Figure 2A This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0021] Figure 2B This is a schematic diagram of the key hierarchy of the MAC security root key in the aNB / ME provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0022] Figure 2C This is a schematic diagram of the key hierarchy in an aNB / ME without a MAC security root key, provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0023] Figure 2D This is a schematic diagram of PDCP layer encryption protection provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0024] Figure 2E This is a schematic diagram of MAC layer encryption protection provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0025] Figure 2FThis is a schematic diagram of the process for PDCP layer integrity protection provided according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0026] Figure 2G This is a schematic diagram of the MAC layer integrity protection process provided according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0027] Figure 2H This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0028] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0029] Figure 4 This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0030] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device proposed in the embodiments of this disclosure.

[0031] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device proposed in the embodiments of this disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0032] This disclosure provides communication methods, communication devices, communication systems, storage media, and program products. In some embodiments, the terms communication method, information processing method, and information transmission method may be used interchangeably.

[0033] The principles of this disclosure will now be described with reference to some embodiments. The embodiments disclosed herein are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative of some embodiments, and are not intended to limit the specific scope of protection of this disclosure. Each step in an embodiment can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and the steps can be arbitrarily combined. For example, a solution after removing some steps in an embodiment can also be implemented as an independent embodiment. Moreover, the order of the steps in an embodiment can be arbitrarily interchanged. Furthermore, the optional implementations in an embodiment can be arbitrarily combined. In addition, the embodiments can be arbitrarily combined. For example, some or all steps of different embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and an embodiment can be arbitrarily combined with optional implementations of other embodiments. In the embodiments of this disclosure, unless otherwise specified, the terminology and / or descriptions between the embodiments are consistent and can be mutually referenced. Technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments according to their inherent logical relationships.

[0034] The terminology used in the embodiments of this disclosure is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of this disclosure.

[0035] In this embodiment of the disclosure, unless otherwise stated, elements expressed in the singular form, such as "a," "an," "the," "the," "the," "the," "the," "the," "this," etc., can mean "one and only one," or "one or more," "at least one," etc. For example, when using articles such as "a," "an," "the," etc. in translation, the noun following the article can be understood as either a singular expression or a plural expression.

[0036] In the embodiments disclosed herein, "multiple" refers to two or more.

[0037] In some embodiments, the terms “at least one of A or B, at least one of A and B”, “one or more”, “a plurality of”, “one, two or more”, etc., can be used interchangeably.

[0038] In some embodiments, terms such as "at least one of A or B, at least one of A and B," "and / or," " / ," etc., can be used interchangeably. For example, "time / frequency" can be understood as time and / or frequency, and "time-frequency domain" can be understood as the time domain and / or frequency domain.

[0039] In some embodiments, the notation "at least one of A or B, at least one of A and B", "A and / or B", "A / B", "A in one case, B in another", "in response to one case A, in response to another case B", etc., may include the following technical solutions depending on the situation: in some embodiments, A (execute A regardless of whether there is a branch B); in some embodiments, B (execute B regardless of whether there is a branch A); in some embodiments, execution is selected from A and B (A and B are selectively executed); in some embodiments, A and B (both A and B are executed). The same applies when there are more branches such as A, B, C, etc.

[0040] In some embodiments, the notation "A or B" may include the following technical solutions, depending on the situation: in some embodiments, A (execute A regardless of whether a branch B exists); in some embodiments, B (execute B regardless of whether a branch A exists); in some embodiments, execution is selected from A and B (A and B are selectively executed). The same applies when there are more branches such as A, B, and C.

[0041] The prefixes "first," "second," etc., used in the embodiments of this disclosure are merely for distinguishing different descriptive objects and do not impose restrictions on the position, order, priority, quantity, or content of the descriptive objects. The description of the descriptive objects should be referred to in the claims or the context of the embodiments, and the use of prefixes should not constitute unnecessary restrictions. For example, if the descriptive object is "information," then the ordinal number before "information" in "first information," "second information," etc., does not restrict the position, order, or priority of the "information." All or part of the information in "first information," "second information," etc., can be located in the same message. All or part of the information in "first information," "second information," etc., can be the same information, and their content, type, carrying, etc., can be the same or different. When they are the same information, one or more functions can be implemented with the same information through field reuse, implicit indication, etc. The same applies to other terms such as "first field." Furthermore, the number of descriptive objects is not limited by ordinal numbers and can be one or more. Taking "first device" as an example, the number of "devices" can be one, two, or more. The same applies to other terms such as "first information."

[0042] In some embodiments, "sending first information, sending second information, sending third information" or "sending first information, second information, and third information" can be interpreted as all or part of the information being sent at once, or as each piece of information being sent separately; the same applies to receiving information.

[0043] In some embodiments, "sending" can mean sending directly, i.e., sending without passing through other nodes; or it can mean sending indirectly, i.e., forwarding through one or more other nodes. "Receiving" can mean receiving directly, i.e. receiving without passing through other nodes; or it can mean receiving indirectly, i.e. receiving after being forwarded by one or more other nodes.

[0044] In some embodiments, "including A" or "containing A" should be understood as open inclusion, that is, "including but not limited to A", which can be understood as directly including A or indirectly including A. "Carrying A" can be interpreted as directly carrying A or indirectly carrying A. "Used to indicate A" can be interpreted as directly indicating A or indirectly indicating A.

[0045] In some embodiments, terms such as “in response to…”, “in response to determining…”, “in the case of…”, “when…”, “if…”, “if…”, etc. can be used interchangeably. These descriptions all indicate that the device will take corresponding actions under certain objective circumstances, without necessarily limiting the time, and do not require the device to have a judgment action when implementing it. These expressions should not be construed as introducing additional technical restrictions or necessary conditions.

[0046] In some embodiments, the terms “greater than,” “greater than or equal to,” “not less than,” “more than,” “more than or equal to,” “not less than,” “higher than,” “higher than or equal to,” “not lower than,” and “above” can be used interchangeably, as can the terms “less than,” “less than or equal to,” “not greater than,” “less than,” “less than or equal to,” “not more than,” “lower than,” “lower than or equal to,” “not higher than,” and “below”.

[0047] In some embodiments, “able” or “may” can be understood as having a certain ability, being permitted to perform certain actions, etc., but is not limited thereto.

[0048] In some embodiments, devices, etc., may be interpreted as physical or virtual, and their names are not limited to those described in the embodiments. Terms such as “device,” “equipment,” “circuit,” “network element,” “network function,” “network device,” “function,” “node,” “unit,” “section,” “system,” “network,” “chip,” “chip system,” “entity,” and “subject” are interchangeable.

[0049] In some embodiments, "network" can be interpreted as devices included in a network (e.g., access network devices, core network devices, etc.).

[0050] In some embodiments, the acquisition of data, information, etc., may comply with the laws and regulations of the country where the location is situated.

[0051] In some embodiments, data, information, etc., may be obtained with the user's consent.

[0052] Furthermore, each element, each row, or each column in the table of this disclosure can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and any combination of any element, any row, or any column can also be implemented as an independent embodiment.

[0053] Figure 1A This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0054] like Figure 1A As shown, the communication system 100 includes a terminal 101 and a network device 102.

[0055] In some embodiments, the first device is a terminal 101 and the second device is a network device 102.

[0056] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the first device is network device 102 and the second device is terminal 101.

[0057] In some embodiments, terminal 101 includes, for example, at least one of the following: mobile phone, wearable device, Internet of Things device, car with communication function, smart car, tablet computer, computer with wireless transceiver function, virtual reality (VR) terminal device, augmented reality (AR) terminal device, wireless terminal device in industrial control, wireless terminal device in self-driving, wireless terminal device in remote medical surgery, wireless terminal device in smart grid, wireless terminal device in transportation safety, wireless terminal device in smart city, and wireless terminal device in smart home, but is not limited thereto.

[0058] In some embodiments, the terms "terminal", "terminal device", "user equipment (UE)", "user terminal", "mobile station (MS)", "mobile terminal (MT)", subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriberstation, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handset, user agent, mobile client, and client can be used interchangeably.

[0059] In some embodiments, network device 102 is, for example, an access network device and / or a core network device.

[0060] In some embodiments, the access network device is, for example, a node or device that connects a terminal to a wireless network. The access network device may include at least one of the following in a 5G communication system: evolved Node B (eNB), next-generation eNB (ng-eNB), next-generation Node B (gNB), advanced / artificial intelligence Node B (aNB), node B (NB), home node B (HNB), home evolved node B (HeNB), radio backhaul device, radio network controller (RNC), base station controller (BSC), base transceiver station (BTS), base band unit (BBU), mobile switching center, base station in a 6G communication system, open RAN, cloud RAN, base station in other communication systems, and access node in a Wi-Fi system, but is not limited thereto.

[0061] In some embodiments, the terms "access network device (AN device)," "radio access network device (RAN device)," "base station (BS)," "radio base station," "fixed station," "node," "access point," "transmission point (TP)," "reception point (RP)," "transmission / reception point (TRP)," "panel," "antenna panel," "antenna array," "cell," "macro cell," "small cell," "femto cell," "pico cell," "sector," "cell group," "serving cell," "carrier," "component carrier," and "bandwidth part (BWP)" can be used interchangeably.

[0062] In some embodiments, the technical solutions of this disclosure can be applied to the Open RAN architecture. In this case, the interfaces between or within access network devices involved in the embodiments of this disclosure can be transformed into internal interfaces of Open RAN. The processes and information interactions between these internal interfaces can be implemented by software or programs.

[0063] In some embodiments, the access network device may be composed of a central unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU). The CU may also be called a control unit. The CU-DU structure can separate the protocol layer of the access network device. Some of the protocol layer functions are centrally controlled by the CU, while the remaining part or all of the protocol layer functions are distributed in the DU and centrally controlled by the CU. However, this is not the only possibility.

[0064] In some embodiments, network device 102 may be at least one of a satellite in a non-terrestrial network (NTN) or a high altitude platform station (HAPS), but is not limited thereto. In some embodiments, network device 120 may be, for example, a low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite, a medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellite, or a geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite. In some embodiments, network device 102 may include one or more transmission and / or reception points (TRPs), one or more TRPs, for example, corresponding to one or more beams on a satellite.

[0065] In some embodiments, a core network device may be a single device comprising one or more network elements, or it may be multiple devices or a group of devices, each comprising all or part of the aforementioned one or more network elements. Network elements may be virtual or physical. The core network may include, for example, at least one of the following: Evolved Packet Core (EPC), 5G Core Network (5GCN), and Next Generation Core (NGC).

[0066] In some embodiments, at least one of the access network device, core network device, and network device can be replaced by a terminal. For example, various embodiments of this disclosure can also be applied to structures where communication between at least one of the access network device, core network device, and network device and the terminal is replaced by communication between multiple terminals (e.g., device-to-device (D2D), vehicle-to-everything (V2X), etc.). In this case, the structure can also be configured such that the terminal has all or part of the functions of the network device. Furthermore, terms such as "uplink" and "downlink" can be replaced with terms corresponding to communication between terminals (e.g., "sidelink"). For example, uplink channel, downlink channel, etc. can be replaced with sidelink channel, and uplink link, downlink link, etc. can be replaced with sidelink link.

[0067] In some embodiments, the terminal may be replaced by at least one of an access network device, a core network device, and a network device. In this case, it may also be configured such that at least one of the access network device, core network device, and network device has all or some of the functions of the terminal.

[0068] It is understood that the communication system described in this disclosure is for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of this disclosure, and does not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions proposed in this disclosure. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of system architecture and the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solutions proposed in this disclosure are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0069] The following embodiments of this disclosure can be applied to Figure 1A The communication system 100 shown, or a part thereof, but not limited to it. Figure 1A The entities shown are illustrative; a communication system may include... Figure 1A All or part of the main body, or may include Figure 1A Other entities besides the main body, the number and form of each entity are arbitrary, each entity can be physical or virtual, the connection relationship between the entities is illustrative, the entities can be unconnected or connected, and the connection can be in any way, it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection, it can be a wired connection or a wireless connection.

[0070] The embodiments disclosed herein can be applied to Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), LTE-Beyond (LTE-B), SUPER 3G, IMT-Advanced, 4th generation mobile communication system (4G), 5th generation mobile communication system (5G), 5G new radio (NR), 6th generation mobile communication system (6G), Future Radio Access (FRA), New-Radio Access Technology (RAT), New Radio (NR), New radio access (NX), Future generation radio access (FX), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 2000, UltraMobile Broadband (UMB), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Engineers (IEEE) 802.20, Ultra-Wideband (UWB), Bluetooth (Bluetooth (registered trademark)), Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) networks, Device-to-Device (D2D) systems, Machine-to-Machine (M2M) systems, Internet of Things (IoT) systems, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) systems, Non-Terrestrial Networks (NTN), systems utilizing other communication methods, and next-generation systems built upon them, etc. Furthermore, multiple systems can be combined (e.g., a combination of LTE or LTE-A with 5G).

[0071] In some embodiments, the communication methods involved in this disclosure can be applied to non-terrestrial network scenarios, but are not limited thereto. They can also be applied to terrestrial network scenarios or satellite and terrestrial joint networking scenarios, etc.

[0072] In some embodiments of this disclosure, in 5G deployment, it is most suitable to adopt an architecture that divides the internal structure of the base station (gNode B / gNB) into two parts: a centralized unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU), which are connected by a new interface called the F1 interface.

