A security authentication method and system based on discrete topology path uncertainty
By constructing a new security architecture based on a security authentication method for discrete topological paths with uncertainty, and by utilizing the scarcity and structure of private discrete topological spaces, the problem of existing post-quantum cryptography being vulnerable to quantum algorithm attacks is solved, thus realizing a post-quantum cryptographic system with high security and dynamic adaptation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611305892.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-26
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing post-quantum cryptography schemes rely on computational complexity assumptions, making them vulnerable to attacks from Shor's quantum algorithm and Grover's quantum search algorithm. They lack sufficient security, and the increase in key size leads to a sharp rise in storage and computational overhead.
We construct a secure authentication method based on the uncertainty of discrete topological paths. By leveraging the exponential scarcity and structural privacy of private discrete topological spaces, we form a new security foundation, resist quantum algorithm attacks, support multiple mathematical carriers, and support dynamic reconstruction.
It achieves high security without relying on computational complexity assumptions, resists Shor's quantum period extraction and Grover's quantum search acceleration, supports multiple mathematical vectors, and dynamically reconstructs to reduce the risk of long-term observation, reaching quantum security levels of 128-bit and 256-bit.
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Figure CN123122918A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the fields of cryptography and information security technology, and in particular to a secure authentication method and system based on artificially constructed discrete topological spaces under the post-quantum cryptography system. It can be applied to security business scenarios such as identity authentication, digital signature, key verification, challenge-response protocol, and device access verification. Background Technology
[0002] Existing post-quantum cryptography schemes mainly include lattice cryptography, multivariate cryptography, encoded cryptography, and hash-based signatures. The security of these schemes is based on specific computational complexity assumptions, and their security depends on the computational difficulty of solving a certain type of mathematical problem. Once a new classical or quantum algorithm emerges that overcomes the corresponding difficulty problem, the security of the cryptographic system will collapse directly.
[0003] Most existing cryptographic systems have underlying mathematical objects with algebraic structures such as finite commutative groups, fixed generators, and extractable algebraic periods. These structures can be subjected to period extraction attacks by Shor's quantum algorithm. Grover's quantum search algorithm can also achieve a square root acceleration effect for exhaustive attacks, further compressing the security margin.
[0004] Current cryptographic security game modes are generally asymmetric games of computational power, relying on increasing the key size to offset the threat of quantum computing power, at the cost of a sharp increase in storage, computation, and bandwidth overhead. No security authentication system has yet emerged whose security foundation stems from the exponential scarcity of paths within a manually constructed private discrete topological space. Such a system does not rely on the assumption of computational difficulty and resists quantum algorithm attacks from the mathematical structure level. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a secure authentication method and system based on the uncertainty of discrete topological paths, constructing a novel structural game-theoretic security paradigm. This paradigm shifts the security foundation from the assumption of computational complexity to the exponential scarcity and structural privacy of legitimate paths within a private discrete topological space. It avoids Shor's quantum period extraction attack and structurally offsets Grover's quantum search acceleration. It supports implementation using multiple mathematical carriers and dynamic reconstruction, thus overcoming the shortcomings of existing post-quantum cryptography that overly rely on the assumption of computational difficulty.
[0006] The technical solution of the present invention is as described in claims 1-15.
[0007] The discrete topological path uncertainty system constructed in this application can serve as the spatial dimension foundation for a more generalized security architecture. In subsequent research, the applicant further introduced a time-varying topological self-decay mechanism (second generation) and a pure number-theoretic unidirectional structure based on the Collatz fission unidirectional mapping (third generation), forming a three-generation progressive post-quantum security system. This application is the first-generation foundation of the aforementioned system.
