Access control methods, devices, equipment, and media based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management.

By modeling enterprise data as tree nodes and retrieving permissions along the parent chain path, the problem of permission blind spots and unauthorized access in traditional solutions is solved. This enables fine-grained permission management and traceable data change records, improving data security and response performance.

CN123122950APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17SINOMACH IND INTERNET RES INST (HENAN) CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611385802.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-08
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional access control schemes struggle to precisely express the inheritance and conflict relationships between parent-child data nodes, lack clear decision-making logic, leading to blind spots in permissions or risks of unauthorized access. Furthermore, the absence of traceable version snapshot mechanisms and index optimizations negatively impacts response performance.

Method used

Enterprise management data is modeled as tree-like data nodes, with explicit permission policies attached. Permissions are retrieved along the parent chain path, allowing or denying access. Version history is recorded before data changes, and a new version identifier is generated.

Benefits of technology

It accurately handles permission inheritance and conflicts, improves the granularity and interpretability of permission control, reduces management risks, and supports optimistic locking verification and audit tracing for concurrent write conflicts across multiple devices.

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Abstract

This application discloses an access control method, apparatus, device, and medium based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization control, relating to the field of data management. The method includes: modeling enterprise management data as a tree-like data node structure; determining the target data node based on the access request sent by the accessing subject; searching for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data node based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node; if the effective permission of the target data node is "deny access," returning an access denial prompt to the accessing subject; if the effective permission of the target data node is "allow access," obtaining the data changes performed on the target data node by the accessing subject based on the access request, writing a snapshot of the current data of the target data node before the change to the version history, writing the changed data to the target data node, generating a new version identifier for the target data node, and returning the version identifier to the accessing subject. This application improves the fine-grained management of data permissions.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data management, and in particular to access control methods, devices, equipment and media based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization control. Background Technology

[0002] In enterprise data management systems, access control is a core element in ensuring data security and compliant operations. Traditional access control schemes typically provide coarse-grained authorization based on roles or user groups, making it difficult to finely express the inheritance and conflict relationships between parent-child data nodes. For example, organizational structures, product catalogs, and financial accounts naturally exhibit tree-like hierarchical characteristics, while existing relational databases or ordinary permission tables often only record the access rules of the nodes themselves. When the policies of upper-level and lower-level nodes are inconsistent, there is a lack of clear judgment logic, which can easily lead to blind spots in permissions or risks of unauthorized access. At the same time, most systems only focus on the access decision result, and for data changes after access is granted, there is often a lack of traceable version snapshot mechanisms, which cannot meet the needs of auditing, tracing, and rolling back of erroneous operations. In addition, the efficiency of searching permission policies decreases with increasing node depth. When recursively searching along the parent chain path, existing implementations often suffer from poor response performance due to a lack of caching or index optimization. More importantly, existing solutions do not handle the priority of denying and allowing access in a consistent manner. Some use default allow, while others use default deny, resulting in inconsistent permission behaviors across different business modules and increasing management and development costs.

[0003] In conclusion, how to improve the fine-grained management of data permissions is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to provide an access control method, apparatus, device, and medium based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, which can improve the fine-grained management of data permissions. The specific solution is as follows: Firstly, this application provides an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, including: The enterprise management data of the target enterprise is modeled as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship; the tree-like data node is attached with an explicit permission policy oriented towards the access subject, and the explicit permission policy includes allowing access or denying access; The target data node is determined based on the access request sent by the accessing subject, and the explicit permission policy is searched in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. If the valid permission of the target data node is "Access Denied", then return an access denied message to the accessing entity. If the valid permission of the target data node is "allowed access", then based on the access request, obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

[0005] Optionally, each of the tree-like data nodes includes a node identifier and a path identifier. The path identifier is used to characterize the position of the data node in the tree-like hierarchical structure and is formed by sequentially concatenating the identifiers of the data node at each level.

[0006] Optionally, the step of searching for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node includes: If the target data node itself has an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject, then its own explicit permission policy will be directly determined as a valid permission. If the target data node itself does not have an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject, then based on the path identifier, search radially upwards along the parent link to obtain the explicit permission policy attached to the node that meets the condition closest to the target data node, and determine it as the valid permission of the target data node. If no explicit permission policy is found by traversing the parent chain path of the target data node to the root node, then the preset default permission policy is determined as the valid permission for the target data node.

[0007] Optionally, the method further includes: If the target data node has several explicit permission policies attached, the explicit permission policies are sorted according to a preset priority to generate a policy sequence. If there are allowed and denied accesses with the same preset priority in the policy sequence, then the denied access is determined as a valid permission; The explicit permission policy carries an effective condition, which includes any one or more of the following: time window, source network address, or attribute expression.

[0008] Optionally, before writing the current data snapshot before the target data node is changed into the version history, the method further includes: The desired version identifier of the accessing subject is determined based on the access request; The desired version identifier is compared with the current version identifier of the target data node; If the expected version identifier is inconsistent with the current version identifier, a concurrent write conflict is determined to have occurred, the data change is refused to be executed, and the current version identifier of the target data node is returned to the accessing subject. If the expected version identifier is consistent with the current version identifier, it is determined that no concurrent write conflict has occurred, and the current data snapshot before the target data node change is written into the version history.

[0009] Optionally, the method further includes: Receive a version rollback request sent by the access subject, obtain the corresponding historical data snapshot from the version history record according to the rollback version identifier in the version rollback request, and restore the data in the target data node to the historical data snapshot; The system receives an audit request from the accessing entity and, based on the time interval or accessing entity identifier in the audit request, exports the corresponding audit trajectory from the version history.

[0010] Optionally, the method further includes: Establish relation edges with relation names between the tree-like data nodes; the relation edges form an association network independently of the parent-child hierarchical relationship; the relation edges carry a direction attribute, and the direction attribute is used to distinguish between a one-way association from the starting node to the ending node and a two-way equivalent association between the starting node and the ending node; Obtain the relationship retrieval request sent by the accessing entity; Based on any one or more of the start node, end node, or relationship name in the relationship retrieval request, retrieve and return matching relationship edges from the association network; Obtain the relationship clearing request sent by the accessing entity; The corresponding relationship edge is deleted from the associated network according to the relationship clearing request.

[0011] Secondly, this application provides an access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, including: The node modeling module is used to model the enterprise management data of the target enterprise as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship; the tree-like data node is attached with an explicit permission policy oriented to the access subject, and the explicit permission policy includes allowing access or denying access; The permission determination module is used to determine the target data node based on the access request sent by the access subject, and to search for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node, so as to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. The first permission determination module is used to return an access denied prompt to the access subject if the valid permission of the target data node is access denied. The second permission determination module is used to, if the valid permission of the target data node is allowed access, obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node based on the access request, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

[0012] Thirdly, this application provides an electronic device, comprising: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor is used to execute the computer program to implement the access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management as described above.

