A Dynamic Security Domain Reconstruction Method and System for Distribution Systems Based on Disaster Chain Fault Attribution

By constructing a disaster chain fault attribution chain and a comprehensive disaster-induced risk analysis of equipment, time-varying operating constraint parameters are generated, power supply modes are screened, and safety domain reconstruction is carried out. This solves the problem of characterizing the safe operating range of the power distribution system under the influence of disasters and realizes power supply recovery analysis under disaster conditions.

CN123121561APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17CHANGSHA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611631956.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-10-21
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing power distribution systems struggle to continuously express the relationship between disaster propagation, equipment risks, changes in transmission capacity, and safe operating range under the influence of disaster propagation. This makes it difficult to fully incorporate the impact of disasters into the calculation of power supply modes and safety domains, and it is also difficult to uniformly express the safe operating range of different power supply modes.

Method used

By constructing a fault attribution chain for primary and secondary disasters, calculating the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of equipment, generating a time-varying set of operating constraint parameters, screening alternative power supply modes, and constructing a safe and feasible subdomain through power distribution flow verification, a union operation is performed to form an overall dynamic safety domain, and the dynamic safety boundary is updated as the disaster evolves.

Benefits of technology

It achieves a unified representation of equipment risk and power supply mode under disaster conditions, ensures the continuity and flexibility of safe operation range, and provides a basis for power supply recovery analysis under the impact of disasters.

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Abstract

This application discloses a method and system for reconstructing the dynamic safety domain of a power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution. The method includes: constructing a fault attribution chain constrained by the physical mechanism of the disaster, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial reachability based on multi-source information; recursively deriving the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of equipment; determining the equipment operating status based on the risk and generating a time-varying set of operating constraint parameters; generating and screening alternative power supply modes; constructing a safe and feasible subdomain and searching for boundary points by combining operating constraints and power flow verification; forming the overall dynamic safety domain through the union operation of non-empty subdomains; updating the dynamic safety boundary and determining the boundary change characteristics. Because this invention associates different power supply modes through the transformation of disaster risk into equipment operating constraints, it can reflect changes in the safe operating range caused by disaster evolution, providing a basis for adjusting operating modes and restoring power supply.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of power distribution system safety analysis technology, and in particular to a method and system for dynamic safety domain reconstruction of power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution. Background Technology

[0002] The power distribution system is responsible for distributing electrical energy and supplying power to users. With the integration of distributed power sources, energy storage, and flexible loads, the node power and power supply methods of the power distribution system exhibit significant variability. It is necessary to coordinate power output, load supply, and network reconfiguration while meeting requirements such as equipment transmission capacity, node voltage, and power balance. In disaster scenarios such as rainstorms, wildfires, ice accumulation, landslides, and mudslides, these disasters may directly impact equipment or induce secondary disasters affecting line corridors and power supply paths, causing equipment performance degradation, component outages, and limited load transfer. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the range within which the power distribution system can maintain safe operation under different power supply methods, considering both disaster evolution and changes in equipment status.

[0003] Current power distribution system safety operation analysis typically involves performing power flow calculations based on operational measurements, network topology, and equipment parameters. This checks node voltages, branch power flows, power balance, and equipment operating limits to determine whether a given operating point meets safety requirements. Safety domain analysis further organizes operating points that meet relevant constraints into feasible regions, describing the permissible load and power output variations through safety boundaries. In fault recovery or load transfer scenarios, different power supply paths can be created by adjusting the states of sectionalizing switches and tie switches, and the corresponding operating modes can be verified. Some analysis methods also consider equipment capacity changes caused by disasters to adjust operational constraints and safety boundaries.

[0004] However, in scenarios where primary disasters trigger secondary disasters and further affect equipment, relying solely on current electrical measurements or changes in the limits of a single device is insufficient to continuously express the relationship between disaster propagation, equipment risk, changes in transmission capacity, and the safe operating range. If equipment risk is not further translated into component availability, permissible equipment transmission capacity, switching operation conditions, and load transfer capacity, the impact of the disaster cannot be fully incorporated into the calculation of the power supply mode and safety domain. Furthermore, the safety domain obtained for a single topology cannot uniformly express the operating range supported by different alternative power supply modes, thus failing to reflect the overall safety boundary changes caused by disaster evolution. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The main purpose of this application is to provide a dynamic safety domain reconstruction method and system for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution, aiming to solve the technical problems of insufficient correlation between disaster propagation impact and power distribution system operation constraints in the existing technology, and the difficulty in uniformly representing the changes in the safe operating range under different power supply modes as disasters evolve.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides a dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution, the method comprising the following steps: Obtain information on multi-source disasters and equipment operation, and construct a primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial accessibility. The primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain includes inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes, and fault result nodes. Based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment results of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain, the risk status of the recursive nodes is deduced, and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment is calculated. Based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, the normal operation, derated operation, or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers is determined, and a time-varying operation constraint parameter set is generated. The time-varying operation constraint parameter set includes the set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable status of the switches, and the load transfer capacity. Based on the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, alternative power supply modes are generated and screened; Based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operation constraint parameter set, establish operation boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints, and construct a safe and feasible subdomain by combining power distribution flow verification and search for boundary points; Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic safe domain. Extract and update the dynamic safe boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

[0007] Optionally, the step of acquiring multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and constructing a primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial reachability, includes: The system acquires multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, performs time-series alignment based on a unified time window, and spatially correlates the information based on equipment location, line corridor, and disaster impact range to obtain a unified observation vector. The multi-source disaster and equipment operation information includes environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and operation measurement information. Based on the disaster intensity, impact range, and equipment abnormal status changes reflected by the unified observation vector, the disaster evolution stages are divided, and corresponding inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes, and fault result nodes are established. Based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the propagation correlation between each node is determined, and the directed correlation edges are determined based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability. Each node and the directed correlation edges are combined into the primary secondary disaster failure attribution chain.

[0008] Optionally, the step of calculating the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation determination result of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain to deduce the risk status of the recursive nodes includes: Based on historical disaster records and simulation samples, the number of samples activated by the predecessor node and the number of samples activated by the successor node after the predecessor node is activated are counted in the attribution chain of the primary and secondary disaster failures, the conditional transition probability is estimated, and the basic risk of each node is obtained. The spatiotemporal propagation determination result is determined based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability. Based on the spatiotemporal propagation determination result, the propagation risk of non-propagable associated edges is set to zero, and the propagation risk of propagable associated edges is set to the product of the conditional transition probability and the risk state of the predecessor node. The basic risk of each node and the propagation risk from each predecessor node are respectively taken as complementary probabilities. The product of all the complementary probabilities is then multiplied and the complement value is taken to recursively obtain the node risk state. Based on the severity of the fault, the importance of the equipment, and the correlation with historical faults, the influence weight of each fault result node associated with the equipment is determined, and the influence weight is normalized. Based on the normalized impact weights, the node risk status of the corresponding fault result node is weighted and summed to obtain the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment.

[0009] Optionally, the step of determining the normal operation, derating operation, or shutdown status of the line and transformer based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, and generating a time-varying set of operating constraint parameters, includes: Risk ranges are determined based on equipment type and disaster type, and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment is mapped to the normal operation, derated operation or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers based on the risk ranges. The allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the normal operating state is maintained at the normal operating value, the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the derated operating state is set as the product of the normal operating value and the capacity maintenance coefficient, and the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the exit from the operating state is set to zero, thus obtaining the time-varying allowable conveying capacity of the equipment. The capacity maintenance coefficient is calibrated according to the equipment type, disaster type and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment and is greater than zero and less than one. Lines and transformers that have been taken out of service are classified into the unavailable component set, and the switch operability status is determined based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the switchgear. Based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, the set of unavailable components and the switch operability status, the available power supply path is determined. The power flow is checked according to the available power supply path and the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment. The maximum transferable load that meets the requirements of node power balance, node voltage and equipment transmission capacity is taken as the load transfer capacity. The set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transport capacity of the equipment, the operable state of the switch, and the load transfer capacity are combined to form a set of time-varying operating constraint parameters.

[0010] Optionally, the step of generating and filtering alternative power supply modes based on the time-varying operating constraint parameter set includes: Based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, the distribution network topology and switch status are obtained, and based on the switch operability status, the segment switches and tie switches participating in power supply reconfiguration are determined, and switch status combinations are generated. Based on the set of unavailable components, each of the switch state combinations is checked for device availability, network connectivity, and radiation, and the switch state combinations containing unavailable components, passive islands, or closed-loop power supply structures are eliminated. Verify the power supply path between the critical load and the available power source for the retained switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations in which the critical load and the available power source are connected; Calculate the required load transfer for each of the aforementioned switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations whose required load transfer for the power supply area does not exceed the corresponding load transfer capacity to obtain alternative power supply modes.

