A train integrated logic control unit and an integrated electrical and communication control method
By introducing dual-channel acquisition and cross-redundancy judgment in LCU and RIOM, the resource waste and failure risk caused by independent configuration of LCU and RIOM are solved, and a more efficient and reliable train control system is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611287490.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-24
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In the existing technology, the logic control unit (LCU) and the remote input/output module (RIOM) in the train network control system are treated as two independent devices, which leads to problems such as redundant wiring, waste of resources, increased risk of failure, and fragmented system control.
The system employs a dual-channel acquisition board (both A-series and B-series) and an on-board two-out-of-two voting SIL4-level input board. It combines SIL4-level and SIL2-level main control boards for cross-redundancy judgment, generates control commands, and interacts with the train communication network through a communication board to achieve the integration of LCU and RIOM.
It reduces design costs, improves the safety and reliability of the control system, reduces wiring complexity and failure risk, and enables online diagnosis and rapid fault location.
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Figure CN123104730A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of rail transit vehicle control technology, and in particular to a train integrated logic control unit and an integrated electrical and communication control method. Background Technology
[0002] In the field of rail transit vehicle control, traditionally, a large number of mechanical contact relays, intermediate relays, and time relays are used to form hard-wired logic control circuits connected by complex cable networks. These circuits are used to achieve logic interlocking and control signal transmission for key functions such as pantograph raising and lowering, traction application, braking control, emergency braking safety loops, door control, and air conditioning and lighting. This electrical control system directly affects the train's operational safety and efficiency.
[0003] However, the above-mentioned control scheme based on contact relays has revealed many inherent defects in long-term engineering practice: Firstly, they have poor environmental adaptability and a high failure rate. Contact relays operate under harsh conditions unique to train operation, such as high temperatures, humidity, and continuous vibration. Their mechanical structure and contacts are prone to physical failures such as aging, jamming, contact oxidation, and even burning, ultimately leading to poor contact or open circuits between the moving and stationary contacts. Taking Guangzhou Metro Line 1 as an example, a single train uses as many as 472 relays, with approximately 250 failures per year. Relay failures account for a significant proportion of delays, passenger evacuation, and emergency rescue incidents, severely impacting operational order.
[0004] Secondly, the wiring is complex and maintenance costs are high. The control logic relies entirely on hard-wired cable connections, resulting in complex vehicle wiring, time-consuming debugging and troubleshooting, and the relays used in high-speed trains are mostly imported components, leading to high procurement and replacement costs.
[0005] Third, it lacks online diagnostic capabilities. The existing system does not have online operation monitoring and intelligent fault diagnosis functions, making it difficult to locate fault points and resulting in low maintenance efficiency.
[0006] Fourth, it lacks versatility and flexibility. When the train control function needs to be modified or upgraded, the hardware wiring must be rebuilt, which is a lot of work and difficult to adapt to the needs of functional iteration.
[0007] Fifth, they are bulky and heavy. A large number of relays and cables occupy the limited on-board installation space, which is not conducive to the overall vehicle lightweighting and equipment layout optimization.
[0008] To address the aforementioned issues, the industry has developed contactless logic control units (LCUs) based on solid-state electronic devices in recent years. This technology replaces traditional contact relays with solid-state switching circuits such as optocouplers and metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs), implementing logic operations and delay functions through software programming. LCU technology has been maturely applied in the locomotive field for over a decade, and in 2016, it was implemented in batches on urban rail trains on Shenzhen Metro Line 9. Actual operation has shown that its failure rate is significantly lower than that of traditional relay solutions. Currently, new metro projects in cities such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, Ningbo, Xi'an, and Qingdao have widely adopted LCU solutions, and some existing lines are also undergoing LCU upgrades. Their safety integrity level has reached Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 4, meeting the control requirements of high-safety-level electrical circuits.
[0009] Although LCU technology effectively overcomes many shortcomings of traditional relay solutions, a technical problem remains unresolved in current industry designs: the Logic Control Unit (LCU) and the Remote Input / Output Module (RIOM) in the train network control system exist as two independent devices. Their functions highly overlap, yet they are physically separate and wired independently. Taking a typical 6-car metro train as an example, the entire train requires 6 LCUs and 8 RIOMs to meet hard-wired control requirements, leading to the following problems: Redundant wiring and waste of resources: The same electrical signal needs to be connected to LCU and RIOM separately, resulting in repeated hard wiring, long cable paths, more intermediate breakpoints, and increased wiring complexity. Space and cost pressures: Two independent sets of equipment occupy a large amount of installation space under the vehicle or inside the cabinet, significantly increasing procurement and design costs. Increased risk of failure: The increase in the number of devices and wiring nodes directly leads to a significant increase in potential failure points; The fragmented system control, with the physical and functional separation of the LCU and RIOM, results in an architectural disconnect between the electrical hardwired control and the network control system, which is detrimental to the real-time and precise integrated collaborative control of the vehicle. Summary of the Invention
[0010] The purpose of this application is to address the deficiencies in the existing technology by providing a train integrated logic control unit and an integrated electrical and communication control method and system, thereby solving the problems existing in the prior art.
[0011] To achieve the above objectives, in a first aspect, this application provides a train integrated logic control unit and an integrated electrical and communication control method, applied to a local logic control unit, comprising: Two SIL4-level input boards (Series A and Series B) respectively acquire switch signals of the same safety level through dual channels and perform on-board two-out-of-two voting, before sending them to the Series A and Series B SIL4-level main control boards respectively. The two SIL4-level main control boards compare the signals they receive, and if they match, they generate safety level control commands and send them to the communication board and the corresponding SIL4-level output board respectively. And / or, two SIL2-level input boards (Series A and Series B) respectively acquire non-safety level switch signals, process them through the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, generate non-safety level control commands, and send them to the corresponding SIL2-level output board and the communication board respectively. The communication board sends safety level control commands and / or non-safety level control commands to the train communication network, and receives control data from other carriages and / or the central control unit from the train communication network. Two SIL4 level main control boards perform cross-redundancy checks on safety level control commands and control data. When the checks are consistent, the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output; when they are inconsistent, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and an anomaly is reported. And / or the SIL2 level main control board performs cross-redundancy checks on non-safety level control commands and control data. When they are consistent, the corresponding SIL2 level output board is triggered to output; when they are inconsistent, the non-safety level control command is output and an anomaly is reported.
[0012] In one possible implementation, the two SIL4 level input boards (Series A and Series B) respectively perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signals, and then send them to the Series A and Series B SIL4 level main control boards respectively. Specifically, this includes: The A-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the security level switch signal and then sends it to the A-series SIL4 level main control board. The B-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same security level switch signal and then sends it to the B-series SIL4 level main control board. The A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board perform a two-out-of-two synchronous comparison of the signals they receive, and generate security level control commands respectively after the vote is consistent. Each SIL4 level main control board will send the generated security level control commands to the corresponding SIL4 level output board and communication board.
