Operation access control methods, devices, and systems

By configuring the permission domain identifier in the restricted permission domain session and writing the original permission domain identifier in the access request, and using the pre-policy execution point to verify the permission scope, the problem of restricted applications indirectly accessing protected resources is solved, and strict control and security improvement of cross-application access are achieved.

CN123116306APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17SHENZHEN TIE DONGQING INTELLIGENT TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611479491.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-21
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, there are problems such as restricted applications indirectly accessing protected resources through other applications or system services, and the scope of temporary privilege escalation being too broad and the permission status remaining.

Method used

By establishing a restricted permission domain session and configuring a permission domain identifier for it, the original permission domain identifier is written into the request when an access request is received. The permission scope of the access request is verified by the pre-emptive policy execution point, and differentiated control policies are output, such as denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, or requiring master credential authentication, to ensure that the operation within the permission scope complies with the permission boundary.

Benefits of technology

It achieves strict control over cross-application access to restricted applications, prevents unauthorized behavior, ensures operational convenience and security, avoids permission expansion and state residue, and improves the security of shared devices by multiple users.

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Abstract

This application provides a method, apparatus, and system for operation permission control, belonging to the field of computer technology. The method includes: establishing a restricted permission domain session; receiving an access request initiated by a first application within the restricted permission domain session, the access request including a target operation to be performed, the target operation including at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources; writing an original permission domain identifier into the access request and forwarding the access request to the target component performing the target operation; comparing the original permission scope of the access request with the component's corresponding permission scope based on the original permission domain identifier through the target component's pre-policy execution point, and outputting a corresponding control policy. This method can solve the problem of restricted applications indirectly accessing protected resources through other applications or system services.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application belongs to the field of computer technology, and in particular relates to an operation permission control method, device, and system. Background Technology

[0002] With the widespread adoption of smart devices, smartphones, tablets, and other smart devices have become indispensable tools in people's daily lives. In real-world scenarios, the same device is often shared by multiple users with different identities. For example, children often need to use their parents' smart devices for learning, entertainment, or communication, and parents may want their children to have limited access to certain application functions.

[0003] To meet these needs, related technologies typically restrict device usage by setting different passwords for different desktops, hiding specific application icons, setting a list of allowed applications, or directly switching to a separate user account. The control logic of this type of solution focuses on controlling application entry points; that is, interception or filtering is only performed during application startup. After successful authentication, the system generally determines permissions based on the current account, current desktop, or the ultimately invoked application, and decides whether to grant access accordingly.

[0004] However, the above solutions have significant shortcomings in practical applications. Allowed applications often integrate rich system interaction capabilities, allowing users to indirectly access other applications or system resources through their interaction with other applications. For example, children can click on share links within an allowed learning application, which can then redirect to unrestricted interfaces such as browsers, social media apps, payment pages, or system settings. Restricted applications can leverage high-privilege intermediary components to expand their permissions, failing to truly achieve effective control over indirect cross-application access. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides an operation permission control method, apparatus, and system that can solve the problem of restricted applications indirectly accessing protected resources through other applications or system services, and can further solve the problems of excessively large scope after temporary permission elevation and permission and status residues after the temporary authorization ends.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide an operation permission control method, the method comprising: Establish a restricted access domain session, which corresponds to an access domain identifier. While the restricted permission domain session is maintained, an access request initiated by the first application within the restricted permission domain session is received. The access request includes the target operation to be performed, and the target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources. Based on the permission domain identifier, the original permission domain identifier is written into the access request, and the access request is forwarded to the target component that performs the target operation; the original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is a restricted permission domain session; By using the pre-policy execution point of the target component, the original permission scope of the access request is compared with the component permission scope corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier; If the original permission scope is greater than or equal to the permission scope of the target component, then the target component is allowed to perform the target operation based on the access request; If the original permission scope is smaller than the permission scope of the target component, the corresponding control policy will be output according to the type of the target operation. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0007] The first aspect of the beneficial effects is as follows: By establishing restricted permission domain sessions and configuring corresponding permission domain identifiers, global constraints can be imposed on all application access behavior within the restricted session through operating system-level control. When an application within the restricted permission domain session initiates a security-related request involving cross-application calls or access to protected resources, the system forcibly writes the original, immutable permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, ensuring that the source of the request can be accurately traced by the underlying system. Before the access request is forwarded to the target component for execution, the pre-policy execution point located before the target component determines the original allowed permission range of the restricted permission domain session based on the original permission domain identifier and strictly compares it with the component permission range corresponding to the target component itself. If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range, it means that the current request has not exceeded the predetermined boundary of the restricted permission domain session, and the system allows execution, thus ensuring the smooth operation of normal operations in restricted scenarios; if the original permission range is less than the component permission range, it means that the target component has higher permissions than the restricted permission domain session itself, posing a risk of being exploited to break through the restricted scope and causing unauthorized access. To this end, the system outputs differentiated control strategies based on the specific type of the target operation, such as denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, or requiring master credential authentication, to accurately intercept unauthorized behavior. Compared to related technologies that only intercept application entry points and roughly determine permissions based on the current desktop or the final calling application after successful authentication, this embodiment traces the source of access requests by writing the original permission domain identifier and sets a pre-policy point verification mechanism. This effectively blocks the path for applications within a restricted permission domain session to expand their permissions through high-privilege intermediate components or target components, significantly improving the rigor of cross-application access control. While ensuring operational convenience in restricted scenarios, it also significantly enhances the security of smart devices when shared by multiple users.

[0008] In one possible implementation, the pre-policy execution point of the target component compares the original permission scope of the access request with the corresponding component permission scope based on the original permission domain identifier, including: Identify the target component for performing the target operation, and the execution point of the preceding strategy for the target component; The target component's pre-policy execution point determines the original permission scope of the access request based on the original permission domain identifier; Compare the original permission scope with the permission scope of the target component.

[0009] In this implementation, the execution point of the pre-policy is further defined. First, the original permission scope is determined based on the original permission domain identifier, and then compared with the component permission scope of the target component. This clarifies the execution logic and basis of permission verification. This makes the permission determination process clearer, more accurate, and traceable, ensuring that every cross-application request undergoes unified and standardized pre-checkpoint verification before execution, further improving the reliability of unauthorized access interception.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the access request is forwarded to the target component via multiple intermediate components, each of which performs pre-processing steps for the target operation; during the access request forwarding process, the original permission domain identifier remains unchanged. The method also includes: When an access request is forwarded to the i-th intermediate component among multiple intermediate components, the pre-policy execution point of the i-th intermediate component compares the original permission range with the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component based on the original permission domain identifier; i is a positive integer. If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the permission range of the component corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, then the i-th intermediate component is allowed to execute the i-th preprocessing step of the target operation according to the access request; After the i-th intermediate component completes the i-th preprocessing step, the access request is forwarded to the (i+1)-th intermediate component among the multiple intermediate components. Forward the access request to the target component that performs the target operation, including: Once all intermediate components have completed the pre-processing steps for the target operation, the access request is forwarded to the target component that performed the target operation.

[0011] This implementation describes the scenario where access requests are forwarded by multiple intermediate components before reaching the target component, and explains the policy output logic for this situation. By ensuring that the original permission domain identifier remains unchanged during the forwarding process of access requests through multiple intermediate components, and by verifying the permission scope corresponding to each intermediate component one by one, hierarchical control of the cross-component call chain is achieved. That is, the processing logic of each intermediate component's relevant steps is the same as that of the target component, and all require verification by the component's pre-policy execution point. Only after the verification is passed can the request proceed to the next component. This effectively prevents restricted applications from bypassing permissions by using any high-privilege intermediate component, avoids privilege escalation vulnerabilities in multi-level component forwarding scenarios, and significantly improves security in complex call chain scenarios.

[0012] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: If the original permission range is less than the permission range of the component corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, then the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the i-th preprocessing step. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication. If the i-th preprocessing step fails, cancel the step of forwarding the access request to the target component that performs the target operation and subsequent steps.

