Methods for combining deception defense with vulnerability scanning, honeypotting, interference, and asset protection
By generating shadow fingerprint assets and configuring controlled fake vulnerability responses through an SDN controller, the problem of concealing real assets and deceiving the environment in existing technologies is solved. This enables dynamic utilization of scanning behavior and policy closure, and improves the ability to reverse look up scanning sources and the effectiveness of authorized scanning.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611522584.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-29
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing technologies struggle to effectively coordinate the concealment of real assets, the creation of a trustworthy environment, and the dynamic utilization of scanning behavior during vulnerability scanning countermeasures. This can lead to the potential exposure of real assets or conflicts between protection strategies and legitimate scanning needs.
The SDN controller generates shadow fingerprint assets, configures the TCP/IP protocol stack parameters of the shadow fingerprint assets to match the real assets, guides scan traffic to the shadow fingerprint assets and provides controlled fake vulnerability responses, while the real assets adopt a silent protocol stack to only respond to legitimate requests, and dynamically updates the strategy based on scan packets.
It enhances the credibility of the deception environment and the ability to trace the scanning source, dynamically adjusts strategies to cope with new scanners and changing strategies, reduces the probability of being detected, and ensures the normal availability of authorized scanning.
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Figure CN123122995A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a method for integrating vulnerability scanning, honeypotting, interference, and asset protection with deception defense. Background Technology
[0002] Attackers use automated scanners to discover assets and detect vulnerabilities in target network segments. To reduce the risk of real assets being scanned and exploited, existing technologies typically employ methods such as deploying honeypots or fake services, setting up port filtering or silent responses, using SDN for traffic redirection, and inducing scanners with fake vulnerability information.
[0003] If a fake asset exists only at the IP layer and lacks the same transport and application layer response logic as a real asset, the scanner may identify it as a fake target through features such as TCP / IP protocol stack fingerprints, TCP option combinations, and response timing, causing the deception to fail.
[0004] If real assets are uniformly subjected to a silent or filtering strategy, although the port status can be hidden, it may also block authorized vulnerability scanning requests, causing legitimate scans to fail to discover real vulnerabilities and affecting asset security assessment.
[0005] If false vulnerability information remains static for a long period of time, attackers can discover contradictions through multiple scans, cross-validation, and vulnerability exploitation attempts, thereby bypassing the deception layer and locating the real assets.
[0006] In existing solutions, the scan packets captured by honeypots are mostly used for logging or alarms, and do not form a closed loop with traffic diversion strategies and real asset response strategies, making it difficult to dynamically adjust the countermeasures based on the scanner's behavior.
[0007] All of the above situations could lead to the exposure of real assets under continuous scanning, or create a conflict between protection strategies and legitimate scanning needs.
[0008] Therefore, in response to the problems mentioned above, this invention proposes a vulnerability scanning honeypot-based interference and asset protection method that integrates deception defense. Summary of the Invention
[0009] To overcome the difficulty of existing technologies in effectively coordinating the concealment of real assets, the credibility of the deception environment, and the dynamic utilization of scanning behavior during vulnerability scanning, this invention proposes a vulnerability scanning honeypot-based interference and asset protection method that integrates deception defense. This method uses SDN to distribute shadow fingerprint assets and guide scanning traffic. The shadow assets provide controlled fake vulnerability responses, while the real assets use a silent protocol stack to only respond to legitimate vulnerability scanning requests. The method also dynamically updates the traffic redirection and response strategies based on the scanning packets captured by the shadow assets, thereby protecting real assets while improving the credibility of deception and the ability to reverse-check the scanning source.
[0010] The technical solution of this invention is: a method for integrating deception defense with vulnerability scanning, honeypotting, interference, and asset protection. S1. Deploy an SDN controller within the protected network. The SDN controller generates and maintains a set of shadow fingerprint assets within the address space of the protected network. Each shadow fingerprint asset in the set has an independent network identifier at the IP layer that can be distinguished from the real asset, and has a complete protocol stack response capability at the transport and application layers that matches the independent network identifier. Specifically, the SDN controller can bind TCP / IP protocol stack parameters to shadow fingerprint assets that match the operating system fingerprint characteristics of the target real asset, so that the shadow fingerprint asset appears as a real host from the perspective of the scanner.