[0073] Figure 1B This is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of a centralized unit-distributed unit separation architecture according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0074] Figure 1C This is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of a centralized unit-distributed unit separation architecture according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0075] like Figure 1B and Figure 1C As shown, the centralized unit (CU) supports the following protocol layers:

[0076] (11) Service data adaptation protocol (SDAP) (exists only in 5G, this protocol layer does not exist in 4G);

[0077] (12) Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol;

[0078] (13) Packet data convergence protocol (PDCP).

[0079] like Figure 1B and Figure 1C As shown, the distributed unit supports the following protocol layers:

[0080] (21) Radio Link Control (RLC) protocol;

[0081] (22) Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol;

[0082] (23) Physical layer (PHY) protocol.

[0083] In some embodiments, according to the radio access network (RAN) security architecture, access stratum (AS) security is terminated and processed by the PDCP layer of the base station. Since only the centralized unit (CU) in the base station supports the PDCP layer, current AS security terminates at the centralized unit, while the distributed unit (DU) is transparent to security protection; that is, there are no security-related processing procedures in the RLC layer, MAC layer, and physical layer supported by the distributed unit (DU).

[0084] In some embodiments of 5G NR, the MAC control element (MACCE) is used to transmit time-critical control information within the MAC layer, such as scheduling control, buffer status, timing advance (TA), and resource management signaling. The MAC layer forms a payload based on the upper layers and adds its own control element to generate a medium access control protocol data unit (MAC PDU). A MAC PDU consists of multiple sub-PDUs, which contain both control commands in the form of MAC CEs and user plane or control plane data in the form of medium access control service data units (MAC SDUs) from different logical channels. It is foreseeable that as 6G introduces more underlying mechanisms to support more complex functions, greater flexibility, and more demanding performance requirements, the MAC layer will play an even more important role in 6G.

[0085] In some embodiments, communication protocols require that 6G systems provide appropriate means to mitigate the impact of MAC CE tampering and replay, and to mitigate privacy risks caused by the exploitation of identifiers in MAC CEs. Related technologies have proposed a mechanism for protecting MAC CE messages using temporary keys. However, the problem of activating and maintaining MAC CE protection in different scenarios based on this mechanism remains to be solved. For example: MAC CE protection activation and maintenance in UE state transition scenarios (such as UE transitioning from idle to connected, from connected to inactive, and back to connected); MAC CE protection in UE mobility scenarios (especially LTM scenarios) when MAC CE messages are sent or received by different base stations; MAC CE protection in dual connectivity (DC) scenarios when the UE is simultaneously connected to multiple base stations; and MAC CE protection in MAC CE retransmission scenarios, etc.

[0086] Therefore, it is necessary to study the mechanisms for activating and maintaining MAC CE message protection in different scenarios.

[0087] In some embodiments, traditional 5G systems do not support MAC layer security protection. Therefore, there is currently no standardized mechanism for the base station's PDCP layer to provide security support for its MAC layer.

[0088] In some embodiments, related technologies propose methods for deriving and distributing root keys for low-level security supported by base station distributed units (such as aNB-DU). MAC layer protection based on root keys in these related technologies primarily relies on media access control security (MACsec), a standardized secure communication method in communication protocols. However, MACsec is mainly used for MAC layer message protection between base stations (such as aNB) (e.g., Xa, F1), while MAC CE messages are transmitted on the Uu interface (air interface) between the base station and the terminal. Considering the complexity of MACsec, applying it to the Uu interface would be a relatively heavy-duty solution.

[0089] In some embodiments, related technologies have proposed a mechanism for protecting MAC CE messages using temporary keys, laying the foundation for MAC CE protection. However, the problems of activating and maintaining MAC CE protection in different scenarios remain unresolved.

[0090] Based on this, the main purpose of the communication method involved in this embodiment is to ensure that MAC CE protection can be activated and maintained in UE state transition scenarios (i.e., UE transitions from idle state to connected state, from connected state to inactive state and then back to connected state).

[0091] Figure 2A This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to embodiments of this disclosure. For example... Figure 2A As shown, the embodiments of this disclosure relate to a communication method, which includes:

[0092] In step S2101, the network device derives the first key based on the second key.

[0093] In some embodiments, the first key is a temporary key or a one-time key.

[0094] In some embodiments, the first key is derived on demand when sending and / or receiving a second message.

[0095] In some embodiments, the first key is derived from the second key via a key derivation function.

[0096] In some embodiments, the first key is, for example, as described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown MAC_CE .

[0097] In some embodiments, terms such as first key, MAC security key, MAC CE security key, MAC layer security key, key for MAC layer protection, and key for MAC CE protection can be used interchangeably.

[0098] In some embodiments, the second message is a Media Access Control (MAC) layer message or a Media Access Control layer control unit.

[0099] In some embodiments, the terms Media Access Control Layer Control Unit, Media Access Control Control Unit (MAC CE), and Media Access Control Layer Control Unit can be used interchangeably.

[0100] In some embodiments, the second key is the root key of the first key.

[0101] In some embodiments, the second key is a Media Access Control (MAC) root key, which is generated based on the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key.

[0102] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the second key is the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key.

[0103] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the second key is the first key that has already been used.

[0104] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the second key is a radio resource control layer integrity key, which is generated based on the radio resource control layer root key.

[0105] In some embodiments, the media access control layer root key is a root key used to protect the second message.

[0106] In some embodiments, the media access control layer root key is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown MACRoot .

[0107] In some embodiments, terms such as Media Access Control Root Key and MAC Security Root Key can be used interchangeably.

[0108] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is a root key used to protect the RRC layer.

[0109] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown aNB .

[0110] In some embodiments, terms such as Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key and RRC security root key can be used interchangeably.

[0111] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer integrity key is a key used to protect the integrity of the RRC layer.

[0112] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown RRCint .

[0113] In some embodiments, terms such as Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key and RRC integrity security root key can be used interchangeably.

[0114] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer encryption key is a key used to protect the RRC layer encryption.

[0115] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption key is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown RRCenc .

[0116] In some embodiments, terms such as Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption key and RRC encryption security root key can be used interchangeably.

[0117] In some embodiments, the first key includes at least one of a key for media access control layer cryptographic protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection.

[0118] In some embodiments, the key used for media access control layer encryption protection is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown MACenc .

[0119] In some embodiments, terms such as key for media access control layer encryption protection and media access control layer encryption key can be used interchangeably.

[0120] In some embodiments, the key used for media access control layer integrity protection is, for example, described below. Figure 2B and Figure 2C K shown MACint .

[0121] In some embodiments, terms such as key for media access control layer integrity protection and media access control layer integrity key can be used interchangeably.

[0122] Figure 2B This is a schematic diagram of the key hierarchy of the MAC security root key in the aNB / ME provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0123] Taking an aNB as the network device and a mobile device (ME) as the terminal as an example, Figure 2B It shows that K is present in aNB / ME MACRoot The key hierarchy.

[0124] like Figure 2B As shown, in a hierarchical architecture that supports MAC security, the aNB's CU (aNB-CU) or ME / PDCP is based on K. aNB Derivation of K MACRoot Based on K MACRoot Derivation of K MAC_CE and K MAC_CE Configure or provide to the DU (aNB-DU) or ME / MAC of the aNB.

[0125] In addition, such as Figure 2B As shown, the CU or ME / PDCP in aNB is based on K. aNB It also derives from K RRCint K RRCenc K UPint and K UPenc The CU or ME / PDCP in aNB will also K MACRoot Distribute and store to the aNB's DU (aNB-DU) or ME / MAC, and then the aNB's DU (aNB-DU) or ME / MAC is based on K. MACRoot Derivation of K MAC_CE .

[0126] In some embodiments, in a 6G communication system, it is not necessary to introduce a counter or sequence number in each second message.

[0127] In some embodiments, K MAC_CE It is used only once, so the terminal does not need to maintain K in the terminal security context. MAC_CE .

[0128] In some embodiments, different second messages may use different K. MAC_CE This provides protection, thereby ensuring secure isolation between the second messages.

[0129] In some embodiments, K MAC_CE It can be based on K MACRoot or old / used K MAC_CE Update.

[0130] In some embodiments, in each aNB-to-aNB or aNB-to-aNB handover scenario, once K aNB Refreshed, K MACRoot It will also be based on the refreshed K aNB Regenerated. This ensures K. MACRoot With K aNB Keep in sync.

[0131] Figure 2C This is a schematic diagram of the key hierarchy in an aNB / ME without a MAC security root key, provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0132] Taking an aNB as the network device and a mobile device (ME) as the terminal as an example, Figure 2C This shows that there is no K in aNB / ME MACRoot The key level is better suited to mobile scenarios (i.e., situations where the AS security root key changes due to changes in the aNB).

[0133] like Figure 2C As shown, in a hierarchical architecture that supports MAC security, the aNB's CU (aNB-CU) or ME / PDCP is based on K. aNB Derivation of K MACint and K MACenc and K MACint and K MACenc Configure or provide to the DU (aNB-DU) or ME / MAC of the aNB.

[0134] In other words, the CU or ME / PDCP of aNB can K aNB As the MAC security root key K MACRoot Therefore, K can be used directly. aNBThe first key is derived.

[0135] In addition, such as Figure 2C As shown, the CU or ME / PDCP in aNB is based on K. aNB It also derives from K RRCint K RRCenc K UPint and K UPenc .

[0136] In some embodiments, the network device uses a second key to process the input parameters of a key derivation function (KDF) to generate a first key.

[0137] In some embodiments, the key derivation function (KDF) employs a stream cipher algorithm or a secure hash algorithm.

[0138] In some embodiments, the stream cipher algorithm is, for example, ChaCha20.

[0139] Thus, network devices can use ChaCha20 as a key derivation function (KDF) to derive the first key based on the second key.

[0140] In some embodiments, the input parameters of the key derivation function are determined based on at least one of the following:

[0141] (a1) Function identifier / function code (FC);

[0142] In some embodiments, the specific value of FC is to be determined / to be defined (TBD), which may be predefined by the protocol or indicated by the network device.

[0143] (a2) Freshness parameters;

[0144] In some embodiments, the freshness parameter includes at least one of the following: system frame number (SFN), subframe number, hyperframe number (HFN), slot index, OFDM symbol index, or COUNT.

[0145] (a3) Length of the freshness parameter;

[0146] (a4) Transmission direction;

[0147] In some embodiments, the transmission direction is, for example, uplink (UL) or downlink (DL).

[0148] In some embodiments, UL refers to the transmission direction from the terminal to the network device.

[0149] In some embodiments, DL refers to the transmission direction from the network device to the terminal.

[0150] (a5) Length of the transmission direction;

[0151] (a6) Algorithm type distinguisher;

[0152] In some embodiments, terms such as algorithm type distinguisher and algorithm distinguisher can be used interchangeably.

[0153] In some embodiments, the algorithm type distinguisher indicates that the first key is used for Media Access Control (MAC) integrity protection or MAC encryption protection.

[0154] For example, the algorithm type distinguisher indicates that the first key is used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection, that is, the first key is a key used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection.

[0155] For example, the algorithm type distinguisher indicates that the first key is used for Media Access Control (MAC) encryption protection, that is, the first key is a key used for MAC encryption protection.

[0156] For example, the algorithm type distinguisher indicates that the first key is used for both Media Access Control (MAC) integrity protection and MAC encryption protection, that is, the first key includes a key for MAC encryption protection and a key for MAC integrity protection.

[0157] In some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is the defined value of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption algorithm.

[0158] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is the defined value of the Radio Resource Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

[0159] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is the defined value of the Media Access Control layer encryption algorithm.

[0160] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is the defined value of the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

[0161] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption algorithm refers to a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses an RRC encryption key to encrypt RRC signaling data at the transmitting end and decrypt it at the receiving end.

[0162] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption algorithm is, for example, the New Radio Encryption Algorithm (NEA), and the algorithm type distinguisher of the RRC encryption algorithm is, for example, N-RRC-enc-alg.

[0163] In some embodiments, terms such as Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption algorithm and RRC encryption algorithm can be used interchangeably.

[0164] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm refers to a symmetric algorithm in which the transmitting end uses the RRC integrity key to generate a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I) for RRC signaling data and performs integrity verification at the receiving end.

[0165] In some embodiments, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm is, for example, the New Radio Integrity Algorithm (NIA), and the algorithm type distinguisher of the RRC integrity algorithm is, for example, N-RRC-int-alg.

[0166] In some embodiments, terms such as Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm and RRC integrity algorithm can be used interchangeably.

[0167] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control (MAC) encryption algorithm refers to a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses a key for MAC encryption protection to encrypt the second message at the sending end and decrypt it at the receiving end.

[0168] In some embodiments, the media access control layer encryption algorithm is a custom or newly added encryption algorithm in the communication protocol.

[0169] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control (MAC) encryption algorithm is, for example, NEA, and the algorithm type distinguisher for the MAC encryption algorithm is, for example, N-MAC-enc-alg.

[0170] In some embodiments, terms such as Media Access Control Layer Encryption Algorithm, MAC Encryption Algorithm, and Encryption Protection Algorithm can be used interchangeably.

[0171] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control (MAC) integrity algorithm refers to a symmetric algorithm in which the sending end uses a key for MAC integrity protection to generate an integrity check code for the second message and performs integrity verification at the receiving end.