[0013] In this implementation, by limiting the output of control policies to precisely based on the type of the preceding processing step when the intermediate component fails to verify, and canceling all subsequent forwarding steps upon failure, the system can quickly intercept and react to specific unauthorized access risks, mitigating losses in a timely manner and effectively preventing invalid requests from continuing to forward and consuming system resources. This improves the accuracy of interception actions and the efficiency of system execution.

[0014] In one possible implementation, restricted access domain sessions are established based on restricted authentication credentials; If the original permission scope is smaller than the permission scope of the target component, then the corresponding control strategy is output according to the type of the target operation, including: When the target operation is a sensitive operation, the control policy is determined to require master credential authentication. Require master credential authentication means that the master authentication credential is verified, and if the master authentication credential is obtained, the target component is allowed to execute the target operation according to the access request. The permissions of the master authentication credential are higher than those of the restricted authentication credential. The method also includes: Issue a master voucher verification prompt message; If the primary authentication credential is not received, the target component is denied the right to perform the target operation based on the access request.

[0015] In this implementation, sessions in restricted access domains are established based on restricted authentication credentials, and a higher-level master credential authentication mechanism is introduced for sensitive operations; failure to authenticate results in direct rejection. This tiered authentication strategy significantly reduces the risk of restricted users (such as children) performing high-risk operations like payments or data deletion without parental permission, further enhancing the stringency of sensitive operation control.

[0016] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: Upon receiving the primary authentication credential, a temporary elevated authorization is generated. The temporary elevated authorization is used at least to establish a binding relationship between the target operation, the target component, and the target resources that the target component needs to call when performing the target operation. The temporary elevated authorization has a corresponding authorization validity period. Include the temporary authorization identifier corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization in the access request; The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies the binding relationship between the temporary authorization identifier, the original permission domain identifier, and the temporary elevated authorization in the access request, and obtains the temporary authorization verification result. When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the target component is allowed to execute the target operation based on the temporary elevated authorization; If the temporary authorization verification result is that the verification fails, the target component is refused to perform the target operation based on the access request.

[0017] In this implementation, the generated temporary elevated authorization is only allowed to take effect on the target operation and will not change the permissions of the restricted permission domain session. In other words, the permission domain identifier of the restricted permission domain session remains unchanged. By limiting the generation of temporary elevated authorizations to specific target operations, components, resources, and validity periods after receiving the master authentication credential, and verifying the temporary authorization identifier and binding relationship before execution, this embodiment effectively overcomes the problem of uncontrolled authorization scope caused by directly elevating all permissions of the permission domain session after master authentication in traditional solutions. It only allows temporary privilege escalation for sensitive operations, and only requests with completely matching binding relationships can be executed. Operations not permitted in other sessions still cannot be executed using the temporary elevated authorization corresponding to the target operation, greatly improving the controllability and security of authorization.

[0018] In one possible implementation, after allowing the target component to execute the target operation based on the temporary elevated authorization when the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the following steps are also included: During the execution of the target operation or within the validity period of the temporarily enhanced authorization, a second access request is received from a second application within a restricted permission domain session. The second access request is used to request the invocation of the target component to execute the second target operation. The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies whether the second access request carries a temporary authorization identifier; If the second access request does not carry a temporary authorization identifier, the target component's pre-policy execution point determines and outputs the control policy corresponding to the second access request based on the original permission domain identifier in the second access request, so as to prevent the target component from using the temporary elevated authorization to perform other operations besides the target operation.

[0019] In this implementation, by limiting the validity period of the temporary authorization, requests initiated by other applications within the restricted session are checked to see if they carry the temporary authorization identifier. If not, the original permissions are used for re-evaluation. This embodiment effectively prevents other applications from using the temporary authorization to perform irrelevant operations, ensuring the absolute exclusivity and strict isolation of the temporary authorization, and completely eliminating the risk of unauthorized access caused by multiple applications sharing a single temporary authorization.

[0020] In one possible implementation, the method further includes: The temporary elevated authorization will be invalidated if the authorization termination conditions are met; the authorization termination conditions include at least one of the following: the target operation has been completed, the validity period of the temporary elevated authorization has expired, or the first application has exited operation; Clean up the binding relationships established by the temporary upgrade authorization; If the binding relationship cleanup fails, the temporary elevated authorization will remain invalid, and subsequent access requests corresponding to sensitive operations that rely on the temporary elevated authorization will be rejected by default until the cleanup is complete.

[0021] This implementation first invalidates the temporary authorization and cleans up the binding relationship after the authorization ends. If the cleanup fails, the temporary authorization remains invalid, and subsequent sensitive requests are rejected by default. Timely cleanup after the temporary authorization is used effectively prevents permission leaks caused by residual temporary authorizations. Simultaneously, by forcibly invalidating the temporary authorization and rejecting subsequent sensitive operations that rely on it when cleanup fails, a fallback strategy is established to ensure that the system can still block potential threats under abnormal circumstances, effectively improving the overall robustness and security of the device.

[0022] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide an operation access control device, including: The session management module is used to establish restricted permission domain sessions, each with a corresponding permission domain identifier. The policy enforcement module is used to receive an access request initiated by the first application within the restricted permission domain session while the restricted permission domain session is maintained. The access request includes the target operation to be executed, and the target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources. The policy enforcement module is also used to write the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, and forward the access request to the target component that performs the target operation; the original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is a restricted permission domain session; The policy execution module is also used to compare the original permission range of the access request with the component permission range corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier through the pre-policy execution point of the target component; The policy execution module is also used to allow the target component to perform the target operation based on the access request if the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component. The policy execution module is also used to output the corresponding control policy according to the type of the target operation if the original permission range is smaller than the component permission range corresponding to the target component. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0023] Thirdly, this application also provides an electronic device. The electronic device includes a memory, one or more processors, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. The electronic device executes the computer program to implement any of the implementations of the first aspect described above.

[0024] Fourthly, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method of any of the implementations of the first aspect described above.

[0025] Fifthly, this application also provides a computer program product that, when run on an electronic device, causes the electronic device to execute any of the implementation methods of the first aspect described above.

[0026] Sixthly, this application also provides an operation access control system, which includes the operation access control device described in the second aspect above.

[0027] It is understood that the beneficial effects of the second to sixth aspects mentioned above can be found in the relevant descriptions in the first aspect above, and will not be repeated here. Attached Figure Description

[0028] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0029] Figure 1This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an operation access control system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of an operation permission control method provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the operation permission control process when a child uses a parent's mobile phone, provided in one embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a structural block diagram of an operation permission control device provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0030] With the widespread adoption of smart devices, the same device is often shared by multiple users with different identities. For example, children frequently need to use their parents' smart devices for learning or entertainment, while parents want to allow children limited use of certain functions, provided their own data security is ensured. Similarly, visitors often need to temporarily borrow the owner's smart device for basic operations such as calls and navigation, while the owner also wants to restrict the visitor's access to prevent them from viewing sensitive data such as contacts and photos.

[0031] To meet the above needs, the operating system of smart devices usually provides a variety of solutions such as child mode, guest mode or app lock. These solutions typically restrict the scope of device use by using different passwords to access different desktops, hiding app icons, setting a list of allowed apps, or directly switching to a separate user account.

[0032] However, the control logic of such schemes mainly focuses on the interception of application entry points. After successful authentication, the system generally only determines permissions based on the current account, the current desktop, or the application that is ultimately called. This approach has obvious defects in practical applications.

[0033] The permitted applications integrate rich system interaction capabilities, allowing users to indirectly access other applications or system resources through sharing panels, file selectors, notification jumps, deep links, voice assistants, widgets, or background tasks. Because only the application icon or the final application is restricted, the system cannot reliably determine which restricted permission domain the request originally originated from. This allows restricted applications to illegally expand their permissions using high-privilege intermediate components (such as browsers or sharing services), failing to effectively control indirect access across applications. Furthermore, the technology lacks sufficient control over sensitive operations within permitted applications, such as payment, deletion, publishing, and settings modification. After parents enter the master credential, the device may enter a state of full permissions, with an excessively broad scope and prolonged duration of authorization. Moreover, after temporary operations are completed, URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) ​​authorizations, background tasks, sensitive pages, clipboard content, or temporary files may remain, posing a risk of information leakage.