[0013] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program; wherein, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the aforementioned access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management.

[0014] In summary, this application models the enterprise management data of the target enterprise as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship. The tree-like data node carries explicit permission policies for the accessing subject, including allowing or denying access. Based on the access request sent by the accessing subject, the target data node is determined. The explicit permission policy is searched within the tree-like data node based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. If the effective permission of the target data node is denying access, an access denial prompt is returned to the accessing subject. If the effective permission of the target data node is allowing access, the data changes performed by the accessing subject on the target data node are obtained based on the access request. A snapshot of the current data of the target data node before the change is written to the version history, and the changed data is written to the target data node, generating a new version identifier for the target data node. The version identifier is then returned to the accessing subject. As can be seen, various types of management data within an enterprise are abstracted into a tree-like node structure with a parent-child hierarchical relationship, and explicit permission policies for specific accessing subjects are directly attached to each node. Upon receiving an access request, the system first locates the target data node. Then, it searches upwards along the parent chain of the target data node, retrieving all defined explicit permission policies to comprehensively determine the effective permissions of the target data node. If the effective permission is to deny access, a denial message is returned to the requester; if access is allowed, the corresponding data modification operation is permitted. Before the modification occurs, a snapshot of the target node's current data is automatically saved to the version history. New data is then written, and a new version identifier for the node is generated. Finally, the version identifier is fed back to the accessing entity. In this way, by searching explicit permission policies level by level along the parent chain, permission inheritance and conflicts between upper and lower level nodes can be accurately handled, effectively avoiding unauthorized access or policy blind spots. This improves the granularity and interpretability of permission control and reduces management risks caused by inconsistent policies. Attached Figure Description

[0015] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0016] Figure 1 This application discloses a flowchart of an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management. Figure 2 This application discloses a flowchart of an explicit permission policy control for a specific node. Figure 3This application discloses a specific access control flowchart based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management. Figure 4 This is another specific access control flowchart based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management disclosed in this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an interconnected network structure disclosed in this application; Figure 6 This application discloses a block diagram of an access control system based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management. Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an access control device structure based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management disclosed in this application; Figure 8 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device disclosed in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0017] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0018] Currently, access control is a core element in ensuring data security and compliant operations within enterprise data management systems. Traditional access control schemes typically employ coarse-grained authorization based on roles or user groups, making it difficult to finely express the inheritance and conflict relationships between parent-child data nodes. For example, organizational structures, product catalogs, and financial accounts naturally exhibit tree-like hierarchical characteristics, while existing relational databases or ordinary permission tables often only record the access rules of the nodes themselves. When the policies of upper-level and lower-level nodes are inconsistent, there is a lack of clear judgment logic, easily leading to blind spots in permissions or risks of unauthorized access. Furthermore, most systems only focus on the access decision result, often lacking a traceable version snapshot mechanism for data changes after access is granted, failing to meet the needs of auditing, tracing, and rolling back erroneous operations. In addition, the efficiency of searching permission policies decreases with increasing node depth. When recursively searching along the parent chain path, existing implementations often suffer from performance issues due to a lack of caching or index optimization. More critically, existing solutions do not uniformly prioritize access denial and access permission; some use default permission, while others use default denial, resulting in inconsistent permission behaviors across different business modules and increasing management and development costs. To address the aforementioned technical issues, this application discloses an access control method, apparatus, device, and medium based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, which can improve the fine-grained management of data permissions.

[0019] See Figure 1 As shown in the figure, this invention discloses an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, including: Step S11: Model the enterprise management data of the target enterprise as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship; the tree-like data node is attached with an explicit permission policy for the access subject, the explicit permission policy including allow access or deny access.

[0020] In this embodiment, the target enterprise requiring data access control is identified. The enterprise management data of the target enterprise includes various data objects generated and managed during its production, operation, and IT infrastructure development. These include both business data and equipment data. Business data includes organizational structure data, product catalog data, financial account data, project sets and task data, approval document data, and digital asset resource data. Equipment data includes equipment ledger data, spare parts data, equipment location data, and sensor measurement point data. It should be noted that in traditional solutions, these two types of data are often stored in separate subsystems, each using different identification and access control systems. However, in this embodiment, business data and equipment data are uniformly abstracted into a single tree-like data node.

[0021] Specifically, based on the inherent hierarchical relationships within enterprise management data, each data object is mapped to a data node, and these data nodes are organized into several directed trees using parent node identifiers. Each data node has at most one parent node and can have zero, one, or more child nodes; the data node without a parent node is the root node. Taking organizational structure data as an example, the group is mapped as the root node, and its subordinate business units, departments, and work teams are mapped sequentially to the next level of data nodes. Similarly, with equipment data, factory areas, workshops, production lines, equipment, and spare parts are mapped sequentially to nested data nodes. Thus, the hierarchical relationships in enterprise management data are mapped to a tree-like hierarchical structure.

[0022] It should be noted that each of the tree-like data nodes includes a node identifier and a path identifier. The path identifier is used to characterize the position of the data node in the tree-like hierarchical structure and is formed by sequentially concatenating the identifiers of the data node at each level. Specifically, the tree-structured data nodes include, but are not limited to, the following fields: Node Identifier, used to globally and uniquely identify the data node, which can be a universally unique identifier automatically assigned by the system or a custom value provided by the caller in the creation request; Parent Node Identifier, used to record the direct parent node of the data node, with the parent node identifier of the root node being empty; URN (Uniform Resource Name) Path Identifier, used to characterize the position of the data node in the tree hierarchy; Node Type, used to distinguish whether the data node is a business node, device node, or hybrid node; Node Data, used to carry the business or device payload corresponding to the data node, which can be stored in the form of key-value objects; Number of Child Nodes, used to redundantly record the current number of direct child nodes of the data node to accelerate node statistics and permission scope determination; Version Identifier, used to characterize the current version of the data node, which is updated every time data changes occur; Write Time and Write Subject, used to record the time and executor of the most recent data change; Node Status, used to distinguish whether the data node is in a normal state or a soft deletion state. Node data is shown in Table 1.