[0172] In some embodiments, the media access control layer integrity algorithm is a custom or newly added integrity algorithm in the communication protocol.

[0173] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm (MIA) is, for example, NIA, and the algorithm type distinguisher for the MIA is, for example, N-MAC-int-alg.

[0174] In some embodiments, terms such as Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm, MAC Integrity Algorithm, and Integrity Protection Algorithm can be used interchangeably.

[0175] For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher can reuse the defined value of N-RRC-enc-alg in the communication protocol, such as 0x03 as shown in Table 1.

[0176] For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher can reuse the defined value of N-RRC-int-alg in the communication protocol, such as 0x04 as shown in Table 1.

[0177] For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher can be the definition value of N-MAC-enc-alg, which is newly added in the communication protocol, such as 0x07 as shown in Table 1.

[0178] For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher can be the newly added N-MAC-int-alg definition value in the communication protocol, such as 0x08 as shown in Table 1.

[0179] Table 1 Algorithm Type Distinguishing Markers

[0180] Algorithm type distinguisher The value of the algorithm type distinguisher. N-NAS-enc-alg 0x01 N-NAS-int-alg 0x02 N-CP-enc-alg 0x03 N-CP-int-alg 0x04 N-UP-enc-alg 0x05 N-UP-int-alg 0x06 N-MAC-enc-alg 0x07 N-MAC-int-alg 0x08

[0181] In Table 1, N-NAS-enc-alg represents the algorithm type distinguisher for non-access stratum (NAS) encryption algorithms, N-NAS-int-alg represents the algorithm type distinguisher for NAS layer integrity algorithms, N-UP-enc-alg represents the algorithm type distinguisher for user plane (UP) encryption algorithms, and N-UP-int-alg represents the algorithm type distinguisher for user plane integrity algorithms.

[0182] (a7) Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0183] (a8) Algorithm identity;

[0184] In some embodiments, the algorithm identifier indicates a negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control (MAC) integrity protection or MAC encryption protection.

[0185] For example, the algorithm identifier indicates the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection, i.e., the Media Access Control Layer integrity protection algorithm.

[0186] For example, the algorithm identifier indicates the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control (MAC) encryption protection, i.e., the MAC encryption protection algorithm.

[0187] For example, the algorithm identifier indicates the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer (MAC) integrity protection and MAC encryption protection, namely the MAC integrity protection algorithm and the MAC encryption protection algorithm.

[0188] (a9) Length of the algorithm identifier.

[0189] In some embodiments, during the process of deriving a first key (such as a key for media access control layer encryption protection or a key for media access control layer integrity protection) based on a second key, the network device needs to combine the input parameters (a1) to (a9) above to form the input S of the key derivation function:

[0190] FC = TBD;

[0191] P0 = SFN + subframe number;

[0192] L0 = P0 length;

[0193] P1 = "UL" or "DL";

[0194] L1 = "UL / DL" length;

[0195] P2=algorithm type distinguisher;

[0196] L2=length of algorithm type distinguisher;

[0197] P3 = algorithm identity;

[0198] L3 = length of algorithm identity.

[0199] In some embodiments, the second key is, for example, a 256-bit input key.

[0200] In some embodiments, during each handover between or within a network device, once the second key is updated, the first key is also regenerated based on the updated second key, thereby ensuring that the root key on the network device side remains up-to-date.

[0201] In some embodiments, where the first key includes a key for media access control layer encryption protection, the second message is encrypted using at least one of the following input parameters (b1) to (b6):

[0202] (b1) Freshness parameters;

[0203] In some embodiments, the freshness parameter includes at least one of the following: a counter (COUNT), a system frame number (SFN), a subframe number, a hyperframe number (HFN), a slot index, or an OFDM symbol index.

[0204] In some embodiments, where the freshness parameter is included as an input parameter in the second message, the freshness parameter is set to all zeros.

[0205] (b2) Direction of transmission identifier (DIRECTION);

[0206] In some embodiments, the transmission direction identifier indicates UL or DL.

[0207] (b3) Bearer identifier or Logical Channel Identifier (LCID);

[0208] In some embodiments, if the input parameters used in the second message include a bearer identifier, the bearer identifier is set to all zeros or replaced with a logical channel identifier.

[0209] (b4) Key stream length (LENGTH);

[0210] (b5) A key used for encryption protection of the media access control layer, such as K MACenc ;

[0211] (b6) Encryption protection algorithm, i.e., media access control layer encryption algorithm, such as NEA.

[0212] Figure 2D This is a schematic diagram of PDCP layer encryption protection provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0213] Figure 2EThis is a schematic diagram of MAC layer encryption protection provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0214] like Figure 2D As shown, at the PDCP layer, RRC signaling or user plane messages are encrypted according to the usage and operation mode of the 128-NEA algorithm specified in the communication protocol. The specific process includes the following:

[0215] The sender generates a keystream (KEYSTREAM) from the input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, BEARER, LENGTH, and KEY using NEA. The plaintext block (PLAINTEXT BLOCK) and the keystream block (KEYSTREAM) are XORed to generate a ciphertext block (CIPHERTEXT). The ciphertext block (KEYSTREAM) is then sent to the receiver.

[0216] Receiver: Uses the same input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, BEARER, LENGTH, KEY, NEA as the sender to generate the same keystream (KEYSTREAM) block (BLOCK); performs XOR operations with the received ciphertext (CIPHERTEXT) block (KEYSTREAM) and keystream (KEYSTREAM) block (BLOCK) to recover the plaintext (PLAINTEXT) block (BLOCK).

[0217] like Figure 2E As shown, at the MAC layer, the second message is encrypted using input parameters (b1) to (b6), and the specific process includes the following:

[0218] Sender: Input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, BEARER / LCID, LENGTH, K MACenc The NEA generates a keystream (KEYSTREAM); the plaintext block (PLAINTEXT BLOCK) and the keystream block (KEYSTREAM) are XORed or otherwise operated to generate a ciphertext block (CIPHERTEXT); the ciphertext block (KEYSTREAM) is then sent to the receiving end.

[0219] Receiver: Uses the same input parameters as the sender: COUNT, DIRECTION, BEARER / LCID, LENGTH, K MACencNEA generates the same keystream block (KEYSTREAM); the received ciphertext block (KEYSTREAM) is XORed with the keystream block (KEYSTREAM) to recover the plaintext block (PLAINTEXT).

[0220] Figure 2E In this context, because neither the current Media Access Control (MAC) messages nor the MAC control unit carry a COUNT value, and the protection key (KEY) used is a one-time key K, MACenc Since COUNT is unavailable, it is set to all zeros. Because the second message is not based on a bearer message, BEARER is also set to all zeros, or LCID can be used instead of BEARER.

[0221] Figure 2E The image does not explicitly show the BEARER; instead, LCID is used to represent BEARER.

[0222] In some embodiments, where the first key includes a key for media access control layer integrity protection, the second message uses at least one of the following (c1) to (c6) input parameters for integrity protection:

[0223] (c1) Freshness parameter;

[0224] In some embodiments, the freshness parameter includes at least one of the following: a counter (COUNT), a system frame number (SFN), a subframe number, a hyperframe number (HFN), a slot index, or an OFDM symbol index.

[0225] In some embodiments, where the freshness parameter is included as an input parameter in the second message, the freshness parameter is set to all zeros.

[0226] (c2) Direction of transmission identifier (DIRECTION);

[0227] In some embodiments, the transmission direction identifier indicates UL or DL.

[0228] (c3) Message, i.e., the second message;

[0229] (c4) Bearer identifier or Logical Channel Identifier (LCID);

[0230] In some embodiments, when the input parameters used in the second message include a bearer identifier, the bearer identifier is set to all zeros or replaced with a logical channel identifier.

[0231] (c5) A key used for media access control layer integrity protection, such as K MACint ;

[0232] (c6) Integrity protection algorithms, namely Media Access Control layer integrity algorithms, such as NIA.

[0233] Figure 2F This is a schematic diagram of the process for PDCP layer integrity protection provided according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0234] Figure 2G This is a schematic diagram of the MAC layer integrity protection process provided according to embodiments of this disclosure.

[0235] like Figure 2F As shown, at the PDCP layer, RRC signaling or user plane data undergoes integrity protection according to the NIA algorithm specified in the communication protocol. The specific process includes the following:

[0236] Sender: Input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, MESSAGE, BEARER, and KEY are used by NIA to generate a message authentication code or integrity message authentication code (MAC-I) / NAS message authentication code (NAS-MAC).

[0237] Receiver: Using the same input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, MESSAGE, BEARER, KEY, NIA as the sender, it generates the expected message authentication code or expected integrity message authentication code (XMAC-I) / expected NAS message authentication code (XNAS-MAC).

[0238] like Figure 2G As shown, at the MAC layer, the second message uses input parameters (c1) to (c6) for integrity protection. The specific process includes the following:

[0239] Sender: Input parameters COUNT, DIRECTION, MESSAGE, BEARER / LCID, K MACint MAC-I / NAS-MAC is generated via NIA.

[0240] Receiver: Uses the same input parameters as the sender: COUNT, DIRECTION, MESSAGE, BEARER / LCID, K. MACint , NIA, generates XMAC-I / XNAS-MAC.

[0241] Figure 2G In this context, because neither the current Media Access Control (MAC) messages nor the MAC control unit carry a COUNT value, and the protection key (KEY) used is a one-time key K, MACint Since COUNT is unavailable, it is set to all zeros. Because the second message is not based on a bearer message, BEARER is also set to all zeros, or LCID can be used instead of BEARER.

[0242] Figure 2G The image does not explicitly show the BEARER; instead, LCID is used to represent BEARER.

[0243] Figures 2D to 2G In this context, the sending end is the terminal, and the receiving end is the network device. Alternatively, the sending end is the network device, and the receiving end is the terminal.

[0244] In some embodiments, if the network device requires a first key, the network device needs to perform step S2101.

[0245] In step S2102, the network device sends the first message to the terminal.

[0246] Correspondingly, the terminal receives the first message sent by the network device.

[0247] In some embodiments, the first message is used to activate media access control layer security.

[0248] In some embodiments, a terminal may transition from connected state (RRC_IDLE) to connected state (RRC_CONNECTED), during which the terminal needs to activate AS security. Based on this, the network device may send a first message to the terminal to activate Media Access Control (MAC) security.

[0249] In some embodiments, the first message includes at least one of the following:

[0250] (d1) Media Access Control Layer Security Activation Indicator, used to indicate the activation of Media Access Control Layer security;

[0251] (d2) Security protection configuration information used in the media access control layer;

[0252] (d3) Security protection configuration information for the media access control layer control unit.

[0253] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control Layer (MACL) security activation indicator is optional, since the security protection configuration information already implicitly indicates the activation of MACL security.

[0254] In some embodiments, the security protection configuration information includes at least one of the following:

[0255] (e1) List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected;

[0256] (e2) List of media access control layer control units that need to be encrypted;

[0257] (e3) List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected for integrity;

[0258] (e4) Media access control layer encryption algorithm;

[0259] (e5) Media access control layer integrity algorithm.

[0260] In some embodiments, the media access control layer encryption algorithm is a negotiated encryption protection algorithm.

[0261] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control (MAC) encryption algorithm is optional, as it can be configured to be the same as the Radio Resource Control (RRC) encryption algorithm.

[0262] In some embodiments, the media access control layer integrity algorithm is a negotiated integrity protection algorithm.

[0263] In some embodiments, the Media Access Control (MAC) integrity algorithm is optional, since the MAC integrity algorithm can be configured to be the same as the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm.

[0264] In some embodiments, the first message is also used to activate radio resource control layer security, and the activation of radio resource control layer security is used to protect the security of the terminal after it transitions to the connected state.

[0265] In some embodiments, the first message further includes: a Radio Resource Control (RRC) security activation indicator for indicating activation of RRC security.

[0266] In some embodiments, the first message can simultaneously activate MAC layer security and RRC layer security.

[0267] In some embodiments, the first message is, for example, an AS security mode command message.

[0268] In some embodiments, the MAC layer security activation process can be integrated into the access stratum security mode command (AS SMC) procedure.

[0269] In some embodiments, MAC layer security and RRC layer security can be activated together as part of AS security.

[0270] In some embodiments, the difference between RRC layer security activation and MAC layer security activation lies in the fact that the first key for MAC layer security may not be derived in the AS SMC procedure. The AS SMC procedure primarily prepares the security context required for second message protection, such as the root key (K) including the first key. aNB or K MACRoot The temporary key is derived only by the terminal (such as the UE) and the network device (such as the aNB) at the time of MAC CE transmission and reception.

[0271] In some embodiments, before sending the first message, the network device derives the first key based on the second key, that is, the network device derives the first key first and then sends the first message; or, the derivation of the first key precedes the sending of the first message.

[0272] For example, before sending the first message, the network device generates a first key based on the Media Access Control layer root key.

[0273] For example, before sending the first message, the network device generates a first key based on the radio resource control layer root key.

[0274] For example, before sending the first message, the network device generates a first key based on the Radio Resource Control Layer integrity key.

[0275] In step S2103, after sending the first message, the network device initiates integrity protection and encryption of the sent second message based on the first key.

[0276] In some embodiments, after sending the first message, the network device initiates integrity protection and encryption of the second message sent to the terminal based on the first key. This achieves secure protection for the second message.