[0011] S2, the SDN controller further configures the flow tables of each SDN switch in the protected network, so that scanning traffic pointing to the shadow fingerprint asset set is diverted to the corresponding shadow fingerprint asset, while scanning traffic pointing to the real asset is only allowed to reach the real asset if the preset legitimacy judgment conditions are met. The legitimacy judgment conditions include that the TCP option field carried by the scan packet conforms to the preset legitimate scanner TCP option signature. The TCP option signature may include the combination characteristics of the order of specific option types in the TCP header option field, the relative offset of each option and the total length of the options, and be consistent with the scan packet generated by the preset authorized vulnerability scanning tool.
[0012] S3, for scanning traffic redirected to any shadow fingerprint asset, the shadow fingerprint asset executes the pre-defined vulnerability response logic; The vulnerability response logic includes: based on the detection characteristics in the received scan message, returning response data to the scanner that matches its detection target and contains controlled fake vulnerability information; The controlled fake vulnerability information is set to appear exploitable from the scanner's perspective, but it has no actual exploitability within the protected network. For example, the shadow fingerprint asset can return a session token that has been successfully authenticated with a weak password to the scanner, and when the session token is used for subsequent access requests, it returns pre-set fake management interface page data. However, the fake management interface page data does not contain any links or credentials pointing to any real assets within the protected network. As a result, the scanner will believe that it has discovered and entered a real system with a vulnerability, and thus focus subsequent scanning and attack activities on the shadow fingerprint asset. S4. For scan traffic that is not redirected to the shadow fingerprint asset but points to the real asset, the real asset uses a silent protocol stack to not generate a transport layer response for scan messages that do not meet the legality judgment conditions. Specifically, the scan packet is discarded and no TCP RST or ICMP unreachable packets are sent to the scanner, so that the real asset appears as "filtered" or "non-existent" in the scanner's port status determination results. Only scan packets that meet the legality determination conditions are established with transport layer connections and the real application layer response is returned. Thus, the real asset remains hidden from the perspective of the unauthorized scanner, while the authorized vulnerability scanner can still discover the real vulnerability normally.
[0013] S5, the SDN controller also collects scan packets captured by the shadow fingerprint asset and extracts scanning behavior features from the captured scan packets. These scanning behavior features include at least one of TCP option combination patterns, scan timing intervals, and probe payload structures. They may also include timing fingerprint features such as the incremental pattern of the transport layer source port, the scanning target port traversal order, and the retransmission strategy extracted after session reassembly of multiple scan packets received by the same shadow fingerprint asset within a preset time window. Based on the extracted scanning behavior features, the SDN controller updates the pre-set legitimate scanner TCP option signature in the legality judgment conditions of the silent protocol stack, and at the same time updates the type and presentation method of the controlled fake vulnerability information set to present an exploitable state in the vulnerability response logic of the shadow fingerprint asset.
[0014] S6. During the update process, the extracted scanning behavior features can be compared with the legitimate scanner behavior features recorded in the shadow fingerprint asset set. If they match, the TCP option signature corresponding to the scanning behavior feature is added to the legality judgment condition. If they do not match, the source address corresponding to the scanning behavior feature is added to the temporary silent list, and the scanning traffic sent by the source address in the temporary silent list is diverted to the shadow fingerprint asset. The SDN controller can also monitor the scanning frequency of each shadow fingerprint asset. When the scanning frequency of a shadow fingerprint asset exceeds a threshold within a preset period, the controller performs an identifier rotation for that shadow fingerprint asset, including releasing the current IP address and allocating a new unused IP address, while simultaneously updating the corresponding flow table redirection rules. The presentation of controlled fake vulnerability information can also be dynamically adjusted according to the overall scanning trend of the shadow fingerprint asset set: when the total scanning frequency increases, the diversity of controlled fake vulnerability information types is increased; when the total scanning frequency decreases, the depth of leakage of controlled fake vulnerability information is reduced.
[0015] Furthermore, the SDN controller can generate a scanner fingerprint model based on scan packets captured from shadow fingerprint assets. This model maps scanning behavior characteristics to scanner type identifiers and provides these identifiers to the silent protocol stack as an auxiliary reference for legitimacy determination. When the silent protocol stack receives a scan packet carrying an unknown TCP option signature, if the scanner fingerprint model determines that the similarity between the scanning behavior characteristics corresponding to the scan packet and the recorded authorized scanner type identifier exceeds a set threshold, the scan packet is temporarily allowed to reach the real asset, and the complete fingerprint of the scan packet is recorded on the real asset side for subsequent verification.