[0008] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: 1. Security stems from the exponential scarcity and private configuration of legal paths within discrete topologies. It does not rely on computational complexity assumptions or algebraic difficulties, and there is no risk of "the algorithm failing as a whole when the assumption of difficulty is broken." 2. The topological space can be configured to have no intrinsic algebraic period and no finite commutative group structure, eliminating the preconditions for the Shor quantum period extraction algorithm to be used; 3. The proportion of legitimate paths decreases exponentially with the size of the space. The exponentially expanding path space can structurally offset Grover's quantum square root accelerated attack, and can be configured to achieve quantum security levels of 128 bits and 256 bits. 4. Supports implementation using various mathematical vectors: number-theoretic multiplication grids, private graph homomorphic topologies, obfuscated codeword spaces, high-dimensional discrete manifolds, and combinatorial optimization solution spaces, with a wide range of engineering applications; 5. Supports dynamic topology reconstruction and allows offline updates of private configuration parameters, reducing the security risks associated with long-term observation and fitting; 6. It can implement constant-time retrieval logic, eliminating the risk of side-channel leakage due to timing, power consumption, etc. Attached Figure Description
[0009] Figure 1 This diagram illustrates the overall paradigm principle of the present invention, fully demonstrating the five core execution steps of the security authentication method of the present invention: S1 Topology Construction Step, S2 Path Definition Step, S3 Query Receiving Step, S4 Retrieval and Judgment Step, and S5 Result Output Step. Specifically, Step S1 constructs a customized discrete topology space based on private configuration parameters. The box shows the details of the private configuration parameters: node filtering rules, connection weight matrix, path constraints, nonlinear obfuscation rules, and the customized discrete topology space structure, including the node set and connection relationships. Step S2 defines a set of legal paths constrained by the private configuration parameters within the topology space and marks the exponential scarcity relationship between the total number of legal paths and the total number of all possible paths: M / P_all ≤ 2. Step S3 receives external query requests, which include start-point and end-point information. Step S4 performs constant-time path retrieval, with the retrieval period independent of topology size, path length, and retrieval results, determining whether a legal path satisfying the constraints exists between the start and end points. Step S5 outputs the authentication result; authentication succeeds if a legal path exists, and fails if no legal path exists. The bottom box of the diagram summarizes four layers of security foundation: exponential scarcity of legitimate paths, privacy of topological structure, absence of inherent algebraic period to resist Shor's quantum algorithm, and exponential path space size to offset Grover's quantum acceleration attack; arrows indicate the complete data and logical flow between each step.
[0010] Figure 2 This diagram illustrates a two-dimensional multiplication grid topology embodiment provided by this invention. Corresponding to the number theory carrier implementation, it shows a two-dimensional grid topology structure using a subset of natural numbers as topological nodes and multiplication operations as connection relationships. In the diagram, hollow circles represent publicly available ordinary natural number nodes, solid circles represent private anchor prime number nodes held only by legitimate users, and pentagrams represent target composite number nodes. Thin gray lines represent publicly available multiplication connections and are labeled with the corresponding multipliers; thick orange lines represent legitimate factorization paths that satisfy the private anchor constraints. An exemplary legitimate factorization path starts from root node 1, passes through the private anchor prime number 29, and arrives at the target composite number 841, i.e., 1→29→841. The anchor set is obtained through a 6k±1 orbital selection and is held only by legitimate users. Ordinary composite numbers can be identified through publicly available rules, but the complete factorization path is constrained by the private anchor set; attackers cannot construct a legitimate path relying solely on publicly available information. The lower right corner of the diagram provides an example of an authentication query: starting point = 1, ending point = 841, a legitimate path exists, and authentication is successful.
[0011] Figure 3 This diagram illustrates a private graph homomorphic topology embodiment provided by this invention. Corresponding to a graph theory implementation, it shows a topology structure where graph vertices are topological nodes, edges are connections, and edge labels are private homomorphic mapping outputs. Hollow circles represent public graph vertices, thin gray lines represent public graph edges, and edges are labeled with private homomorphic labels such as σ(a), σ(b), and σ(c). Thick orange lines represent legitimate authentication paths that satisfy private homomorphic constraints; label transformations between adjacent vertices strictly follow private permutation and nonlinear obfuscation rules. Gray dashed lines with crosses represent illegal paths that violate private configuration constraints. The right-hand box provides an example of private homomorphic rules, with the mapping σ: x → x² + x + 1 (mod p), where π is a private permutation. This set of rules belongs to private configuration parameters, held only by legitimate users and not publicly disclosed. Attackers can only obtain the public graph vertices and edges, but cannot know the private permutations and nonlinear obfuscation rules, therefore they cannot construct or predict legitimate paths.
[0012] Figure 4This diagram illustrates an embodiment of the obfuscated codeword space provided by this invention. The diagram corresponds to the implementation of the encoding carrier and shows the codeword space topology with codeword vectors as nodes and verification constraints as connections. Hollow circles represent publicly available codeword bytes and are labeled with their corresponding codeword vectors; thin gray lines represent publicly available basic verification constraints; thick orange lines represent legal codeword sequence paths that satisfy private verification matrix constraints. An example legal path is: 000000→110011→011110→111100, where all codewords satisfy the private verification matrix constraints. The lower half of the diagram shows two sets of contrasting diagrams: the left side represents the traditional linear codeword space, characterized by regular arrangement and equidistant periodic structure, with a risk warning: its period can be extracted by Shor's algorithm; the right side represents the obfuscated codeword space, processed by a randomized obfuscation layer, exhibiting irregular arrangement and no equidistant periodic structure, with a characteristic marked: resistant to Shor's period extraction attack. The complete private parity check matrix and randomized confusion layer are held only by legitimate users, while the basic codeword framework is publicly available. The randomized confusion layer is used to disrupt the inherent linear periodic structure of traditional linear error-correcting codes, eliminating the periodic premise that can be exploited by Shor's quantum algorithm.