[0277] In some embodiments, on the network device side, downlink encryption of the second message can be initiated after the first message is sent.

[0278] In step S2104, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal derives the first key based on the second key.

[0279] In some embodiments, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal derives the first key based on the second key.

[0280] In some embodiments, the terminal and network device derive the first key simultaneously using the same input parameters of the key derivation function.

[0281] In some embodiments, the optional implementation of the terminal deriving the first key based on the second key can be found in step S2101, where the network device derives the first key based on the second key, and will not be repeated here.

[0282] For example, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal generates a first key based on the media access control layer root key.

[0283] For example, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal generates a first key based on the root key of the radio resource control layer.

[0284] For example, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal generates a first key based on the Radio Resource Control Layer integrity key.

[0285] In some embodiments, if the terminal requires a first key, the terminal needs to execute step S2104.

[0286] In step S2105, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal initiates integrity protection for the sent second message and decryption of the received second message based on the first key.

[0287] In some embodiments, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal, based on the first key, initiates integrity protection and encryption of the second message sent to the network device, and initiates decryption and integrity verification of the second message received from the network device. This achieves secure protection for the second message.

[0288] In some embodiments, on the terminal side, downlink decryption of the second message can be initiated after the first message is received and successfully verified.

[0289] Step S2106: The terminal sends a third message to the network device.

[0290] Correspondingly, the network device receives the third message sent by the terminal.

[0291] In some embodiments, the third message is used to confirm that the media access control layer security has been successfully activated.

[0292] In some embodiments, the third message is also used to confirm that the Radio Resource Control Layer security has been successfully activated.

[0293] In some embodiments, the third message is, for example, the AS Security Mode Complete message.

[0294] In step S2107, after sending the third message, the terminal initiates encryption of the sent second message based on the first key.

[0295] In some embodiments, after sending the third message, the terminal initiates integrity protection and encryption of the second message sent to the network device based on the first key.

[0296] In some embodiments, on the terminal side, uplink encryption of the second message can be initiated after the third message is sent.

[0297] In step S2108, after receiving the third message, the network device initiates the decryption of the received second message based on the first key.

[0298] In some embodiments, after receiving the third message, the network device initiates decryption and integrity verification of the second message received from the terminal based on the first key.

[0299] In some embodiments, on the network device side, uplink decryption of the second message can be initiated after the third message is received.

[0300] In some embodiments, the terminal and network device require a first message to activate Media Access Control (MAC) security. Since the terminal deletes the second key when it is in an idle state, the first message is needed to activate MAC security when the terminal transitions from an idle state to a connected state.

[0301] Using the above method, if the network device needs to switch the terminal (RRC_IDLE) to the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED), the network device can send a first message to the terminal and derive a first key based on the second key, using the first key to securely protect the second message. The terminal can determine whether to activate Media Access Control (MAC) layer security based on the first message sent by the network device. After receiving and successfully verifying the first message, the terminal can derive a first key based on the second key and use the first key to securely protect the second message. This achieves integrity and / or encryption protection for MAC layer messages or MAC CE.

[0302] Furthermore, with Media Access Control (MAC) layer security successfully activated, the terminal sends a third message to the network device. After sending the third message, the terminal initiates encryption of the sent second message based on the first key. Upon receiving the third message, the network device initiates decryption of the received second message based on the first key. This achieves integrity and / or encryption protection for MAC layer messages or MAC CE.

[0303] In some embodiments, the names of information, etc., are not limited to the names described in the embodiments. Terms such as "information", "message", "signal", "signaling", "report", "configuration", "indication", "instruction", "command", "channel", "parameter", "domain", "field", "symbol", "symbol", "codebook", "codeword", "codepoint", "bit", "data", "program", and "chip" can be used interchangeably.

[0304] In some embodiments, all or part of the various information, messages, signals, signaling, reports, configurations, indications, instructions, etc., may be the same. For example, multiple functions may be implemented with the same information (or other names) through implicit indications or field reuse. For example, the first information and the second information are the same information, or the first indication information and the first report are the same information.

[0305] In some embodiments, terms such as “uplink”, “uplink”, and “physical uplink” can be used interchangeably; terms such as “downlink”, “downlink”, and “physical downlink” can be used interchangeably; and terms such as “sidelink”, “sidelink”, “sidelink communication”, “sidelink communication”, “direct link”, “direct communication”, and “direct link communication” can be used interchangeably.

[0306] In some embodiments, the terms “downlink control information (DCI),” “downlink (DL) assignment,” “DL DCI,” “uplink (UL) grant,” and “UL DCI” can be used interchangeably.

[0307] In some embodiments, "acquire," "get," "obtain," "receive," "transmit," "bidirectional transmission," and "send and / or receive" can be used interchangeably and can be interpreted as receiving from other entities, acquiring from protocols, acquiring from higher layers, obtaining through self-processing, or autonomous implementation. Protocols include, for example, at least one of the 3GPP protocol, Wi-Fi protocol, and audio and / or video protocols.

[0308] In some embodiments, terms such as “send,” “transmit,” “report,” “distribute,” “transfer,” “bidirectional transmission,” “send and / or receive” can be used interchangeably.

[0309] In some embodiments, terms such as "certain," "preset," "default," "set," "indicated," "a certain," "any," and "first" can be used interchangeably. "Certain A," "preset A," "default A," "set A," "indicated A," "a certain A," "any A," and "first A" can be interpreted as A pre-defined in a protocol or the like, or as A obtained through setting, configuration, or instruction, or as specific A, a certain A, any A, or first A, but are not limited thereto.

[0310] In some embodiments, the determination or judgment can be made by a value represented by 1 bit (0 or 1), or by a true or false value (boolean), or by a comparison of numerical values ​​(e.g., a comparison with a predetermined value), but is not limited thereto.

[0311] In some embodiments, "not expecting to receive" can be interpreted as not receiving on time domain resources and / or frequency domain resources, or as not performing subsequent processing on the data and / or instructions received; "not expecting to send" can be interpreted as not sending, or as sending but not expecting the receiver to respond to the sent content.

[0312] In some embodiments, if an arrow in the interaction diagram representing the sending of information, signaling, etc. from one subject to another passes through other subjects, it can be interpreted as the information being forwarded from one subject to another via other subjects, or it can be interpreted as the information being sent from one subject to another without passing through other subjects.

[0313] The communication method involved in the embodiments of this disclosure may include at least one of steps S2101 to S2108. For example, step S2102 + step S2103 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, step S2101 + S2102 + step S2103 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, step S2102 + step S2103 + S2106 + S2108 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, step S2102 + S2105 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, step S2102 + S2104 + S2105 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and step S2102 + S2105 + S2106 + S2108 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Step 07 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Steps S2102+S2104+S2105+S2106+S2107 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Steps S2102+S2103+S2105 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Steps S2102+S2103+S2104+S2105 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Steps S2102+S2103+S2105+S2106+S2107 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. Steps S2101+S2102+S2103+S2105 can be implemented as independent embodiments; steps S2101+S2102+S2103+S2104+S2105 can be implemented as independent embodiments; steps S2101+S2102+S2103+S2105+S2106+S2107 can be implemented as independent embodiments; steps S2102+S2103+S2105+S2106+S2108 can be implemented as independent embodiments. The following steps can be implemented as independent embodiments: S2102 + S2103 + S2104 + S2105 + S2106 + S2108; S2102 + S2103 + S2105 + S2106 + S2107 + S2106 + S2108; S2101 + S2102 + S2103 + S2105 + S2106 + S2108.Steps S2101+S2102+S2103+S2104+S2105+S2106+S2108 can be implemented as independent embodiments, but are not limited thereto.

[0314] In some embodiments, steps S2103 and S2104 may be performed in a different order or simultaneously, steps S2105 may be performed in a different order or simultaneously, and steps S2107 and S2108 may be performed in a different order or simultaneously.

[0315] In some embodiments, step S2101 is optional, and one or more of these steps may be omitted or substituted in different embodiments.

[0316] In some embodiments, step S2104 is optional, and one or more of these steps may be omitted or substituted in different embodiments.

[0317] In some embodiments, steps S2106, S2107, and S2108 are optional, and one or more of these steps may be omitted or substituted in different embodiments.

[0318] In some embodiments, the steps and their optional implementations, technical effects, and other related parts of the specification described before or after this embodiment can be referred to, which will not be repeated here.

[0319] Figure 2H This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to embodiments of this disclosure. For example... Figure 2H As shown, the embodiments of this disclosure relate to a communication method, which includes:

[0320] Step S2201: The terminal sends a fourth message to the network device.

[0321] Correspondingly, the network device receives the fourth message sent by the terminal.

[0322] In some embodiments, the fourth message is used to instruct the terminal to request to return from the inactive state (RRC_INACTIVE) to the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED).

[0323] In some embodiments, the fourth message is, for example, message 3.

[0324] In some embodiments, when the terminal sends the fourth message, the terminal or network device may also send the second message at the same time, that is, the second message before the terminal successfully restores the connection state.

[0325] In some embodiments, the second message may be, for example, a Media Access Control Layer (MAC) control unit for recovery (MAC layer Resume MAC CE).

[0326] In some embodiments, the fourth message further includes a Radio Resource Control Resume Request message on Radio Bearer 0 of the Radio Resource Control layer (RRCResumeRequest message on SRB0 of the RRC layer).

[0327] In some embodiments, after generating the Resume-related MAC CE for the MAC layer, the terminal uses a first key solely to protect the integrity of the Resume-related MAC CE for the MAC layer.

[0328] In some embodiments, the terminal needs to restore the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED). The terminal can first derive the first key based on the second key, then protect the second message based on the first key, and then send a fourth message to the network device to request to restore from the inactive state (RRC_INACTIVE) to the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED).

[0329] In some embodiments, the terminal needs to restore the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED). The terminal can first send a fourth message to the network device, which can request to restore the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED) from the inactive state (RRC_INACTIVE), and then derive the first key based on the second key, and use the first key to protect the second message.

[0330] In step S2202, if the network device that restores the terminal to the connected state and the network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state are the same network device, the terminal and the network device derive the first key based on the second key, and perform security protection on the second message before the terminal successfully restores to the connected state based on the first key.

[0331] In some embodiments, the network device uses the key stored in the access layer security context as the second key and derives the first key based on the second key.

[0332] For example, when the Media Access Control (MAC) root key is retained in the access layer security context, the network device generates a first key based on the MAC root key.

[0333] For example, in the case where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key in the access layer security context but the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is retained, the network device generates a first key based on the RRC root key.

[0334] For example, in the access layer security context where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key and a Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key but the RRC integrity key is retained, the network device generates a first key based on the RRC integrity key.

[0335] In some embodiments, the terminal and network device do not require message activation of the Media Access Control layer security. This is because the terminal retains the second key and does not delete it during the transition from a connected state to an inactive state.

[0336] Alternatively, in some embodiments, the terminal and network device may activate media access control layer security via a message, such as a first message.

[0337] In some embodiments, the optional implementation of the network device deriving the first key based on the second key can be found in step S2101, where the network device derives the first key based on the second key, and will not be repeated here.

[0338] In some embodiments, the network device performs integrity verification on the received second message based on the first key to check whether the second message has been tampered with during transmission. This achieves security protection for the second message.

[0339] In some embodiments, the first key is, for example, a media access control layer integrity key.

[0340] In addition, in some embodiments, if the network device that restores the terminal to the connected state is not the same network device as the network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state, the network device does not provide security protection for the second message before the terminal successfully restores to the connected state.

[0341] In some embodiments, network devices treat Resume-related MAC CEs as unsecured messages and do not perform any verification.

[0342] Using the above method, during the transition from a connected state to an inactive state, both the terminal and the network device can retain the root key, i.e., the second key, required for subsequent activation of the Media Access Control (MAC) layer security. Thus, if the terminal needs to recover from the inactive state to the connected state, during the recovery process, the terminal can send a fourth message to the network device to request recovery from the inactive state to the connected state. Based on the second key retained in the inactive state, a first key is derived, and the second message before the terminal successfully recovers to the connected state is securely protected based on the first key. During the recovery process, the network device can derive the first key based on the second key, and the second message before the terminal successfully recovers to the connected state is securely protected based on the first key. This achieves integrity and / or encryption protection for MAC layer messages or MAC CE.

[0343] The communication method involved in the embodiments of this disclosure may include at least one of steps S2201 to S2202. For example, steps S2201 and S2202 may be implemented as independent embodiments, but are not limited thereto.

[0344] In some embodiments, the steps and their optional implementations, technical effects, and other related parts of the specification described before or after this embodiment can be referred to, which will not be repeated here.

[0345] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a communication method provided according to an embodiment of this disclosure. For example... Figure 3 As shown in Figure A, this disclosure relates to a communication method executed by a first device, the method comprising:

[0346] Step S3101: Receive or send a first message, the first message being used to activate media access control layer security.

[0347] The optional implementation of step S3101 can be found in [reference]. Figure 2A Steps S2102 and S2104, Figure 2H Optional implementation methods of step S2201, and Figures 2A to 2H Other related parts in the embodiments involved will not be described in detail here.

[0348] Step S3102: Secure the second message based on the first key. The first key includes at least one of a key for media access control layer encryption protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection. The second message is a media access control layer message or a media access control layer control unit.

[0349] The optional implementation of step S3102 can be found in [reference]. Figure 2A Steps S2103 and S2105, Figure 2HOptional implementation methods of step S2202, and Figures 2A to 2H Other related parts in the embodiments involved will not be described in detail here.