[0011] Optionally, the step of establishing operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints, and disaster corridor constraints based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, and constructing a safe and feasible subdomain and searching for boundary points in conjunction with power flow verification, includes: The nodes and power supply paths participating in the power supply are determined according to the alternative power supply modes described above, and a node injection vector is formed based on a unified network node index and the injected power of each node. Operating boundary constraints are established based on the upper and lower limits of the injected power of load nodes and distributed power nodes, and normal operating condition constraints are established based on the allowable transmission capacity of lines and transformers under normal operating conditions. Based on the set of unavailable components, the effective network connection relationship is defined, and the transmission power of the lines and transformers is defined based on the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, thus forming a disaster corridor constraint; Based on the node injection vector, power flow calculation is performed, and feasible operating points that simultaneously satisfy the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, node power balance, and node voltage requirements are formed into a safe and feasible subdomain. Perform a directional search on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and output the safe and feasible subdomains and boundary points.

[0012] Optionally, the step of performing a directional search on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains and outputting the safe and feasible subdomains and boundary points includes: In each of the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, an internal feasible running point is selected as the reference running point, and a set of unit search directions is set in the node injection space. The node injection vector is gradually changed along each unit search direction from the reference operating point to obtain candidate operating points. Power flow calculation and verification of the operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints are performed on the candidate operating points. Based on the location where the candidate operating point first fails to meet the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, and the node voltage or node power balance requirements, the endpoints of the continuous feasible interval starting from the reference operating point are determined to obtain the candidate boundary point; When the change of the candidate boundary point corresponding to the adjacent unit search direction exceeds the preset error, add a unit search direction in the corresponding direction interval and repeat the search to update the candidate boundary point; The candidate boundary points corresponding to the search directions of each unit are determined as boundary points, and the safe and feasible subdomain and the boundary points are output.

[0013] Optionally, the step of performing a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains to form a global dynamic safety domain, extracting and updating the dynamic safety boundary as the disaster evolves, and determining the boundary change characteristics includes: Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and update the overall dynamic safe domain as the disaster evolves; The boundary points of each of the aforementioned safe and feasible subdomains are used as candidate points. Candidate points located inside the overall dynamic safety domain are eliminated to extract the dynamic safety boundary. The operating point before the disaster is selected as the reference operating point, and the unit search direction is set to be consistent across the disaster stage. When the reference operating point belongs to the overall dynamic safety domain, the distance from the reference operating point to the first time the dynamic safety boundary is reached is calculated by continuously maintaining the position within the overall dynamic safety domain along each unit search direction. The directional safety margin is obtained. When the reference operating point does not belong to the overall dynamic safety domain, the directional safety margin is recorded as zero. When the directional safety margin before the disaster is positive, the degree of boundary contraction is obtained by subtracting the ratio of the current disaster stage to the directional safety margin before the disaster. The boundary migration amount is determined based on the difference between the directional safety margin of the current disaster stage and the previous disaster stage. The overall dynamic safety domain, the dynamic safety boundary, and the boundary change characteristics are output, including the boundary contraction degree and the boundary migration amount.

[0014] Furthermore, to achieve the above objectives, this application also proposes a dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution, which applies the chain-of-fault attribution-based dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for distribution systems described above. The chain-of-fault attribution-based dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for distribution systems includes: The attribution chain construction module is used to obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and construct the primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the time sequence of events and spatial reachability. The primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain includes inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes and failure result nodes. The risk calculation module is used to calculate the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment by inferring the risk status of the recursive nodes based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment results of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain. The constraint generation module is used to determine the normal operation, derated operation, or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, and to generate a time-varying set of operation constraint parameters. The time-varying set of operation constraint parameters includes a set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable status of the switches, and the load transfer capacity. The mode filtering module is used to generate and filter candidate power supply modes based on the time-varying operation constraint parameter set; The subdomain solution module is used to establish operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints, and disaster corridor constraints based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, and to construct a safe and feasible subdomain and search for boundary points in conjunction with power distribution flow verification. The security domain reconstruction module is used to perform a union operation on the non-empty secure feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic security domain, extract and update the dynamic security boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

[0015] Furthermore, to achieve the above objectives, this application also proposes a dynamic security domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on chain fault attribution. The device includes: a memory, a processor, and a dynamic security domain reconfiguration program for a power distribution system based on chain fault attribution stored in the memory. The processor is used to run the dynamic security domain reconfiguration program for a power distribution system based on chain fault attribution, and the configuration is to implement the steps of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for a power distribution system based on chain fault attribution as described above.

[0016] This application constructs a fault attribution chain by jointly constraining the physical mechanism of disasters, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial accessibility, ensuring that the correlation between environmental disturbances and equipment failures has clear propagation conditions, reducing the interference of temporally or spatially incompatible events on risk transmission; it determines the risk of recursive nodes through conditional transition probabilities and spatiotemporal propagation, transforming dispersed disaster effects into comprehensive disaster-induced risks for equipment, providing a unified input for adjusting equipment operating status; by distinguishing between normal operation, derated operation, and out-of-operation, it reflects equipment performance degradation and complete failure as tightening of transmission capacity and changes in network availability, respectively, ensuring that disaster impacts are reflected in constraint parameters that can participate in electrical calculations; and it further utilizes alternative power supply modes and operational constraints and humidity levels under each mode for selection. The flow verification combines topological feasibility, equipment transmission capacity, and electrical operation feasibility into the safe and feasible subdomain, reducing judgment bias caused by only considering network connectivity and ignoring operational limits. Through the union operation and boundary update of the non-empty safe and feasible subdomain, the operating points that can be covered by different power supply modes are uniformly expressed, and the changes in the safe range caused by changes in the disaster stage are reflected. Therefore, this invention connects disaster propagation analysis and operation constraint generation with the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of equipment, and then connects power supply mode screening, subdomain solution, and overall safety domain reconstruction with the same set of time-varying constraints. This allows the disaster impact to be transmitted to the safety boundary along the calculation process, providing a basis for comparing the operational feasibility range of different disaster stages and conducting operation mode adjustment and power supply restoration analysis. Attached Figure Description

[0017] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the first embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating the changes in equipment status and the contraction of dynamic safety boundaries under the influence of disasters; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the second embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the third embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. Figure 5This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution, as described in an embodiment of this application. Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the equipment structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the dynamic security domain reconstruction method of the power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution in the embodiments of this application.

[0020] The purpose, features, and advantages of this application will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0021] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of this application and are not intended to limit this application.

[0022] To better understand the technical solution of this application, a detailed description will be provided below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0023] Based on this, the first embodiment of this application provides a method for dynamic security domain reconfiguration of a power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution, referring to... Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the first embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconstruction method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application.

[0024] This embodiment is applicable to the analysis of the safe operating range of power distribution systems under disaster conditions. For example, in cases where heavy rain induces landslides or mudslides, fallen trees affect line corridors, or icing affects equipment operating capacity, the allowable node power range and its variations under different power supply paths are analyzed by combining equipment status and operating measurements.

[0025] This embodiment uses a power distribution system safety operation analysis server as the execution entity. The server receives environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and operational measurement information, and performs calculations using equipment parameters, network topology, and power supply relationships corresponding to the actual power distribution system. The environmental and equipment monitoring side provides observation data, and the server completes fault attribution, risk calculation, operational constraint generation, and security domain reconstruction, outputting results for use in operational mode adjustment and power supply restoration analysis.

[0026] In this embodiment, the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconstruction method based on disaster chain fault attribution includes: Step S10: Obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and construct the primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the time sequence of events, and the spatial reachability relationship.

[0027] It should be noted that the primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain is a directed propagation association that connects the disaster induction, disaster propagation, equipment response, and failure formation process, including inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes, and failure result nodes.

[0028] Triggering factor nodes are nodes that characterize the initiating factors of a disaster; propagation stage nodes are nodes that characterize the development of a disaster and its secondary effects; equipment response nodes are nodes that characterize the changes in the state of equipment after being affected by a disaster; and failure result nodes are nodes that characterize the result of equipment failure or functional impairment.

[0029] In the specific implementation, the server reads disaster observations, equipment alarms, and operational measurements. Based on the event content, it identifies the corresponding triggering factors, propagation process, equipment response, and fault results, and associates the event time, location, and equipment identifier. Then, it analyzes whether there is a physical propagation basis, a sequential relationship, and spatial arrival conditions between two events, and connects events that meet the conditions into a directed propagation association.

[0030] Step S20: Based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment result of the primary secondary disaster fault attribution chain, calculate the risk status of the recursive nodes and calculate the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment.