[0034] To address the aforementioned technical problems, embodiments of this application provide an operation permission control method applied to the operating system of a terminal device (smart device / electronic device). Simultaneously, embodiments of this application also provide an operation permission control system integrated into the aforementioned operating system for executing the aforementioned operation permission control method.

[0035] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an operation permission control system provided in one embodiment of this application. The system 100 includes: a credential input module 110, an authentication decision module 120, a permission mapping module 130, a session management module 140, a policy execution module 150, a temporary escalation module 160, a state recovery module 170, an audit module 180, and a trusted execution environment or secure storage 190. Data transmission between the modules is achieved through communication connections.

[0036] The credential input module 110 receives authentication credentials, which are passwords, gestures, fingerprints, facial recognition, or other credentials supported by the device to represent user identity information. The type of authentication credential is related to the current user's operation permissions. Authentication credentials include restricted authentication credentials and primary authentication credentials, with the primary authentication credential having higher permissions than the restricted authentication credential. There is one primary authentication credential, and the number of restricted authentication credentials can be configured to at least one as needed. When multiple restricted authentication credentials exist, each restricted authentication credential has different levels of permissions.

[0037] The credential input module 110 sends the authentication credential to the authentication decision module 120. The authentication decision module 120 verifies the authentication credential and outputs a credential identifier or authentication result, which indicates the type of authentication credential. The authentication decision module 120 then sends the credential identifier to the permission mapping module 130.

[0038] The permission mapping module 130 is used to determine and load the corresponding permission domain configuration based on the credential identifier. The permission domain configuration is a set of rules predefined by the operating system to limit the applications, resources, and executable operations that a specific credential identity can access. For example, a child credential (a type of restricted authentication credential) can correspond to a restricted permission domain configuration, and a primary authentication credential can correspond to a primary permission domain configuration. Different permission domains can be configured into different permission sets according to resources, applications, and operations. The restricted permission domain configuration can be a subset of the allowed scope of the primary permission domain configuration.

[0039] Permission domain configuration is the basis for establishing permission domain sessions, which are dynamic instantiations of the permission domain configuration in specific authentication events. Internally, a permission domain session is a logical security context established by the operating system and recognizable by multiple system services, rather than a single application's page session. This logical security context is similar to a "security token" assigned to the current user by the operating system, containing the permission domain identifier to which the current session belongs and the corresponding permission boundary information. During the duration of a permission domain session, application calls, resource access, and sensitive operation requests entering the system security control boundary are all constrained by this permission domain session until it is destroyed when termination conditions such as screen lock, timeout, or exit are triggered.

[0040] The permission mapping module 130 sends the permission domain configuration to the session management module 140. Based on this, the session management module 140 establishes the corresponding permission domain session and generates a session token and permission domain identifier. The session management module 140 provides the session context of the permission domain session to the policy execution module 150, so that the policy execution module 150 can perform permission verification on the access request based on the session context.

[0041] Once the permission domain session is established, the user can perform various operations on the device through this session. At this time, the system will trigger the corresponding security control process based on the type of session established, the type of operation, and the system resources involved in the operation.

[0042] In this embodiment, if a primary permission domain session is established, since it has the highest permission level, the application operations within the session are generally within the allowed range. Therefore, the security control process in this embodiment is mainly aimed at scenarios with restricted permission domain sessions.

[0043] If a restricted access domain session is established, the user can perform operations on applications permitted by the restricted access domain (e.g., the first application) during the session's duration. Some of these operations may not involve system security (e.g., ordinary browsing or page turning within the application), and these will not trigger subsequent security control processes. However, if the user's operations on the application involve system security (e.g., cross-application calls or access to protected resources), the system will generate a corresponding access request. This access request includes the target operation to be performed. In this case, the operating system will write an original access domain identifier to the access request. This original access domain identifier corresponds to the access domain identifier of the access domain session, indicating that the access request originates from an application within that access domain session.

[0044] In order to achieve the target operation, the access request will be forwarded to the target component that can perform the target operation. During this process, the policy execution module 150 needs to further verify the access request and output the policy to determine whether the access request is allowed to reach the target component so that it can perform the target operation.

[0045] When security-related access requests such as application calls, component calls, and access to protected resources arrive at the policy enforcement module 150, the policy enforcement module 150 reads or verifies the session token and the original permission domain identifier.

[0046] In this embodiment, the policy execution module 150 may include at least two policy execution points distributed in multiple operating system services. These policy execution points are also called pre-policy execution points. Each pre-policy execution point is set before the corresponding component executes the corresponding processing steps. It is used to perform specific permission verification before the access request reaches the component and decide whether to allow the access request to continue to be forwarded to the subsequent component or the target component.

[0047] Specifically, there are two types of access request processing flows: the first type is the direct execution type, in which the access request goes directly from the initiating application to the target component, and the target component directly executes the target operation without going through intermediate components; the second type is the indirect execution type, in which the access request needs to go through at least one intermediate component to perform corresponding pre-processing steps, and after the pre-processing steps are completed, the access request is forwarded to subsequent intermediate components or the final target component.

[0048] There is at least one intermediate component, and each intermediate component has a corresponding pre-strategy execution point. The verification logic of the pre-strategy execution point is the same as the verification logic of the pre-strategy execution point of the target component.

[0049] That is, when an access request is forwarded to the i-th intermediate component (here, forwarding to the i-th intermediate component refers to a state of forwarding from the (i-1)-th intermediate component to the i-th intermediate component. Before actually reaching the i-th intermediate component, it needs to be verified at the pre-policy execution point. Only if the verification is successful will the i-th intermediate component confirm receipt and proceed with subsequent operations), the pre-policy execution point of the i-th intermediate component compares the original permission range of the access request with the size relationship between the original permission domain identifier and the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component.

[0050] If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range of the intermediate component, the intermediate component is allowed to execute the corresponding pre-processing steps. If the original permission range is less than the component permission range of the intermediate component, the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the pre-processing step, and the subsequent forwarding and execution process is terminated if the verification fails. This process continues, verifying each intermediate component one by one, until all intermediate components pass the pre-processing policy execution point verification and the intermediate components complete the corresponding pre-processing steps. Only then is the access request forwarded to the final target component to execute the target operation.

[0051] exist Figure 1 The example illustrates four policy execution points, including: application or component invocation policy execution point 151, data or file access policy execution point 152, notification or deep link policy execution point 153, and system settings or background task policy execution point 154.

[0052] The application or component call strategy execution point 151 is set at the entry point of application startup or component call. It is used to verify the size relationship between the original permission range and the component permission range of the target application or component before the application or component is called, so as to prevent restricted applications from exceeding their permissions by calling high-privilege components.

[0053] For example, consider a learning application A within the child permission domain D1 that triggers a cross-application call via a sharing panel. Learning application A integrates a share button. When a child clicks this button, the system generates an access request. The target operation is to invoke the system's sharing service (intermediate component) and share the content to a social application (target component). The system writes the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier. This identifier indicates that the access request originates from the restricted permission domain D1.

[0054] When the access request reaches the application or component call policy execution point 151, the execution point determines the original permission scope of D1 based on the original permission domain identifier and obtains the component permission scope corresponding to the system sharing service and social application. Since the original permission scope of D1 is smaller than the component permission scope of the system sharing service and social application, and the cross-application sharing operation exceeds the scope allowed by D1, the application or component call policy execution point 151 determines that the target operation has an unauthorized access risk, outputs a "deny" control policy, and blocks the access request.

[0055] Therefore, even if the system sharing service or social application itself has high privileges, it cannot be used by the restricted application D1, effectively preventing the restricted application from illegally expanding its privileges through the sharing panel.

[0056] The data or file access policy enforcement point 152 is set at the entry point of the data or file access service. It is used to verify the size relationship between the original permission scope and the component permission scope of the data access component before accessing protected data or files, so as to prevent restricted applications from accessing data or files beyond their permission scope.