[0350] In the above embodiments, when the first device is a network device, the network device generates a first key based on the second key, the network device sends a first message to the terminal, and the network device performs security protection on the second message based on the first key.

[0351] In the above embodiments, when the first device is a network device, the network device sends a first message to the terminal. The network device receives a third message sent by the terminal. If the network device that restores the terminal to a connected state and the network device that puts the terminal into an inactive state are the same network device, the network device derives the first key based on the second key and uses the first key to securely protect the second message.

[0352] In some embodiments, when the first device is a terminal, the terminal receives a first message sent by the network device. After receiving and successfully verifying the first message or after sending the third message, the terminal generates a first key based on the second key and uses the first key to securely protect the second message.

[0353] In some embodiments, when the first device is a terminal, the terminal sends a first message to the network device to request the terminal to return to the connected state. If the network device serving the terminal's return to the connected state is the same network device that placed the terminal in an inactive state, during the process of the terminal returning from the inactive state to the connected state, the terminal derives the first key based on the second key and uses the first key to securely protect the second message.

[0354] In some embodiments, when the first device is a network device, the network device receives a first message sent by the terminal to request the terminal to return to a connected state. If the network device serving to restore the terminal to a connected state is the same network device as the network device that placed the terminal in an inactive state, the network device derives the first key based on the second key during the process of the terminal returning from an inactive state to a connected state, and uses the first key to securely protect the second message.

[0355] In the above embodiments, the first device sends or receives a first message for activating MAC layer security, and provides security protection for a second message based on a first key. The second message is either a MAC layer message or a MAC CE. Based on the aforementioned configuration, this disclosure embodiment achieves encrypted protection and / or integrity protection for MAC layer messages or MAC CEs, enabling MAC layer control signaling to possess confidentiality and integrity protection capabilities during air interface transmission. This prevents attackers from eavesdropping, tampering, and forging attacks on MAC layer control signaling, filling the technical gap in MAC layer security protection in communication protocols.

[0356] In some embodiments, the first key is a temporary key or a one-time key, and the first key is derived on demand based on the second key through a key derivation function when sending and / or receiving the second message.

[0357] In the above embodiments, the storage overhead and power consumption caused by the long-term maintenance of the MAC layer security context by terminals and network devices are avoided, which is particularly suitable for the protection of media control layer control units that are not frequently transmitted. Meanwhile, each or multiple second messages are protected by an independent first key. Even if one key is compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt or forge other second messages, achieving both forward and backward security. Furthermore, on-demand derivation eliminates the need for additional signaling interaction to synchronize the first key, reducing air interface signaling overhead. This allows network devices to flexibly configure different first keys for different terminals, different messages, or different sessions, enhancing the system's security flexibility and scalability.

[0358] In some embodiments, the second message is encrypted using at least one of the following:

[0359] Freshness parameters;

[0360] Transmission direction identifier;

[0361] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0362] Key stream length;

[0363] Keys used for encryption protection of the media access control layer;

[0364] Encryption protection algorithm.

[0365] In the above embodiments, by configuring input parameters for encryption protection of the second message, comprehensive isolation and dynamism of encryption protection are achieved in three dimensions: time, direction, and physical space, thereby improving the resistance to attacks. While ensuring encryption strength, redundant computational overhead is avoided, balancing security and processing overhead.

[0366] The freshness parameter ensures that the key streams generated at different times are different, thus resisting replay attacks.

[0367] The transmission direction identifier ensures that the uplink and downlink use independent key streams.

[0368] The logical channel identifier ensures that the encryption key streams on different logical channels are isolated from each other.

[0369] The key stream length can be dynamically configured based on the size of the second message.

[0370] The introduction of MAC layer encryption keys and encryption protection algorithms allows network devices to flexibly configure different encryption parameters for different terminals, messages, or sessions according to actual security needs.

[0371] In some embodiments, the second message is protected for integrity using at least one of the following:

[0372] Freshness parameters;

[0373] Transmission direction identifier;

[0374] The second message;

[0375] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0376] Keys used for integrity protection of the media access control layer;

[0377] Integrity protection algorithm.

[0378] In the above embodiments, integrity protection is achieved by configuring input parameters for the second message.

[0379] The freshness parameter ensures that the integrity check code (MAC-I) generated at different times is unique and unpredictable, effectively resisting replay attacks.

[0380] The transmission direction identifier ensures that the uplink and downlink use independent integrity key streams, preventing the integrity verification mechanism in one direction from being compromised and affecting the security of the other direction.

[0381] Among them, the logical channel identifier can ensure that the second message on different logical channels uses an independent integrity protection context, realizing integrity protection isolation in multi-bearer scenarios.

[0382] By using the message itself as one of the input parameters, the integrity check code is uniquely bound to the message content, ensuring that the receiving end can accurately identify whether the message has been tampered with during transmission.

[0383] The introduction of MAC layer integrity keys and integrity protection algorithms allows network devices to flexibly configure different integrity protection parameters for different terminals, messages, or sessions according to actual security needs, balancing security and processing overhead.

[0384] In some embodiments, where the input parameters used in the second message include a freshness parameter and a carrier identifier, both the freshness parameter and the carrier identifier are set to all zeros.

[0385] In the above embodiments, by setting both the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier to all zeros, the parameter processing method for MAC layer security protection is unified, which can simultaneously serve the security protection of the RRC layer, PDCP layer and MAC layer. This means that after the terminal and network device are activated for MAC layer security, there is no need for the terminal and network device to negotiate or configure the values ​​of the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier. This reduces signaling overhead and configuration complexity, and lowers the difficulty of device implementation.

[0386] Since MAC layer messages or MAC CEs themselves do not have a bearer context, and COUNT may not be available in the case of the MAC layer, directly reusing the security parameter filling method of the traditional RRC layer / PDCP layer will result in missing input parameters and failure to perform encryption or integrity protection operations normally.

[0387] Based on this, by setting both the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier to all zeros, the input parameters of traditional protection algorithms (NEA / NIA) can be filled normally in the MAC layer scenario. There is no need to design a dedicated security algorithm for the MAC layer. Traditional encryption and integrity protection algorithms can be directly reused, simplifying the implementation complexity and maintaining compatibility with traditional protection algorithms.

[0388] Alternatively, when using the Logical Channel Identifier (LCID) instead of the bearer identifier, since the LCID is used at the MAC layer to distinguish different logical channels, using it as one of the input parameters for integrity protection and encryption protection solves the problem of no bearer context at the MAC layer, while retaining the ability to distinguish different logical channels or different MAC CE streams. This achieves secure isolation in multi-logical channel scenarios and enhances the granularity of MAC layer security protection.

[0389] In some embodiments, the first key is determined by at least one of the following key derivation functions:

[0390] Function identifier FC;

[0391] Freshness parameters;

[0392] The length of the freshness parameter;

[0393] Transmission direction;

[0394] Length in the direction of transmission;

[0395] Algorithm type distinguisher, indicating whether the first key is used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0396] Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0397] Algorithm identifier, indicating the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0398] The length of the algorithm identifier.

[0399] In the above embodiments, a unified KDF architecture and diverse parameter combinations are used to achieve flexible derivation, functional isolation, and dynamic updating of MAC layer security keys, thereby enhancing key security and management flexibility.

[0400] By introducing Function Identifiers (FC), different key derivation purposes can be distinguished within the same KDF architecture (e.g., MAC layer encryption key derivation and MAC layer integrity key derivation use different FC values), thus realizing functional isolation of key derivation.

[0401] By introducing a freshness parameter and its length, the uniqueness and unpredictability of the first key derived at different times can be ensured, thus avoiding the security risks introduced by key reuse.

[0402] By introducing the transmission direction and its length, it is possible to ensure that the same terminal uses different first keys for uplink and downlink at the same time, thus achieving two-way key isolation.

[0403] By introducing an independent algorithm type distinguisher and its length, it is possible to clearly indicate whether the currently derived first key is used for MAC layer encryption protection or MAC layer integrity protection, thus avoiding the mixing of different types of keys.

[0404] By introducing an algorithm identifier and its length, the specific encryption or integrity protection algorithm negotiated can be indicated (e.g., NEA2 or NIA2), thus binding key derivation to the algorithm negotiation result.

[0405] In some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is any of the following:

[0406] Definition of the encryption algorithm for the Radio Resource Control layer;

[0407] Definition values ​​of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm;

[0408] Definition values ​​of the encryption algorithm for the media access control layer;

[0409] Definition of the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

[0410] In the above embodiments, the MAC layer encryption and integrity algorithms can reuse the defined values ​​of the RRC layer encryption and integrity algorithms, reducing modifications to the protocol stack, maximizing the reuse of traditional security mechanisms, and reducing implementation complexity. Alternatively, the MAC layer encryption and integrity algorithms can adopt new defined values, clearly distinguishing different levels and security types during key derivation, avoiding key mixing. Therefore, through the above configuration, the MAC layer security mechanism can remain compatible with the RRC layer security architecture, while reserving flexible design space for future expansion.

[0411] In some embodiments, the first key is derived from a second key; wherein the second key is any one of the following:

[0412] A Media Access Control (MAC) root key, which is generated based on a Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key;

[0413] Alternatively, the root key of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer;

[0414] Or, the first key that has already been used;

[0415] Alternatively, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key, which is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0416] In the above embodiments, a variety of feasible implementation methods are provided for the second key, which can flexibly realize the derivation of the first key, so that the derivation of the first key does not depend on a specific second key.

[0417] In some embodiments, the first message is further used to activate Radio Resource Control (RRC) security, and the activation of RRC security is used to protect the security of the terminal after it transitions to the connected state.

[0418] In the above embodiments, the activation of MAC layer security and RRC layer security can be triggered simultaneously through the first message. Compared with activating the two security layers separately through independent messages, this reduces signaling overhead and speeds up the security activation process.

[0419] In some embodiments, the first message includes at least one of the following:

[0420] Media access control layer security activation indicator, used to indicate the activation of media access control layer security;

[0421] Security protection configuration information used for the media access control layer;

[0422] Security protection configuration information for the media access control layer control unit.

[0423] In the above embodiments, a variety of feasible implementation methods are provided for the content of the first message, enabling network devices to flexibly configure MAC layer security activation methods and protection strategies.

[0424] The Media Access Control Layer Security Activation Indicator explicitly instructs the terminal to activate MAC layer security, ensuring that both communicating parties have a consistent understanding.

[0425] Among them, through the security protection configuration information, a unified policy can be configured for the second message as a whole, or different security policies can be configured for different types of MAC CEs, realizing fine-grained protection and balancing security and resource consumption.

[0426] Among them, the security protection configuration information is sent along with the first message, which reduces signaling overhead and speeds up the activation process. At the same time, network devices can dynamically adjust the configuration according to actual needs, enhancing the system's flexibility and scenario adaptability.

[0427] In some embodiments, the security protection configuration information includes at least one of the following:

[0428] List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected;

[0429] List of media access control layer control units that need to be encrypted;

[0430] List of media access control layer control units that require integrity protection;

[0431] Media access control layer encryption algorithm;

[0432] Media access control layer integrity algorithm.

[0433] In the above embodiments, multiple feasible implementation methods are provided for security protection configuration information, and multi-dimensional fine-grained configuration capabilities are provided for MAC layer security protection, distinguishing between levels, types and algorithms. This enables network devices to achieve a balance between security and resource overhead, while supporting collaborative work with the RRC layer / PDCP layer security algorithm system.

[0434] In some embodiments, the second message is securely protected based on a first key, including:

[0435] When the first device is a terminal, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, integrity protection of the sent second message and decryption of the received second message are initiated.

[0436] If the first device is a network device, after sending the first message, integrity protection and encryption of the sent second message are initiated.

[0437] In the above embodiments, after the terminal successfully verifies the first message, it initiates integrity protection for the sent second message and decryption of the received second message, so that the second message on the uplink has anti-tampering capability before being sent, and the terminal can decrypt the second message on the downlink sent by the network device in a timely manner.

[0438] After sending the first message, the network device initiates integrity protection and encryption for the second message, enabling the second message on the downlink to be tamper-proof and eavesdropping-proof before transmission, thus improving system security.

[0439] The above step-by-step configuration takes into account the different processing timings and roles of terminals and network devices, and has good compatibility and reliability in actual deployment.

[0440] In some embodiments, when the first device is a terminal, the method further includes:

[0441] A third message is sent to the network device to confirm that the Media Access Control Layer security has been successfully activated; after sending the third message, encryption of the sent second message is initiated.

[0442] When the first device is a network device, the method further includes:

[0443] The receiving terminal sends a third message, which is used to confirm that the media access control layer security has been successfully activated; after receiving the third message, the decryption of the received second message is initiated.

[0444] In the above embodiments, through the interaction of the third message and the sequential initiation of encryption / decryption, the terminal initiates uplink encryption after sending the third message to confirm MAC layer security activation, and the network device initiates uplink decryption after receiving the third message. This ensures that the terminal and the network device are synchronized and consistent in uplink encryption capabilities, and avoids the network device being unable to parse the encrypted second message subsequently sent by the terminal due to the failure to initiate decryption. At the same time, the third message, as a confirmation signaling, clarifies the completion time of security activation, provides a clear triggering condition for encryption initiation, and improves the reliability and controllability of the activation process.