[0013] In one possible implementation, the SIL4 level control channel adopts a two-out-of-two safety redundancy architecture; The A-series SIL4 level input board has a first acquisition channel and a second acquisition channel. The first acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A1. The input acquisition circuit A1 is used to acquire safety level switch signals, the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1, and the safety processor IO-A1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1. The second acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit A2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A2. The input acquisition circuit A2 is used to acquire switch signals of the same safety level. The diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A2. The safety processor IO-A2 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A2. The security processor IO-A1 and the security processor IO-A2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the A-series SIL4 level main control board. The A-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-A1 and CPU-A2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two voting on the received signals. If the voting is consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the A-series SIL4 level output board and communication board respectively. The A-series SIL4 level output board has a first output circuit and a second output circuit. The first output circuit includes an output circuit A1 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit A1 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit A1 in real time. The second output circuit includes an output circuit A2 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit A2 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit A2 in real time. The output circuit A1 and the output circuit A2 are respectively controlled by the A-series SIL4 level main control board; The B-series SIL4 level input board has a third and a fourth acquisition channel; The third acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit B1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B1. The input acquisition circuit B1 is used to acquire the safety level switch signal, the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B1, and the safety processor IO-B1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B1. The fourth acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit B2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B2. The input acquisition circuit B2 is used to acquire switch signals of the same safety level. The diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B2. The safety processor IO-B2 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B2. The security processor IO-B1 and the security processor IO-B2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the B-series SIL4 level main control board. The B-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-B1 and CPU-B2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two vote on the received signals. If the vote is consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the B-series SIL4 level output board and communication board respectively. The B-series SIL4 level output board has a third output circuit and a fourth output circuit. The third output circuit includes an output circuit B1 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit B1 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit B1 in real time. The fourth output circuit includes an output circuit B2 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit B2 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit B2 in real time. The output circuits B1 and B2 are respectively controlled by the B-series SIL4 level main control board; A two-out-of-two synchronous comparison is performed between the A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board.
[0014] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: The SIL4 level output board outputs the safety level control commands to the safety level terminal equipment as electrical hard-wired signals. The SIL4 level output board outputs the safety level control command to the safety level terminal equipment as an electrical hardwire signal, specifically including: The SIL4 level output board outputs dry contact switching signals, which are high-level or low-level electrical hardwire signals. The electrical hard-wired signal is directly transmitted to the control terminal of the security level terminal device via cable, and the security level terminal device is controlled to perform actions in a hard-wired drive manner. The SIL4 level output board is also equipped with a diagnostic circuit connected to the output terminal. The diagnostic circuit detects the output status in real time during the output of the electrical hard-wired signal and compares the detected actual output status with the safety level control command. When the actual output state is inconsistent with the safety level control command, the diagnostic circuit reports a fault to the SIL4 level main control board, and the SIL4 level main control board cuts off the output of the SIL4 level output board and guides it to safety.
[0015] In one possible implementation, two SIL2-level input boards, A-series and B-series, respectively acquire non-safety-level switch signals. After processing by the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, non-safety-level control instructions are generated, specifically including: The A-series SIL2 level input board collects non-safety level switch signals, performs logic operations on the A-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the A-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board; the B-series SIL2 level input board collects the non-safety level switch signals in the same way, performs logic operations on the B-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the B-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The A-series SIL2 level main control board and the B-series SIL2 level main control board form a hot standby redundancy architecture, with one board working as the primary system and the other as the backup system to monitor the working status of the primary system in real time; when the primary system fails, the backup system switches to the primary system to continue working. Each SIL2 level input board is equipped with an input acquisition circuit and an input self-test circuit, which are used to acquire non-safety level switch signals and perform input self-tests; each SIL2 level output board is equipped with an output circuit and an output self-test circuit, which are used to output the non-safety level control commands and perform output self-tests.
[0016] In one possible implementation, the SIL2 level control channel adopts a hot standby redundancy plus single-channel diagnostic architecture; The A-series SIL2 level input board includes an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, a processor IO-A1, and an input self-test circuit. The input acquisition circuit A1 is used to acquire non-safety level switch signals; the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1; the processor IO-A1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1; the input self-test circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the input acquisition circuit A1. The A-series SIL2 level main control board has a diagnostic circuit and a CPU-A1 processor. The processor CPU-A1 is connected to the processor IO-A1 and the A-series SIL2 level output board, respectively, and is used to receive the signals processed by the processor IO-A1 and perform logical operations to generate non-safety level control instructions and send them to the A-series SIL2 level output board; the diagnostic circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the processor CPU-A1. The A-series SIL2 level output board includes the processor IO-A1, output circuit A1, output self-test circuit, and diagnostic circuit. The processor IO-A1 is also used to receive non-security level control instructions sent by the processor CPU-A1 and drive the output circuit A1 to output; the output circuit A1 is used to output the non-security level control instructions; the output self-test circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the output circuit A1; the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the actual output status of the output circuit A1 in real time and report the detection status in real time. The B-series SIL2 level input boards, B-series SIL2 level main control boards, and B-series SIL2 level output boards have the same structure and connection relationships as the A-series, and the A-series and B-series are mutually hot-standby redundancies.
[0017] In one possible implementation, the A-series SIL4 level input board, the A-series SIL4 level main control board, the A-series SIL4 level output board, the A-series SIL2 level input board, the A-series SIL2 level main control board, and the A-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminal of the A-series power board. The B-series SIL4 level input board, B-series SIL4 level main control board, B-series SIL4 level output board, B-series SIL2 level input board, B-series SIL2 level main control board and B-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminal of the B-series power board. The input terminals of the A-series power supply board are connected to the first input bus, and the input terminals of the B-series power supply board are connected to the second input bus. The first input bus and the second input bus are independent of each other. SIL4 level boards are located in the first area of the LFU, and SIL2 level boards are located in the second area of the LFU. The LFU has a first internal communication bus and a second internal communication bus. The SIL4 level board and the SIL2 level board are respectively connected to the first internal communication bus and the second internal communication bus. The communication links of the SIL4 level board and the SIL2 level board are physically isolated from each other. A secure communication channel is provided between the SIL4 level main control board and the SIL2 level main control board. Data from the SIL4 level main control board is sent to the SIL2 level main control board through the secure communication channel.
[0018] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: Real-time monitoring of the working status of each SIL4 level input board, SIL4 level main control board, SIL4 level output board, SIL2 level input board, SIL2 level main control board, SIL2 level output board, power board and communication board; When a fault is detected, it is determined whether the fault is fatal or non-fatal. Fatal faults are those that affect train safety functions or may lead to safety accidents, including: inconsistent dual-channel acquisition results of the SIL4 level input board, inconsistent two-out-of-two synchronous comparison of the SIL4 level main control board, short-circuit breakdown of any MOS transistor in the serial double-break output circuit of the SIL4 level output board, and inconsistency between the actual output state detected by the feedback diagnostic circuit of the SIL2 level output board and the control commands issued by the SIL2 level main control board. Non-fatal faults are those that do not affect train safety functions and allow the system to still operate at a degraded level, including: failure of a single acquisition channel of the SIL4 level input board, failure of a single acquisition circuit of the SIL2 level input board, single-channel communication bus failure of the communication board, and single-channel power supply failure of the power supply board. When the fatal fault is detected, the output of the faulty channel is cut off and redirected to the safe side, while the fault information is reported to the train communication network; when the non-fatal fault is detected, the fault status is recorded and the current working mode is maintained, while the fault warning information is reported to the train communication network.
[0019] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: Each car's LFU collects the car's electrical signals through the car's SIL4 level input board, and generates safety level control commands after processing by the car's SIL4 level main control board. Each LFU will send the generated safety level control commands to the Ethernet bus via the train's communication board using the TRDP SDTv4 safety protocol, and share them with LFUs in other carriages via the train communication network; Each LFU reads control commands sent by LFUs in other carriages from the train communication network through its own communication board, and realizes networked transmission of electrical signals throughout the train in the form of virtual electric train wires; Each LFU's SIL2 level communication board reads the control signals sent by the train's central control unit and / or signaling system, and performs logic control calculations in conjunction with the electrical signals collected by the train itself. Each LFU outputs vehicle control-related electrical signals to the terminal equipment through the SIL2 level output board based on the results of the logic control operation.