[0013] Figure 1 S1 - Topology construction step; S2 - Path definition step; S3 - Query receiving step; S4 - Retrieval and judgment step; S5 - Result output step.
[0014] Figure 2 Hollow circles represent ordinary natural number nodes; solid circles represent private anchor prime number nodes; pentagrams represent target composite number nodes; thin gray lines represent public multiplication connections; thick orange lines represent legal factorization paths.
[0015] Figure 3 Hollow circles represent vertices of the public graph; thin gray lines represent edges of the public graph; thick orange lines represent valid authentication paths; and gray dashed lines with crosses represent invalid paths.
[0016] Figure 4 Hollow circles represent code byte points; thin gray lines represent public basic verification constraints; thick orange lines represent the authentication path of legal codeword sequences. Detailed Implementation
[0017] Note: The following embodiments are used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection; they also provide the basis for the original specification disclosure for subsequent divisional cases.
[0018] Example 1: Two-dimensional multiplicative grid topology (number theory carrier) This embodiment uses a two-dimensional multiplicative grid as the discrete topological space. The nodes in the topological space are taken from a subset of natural numbers, and the connection relationships between nodes are defined as multiplication operations.
[0019] The private configuration parameters include anchor point selection rules, with anchor points selected from a set of candidate prime numbers obtained through a 6k±1 orbital filtering process. A valid path is defined as a factorization path from the root node to the target node; the existence of a path is equivalent to whether the target natural number is composite. The retrieval judgment only outputs the authentication result of whether the path exists, without outputting factor information; even if the target number is composite (its attributes can be determined by public rules), the specific factorization chain is still constrained by the private anchor point set, and attackers cannot construct a valid path solely based on the composite number attribute.
[0020] Workflow: 1) Topology construction steps: Construct a multiplicative mesh topology and load the private anchor point set; the nodes and connection relationships are determined by the public mesh structure and the private anchor point selection rules. The anchor point set is held only by legitimate users and cannot be derived from the public mesh from the outside.
[0021] 2) Path definition steps: A valid path must satisfy the condition that all path nodes are taken from the private anchor set, forming a factorization chain of the target number.
[0022] 3) Query receiving steps: Receive external queries, and input includes the starting root node and the target natural number (end point) to be verified.
[0023] 4) Search and determination steps: Search within the grid for a valid factorization path from the root node to the target number, where all intermediate nodes belong to the private anchor set.
[0024] 5) Output steps: If a valid path exists, output "Authentication passed"; otherwise, output "Authentication failed".
[0025] This topology can be configured with a total of N nodes, a total of P_all possible paths, and a total of M valid paths satisfying M / P_all ≤ 2. The percentage of valid paths decreases exponentially with N, and a configurable hit probability of less than 2 is possible. The topology has no fixed switching group cycle, resisting Shor's cycle extraction. It also employs constant-time retrieval logic to eliminate side-channel leakage. Dynamic reconstruction can be triggered, replacing the private anchor point set offline. After the update, the intersection of the old and new valid paths is less than a preset minimum threshold.
[0026] Example 2: Private Graph Homomorphic Topology (Graph Theory Carrier) In this embodiment, the discrete topological space is a graph structure; graph vertices are topological nodes, and edge sets represent the connections between nodes. Private configuration parameters include private permutation and nonlinear obfuscated label mapping rules, i.e., private homomorphic mapping rules. A valid path requires that the label transformation of each adjacent pair of vertices strictly conform to this private homomorphic constraint.
[0027] 1) Topology construction: The basic framework of the vertices and edges of the graph can be made public; however, the permutation of adjacent vertex label mappings and nonlinear confusion rules are private configuration parameters that can only be known by authorized users.
[0028] 2) Path definition: A valid path is a sequence of vertices on a graph, and each step of the label transformation on the sequence satisfies the private homomorphic mapping constraint.
[0029] 3) Query reception: Receive query requests, including the starting vertex and the ending vertex.