[0031] It should be noted that conditional transition probability refers to a probabilistic parameter for the occurrence of a subsequent event given that a preceding event has occurred; spatiotemporal propagation determination result refers to the determination information of whether the corresponding propagation association in the current stage meets the temporal and spatial propagation conditions; node risk status refers to the computational amount used to represent the risk of the event corresponding to the node; and comprehensive disaster-caused risk of equipment refers to the equipment-level risk index formed after summarizing the risks of equipment-related failure results.

[0032] Understandably, conditional transition probability is used to describe the strength of propagation associations, while spatiotemporal propagation determination is used to limit whether the association is effective at the current stage. The two work together to avoid continuing to transmit risks when the current conditions for propagation are not met simply because there was a propagation relationship in the past. Aggregating node risks to devices can provide corresponding inputs for subsequent updates to device status and capabilities.

[0033] In the specific implementation, the propagation impact of the risk calculation of the predecessor node is passed to the successor node. The propagation impact of currently non-propagable associations is not included. Then, the risk of the successor node is updated according to the disaster stage and the direction of association. When the risk calculation reaches the fault result node, the corresponding relationship between the fault result and equipment such as lines, transformers, and switches is summarized to form the equipment identification and comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment in the calculation stage.

[0034] Step S30: Determine the normal operation, derated operation, or shutdown status of the line and transformer based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment, and generate a time-varying operation constraint parameter set.

[0035] It should be noted that normal operation means that the equipment is still included in the calculation according to its normal operating capacity; derated operation means that the equipment is still usable, but its allowable transport capacity is lower than the normal operating value; and out of operation means that the equipment is no longer included in the calculation as an available transport element. The time-varying operation constraint parameter set refers to the combination of the set of unavailable elements updated with the disaster stage, the time-varying allowable transport capacity of the equipment, the switch operability status, and the load transfer capacity.

[0036] Understandably, converting continuous risk information into equipment availability and operational capacity constraints allows risk calculation results to be directly incorporated into electrical operation analysis. Distinguishing between derating operation and decommissioning also allows for the separate expression of equipment capacity tightening and changes in power supply connections, avoiding the lumping of these two different impacts into a single complete failure.

[0037] In practice, the server determines whether the lines and transformers are in normal operation, derated operation, or out of operation based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment and the disaster response relationship of the corresponding equipment. It determines the current allowable transmission capacity for equipment that can still operate, and marks out-of-operation equipment as unavailable. It also determines the switching operation conditions and load transfer capacity by combining the switching risk and available power supply paths, and finally combines the operating constraint parameters according to the same disaster stage.

[0038] Step S40: Generate and filter alternative power supply modes based on the time-varying operation constraint parameter set.

[0039] It should be noted that the alternative power supply mode refers to the optional power supply scheme determined by the network connection status, switch status, and load power supply path; the same load node can obtain power through different paths under different power supply modes.

[0040] Understandably, disasters not only alter the equipment's permissible power transmission capacity but may also cause existing power supply paths to fail. This embodiment generates and filters power supply modes based on current operational constraints, enabling subsequent security domain calculations to cover power supply connections that are currently feasible and reducing redundant calculations for obviously unavailable modes.

[0041] In the specific implementation, the server generates optional connection states based on the distribution network topology, current switch status, and switch operation conditions. It uses unavailable components, equipment capabilities, and load transfer conditions to check the corresponding power supply paths, eliminates combinations that cannot meet the current power supply requirements, and establishes mode identifiers, valid network connection relationships, and load power supply path records for the retained combinations.

[0042] Step S50: Based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operation constraint parameter set, establish operation boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints, and construct a safe and feasible subdomain by combining power distribution flow verification and search for boundary points.

[0043] It should be noted that operational boundary constraints refer to constraints that limit the allowable range of node load and power output; normal operating condition constraints refer to constraints established based on the normal allowable transmission capacity of equipment; disaster corridor constraints refer to network connection and transmission capacity constraints established based on the unavailability of components and changes in equipment capacity caused by disasters. A safe and feasible subdomain refers to the set of operating points that simultaneously meet relevant operational constraints and power flow requirements under an alternative power supply mode.

[0044] The three types of constraints respectively limit the node's operating range, equipment basic capacity, and post-disaster availability. Power flow verification further checks whether power distribution and node voltage are met. Using these conditions together for operating point determination allows the safe and feasible subdomain to simultaneously reflect the power supply path, equipment capacity, and electrical operation requirements.

[0045] In the specific implementation, an effective network connection relationship is established for each alternative power supply mode. The node load and power output are combined into operating points. The corresponding operating boundary, normal capacity and disaster condition parameters are read. Power flow calculation is performed and node power balance, node voltage and equipment transmission capacity are checked. The operating points that meet all conditions are assigned to the corresponding subdomains. Boundary points are obtained by changing the operating points, repeating the verification and locating the transition position between feasible and infeasible states. At the same time, the mode identifier and the constraint information that plays a limiting role at the boundary are retained.

[0046] Step S60: Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic safe domain, extract and update the dynamic safe boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

[0047] It should be noted that the overall dynamic security domain refers to the union of all non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, representing the range of operating points that can be supported by at least one alternative power supply mode; the dynamic security boundary refers to the boundary of the overall dynamic security domain; and the boundary change characteristics refer to the characterization results of the changes in the position and shape of the security boundary between different disaster stages.

[0048] Subdomains of different power supply modes may overlap or complement each other. Union operations can uniformly express the feasible range provided by these modes. Updating equipment constraints and subdomains as disasters evolve enables the overall boundary to reflect changes in equipment capacity and network availability, rather than being limited to a fixed topology.

[0049] In the specific implementation, the server excludes empty subdomains, performs a union operation on the retained subdomains, compares the internal and external relationships of the boundary points of each subdomain with the overall set, and extracts the overall dynamic safety boundary. When new disaster and equipment information arrives, the corresponding risks, equipment status, operating constraints and affected power supply modes are updated, the corresponding subdomains and overall boundaries are recalculated, and the boundary positions and feasible ranges at different stages are compared under a consistent operating point coordinate system to form the boundary change results.

[0050] In one example, refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 This diagram illustrates the changes in equipment status and the contraction of the dynamic safety boundary under the influence of disasters. Fallen trees along the route, substation overload operation, and wind turbine blade icing are typical scenarios representing changes in equipment capacity, corresponding to a decrease in the transmission capacity of distribution lines, the power conversion capacity of substations, and the output capacity of distributed power sources. The three branches in the diagram represent the impact relationships under different scenarios, and these scenarios do not necessarily occur simultaneously. Changes in equipment capacity are further manifested as a tightening of equipment transmission capacity constraints and power output range, and may cause a local reduction in the overall dynamic safety domain. Figure 2 The dashed outline at the bottom represents the dynamic safety boundary before the change, while the solid outline represents the dynamic safety boundary after the change. The arrows indicate the direction in which the boundary contracts inward into the safety domain. The outlines are only used to illustrate the changing relationship of the safe operating range and do not limit the actual dimensions, shape, or reduction ratio of the safety domain.

[0051] The impact of reduced equipment capacity on the safe operating range is transmitted through operating constraints. When the permissible transmission capacity of a line or transformer decreases, or the available output range of distributed power sources shrinks, some node injection power combinations that previously met the operating requirements may no longer meet the updated constraints, thus exiting the corresponding safe and feasible subdomain. When these operating points can no longer be supported by other alternative power supply modes, the overall dynamic safety domain shrinks in the corresponding region. Figure 2 This indicates a localized contraction scenario, but the actual boundary changes also depend on the availability of power supply paths, load transfer capabilities, and the feasibility of other alternative power supply modes.

[0052] The server determines the operating status of lines and transformers based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of equipment at the current disaster stage, updates the allowable transmission capacity of equipment and the set of unavailable components, and establishes corresponding operating constraints in conjunction with the available output range of distributed power sources. For example, for lines affected by fallen trees along the route but still able to operate at reduced capacity, the reduced allowable transmission capacity is used to verify the line's transmission power; for lines that have already been taken out of operation, they are removed from the effective network connections of alternative power supply modes; for wind turbines whose output capacity is reduced due to blade icing, the change in available output range is reflected in the operating boundary constraints of the corresponding distributed power source nodes. After updating the constraints, the safe and feasible subdomains and the overall dynamic safety domain corresponding to each alternative power supply mode are recalculated, and the dynamic safety boundaries before and after the changes are compared under a consistent node coordinate system to obtain... Figure 2 The schematic diagram shows the result of the boundary change.

[0053] Based on the first embodiment described above, in the second embodiment of this application, the same or similar content as the first embodiment can be referred to the above description, and will not be repeated hereafter.

[0054] Based on this, please refer to Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the second embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. In this embodiment, step S10 further includes: Step S101: Obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, perform time-series alignment based on a unified time window, and spatially correlate based on equipment location, line corridor and disaster impact range to obtain a unified observation vector.

[0055] It should be noted that the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information includes environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and operational measurement information.