[0020] Secondly, the present invention provides a train fusion logic control unit, comprising: Series A SIL4 input board, Series B SIL4 input board, SIL4 main control board, SIL2 input board, SIL2 main control board, SIL4 output board, SIL2 output board and communication board; The A-series SIL4 level input board and the B-series SIL4 level input board are respectively used to perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signal, and then send it to the corresponding SIL4 level main control board; the SIL4 level main control board is used to perform two-out-of-two synchronous comparison on the same signal acquired by the A-series and B-series redundant channels, and generate a safety level control command after the vote is consistent. Each SIL4 level main control board sends the generated safety level control command to the corresponding SIL4 level output board and the communication board at the same time. The SIL2 level input board is used to collect non-safety level switch signals. After logic operations by the SIL2 level main control board, non-safety level control commands are generated and sent to the SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The SIL4 level output board is used to output the safety level control command as an electrical hardwire signal to the safety level terminal device; the SIL2 level output board is used to output the non-safety level control command as an electrical hardwire signal to the non-safety level terminal device. The communication board is used to send the safety level control command and / or the non-safety level control command to the train communication network, and to receive control data sent from other carriages and / or the central control unit from the train communication network; The SIL4 level main control board is also used to perform cross-redundancy judgment between the safety level control command and the control data. When the judgment results are consistent, the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output. When the judgment results are inconsistent, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and an anomaly is reported. The SIL2 level main control board is also used to perform cross-redundancy judgment between the non-safety level control command and the control data. When the judgment results are consistent, the SIL2 level output board is used to output. When the judgment results are inconsistent, the non-safety level control command is used to output and an anomaly is reported.
[0021] The application of the train fusion logic control unit and the integrated electrical and communication control method provided in this application has the following technical advantages: (1) Hierarchical control improves economy. This invention constructs a hierarchical control architecture by setting up SIL2 and SIL4 control channels. For hard-wired signals related to driving safety, SIL4 boards are used for acquisition, voting, and output; for hard-wired signals with ordinary control requirements, SIL2 boards are used for acquisition, logic operation, and output. By configuring high-cost SIL4 boards only for safety-related functions and lower-cost SIL2 boards for ordinary control functions, the high design cost caused by uniformly adopting SIL4 configuration throughout the system is avoided, effectively reducing the overall cost of the logic control unit.
[0022] (2) Dual-mode collaboration between hard-wired and network improves safety and control accuracy. This invention integrates the logic control unit and the remote input / output module. Each main control board simultaneously sends the generated control commands to the corresponding output board and communication board. The communication board interacts with the train communication network using a secure communication protocol and performs cross-redundancy judgment on the local control commands and the control data received from the network. This preserves the high reliability of electrical hard-wired signal transmission while enabling real-time sharing of control signals across the entire train using the network. When the local hard-wired acquisition results are inconsistent with the network data, SIL4 prioritizes the local hard-wired results or cuts off the output and reports the anomaly, avoiding control failure caused by a single communication method failure and improving the transmission reliability and response speed of critical control signals.
[0023] (3) Equipment integration improves space utilization and maintenance efficiency. This invention integrates the logic control unit and remote input / output module into a single device, combining the functions of two independent devices in terms of vehicle layout space, saving space occupied by the chassis installation; by sharing the acquisition point and output point, it avoids the duplication of wiring for the same signal to be connected to two independent devices, reducing the length of electrical wiring, and lowering wiring complexity and fault risk points. At the same time, the system can record all input and output channel variables and fault information, support offline diagnostic analysis, optimize the investment of operation and maintenance resources, and improve the efficiency of fault handling.
[0024] (4) Online diagnostics improves maintainability. This invention has a complete online self-diagnostic function, which can detect the working status of each board in real time. When a fatal fault is detected, the corresponding channel output is cut off and redirected to the safety side. When a non-fatal fault is detected, the fault status is recorded and the current working mode is maintained. Compared with the shortcomings of traditional relay solutions, such as difficult fault location and long maintenance time, this invention realizes online fault detection and intelligent diagnosis, which greatly shortens the fault investigation time and reduces maintenance costs. Attached Figure Description
[0025] Figure 1 A design principle block diagram of the Local Logic Control Unit (LFU) provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the logical architecture of LFU provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the SIL2 level security architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the SIL4 level security architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 A flowchart of the train fusion logic control unit and the integrated electrical and communication control method provided in the embodiments of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0026] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0027] The technical solution of this application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0028] Figure 1 This is a design principle block diagram of a Local Logic Control Unit (LFU) provided for an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the train fusion LFU provided by this invention uses a new type of contactless control circuit, such as optocouplers and field-effect transistors, to replace traditional intermediate relays, time relays, and other contact element circuits. Based on the logic control unit platform, it uses soft logic to replace relays to realize logic control functions.
[0029] The LFU (Light Fusion Unit) consists of a power supply module, a main control module, an input module, an output module, and a communication module. The input terminal of the power supply module is connected to the train's DC power supply, such as DC 110V. The output terminal of the power supply module is connected to the power supply terminals of the main control module, input module, output module, and communication module, respectively, to provide operating power for each module of the LFU.
[0030] The input terminal of the input module is connected to the input device via a hard wire cable. The input device includes train buttons, switches, and contactor auxiliary contacts. The input module is used to collect the switching signals of the train control circuit and send the collected switching signals to the main control module.
[0031] The main control module is connected to the input module, output module and communication module respectively. It is used to receive the switch signals collected by the input module, perform logic operations and processing, generate control commands, and send the control commands to the output module and / or communication module.
[0032] The output terminal of the output module is connected to the output device via a hard-wired cable. The output device includes a solenoid valve, a brake valve, a gate controller, and a contactor. The output module is used to receive control commands sent by the main control module and output the control commands as electrical hard-wired signals to the output device to drive the output device to perform actions.
[0033] The communication module connects to the Train Control and Management System (TCMS) via a Multifunction Vehicle Bus (MVB) and / or Ethernet. It is used to upload the switching signals and / or control commands collected by the LFU to the TCMS and to receive control data issued by the TCMS.
[0034] LFU analyzes the function of each electrical circuit and implements all the series and parallel relationships and interlocking logic of all intermediate relays in software logic. It only collects signals such as terminal switches and contacts through the input module and performs the final drive output through the output module, thereby simplifying the train's logic control system and reducing the response time and number of points of the logic control system.
[0035] Taking a 3-car metro train as an example, the original independent configuration of 5 Logic Control Units (LCUs) and 5 Remote Input / Output Modules (RIOMs) has been optimized and integrated into 5 LFUs. Specifically, the original Digital Input Board (DI) function has been replaced by a SIL4 level input board (VI), and the original Generic Digital Output Board (GDO) and Digital Output Board (DO) have been optimized and integrated into SIL4 level output boards (VO) and SIL2 level output boards (DO). This integrated design improves the safety level of the entire electrical control system, reduces redundant operations, and effectively simplifies the vehicle's circuitry.
[0036] In one example, the LFU is also equipped with an analog signal board (AI) for acquiring voltage or current signals output by the vehicle driver controller and signal system, and converting the acquired analog signals into voltage signals.
[0037] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the logical architecture of an LFU provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 As shown, the LFU includes an A-series SIL4 level input board, an A-series SIL4 level main control board, an A-series SIL4 level output board, an A-series SIL2 level input board, an A-series SIL2 level main control board and an A-series SIL2 level output board, a B-series SIL4 level input board, a B-series SIL4 level main control board, a B-series SIL4 level output board, a B-series SIL2 level input board, a B-series SIL2 level main control board and a B-series SIL2 level output board, a power supply board A and a power supply board B.