[0023] Table 1

[0024] It should be noted that when adding a new node, a corresponding URN path is generated: `urnPath = parent.urnPath + " / " + Encode(nodeId)`; the root node's `urnPath = " / " + Encode(nodeId)`. The `nodeId` is URL-encoded and its length is normalized to ensure the path segment is unique and parsable; the separator " / " is used as the level boundary. Then, string prefix matching (materialized-path mode) is performed using `urnPath + " / "` as the prefix, allowing the entire subtree to be retrieved in a single query without recursive JOINs. For all nodes in the target subtree, `urnPath` is reconstructed in batches using a "string replacement" method (old prefix → new prefix), and the old parent's `childCount` is simultaneously decremented by 1 and the new parent's `childCount` is incremented by 1; the entire process is completed atomically within a database transaction, ensuring consistency between the path and the count. When deleting a node, only `state = soft delete` is marked, and the parent's `childCount` is maintained, while the `urnPath` is preserved for recovery, impact analysis, and auditing. The pseudocode for generating the URN path is shown below: Function MakePath(n): if n.parent == null: return " / " + Encode(n.nodeId) return MakePath(n.parent) + " / " + Encode(n.nodeId) Function SubTree(root): return { m | m.urnPath, prefixed with root.urnPath + " / "} Function Move(n, newParent): / / Atomic reconstruction of the entire subtree path oldPrefix = n.urnPath newPrefix = newParent.urnPath + " / " + n.nodeId for m in SubTree(n): m.urnPath = newPrefix + m.urnPath[len(oldPrefix):] Update oldParent.childCount - 1, newParent.childCount + 1 Furthermore, using custom node identifiers ensures that newly created data nodes align with the primary keys in existing business systems, enabling data access and migration without modifying the existing system. This embodiment also supports recursively creating multi-level nested child nodes in a single creation request, allowing the entire subtree to be built in batches with a single request. All created data nodes are atomically committed within the same database transaction, avoiding isolated nodes resulting from tree construction interruptions. In addition, the creator of a data node automatically receives the explicit permission policy corresponding to the node's owner permissions, eliminating the need for separate authorization after creation and preventing situations where the creator cannot access their created nodes due to lack of authorization. The node type allows explicit permission policies and the relationship edges described later to impose differentiated constraints based on the node type. For example, write operations on device nodes can be restricted to access subjects that have passed device authentication, or relationship edges with a certain name can be restricted to be established only between business nodes and device nodes. This preserves differentiated management capabilities for different data types while maintaining unified modeling.

[0025] Meanwhile, explicit permission policies are assigned to each access subject on the node. Access subjects can be users, user groups, roles, application systems, or terminal devices, etc. Explicit permission policies are used to determine whether to allow access to the access subject in a fatal way. The fields of the explicit permission policies are shown in Table 2.

[0026] Table 2

[0027] Step S12: Determine the target data node based on the access request sent by the accessing subject, and search for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node.

[0028] In this embodiment, upon receiving an access request, the target data node is located in the tree-structured data nodes based on the node identifier or path identifier carried in the access request. Starting from the target data node, the parent chain path is formed by traversing all ancestor nodes traversed up to the root node, examining whether the target data node itself and each ancestor node on its parent chain path carry an explicit permission policy for the current access subject. The final permission conclusion is determined by whether access is allowed or denied. Simultaneously, the parsed explicit permission policy is cached according to the (subject, nodeId) dimension, and the cache is incrementally refreshed by monitoring node authorization / movement / deletion operations.

[0029] In one specific embodiment, if the target data node itself carries an explicit permission policy of the access subject, then its own explicit permission policy is directly determined as a valid permission. Specifically, the explicit permission policy carried by the target data node itself has the highest binding force; once it denies access, no ancestor node, regardless of whether it carries an explicit permission policy that allows access, cannot override the denial of access.

[0030] In another specific embodiment, if the target data node itself does not carry an explicit permission policy for the accessing subject, then based on the path identifier, a search is performed radially upwards along the parent link to obtain the explicit permission policy carried by the node closest to the target data node, and this explicit permission policy is determined as the valid permission of the target data node. Specifically, each ancestor node is examined level by level upwards along the parent link path from near to far. Once an explicit permission policy for the current accessing subject is found on an ancestor node, the search is immediately terminated, and this explicit permission policy is determined as the valid permission of the target data node.

[0031] In a third specific embodiment, if no explicit permission policy is found by traversing the parent chain path of the target data node to the root node, the preset default permission policy is determined as the valid permission for the target data node. Specifically, when no explicit permission policy for the current accessing subject is found by traversing the parent chain path to the root node, a fallback policy is triggered, that is, the explicit permission policy pre-configured by the system administrator is directly determined as the valid permission for the target data node. In scenarios with high data security requirements, it is preferable to configure the preset default permission policy as default denial, that is, access is not allowed for those who have not been explicitly authorized, thereby avoiding permission blind spots due to missed authorization configurations.

[0032] The pseudocode for explicit policy preference and explicit rejection preference is shown below: Function Resolve(u, n): If n mounts an explicit policy p (for u or the group to which u belongs): return the effect(p) / / Explicit rejection takes precedence over inheritance permission If n is the root node: return the default strategy(u) return Resolve(u, n.parent) Function CheckWrite(u, n): eff = Resolve(u, n) return eff.effect == ALLOW and "write" ∈ eff.actions In this embodiment, if several explicit permission policies are attached to the target data node, the explicit permission policies are sorted according to preset priorities to generate a policy sequence. If there are allowed access and denied access policies with the same preset priority in the policy sequence, the denied access policy is determined as a valid permission. Specifically, multiple explicit permission policies can be attached to the same data node for different access subjects or different dimensions of the same access subject. For example, if an access subject belongs to both user group A and user group B, and user group A and user group B are granted allowed access and denied access respectively on the same data node, a policy conflict is formed on that data node. Therefore, a policy sequence is generated by sorting the explicit permission policies from high to low according to their preset priorities, and the explicit permission policy with the highest priority in the policy sequence is taken as the explicit permission policy of the data node. When there are allowed access and denied access policies with the same preset priority in the policy sequence, the denied access policy is always determined as the explicit permission policy of the data node.

[0033] Furthermore, the explicit permission policy carries effective conditions, which include any one or more of the following: time window, source network address, or attribute expression. Specifically, the time window of the explicit permission policy is used to limit the policy to be effective only within a specified time interval, such as limiting access to a certain external collaborating entity only during working hours on weekdays; the source network address is used to limit the policy to be effective only for access requests from a specified network segment or address, such as limiting write operations to be initiated only from the enterprise's internal network; the attribute expression is used to dynamically determine whether the explicit permission policy is effective based on the attributes of the accessing entity or the data node itself, such as limiting access only when the accessing entity's job attribute matches the data node's department attribute. During the permission determination process, the effectiveness conditions of each explicit permission policy are first checked to see if they are met. Only explicit permission policies whose effectiveness conditions are met are included in the policy sequence for sorting and adjudication; explicit permission policies whose effectiveness conditions are not met are considered unattached and do not participate in this permission determination.

[0034] Step S13: If the valid permission of the target data node is "Access Denied", then return an access denied prompt to the access subject.

[0035] In this embodiment, when it is determined that the target data node's valid permissions for the current accessing subject are denied, no subsequent operations indicated in the access request are executed. Instead, an access denial prompt is directly returned to the accessing subject. The access denial prompt may carry the identifier of the denied node, the type of operation denied, and the reason for the denial. For example, the target data node itself may have an explicit access denial policy, or the most recent ancestor node along the parent chain path may have an explicit access denial policy. This makes the permission determination result interpretable, facilitating administrators to investigate authorization configurations. It is understood that since the data change has not yet been executed, the data content and version identifier of the target data node remain unchanged. Unauthorized write requests are intercepted before being written to the database, avoiding the damage caused by rolling back unauthorized data after it has been written.