[0056] In practical implementation, environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and power distribution system operation measurement information are acquired, time-series aligned according to a unified time window, and spatially correlated based on equipment location, line corridor, and disaster impact range to form a time-series data set. Unified observation vector : in, , and These represent environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and operational measurement information, respectively. Based on changes in disaster intensity, impact range, and abnormal equipment status, the disaster process is divided into the induction, propagation, equipment response, and failure formation stages.

[0057] Step S102: Based on the disaster intensity, impact range and equipment abnormal state changes reflected by the unified observation vector, divide the disaster evolution stage and establish corresponding inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes and fault result nodes.

[0058] In the specific implementation, the changes in disaster intensity, impact range and equipment status are identified based on the unified observation vector, the corresponding disaster stages are divided, and inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes and fault result nodes are established. The nodes are associated with the corresponding observations, time and equipment records. For the scenario of rainstorm-induced debris flow, the effects of rainstorm, debris flow development, abnormal equipment response and fault result are expressed respectively, so that information at different stages can be transmitted along the subsequent propagation relationship.

[0059] Step S103: Determine the propagation association between each node based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, determine the directed association edges based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability, and combine each node with the directed association edges to form the primary secondary disaster fault attribution chain.

[0060] First, identify potentially related nodes based on the physical mechanism of the disaster. Then, verify the relationship between the event time sequence, the scope of the disaster's impact, and the location of the equipment. Establish directed association edges for nodes that meet the conditions, and organize the set of nodes and the set of directed association edges into a fault attribution chain. For example, if the scope of the disaster's impact does not reach the target route corridor, do not directly establish an effective propagation association simply because there are similar disaster records nearby.

[0061] Fault Attribution Chain Represented as: In the formula, This represents the set of nodes consisting of inducing factors, propagation processes, equipment responses, and failure outcomes. This represents the set of directed edges connecting nodes. The direction of the edges is determined by the physical mechanism of the disaster, the order of events, and spatial reachability. Each node in the fault attribution chain is represented by two states: active and inactive. A node is in the state of 1 when it is active and inactive when it is inactive.

[0062] Based on the above embodiments, please refer to Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the third embodiment of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. In this third embodiment, step S20 further includes: Step S201: Based on historical disaster records and simulation samples, count the number of samples activated by the predecessor node and the number of samples activated by the successor node after the predecessor node is activated in the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain, estimate the conditional transition probability, and obtain the basic risk of each node.

[0063] It should be noted that node activation refers to the occurrence of an event or state corresponding to a node in the sample; basic risk refers to a node-based basic item set separately in the risk recursion relationship. By counting the corresponding samples activated by predecessor nodes and the subsequent activated samples after the predecessor activation, the propagation parameters are made data-driven; smoothing can reduce the impact of directly taking zero or one in the finite-time frequency estimation of samples.

[0064] Historical disaster records and simulation samples are used to estimate the conditional transition probabilities of identified associated edges: In the formula, Represents a node The number of activated samples Represents a node Node after activation The number of activated samples Indicates the smoothing coefficient; This represents the estimated value of the conditional transition probability.

[0065] Step S202: Determine the spatiotemporal propagation judgment result based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability. Based on the spatiotemporal propagation judgment result, set the propagation risk of non-propagable associated edges to zero, and set the propagation risk of propagable associated edges to the product of the conditional transition probability and the risk state of the predecessor node.

[0066] The server determines whether each associated edge simultaneously satisfies the event time sequence and spatial reachability conditions based on event time records, disaster impact range, and device spatial location. For associated edges that do not meet the conditions, the current propagation risk is set to zero. For associated edges that meet the conditions, the conditional transition probability is multiplied by the risk of the predecessor node to form a risk calculation term for the incoming successor node. The associated edge propagation risk calculation term is: in, This represents the spatiotemporal propagation determination value, which is 1 if the propagation condition is met, and 0 otherwise. This represents the risk state of the predecessor node at time t, and its value is in the range [0,1].

[0067] Step S203: Take complementary probabilities for the basic risk of each node and the propagation risk from each predecessor node, take the complement value of the product of all complementary probabilities, and recursively obtain the node risk state.

[0068] It should be noted that complementary probability refers to a computational quantity that corresponds to the probability of a risk event not occurring. In this embodiment, under the condition that the effects of precursor factors are approximately independent, the product of complementary probabilities is used to organize the basic risk and each propagation input.

[0069] For nodes where the effects of each precursor factor are approximately independent Its risk status is recursively calculated using the following formula: In the formula, Represents a node Risk status in the next disaster phase; Represents a node The set of predecessor nodes; Represents a node With nodes The result of the spatiotemporal propagation determination between events is set to 1 if the event time sequence and spatial reachability conditions are met, and 0 otherwise; Represents a node The fundamental risk. For precursor factors with significant correlation, risk is recursively calculated using the corresponding joint conditional transition probabilities.

[0070] Step S204: Determine the influence weight of each fault result node associated with each device based on the fault consequence level, equipment importance, and historical fault correlation degree, and normalize the influence weight.

[0071] The server establishes a fault result set based on the correlation between devices and fault results. It reads the fault consequence level, device importance, and historical fault association information, determines the initial impact weight according to the corresponding calibration rules, and then normalizes it using the sum of the positive values ​​of all initial weights for the same device. The results are then stored together with the device and fault result identifiers. The normalized weights satisfy the following: In the formula, Indicates a device or network node; Indicates the fault result node; Indicates and The associated set of non-empty fault results; This indicates the corresponding right to influence.

[0072] Step S205: Based on the normalized impact weights, the node risk status of the corresponding fault result node is weighted and summed to obtain the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment.

[0073] For devices or network nodes Calculate the overall disaster risk of the equipment based on the associated failure results: In the formula, This indicates the overall disaster risk of device or network node e; Indicates the fault result node The risk status is calculated as a dimensionless quantity, located in the range [0,1] when the risk input and weights meet the aforementioned conditions. This result is a weighted risk index and is not directly equivalent to the joint probability of any associated failure occurring.

[0074] Furthermore, after obtaining the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment, the method further includes the following steps: Step S2051: Along the primary secondary disaster fault attribution chain, determine the fault path from the inducing factor node through the propagation stage node and the equipment response node to the fault result node. Multiply the node risk status of the starting inducing factor node of each fault path with the spatiotemporal propagation judgment result and the conditional transition probability of each directed associated edge in the corresponding fault path to obtain the probability of occurrence of each fault path. Step S2052: For all the fault paths pointing to the same fault result node, if the sum of the occurrence probabilities is greater than zero, the ratio of the occurrence probability of each fault path to the sum is determined as the path contribution. The fault paths are selected in descending order of the path contribution until the cumulative path contribution reaches a preset ratio. The selected fault paths are then determined as the main fault paths. Step S2053: Based on the rated capacity, topological location, critical load power supply ratio and fault consequence level of each device in the line corridor, determine the corridor impact weight corresponding to each device, and normalize the corridor impact weights in the same line corridor. Based on the normalized corridor impact weights, perform a weighted summation of the comprehensive disaster risk of the corresponding devices to obtain the comprehensive risk of the line corridor. Step S2054: Identify the equipment whose comprehensive disaster risk is not less than the preset equipment risk threshold as vulnerable nodes, and identify the line corridor whose comprehensive risk is not less than the preset corridor risk threshold as critical corridor segments.

[0075] It should be noted that the fault path refers to the directed path from the inducing factor node, through the propagation stage and the equipment response, to the fault result node; the path contribution refers to the relative score obtained after normalizing the probability indices of each path for the same fault result.

[0076] In the specific implementation, the server searches for paths leading to the same failure result along the failure attribution chain, calculates the path probability index based on the risk of the starting node, the propagation judgment of each associated edge, and the conditional transition probability, and then normalizes and sorts the total index. The path with the cumulative contribution reaching the preset ratio is determined as the main failure path. The preset ratio is set according to the coverage requirements of the attribution explanation. When the total index is zero, normalization is not performed, and the score of the non-zero path is recorded.

[0077] For nodes induced by factors The fault result node is reached through the propagation stage nodes and the device response nodes. Fault path: The fault path occurs at time... The probability of occurrence is expressed as: In the formula, Indicates the fault path The probability of occurrence; Indicates the risk status of the initiating factor node; and These represent the spatiotemporal propagation determination result and the conditional transition probability between adjacent nodes, respectively.

[0078] For the same fault result The path contribution of all fault paths is expressed as follows: In the formula, Indicates the result of the fault. The set of fault paths; Indicates the fault path The relative degree of contribution, The path index is used for summation. Paths are sorted from highest to lowest contribution, and faulty paths whose cumulative contribution reaches a preset percentage are identified as primary faulty paths.

[0079] If the denominator is zero, it means that there is no valid fault path pointing to the fault result at the current time, and no path contribution calculation is performed.