[0016] The beneficial effects of this invention are: 1. This invention binds TCP / IP protocol stack parameters that match the operating system fingerprint characteristics of real assets to shadow fingerprint assets through an SDN controller, and configures complete vulnerability response logic, so that shadow fingerprint assets have the same response capabilities as real assets at the IP layer, transport layer and application layer, thereby greatly improving the credibility of the deception environment and preventing the scanner from identifying the false target through protocol stack fingerprints, TCP option combinations or response timing differences.
[0017] 2. This invention performs initial screening of scan traffic by signing the legitimate scanner's TCP option in the legitimacy determination conditions, and the silent protocol stack of the real asset establishes a transport layer connection only for scan packets that meet the legitimacy determination conditions and returns a real application layer response. This conceals the real asset from the perspective of unauthorized scanning while ensuring the normal availability of authorized vulnerability scanning.
[0018] 3. This invention dynamically adjusts the diversity and leakage depth of controlled fake vulnerability information based on the overall scanning situation of the shadow fingerprint asset set through the SDN controller, and combines the identification rotation to update the independent network identifier and flow table redirection rules of the shadow fingerprint assets, so that the deception environment evolves dynamically with the scanning behavior, which greatly reduces the probability of being detected by long-term tracking and cross-validation.
[0019] 4. This invention extracts scanning behavior features from scan packets captured by shadow fingerprint assets and updates the legitimacy determination conditions, controlled fake vulnerability information, temporary silent lists, and scanner fingerprint models accordingly. This makes scan packets the input to the strategy closed loop, thereby enabling the adversarial strategy to be dynamically adjusted according to the actual scanning behavior and improving the adaptability to new scanners and changing scanning strategies. Attached Figure Description
[0020] Figure 1 The diagram shown is a schematic representation of the overall process of the method of the present invention; Figure 2 The diagram shown illustrates the system architecture and module relationships of this invention. Detailed Implementation
[0021] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0022] Please see Figure 1 and Figure 2 The present invention provides an embodiment: This invention coordinates the configuration of an SDN controller, a shadow fingerprint asset set, a silent protocol stack, legitimacy judgment conditions, controlled fake vulnerability information, and a scanner fingerprint model, enabling the protected network to form an operational mechanism of "true identity concealment, decoy luring, behavior reverse investigation, and policy closed loop" during vulnerability scanning and adversarial processes. During deployment, an SDN controller is deployed within the protected network. This SDN controller communicates with each SDN switch within the protected network and centrally maintains the address space allocation, flow table redirection rules, and lifecycle of the shadow fingerprint asset set.
[0023] The address space of the protected network can be divided into a real asset address pool and a shadow fingerprint asset address pool. The real asset address pool is used to carry the real assets that actually provide business services, while the shadow fingerprint asset address pool is used to carry the shadow fingerprint assets generated and maintained by the SDN controller.
[0024] Each shadow fingerprint asset in the shadow fingerprint asset set is configured to have an independent network identifier at the IP layer that is distinguishable from the real asset. For example, the SDN controller assigns an unused IP address in the same address segment as the real asset to the shadow fingerprint asset. Thus, when the scanner performs a network segment survey, the shadow fingerprint asset and the real asset appear as different hosts in the same business network segment in the address space.
[0025] Simultaneously, each shadow fingerprint asset possesses complete protocol stack response capabilities at both the transport and application layers, matching its independent network identifier. Specifically, the SDN controller binds TCP / IP protocol stack parameters to the shadow fingerprint asset that match the operating system fingerprint characteristics of the target real asset. This ensures that the shadow fingerprint asset maintains a high degree of consistency with the target real asset in terms of TCP handshake, option fields, window behavior, timestamp behavior, retransmission behavior, and application layer response structure. Through this configuration, even if a scanner employs protocol stack fingerprinting, TCP option combination analysis, or application layer probing, it will be difficult to identify a shadow fingerprint asset as a false target solely based on response differences.