[0445] In some embodiments, the third message is also used to confirm that the Radio Resource Control Layer security has been successfully activated.

[0446] In the above embodiments, the third message simultaneously confirms that both MAC layer security and RRC layer security have been successfully activated. The terminal does not need to send two separate messages to confirm the activation of the two security layers separately, which reduces signaling overhead and speeds up the security activation process. The network device can know that both security layers have been successfully activated with a single message, which simplifies the maintenance of the activation status and reduces the processing complexity of the protocol stack. It also ensures the consistency of the activation sequence of MAC layer security and RRC layer security, providing a unified security premise for subsequent communication.

[0447] In some embodiments, when the first device is a terminal, the method further includes:

[0448] Send a fourth message to the network device, the fourth message being used to instruct the terminal to request to resume from the inactive state to the connected state;

[0449] When the first device is a network device, the method further includes:

[0450] The receiving terminal sends a fourth message, which instructs the terminal to request to return from the inactive state to the connected state.

[0451] In the above embodiments, the terminal requests to return from the inactive state to the connected state via the fourth message. The network device can know that the terminal requests to return from the inactive state to the connected state by receiving the first fourth message. This eliminates the need to obtain this information through additional paging or service request procedures, reducing signaling interaction. It can also trigger the network device to prepare to activate MAC layer security based on the reserved media control layer root key, so that the security activation process and the state recovery process are connected in time, which speeds up the recovery speed of the terminal from the inactive state to the connected state. This is especially suitable for business scenarios that frequently switch between the inactive state and the connected state.

[0452] In some embodiments, the second message is securely protected based on a first key, including:

[0453] During the process of the terminal recovering from the inactive state to the connected state, the first key is derived based on the second key, the second message sent is encoded based on the first key, and the second message received is decoded; wherein, the network device that serves to restore the terminal to the connected state is the same network device as the network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state.

[0454] In some embodiments, the above encoding can be replaced by integrity protection and encryption.

[0455] In some embodiments, the decoding described above can be replaced by decryption and integrity verification.

[0456] In the above embodiments, since the network device that provides terminal recovery services and the network device that puts it into an inactive state are the same network device, the terminal and the network device can reuse the previously established security context (including the second key). The first key can be directly derived without re-executing the complete security activation process, which reduces signaling interaction, lowers recovery latency, and speeds up the recovery speed of the terminal from the inactive state to the connected state. Furthermore, by encoding and decoding the second message, the confidentiality of MAC layer messages during the recovery process is ensured, preventing the signaling from being eavesdropped or tampered with during the recovery process, and improving the security of the inactive state recovery process.

[0457] In some embodiments, the method further includes any one of the following:

[0458] When the Media Access Control Layer root key is retained in the access layer security context, the first key is generated based on the Media Access Control Layer root key;

[0459] In the case where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key in the access layer security context but the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0460] In the access layer security context where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key and no Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key, but the RRC integrity key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC integrity key.

[0461] In the above embodiments, multiple feasible generation methods are provided for the first key, enabling terminals and network devices to flexibly adapt according to the key type actually retained in the current access layer security context. This allows for fast startup of MAC layer security under different security context states, improving the robustness and scenario coverage of the solution.

[0462] In some embodiments, the steps and their optional implementations, technical effects, and other related parts of the specification described before or after this embodiment can be referred to, which will not be repeated here.

[0463] For alternative implementation methods of the above content, please refer to Figure 2A Steps S2102 to S2108, Figure 2H Optional implementation methods for steps S2201 to S2202, and Figures 2A to 2H Other related parts in the embodiments involved will not be described in detail here.

[0464] In some embodiments of the communication method disclosed herein, a terminal receives or sends a first message, which is used to activate media access control layer security.

[0465] The terminal provides security protection for the second message based on a first key, which includes at least one of a key for encryption protection of the Media Access Control Layer (MAC) and a key for integrity protection of the MAC. The second message is a MAC message or a MAC control layer control unit.

[0466] In some embodiments, the first key is a temporary key or a one-time key, and the first key is derived on demand based on the second key through a key derivation function when sending and / or receiving the second message.

[0467] In some embodiments, the second message is encrypted using at least one of the following:

[0468] Freshness parameters;

[0469] Transmission direction identifier;

[0470] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0471] Key stream length;

[0472] Keys used for encryption protection of the media access control layer;

[0473] Encryption protection algorithm.

[0474] In some embodiments, the second message is protected for integrity using at least one of the following:

[0475] Freshness parameters;

[0476] Transmission direction identifier;

[0477] The second message;

[0478] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0479] Keys used for integrity protection of the media access control layer;

[0480] Integrity protection algorithm.

[0481] In some embodiments, when the second message is encrypted and / or protected for integrity using a freshness parameter and a bearer identifier, both the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier are set to all zeros.

[0482] In some embodiments, the first key is determined by at least one of the following key derivation functions:

[0483] Function identifier FC;

[0484] Freshness parameters;

[0485] The length of the freshness parameter;

[0486] Transmission direction;

[0487] Length in the direction of transmission;

[0488] Algorithm type distinguisher, indicating whether the first key is used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0489] Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0490] Algorithm identifier, indicating the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0491] The length of the algorithm identifier.

[0492] In some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is any of the following:

[0493] Definition of the encryption algorithm for the Radio Resource Control layer;

[0494] Definition values ​​of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm;

[0495] Definition values ​​of the encryption algorithm for the media access control layer;

[0496] Definition of the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

[0497] In some embodiments, the first key is derived from a second key; wherein the second key is any one of the following:

[0498] A Media Access Control (MAC) root key, which is generated based on a Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key;

[0499] Alternatively, the root key of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer;

[0500] Or, the first key that has already been used;

[0501] Alternatively, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key, which is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0502] In some embodiments, receiving or sending a first message includes:

[0503] The first message is sent to the network device. The first message is used to activate Media Access Control (MAC) layer security. The first message is also used to activate Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer security. The activation of RRC layer security is used to protect the security of the terminal after it switches to connected mode.

[0504] In some embodiments, the first message includes at least one of the following:

[0505] Media access control layer security activation indicator, used to indicate the activation of media access control layer security;

[0506] Security protection configuration information used for the media access control layer;

[0507] Security protection configuration information for the media access control layer control unit.

[0508] In some embodiments, the security protection configuration information includes at least one of the following:

[0509] List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected;

[0510] List of media access control layer control units that need to be encrypted;

[0511] List of media access control layer control units that require integrity protection;

[0512] Media access control layer encryption algorithm;

[0513] Media access control layer integrity algorithm.

[0514] In some embodiments, the second message is securely protected based on a first key, including:

[0515] After receiving and successfully verifying the first message, integrity protection for the sent second message and decryption of the received second message are initiated.

[0516] In some embodiments, the method further includes:

[0517] Send a third message to the network device, the third message being used to confirm that the media access control layer security has been successfully activated;

[0518] After the third message is sent, encryption of the second message is initiated.

[0519] In some embodiments, the third message is also used to confirm that the Radio Resource Control Layer security has been successfully activated.

[0520] In some embodiments, the terminal further includes performing the following steps:

[0521] A fourth message is sent to the network device, the fourth message being used to instruct the terminal to request to resume from the inactive state to the connected state.

[0522] In some embodiments, the security protection of the second message based on the first key includes:

[0523] During the process of the terminal recovering from the inactive state to the connected state, the first key is derived based on the second key, and the second message is protected by the first key; wherein, the network device that serves to restore the terminal to the connected state is the same network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state.

[0524] In some embodiments, the terminal further includes performing any of the following:

[0525] When the Media Access Control Layer root key is retained in the access layer security context, the first key is generated based on the Media Access Control Layer root key;

[0526] In the case where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key in the access layer security context but the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0527] In the access layer security context where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key and no Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key, but the RRC integrity key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC integrity key.

[0528] In some embodiments of the communication method disclosed herein, a network device receives a first message sent by a terminal, the first message being used to activate media access control layer security.

[0529] The network device provides security protection for the second message based on a first key, the first key including at least one of a key for media access control layer encryption protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection, and the second message being a media access control layer message or a media access control layer control unit.

[0530] In some embodiments, the first key is a temporary key or a one-time key, and the first key is derived on demand based on the second key through a key derivation function when sending and / or receiving the second message.

[0531] In some embodiments, the second message is encrypted using at least one of the following:

[0532] Freshness parameters;

[0533] Transmission direction identifier;

[0534] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0535] Key stream length;

[0536] Keys used for encryption protection of the media access control layer;

[0537] Encryption protection algorithm.

[0538] In some embodiments, the second message is protected for integrity using at least one of the following:

[0539] Freshness parameters;

[0540] Transmission direction identifier;

[0541] The second message;

[0542] Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier;

[0543] Keys used for integrity protection of the media access control layer;

[0544] Integrity protection algorithm.

[0545] In some embodiments, when the second message is encrypted and / or protected for integrity using a freshness parameter and a bearer identifier, both the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier are set to all zeros.

[0546] In some embodiments, the first key is determined by at least one of the following key derivation functions:

[0547] Function identifier FC;

[0548] Freshness parameters;

[0549] The length of the freshness parameter;

[0550] Transmission direction;

[0551] Length in the direction of transmission;

[0552] Algorithm type distinguisher, indicating whether the first key is used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0553] Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0554] Algorithm identifier, indicating the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection;

[0555] The length of the algorithm identifier.

[0556] In some embodiments, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is any of the following:

[0557] Definition of the encryption algorithm for the Radio Resource Control layer;

[0558] Definition values ​​of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm;

[0559] Definition values ​​of the encryption algorithm for the media access control layer;

[0560] Definition of the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

[0561] In some embodiments, the first key is derived from a second key; wherein the second key is any one of the following:

[0562] A Media Access Control (MAC) root key, which is generated based on a Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key;

[0563] Alternatively, the root key of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer;

[0564] Or, the first key that has already been used;

[0565] Alternatively, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key, which is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0566] In some embodiments, the first message sent by the receiving terminal includes:

[0567] The terminal receives the first message, which is used to activate Media Access Control (MAC) layer security and Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer security. The activation of RRC layer security is used to protect the security of the terminal after it switches to connected mode.

[0568] In some embodiments, the first message includes at least one of the following:

[0569] Media access control layer security activation indicator, used to indicate the activation of media access control layer security;

[0570] Security protection configuration information used for the media access control layer;

[0571] Security protection configuration information for the media access control layer control unit.

[0572] In some embodiments, the security protection configuration information includes at least one of the following:

[0573] List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected;

[0574] List of media access control layer control units that need to be encrypted;

[0575] List of media access control layer control units that require integrity protection;

[0576] Media access control layer encryption algorithm;

[0577] Media access control layer integrity algorithm.

[0578] In some embodiments, the second message is securely protected based on a first key, including:

[0579] After sending the first message, integrity protection for the sent second message and encryption of the received second message are initiated.

[0580] In some embodiments, the network device further includes performing the following steps:

[0581] Receive a third message sent by the terminal, the third message being used to confirm that the media access control layer security has been successfully activated;

[0582] After receiving the third message, the decryption of the received second message is initiated.

[0583] In some embodiments, the third message is also used to confirm that the Radio Resource Control Layer security has been successfully activated.

[0584] In some embodiments, the network device further includes performing the following steps:

[0585] The terminal receives a fourth message, which instructs the terminal to request to return from the inactive state to the connected state.

[0586] In some embodiments, the security protection of the second message based on the first key includes:

[0587] During the process of the terminal recovering from the inactive state to the connected state, the first key is derived based on the second key, and the second message is protected by the first key; wherein, the network device that serves to restore the terminal to the connected state is the same network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state.

[0588] In some embodiments, the network device further includes performing any of the following:

[0589] When the Media Access Control Layer root key is retained in the access layer security context, the first key is generated based on the Media Access Control Layer root key;

[0590] In the case where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key in the access layer security context but the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC root key.

[0591] In the access layer security context where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key and no Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key, but the RRC integrity key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC integrity key.

[0592] The communication method disclosed in this embodiment aims to ensure that the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) protection can be activated and maintained in terminal state transition scenarios (i.e., the terminal transitions from idle state to connected state, from connected state to inactive state and then back to connected state).

[0593] 1. Derivation of the first key (MAC CE security key).

[0594] In some embodiments, according to relevant technologies, the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) is protected using a first key (i.e., a temporary key or a one-time key), in the following manner: Figure 2B As shown:

[0595] In some embodiments, in a 6G communication system, it is not necessary to introduce freshness parameters (such as counters or sequence numbers) in each second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE);

[0596] In some embodiments, the first key (MAC CE security key) is used only once, so the terminal does not need to maintain a key for protecting the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) in the terminal security context.

[0597] In some embodiments, different second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CEs) can be protected with different temporary keys to ensure secure isolation between the second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CEs).

[0598] In some embodiments, in a new layered architecture that supports MAC security, in addition to the K generated and stored by network devices (such as aNB-CU), aNB K UPenc K UPint K RRCint and K RRCenc In addition, network devices (such as aNB-CU) will also generate K MACRoot This information is then distributed and stored in network devices (such as aNB-DU). To protect the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the network device (such as aNB) and the terminal (such as UE) transmit the message from K. MACRoot The first key K is derived. MAC_CE The first key K MAC_CE It can be based on K MACRoot or old / used K MAC_CE Update.