[0080] For a line corridor consisting of multiple devices The comprehensive risk of its corridor Represented as: The influence weights of each device within the corridor satisfy the following: In the formula, Indicates equipment For the line corridor The impact weights of comprehensive risks are determined based on the rated capacity of the equipment, topological location, the proportion of critical loads supplied, and the severity of the failure consequences, and are then normalized.

[0081] Based on the comprehensive disaster risk of equipment and the comprehensive risk of the line corridor, identify vulnerable nodes and critical corridor segments: In the formula, and These represent the threshold values ​​for identifying vulnerable nodes and critical corridor segments, respectively. and These are the set of vulnerable nodes and the set of critical corridor segments, respectively.

[0082] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, in the fourth embodiment of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application, step S30 further includes: Step S301: Determine the risk range based on the equipment type and disaster type, and map the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment to the normal operation, derated operation or out-of-operation status of the line and transformer based on the risk range.

[0083] It should be noted that the risk range is used to distinguish the risk range of equipment in normal operation, reduced operation, and withdrawal from operation; differentiating equipment response by different risk ranges can ensure that continuous risk changes correspond to different operating conditions and preserve equipment that still has some operational capability after a disaster.

[0084] Based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment The lines and transformers are classified into three states: normal operation, derated operation, and out of service. For switchgear, two states are determined based on their disaster-induced risk: those allowed to participate in power supply reconfiguration and those not allowed to participate in power supply reconfiguration. In the formula, This indicates that the equipment is operating normally; This indicates that the equipment can still operate at reduced capacity after being damaged by a disaster; This indicates that the device has stopped operating; and These represent the threshold values ​​for determining whether the equipment enters or exits derating operation mode, and must meet the following conditions: The threshold is determined based on the equipment type, disaster type, historical fault records, and simulation results.

[0085] Step S302: Maintain the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the normal operating state at the normal operating value, set the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the derated operating state as the product of the normal operating value and the capacity maintenance coefficient, and set the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the exit operating state to zero, thereby obtaining the time-varying allowable conveying capacity of the equipment. The capacity maintenance coefficient is calibrated according to the equipment type, disaster type and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment and is greater than zero and less than one.

[0086] It should be noted that the capacity retention factor refers to the proportion of the allowable transport capacity under derating conditions to the allowable transport capacity under normal operating conditions. Further converting the state classification into the equipment's allowable transport capacity allows the risk analysis results to be used as capacity constraints in power flow and safety domain calculations. Recording the capacity of decommissioned components as zero, and coordinating with subsequent topology removal, can prevent them from continuing to undertake transport tasks.

[0087] For transmission lines and transformers, their time-varying permissible transmission capacity is determined based on the equipment's disaster response status: In the formula, This indicates the equipment's permissible conveying capacity under normal operating conditions; Indicates the device at time The actual allowable conveying capacity; This represents the capacity retention coefficient under reduced operating conditions, and satisfies... The capability retention coefficient is calibrated based on equipment type, disaster type, and overall disaster risk of the equipment.

[0088] Step S303: The out-of-operation lines and transformers are classified into the unavailable component set, and the switch operability status is determined based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the switchgear.

[0089] It should be noted that the switch operability status refers to whether the switch is currently allowed to be used as an object for power supply reconfiguration, which is different from whether the switch is currently closed or open.

[0090] The lines and transformers that have been taken out of service will be divided into an unavailable line set and an unavailable transformer set, respectively: For switching devices Its operable state is represented as follows: In the formula, B and T represent the entire network's set of lines and the set of transformers, respectively; subscripts The identifier exits the running element. Indicates switching equipment Comprehensive disaster risk; This indicates the risk threshold at which the switch is not allowed to participate in power supply reconfiguration; This indicates that the switch is allowed to participate in power reconfiguration. This indicates that the switch is not allowed to participate in power supply reconfiguration.

[0091] Step S304: Based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, the set of unavailable components and the switch operability status, determine the available power supply path, and perform power flow verification according to the available power supply path and the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, so as to use the maximum transferable load that meets the requirements of node power balance, node voltage and equipment transmission capacity as the load transfer capacity.

[0092] It should be noted that load transfer capacity refers to the maximum transferable load that meets operational requirements given the available power supply path and equipment capacity.

[0093] Path connectivity only indicates the existence of a power supply connection, and does not indicate that the voltage of the line, transformer and node can withstand the required transferred load; combined with power flow verification calculation of transfer capacity, it can provide an electrical operation basis for subsequent mode selection.

[0094] In the specific implementation, the server checks the available power supply path based on the current operating information, unavailable components, and switch operation conditions. Under the corresponding path and time-varying equipment capacity conditions, it changes the load to be transferred, performs power flow calculation, checks node power balance, node voltage, and equipment transmission capacity, and records the maximum transferable load that can be supported when all conditions are met as the transfer capacity of the corresponding area; for areas where there is no path to available power supply, the transfer capacity is recorded as zero.

[0095] Step S305: Combine the set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable state of the switch, and the load transfer capacity to form a set of time-varying operating constraint parameters.

[0096] In practical implementation, the set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transport capacity of the equipment, the switch operable state, and the load transfer capability are combined to form a time-varying control. The corresponding time-varying operating constraint parameter set: In the formula, and These represent the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the transmission line and the transformer, respectively. This represents the vector of switch operable states; This indicates the load transfer capability under the current available topology and equipment transmission capacity conditions.

[0097] The load transfer capacity is obtained through a connectivity check of available power supply paths and a power flow verification under the conditions of meeting node power balance, line transmission capacity, transformer transmission capacity, and node voltage requirements. When there is no power supply path to an available power source in a certain power supply area, its load transfer capacity is set to zero.

[0098] As the disaster state changes, the steps described in this embodiment are repeated to form a sequence of time-varying operational constraint parameters corresponding to different stages of disaster evolution: in, This represents the parameter sequence; K is the number of stages; These are the time segments arranged chronologically.

[0099] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, in the fifth embodiment of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application, step S40 further includes: Step S401: Obtain the distribution network topology and switch status based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, determine the segment switches and tie switches participating in power supply reconfiguration based on the switch operability status, and generate switch status combinations.

[0100] It should be noted that a sectionalizing switch is a switch used to change the connection relationship of line sections; a tie switch is a switch used to change the connection relationship between different power supply paths; and a switch state combination refers to the combination of the open and closed states of various related switches in a backup mode.

[0101] Step S402: Based on the set of unavailable components, perform device availability, network connectivity and radiation verification on each of the switch state combinations, and eliminate the switch state combinations that contain unavailable components, passive islands or closed-loop power supply structures.

[0102] It should be noted that a passive island refers to an independent power supply connection area that does not contain available power sources; radial refers to the absence of a closed-loop power supply structure in the effective power supply network.

[0103] Based on the obtained set of unavailable components, switch operability status, and load transfer capability, determine the sectionalizing switches and tie switches that can participate in power supply reconfiguration. The [number]th... The alternative power supply modes are represented as switch state vectors: In the formula, Indicates the number of switches participating in power supply reconfiguration; Indicates the first Switch in alternative power supply modes closure, Indicates switch Disconnected. All switch states satisfy: In the formula, Indicates switch Is power supply reconfiguration permissible under the current disaster conditions? When this occurs, the corresponding switch must not be activated.

[0104] Step S403: Verify the power supply path between the critical load and the available power source for the retained switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations in which the critical load and the available power source are connected.

[0105] For different switching state combinations, equipment availability, network connectivity, and radiation are checked, eliminating combinations that include unavailable lines, unavailable transformers, passive islanding, or closed-loop power supply structures. For the first... The alternative power supply modes have the following topology: In the formula, Indicates the number of closed branches; Indicates the number of nodes participating in power supply; This indicates the number of independently connected power supply areas.

[0106] Step S404: Calculate the required load transfer for each of the switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations whose required load transfer for the power supply area does not exceed the corresponding load transfer capacity to obtain alternative power supply modes.

[0107] Each connected power supply area contains at least one available power source, ensuring an effective power supply path between critical loads and available power sources. The load transfer capability of the topology-feasible power supply mode is further verified. For power supply areas requiring load transfer... , No. The alternative power supply modes satisfy: In the formula, Indicates the first Power supply area under alternative power supply modes The load that needs to be transferred; This indicates the maximum load transfer capacity of the power supply area under the current disaster conditions obtained in step S2. When the required load transfer exceeds the maximum load transfer capacity, the corresponding alternative power supply mode is eliminated.

[0108] Based on the principle of prioritizing critical loads, power supply modes that are topologically feasible and meet the load transfer capability requirements are ranked to form a set of feasible power supply modes.