[0036] Step S14: If the valid permission of the target data node is "allowed access", then based on the access request, obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

[0037] In this embodiment, when the valid permission is to allow access, the data changes to be performed by the access subject are parsed from the access request. The data changes include, but are not limited to, modifying one or more fields in the node data, replacing the entire node data, moving the data node, and soft deleting the data node.

[0038] Before actually writing the modified data to the target data node, the expected version identifier of the accessing subject is determined based on the access request. The expected version identifier is compared with the current version identifier of the target data node. If the expected version identifier does not match the current version identifier, a concurrent write conflict is determined, the data change is rejected, and the current version identifier of the target data node is returned to the accessing subject. If the expected version identifier matches the current version identifier, no concurrent write conflict is determined, and a snapshot of the current data of the target data node before the change is written to the version history. Specifically, in a multi-device collaborative scenario, the expected version identifier of the accessing subject is obtained and compared with the version number of the current target data node. If they do not match, it means that the node has been successfully modified by another accessing subject within the time window between the accessing subject's read and write operations, and the data on which this data change is based is outdated. In this case, a concurrent write conflict is determined, and the data change is rejected. If the version number is correct, it means that the data node has not been modified by other accessing subjects since the accessing subject read it. A snapshot of the target data node is written to the version history, and after making data changes, a new version identifier is incremented and returned to the accessing subject. The version history can be implemented in the form of a version history table. The pseudocode for node version change is shown below: Function Mutate(n, new_data, u, expected_version): If CheckWrite(u, n) is not found: return "Reject". if expectedVersion exists and expectedVersion != n.writeVersion: return concurrency conflict(current version n.writeVersion) / / optimistic locking Transaction begins: `writeVersion.append(sn.data, n.writeVersion, now(), u, opType))` n.writeVersion ← n.writeVersion + 1 n.data ← New data n.writeTime ← now(); n.writeUser ← u Refresh the permission cache (u, n.nodeId) Transaction commit return success (carrying n.writeVersion) It should be noted that, while refusing to execute the data change, the system returns the current version identifier of the target data node to the accessing subject. Based on this, the accessing subject can retrieve the latest data of the data node again, merge the differences between the local changes and the latest data, and then re-initiate the write request with the new desired version identifier.

[0039] As can be seen from the above, the embodiments of this application abstract various types of management data within an enterprise into a tree-like node structure with parent-child hierarchical relationships, and directly attach explicit permission policies for specific access subjects to each node. For example... Figure 2 As shown, if an access subject initiates an access request to the target node n, the access request carries the user u, new data, and the expected version number expectedVersion (in a multi-device collaborative scenario). When an access request is received, the target data node n is first located. The explicit policy of n itself takes precedence, with DENY taking priority and not being overridden by the ancestor ALLOW; otherwise, the explicit policy of the nearest ancestor is recursively inherited along the parent chain; the root node uses the default policy; if the verification fails, the request is directly rejected. If the valid permission is to deny access, a rejection message is returned to the access subject; if the permission is to allow access, the corresponding data change operation is allowed, and before the change occurs, a snapshot of the target node's current data is automatically stored in the version history. Then, new data is written, and a new version identifier for the node is generated. Finally, the version identifier is fed back to the access subject. The node storage unit writes new data and maintains n.urnPath and the parent node childCount according to URN rules (batch reconstruction of subtree paths during movement). The relationship management unit maintains the named relationship edges of n and updates the association network. The (subject, nodeId) parsing result is refreshed to the permission cache. This approach, by retrieving explicit permission policies level by level along the parent chain, accurately handles permission inheritance and conflicts between upper and lower level nodes, effectively avoiding unauthorized access or policy blind spots. It improves the granularity and interpretability of permission control, and reduces management risks caused by inconsistent policies.

[0040] See Figure 3 As shown, to address the issue of concurrent write conflicts across multiple devices, this invention discloses an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, comprising: Step S21: Receive the version backtracking request sent by the access subject, obtain the corresponding historical data snapshot from the version history record according to the backtracking version identifier in the version backtracking request, and restore the data in the target data node to the historical data snapshot.

[0041] In this embodiment, a matching historical data snapshot is retrieved from the version history record based on the version rollback request, and the data in the target data node is restored to the content saved in the historical data snapshot. The version rollback request carries the identifier of the data node to be rolled back and the rollback version identifier. It should be noted that the rollback operation itself is also considered a data change, therefore it also needs to undergo permission checks and conflict verification. Before restoration, the current data snapshot at the time of the rollback is written to the version history record, and after restoration, a new version identifier is generated. This ensures that the rollback operation itself is auditable and can be rolled back again, and the data state before the rollback is not lost due to the rollback.

[0042] Step S22: Receive the audit request sent by the access subject, and export the corresponding audit trajectory from the version history based on the time interval or access subject identifier in the audit request.

[0043] In this embodiment, based on the time interval or access subject identifier carried in the audit request, all data change records that occurred within the corresponding time interval or were performed by the access subject are filtered from the version history and exported as an audit trajectory in chronological order. The audit trajectory includes the node identifier, the data before the change, the version identifier, the write time, the write subject, and the operation type involved in each data change, thereby completely reconstructing who performed what change on which node at what time. It can be understood that since the movement operation of data nodes is also recorded in the version history, and the path identifier before the movement is saved along with the data snapshot, the changes in the position of data nodes in the tree hierarchy can also be traced. This is of great significance for scenarios that require post-event verification, such as organizational restructuring and asset transfer. Furthermore, the version history retention strategy can be configured to retain all historical versions in full or to perform rolling cleanup according to the retention duration and the number of retained versions, depending on actual needs; in scenarios with high audit compliance requirements, full retention is preferred. The version history is shown in Table 3.

[0044] Table 3

[0045] As shown above, by persisting the current snapshot and incrementing the version number before node changes, it is possible to support optimistic locking verification of concurrent write conflicts across multiple devices, arbitrary historical version backtracking, and auditing.

[0046] See Figure 4 As shown in the figure, this invention discloses an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, including: Step S31: Establish relation edges with relation names between the tree-like data nodes; the relation edges form an association network independently of the parent-child hierarchical relationship, and the relation edges carry a direction attribute, which is used to distinguish between a one-way association from the starting node to the ending node and a two-way equivalent association between the starting node and the ending node.

[0047] In this embodiment, outside the data tree, named relationship edges are established between any two nodes to form a structure such as... Figure 5 The network structure shown is illustrated. The fields of the relationship edges are shown in Table 4.