[0030] 4) Search and determination: Traverse the graph path and determine whether there is a valid path from the starting point to the ending point that satisfies the private label mapping constraint throughout.
[0031] 5) Output the authentication result.
[0032] Attackers only obtain the vertices and edges of the public graph, are unaware of the private permutation and nonlinear obfuscation rules, and are unable to construct or predict legal paths; the proportion of legal paths decreases exponentially as the spatial scale increases; and the system supports dynamic offline updates of private mapping rules.
[0033] Example 3: Obfuscated codeword space (encoding carrier) The discrete topological space is taken as the coded codeword space; each node is a codeword vector; the connection relationship between nodes is defined by the checksum matrix constraint. The private configuration parameter is a private checksum matrix with a randomized confusion layer. The valid path is a sequence of nodes, and each codeword vector in the sequence satisfies the private checksum matrix constraint conditions.
[0034] The randomized confusion layer disrupts the inherent pure linear algebraic structure of traditional error-correcting codes, eliminating periodic structures that can be exploited by Shor's algorithm. The basic codeword set can be publicly disclosed, but the complete private parity-check matrix (including the confusion layer) is not exposed. External attackers only see codeword samples and cannot reconstruct the private parity-check matrix, thus preventing the construction of legitimate paths. The retrieval and determination process queries the input starting and ending codewords, searches for the existence of a codeword sequence path that satisfies the private parity-check constraints, and outputs the authentication result.
[0035] Example 4: High-dimensional discrete manifold (geometric carrier) The discrete topological space employs a high-dimensional discrete manifold; nodes are taken from discrete points in the point cloud set; the connections between nodes are determined by private geodesic constraints. Private configuration parameters include a threshold for geodesic determination and a distance weight matrix. A valid path is defined as a sequence of points that satisfy the private geodesic constraints.
[0036] The base point cloud set can be made public; however, the weights and threshold parameters for geodesic determination are privately configured. The query provides the coordinates of the starting and ending point clouds; it searches for a point sequence between the two points that satisfies the private geodesic constraints and outputs the authentication result. This topology has no inherent algebraic period and relies on path exponent scarcity for security.
[0037] Example 5: Combinatorial Optimization Solution Space (Combinatorial Carrier) The discrete topological space is the solution space for a certain class of combinatorial optimization problems; nodes represent a set of variable assignments; connections between nodes represent allowed transformation operations between assignments. Private configuration parameters are a set of private constraints. A valid path is defined as the sequence of variable assignments that starts from the initial assignment node, where each transformation satisfies the private constraints, and reaches the target assignment node.
[0038] The set of basic variables and transformation operations are public, but the constraints are private configuration parameters. The system queries the starting and ending points for input assignment; it then searches for a transformation path that fully satisfies the private constraints and outputs the authentication result. The percentage of legitimate paths can be exponentially reduced by increasing the number of nodes in the solution space, achieving a post-quantum security level.
[0039] Example 6: System Hardware-Software Implementation Example (System Implementation Example of Claim 3) A secure data storage and verification system based on discrete topology includes: 1) Data structure module: Stores discrete topological space nodes and connection relationships, and saves private configuration parameters; 2) Path library module: Stores the constraint definitions corresponding to the set of legal paths; 3) Verification Engine Module: Receives external query requests, performs constant-time path retrieval, and checks whether the path from the starting point to the end point belongs to the set of valid paths; the retrieval clock cycle is fixed and is not affected by retrieval success / failure or topology size; 4) Output interface module, outputs authentication pass / fail results.
[0040] This system can be implemented using CPU software, FPGA hardware, and security chip IP cores. Private configuration parameters are stored in a secure, isolated storage area, inaccessible externally. Dynamic reconfiguration is supported: upon receiving a reconfiguration trigger signal, the private configuration parameters are updated offline, generating a new set of legal path constraints.
[0041] [1] Qiu Xiaobin. A security authentication method and system based on discrete topology path uncertainty [Z]. Research draft, 2026-08-11 (first generation parent case of this application).
[0042] [2] Qiu Xiaobin. A dynamic security authentication method and system based on time-varying discrete topology and self-decaying mapping [Z]. Research draft, 2026-08-20 (second generation parent case).
[0043] [3] Qiu Xiaobin. Alpha theory and the global convergence theorem of the Collatz conjecture (V9.8-final) [Z]. 2026, internal research manuscript of the applicant (foundation of third generation mathematics).