[0109] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, in the sixth embodiment of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application, step S50 further includes: Step S501: Determine the nodes and power supply paths participating in power supply according to each of the alternative power supply modes, and form a node injection vector based on a unified network node index and the injected power of each node. Step S502: Establish operating boundary constraints based on the upper and lower limits of the injected power of load nodes and distributed power nodes, and establish normal operating condition constraints based on the allowable transmission capacity of lines and transformers under normal operating conditions. Step S503: Define the effective network connection relationship based on the set of unavailable components, and define the transmission power of the line and transformer based on the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment to form a disaster corridor constraint; Step S504: Perform power flow calculation based on the node injection vector, and form a safe and feasible subdomain of feasible operating points that simultaneously meet the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, node power balance and node voltage requirements; Step S505: Perform directional search on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and output the safe and feasible subdomains and boundary points.

[0110] It should be noted that the power flow feasibility condition refers to the existence of a power flow result that satisfies the requirements of node power balance, node voltage, and corresponding equipment operation under a given mode and node injection vector.

[0111] The following applies to a given disaster evolution time. , establish the first The safe and feasible subdomains corresponding to the alternative power supply modes; to simplify the formula expression, the time variable is omitted in the relevant constraint formulas. Based on the network connectivity and power supply path of the alternative power supply mode, the lines, transformers, and nodes participating in the operation are determined, and the injected power of each node is used to form a node injection vector. The injection power is defined as: In the formula, Represents a node Injection power; Indicates load node Injection power; Represents distributed power nodes Injection power; Represents the set of load nodes; This represents a set of distributed power nodes.

[0112] The operational boundary constraints are expressed as follows: The normal operating condition constraint is expressed as follows: Based on the obtained set of unavailable components and the time-varying allowable transport capacity of the equipment, determine the first... Set of unavailable lines corresponding to the alternative power supply modes Unusable transformer collection and permissible transport capacity under disaster conditions. and In this embodiment and They represent the first The set of lines and transformers involved in the alternative power supply modes. Based on the obtained set of unavailable components, determine: In the formula, and They represent the first The alternative power supply modes involve the collection of components in the lines and transformers that are unavailable due to the impact of disasters. Therefore, and These represent the set of lines and the set of transformers that can still operate under this alternative power supply mode, respectively.

[0113] For lines and transformers that are damaged but still operational in the model, the obtained time-varying allowable transmission capacity is assigned to... and .

[0114] The disaster corridor constraint is represented as follows: For sets and Unavailable components in the first section, remove them from the second section. Eliminate from the valid network connections of the alternative power supply modes; for lines and transformers that can still operate after the disaster, through... and This reflects its reduced operating status.

[0115] Applying the operational boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints, and disaster corridor constraints to the node injection vector yields the first... The safe and feasible subdomains corresponding to the alternative power supply modes: In the formula, Indicates the first The safe and feasible subdomains corresponding to the alternative power supply modes; This represents the node injection vector, which consists of the injected power at each node of the power distribution system. This indicates the number of system nodes.

[0116] Furthermore, in order to reduce boundary judgment bias, step S505 specifically includes: Step S5051: Select an internal feasible running point as the reference running point in each non-empty safe and feasible subdomain, and set a set of unit search directions in the node injection space; Step S5052: Gradually change the node injection vector from the reference operating point along each unit search direction to obtain candidate operating points, and perform power flow calculation and verification of the operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints on the candidate operating points; Step S5053: Based on the location where the candidate operating point first fails to meet the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, and the node voltage or node power balance requirements, determine the endpoints of the continuous feasible interval starting from the reference operating point to obtain the candidate boundary point; Step S5054: When the change of the candidate boundary point corresponding to the adjacent unit search direction exceeds the preset error, add a unit search direction in the corresponding direction interval and repeat the search to update the candidate boundary point; Step S5055: Determine the candidate boundary points corresponding to the search directions of each unit as boundary points, and output the safe and feasible subdomain and the boundary points.

[0117] Judge the first Does the operating boundary constraint, normal operating condition constraint, and disaster corridor constraint under the alternative power supply modes have a common feasible solution? If no feasible solution exists, the corresponding safe and feasible subdomain is marked as an empty set, and the alternative power supply mode is eliminated. If a feasible solution exists, an internal feasible operating point is selected as the baseline operating point. .

[0118] Set the set of unit search directions within the node injection space: In the formula, Indicates the first One search direction; Indicates the number of search directions.

[0119] During the search for the boundary of the safe and feasible subdomain, power flow calculations are performed synchronously on the injected vectors of each candidate node to verify the node voltage, power balance, and the operating status of lines and transformers. When a candidate operating point experiences a node voltage exceeding the limit, power imbalance, or equipment transmission capacity exceeding the limit, the search along the current direction is stopped, and the vicinity of the previous feasible operating point is determined as the boundary of the safe and feasible subdomain in the corresponding direction.

[0120] For each search direction, calculate the maximum feasible step size allowed starting from the baseline running point: satisfy: Therefore, we obtain the first... Alternative power supply modes in direction Safe and feasible subdomain boundary points: Repeat the calculation for all search directions to form the corresponding set of boundary points: When the change in boundary points corresponding to adjacent search directions exceeds the preset error, a search direction is added within the corresponding direction interval to improve the calculation accuracy of the safe and feasible subdomain boundary. Step S3 outputs a set of feasible power supply modes, a set of safe and feasible subdomains and their boundary points corresponding to each alternative power supply mode, providing input for subsequent reconstruction of the overall dynamic safety domain and characterization of the dynamic safety boundary.

[0121] This embodiment establishes unified search conditions by using internal feasible starting points and unit directions. It maintains the continuous feasibility of the search interval through complete verification and first-time boundary crossing positioning. Furthermore, it increases sampling for directions with large boundary changes, so that the output boundary points can reflect local operational constraints and reduce boundary judgment errors caused by crossing infeasible intervals and insufficient direction sampling.

[0122] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, in the seventh embodiment of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application, step S60 further includes: Step S601: Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and update the overall dynamic safe domain as the disaster evolves; Step S602: Select the boundary points of each of the safe and feasible subdomains as candidate points, remove the candidate points located inside the overall dynamic safety domain, and extract the dynamic safety boundary; Step S603: Select the operating point before the disaster as the reference operating point, set a consistent unit search direction across disaster stages, and when the reference operating point belongs to the overall dynamic safety domain, calculate the distance from the reference operating point to the first time the dynamic safety boundary is reached while continuously maintaining the position within the overall dynamic safety domain along each unit search direction to obtain the directional safety margin. When the reference operating point does not belong to the overall dynamic safety domain, the directional safety margin is recorded as zero. Step S604: When the directional safety margin before the disaster is positive, the degree of boundary contraction is obtained by subtracting the ratio of the current disaster stage to the directional safety margin before the disaster. Step S605: Determine the boundary migration amount based on the difference between the directional safety margin of the current disaster stage and the previous disaster stage, and output the overall dynamic safety domain, the dynamic safety boundary, and the boundary change characteristics, wherein the boundary change characteristics include the boundary contraction degree and the boundary migration amount.

[0123] In the specific implementation, firstly, the overall dynamic security domain is reconstructed and the dynamic security boundary is extracted, which specifically includes: Based on the obtained set of feasible power supply modes, define the time. The following set of feasible power supply modes are: In the formula, This represents the set of feasible power supply modes under the current disaster stage; Indicates the first The safe and feasible subdomains corresponding to the feasible power supply modes.

[0124] Perform a union operation on each safe and feasible subdomain to form a time interval. The overall dynamic security domain below: In the formula, Indicates time The overall dynamic security domain is defined as follows: The dynamic security boundary of the overall dynamic security domain is represented as: In the formula, Represents dynamic safety boundaries. This represents the closure of the set. In actual computation, the boundary points of each safe and feasible subdomain are used as candidate points, and candidate points located inside the overall dynamic safe domain are eliminated to form a set of dynamic safe boundary points.

[0125] Then, the contraction and migration characteristics of the dynamic safety boundary are calculated, specifically including: The operational point before the disaster occurred was selected as a fixed reference point: In the formula, This indicates the baseline time before the disaster occurred.

[0126] Before calculating the directional safety margin, determine whether the fixed reference point is located within the current overall dynamic safety domain. When: When: , calculate the directional safety margin according to the following formula; when: This indicates that the baseline operating point before the disaster has exceeded the current overall dynamic safety domain. As agreed, the safety margins in each direction are recorded as follows: When the fixed reference point does not belong to the current overall dynamic security domain, the security margin in the corresponding direction is denoted as... ;exist Under the condition that the dynamic safety boundary shrinkage degree in the corresponding direction is denoted as .

[0127] Search direction along unit Calculate the directional safety margin of the dynamic safety boundary: In the formula, Indicates a fixed reference point along the direction The initial distance to the dynamic safety boundary.

[0128] In satisfying Under these conditions, direction The degree of contraction of the dynamic safety boundary is expressed as: in, This indicates that the dynamic safety boundary has shrunk relative to the baseline state; This indicates that the safe operating range in this direction has been expanded.