[0057] For example, consider the learning application A within the child permission domain D1 accessing the photo album via a file selector. Learning application A integrates an "Add Attachment" function. When a child clicks this function, an access request is generated. The target operation is to invoke the system file selector (intermediate component) and access photos (target resources) in the photo album. The system writes the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier and forwards it to the data or file access policy enforcement point 152.

[0058] Data or file access policy execution point 152 determines the original permission scope of D1 based on the original permission domain identifier and obtains the component permission scope corresponding to the file selector component. Since the original permission scope of D1 is smaller than the component permission scope of the file selector, and the photos in the album are protected resources, data or file access policy execution point 152 determines that the access request exceeds the permission scope allowed by D1, and outputs a "de-identification" control policy based on the type of the target operation (access to protected resources).

[0059] Under this control strategy, the file selector only returns de-identified thumbnails from the album to the learning application A (e.g., blurred or only showing photos from the specified learning folder), instead of returning the original high-resolution photos. This effectively protects the privacy and security of sensitive data in the parents' album while meeting the learning application's need to add attachments.

[0060] The notification or deep link policy execution point 153 is set at the entry point of the notification service or deep link. It is used to verify the size relationship between the original permission scope and the component permission scope of the notification component or deep link component before the notification jump or deep link is invoked, so as to prevent restricted applications from jumping to unauthorized pages through notifications or deep links.

[0061] For example, consider a push notification received by learning application A within the child permission domain D1. The system pushes a notification containing a deep link to learning application A. After the child clicks on the notification, an access request is generated. The target operation is to redirect the user to a browser (target component) via the notification service (intermediate component) and open the specified webpage. The system writes the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier.

[0062] When the access request reaches the notification or deep link policy execution point 153, the execution point determines the original permission scope of D1 based on the original permission domain identifier and obtains the corresponding component permission scope of the notification service and browser. Since the original permission scope of D1 is smaller than the component permission scope of the browser component, and the target webpage of the deep link redirection operation is not within the list allowed by D1, the notification or deep link policy execution point 153 determines that the redirection operation exceeds the scope allowed by D1, outputs a "deny" control policy, and blocks the access request.

[0063] Therefore, even if the browser itself has high privileges to access any webpage, the restricted application D1 cannot bypass the restrictions through notification redirects or deep links, effectively preventing the restricted application from redirecting to unauthorized pages through notifications or deep links, and effectively ensuring the integrity of the restricted permission domain boundary.

[0064] The system settings or background task policy execution point 154 is set at the entry point of the system settings service or background task. It is used to verify the relationship between the original permission scope and the component permission scope of the system settings component or background task component before modifying system settings or starting a background task, so as to prevent restricted applications from performing system settings modifications or starting background tasks beyond their permission scope.

[0065] For example, consider a learning application A within the child permission domain D1 attempting to modify system Wi-Fi settings or initiate a background download task. Learning application A initiates an access request to modify system settings, with the target operation being to invoke the system settings service (target component) and modify the Wi-Fi connection status. The system writes the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier.

[0066] When the access request reaches the system settings or background task policy execution point 154, the execution point determines the original permission scope of D1 based on the original permission domain identifier and obtains the component permission scope corresponding to the system settings component. Since the original permission scope of D1 is much smaller than the component permission scope of the system settings component, and modifying system settings is an operation that exceeds the scope allowed by D1, the system settings or background task policy execution point 154 determines that the target operation has an unauthorized access risk, outputs a "deny" control policy, and blocks the access request.

[0067] In another scenario, if application A attempts to launch a high-risk task (such as uploading user data) in the background, the system settings or background task policy execution point 154 will also perform verification according to the above logic. Since the background task component's permission scope is greater than D1's original permission scope, the execution point outputs a "deny" control policy, preventing the background task from starting. This effectively prevents restricted applications from threatening device security by modifying system settings or launching background tasks, ensuring that applications within the restricted permission domain cannot perform system-level operations beyond their permission scope.

[0068] In practice, the policy execution point can also be set in application management, file sharing, payment, installation management or other system services, but this embodiment does not limit this.

[0069] Among the above policy execution points, the pre-policy execution point located before the target component executes the target operation is used to compare the original permission range of the access request with the component permission range corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier. If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component, the target component is allowed to execute the target operation according to the access request. If the original permission range is less than the component permission range corresponding to the target component, the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the target operation. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0070] Specifically, the target operation type includes sensitive operations. Sensitive operations include at least one of the following: payment, transfer, purchase, deletion or writing of protected data, external publication or transmission of content, installation or uninstallation of applications, modification of accounts, permissions or security settings, and initiation of high-risk background tasks. When the target operation type is a sensitive operation, the control policy determined at the pre-policy execution point requires master credential authentication.

[0071] In this scenario, the authentication decision module 120 initiates the master credential authentication process, which includes: issuing a master credential verification prompt; requiring the user to re-enter the master authentication credential through the credential input module 110; and the authentication decision module 120 verifying the master authentication credential. If the master authentication credential is not received or verification fails (e.g., a child user continues to enter a restricted authentication credential), the control policy is determined to be rejection, meaning the target component is denied from performing the target operation based on the access request.

[0072] If the primary authentication credential is received and verified, the permissions of the current restricted permission domain session remain unchanged, and no primary permission domain session is established or switched. At this time, the temporary elevation module 160 generates a temporary elevation authorization that is only applicable to the current target operation. The temporary elevation authorization is at least used to establish a binding relationship between the target operation, the target component, and the target resources that the target component needs to call when performing the target operation. The temporary elevation authorization has a corresponding authorization validity period, and the above information that has established a binding relationship is assigned an elevation event association identifier.

[0073] Subsequently, a temporary authorization identifier corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization is written into the access request. The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies the temporary authorization identifier, the original permission domain identifier, and the binding relationship corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization in the access request, obtaining a temporary authorization verification result. When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the target component is allowed to execute the target operation based on the temporary elevated authorization; when the temporary authorization verification result is unsuccessful, the target component is denied the right to execute the target operation based on the access request.

[0074] When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the access request arrives at the target component, and the target component executes the target operation.

[0075] If a user initiates other operations on an application within a restricted permission domain session and generates a new access request during the execution of the target operation or within the validity period of the temporary elevated authorization, the access request will not be approved by default. Instead, the system will check whether a temporary authorization identifier for the temporary elevated authorization exists. If it is not carried or does not match the binding relationship, the system will re-determine the permissions according to the original permission domain identifier to prevent the temporary elevated authorization from being used for operations other than the target operation.

[0076] For example, a second access request initiated by a second application within a restricted permission domain session is received. This second access request requests the invocation of a target component to perform a second target operation. The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies whether the second access request carries a temporary authorization identifier.

[0077] If the second access request does not include a temporary authorization identifier, it indicates that the second access request is unrelated to the currently valid temporary elevated authorization. The target component's pre-policy execution point, based on the original permission domain identifier in the second access request, re-compares the original permission scope of the second access request with the component permission scope of the target component, determines and outputs the control policy corresponding to the second access request, and prevents the target component from using the temporary elevated authorization to perform operations other than the target operation. In other words, the temporary elevated authorization is only valid for the currently bound target operation; other applications or operations cannot use this authorization, effectively achieving exclusive isolation for a single authorization.

[0078] When the target operation is completed, the validity period of the temporary elevated authorization expires, the usage limit is exhausted, the device screen is locked, or the application exits, the state restoration module 170, based on the elevation event association identifier, selectively revokes the temporary elevated authorization and clears the temporary state associated with the elevation event association identifier. Temporary states include temporary URI authorization, associated background tasks, temporary files, sensitive pages, clipboard content, and page return states. After clearing, the original restricted permission domain session is restored and continues.

[0079] If the cleanup fails, for example, if the background task cannot be terminated, the temporary file is occupied and cannot be deleted, or the associated status cannot be located, the status recovery module 170 keeps the temporary elevated authorization invalid and refuses subsequent sensitive requests that depend on or belong to the temporary elevated authorization by default, until the cleanup is completed or a secure isolation status is established, forming a "failure to close" fallback mechanism to ensure that residual permissions will not cause security threats.