[0038] The LFU is housed within a chassis. The LFU logic architecture also includes a backplane, on which the aforementioned boards are plugged into, enabling electrical connections and data transmission between the boards.
[0039] The A-series SIL4 level input board, A-series SIL4 level main control board, A-series SIL4 level output board, A-series SIL2 level input board, A-series SIL2 level main control board, and A-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminals of the A-series power board; the B-series SIL4 level input board, B-series SIL4 level main control board, B-series SIL4 level output board, B-series SIL2 level input board, B-series SIL2 level main control board, and B-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminals of the B-series power board. The input terminals of the A-series power board are connected to the first input bus, and the input terminals of the B-series power board are connected to the second input bus. The first input bus and the second input bus are independent of each other.
[0040] SIL4 level boards are located in the first area of the chassis, and SIL2 level boards are located in the second area of the chassis. The SIL4 level boards and SIL2 level boards are spatially separated.
[0041] The LFU (Level 1 Utility Unit) has a first internal communication bus and a second internal communication bus. SIL4 level boards and SIL2 level boards are respectively connected to the first internal communication bus and the second internal communication bus. The communication links of the SIL4 level boards and the SIL2 level boards are physically isolated. A secure communication channel is provided between the SIL4 level main control board and the SIL2 level main control board, through which data from the SIL4 level main control board is sent to the SIL2 level main control board.
[0042] LFU adopts a single-machine dual-redundancy design. Both the SIL2 and SIL4 level main control boards use a hot-standby redundancy design. The two redundant main control boards are powered on and work simultaneously. During normal system operation, the master and slave boards simultaneously receive input status and perform logic calculations, but only the main board performs logic outputs, and the slave board monitors the status of the main board. When the main board fails, the slave board resets the main board and becomes the main board, seamlessly switching according to the logic calculation results.
[0043] In terms of power board redundancy design, the entire power supply is divided into A / B redundant power supply groups. The A-series power supply boards power the A-series boards, and the B-series power supply boards power the B-series boards. The external power input bus of the redundant power supply boards is completely independent and has an independent control switch, such as a circuit breaker, at a remote location.
[0044] Each VI / VO / DI / DO system consists of redundant A / B series boards. Under normal circumstances, both series simultaneously acquire and output data, performing real-time self-tests and reporting the acquisition, output, and diagnostic status in real time. If a fault is detected in an I / O card, the main control board retrieves the acquisition status of the other series of the faulty card, ensuring normal system operation, while other normal I / O cards maintain both series operation. The system employs a cross-redundancy strategy, with the A / B series of the main control board and I / O boards implementing cross-communication control. A fault in a single board only requires switching the A / B series of that single board, while other boards do not need to be switched, greatly improving system availability.
[0045] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the SIL2 level security architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 3 As shown, the SIL2 level control channel adopts a hot standby redundancy plus single-channel diagnostic architecture.
[0046] The A-series SIL2 level input board includes an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, a processor IO-A1, and an input self-test circuit. The input acquisition circuit A1 uses an optically isolated circuit to acquire non-safety level switching signals; the diagnostic circuit performs fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1; the processor IO-A1 processes the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1; and the input self-test circuit performs periodic self-tests on the input acquisition circuit A1.
[0047] The A-series SIL2 level main control board includes a diagnostic circuit and a processor CPU-A1. The processor CPU-A1 is connected to both the processor IO-A1 and the A-series SIL2 level output board. It receives signals processed by the processor IO-A1, performs logical operations, generates non-safety level control instructions, and sends them to the A-series SIL2 level output board. The diagnostic circuit performs periodic self-tests on the processor CPU-A1.
[0048] The A-series SIL2 level output board includes the aforementioned processor IO-A1, output circuit A1, output self-test circuit, and diagnostic circuit. The processor IO-A1 is also used to receive non-security level control commands sent by the processor CPU-A1 and drive the output circuit A1 to output; the output circuit A1 is used to output the non-security level control commands; the output self-test circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the output circuit A1; the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the actual output status of the output circuit A1 in real time and report the detection status in real time. Each output has a corresponding indicator light.
[0049] The B-series SIL2 level input boards, B-series SIL2 level main control boards, and B-series SIL2 level output boards have the same structure and connection relationships as the A-series, and the A-series and B-series are mutually hot-standby redundancies.
[0050] Specifically, the two SIL2-level input boards, A-series and B-series, respectively collect non-safety level switch signals. After processing by the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, non-safety level control commands are generated, including: The A-series SIL2 level input board collects non-safety level switch signals, performs logic operations on the A-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the A-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The B-series SIL2 level input board collects the non-safety level switch signals in the same way, performs logic operations on the B-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the B-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board.
[0051] The A-series SIL2 level main control board and the B-series SIL2 level main control board form a hot standby redundancy architecture. One board works as the primary system, and the other serves as the backup system to monitor the working status of the primary system in real time. When the primary system fails, the backup system switches to the primary system and continues to work.
[0052] Each SIL2 level input board is equipped with an input acquisition circuit and an input self-test circuit, which are used to acquire non-safety level switch signals and perform input self-tests; each SIL2 level output board is equipped with an output circuit and an output self-test circuit, which are used to output the non-safety level control commands and perform output self-tests.
[0053] In the SIL2 safety architecture, the system adopts a hot standby redundancy plus single-channel diagnostics architecture. Single-channel diagnostics meet SIL2 safety requirements, while hot standby redundancy improves availability. The main safety strategies for each function are as follows: Inputs employ periodic self-testing plus A / B comparison; upon fault detection, the corresponding output is guided towards safety. Logic processing performs periodic self-tests on CPU voltage, clock, temperature, and logic execution order. Outputs monitor their status in real time and upload the monitoring data. Any single point of failure in the system can be detected and guided towards safety; after a failure, a 2x redundancy architecture ensures system availability.
[0054] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a SIL4 level security architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 As shown, the SIL4 level control channel adopts a two-out-of-two safety redundancy architecture.
[0055] The A-series SIL4 level input board (VI) includes a first acquisition channel and a second acquisition channel. The first acquisition channel comprises an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A1. The input acquisition circuit A1 acquires safety level switching signals, the diagnostic circuit performs fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1, and the safety processor IO-A1 processes the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1. The second acquisition channel comprises an input acquisition circuit A2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A2. The input acquisition circuit A2 acquires the same safety level switching signals, the diagnostic circuit performs fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A2, and the safety processor IO-A2 processes the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A2. Both the input acquisition circuits A1 and A2 employ optical isolation circuits.
[0056] The security processor IO-A1 and the security processor IO-A2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the A-series SIL4 level main control board.
[0057] The A-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-A1 and CPU-A2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two vote on the received signals. If the votes are consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the A-series SIL4 level output board (VO) and communication board, respectively.
[0058] The A-series SIL4 level output board (VO) includes a first output circuit and a second output circuit. The first output circuit includes output circuit A1 and a diagnostic circuit. Output circuit A1 outputs the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit monitors the on / off status of output circuit A1 in real time. The second output circuit includes output circuit A2 and a diagnostic circuit. Output circuit A2 outputs the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit monitors the on / off status of output circuit A2 in real time. Output circuits A1 and A2 are controlled by the A-series SIL4 level main control board. Each output has a corresponding indicator light.
[0059] The B-series SIL4 level input board includes a third and a fourth acquisition channel. The third acquisition channel comprises an input acquisition circuit B1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B1. The input acquisition circuit B1 acquires the safety level switch signal, the diagnostic circuit performs fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B1, and the safety processor IO-B1 processes the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B1. The fourth acquisition channel comprises an input acquisition circuit B2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B2. The input acquisition circuit B2 acquires the same safety level switch signal, the diagnostic circuit performs fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B2, and the safety processor IO-B2 processes the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B2.