[0599] In some embodiments, during each handover between network devices (such as aNB) or within a network device (such as aNB), once K aNB Refreshed, K MACRoot It will also be based on the refreshed KaNB Regenerated. This ensures that the first key (MAC CE security key) matches the K key. aNB Keep in sync.

[0600] In some embodiments, to better adapt the key hierarchy to mobility scenarios (i.e., situations where the AS security root key changes due to changes in network devices (such as aNB), it can also be proposed that the terminal (such as UE) and the network device (such as aNB) will... aNB As the root key of the MAC layer, it can be directly obtained from K aNB The first key is derived. In some embodiments, the new key level is as follows: Figure 2C As shown.

[0601] In some embodiments, network devices (such as aNB) and terminals (such as UE) simultaneously derive K using the following same parameters. MACint and K MACenc , which serves as the input S of the KDF.

[0602] FC = TBD;

[0603] P0=System Frame Number (SFN)+subframe number;

[0604] L0 = P0 length;

[0605] P1 = "UL" or "DL";

[0606] L1 = "UL / DL" length;

[0607] P2=algorithm type distinguisher;

[0608] L2=length of algorithm type distinguisher;

[0609] P3 = algorithm identity.

[0610] L3=length of algorithm identity.

[0611] In some embodiments, the second key (input key) is a 256-bit K key. aNB .

[0612] In some embodiments, P2 indicates that the derived first key is used for integrity protection (K). MACint ) or encryption protection (K MACenc ).

[0613] In some embodiments, P3 indicates the negotiation algorithm used for integrity protection or encryption protection. This negotiation algorithm is the same as the algorithm negotiated for RRC security. Therefore, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher can reuse the value defined in the communication protocol for N-RRC-enc-alg or N-RRC-int-alg, or a new value can be defined for MAC layer security, as shown in Table 1.

[0614] 2. Protection of the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0615] 2-1. Confidentiality Protection.

[0616] In some embodiments, at the PDCP layer, the encryption of RRC signaling or user plane messages follows the usage and operation mode of the 128-NEA algorithm specified in the communication protocol, as detailed in the following process: Figure 2D As shown.

[0617] In some embodiments, at the MAC layer, the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) uses Figure 2E The input parameters shown are encrypted. Since the first key used for protection is a temporary key, COUNT is unavailable and should be set to all zeros. Since the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) is not a bearer-based message, BEARER should also be set to all zeros, or LCID can be used instead of BEARER.

[0618] 2-2, Integrity Protection.

[0619] In some embodiments, at the PDCP layer, RRC signaling or user plane messages are protected for integrity according to the usage and operation mode of the 128-NIA algorithm specified in the communication protocol. The specific process is as follows: Figure 2F As shown.

[0620] In some embodiments, at the MAC layer, the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) uses Figure 2G The input parameters shown are used for integrity protection. Since the key used for protection is a temporary key, COUNT is unavailable and should therefore be set to all zeros. Because the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE) is not a bearer-based message, BEARER should also be set to all zeros, or LCID can be used instead of BEARER.

[0621] 2-3, MAC secure activation during state transition.

[0622] 2-3-1, The terminal switches from idle state (RRC_IDLE) to connected state (RRC_CONNECTED).

[0623] In some embodiments, when a terminal transitions from an idle state to a connected state, AS security needs to be activated during the transition process. For MAC security activation, it can be integrated into the AS SMC process; that is, MAC CE security and RRC security are activated together as part of AS security.

[0624] In some embodiments, in addition to the information for RRC security activation, the AS security mode command message sent from the network device (such as aNB) to the terminal (such as UE) additionally includes: configuration information of the MAC security protection type that needs to be protected, and optionally includes a MAC security activation indicator and a selected MAC layer encryption and integrity algorithm.

[0625] In some embodiments, the MAC security activation indicator is optional because the configuration information for MAC CE protection implicitly indicates the activation of MAC layer protection. The selected MAC layer encryption and integrity algorithm is also optional, as the MAC layer algorithm can be set to be the same as the RRC encryption and integrity algorithm.

[0626] In some embodiments, on the network device (e.g., aNB) side, if a first key is required, the network device (e.g., aNB) derives the first key before sending the AS security mode command message. If K is required... MACRoot Network devices (such as aNB) derive K before sending the AS security mode command message. MACRoot Downlink encryption for the second message can be initiated after sending the AS security mode command message. Uplink decryption for the second message can be initiated after receiving the AS security mode completion message.

[0627] In some embodiments, on the terminal (e.g., UE) side, downlink decryption of the second message can be initiated after receiving and successfully verifying the AS security mode command message. If a first key is required, the terminal (e.g., UE) will also derive the first key after receiving and successfully verifying the AS security mode command message. If K is required... MACRoot After receiving and successfully verifying the AS security mode command message, the terminal (such as the UE) will also derive K. MACRoot Uplink encryption for the second message can be initiated after the AS security mode completion message is sent.

[0628] Figure 4 This is an interactive schematic diagram of the communication method provided according to embodiments of this disclosure. For example... Figure 4 As shown, the embodiments of this disclosure relate to a communication method. Taking an aNB as the network device and a UE as the terminal as an example, the above method includes:

[0629] Step S4101: aNB starts RRC integrity protection.

[0630] In step S4102, the aNB sends an AS security mode command message (AS Security Mode Command (Integrity algorithm, Ciphering algorithm, MAC security indication, selected MACCE configuration, MAC-I)) to the UE.

[0631] In some embodiments, the AS security mode command message may be the first message mentioned above.

[0632] Step S4103, aNB starts RRC / MAC downlink ciphering.

[0633] Step S4104: The UE verifies the integrity of the AS security mode command message. If successful, the UE initiates RRC / MAC integrity protection and RRC / MAC downlink deciphering.

[0634] In step S4105, the UE sends an AS Security Mode Complete (MAC-I) message to the aNB.

[0635] In some embodiments, the AS security mode completion message may be the third message mentioned above.

[0636] Step S4106: The UE starts RRC / MAC uplink ciphering.

[0637] Step S4107: aNB starts RRC / MAC uplink deciphering.

[0638] In some embodiments, the aNB mentioned above can be replaced with gNB / ng-eNB.

[0639] In some embodiments, if an arrow in the interaction diagram representing the sending of information, signaling, etc. from one subject to another passes through other subjects, it can be interpreted as the information being forwarded from one subject to another via other subjects, or it can be interpreted as the information being sent from one subject to another without passing through other subjects.

[0640] In some embodiments, the steps and their optional implementations, technical effects, and other related parts of the specification described before or after this embodiment can be referred to, which will not be repeated here.

[0641] In some embodiments, the main difference between RRC security activation and MAC security activation is that the first key for MAC security may not be derived in the AS SMC procedure. The AS SMC procedure primarily prepares the security context required for the second message protection, including the root key of the first key (such as K). aNB or K MACRoot The first key is derived only by the network device (such as aNB) and the algorithm used for the second message protection.

[0642] 2-3-1. Under the same network device (such as aNB), the terminal goes from the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED) to the inactive state (RRC_INACTIV) and then back to the connected state (RRC_CONNECTED).

[0643] In some embodiments, it is assumed that the terminal (e.g., UE) can still protect the sent second message (e.g., Resume MAC CE) even when inactive. Therefore, when the network device (e.g., aNB) puts the terminal (e.g., UE) into an inactive state by sending an RRRCrease message carrying suspendConfig to the terminal (e.g., UE), the network device (e.g., aNB) should delete the current AS key K. RRCenc K UPenc and K UPint However, retain the current AS key K. RRCint And the current K aNB (If there are no unused {Next Hop Chaining Counter (NCC)} pairs, and {Next Hop Key (NH)} pairs are currently available). Retain the current K. aNB As the root key for the first key (derived from the MAC security key). If the current K is not retained... aNB Then use the current K. RRCint The root key is derived securely from the MAC layer.

[0644] In some embodiments, upon receiving an RRRRelease message carrying suspendConfig from a network device (e.g., aNB) on the terminal (e.g., UE) side, the terminal (e.g., UE) should delete the current AS key K. RRCenc K UPenc and K UPint However, retain the current AS key K. RRCint And in the received NCC value and the current K aNB If the associated NCC values ​​are the same, retain the current K. aNB .

[0645] In some embodiments, when a terminal (e.g., a UE) decides to restore the RRC connection to transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED, the terminal (e.g., the UE) will send Message 3, which includes a Resume MAC CE at the MAC layer and an RRCResumeRequest message on the RRC layer SRB0. After generating the Resume MAC CE message, the terminal (e.g., the UE) uses the K stored in its AS security context. aNB Or KRRCint generates the first key (e.g., K MACint This is solely for protecting the integrity of the Resume MAC CE. On the network device (e.g., aNB) side, there are two scenarios:

[0646] If the terminal (e.g., UE) reverts to the same network device (e.g., aNB) that inactive it, the network device (e.g., aNB) can generate a first key (e.g., K) by sharing the same AS security context as the terminal (e.g., UE). MACint To verify the integrity of Resume MAC CE.

[0647] If the UE reverts to a different network device (such as aNB) than the one that deactivated it, the network device (such as aNB) will treat the Resume MAC CE as an unprotected message and will not perform any authentication.

[0648] In some embodiments, the terminal (e.g., UE) side includes the following:

[0649] The terminal (such as UE) should be able to be based on K aNB Derivation of K MACint and K MACenc It is used to protect the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0650] The terminal (such as the UE) should be able to calculate K using the system frame number (SFN), UL / DL string, subframe number, algorithm type distinguisher, and algorithm identifier. MACint and KMACenc .

[0651] When encrypting / decrypting a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to set the COUNT input to all zeros.

[0652] When performing integrity protection or verification on a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to set the COUNT input to all zeros.

[0653] When encrypting / decrypting a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to set the BEARER input to all zeros.

[0654] When performing integrity protection or verification on a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to set the BEARER input to all zeros.

[0655] When encrypting / decrypting a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to use LCID instead of BEARER input.

[0656] When performing integrity protection or verification on a second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE), the terminal (such as UE) should be able to use LCID instead of BEARER input.

[0657] The terminal (such as the UE) should be able to receive and understand the selected security protection configuration contained in the first message (such as the AS SMC message).

[0658] The terminal (such as the UE) should be able to receive and understand the Media Access Control Layer Security Activation Indicator contained in the first message (such as the AS Security Mode Command Message).

[0659] After receiving and successfully verifying the first message (such as the AS security mode command message), the terminal (such as the UE) should be able to initiate downlink decryption of the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0660] After receiving and successfully verifying the first message (such as the AS security mode command message), the terminal (e.g., UE) should be able to derive K. MACRoot .

[0661] After sending a third message (such as an AS security mode completion message), the terminal (such as a UE) should be able to initiate uplink encryption for the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0662] When resuming from an inactive state to a connected state, the terminal (such as a UE) should be able to use the K stored in its AS security context. aNB or K RRCint Generate KMACint This is to protect the integrity of the second message (such as Resume MAC CE).

[0663] In some embodiments, the network device (such as an aNB) side includes the following:

[0664] Network devices (such as aNBs) should be able to be based on K aNB Derivation of K MACint and K MACenc It is used to protect the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0665] Network devices (such as aNBs) should be able to calculate K using the system frame number (SFN), UL / DL string, subframe number, algorithm type distinguisher, and algorithm identifier. MACint and K MACenc .

[0666] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to set the COUNT input to all zeros when encrypting / decrypting second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CE).

[0667] Network devices (such as aNBs) should be able to set the COUNT input to all zeros when performing integrity protection or authentication on second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CEs).

[0668] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to set the BEARER input to all zeros when encrypting / decrypting second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CE).

[0669] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to set the BEARER input to all zeros when performing integrity protection or authentication on second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CE).

[0670] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to use LCID instead of BEARER input when encrypting / decrypting second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CE).

[0671] Network devices (such as aNBs) should be able to use LCID instead of BEARER input when performing integrity protection or authentication on second messages (MAC layer messages or MAC CE).

[0672] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to include selected security protection configuration information in the first message (such as an AS SMC message).

[0673] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to include a Media Access Control Layer Security Activation Indicator in the first message (such as an AS SMC message).

[0674] Network devices (such as aNB) should be able to derive KMACRoot before sending the first message (such as an AS security mode command message).

[0675] After sending the first message (such as an AS security mode command message), network devices (such as aNB) should be able to initiate uplink encryption for the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0676] After receiving the first message (such as the AS security mode command message), the network device (such as aNB) should be able to initiate downlink decryption of the second message (MAC layer message or MAC CE).

[0677] When a message is received from a UE in an inactive state, the network device (such as an aNB) should be able to use the K stored in its AS security context. aNB or K RRCint Generate K MACint This is to verify the integrity of the second message (such as Resume MAC CE).

[0678] This disclosure also proposes an apparatus (also referred to as a communication device, etc.) for implementing any of the above methods. For example, an apparatus is proposed that includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by the terminal in any of the above methods. Furthermore, another apparatus is proposed that includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by a network device (e.g., an access network device, a core network functional node, a core network device, etc.) in any of the above methods.