[0080] The audit module 180 is used to record audit events generated during policy execution, temporary elevation, authorization revocation, and state recovery to ensure that the operation process is traceable and to support security incident investigation and system optimization.

[0081] The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or Secure Storage 190 provides a security foundation for modules requiring trusted protection. This environment is independent of the normal operating system environment. The authentication decision module 120 completes authentication credential verification within the TEE 190; the session token generated by the session management module 140, the original permission domain identifier used by the policy enforcement module 150, and the temporary elevation authorization generated by the temporary elevation module 160 are all protected for integrity or securely stored by the TEE 190 to ensure that the aforementioned core data is not tampered with, forged, or stolen by ordinary applications.

[0082] Permission domain sessions can end upon timeout, credential switching, user logout, device restart, account switching, or a preset end event. After the session ends, the session management module 140 revokes the session token and any unexpired temporary elevated authorizations, restricts or terminates associated background tasks, and clears associated temporary states. Subsequently, any new security-related requests must be re-authenticated and a new permission domain session must be established to ensure that each use undergoes a complete authentication and permission configuration process.

[0083] exist Figure 1 The diagram includes solid lines and dashed lines. Solid lines are used to identify business / control processes between modules, while dashed lines indicate that the trusted execution environment or secure storage 190 provides trusted security support to the authentication decision module 120, session management module 140, policy execution module 150, and temporary elevation module 160.

[0084] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of an exemplary embodiment of the present application providing an operation permission control method, which can be implemented by, for example... Figure 1 The system execution shown can also be executed by the operating system. The method includes the following steps.

[0085] Step 201: Establish a restricted access domain session.

[0086] Among them, restricted permission domain sessions correspond to permission domain identifiers, and restricted permission domain sessions are established based on restricted authentication credentials.

[0087] As mentioned above, prior to step 201, this application embodiment further includes the following steps S211 to S214.

[0088] S211, such as Figure 1 The credential input module 110 shown receives the authentication credentials input by the user and sends the authentication credentials to, for example, Figure 1 The authentication decision module 120 shown.

[0089] S212, the authentication decision module 120 verifies the authentication credential and outputs the credential identifier or authentication result, sending the credential identifier to, for example... Figure 1 The permission mapping module 130 shown; S213, the permission mapping module 130 loads the corresponding permission domain configuration based on the credential identifier and sends the permission domain configuration to, for example, Figure 1 The session management module 140 shown; S214, the session management module 140 establishes a permission domain session and generates a session token and permission domain identifier according to the permission domain configuration.

[0090] Step 202: While the restricted access domain session is maintained, receive the access request initiated by the first application within the restricted access domain session.

[0091] The access request includes the target operation to be performed, which refers to the specific action requested by the access request. The access request is the request carrier received by the system, and the target operation is the specific behavior that the request intends to perform.

[0092] The target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operations or access to protected resources.

[0093] Cross-application call operations refer to operations initiated by the first application that require calling other applications or system components outside the first application, including but not limited to: jumping to the second application, launching the system sharing service, launching the file selector, launching the voice assistant, jumping via notification or jumping via deep link, etc.

[0094] Accessing protected resources refers to an operation initiated by the first application that requests access to resource data that requires system authorization or permission control, including but not limited to: accessing the photo album, contacts, location information, clipboard content, system settings, etc.

[0095] Ordinary touch, scrolling, or interface display events that do not involve the protected object are not within the scope of the target operation that requires generating an access request.

[0096] In an optional embodiment, the access request at least includes, carries, or can be resolved by the system to include the target application or target component, target resource, and target operation.

[0097] In this context, the target application or target component refers to the final object that performs the target operation. For example, when the target operation is to redirect to a browser, the target application is the browser application, and the target component is the browser process or the corresponding system service. When the target operation is to access a photo album, the target component is the photo album service or a file selector.

[0098] A target resource refers to a specific data object involved in a target operation, such as a specific photo in an album, a contact entry in an address book, a specific file path, or a specific web address.

[0099] Step 203: Write the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, and forward the access request to the target component that performs the target operation.

[0100] The original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is a restricted permission domain session.

[0101] The original permission domain identifier at least indicates the permission domain to which the initial initiator belongs, and may also include the initiating application identifier, target component, target resource, target operation, policy version, and integrity verification information.

[0102] In some embodiments, the access request is forwarded to the target component via multiple intermediate components, each of which is used to perform pre-processing steps for the target operation; during the access request forwarding process, the original permission domain identifier remains unchanged.

[0103] Intermediate components are application components or system services located between the original initiator (first application) and the final target component, undertaking routing, proxying, parsing, selection, or capability provision. Examples include sharing services, file selectors, browsers, notification services, voice assistants, or content providers.

[0104] When a request is forwarded to the target component via one or more intermediate components, the trusted system component maintains and verifies the original permission domain identifier. Ordinary applications cannot delete, replace, forge, or change this identifier to a higher permission.

[0105] Before forwarding the access request to the target component that performs the target operation, the method includes the following steps S231 to S233.

[0106] S231, when the access request is forwarded to the i-th intermediate component among multiple intermediate components, the pre-policy execution point of the i-th intermediate component compares the size relationship between the original permission range and the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component according to the original permission domain identifier; i is a positive integer.

[0107] Specifically, determine the i-th intermediate component that performs the i-th preprocessing step, and the preprocessing strategy execution point of the i-th intermediate component.

[0108] The pre-policy execution point of the i-th intermediate component determines the original permission range of the access request based on the original permission domain identifier; and compares the size relationship between the original permission range and the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component.

[0109] S232, if the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, then the i-th intermediate component is allowed to execute the i-th pre-processing step of the target operation according to the access request.

[0110] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the permission ranges corresponding to each application, component, and permission domain session are typically configured in a hierarchical structure from low to high, meaning that higher permission ranges contain lower permission ranges, and lower permission ranges are subsets of higher permission ranges. When the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range of the i-th intermediate component, it indicates that the original permissions of the restricted permission domain session are sufficient to cover the permissions required for the intermediate component to perform the pre-processing steps, and in this case, it can be directly allowed.

[0111] In other optional embodiments, if there is no hierarchical inclusion relationship between the permission scopes, the intersection of the original permission scope and the component permission scope of the i-th intermediate component can be taken. If the intersection can meet the permission requirements for executing the i-th preprocessing step, then execution is allowed; if the intersection cannot meet the permission requirements for executing the i-th preprocessing step, then the verification is deemed to have failed and execution is not allowed.

[0112] S233, after the i-th intermediate component has completed the i-th preprocessing step, the access request is forwarded to the (i+1)-th intermediate component among the multiple intermediate components.

[0113] Therefore, the access request will only be forwarded to subsequent intermediate components after the pre-processing strategy execution point verification passes and the i-th intermediate component successfully completes the i-th pre-processing step. If the i-th pre-processing step fails, the subsequent forwarding process will be terminated.

[0114] Once all intermediate components have completed the pre-processing steps for the target operation, the access request is forwarded to the target component that performed the target operation.

[0115] In some embodiments, if the original permission range is less than the permission range of the component corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the i-th preprocessing step. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0116] If the i-th preprocessing step fails, the step of forwarding the access request to the target component that performs the target operation and subsequent steps (i.e., steps 204 to 206) are cancelled.

[0117] If any intermediate component fails to validate or the preprocessing step fails to execute, the entire subsequent forwarding process of the access request will be terminated immediately, and the access request will not reach the target component, thereby effectively preventing restricted applications from using intermediate components to perform target operations without authorization.

[0118] It is worth noting that the verification process performed by each intermediate component and its preceding strategy execution point is logically the same as that performed by the target component and its preceding strategy execution point. This will not be described again here, but will be explained in detail in steps 204 to 206.

[0119] Step 204: Based on the original permission domain identifier, the execution point of the target component's pre-policy compares the original permission range of the access request with the permission range of the corresponding component of the target component.

[0120] Specifically, identify the target component for performing the target operation, and the execution point of the preceding strategy for the target component.

[0121] The target component's pre-policy execution point determines the original permission range of the access request based on the original permission domain identifier; it then compares the original permission range with the corresponding component permission range of the target component.