[0060] The security processor IO-B1 and the security processor IO-B2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the B-series SIL4 level main control board.
[0061] The B-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-B1 and CPU-B2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two vote on the received signals. If the votes are consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the B-series SIL4 level output board and communication board, respectively.
[0062] The B-series SIL4 level output board includes a third output circuit and a fourth output circuit. The third output circuit comprises an output circuit B1 and a diagnostic circuit. Output circuit B1 outputs the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit monitors the on / off status of output circuit B1 in real time. The fourth output circuit comprises an output circuit B2 and a diagnostic circuit. Output circuit B2 outputs the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit monitors the on / off status of output circuit B2 in real time. Output circuits B1 and B2 are controlled by the B-series SIL4 level main control board.
[0063] A two-out-of-two synchronous comparison is performed between the A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board.
[0064] The SIL4 level input board VI employs a safety processor chip to achieve dual-channel 2-out-of-2 data acquisition. The input stage uses dynamic acquisition technology for fault detection and performs a 2-out-of-2 comparison. If the two acquisition results are inconsistent, the system is redirected to safety. The on-board 2-out-of-2 voting means that two acquisition channels within the same SIL4 level input board simultaneously acquire the same external signal. The two acquisition results are processed and compared independently by two safety processors. When the two results are consistent, the vote passes, and the board outputs a valid signal. When the two results are inconsistent, the vote fails, the board determines that its own acquisition channel is faulty, cuts off the signal output, reports the fault, and redirects to safety.
[0065] Dynamic acquisition technology refers to the SIL4 level input board actively injecting a small, controlled test pulse into the signal acquisition circuit, and determining whether there are faults such as open circuits or short circuits in the acquisition circuit by detecting whether the response of this test pulse is normal. The combination of dynamic acquisition and static level reading can complete the fault detection of the acquisition circuit itself while acquiring signals.
[0066] SIL4 level logic processing employs two SIL4 level safety processors that periodically monitor the CPU's voltage, temperature, clock, memory, FLASH, instruction set, and stack. Simultaneously, the two CPUs synchronously compare input data, output data, logic operation results, and fault status, and the system is guided to safety when a fault is detected or the comparison results are inconsistent.
[0067] The SIL4 level output board (VO) uses a safety processor chip to achieve a 2-out-of-2 dual-channel voting output. Output control employs MOSFET circuitry, dynamic output detection, and serial double-break technology. Each output channel is implemented using four MOSFETs connected in series and parallel. The upper and lower dual-channel switches are connected in series and controlled separately by two CPUs in a 2-out-of-2 configuration. The output channel only conducts an output signal when both CPUs simultaneously output a closing command. Each switch consists of two MOSFETs connected in parallel, enabling MOSFET self-testing during output and real-time dynamic diagnosis of the MOSFETs' on / off states, ensuring timely safety guidance in case of faults.
[0068] The specific topology of the serial dual-output circuit is as follows: each output is implemented by four MOSFETs connected in series and parallel – the upper output consists of two MOSFETs connected in parallel to form an upper switch, and the lower output consists of two MOSFETs connected in parallel to form a lower switch. The upper and lower switches are connected in series between the positive and negative terminals of the output. The upper switch is controlled by an A-series SIL4 level main control board, and the lower switch is controlled by a B-series SIL4 level main control board. Only when both CPUs simultaneously output closing instructions will the upper and lower switches be turned on, and the output channel will output a signal; when either switch is turned off, the output is cut off.
[0069] In the event of a single or double-point failure in any SIL4 level control channel, the system can detect and guide to safety. After a failure occurs, a 2x redundancy architecture ensures system availability. Simultaneously, the system employs a cross-redundancy strategy, with the main control board and I / O boards implementing cross-communication control between their A / B series: when a single board fails, only the failed board needs to be switched to the corresponding board in the other series, while other unfailed boards maintain their current operating state, thereby improving system availability.
[0070] Figure 5 The flowchart of the train fusion logic control unit and the integrated electrical and communication control method provided in the embodiments of the present invention is as follows: Figure 5 As shown, the method includes the following steps: Step 510: The two SIL4 level input boards of series A and series B respectively perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signals, and then send them to the SIL4 level main control boards of series A and series B respectively; the two SIL4 level main control boards compare the signals they receive, and if they match, generate a safety level control command and send it to the communication board and the corresponding SIL4 level output board respectively; and / or, the two SIL2 level input boards of series A and series B respectively acquire non-safety level switch signals, process them after being processed by the corresponding SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and send them to the corresponding SIL2 level output board and communication board respectively.
[0071] Specifically, the two SIL4 level input boards, A-series and B-series, respectively perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signals, and then send them to the A-series and B-series SIL4 level main control boards, including: The A-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the security level switch signal before sending it to the A-series SIL4 level main control board; the B-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same security level switch signal before sending it to the B-series SIL4 level main control board; the A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board perform two-out-of-two synchronous comparison on their respective received signals, and generate security level control commands respectively after the vote is consistent; each SIL4 level main control board sends the generated security level control commands to the corresponding SIL4 level output board and communication board respectively.
[0072] The two SIL2-level input boards, series A and series B, respectively collect non-safety level switch signals. After processing by the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, they generate non-safety level control commands, which specifically include: The A-series SIL2 level input board collects non-safety level switch signals, performs logic operations on the A-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the A-series SIL2 level output board and communication board. The B-series SIL2 level input board collects the same non-safety level switch signals in the same way, performs logic operations on the B-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the B-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The A-series SIL2 level main control board and the B-series SIL2 level main control board form a hot standby redundancy architecture, with one board acting as the primary system and the other as the backup system to monitor the working status of the primary system in real time. When the primary system fails, the backup system switches to the primary system and continues to work. Each SIL2 level input board is equipped with an input acquisition circuit and an input self-test circuit for collecting non-safety level switch signals and performing input self-tests. Each SIL2 level output board is equipped with an output circuit and an output self-test circuit for outputting the non-safety level control commands and performing output self-tests.
[0073] In step 520, the communication board sends safety level control commands and / or non-safety level control commands to the train communication network, and receives control data from other carriages and / or the central control unit from the train communication network.
[0074] Step 530: The two SIL4 level main control boards perform cross-redundancy judgment on the safety level control commands and control data respectively. When the judgment results are consistent, the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output. When they are inconsistent, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and an anomaly is reported. And / or the SIL2 level main control board performs cross-redundancy judgment on the non-safety level control commands and control data. When they are consistent, the corresponding SIL2 level output board is triggered to output. When they are inconsistent, the non-safety level control command is output and an anomaly is reported.
[0075] Specifically, the cross-redundancy judgment of the SIL4 level main control board includes: the SIL4 level main control board compares the safety level control command generated by the local hard-wired acquisition and two-out-of-two voting with the control data received by the communication board from the train communication network, including the status of other carriages and / or the command of the central control unit; when the two are consistent, the local command is deemed reliable and the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output; when the two are inconsistent, it is determined that there may be a local acquisition failure or network communication abnormality, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and the abnormality is reported.
[0076] The cross-redundancy judgment method of the SIL2 level main control board is the same as that of SIL4 level, that is, it compares the locally generated non-safety level control commands with the control data received from the network. However, there is a fundamental difference in the way they handle inconsistencies: SIL4 level involves driving safety functions, such as emergency braking. When the judgment is inconsistent, the output must be cut off and the system must be guided to safety to prevent erroneous commands from being executed. SIL2 level controls non-safety related functions, such as lighting and air conditioning. When the judgment is inconsistent, the output is based on the results collected by the local hardwire and only the anomaly is reported to ensure that the basic functions are not affected by network communication failures.