[0026] First, let's explain the shadow fingerprint asset set. The SDN controller can generate shadow fingerprint assets in batches based on the asset distribution, service type, and address range planning of the protected network, and record the unique network identifier, protocol stack parameters, vulnerability response logic, and lifecycle status of each shadow fingerprint asset in the shadow fingerprint asset set.
[0027] The aforementioned shadow fingerprint asset set is a dynamic set continuously maintained by the SDN controller. When the frequency of scanning a shadow fingerprint asset exceeds a preset threshold, the SDN controller can perform identifier rotation on that shadow fingerprint asset. This involves releasing the current IP address and allocating a new unused IP address, while simultaneously updating the corresponding flow table redirection rules. This creates a break between the asset profile previously established by the scanner and subsequent scan results. Identifier rotation does not change the vulnerability response logic or protocol stack parameter type of the shadow fingerprint asset; rather, it changes its independent network identifier at the network layer, thereby reducing the risk of long-term tracking and cross-validation without affecting its deception capabilities. Each shadow fingerprint asset in the set can also maintain its own scan frequency, most recent scan time, captured scan packet digests, and the types of controlled fake vulnerability information returned. This information is collected uniformly by the SDN controller and used for subsequent policy updates.
[0028] Continuing with the explanation of flow table redirection and legality determination, the SDN controller configures the flow tables of each SDN switch in the protected network so that scan traffic pointing to the shadow fingerprint asset set is redirected to the corresponding shadow fingerprint asset, while scan traffic pointing to the real asset is only allowed to reach the real asset if the preset legality determination conditions are met.
[0029] The aforementioned flow table redirection rules can be configured based on matching items such as destination IP address, destination port, TCP option fields, source IP address, and protocol type. For packets whose destination IP address belongs to a shadow fingerprint asset set, the SDN switch forwards them to the corresponding shadow fingerprint asset, which then executes the pre-defined vulnerability response logic. For packets whose destination IP address belongs to a real asset, the SDN switch performs initial screening based on legitimacy criteria. Legitimacy criteria include that the TCP option fields carried by the scan packet conform to the pre-defined legitimate scanner TCP option signature. The legitimate scanner TCP option signature includes a combination of features such as the order of specific option types in the option fields of the scan packet's TCP header, the relative offsets of each option, and the total length of the options. These features are configured to be consistent with the scan packets generated by pre-defined authorized vulnerability scanning tools. Because different scanners have stable differences in implementing TCP options, scan packets generated by authorized vulnerability scanning tools usually have pre-extractable option combination features, while unauthorized scanners or attacker scanners often use different option combination patterns. Therefore, the SDN controller can allow packets that conform to the valid scanner's TCP option signature to be forwarded to the real asset, while discarding or redirecting non-compliant packets to the shadow fingerprint asset. For scan packets that still reach the real asset due to flow table misses, tunnel encapsulation, fragmentation, or other reasons, the silent protocol stack on the real asset side performs a secondary judgment to ensure that the real asset does not generate a recognizable transport layer response to unauthorized scans.
[0030] For scanning traffic redirected to any shadow fingerprint asset, the shadow fingerprint asset executes pre-defined vulnerability response logic. This logic, based on the probe characteristics in the received scan packet, returns response data to the scanner that matches its probe target and contains controlled fake vulnerability information. The controlled fake vulnerability information is set to appear exploitable from the scanner's perspective, but it has no actual exploitability within the protected network. For example, if the scan packet probes for weak passwords on the management port, the shadow fingerprint asset can return a session token indicating successful weak password authentication. When this session token is used for subsequent access requests, it returns pre-defined fake management interface page data. This fake management interface page data does not contain links or credentials to any real assets within the protected network; therefore, even if the scanner obtains the session token and enters the fake management interface, it cannot further access real assets. The shadow fingerprint asset can also return different types of controlled fake vulnerability information based on the scan packet's probe path, request method, and parameter structure, leading the scanner to believe that multiple exploitable vulnerabilities have been discovered, thus focusing subsequent scanning and attack activities on that shadow fingerprint asset. While returning controlled fake vulnerability information, the shadow fingerprint asset fully records the scan packets, interaction sequence, and subsequent actions of the scanner, and submits this information to the SDN controller.