[0122] Step 205: If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component, then the target component is allowed to perform the target operation according to the access request.

[0123] Referring to S232, when the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range of the target component, it indicates that the original permissions of the restricted permission domain session are sufficient to cover the permissions required for the target component to perform the target operation, and in this case, it can be allowed directly.

[0124] In other optional embodiments, if there is no hierarchical inclusion relationship between the permission scopes, the intersection of the original permission scope and the component permission scope of the target component can be taken. If the intersection can meet the permission requirements for executing the target operation, execution is allowed; if the intersection cannot meet the permission requirements for executing the target operation, the verification is deemed to have failed and execution is not allowed.

[0125] Step 206: If the original permission range is less than the permission range of the target component, then output the corresponding control policy according to the type of the target operation.

[0126] The control strategies include at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0127] It should be noted that "allow execution" is also a type of control policy. That is, steps 205 and 206 together constitute the complete policy output logic: based on the relationship between the original permission scope and the permission scope of the target component, and the type of the target operation, the corresponding control policy is output. Control policies include at least one of the following: allow, deny, read-only, de-identify, downgrade, or require master credential authentication.

[0128] When the original permission range is greater than or equal to the permission range of the target component, the allowed control policy is output; when the original permission range is less than the permission range of the target component, the control policy such as deny, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, or requiring master credential authentication is output according to the type of the target operation.

[0129] "Reject" means that the target component is not allowed to perform the target operation based on the access request.

[0130] "Read-only" means that the target component is allowed to perform target operations in read-only mode, and writing or modifying the target resource is prohibited.

[0131] "Desensitization" refers to allowing the target component to access the target resource, but returning the sensitive information in the target resource after desensitization processing.

[0132] "Degradation processing" means allowing the target component to perform target operations with downgraded functionality, while prohibiting the enabling of functions that exceed the scope of the restricted permission domain.

[0133] "Require master credential authentication" means verifying the master authentication credential and, if the master authentication credential is obtained, allowing the target component to perform the target operation based on the access request. Here, the permissions of the master authentication credential are higher than those of the restricted authentication credential.

[0134] Specifically, based on the risk level of the operation type, target operations can be categorized into sensitive operations and non-sensitive operations. Sensitive operations refer to various operations that may affect user data, account security, system settings, or payment security, and require close monitoring and strict control.

[0135] Sensitive operations include, but are not limited to: payments, transfers, purchases, deletion or writing of protected data, publishing or transmitting content, installing or uninstalling applications, modifying accounts, permissions or security settings, and starting high-risk background tasks. Non-sensitive operations refer to other operations besides the above-mentioned sensitive operations; these operations typically do not have a significant impact on device security or user data.

[0136] If the target operation is a sensitive operation, the control policy is set to require master credential authentication.

[0137] For example, the following describes the master credential authentication and subsequent processes.

[0138] First, a master credential verification prompt is sent. This prompt prompts the user to enter the master authentication credential. For example, it may prompt the user to perform a fingerprint scan on a designated interface of the terminal device (such as the lock screen, payment confirmation screen, or system settings screen), collect the entered fingerprint through the sensing area on the screen, and verify the fingerprint. Alternatively, it may prompt the user to enter a password, gesture, or facial recognition. The system receives the authentication credential entered by the user and verifies it.

[0139] The verification of authentication credentials includes the following two scenarios.

[0140] Scenario 1: If the primary authentication credential is not received, the target component is denied the right to perform the target operation based on the access request.

[0141] "Not receiving the primary authentication credential" means: (1) no authentication credential input by the user is received within the preset time period; (2) or the received authentication credential is not the primary authentication credential (e.g., a restricted authentication credential such as a child authentication credential is received).

[0142] Scenario 2: Upon receiving the primary authentication credential, generate a temporary elevated authorization.

[0143] Temporary upgrades to authorization have corresponding authorization validity periods. The authorization validity period can be the duration of a single authorization (e.g., 5 minutes) or the number of uses (e.g., 1 authorization, each authorization only allows the execution of the target operation).

[0144] Temporary elevation of authorization is at least used to establish a binding relationship between the target operation, the target component, and the target resources that the target component needs to call when performing the target operation.

[0145] For example, a temporary upgrade of authorization may be bound to at least two of the following: target application, target resource, target operation, authorization validity period, or number of uses.

[0146] The system writes the temporary authorization identifier corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization into the access request.

[0147] At this point, the system does not directly allow the target component to execute the target operation. This is because during the validity period of the temporary elevated authorization, other access requests may also request to invoke the target component. To ensure that the temporary elevated authorization is only valid for the current target operation and to prevent it from being stolen by other access requests, the target component's pre-policy execution point needs to re-verify the access request.

[0148] Specifically, the target component's pre-policy execution point verifies the binding relationship between the temporary authorization identifier, the original permission domain identifier, and the temporary elevated authorization in the access request, and obtains the temporary authorization verification result.

[0149] 2.1 When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the target component is allowed to perform the target operation based on the temporary enhanced authorization.

[0150] If the access request includes a temporary authorization identifier, and the size of the component permission scope between the temporary authorization identifier and the target component is also verified based on the original permission domain identifier, then the verification is deemed successful, and the target component is allowed to execute the target operation based on the temporary authorization and the relevant information that has been bound to the temporary authorization.

[0151] If other access requests exist, it is still necessary to verify whether they include a temporary authorization identifier.

[0152] Optionally, during the execution of the target operation or within the validity period of a temporarily enhanced authorization, a second access request initiated by a second application within a restricted permission domain session may be received. The second access request is used to request the invocation of the target component to execute the second target operation.

[0153] The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies whether the second access request carries a temporary authorization identifier.

[0154] If the second access request does not carry a temporary authorization identifier, the target component's pre-policy execution point determines and outputs the control policy corresponding to the second access request based on the original permission domain identifier in the second access request, so as to prevent the target component from using the temporary elevated authorization to perform other operations besides the target operation.

[0155] If the conditions for ending the authorization are met, invalidate the temporary elevation authorization.

[0156] For example, the authorization termination conditions include at least one of the following: the target operation is completed, the validity period of the temporary authorization upgrade expires, or the first application exits operation.

[0157] In some embodiments, the authorization termination conditions also include: exhaustion of usage attempts, or locking of the terminal device screen.

[0158] At this point, the binding relationships established by the temporary upgrade authorization are cleaned up, that is, the binding relationships and associated identifiers between other relevant information and the temporary upgrade authorization are revoked, and redundant data generated during the execution of the target operation by the target component are cleaned up.

[0159] If the binding relationship cleanup fails, the temporary elevated authorization will remain invalid, and subsequent access requests corresponding to sensitive operations that rely on the temporary elevated authorization will be rejected by default until the cleanup is complete.

[0160] 2.2 When the temporary authorization verification result is that the verification fails, the target component is refused to perform the target operation according to the access request.

[0161] In this embodiment, the permission domain session can end upon timeout, authentication credential switching (e.g., switching from a restricted authentication credential to a primary authentication credential), user-initiated logout (e.g., receiving a user action indicating logout from the permission domain session), terminal device restart, account switching, or a preset end event. After the permission domain session ends, the session token and any unexpired temporary elevated authorizations are revoked, associated background tasks are restricted or terminated, and associated temporary states are cleared. Subsequent security-related access requests must be re-verified by the policy enforcement point, and a new permission domain session must be established.

[0162] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment effectively improves the rigor of cross-application access control, ensuring operational convenience in restricted scenarios while significantly enhancing the security of smart devices when shared by multiple users.

[0163] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of controlling access permissions for children using a parent's mobile phone, as provided in one embodiment of this application. The mobile phone is... Figure 2 One of the terminal devices involved in the process, which includes the following steps.

[0164] Step 301: Parents pre-enter the main authentication credential (such as the main fingerprint F0), the restricted authentication credential (such as the child's fingerprint F1), and their corresponding permission mapping relationship into their mobile phones.

[0165] The permission mapping relationship means that the primary authentication credential is used to establish a primary permission domain session, and the restricted authentication credential is used to establish a restricted permission domain session.