Claims
1. Claim 1 (Independent Claim - Method Type) A security authentication method, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Topology construction steps: Construct a discrete topology space, wherein the set of nodes in the discrete topology space and the connection relationships between nodes are at least partially determined by private configuration parameters, which are only visible to legitimate users, cannot be derived from public rules, and cannot be reversed from public data; Path definition steps: Define a set of legal paths in the discrete topology space, wherein a legal path is a sequence of nodes that satisfies at least one constraint determined by the private configuration parameters; Query receiving steps: Receive externally input query requests, which include start-point information and end-point information; Search and determination steps: Search the discrete topological space for a valid path from the starting point to the ending point; Output steps: Based on the search results, output the authentication pass or authentication fail result; The security strength of the method comes entirely from the exponential scarcity and structural uncertainty of the legal path in all possible paths in the discrete topological space, rather than computational complexity, algebraic difficulty, or computational exhaustiveness.
2. Claim 2 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The total number of nodes in the discrete topological space is N, and the total number of possible paths is P. all The total number of valid paths is M, satisfying the relation M / P. all ≤ 2, where k is a positive integer less than N; the global proportion of the legal path decreases strictly exponentially with the increase of N. When N is a preset security threshold, the probability of a legal path being randomly hit is less than 2 or at least 2, thus achieving the quantum security strength after equality. The discrete topological space has no inherent algebraic period, no finite commutative group structure, and no fixed generator, thus being structurally immune to Shor's quantum period extraction attack; the exponential path space scale structurally cancels Grover's quantum square root acceleration attack.
3. Claim 3 (Independent Claim - System Type) A secure data storage and verification system based on discrete topology, characterized in that it includes: Data structure module: Stores node data and connection relationship data of discrete topology space, and the data includes private configuration parameters; Path library module: Stores definition data of a set of legal paths, wherein a legal path is a sequence of nodes that satisfy the constraints determined by the private configuration parameters; Verification engine module: In response to an external query request, it retrieves whether the path from a specified start point to a specified end point in the discrete topology space belongs to the set of legal paths; Output interface module: Outputs verification results; The retrieval time of the verification engine module is configured to be constant, regardless of the size of the discrete topology space, the path length, or the retrieval results, in order to eliminate the risk of side-channel leakage.
4. Claim 4 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The discrete topological space is a two-dimensional multiplicative grid structure, where nodes are subsets of natural numbers and connections are multiplicative relationships.
5. Claim 5 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The private configuration parameters include anchor point selection rules, where the anchor points are a set of candidate prime numbers filtered based on the 6k±1 orbital.
6. Claim 6 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The legitimate path is the factorization path from the root node to the target node; the retrieval judgment only outputs the authentication result of whether the path exists or not, and does not output factor information; even if the target number is a composite number (whose attributes can be determined by public rules), the specific factorization chain is still constrained by the private anchor set, and attackers cannot construct a legitimate path based solely on the composite number attribute.
7. Claim 7 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The discrete topological space is a graph structure, with nodes as graph vertices, connections as edge sets, and legal paths satisfying private homomorphic mapping rules.
8. Claim 8 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The private homomorphic mapping rules include the label mapping relationship between adjacent nodes on the path satisfying private permutation or nonlinear confusion rules.
9. Claim 9 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The discrete topological space is an encoding space, the nodes are codeword vectors, and the legal path is a codeword sequence that satisfies the private parity check matrix constraint.
10. Claim 10 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, The private verification matrix includes a randomized confusion layer to eliminate the linear algebraic periodic structure of the code space and resist Shor-type quantum period extraction attacks.
11. Claim 11 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The discrete topological space is a high-dimensional discrete manifold, the nodes are points in the point cloud set, and the legal path is a sequence of points that satisfy the private geodesic constraints.
12. Claim 12 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The discrete topological space is the solution space of the combinatorial optimization problem, and the legal path is a set of variable assignment sequences that satisfy the private constraints.
13. Claim 13 (dependent claim) The method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, characterized in that, The private configuration parameters include at least one of the following: node filtering rules, connection weight matrix, path constraints, starting point set, ending point set, and nonlinear obfuscation key.
14. Claim 14 (dependent claim) The method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, characterized in that, It also includes a dynamic reconstruction step: when a preset condition is triggered, at least a portion of the private configuration parameters are updated offline, and the intersection of the updated set of legal paths and the set of legal paths before the update is less than a preset minimum threshold.
15. Claim 15 (dependent claim) The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The retrieval and determination step adopts constant-time retrieval logic, and the number of retrieval cycles is independent of the path retrieval results, which is used to eliminate side-channel attack characteristics such as timing and power consumption.