[0048] Table 4

[0049] In this embodiment, when the direction attribute is unidirectional, the relation edge represents a unidirectional business association from the starting node to the ending node, such as pre-positioning or replacement, and its reverse association is not valid. When the direction attribute is bidirectional, the relation edge represents a bidirectional equivalent association between the starting node and the ending node, such as equivalence or mapping, and both its forward and reverse directions can be retrieved. It should be noted that the association network is constructed independently of the parent-child hierarchical relationship, that is, whether there is a relation edge between two data nodes and what kind of relation edge exists is irrelevant to whether the two have an ancestor-descendant relationship in the tree hierarchy. Thus, the business association between data nodes under different branches can be directly expressed, making up for the insufficiency of a single-level tree in expressing cross-branch associations. The pseudocode for relation edge management is shown below: Function AddEdge(from, to, name, direction, props): Write the relation table. append({from, to, name, direction, props}) The function `QueryEdges(filter)`: / / filter: {from?, to?, name?} allows for any combination of these. return `relationship_table.select(match_filter)` Function RemoveEdges(filter): `relationship_table.delete(match_filter)` Step S32: Obtain the relationship retrieval request sent by the accessing subject.

[0050] Step S33: Based on any one or more of the starting node, ending node, or relationship name in the relationship retrieval request, retrieve and return matching relationship edges from the association network.

[0051] In this embodiment, if the accessing entity needs to query a data node, it will send a relationship retrieval request. The relationship retrieval request can carry the starting node, the ending node, or the relationship name. Using the starting node and the relationship name as conditions, all downstream associations of the starting node can be retrieved in a forward direction; using the ending node and the relationship name as conditions, all upstream associations of the ending node can be retrieved in a reverse direction; using the relationship name as conditions, all relationship edges carrying the same business semantics can be filtered out globally.

[0052] Step S34: Obtain the relationship clearing request sent by the accessing subject.

[0053] Step S35: Delete the corresponding relationship edge from the associated network according to the relationship clearing request.

[0054] In this embodiment, if the accessing subject needs to delete a relation edge, it will send a relation clearing request. For example, the relation clearing request is used to delete a specified relation edge. It can specify the edge identifier to clear a single relation edge, or specify the relation name to clear all relation edges carrying the same business semantics in batches.

[0055] Furthermore, transitive closure analysis can be performed based on the aforementioned network of relationships. This involves starting from a data node and expanding hop-by-hop along the relationship edges to determine the set of all data nodes that can be reached. This allows for an assessment of which related nodes will be affected by the change before implementing a change on that data node. To avoid excessive expansion or loops in densely connected networks, the maximum number of hops for the transitive closure analysis can be configured with an upper limit.

[0056] As can be seen from the previous embodiment, this application discloses an access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, which can improve the fine-grained management of data permissions. Next, in conjunction with three specific application embodiments, we will address... Figure 6 The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management is explained in detail.

[0057] Application Example 1: Access control for digital twin resource management platforms.

[0058] The digital twin resource management platform integrates various digital asset resources such as Building Information Modeling (BIM), Geographic Information Systems (GIS), graphical language transmission format models, and real-time rendering engines. It needs to manage multiple digital twin projects simultaneously, each with a hierarchical resource tree. From top to bottom, the tree consists of sub-nodes such as project, external identifier root node, model and drawings, point cloud, and equipment locations. The platform supports multi-tenant, multi-role collaborative access from design institutes, construction companies, owners, and external collaborators. It also needs to support simultaneous modification of the same digital asset by the design-side 3D editor, the on-site mobile inspection application, and the web-based configuration tool. Furthermore, the platform contains numerous cross-level business relationships, such as a device measurement point belonging to a factory building, or a BIM component mapped to an IoT measurement point. In traditional solutions, these resources are scattered across different systems, permissions are statically configured at the role level, versions rely on manual backups, and relationships are maintained using external tables, exhibiting the drawbacks listed in the background section.

[0059] All resources in the digital twin resource management platform are uniformly abstracted into tree-like data nodes. Regarding node modeling, taking a port digital delivery project as an example, the root node's path identifier is " / proj_haiyang" and its node type is a business node; the external identifier root node's path identifier is " / proj_haiyang / ext_bim"; the building information model floor node's path identifier is " / proj_haiyang / ext_bim / floor_3" and its node type is a hybrid node; the factory component node's path identifier is " / proj_haiyang / ext_bim / floor_3 / comp_001"; and the equipment measuring point node's path identifier is " / proj_haiyang / ext_iot / sensor_007" and its node type is an equipment node. When adding a new equipment measurement point node, its path identifier is formed by concatenating the path identifier of the parent node; when retrieving all assets below this floor, subtree matching is performed with " / proj_haiyang / ext_bim / floor_3 / " as the prefix, and the entire subtree can be retrieved in one query; when moving factory components to another floor, all descendant nodes with the path identifier of this node as the prefix are batch-replaced with strings to rebuild the path identifier, and the number of child nodes of the new and old parent nodes is updated synchronously.

[0060] Regarding access control, project administrators attach explicit permission policies allowing access to the design institute user group on the project root node, with the operation set including read and write. On confidential factory component nodes, explicit permission policies denying access are attached to external collaboration groups, even if their ancestor nodes have already been granted access. When an external collaboration group accesses this component node, the denial of access is triggered, and this denial is not overridden by any ancestor node's allowable access, thus eliminating the risk of cross-tenant privilege escalation. On read-only delivery package nodes, explicit permission policies allowing access are attached, with the operation set including only read and not write; therefore, the effective permissions inherited by downstream descendant nodes are read-only. The above parsing results are written to the permission cache according to the binary dimension of the access subject and data node, and incremental refresh is performed when authorization changes.

[0061] Regarding version management, when the 3D editor on the design side and the mobile inspection application on the field side simultaneously modify the same device measurement node, both parties' write requests carry the expected version identifier obtained during their respective reads. The first request, after comparison confirming that the expected version identifier matches the current version identifier, first writes a snapshot of the data before the change, along with the then-current version identifier, write time, write subject, and operation type, to the version history. Then, a new version identifier is generated and written to the changed data. Finally, a success result and the new version identifier are returned to the caller. The second request, after comparison, finds that its expected version identifier is inconsistent with the auto-incremented current version identifier. Therefore, a concurrent write conflict is determined, the data change is rejected, and the current version identifier is returned. The client performs difference merging and then retryes. Furthermore, auditors can restore the device measurement node to the delivery baseline version, leaving a complete trace in the version history, supporting backtracking to any historical version.

[0062] In terms of association management, a mapping relationship edge is established between equipment measurement point nodes and plant component nodes. Since these nodes are located under different subtree branches, their association is difficult to express using a hierarchical tree and is supplemented by an association network. Similarly, a belonging relationship edge is established between process equipment nodes and their respective plant nodes. Retrieving all mapping relationship edges by relationship name enables bidirectional linkage between the Building Information Model (BIM) and IoT data. Performing bidirectional retrieval by starting or ending node allows the component to trace back to its mapped equipment measurement point. When a component node changes, transitive closure analysis is performed via the association network to assess which measurement points will be affected and require synchronous updates.