[0031] For scan traffic directed to real assets but not to shadow fingerprint assets, the real assets employ a silent protocol stack that does not generate a transport layer response for scan packets that do not meet the legitimacy criteria. Specifically, the scan packet is discarded, and no TCP RST or ICMP unreachable messages are sent to the scanner, causing the real asset to appear as "filtered" or "non-existent" in the scanner's port status assessment. Only scan packets that meet the legitimacy criteria are connected to the transport layer, and a real application layer response is returned. Through this method, unauthorized scanners, when scanning real assets, cannot determine the existence of the real asset through TCP handshake success, connection rejection, or ICMP unreachable responses, thus creating the illusion that the real asset is missing or unreachable in the scan results. Authorized vulnerability scanners, carrying scan packets that conform to the TCP option signatures of legitimate scanners, are able to establish a transport layer connection with the real asset and obtain a real application layer response, thereby discovering the real vulnerability. The silent protocol stack and SDN flow table redirection rules work together. The former provides final response control on the real asset side, while the latter provides traffic redirection and initial screening on the network side. Together, they ensure that real assets are hidden from the perspective of unauthorized scanning, but are available from the perspective of authorized scanning.
[0032] Continuing with the explanation of scan packet capture and scan behavior feature extraction, the SDN controller collects scan packets captured from shadow fingerprint assets and extracts scan behavior features from these packets. Scan behavior features include at least one of the following: TCP option combination patterns, scan timing intervals, and probe payload structures. The SDN controller can also perform session reassembly on multiple scan packets received from the same shadow fingerprint asset within a preset time window, extracting at least one timing fingerprint feature from the following: the incremental pattern of the transport layer source port used by the scanner, the traversal order of the scanned target ports, and the retransmission strategy. By combining and analyzing these features, the SDN controller can distinguish between authorized vulnerability scanning tools, general automated scanners, customized attack scanners, and manual probing behavior. For example, authorized vulnerability scanning tools typically have stable TCP option combination patterns, relatively standardized scan timing intervals, and specific probe payload structures; attacker scanners may employ randomized source ports, unordered target port traversal, aggressive retransmission strategies, or abnormal probe payload structures. Based on the extracted scanning behavior characteristics, the SDN controller updates the legality determination conditions of the silent protocol stack, setting the pre-defined legitimate scanner TCP option signature and the vulnerability response logic for updating shadow fingerprint assets to display controlled fake vulnerability information in an exploitable state. This update process makes the legality determination conditions and controlled fake vulnerability information no longer fixed configurations, but can be dynamically adjusted according to actual scanning behavior, thereby improving adaptability to new scanners and changing scanning strategies.
[0033] Continuing with the explanation of the policy closed-loop update, the SDN controller compares the extracted scanning behavior characteristics with the legitimate scanner behavior characteristics already recorded in the shadow fingerprint asset set. If a match is found, the TCP option signature corresponding to that scanning behavior characteristic is added to the legitimacy judgment condition, enabling the scanning traffic corresponding to that scanning behavior characteristic to reach the real asset. If a mismatch is found, the source address corresponding to that scanning behavior characteristic is added to a temporary silent list, and scanning traffic sent by source addresses in the temporary silent list is redirected to the shadow fingerprint asset.
[0034] The aforementioned temporary silent list serves as a temporary redirection basis with time or status attributes. When subsequent scanning behavior characteristics change and meet the characteristics of a legitimate scanner, the SDN controller can remove it from the temporary silent list or adjust its redirection strategy. The SDN controller is also configured to monitor the scanning frequency of each shadow fingerprint asset in the shadow fingerprint asset set. When the scanning frequency of a shadow fingerprint asset exceeds a threshold within a preset period, the controller performs an identifier rotation for that shadow fingerprint asset, releasing the current IP address and assigning a new unused IP address, while simultaneously updating the corresponding flow table redirection rules. Through identifier rotation, it becomes difficult for scanners to correlate the behavior of the same shadow fingerprint asset across different time windows, thereby reducing the probability of controlled fake vulnerability information being detected through cross-validation. The presentation of controlled fake vulnerability information is dynamically adjusted by the SDN controller based on the overall scanning trend of the shadow fingerprint asset set: when the total frequency of scanning of the shadow fingerprint asset set increases, the diversity of controlled fake vulnerability information types is increased, making the decoy environment present more vulnerability types and more complex asset profiles; when the total frequency of scanning of the shadow fingerprint asset set decreases, the disclosure depth of controlled fake vulnerability information is reduced, avoiding excessive exposure of fake vulnerability details that could be reverse-analyzed by the scanning party. This dynamic adjustment maintains the credibility of the decoy environment while reducing the risk of the decoy environment being identified after long-term research.