[0077] Furthermore, the SIL4 level output board outputting the safety level control command to the safety level terminal equipment as an electrical hardwired signal specifically includes: the SIL4 level output board outputting a dry contact switching signal, which is a high-level or low-level electrical hardwired signal; the electrical hardwired signal is directly transmitted to the control terminal of the safety level terminal equipment via a cable, controlling the safety level terminal equipment to perform actions in a hardwired drive manner; the SIL4 level output board also includes a diagnostic circuit connected to the output terminal, the diagnostic circuit detecting the output status in real time during the electrical hardwired signal output, and comparing the detected actual output status with the safety level control command; when the actual output status is inconsistent with the safety level control command, the diagnostic circuit reports a fault to the SIL4 level main control board, and the SIL4 level main control board cuts off the output of the SIL4 level output board and guides to safety.
[0078] Furthermore, the method also includes fault self-diagnosis and safety guidance.
[0079] Specifically, the system monitors the operational status of each SIL4-level input board, SIL4-level main control board, SIL4-level output board, SIL2-level input board, SIL2-level main control board, SIL2-level output board, power supply board, and communication board in real time. When a fault is detected, it is determined whether the fault is fatal or non-fatal. Fatal faults are those that affect train safety functions or may lead to safety accidents, including: inconsistent dual-channel acquisition results of the SIL4-level input board, inconsistent two-out-of-two synchronous comparison of the SIL4-level main control board, short-circuit breakdown of any MOSFET in the serial double-break output circuit of the SIL4-level output board, and feedback diagnostics of the SIL2-level output board. The actual output state detected by the circuit failure is inconsistent with the control commands issued by the SIL2 level main control board; the non-fatal faults are faults that do not affect the train's safety functions and allow the system to still operate at a degraded level, including: single acquisition channel failure of the SIL4 level input board, single acquisition circuit failure of the SIL2 level input board, single communication bus failure of the communication board, and single power supply failure of the power board; when the fatal fault is detected, the output of the faulty channel is cut off and redirected to the safety side, and the fault information is reported to the train communication network; when the non-fatal fault is detected, the fault state is recorded and the current working mode is maintained, and the fault warning information is reported to the train communication network.
[0080] In one example, regarding the fault handling strategy, when a non-fatal fault occurs in the system, the fault state is recorded. When a fatal fault occurs, the system is redirected to a safe state, and the fault is recorded. Safe computation is considered safe when there is no external data output; safe communication is considered safe when there is no external communication output or the data receiver does not accept the output; safe output is considered safe when there is no output; and safe input is considered safe when there is no input. In this application, the safe state refers to the default safe state adopted by the system when a fault is detected. Specifically, safe computation is considered safe when there is no external data output; safe communication is considered safe when there is no external communication output or the data receiver does not accept the output; safe output is considered safe when there is no output; and safe input is considered safe when there is no input. This ensures that the system will not output erroneous instructions under any fault condition.
[0081] Regarding event logging, the system can record all input and output channel variables with a sampling period of 30ms, allowing for recording time of 10 days or longer; with a sampling period of 50ms, the recording time can be up to one month. The system has fault diagnosis capabilities, capable of recording up to 60,000 fault messages, which can be downloaded via the Ethernet maintenance port.
[0082] For Portable Test Unit (PTU) software maintenance, dedicated PTU maintenance software is provided for LFU, enabling log data download and offline analysis, and supporting historical IO timing analysis and fault analysis.
[0083] Regarding external communication and security protocols, the LFU provides dual-channel MVB bus and dual-channel Ethernet, supports Train Real-Time Data Protocol Security Data Protocol Version 4 / Version 2, namely TRDP SDTv4 / SDTv2 security protocols, and dual-channel Controller Area Network (CAN) / Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate (CANFD) network interfaces. All external communication is dual-channel redundant communication.
[0084] The communication protocol complies with the EN50169 safety communication protocol, employing methods such as sequence numbers, CRC checksums, and timestamps to detect fault modes such as duplication, deletion, insertion, out-of-order delivery, corruption, and delay in communication data, and guiding the system to safety upon fault detection. External Ethernet communication supports both TRDP SDTv2 and TRDP SDTv4 SIL2 safety communication protocols.
[0085] Furthermore, the method also includes networked collaborative control of multi-train formations.
[0086] Each LFU in each carriage acquires electrical signals from its own carriage via its SIL4 level input board. After processing by the carriage's SIL4 level main control board, it generates safety level control commands. Each LFU sends these commands to the Ethernet bus via its own communication board using the Train Real-time Data Protocol (TRDP) SDTv4 safety protocol, and shares them with LFUs in other carriages via the train communication network. Each LFU reads control commands from other carriage LFUs via its own communication board, achieving networked transmission of all train electrical signals using virtual electric train conductors. Each LFU's SIL2 level communication board reads control signals from the train's central control unit and / or signaling system, and performs logic control calculations in conjunction with the electrical signals acquired by the carriage. Based on the results of these logic control calculations, each LFU outputs vehicle control-related electrical signals, such as high or low levels, to the terminal equipment via its SIL2 level output board.
[0087] The virtual electric train wiring refers to the process where each LFU (Light Fuses) in a train transmits electrical signals collected by the train itself, such as emergency braking status and door status, to the train communication network via a communication board using the TRDP SDTv4 safety protocol. Simultaneously, it reads status signals from other LFUs in other trains from the train communication network. This replaces traditional physical hard-wired cables with network communication to achieve the transmission and sharing of electrical signals across the entire train. Each LFU performs comprehensive logical judgment based on the hard-wired signals collected by its own train and the signals from other trains read from the network, achieving coordinated control of the entire train.
[0088] In one example, taking the emergency brake button signal as an example, the entire control process is explained as follows: When the emergency brake button in a carriage is pressed, the two SIL4-level input boards (A-series and B-series) of the LFU (Least Functional Unit) in that carriage perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the safety level switch signal. If the votes match, the signals are sent to the A-series and B-series SIL4-level main control boards respectively. The two SIL4-level main control boards then perform a two-out-of-two synchronous comparison on the signals they receive. If the votes match, a safety level control command, such as an emergency brake command, is generated and simultaneously sent to the corresponding SIL4-level output board and communication board. The SIL4-level output board outputs the emergency brake command directly to the emergency brake valve as an electrical hardwired signal via a cable, driving the emergency brake valve to perform its action. Simultaneously, the communication board sends the emergency brake command to the train communication network using the TRDP SDTv4 safety protocol, sharing it with the LFUs in other carriages and the central control unit, achieving coordinated emergency braking across the entire train. The SIL4 level main control board also performs cross-redundancy judgment between the locally generated emergency braking command and the status data of other carriages received through the network. When the judgment results are consistent, the output is normal. When the judgment results are inconsistent, such as when the network data shows that other carriages have not triggered emergency braking, the output of the SIL4 level output board is cut off and an anomaly is reported to ensure safety.
[0089] For non-safety level signals, taking the carriage lighting switch signal as an example: Two SIL2-level input boards (A-series and B-series) respectively collect the lighting switch signal. After logic operations by the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, non-safety level control commands, such as lighting switch commands, are generated and sent to the SIL2-level output board and communication board. The SIL2-level output board outputs electrical hard-wired signals to the lighting equipment for execution, while the communication board simultaneously sends the lighting status to the train communication network. The SIL2-level main control board performs cross-redundancy checks on the local lighting command and the control data received from the network. If the checks match, normal output is performed; if they do not match, the local lighting command is still output and an anomaly is reported to ensure that basic lighting functions are not affected.