[0166] Step 302: After receiving the child's fingerprint F1 on the device lock screen or restricted access interface, verify the authentication credential and establish the corresponding permission domain session.

[0167] If authentication is successful, the phone's operating system establishes a child permission domain session D1 within the current device account without switching the operating system user account.

[0168] D1 is a restricted access domain session, which has a corresponding restricted access domain identifier and only allows communication from the learning application, camera, specified video application, and specified contact.

[0169] Once D1 is established, the phone interface can either display only apps that are allowed for children, or retain other app entry points and directly intercept them when the startup request reaches the app's pre-policy execution point.

[0170] For application launch requests that are explicitly prohibited at the entry point, the system can directly reject them based on the current permission domain without continuing the full resource access process; for applications that are allowed to launch and their subsequent security-related requests, continuous access control will continue to be implemented.

[0171] Step 303: The child clicks the share link through the interface of learning application A (the first application).

[0172] When a child clicks the share link, an access request containing the target action is automatically generated. The target action is to call browser C (the target component) via the system sharing service B (the intermediate component).

[0173] After receiving the access request, the system writes the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, and forwards the access request to the sharing service B.

[0174] The pre-policy execution point of sharing service B compares the original permission range with the permission range of the corresponding component of sharing service B based on the original permission domain identifier.

[0175] D1's permission scope is smaller than the component permission scope of sharing service B. The pre-policy execution point outputs the corresponding control policy based on the type of the target operation (cross-application call).

[0176] For example, the type of the pre-processing step (cross-application sharing redirect) exceeds the scope allowed by D1. The pre-policy enforcement point determines that there is a risk of abuse of this high-privilege intermediate component, determines that the verification fails, outputs a denial control policy, and blocks the access request.

[0177] Therefore, the access request is intercepted and no longer forwarded to browser C. Even though sharing service B or browser C usually has higher privileges, because they are intercepted in the intermediate stage, they cannot break through the original privileges of restricted application A. This prevents restricted application from expanding its privileges through high-privilege intermediate components, effectively ensuring that the permission boundaries of restricted permission domain session D1 are not breached, and guaranteeing the security of cross-application access control.

[0178] Step 304: The child makes a course purchase through the learning application A.

[0179] The system receives an access request carrying the target operation. The access request retains the original permission domain identifier of D1, and the target operation belongs to sensitive operations such as payment and purchase.

[0180] Step 305: The system identifies the target operation as a sensitive operation, determines the control policy to require master credential authentication, and issues a master credential verification prompt message.

[0181] After the parent enters their primary fingerprint (F0), the system verifies the primary authentication credential. Upon successful verification, the system does not establish a primary access domain session but maintains the D1 session unchanged, generating only a temporary enhanced authorization for that course order. This temporary enhanced authorization is bound to the target application, target order, payment operation, and enhanced event association identifiers, and has a corresponding authorization validity period (e.g., one-time, valid for five minutes).

[0182] Among them, the promotion event association identifier is used to group the associated states such as temporary authorization, payment page, temporary URI authorization and background task generated by this promotion, so as to carry out targeted cleanup and auditing after the authorization ends. It is different from the temporary authorization identifier; the temporary authorization identifier is written into the access request and is used by the front-end policy execution point to verify whether this temporary authorization is valid.

[0183] The system writes the temporary authorization identifier corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization into the access request.

[0184] Step 306: The pre-policy execution point of the target component (payment component) verifies the binding relationship between the temporary authorization identifier, the original permission domain identifier, and the temporary elevated authorization in the access request, and obtains the temporary authorization verification result.

[0185] When the verification passes, the payment component is allowed to perform the payment operation based on the temporary enhanced authorization. During this process, if the child initiates other access requests (e.g., purchasing other orders or starting delayed tasks) within the validity period of the temporary enhanced authorization, the target component's pre-policy execution point verifies whether the request carries a temporary authorization identifier; if it does not carry a temporary authorization identifier, the corresponding control policy is determined and output based on the original permission domain identifier in the request to prevent the temporary enhanced authorization from performing operations other than payment.

[0186] Step 307: After payment is completed, the authorization termination condition is met (target operation completed or authorization validity period expires), and the system invalidates the temporary upgrade authorization.

[0187] Based on the event association identifier, the payment authorization is revoked, the payment page is closed, relevant clipboard content, temporary URI authorization, background tasks and page return paths are cleared, and the D1 session is restored and continued.

[0188] Children cannot continue payment via the back button, other orders, or delayed tasks, thus enabling continuous and precise control over sensitive operations within restricted access domain sessions.

[0189] Corresponding to the operation permission control method in the above embodiment, Figure 4 A structural block diagram of the operation permission control device provided in the embodiments of this application is shown. For ease of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiments of this application are shown.

[0190] Reference Figure 4 The device 400 includes: Session management module 410 is used to establish restricted permission domain sessions, and each restricted permission domain session has a corresponding permission domain identifier. The policy enforcement module 420 is used to receive an access request initiated by the first application within the restricted permission domain session while the restricted permission domain session is maintained. The access request includes a target operation to be performed, and the target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources. The policy execution module 420 is also used to write the original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, and forward the access request to the target component that performs the target operation; the original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is a restricted permission domain session; The policy execution module 420 is also used to compare the original permission range of the access request with the component permission range corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier through the pre-policy execution point of the target component; The policy execution module 420 is also used to allow the target component to perform the target operation according to the access request if the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component. The policy execution module 420 is also used to output a corresponding control policy based on the type of the target operation if the original permission range is smaller than the component permission range corresponding to the target component. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

[0191] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the above-mentioned devices / modules are based on the same concept as the method embodiments of this application. For details on their specific functions and technical effects, please refer to the method embodiments section, and they will not be repeated here.

[0192] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the above-described division of functional units and modules is merely an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiments can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. Furthermore, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for easy differentiation and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above system can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0193] To implement the above embodiments, this application also proposes an electronic device. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application.

[0194] like Figure 5 As shown, the above-mentioned electronic device 500 includes: The system includes a memory 510 and at least one processor 520, and a bus 530 connecting different components (including the memory 510 and the processor 520). The memory 510 stores a computer program, and when the processor 520 executes the program, it implements the operation permission control method of the present application embodiment.

[0195] Bus 530 represents one or more of several bus architectures, including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, a graphics acceleration port, a processor, or a local bus using any of the various bus architectures. Examples of these architectures include, but are not limited to, the Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, the MicroChannel Architecture (MCA) bus, the Enhanced ISA bus, the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and the Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus.

[0196] Electronic device 500 typically includes a variety of electronic device readable media. These media can be any available media that can be accessed by electronic device 500, including volatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media.

[0197] Memory 510 may also include computer system readable media in the form of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 540 and / or cache memory 550. Electronic device 500 may further include other removable / non-removable, volatile / non-volatile computer system storage media. By way of example only, storage system 560 may be used to read and write non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media (… Figure 5 Not shown; usually referred to as a "hard drive"). Although Figure 5 As not shown, a disk drive for reading and writing to a removable non-volatile disk (e.g., a "floppy disk") and an optical disk drive for reading and writing to a removable non-volatile optical disk (e.g., a CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or other optical media) may be provided. In these cases, each drive may be connected to bus 530 via one or more data media interfaces. Memory 510 may include at least one program product having a set (e.g., at least one) of program modules configured to perform the functions of the embodiments of this application.

[0198] A program / utility 580 having a set (at least one) of program modules 570 may be stored, for example, in memory 510. Such program modules 570 include—but are not limited to—an operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data. Each or some combination of these examples may include an implementation of a network environment. Program modules 570 typically perform the functions and / or methods described in the embodiments of this application.

[0199] Electronic device 500 can also communicate with one or more external devices 590 (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, display 591, etc.), and with one or more devices that enable a user to interact with electronic device 500, and / or with any device that enables electronic device 500 to communicate with one or more other computing devices (e.g., network card, modem, etc.). This communication can be performed via input / output (I / O) interface 595. Furthermore, electronic device 500 can also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), and / or public networks, such as the Internet) via network adapter 593. As shown, network adapter 593 communicates with other modules of electronic device 500 via bus 530. It should be understood that, although not shown in the figures, other hardware and / or software modules can be used in conjunction with electronic device 500, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives, and data backup storage systems.