[0035] Finally, the scanner fingerprint model is explained. The SDN controller generates a scanner fingerprint model based on scan packets captured from the shadow fingerprint asset. The scanner fingerprint model maps scanning behavior characteristics to scanner type identifiers and provides the scanner type identifiers to the silent protocol stack as an auxiliary reference for legitimacy determination. The scanner fingerprint model can maintain the correspondence between scanning behavior characteristics and scanner type identifiers in the form of mapping tables, feature comparison records, or behavior feature indexes. When the silent protocol stack receives a scan packet carrying an unknown TCP option signature, if the scanner fingerprint model determines that the similarity between the scanning behavior characteristics corresponding to the scan packet and the recorded authorized scanner type identifier exceeds a set threshold, the scan packet is temporarily allowed to reach the real asset, and the complete fingerprint of the scan packet is recorded on the real asset side for subsequent verification. If subsequent verification confirms that the scan packet comes from an authorized scanner, the SDN controller adds the TCP option signature corresponding to the scanning behavior characteristics to the legitimacy determination conditions; if subsequent verification confirms that the scan packet does not come from an authorized scanner, the SDN controller adds the source address to the temporary silent list and redirects its scan traffic to the shadow fingerprint asset. By using the scanner fingerprint model, the silent protocol stack can not only make judgments based on the static TCP option signatures of legitimate scanners, but also make auxiliary judgments based on the similarity of dynamic scanning behavior characteristics. Thus, even when the TCP option fields are offset due to upgrades to authorized scanners, changes in option signatures, or changes in network paths, the acceptability of authorized scan traffic can still be maintained, while not significantly expanding the scope of unauthorized scan traffic.
[0036] To further illustrate the effectiveness of this invention, an experiment is conducted below. This experimental environment deploys an SDN controller, several SDN switches, real assets, a set of shadow fingerprint assets, authorized vulnerability scanning tools, and various unauthorized scanners.
[0037] The experiment was set up in three groups: Comparative Example 1 employs conventional asset protection methods without deception defense; Comparative Example 2 uses a method of fake assets only at the IP layer. Its fake assets only exist at the IP layer and do not have complete protocol stack response capabilities or controlled fake vulnerability information. The embodiments employ the present invention.
[0038] The experimental results are shown in Table 1: Table 1 Comparison of Scan Countermeasures under Different Asset Protection Methods
[0039] As shown in Table 1, in Comparative Example 1 without deception defense, real assets are completely exposed. Unauthorized scanners can easily identify real assets and cannot effectively identify scanner types, nor can they be tricked using controlled fake vulnerability information. In Comparative Example 2, although fake assets can disperse scanning traffic to some extent, due to the lack of complete protocol stack response capabilities and controlled fake vulnerability information, the detection rate of shadow fingerprint assets is high, and a large proportion of real assets are still identified. The authorized scan pass rate also decreases due to the crude traffic diversion strategy. In the embodiment, the scanner identification rate of real assets drops to 7%, the detection rate of shadow fingerprint assets drops to 3%, the authorized scan pass rate remains at 99.5%, the scanner type identification accuracy reaches 96%, the policy update latency is less than 200ms, and the success rate of deception using controlled fake vulnerability information reaches 94%.
[0040] To further illustrate the impact of identifier rotation on the long-term deception capability of shadow fingerprint assets, the table below shows a comparison of the effects before and after identifier rotation under different scanning frequency thresholds within a preset period. Identifier rotation is executed by the SDN controller, including releasing the current IP address and allocating a new unused IP address, while updating the corresponding flow table redirection rules.