[0063] Taking updating equipment measurement points and triggering associated linkage at the field end as an example, the complete chain of a single write request is as follows: The field end initiates a write request to sensor_007, carrying the inspector's access subject identifier, the changed data, and the expected version identifier; the system parses the inspector's valid permissions for this node, which are inherited from the project root node's allowed access and the node itself does not have access denied, so the permission verification passes; then, concurrent write conflict verification is performed, and the expected version identifier is consistent with the current version identifier, so the verification passes; then, a snapshot of the data before the change is written to the version history and a new version identifier is generated; then, the changed data is written, and the path identifier of this node and the number of child nodes of the parent node are maintained according to the path generation rules; then, the mapping relationship edges of this node are retrieved, and the associated component nodes are marked as pending synchronization; finally, the permission cache of the access subject and data node tuple is refreshed. The above steps from permission determination to data writing are completed in an orderly manner within the same database transaction. Thus, the platform's digital assets are uniformly converged on the base of tree-like data nodes and path identifiers, with authorization, version, and association maintained from the same source, and the above capabilities can be implemented without introducing heavy external components such as graph databases.

[0064] Application Example 2: Access Control for Approval Flow and Project Management.

[0065] Taking a lightweight enterprise collaboration scenario as an example, this embodiment uses a project set and approval workflow with multiple projects running in parallel as an example for illustration.

[0066] A group uses a project portfolio model to manage multiple parallel projects. Each project contains several task nodes, and key nodes require an approval process. For example, a purchase request needs to be approved by the department manager and then by the finance department. This scenario presents three requirements: First, unified asset management, meaning that projects, tasks, approval forms, and attachments are all modeled as data nodes, using the same path addressing and node movement mechanism; second, hierarchical authorization, meaning that the project portfolio director can view all projects, project managers only manage their own projects, and ordinary members must be explicitly rejected for sensitive nodes such as budget adjustments; third, concurrent countersigning, meaning that the same approval form may be filled in by multiple approvers simultaneously, and it is necessary to avoid overlapping.

[0067] Regarding node modeling and access control, a typical path identifier example is as follows: the project set root node is " / corp / program / 20XX", project A node is " / corp / program / 20XX / projA", task module node is " / corp / program / 20XX / projA / tasks", purchase requisition node is " / corp / program / 20XX / projA / tasks / pr-1024", and approval opinion node is " / corp / program / 20XX / projA / tasks / pr-1024 / opinion-zhang". In this scenario, each data node is primarily a business node. When project A needs to be transferred entirely to another project set, only this data node needs to be moved. The path identifiers of all its descendant nodes are atomically reconstructed according to the aforementioned rules, and the link relationship between the approval form and the approval opinion will not be lost. Regarding authorization, an explicit permission policy of "allow access" is attached to the project manager group on the root node of the project set, and an explicit permission policy of "allow access" is attached to the ordinary member group on the root node of project A. However, an explicit permission policy of "deny access" is attached to the ordinary member group on the sensitive purchase requisition node for budget adjustments. During parsing, when an ordinary member accesses the purchase requisition node, the "deny access" policy attached to that node itself is triggered, and it is not overridden by the "allow access" policy of any ancestor node. This not only preserves the convenience of collaboration within the project, but also achieves precise blocking of sensitive documents.

[0068] Regarding version and association management, when a purchase requisition enters the countersigning stage, if Zhang San and Li Si simultaneously fill in their approval opinions, they each initiate the operation of adding sub-opinions based on the same version they read. Their requests both carry the same expected version identifier. Since the added opinion is implemented as an independent sub-node of the purchase requisition node, and the version identifier is only maintained for changes to the data node itself (the parent node's version identifier is not automatically incremented by adding a sub-node), the two individuals adding sub-opinions do not affect each other and can both be successfully submitted. However, if one of them attempts to rewrite the same summary field of the purchase requisition node itself, such as simultaneously modifying the purchase amount, the later submitter will be rejected because their expected version identifier does not match the already automatically incremented current version identifier. They must then re-edit based on the new version and resubmit, thus preventing mutual overwriting during the countersigning process. Any historical version can be traced back through the version history. In terms of relationships, a one-way relationship edge with the prefix "Purchase requisition" is established between the purchase requisition node and the payment task node, indicating that the payment task requires the purchase requisition to be approved. A one-way relationship edge with the prefix "Assigned" is established between the purchase requisition node and the approver node. By performing a search based on the prefix "Purchase requisition", the scope of the impact of the payment task being blocked due to the purchase not being approved can be automatically deduced.

[0069] Application Example 3: Access control for equipment ledgers and asset inventory.

[0070] Taking the scenario of heavy asset registration and periodic inventory as an example, this embodiment uses enterprise equipment ledger and annual asset inventory as examples to illustrate and demonstrate the lightweight implementation of the four mechanisms.

[0071] A manufacturing company maintains a comprehensive equipment ledger, organized hierarchically by factory area, workshop, production line, equipment, and spare parts. During annual asset inventory, multiple inventory personnel simultaneously update equipment status and quantity across different areas. This scenario also presents three requirements: unified asset modeling, hierarchical authorization, and concurrent inventory. Specifically, workshop directors can manage equipment within their workshops, but financial valuation and depreciation records must be blocked from ordinary inventory personnel. Furthermore, multiple inventory personnel may update the same equipment record simultaneously during the inventory period.

[0072] Regarding node modeling and access control, a typical path identifier example is as follows: the plant root node is " / corp / site / plant-1", the workshop node is " / corp / site / plant-1 / workshop-A", the production line node is " / corp / site / plant-1 / workshop-A / line-1", the equipment node is " / corp / site / plant-1 / workshop-A / line-1 / eq-053" and its node type is equipment node, and the spare parts node is " / corp / site / plant-1 / workshop-A / line-1 / eq-053 / sp-009". When a piece of equipment is transferred to another production line, only the equipment node needs to be moved. The path identifiers of all its spare parts sub-nodes are atomically reconstructed according to the aforementioned rules, and the financial valuation and maintenance records will not be broken due to the move. Regarding authorization, an explicit permission policy of "allow access" is applied to the workshop director group at the plant root node, and an explicit permission policy of "allow access" is applied to the inventory staff group at the workshop root node. However, an explicit permission policy of "deny access" is applied to the inventory staff group at the financial node that carries the original value, depreciation, and valuation. During parsing, when an inventory staff member accesses the financial node, the "deny access" policy applied to that node itself is triggered, and it is not overridden by any "allow access" policy of any ancestor node. This retains the convenience for inventory staff to modify equipment status while achieving precise blocking of financial data.