[0679] It should be understood that the division of units or modules in the above device is only a logical functional division. In actual implementation, they can be fully or partially integrated into a single physical entity, or they can be physically separated. Furthermore, the units or modules in the device can be implemented by a processor calling software: for example, the device includes a processor connected to a memory containing instructions. The processor calls the instructions stored in the memory to implement any of the above methods or to implement the functions of the units or modules in the above device. The processor can be, for example, a general-purpose processor, such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU) or a microprocessor, and the memory can be internal or external to the device. Alternatively, the units or modules in the device can be implemented in the form of hardware circuits. The functionality of some or all of the units or modules can be achieved through the design of these hardware circuits, which can be understood as one or more processors. For example, in one implementation, the hardware circuit is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The functionality of some or all of the units or modules is achieved through the design of the logical relationships between the components within the circuit. In another implementation, the hardware circuit can be implemented using a programmable logic device (PLD). Taking a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) as an example, it can include a large number of logic gates. The connection relationships between the logic gates are configured through configuration files, thereby achieving the functionality of some or all of the units or modules. All units or modules of the above device can be implemented entirely through processor-called software, entirely through hardware circuits, or partially through processor-called software with the remaining parts implemented through hardware circuits.

[0680] In this embodiment, the processor is a circuit with signal processing capabilities. In one implementation, the processor can be a circuit with instruction read and execute capabilities, such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a microprocessor, a graphics processing unit (GPU) (which can be understood as a microprocessor), or a digital signal processor (DSP). In another implementation, the processor can implement certain functions through the logical relationships of hardware circuits. The logical relationships of the aforementioned hardware circuits are fixed or reconfigurable. For example, the processor is a hardware circuit implemented using an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a programmable logic device (PLD), such as an FPGA. In a reconfigurable hardware circuit, the process of the processor loading a configuration document and configuring the hardware circuit can be understood as the process of the processor loading instructions to implement the functions of some or all of the above units or modules. Furthermore, it can also be a hardware circuit designed for artificial intelligence, which can be understood as an ASIC, such as a Neural Network Processing Unit (NPU), a Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), or a Deep Learning Processing Unit (DPU).

[0681] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of this disclosure. The communication device 500 is used to perform any of the above methods. In some embodiments, the communication device 500 may include at least one of a transceiver module 501, a processing module 502, etc.

[0682] In some embodiments, the communication device 500 can act as a terminal 101. The transceiver module 501 is used to receive or send a first message, which is used to activate Media Access Control (MAC) security. The processing module 502 is used to provide security protection for a second message based on a first key. The first key includes at least one of a key for MAC encryption protection and a key for MAC integrity protection. The second message is a MAC message or a MAC control unit. Optionally, the transceiver module is used to perform at least one of the communication steps (e.g., steps S2102, S2106, S2201, S3101, S4102, S4105, but not limited thereto) performed by the terminal 101 in any of the above methods. Further details are omitted here. Optionally, the above processing module is used to execute at least one of the other steps executed by the terminal 101 in any of the above methods (e.g., steps S2104, S2105, S2107, S2202, S3102, S4104, S4106, but not limited thereto), which will not be elaborated here.

[0683] In some embodiments, the communication device 500 can act as the network device 102. The transceiver module 501 is used to receive or send a first message, which is used to activate Media Access Control (MAC) security. The processing module 502 is used to provide security protection for a second message based on a first key, which includes at least one of a key for MAC encryption protection and a key for MAC integrity protection. The second message is a MAC message or a MAC control unit. Optionally, the transceiver module is used to perform at least one of the communication steps (e.g., steps S2102, S2106, S2201, S3101, S4102, S4105, but not limited thereto) performed by the network device 102 in any of the above methods. Further details are omitted here. Optionally, the above processing module is used to execute at least one of the other steps executed by the network device 102 in any of the above methods (e.g., steps S2101, S2103, S2108, S2202, S3102, S4101, S4103, S4107, but not limited thereto), which will not be elaborated here.

[0684] In some embodiments, the transceiver module may include a transmitting module and / or a receiving module, which may be separate or integrated. Optionally, the transceiver module may be interchangeable with a transceiver.

[0685] In some embodiments, the processing module may be a single module or may include multiple sub-modules. Optionally, the multiple sub-modules may each perform all or part of the steps required by the processing module.

[0686] In some embodiments, the processing module can be interchanged with the processor, and the transceiver module can be interchanged with the transceiver.

[0687] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device proposed in an embodiment of this disclosure. The communication device 600 can be a network device (e.g., access network device and / or core network device), a terminal (e.g., user equipment), a chip, chip system, or processor that supports the network device in implementing any of the above methods, or a chip, chip system, or processor that supports the terminal in implementing any of the above methods. The communication device 600 can be used to implement the methods described in the above method embodiments; for details, please refer to the descriptions in the above method embodiments.

[0688] like Figure 6 As shown, the communication device 600 is used to execute any of the above methods. In some embodiments, the communication device 600 includes one or more processors 601. The processor 601 may be a general-purpose processor or a special-purpose processor, such as a baseband processor or a central processing unit. The baseband processor may be used to process communication protocols and communication data, and the central processing unit may be used to control communication devices (e.g., base stations, baseband chips, terminal devices, terminal device chips, DUs or CUs, etc.), execute programs, and process program data. Optionally, the communication device 600 is used to execute any of the above methods. Optionally, one or more processors 601 are used to invoke instructions to cause the communication device 600 to execute any of the above methods.

[0689] In some embodiments, the communication device 600 further includes one or more transceivers 602.

[0690] When the communication device 600 acts as the terminal 101, the transceiver 602 performs at least one of the communication steps such as sending and / or receiving in the above method (e.g., steps S2102, S2106, S2201, S3101, S4102, S4105, but not limited thereto), and the processor 601 performs at least one of the other steps (e.g., steps S2104, S2105, S2107, S2202, S3102, S4104, S4106, but not limited thereto).

[0691] When the communication device 600 acts as the network device 102, the transceiver 602 performs at least one of the communication steps such as sending and / or receiving in the above method (e.g., steps S2102, S2106, S2201, S3101, S4102, S4105, but not limited thereto), and the processor 601 performs at least one of the other steps (e.g., steps S2101, S2103, S2108, S2202, S3102, S4101, S4103, S4107, but not limited thereto).

[0692] In optional embodiments, the transceiver may include a receiver and / or a transmitter, which may be separate or integrated. Optionally, the terms transceiver, transceiver unit, transceiver, transceiver circuit, interface circuit, interface, etc., can be used interchangeably; the terms transmitter, transmitting unit, transmitter, transmitting circuit, etc., can be used interchangeably; the terms receiver, receiving unit, receiver, receiving circuit, etc., can be used interchangeably.

[0693] In some embodiments, the communication device 600 further includes one or more memories 603 for storing data and / or instructions. Optionally, one or more processors 601 are used to invoke instructions stored in the memory 603 to cause the communication device 600 to perform any of the above methods. Optionally, all or part of the memory 603 may also be located outside the communication device 600.

[0694] In some embodiments, the communication device 600 may include one or more interface circuits 604. Optionally, the interface circuit 604 is connected to the memory 603, and the interface circuit 604 can be used to receive data and / or instructions from the memory 603 or other devices, and can be used to send data and / or instructions to the memory 603 or other devices. For example, the interface circuit 604 can read data and / or instructions stored in the memory 603 and send the data and / or instructions to the processor 601. Optionally, the terms interface circuit, interface, transceiver pin, etc., can be used interchangeably.

[0695] The communication device 600 described in the above embodiments may be a network device or a terminal, but the scope of the communication device 600 described in this disclosure is not limited thereto, and the structure of the communication device 600 may vary. Figure 6The limitations. The communication device may be a standalone device or part of a larger device. For example, the communication device may be: (1) a standalone integrated circuit IC, or chip, or chip system or subsystem; (2) a collection of one or more ICs, optionally including storage components for storing data, programs and / or instructions; (3) an ASIC, such as a modem; (4) a module that can be embedded in other devices; (5) a receiver, terminal device, smart terminal device, cellular phone, wireless device, handheld device, mobile unit, vehicle device, network device, cloud device, artificial intelligence device, etc.; (6) others, etc.

[0696] This disclosure also proposes a storage medium storing instructions that, when executed on a communication device, cause the communication device to perform any of the above methods. Optionally, the storage medium is an electronic storage medium. Optionally, the storage medium is a computer-readable storage medium, but not limited thereto; it may also be a storage medium readable by other devices. Optionally, the storage medium may be a non-transitory storage medium, but not limited thereto; it may also be a temporary storage medium.

[0697] This disclosure also proposes a program product, including a program and / or instructions, which, when executed by a communication device, cause the communication device to perform any of the above methods. Optionally, the program product is a computer program product. Optionally, the program product is stored on the storage medium.

[0698] This disclosure also proposes a computer program that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform any of the above methods.

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that, Performed by a first device, the method includes: Receive or send a first message, the first message being used to activate media access control layer security; The second message is secured based on a first key, which includes at least one of a key for media access control layer encryption protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection. The second message is a media access control layer message or a media access control layer control unit.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first key is a temporary key or a one-time key. When sending and / or receiving the second message, the first key is derived on demand based on the second key through a key derivation function.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The second message is protected by encryption and / or integrity using at least one of the following: Freshness parameters; Transmission direction identifier; Bearer identifier or logical channel identifier; Key stream length; Keys used for encryption protection of the media access control layer; Encryption protection algorithm; The second message; Keys used for integrity protection of the media access control layer; Integrity protection algorithm.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, When the second message is protected by encryption and / or integrity using a freshness parameter and a bearer identifier, both the freshness parameter and the bearer identifier are set to all zeros.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The first key is determined by at least one of the following key derivation functions: Function identifier FC; Freshness parameters; The length of the freshness parameter; Transmission direction; Length in the direction of transmission; Algorithm type distinguisher, indicating whether the first key is used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection; Length of the algorithm type distinguisher; Algorithm identifier, indicating the negotiation algorithm used for Media Access Control Layer integrity protection or Media Access Control Layer encryption protection; The length of the algorithm identifier.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The value of the algorithm type distinguisher is any of the following: Definition of the encryption algorithm for the Radio Resource Control layer; Definition values ​​of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity algorithm; Definition values ​​of the encryption algorithm for the media access control layer; Definition of the Media Access Control Layer Integrity Algorithm.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1-6, characterized in that, The first key is derived from the second key; wherein the second key is any one of the following: A Media Access Control (MAC) root key, which is generated based on a Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key; Alternatively, the root key of the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer; Or, the first key that has already been used; Alternatively, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) integrity key, which is generated based on the RRC root key.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The first message is also used to activate Radio Resource Control (RRC) security, which is used to protect the security of the terminal after it transitions to connected mode.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The first message includes at least one of the following: Media access control layer security activation indicator, used to indicate the activation of media access control layer security; Security protection configuration information used for the media access control layer; Security protection configuration information for the media access control layer control unit.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, The security protection configuration information includes at least one of the following: List of media access control layer control units that need to be protected; List of media access control layer control units that need to be encrypted; List of media access control layer control units that require integrity protection; Media access control layer encryption algorithm; Media access control layer integrity algorithm.

11. The method according to any one of claims 8-10, characterized in that, The second message is securely protected based on the first key, including: When the first device is a terminal, after receiving and successfully verifying the first message, integrity protection of the sent second message and decryption of the received second message are initiated. If the first device is a network device, after sending the first message, integrity protection and encryption of the sent second message are initiated.

12. The method according to any one of claims 8-11, characterized in that, When the first device is a terminal, the method further includes: A third message is sent to the network device to confirm that the Media Access Control Layer security has been successfully activated; after sending the third message, encryption of the sent second message is initiated. When the first device is a network device, the method further includes: The receiving terminal sends a third message, which is used to confirm that the media access control layer security has been successfully activated; after receiving the third message, the decryption of the received second message is initiated.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that, The third message is also used to confirm that the Radio Resource Control Layer security has been successfully activated.

14. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the first device is a terminal, a fourth message is sent to the network device, the fourth message being used to instruct the terminal to request to resume from the inactive state to the connected state; When the first device is a network device, a fourth message is sent by the receiving terminal, the fourth message being used to instruct the terminal to request to restore from the inactive state to the connected state.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The second message is securely protected based on the first key, including: During the process of the terminal recovering from the inactive state to the connected state, the first key is derived based on the second key, the second message sent is encoded based on the first key, and the second message received is decoded; wherein, the network device that serves to restore the terminal to the connected state is the same network device as the network device that puts the terminal into the inactive state.

16. The method according to claim 14 or 15, characterized in that, The method further includes any one of the following: When the Media Access Control Layer root key is retained in the access layer security context, the first key is generated based on the Media Access Control Layer root key; In the case where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key in the access layer security context but the Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC root key. In the access layer security context where there is no Media Access Control (MAC) root key and no Radio Resource Control (RRC) root key, but the RRC integrity key is retained, the first key is generated based on the RRC integrity key.

17. A communication method for a communication system, the communication system including a first device, the method comprising: The first device receives or sends a first message, which is used to activate media access control layer security. The first device provides security protection for the second message based on a first key, the first key including at least one of a key for media access control layer encryption protection and a key for media access control layer integrity protection, and the second message is a media access control layer message or a media access control layer control unit.

18. A communication device, characterized in that, The communication device is used to perform the communication method according to any one of claims 1-16.

19. A communication system, characterized in that, Includes a first device, wherein the first device is configured to implement the communication method of any one of claims 1-16.

20. A storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores instructions that, when executed on a communication device, cause the communication device to perform the communication method as described in any one of claims 1-16.

21. A program product, characterized in that, It includes at least one of a program and instructions, wherein when the program or instructions are executed by a communication device, they implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-16.