[0090] The application of the train fusion logic control unit and the integrated electrical and communication control method provided in this application has the following technical advantages: (1) Hierarchical control improves economy. This invention constructs a hierarchical control architecture by setting up SIL2 and SIL4 control channels. For hard-wired signals related to driving safety, SIL4 boards are used for acquisition, voting, and output; for hard-wired signals with ordinary control requirements, SIL2 boards are used for acquisition, logic operation, and output. By configuring high-cost SIL4 boards only for safety-related functions and lower-cost SIL2 boards for ordinary control functions, the high design cost caused by uniformly adopting SIL4 configuration throughout the system is avoided, effectively reducing the overall cost of the logic control unit.
[0091] (2) Dual-mode collaboration between hard-wired and network improves safety and control accuracy. This invention integrates the logic control unit and the remote input / output module. Each main control board simultaneously sends the generated control commands to the corresponding output board and communication board. The communication board interacts with the train communication network using a secure communication protocol and performs cross-redundancy judgment on the local control commands and the control data received from the network. This preserves the high reliability of electrical hard-wired signal transmission while enabling real-time sharing of control signals across the entire train using the network. When the local hard-wired acquisition results are inconsistent with the network data, SIL4 prioritizes the local hard-wired results or cuts off the output and reports the anomaly, avoiding control failure caused by a single communication method failure and improving the transmission reliability and response speed of critical control signals.
[0092] (3) Equipment integration improves space utilization and maintenance efficiency. This invention integrates the logic control unit and remote input / output module into a single device, combining the functions of two independent devices in terms of vehicle layout space, saving space occupied by the chassis installation; by sharing the acquisition point and output point, it avoids the duplication of wiring for the same signal to be connected to two independent devices, reducing the length of electrical wiring, and lowering wiring complexity and fault risk points. At the same time, the system can record all input and output channel variables and fault information, support offline diagnostic analysis, optimize the investment of operation and maintenance resources, and improve the efficiency of fault handling.
[0093] (4) Online diagnostics improves maintainability. This invention has a complete online self-diagnostic function, which can detect the working status of each board in real time. When a fatal fault is detected, the corresponding channel output is cut off and redirected to the safety side. When a non-fatal fault is detected, the fault status is recorded and the current working mode is maintained. Compared with the shortcomings of traditional relay solutions, such as difficult fault location and long maintenance time, this invention realizes online fault detection and intelligent diagnosis, which greatly shortens the fault investigation time and reduces maintenance costs.
[0094] Those skilled in the art will further recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of the various examples have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0095] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0096] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of this application. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application.
Claims
1. A train integrated logic control unit and an integrated electrical and communication control method, applied to a local logic control unit, characterized in that, include: Two SIL4-level input boards (Series A and Series B) respectively acquire switch signals of the same safety level through dual channels and perform on-board two-out-of-two voting, before sending them to the Series A and Series B SIL4-level main control boards respectively. The two SIL4-level main control boards compare the signals they receive, and if they match, they generate safety level control commands and send them to the communication board and the corresponding SIL4-level output board respectively. And / or, two SIL2-level input boards (Series A and Series B) respectively acquire non-safety level switch signals, process them through the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, generate non-safety level control commands, and send them to the corresponding SIL2-level output board and the communication board respectively. The communication board sends safety level control commands and / or non-safety level control commands to the train communication network, and receives control data from other carriages and / or the central control unit from the train communication network. The two SIL4 level main control boards perform cross-redundancy judgment on the safety level control commands and control data respectively. When the judgment results are consistent, the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output; when they are inconsistent, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and the abnormality is reported. The SIL2 level main control board will perform cross-redundancy judgment on the non-safety level control commands and control data. If they match, the corresponding SIL2 level output board will be triggered to output. If they do not match, the non-safety level control command will be output and the anomaly will be reported.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The two SIL4 level input boards of series A and series B respectively perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signals, and then send them to the SIL4 level main control boards of series A and series B respectively. Specifically, this includes: The A-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the security level switch signal and then sends it to the A-series SIL4 level main control board. The B-series SIL4 level input board performs dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same security level switch signal and then sends it to the B-series SIL4 level main control board. The A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board perform a two-out-of-two synchronous comparison of the signals they receive, and generate security level control commands respectively after the vote is consistent. Each SIL4 level main control board will send the generated security level control commands to the corresponding SIL4 level output board and communication board.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The SIL4 level control channel adopts a two-out-of-two safety redundancy architecture. The A-series SIL4 level input board has a first acquisition channel and a second acquisition channel. The first acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A1. The input acquisition circuit A1 is used to acquire safety level switch signals, the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1, and the safety processor IO-A1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1. The second acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit A2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-A2. The input acquisition circuit A2 is used to acquire switch signals of the same safety level. The diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A2. The safety processor IO-A2 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A2. The security processor IO-A1 and the security processor IO-A2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the A-series SIL4 level main control board. The A-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-A1 and CPU-A2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two voting on the received signals. If the voting is consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the A-series SIL4 level output board and communication board respectively. The A-series SIL4 level output board has a first output circuit and a second output circuit. The first output circuit includes an output circuit A1 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit A1 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit A1 in real time. The second output circuit includes an output circuit A2 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit A2 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit A2 in real time. The output circuit A1 and the output circuit A2 are respectively controlled by the A-series SIL4 level main control board; The B-series SIL4 level input board has a third and a fourth acquisition channel; The third acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit B1, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B1. The input acquisition circuit B1 is used to acquire the safety level switch signal, the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B1, and the safety processor IO-B1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B1. The fourth acquisition channel includes an input acquisition circuit B2, a diagnostic circuit, and a safety processor IO-B2. The input acquisition circuit B2 is used to acquire switch signals of the same safety level. The diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit B2. The safety processor IO-B2 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit B2. The security processor IO-B1 and the security processor IO-B2 perform an on-board two-out-of-two vote on their respective acquisition results. If the vote is consistent, the signal is sent to the B-series SIL4 level main control board. The B-series SIL4 level main control board is equipped with security processors CPU-B1 and CPU-B2. The two security processors perform a two-out-of-two vote on the received signals. If the vote is consistent, a security level control command is generated and sent to the B-series SIL4 level output board and communication board respectively. The B-series SIL4 level output board has a third output circuit and a fourth output circuit. The third output circuit includes an output circuit B1 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit B1 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit B1 in real time. The fourth output circuit includes an output circuit B2 and a diagnostic circuit. The output circuit B2 is used to output the safety level control command, and the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the on / off state of the output circuit B2 in real time. The output circuits B1 and B2 are respectively controlled by the B-series SIL4 level main control board; A two-out-of-two synchronous comparison is performed between the A-series SIL4 level main control board and the B-series SIL4 level main control board.