[0073] Regarding version control and related management, during the inventory period, multiple inventory personnel update different equipment nodes in different areas. For example, Person A is responsible for Area A and updates the operating status of a certain equipment, while Person B is responsible for Area B and updates the physical quantity of another equipment. Since they are targeting different data nodes, and each data node independently maintains its own version identifier, they can each successfully submit with the expected version identifier read locally without blocking each other. However, in cases where two people need to update the same equipment node simultaneously, the person who submits first increments the version identifier of the node and writes a snapshot of the data before the change beforehand. The person who submits later is rejected because their expected version identifier is inconsistent with the current version identifier and must re-check based on the new version before editing. Concurrent writes on the same data node are thus serialized, ensuring that multiple inventory personnel can efficiently carry out concurrent inventory without overwriting each other's accounting and physical data. Any historical version can be traced back through the version history record, meeting the traceability requirements. Regarding the association, a one-way relationship edge named "Replacement" is established between spare parts nodes and equipment nodes; a one-way relationship edge named "Located" is established between equipment nodes and workshop nodes to express the physical ownership of assets; and a two-way relationship edge named "Same Model" is established between two equipment nodes of the same model to facilitate the batch distribution of maintenance strategies. By performing a search based on the relationship name replacement, a list of equipment affected by changes in spare parts inventory can be derived. It is understood that the above three application examples cover three typical scenarios: heavy industrial assets, general collaboration, and asset registration, collectively demonstrating that the technical solution of this application has good versatility and implementability.

[0074] In summary, compared with the prior art, this application has at least the following beneficial effects.

[0075] Firstly, a unified data foundation: Device data and business data are uniformly modeled as tree-like data nodes carrying node identifiers, path identifiers, and version identifiers, and with explicit permission policies and relationship edges attached. This allows addressing, authorization, versioning, and association to form a closed loop on the same data model, facilitating authorization sharing, auditing, and backtracking.

[0076] Secondly, secure permission inheritance: The system prioritizes explicit permission policies closest to the target data node and searches the parent chain path level by level. Explicit denial of access takes precedence over inherited permission. This fundamentally eliminates the risk of parent node permission overrides child node denial of access. Furthermore, a unified and configurable default permission policy eliminates inconsistencies in permission behaviors across different business modules.

[0077] Third, traceable version management: before data changes, a snapshot of the data before the change is written and a new version identifier is generated, supporting the verification of concurrent write conflicts of multiple devices and the backtracking of historical versions. Moreover, this capability is implemented at the data layer, and the upper-layer business does not need to handle it itself.

[0078] Fourth, flexible association network: Relationship edges with relationship names form an association network independent of the parent-child hierarchy, which makes up for the inability of a single-level tree to express cross-branch business relationships, and can evaluate the scope of impact of changes based on transitive closure analysis.

[0079] Fifth, it is loosely coupled and easy to implement: all of the above capabilities share the same data base, and can be implemented by those skilled in the art based on the description in this specification, without the need to introduce heavy external components such as graph databases.

[0080] It should be further explained that, using a tree-structured data node storage as a unified data foundation, the system first determines the current access subject's valid permissions to the target data node, then performs concurrent write conflict verification, followed by writing a snapshot of the data before the change, and finally writing the changed data and generating a new version identifier. This execution order ensures that any change to a data node undergoes triple protection: permission determination, conflict prevention, and record keeping.

[0081] See Figure 7 As shown, this embodiment of the invention discloses an access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, comprising: The node modeling module 11 is used to model the enterprise management data of the target enterprise as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship; the tree-like data node is attached with an explicit permission policy oriented to the access subject, and the explicit permission policy includes allowing access or denying access; The permission determination module 12 is used to determine the target data node based on the access request sent by the access subject, and to search for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node, so as to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. The first permission determination module 13 is used to return a denied access prompt to the access subject if the valid permission of the target data node is denied access. The second permission determination module 14 is used to obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node based on the access request if the valid permission of the target data node is the allowed access, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

[0082] As shown above, this application abstracts various types of management data within an enterprise into a tree-like node structure with parent-child hierarchical relationships, and directly attaches explicit permission policies for specific access subjects to each node. When an access request is received, the target data node is first located, and then all defined explicit permission policies are retrieved level by level along the parent chain path of the target data node to comprehensively determine the effective permissions of the target data node. If the effective permission is to deny access, a denial message is returned to the requester; if the access is allowed, the corresponding data change operation is allowed, and before the change occurs, a snapshot of the current data of the target node is automatically stored in the version history, then the new data is written and a new version identifier for the node is generated, and finally the version identifier is fed back to the access subject. In this way, by retrieving explicit permission policies level by level along the parent chain path, permission inheritance and conflicts between upper and lower level nodes can be accurately handled, effectively avoiding unauthorized access or policy blind spots. This improves the granularity and interpretability of permission control and reduces the management risks caused by inconsistent policies.

[0083] Optionally, each of the tree-like data nodes includes a node identifier and a path identifier. The path identifier is used to characterize the position of the data node in the tree-like hierarchical structure and is formed by sequentially concatenating the identifiers of the data node at each level.

[0084] Optionally, the permission determination module 12 may specifically include: The first permission determination unit is used to determine its own explicit permission policy as a valid permission if the target data node itself has an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject. The second permission determination unit is used to search radially upward along the parent link based on the path identifier if the target data node itself does not have an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject, and obtain the explicit permission policy attached to the node that satisfies the condition of being closest to the target data node, so as to determine it as the valid permission of the target data node. The third permission determination unit is used to determine the preset default permission policy as the valid permission of the target data node if no explicit permission policy is found when searching along the parent chain path of the target data node to the root node.

[0085] Optionally, the access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management may further include: The sequence generation unit is used to sort the explicit permission policies according to a preset priority and generate a policy sequence if the target data node has several explicit permission policies attached to it. The policy determination unit is used to determine the denied access as a valid permission if there are allowed access and denied access with the same preset priority in the policy sequence; wherein the explicit permission policy carries an effective condition, and the effective condition includes any one or more of the following: time window, source network address, or attribute expression.

[0086] Optionally, the access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management may further include: An identifier determination unit is used to determine the desired version identifier of the accessing subject based on the access request; The identification comparison unit is used to compare the desired version identifier with the current version identifier of the target data node; The first comparison and determination unit is used to determine that a concurrent write conflict has occurred if the expected version identifier is inconsistent with the current version identifier, refuse to execute the data change, and return the current version identifier of the target data node to the access subject; The second comparison and determination unit is used to determine that no concurrent write conflict has occurred if the expected version identifier is consistent with the current version identifier, and to write the current data snapshot before the target data node change into the version history.

[0087] Optionally, the access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management may further include: The snapshot unit is used to receive a version rollback request sent by the access subject, obtain the corresponding historical data snapshot from the version history record according to the rollback version identifier in the version rollback request, and restore the data in the target data node to the historical data snapshot. An audit trajectory export unit is used to receive an audit request sent by the access subject and export the corresponding audit trajectory from the version history based on the time interval or access subject identifier in the audit request.