[0129] The dynamic safety boundary migration between adjacent disaster stages is expressed as: in, This indicates that the dynamic safety boundary is migrating towards the fixed reference point; This indicates that the dynamic safety boundary is far from the fixed reference point. By comparing different directions... and This determines the main contraction direction, migration trend, and key boundary areas of the dynamic safety boundary.

[0130] Re-identify critical instability points and key weak points. First, determine the positional relationship between the current operating point and the overall dynamic safety domain. When: When: Calculate the minimum weighted distance from the current running point to the dynamic safety boundary, and use it as the safety margin of the current running state. When: When the current operating state has exceeded the dynamic safety boundary, the distance from the current operating point to the boundary is no longer interpreted as a safety margin, and the process of adjusting the alternative power supply mode, transferring the load, or restoring the power supply is initiated.

[0131] Given that the current running point is located within the overall dynamic safety domain, calculate the minimum weighted distance from the current running point to the dynamic safety boundary: In the formula, This indicates the safety margin of the current operating state; Indicates the current running point; This represents the normalized weight matrix indicating the node injection power. Its expression is: in: In the formula, Represents a node The allowable range of variation in injected power. Using the normalized weight matrix, the influence of differences in the dimensions and numerical scales of injected power at different nodes on the boundary distance calculation results can be eliminated. When the allowable range of variation for a node is zero, that node is removed from the distance calculation variables.

[0132] The dynamic safety boundary point closest to the current operating point is determined as the critical instability point: In the formula, This indicates the critical instability point under the current disaster stage. Based on the transmission capacity of the lines, the transmission capacity of the transformers, the injected power of the nodes, or the disaster corridor constraints that reach the limits at this point, the corresponding critical lines, critical transformers, critical nodes, and critical corridor segments are determined.

[0133] As the disaster state changes, repeat the above steps to obtain the overall dynamic safety domain and dynamic safety boundary corresponding to different stages of disaster evolution.

[0134] Finally, the overall dynamic security domain, dynamic security boundary, boundary contraction and migration results, critical instability points, and key weak links are output, providing a basis for prevention and control, operation mode adjustment, and power supply restoration under disaster conditions.

[0135] It should be noted that the above examples are only for understanding this application and do not constitute a limitation on the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method of power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution in this application. Any simple modifications based on this technical concept are within the protection scope of this application.

[0136] This application also provides a dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution. Please refer to [link / reference]. Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of a dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for a power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution. The system includes: The attribution chain construction module 10 is used to obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and construct the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain according to the physical mechanism of the disaster, the time sequence of events and the spatial reachability relationship. The primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain includes inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes and fault result nodes. Risk calculation module 20 is used to calculate the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment result of the primary secondary disaster fault attribution chain to infer the risk status of the recursive nodes. The constraint generation module 30 is used to determine the normal operation, derated operation or out-of-operation status of the line and transformer based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, and generate a time-varying operation constraint parameter set, which includes a set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable status of the switch and the load transfer capacity. The mode filtering module 40 is used to generate and filter candidate power supply modes based on the time-varying operation constraint parameter set; Subdomain solving module 50 is used to establish operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints based on the alternative power supply mode and the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, and to construct a safe and feasible subdomain and search for boundary points in combination with power flow verification. The security domain reconstruction module 60 is used to perform a union operation on the non-empty security feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic security domain, extract and update the dynamic security boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

[0137] The dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution provided in this application employs the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution in the above embodiments, and can solve the technical problems to be solved by the aforementioned dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution provided in this application are the same as those of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution provided in the above embodiments, and other technical features of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution are the same as those disclosed in the methods of the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0138] This application provides a dynamic safety domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on chain-of-fault attribution. The dynamic safety domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on chain-of-fault attribution includes: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to execute the dynamic safety domain reconfiguration method for a power distribution system based on chain-of-fault attribution in any of the above embodiments.

[0139] The following is for reference. Figure 6 The diagram illustrates a structural schematic suitable for implementing the dynamic security domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on chain-of-fault attribution in the embodiments of this application. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on chain-of-fault attribution in the embodiments of this application may include, but is not limited to, servers, workstations, industrial computers, and desktop or laptop computers with corresponding data processing capabilities deployed in power distribution dispatch centers or power distribution monitoring platforms. Figure 6 The power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution shown is merely an example and should not impose any limitations on the functionality and scope of use of the embodiments of this application.

[0140] like Figure 6As shown, the power distribution system dynamic safety domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution may include a processing unit 1001 (e.g., a central processing unit, a graphics processing unit, etc.), which can execute the aforementioned power distribution system dynamic safety domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution according to a program stored in ROM 1002 (Read Only Memory) or a program loaded from storage device 1003 into RAM 1004 (Random Access Memory). RAM 1004 also stores various programs and data required for device operation, such as multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chains, comprehensive disaster-induced risks of equipment, time-varying operating constraint parameter sets, alternative power supply modes, and related data on safe and feasible subdomains and dynamic safety boundaries. The processing unit 1001, ROM 1002, and RAM 1004 are interconnected via bus 1005. I / O interface 1006 is also connected to bus 1005.

[0141] Typically, the following devices can be connected to I / O interface 1006: input devices 1007, such as keyboards, mice, and touchscreens, for inputting or configuring power distribution system parameters, disaster scenario information, and calculation parameters; output devices 1008, such as LCDs (Liquid Crystal Displays), for displaying the overall dynamic security domain, dynamic security boundaries, and boundary change characteristics; storage devices 1003, such as hard disks and solid-state drives, for storing programs, input data, and calculation results; and communication devices 1009. Communication device 1009 allows the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution to conduct wired or wireless communication with disaster monitoring systems, power distribution automation systems, or equipment operation monitoring terminals to obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and to transmit the overall dynamic security domain, dynamic security boundaries, and boundary change characteristics to external systems or terminals. Although the figure shows a power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution with various devices, it should be understood that it is not required to implement or possess all the devices shown; more or fewer devices can be configured according to actual application needs.

[0142] The power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution provided in this application employs the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution in the above embodiments, and can solve the technical problems to be solved by the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution provided in this application are the same as the beneficial effects of the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on disaster chain fault attribution provided in the above embodiments, and other technical features in the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on disaster chain fault attribution are the same as the features disclosed in the previous embodiment method, and will not be repeated here.

[0143] It should be understood that the various parts disclosed in this application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the description of the above embodiments, specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.

[0144] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

[0145] This application provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions (i.e., a computer program) stored thereon, which are used to execute the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution in the above embodiments.

[0146] The computer-readable storage medium provided in this application can be a tangible medium capable of storing computer programs, such as a hard disk, random access memory, read-only memory, flash memory, optical storage device, or magnetic storage device. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the above-described method for dynamic security domain reconfiguration of power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution.

[0147] The aforementioned computer-readable storage medium may be included in a power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on chain-of-fault attribution; or it may exist independently and not be assembled into a power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on chain-of-fault attribution.

[0148] The aforementioned computer-readable storage medium carries one or more programs. When the aforementioned one or more programs are executed by the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on chain fault attribution, the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on chain fault attribution performs the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on chain fault attribution as described in the above embodiments.

[0149] Computer program code for performing the operations of this application can be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, and C++, as well as conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as the "C" language or similar programming languages. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In cases involving remote computers, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer via any type of network—including LAN (Local Area Network) or WAN (Wide Area Network)—or can be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0150] The modules described in the embodiments of this application can be implemented in software or hardware. The names of the modules do not necessarily limit the functionality of the unit itself.

[0151] The readable storage medium provided in this application is a computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-readable program instructions (i.e., a computer program) for executing the above-described dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution. This method can solve the technical problems to be addressed by the aforementioned dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the computer-readable storage medium provided in this application are the same as those of the dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on chain-of-fault attribution provided in the above embodiments, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0152] The above description is only a part of the embodiments of this application and does not limit the patent scope of this application. All equivalent structural transformations made under the technical concept of this application and using the contents of the specification and drawings of this application, or direct / indirect applications in other related technical fields, are included in the patent protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for dynamic security domain reconfiguration of a power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain information on multi-source disasters and equipment operation, and construct a primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial accessibility. The primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain includes inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes, and fault result nodes. Based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment results of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain, the risk status of the recursive nodes is deduced, and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment is calculated. Based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, the normal operation, derated operation, or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers is determined, and a time-varying operation constraint parameter set is generated. The time-varying operation constraint parameter set includes the set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable status of the switches, and the load transfer capacity. Based on the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, alternative power supply modes are generated and screened; Based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operation constraint parameter set, establish operation boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints, and construct a safe and feasible subdomain by combining power distribution flow verification and search for boundary points; Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic safe domain. Extract and update the dynamic safe boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

2. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The process of acquiring multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and constructing a primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the temporal sequence of events, and spatial accessibility, includes: The system acquires multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, performs time-series alignment based on a unified time window, and spatially correlates the information based on equipment location, line corridor, and disaster impact range to obtain a unified observation vector. The multi-source disaster and equipment operation information includes environmental disturbance information, equipment status information, and operation measurement information. Based on the disaster intensity, impact range, and equipment abnormal status changes reflected by the unified observation vector, the disaster evolution stages are divided, and corresponding inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes, and fault result nodes are established. Based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the propagation correlation between each node is determined, and the directed correlation edges are determined based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability. Each node and the directed correlation edges are combined into the primary secondary disaster failure attribution chain.

3. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method of calculating the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of equipment by recursively determining the risk status of nodes based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment results of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain includes: Based on historical disaster records and simulation samples, the number of samples activated by the predecessor node and the number of samples activated by the successor node after the predecessor node is activated are counted in the attribution chain of the primary and secondary disaster failures, the conditional transition probability is estimated, and the basic risk of each node is obtained. The spatiotemporal propagation determination result is determined based on the event time sequence and spatial reachability. Based on the spatiotemporal propagation determination result, the propagation risk of non-propagable associated edges is set to zero, and the propagation risk of propagable associated edges is set to the product of the conditional transition probability and the risk state of the predecessor node. The basic risk of each node and the propagation risk from each predecessor node are respectively taken as complementary probabilities. The product of all the complementary probabilities is then multiplied and the complement value is taken to recursively obtain the node risk state. Based on the severity of the fault, the importance of the equipment, and the correlation with historical faults, the influence weight of each fault result node associated with the equipment is determined, and the influence weight is normalized. Based on the normalized impact weights, the node risk status of the corresponding fault result node is weighted and summed to obtain the comprehensive disaster risk of the equipment.

4. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The process of determining the normal operation, derating operation, or shutdown status of lines and transformers based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, and generating a time-varying set of operation constraint parameters, includes: Risk ranges are determined based on equipment type and disaster type, and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment is mapped to the normal operation, derated operation or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers based on the risk ranges. The allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the normal operating state is maintained at the normal operating value, the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the derated operating state is set as the product of the normal operating value and the capacity maintenance coefficient, and the allowable conveying capacity corresponding to the exit from the operating state is set to zero, thus obtaining the time-varying allowable conveying capacity of the equipment. The capacity maintenance coefficient is calibrated according to the equipment type, disaster type and the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment and is greater than zero and less than one. Lines and transformers that have been taken out of service are classified into the unavailable component set, and the switch operability status is determined based on the comprehensive disaster risk of the switchgear. Based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, the set of unavailable components and the switch operability status, the available power supply path is determined. The power flow is checked according to the available power supply path and the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment. The maximum transferable load that meets the requirements of node power balance, node voltage and equipment transmission capacity is taken as the load transfer capacity. The set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transport capacity of the equipment, the operable state of the switch, and the load transfer capacity are combined to form a set of time-varying operating constraint parameters.

5. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The generation and screening of alternative power supply modes based on the time-varying operating constraint parameter set includes: Based on the multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, the distribution network topology and switch status are obtained, and based on the switch operability status, the segment switches and tie switches participating in power supply reconfiguration are determined, and switch status combinations are generated. Based on the set of unavailable components, each of the switch state combinations is checked for device availability, network connectivity, and radiation, and the switch state combinations containing unavailable components, passive islands, or closed-loop power supply structures are eliminated. Verify the power supply path between the critical load and the available power source for the retained switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations in which the critical load and the available power source are connected; Calculate the required load transfer for each of the aforementioned switch state combinations, and retain the switch state combinations whose required load transfer for the power supply area does not exceed the corresponding load transfer capacity to obtain alternative power supply modes.

6. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The process of establishing operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints, and disaster corridor constraints based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, and constructing a safe and feasible subdomain and searching for boundary points in conjunction with power flow verification, includes: The nodes and power supply paths participating in the power supply are determined according to the alternative power supply modes described above, and a node injection vector is formed based on a unified network node index and the injected power of each node. Operating boundary constraints are established based on the upper and lower limits of the injected power of load nodes and distributed power nodes, and normal operating condition constraints are established based on the allowable transmission capacity of lines and transformers under normal operating conditions. Based on the set of unavailable components, the effective network connection relationship is defined, and the transmission power of the lines and transformers is defined based on the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, thus forming a disaster corridor constraint; Based on the node injection vector, power flow calculation is performed, and feasible operating points that simultaneously satisfy the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, node power balance, and node voltage requirements are formed into a safe and feasible subdomain. Perform a directional search on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and output the safe and feasible subdomains and boundary points.

7. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The step of performing a directional search on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains and outputting the safe and feasible subdomains and boundary points includes: In each of the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, an internal feasible running point is selected as the reference running point, and a set of unit search directions is set in the node injection space. The node injection vector is gradually changed along each unit search direction from the reference operating point to obtain candidate operating points. Power flow calculation and verification of the operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints and disaster corridor constraints are performed on the candidate operating points. Based on the location where the candidate operating point first fails to meet the operating boundary constraints, the normal operating condition constraints, the disaster corridor constraints, and the node voltage or node power balance requirements, the endpoints of the continuous feasible interval starting from the reference operating point are determined to obtain the candidate boundary point; When the change of the candidate boundary point corresponding to the adjacent unit search direction exceeds the preset error, add a unit search direction in the corresponding direction interval and repeat the search to update the candidate boundary point; The candidate boundary points corresponding to the search directions of each unit are determined as boundary points, and the safe and feasible subdomain and the boundary points are output.

8. The dynamic security domain reconfiguration method for power distribution systems based on disaster chain fault attribution as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The process of performing a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains to form a global dynamic safety domain, extracting and updating the dynamic safety boundary as the disaster evolves, and determining the boundary change characteristics includes: Perform a union operation on the non-empty safe and feasible subdomains, and update the overall dynamic safe domain as the disaster evolves; The boundary points of each of the aforementioned safe and feasible subdomains are used as candidate points. Candidate points located inside the overall dynamic safety domain are eliminated to extract the dynamic safety boundary. The operating point before the disaster is selected as the reference operating point, and the unit search direction is set to be consistent across the disaster stage. When the reference operating point belongs to the overall dynamic safety domain, the distance from the reference operating point to the first time the dynamic safety boundary is reached is calculated by continuously maintaining the position within the overall dynamic safety domain along each unit search direction. The directional safety margin is obtained. When the reference operating point does not belong to the overall dynamic safety domain, the directional safety margin is recorded as zero. When the directional safety margin before the disaster is positive, the degree of boundary contraction is obtained by subtracting the ratio of the current disaster stage to the directional safety margin before the disaster. The boundary migration amount is determined based on the difference between the directional safety margin of the current disaster stage and the previous disaster stage. The overall dynamic safety domain, the dynamic safety boundary, and the boundary change characteristics are output, including the boundary contraction degree and the boundary migration amount.

9. A dynamic security domain reconfiguration system for a distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution, applying the disaster chain fault attribution method for distribution systems according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that, The system includes: The attribution chain construction module is used to obtain multi-source disaster and equipment operation information, and construct the primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain based on the physical mechanism of the disaster, the time sequence of events and spatial reachability. The primary and secondary disaster failure attribution chain includes inducing factor nodes, propagation stage nodes, equipment response nodes and failure result nodes. The risk calculation module is used to calculate the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment by inferring the risk status of the recursive nodes based on the conditional transition probability and spatiotemporal propagation judgment results of the primary and secondary disaster fault attribution chain. The constraint generation module is used to determine the normal operation, derated operation, or out-of-operation status of the lines and transformers based on the comprehensive disaster-induced risk of the equipment, and to generate a time-varying set of operation constraint parameters. The time-varying set of operation constraint parameters includes a set of unavailable components, the time-varying allowable transmission capacity of the equipment, the operable status of the switches, and the load transfer capacity. The mode filtering module is used to generate and filter candidate power supply modes based on the time-varying operation constraint parameter set; The subdomain solution module is used to establish operating boundary constraints, normal operating condition constraints, and disaster corridor constraints based on the alternative power supply modes and the time-varying operating constraint parameter set, and to construct a safe and feasible subdomain and search for boundary points in conjunction with power distribution flow verification. The security domain reconstruction module is used to perform a union operation on the non-empty secure feasible subdomains to form an overall dynamic security domain, extract and update the dynamic security boundary as the disaster evolves, and determine the boundary change characteristics.

10. A dynamic security domain reconfiguration device for a power distribution system based on disaster chain fault attribution, characterized in that, The power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration device based on chain fault attribution includes: a memory, a processor, and a power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration program based on chain fault attribution stored in the memory. The processor is used to run the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration program based on chain fault attribution. The power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration program based on chain fault attribution is configured to implement the power distribution system dynamic security domain reconfiguration method based on chain fault attribution as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.