4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The method further includes: The SIL4 level output board outputs the safety level control commands to the safety level terminal equipment as electrical hard-wired signals. The SIL4 level output board outputs the safety level control command to the safety level terminal equipment as an electrical hardwire signal, specifically including: The SIL4 level output board outputs dry contact switching signals, which are high-level or low-level electrical hardwire signals. The electrical hard-wired signal is directly transmitted to the control terminal of the security level terminal device via cable, and the security level terminal device is controlled to perform actions in a hard-wired drive manner. The SIL4 level output board is also equipped with a diagnostic circuit connected to the output terminal. The diagnostic circuit detects the output status in real time during the output of the electrical hard-wired signal and compares the detected actual output status with the safety level control command. When the actual output state is inconsistent with the safety level control command, the diagnostic circuit reports a fault to the SIL4 level main control board, and the SIL4 level main control board cuts off the output of the SIL4 level output board and guides it to safety.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The two SIL2-level input boards, series A and series B, respectively collect non-safety level switch signals. After processing by the corresponding SIL2-level main control board, they generate non-safety level control commands, which specifically include: The A-series SIL2 level input board collects non-safety level switch signals, performs logic operations on the A-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the A-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board; the B-series SIL2 level input board collects the non-safety level switch signals in the same way, performs logic operations on the B-series SIL2 level main control board to generate non-safety level control commands, and sends them to the B-series SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The A-series SIL2 level main control board and the B-series SIL2 level main control board form a hot standby redundancy architecture, with one board working as the primary system and the other as the backup system to monitor the working status of the primary system in real time; when the primary system fails, the backup system switches to the primary system to continue working. Each SIL2 level input board is equipped with an input acquisition circuit and an input self-test circuit, which are used to acquire non-safety level switch signals and perform input self-tests; each SIL2 level output board is equipped with an output circuit and an output self-test circuit, which are used to output the non-safety level control commands and perform output self-tests.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The SIL2 level control channel adopts a hot standby redundancy plus a single-channel diagnostic architecture. The A-series SIL2 level input board includes an input acquisition circuit A1, a diagnostic circuit, a processor IO-A1, and an input self-test circuit. The input acquisition circuit A1 is used to acquire non-safety level switch signals; the diagnostic circuit is used to perform fault detection on the input acquisition circuit A1; the processor IO-A1 is used to process the acquisition results of the input acquisition circuit A1; the input self-test circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the input acquisition circuit A1. The A-series SIL2 level main control board has a diagnostic circuit and a CPU-A1 processor. The processor CPU-A1 is connected to the processor IO-A1 and the A-series SIL2 level output board, respectively, and is used to receive the signals processed by the processor IO-A1 and perform logical operations to generate non-safety level control instructions and send them to the A-series SIL2 level output board; the diagnostic circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the processor CPU-A1. The A-series SIL2 level output board includes the processor IO-A1, output circuit A1, output self-test circuit, and diagnostic circuit. The processor IO-A1 is also used to receive non-security level control instructions sent by the processor CPU-A1 and drive the output circuit A1 to output; the output circuit A1 is used to output the non-security level control instructions; the output self-test circuit is used to perform periodic self-tests on the output circuit A1; the diagnostic circuit is used to detect the actual output status of the output circuit A1 in real time and report the detection status in real time. The B-series SIL2 level input boards, B-series SIL2 level main control boards, and B-series SIL2 level output boards have the same structure and connection relationships as the A-series, and the A-series and B-series are mutually hot-standby redundancies.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The A-series SIL4 level input board, A-series SIL4 level main control board, A-series SIL4 level output board, A-series SIL2 level input board, A-series SIL2 level main control board and A-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminal of the A-series power board. The B-series SIL4 level input board, B-series SIL4 level main control board, B-series SIL4 level output board, B-series SIL2 level input board, B-series SIL2 level main control board and B-series SIL2 level output board are connected to the output terminal of the B-series power board. The input terminals of the A-series power supply board are connected to the first input bus, and the input terminals of the B-series power supply board are connected to the second input bus. The first input bus and the second input bus are independent of each other. SIL4 level boards are located in the first area of the LFU, and SIL2 level boards are located in the second area of the LFU. The LFU has a first internal communication bus and a second internal communication bus. The SIL4 level board and the SIL2 level board are respectively connected to the first internal communication bus and the second internal communication bus. The communication links of the SIL4 level board and the SIL2 level board are physically isolated from each other. A secure communication channel is provided between the SIL4 level main control board and the SIL2 level main control board. Data from the SIL4 level main control board is sent to the SIL2 level main control board through the secure communication channel.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Real-time monitoring of the working status of each SIL4 level input board, SIL4 level main control board, SIL4 level output board, SIL2 level input board, SIL2 level main control board, SIL2 level output board, power board and communication board; When a fault is detected, it is determined whether the fault is fatal or non-fatal. Fatal faults are those that affect train safety functions or may lead to safety accidents, including: inconsistent dual-channel acquisition results of the SIL4 level input board, inconsistent two-out-of-two synchronous comparison of the SIL4 level main control board, short-circuit breakdown of any MOS transistor in the serial double-break output circuit of the SIL4 level output board, and inconsistency between the actual output state detected by the feedback diagnostic circuit of the SIL2 level output board and the control commands issued by the SIL2 level main control board. Non-fatal faults are those that do not affect train safety functions and allow the system to still operate at a degraded level, including: failure of a single acquisition channel of the SIL4 level input board, failure of a single acquisition circuit of the SIL2 level input board, single-channel communication bus failure of the communication board, and single-channel power supply failure of the power supply board. When the fatal fault is detected, the output of the faulty channel is cut off and redirected to the safe side, while the fault information is reported to the train communication network; when the non-fatal fault is detected, the fault status is recorded and the current working mode is maintained, while the fault warning information is reported to the train communication network.
9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Each car's LFU collects the car's electrical signals through the car's SIL4 level input board, and generates safety level control commands after processing by the car's SIL4 level main control board. Each LFU will send the generated safety level control commands to the Ethernet bus via the train's communication board using the TRDP SDTv4 safety protocol, and share them with LFUs in other carriages via the train communication network; Each LFU reads control commands sent by LFUs in other carriages from the train communication network through its own communication board, and realizes networked transmission of electrical signals throughout the train in the form of virtual electric train wires; Each LFU's SIL2 level communication board reads the control signals sent by the train's central control unit and / or signaling system, and performs logic control calculations in conjunction with the electrical signals collected by the train itself. Each LFU outputs vehicle control-related electrical signals to the terminal equipment through the SIL2 level output board based on the results of the logic control operation.
10. A train fusion logic control unit, characterized in that, include: Series A SIL4 input board, Series B SIL4 input board, SIL4 main control board, SIL2 input board, SIL2 main control board, SIL4 output board, SIL2 output board and communication board; The A-series SIL4 level input board and the B-series SIL4 level input board are respectively used to perform dual-channel acquisition and on-board two-out-of-two voting on the same safety level switch signal, and then send it to the corresponding SIL4 level main control board; the SIL4 level main control board is used to perform two-out-of-two synchronous comparison on the same signal acquired by the A-series and B-series redundant channels, and generate a safety level control command after the vote is consistent. Each SIL4 level main control board sends the generated safety level control command to the corresponding SIL4 level output board and the communication board at the same time. The SIL2 level input board is used to collect non-safety level switch signals. After logic operations by the SIL2 level main control board, non-safety level control commands are generated and sent to the SIL2 level output board and the communication board. The SIL4 level output board is used to output the safety level control command as an electrical hardwire signal to the safety level terminal device; The SIL2 level output board is used to output the non-safety level control commands as electrical hard-wired signals to the non-safety level terminal equipment. The communication board is used to send the safety level control command and / or the non-safety level control command to the train communication network, and to receive control data sent from other carriages and / or the central control unit from the train communication network; The SIL4 level main control board is also used to perform cross-redundancy judgment on the safety level control command and the control data. When the judgment results are consistent, the corresponding SIL4 level output board is triggered to output. When the judgment results are inconsistent, the output of the corresponding SIL4 level output board is cut off and the abnormality is reported. The SIL2 level main control board is also used to perform cross-redundancy judgment between the non-safety level control command and the control data. When the judgment results are consistent, the result is output through the SIL2 level output board. When the judgment results are inconsistent, the result is output as the non-safety level control command and an anomaly is reported.