[0088] Optionally, the access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management may further include: A relation edge establishment unit is used to establish relation edges with relation names between the tree data nodes; the relation edges form an association network independently of the parent-child hierarchical relationship; the relation edges carry a direction attribute, and the direction attribute is used to distinguish between a one-way association from the starting node to the ending node and a two-way equivalent association between the starting node and the ending node; A retrieval request acquisition unit is used to acquire a relationship retrieval request sent by the accessing subject; The relation edge retrieval unit is used to retrieve and return matching relation edges from the association network based on any one or more of the start node, end node, or relation name in the relation retrieval request. A clearing request unit is used to obtain a relationship clearing request sent by the accessing subject; The relationship edge deletion unit is used to delete the corresponding relationship edge from the associated network according to the relationship clearing request.

[0089] Furthermore, embodiments of this application also disclose an electronic device, Figure 8 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device 20 according to an exemplary embodiment. The content of the diagram should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application. The electronic device 20 may specifically include: at least one processor 21, at least one memory 22, a power supply 23, a communication interface 24, an input / output interface 25, and a communication bus 26. The memory 22 stores a computer program, which is loaded and executed by the processor 21 to implement the relevant steps in the access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management disclosed in any of the foregoing embodiments. Furthermore, the electronic device 20 in this embodiment may specifically be a computer.

[0090] In this embodiment, the power supply 23 is used to provide operating voltage for each hardware device on the electronic device 20; the communication interface 24 can create a data transmission channel between the electronic device 20 and external devices, and the communication protocol it follows can be any communication protocol applicable to the technical solution of this application, and is not specifically limited here; the input / output interface 25 is used to acquire external input data or output data to the outside world, and its specific interface type can be selected according to specific application needs, and is not specifically limited here.

[0091] In addition, the memory 22, as a carrier for resource storage, can be a read-only memory, random access memory, disk or optical disk, etc. The resources stored thereon can include operating system 221, computer program 222, etc., and the storage method can be temporary storage or permanent storage.

[0092] The operating system 221 is used to manage and control the various hardware devices on the electronic device 20 and the computer program 222, which may be Windows Server, Netware, Unix, Linux, etc. In addition to including a computer program capable of performing the access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management disclosed in any of the foregoing embodiments, the computer program 222 may further include computer programs capable of performing other specific tasks.

[0093] Furthermore, this application also discloses a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program; wherein, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the aforementioned access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management. Specific steps of this method can be found in the corresponding content disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0094] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to in the method section.

[0095] Those skilled in the art will further recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of the various examples have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0096] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented directly by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.

[0097] Finally, it should be noted that in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0098] The technical solutions provided in this application have been described in detail above. Specific examples have been used to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope based on the ideas of this application. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.

Claims

1. An access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, characterized in that, include: The enterprise management data of the target company is modeled as a tree-like data node with a parent-child hierarchical relationship; The tree-structured data nodes are attached with explicit permission policies for the accessing subjects, and the explicit permission policies include allowing access or denying access. The target data node is determined based on the access request sent by the accessing subject, and the explicit permission policy is searched in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. If the valid permission of the target data node is "Access Denied", then return an access denied message to the accessing entity. If the valid permission of the target data node is "allowed access", then based on the access request, obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

2. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 1, characterized in that, Each of the tree-like data nodes includes a node identifier and a path identifier. The path identifier is used to characterize the position of the data node in the tree-like hierarchical structure and is formed by sequentially concatenating the identifiers of the data node at each level.

3. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of searching for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node to determine the effective permissions of the target data node includes: If the target data node itself has an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject, then its own explicit permission policy will be directly determined as a valid permission. If the target data node itself does not have an explicit permission policy attached to the access subject, then based on the path identifier, search radially upwards along the parent link to obtain the explicit permission policy attached to the node that meets the condition closest to the target data node, and determine it as the valid permission of the target data node. If no explicit permission policy is found by traversing the parent chain path of the target data node to the root node, then the preset default permission policy is determined as the valid permission for the target data node.

4. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: If the target data node has several explicit permission policies attached, the explicit permission policies are sorted according to a preset priority to generate a policy sequence. If there are allowed and denied accesses with the same preset priority in the policy sequence, then the denied access is determined as a valid permission; The explicit permission policy carries an effective condition, which includes any one or more of the following: time window, source network address, or attribute expression.

5. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before writing the current data snapshot before the target data node change to the version history, the method further includes: The desired version identifier of the accessing subject is determined based on the access request; The desired version identifier is compared with the current version identifier of the target data node; If the expected version identifier is inconsistent with the current version identifier, a concurrent write conflict is determined to have occurred, the data change is refused to be executed, and the current version identifier of the target data node is returned to the accessing subject. If the expected version identifier is consistent with the current version identifier, it is determined that no concurrent write conflict has occurred, and the current data snapshot before the target data node change is written into the version history.

6. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Receive a version rollback request sent by the access subject, obtain the corresponding historical data snapshot from the version history record according to the rollback version identifier in the version rollback request, and restore the data in the target data node to the historical data snapshot; The system receives an audit request from the accessing entity and, based on the time interval or accessing entity identifier in the audit request, exports the corresponding audit trajectory from the version history.

7. The access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Establish relation edges with relation names between the tree-like data nodes; The relation edges form an association network independently of the parent-child hierarchical relationship. The relation edges carry a direction attribute, which is used to distinguish between a one-way association from the starting node to the ending node and a two-way equivalent association between the starting node and the ending node. Obtain the relationship retrieval request sent by the accessing entity; Based on any one or more of the start node, end node, or relationship name in the relationship retrieval request, retrieve and return matching relationship edges from the association network; Obtain the relationship clearing request sent by the accessing entity; The corresponding relationship edge is deleted from the associated network according to the relationship clearing request.

8. An access control device based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management, characterized in that, include: The node modeling module is used to model the enterprise management data of the target enterprise as tree-like data nodes with parent-child hierarchical relationships; The tree-structured data nodes are attached with explicit permission policies for the accessing subjects, and the explicit permission policies include allowing access or denying access. The permission determination module is used to determine the target data node based on the access request sent by the access subject, and to search for explicit permission policies in the tree-like data nodes based on the parent chain path of the target data node, so as to determine the effective permissions of the target data node. The first permission determination module is used to return an access denied prompt to the access subject if the valid permission of the target data node is access denied. The second permission determination module is used to, if the valid permission of the target data node is allowed access, obtain the data changes performed by the access subject on the target data node based on the access request, write the current data snapshot of the target data node before the change into the version history, write the changed data into the target data node, generate a new version identifier for the target data node, and return the version identifier to the access subject.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor is configured to execute the computer program to implement the access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, Used to store computer programs; wherein, when the computer programs are executed by a processor, they implement the access control method based on enterprise data node modeling and authorization management as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.