[0200] The processor 520 performs various functional applications and data processing by running programs stored in the memory 510.

[0201] It should be noted that the implementation process and technical principles of the electronic device in this embodiment are explained in the foregoing description of the operation permission control method in the embodiments of this application, and will not be repeated here.

[0202] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, can implement the steps in the above-described method embodiments.

[0203] This application provides a computer program product that, when run on an electronic device, enables the electronic device to implement the steps described in the various method embodiments above.

[0204] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments of this application can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. This computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. A computer-readable medium can include at least: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code to an electronic device, a recording medium, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media. Examples include USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks. In some regions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media cannot be electrical carrier signals or telecommunication signals.

[0205] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0206] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0207] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices / electronic devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / electronic device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0208] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0209] In the foregoing, specific details such as particular system architectures and techniques have been set forth for illustrative purposes and not for limitation, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of this application. However, those skilled in the art will understand that this application can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, apparatuses, circuits, and methods have been omitted to avoid unnecessary detail from obscuring the description of this application.

[0210] It should be understood that, when used in this application specification and the appended claims, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or a collection thereof.

[0211] It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used in this application specification and the appended claims means any combination of one or more of the associated listed items and all possible combinations, and includes such combinations.

[0212] As used in this application specification and the appended claims, the term "if" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as "when," "once," "in response to determination," or "in response to detection." Similarly, the phrase "if determined" or "if detected [the described condition or event]" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as meaning "once determined," "in response to determination," "once detected [the described condition or event]," or "in response to detection [the described condition or event]."

[0213] Furthermore, in the description of this application and the appended claims, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0214] References to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" as described in this specification mean that one or more embodiments of this application include a specific feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment. Therefore, the phrases "in one embodiment," "in some embodiments," "in other embodiments," "in still other embodiments," etc., appearing in different parts of this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but rather mean "one or more, but not all, embodiments," unless otherwise specifically emphasized. The terms "comprising," "including," "having," and variations thereof mean "including but not limited to," unless otherwise specifically emphasized.

[0215] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and should all be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. An operation authority control method characterized by comprising: The method includes: Establish a restricted permission domain session, wherein the restricted permission domain session corresponds to a permission domain identifier; While the restricted permission domain session is maintained, an access request initiated by a first application within the restricted permission domain session is received. The access request includes a target operation to be performed, and the target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources. Based on the permission domain identifier, the original permission domain identifier is written into the access request, and the access request is forwarded to the target component that performs the target operation; the original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is the restricted permission domain session; Based on the original permission domain identifier, the pre-policy execution point of the target component compares the original permission range of the access request with the permission range of the corresponding component of the target component. If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component, then the target component is allowed to execute the target operation according to the access request; If the original permission range is smaller than the component permission range corresponding to the target component, then the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the target operation. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step of comparing the original permission range of the access request with the component permission range corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier through the pre-policy execution point of the target component includes: Identify the target component that performs the target operation, and the execution point of the preceding policy for the target component; The pre-policy execution point of the target component determines the original permission range of the access request based on the original permission domain identifier; Compare the original permission range with the component permission range corresponding to the target component.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The access request is forwarded to the target component via multiple intermediate components, each of which is used to perform a pre-processing step of the target operation. During the access request forwarding process, the original permission domain identifier remains unchanged; The method further includes: When the access request is forwarded to the i-th intermediate component among the plurality of intermediate components, the pre-policy execution point of the i-th intermediate component compares the original permission range with the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component based on the original permission domain identifier; i is a positive integer; If the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, then the i-th intermediate component is allowed to execute the i-th preprocessing step of the target operation according to the access request; When the i-th intermediate component has completed the i-th preprocessing step, the access request is forwarded to the (i+1)-th intermediate component among the plurality of intermediate components; Forwarding the access request to the target component that performs the target operation includes: Once all intermediate components have completed the pre-processing steps for the target operation, the access request is forwarded to the target component that performed the target operation.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The method further includes: If the original permission range is less than the component permission range corresponding to the i-th intermediate component, then the corresponding control policy is output according to the type of the i-th preprocessing step. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication. If the i-th preprocessing step fails, the step of forwarding the access request to the target component that performs the target operation and subsequent steps are cancelled.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The restricted access domain session is established based on restricted authentication credentials; If the original permission range is smaller than the component permission range corresponding to the target component, then a corresponding control strategy is output according to the type of the target operation, including: If the type of the target operation is a sensitive operation, the control policy is determined to be the requirement for master credential authentication; the requirement for master credential authentication means verifying the master authentication credential, and if the master authentication credential is obtained, allowing the target component to execute the target operation according to the access request, wherein the permissions of the master authentication credential are higher than the permissions of the restricted authentication credential. The method further includes: Issue a master voucher verification prompt message; If the primary authentication credential is not received, the target component is denied the right to perform the target operation based on the access request.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, The method further includes: Upon receiving the primary authentication credential, a temporary elevation authorization is generated. The temporary elevation authorization is used at least to establish a binding relationship between the target operation, the target component, and the target resources that the target component needs to invoke when executing the target operation. The temporary elevation authorization has a corresponding authorization validity period. The temporary authorization identifier corresponding to the temporary elevated authorization is written into the access request; The pre-policy execution point of the target component verifies the binding relationship between the temporary authorization identifier, the original permission domain identifier, and the temporary elevated authorization in the access request, and obtains the temporary authorization verification result. When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, the target component is allowed to execute the target operation based on the temporary enhanced authorization; If the temporary authorization verification result is that the verification fails, the target component is refused to perform the target operation according to the access request.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein, When the temporary authorization verification result is successful, allowing the target component to execute the target operation based on the temporary enhanced authorization further includes: During the execution of the target operation or within the validity period of the temporary enhanced authorization, a second access request is received from a second application within the restricted permission domain session. The second access request is used to request the invocation of the target component to execute the second target operation. The target component's pre-policy execution point verifies whether the temporary authorization identifier is carried in the second access request; If the temporary authorization identifier is not carried in the second access request, the pre-policy execution point of the target component determines and outputs the control policy corresponding to the second access request based on the original permission domain identifier in the second access request, so as to prevent the target component from using the temporary elevated authorization to perform other operations besides the target operation.

8. The method of claim 6, wherein, The method further includes: The temporary elevated authorization is invalidated if the authorization termination conditions are met; the authorization termination conditions include at least one of the following: the target operation is completed, the validity period of the temporary elevated authorization expires, or the first application exits operation; Clean up the binding relationships established by the temporary upgrade authorization; If the binding relationship cleanup fails, the temporary elevated authorization remains invalid, and subsequent access requests corresponding to sensitive operations that rely on the temporary elevated authorization are rejected by default until the cleanup is complete.

9. An operation authority control device characterized by comprising: The device includes: The session management module is used to establish restricted permission domain sessions, each of which has a corresponding permission domain identifier. The policy enforcement module is configured to receive an access request initiated by a first application within the restricted permission domain session, provided that the restricted permission domain session is maintained. The access request includes a target operation to be performed, and the target operation includes at least one of cross-application call operation or access to protected resources. The policy execution module is further configured to write an original permission domain identifier into the access request based on the permission domain identifier, and forward the access request to the target component that performs the target operation; the original permission domain identifier is used to indicate that the source of the access request is the restricted permission domain session; The policy execution module is further configured to compare the original permission range of the access request with the component permission range corresponding to the target component based on the original permission domain identifier through the pre-policy execution point of the target component; The policy execution module is further configured to allow the target component to execute the target operation according to the access request if the original permission range is greater than or equal to the component permission range corresponding to the target component; The policy execution module is further configured to output a corresponding control policy based on the type of the target operation if the original permission range is smaller than the component permission range corresponding to the target component. The control policy includes at least one of the following: denial, read-only, de-identification, downgrade processing, and requiring master credential authentication.

10. An operating rights control system, characterized by The operation permission control system includes the operation permission control device as described in claim 9.