[0041] Table 2. Impact of Identifier Rotation on the Deceptive Capability of Shadow Fingerprint Assets
[0042] As shown in Table 2, when the scanning frequency of a shadow fingerprint asset exceeds a threshold within a preset period, identifier rotation significantly reduces its detection rate and improves the scanner tracking loss rate. Since identifier rotation only changes the independent network identifier of the shadow fingerprint asset and its corresponding flow table redirection rules, without altering the response strategy of the real asset or the legitimacy judgment conditions of the authorized scanner, the authorized scan pass rate does not decrease significantly due to identifier rotation. This mechanism enables the shadow fingerprint asset set to maintain its deceptive capabilities over a long period, preventing attackers from associating the behavior of the same shadow fingerprint asset through multiple scans and identifying its false attributes.
[0043] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention in any other way. Any person skilled in the art may make changes or modifications to the above-disclosed technical content to create equivalent embodiments that can be applied to other fields. However, any simple modifications, equivalent changes, and modifications made to the above embodiments based on the technical essence of the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention shall still fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for integrating vulnerability scanning, honeypotting, interference, and asset protection with deception defense, characterized in that: Includes the following steps: S1. Deploy an SDN controller within the protected network. The SDN controller generates and maintains a set of shadow fingerprint assets within the address space of the protected network. Each shadow fingerprint asset in the set has an independent network identifier at the IP layer that is distinguishable from the real asset, and has a complete protocol stack response capability at the transport and application layers that matches the independent network identifier. S2, the SDN controller configures the flow tables of each SDN switch in the protected network so that scanning traffic pointing to the set of shadow fingerprint assets is diverted to the corresponding shadow fingerprint assets, while scanning traffic pointing to real assets is only allowed to reach the real assets if the preset legality judgment conditions are met. S3, For scanning traffic redirected to any shadow fingerprint asset, the shadow fingerprint asset executes a pre-defined vulnerability response logic. The vulnerability response logic includes returning response data to the scanner that matches its detection target and contains controlled fake vulnerability information based on the detection characteristics in the received scan message. The controlled fake vulnerability information is set to appear exploitable from the scanner's perspective but does not have actual exploitability within the protected network. S4. For scan traffic that is not redirected to the shadow fingerprint asset but points to the real asset, the real asset responds using a silent protocol stack. This silent protocol stack is used to not generate a transport layer response for scan packets that do not meet the legality determination conditions, so that the real asset appears to be non-existent or filtered from the scanner's perspective. Only for scan packets that meet the legality determination conditions, a transport layer connection is established and a real application layer response is returned. The legality determination conditions include that the TCP option field carried by the scan packet conforms to the preset legal scanner TCP option signature. S5, the SDN controller collects the scan packets captured by the shadow fingerprint assets and extracts the scan behavior features from the captured scan packets. The scan behavior features include at least one of TCP option combination mode, scan timing interval and probe payload structure. S6. Based on the extracted scanning behavior characteristics, update the pre-set legitimate scanner TCP option signature in the legality judgment conditions of the silent protocol stack, and at the same time update the type and presentation method of the controlled fake vulnerability information set to present an exploitable state in the vulnerability response logic of the shadow fingerprint asset.
2. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of the shadow fingerprint asset includes: the SDN controller allocating an unused IP address in the same address range as the real asset in the protected network to the shadow fingerprint asset, and binding TCP / IP protocol stack parameters that match the operating system fingerprint characteristics of the target real asset to the shadow fingerprint asset.
3. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The controlled fake vulnerability information in the vulnerability response logic of the shadow fingerprint asset includes: returning a session token that was successfully authenticated with a weak password to the scanner, and when the session token is used for subsequent access requests, returning pre-set fake management interface page data, which does not contain any links or credentials pointing to any real assets within the protected network.
4. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The silent protocol stack does not generate a transport layer response for scan packets that do not meet the legality determination conditions, including: discarding the scan packet and not sending a TCP RST packet or an ICMP unreachable packet to the scanner, so that the real asset appears as "filtered" or "does not exist" in the scanner's port status determination result.
5. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The legitimate scanner TCP option signature includes: the order of specific option types in the option field of the TCP header of the scan packet, the relative offset of each option and the combination of the total length of the options, and this combination feature is consistent with the scan packet generated by the pre-installed authorized vulnerability scanning tool.
6. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Extracting scanning behavior features from captured scan packets also includes: performing session reassembly on multiple scan packets received by the same shadow fingerprint asset within a preset time window, and extracting at least one temporal fingerprint feature from the following: the incremental mode of the transport layer source port used by the scanner, the traversal order of the scan target port, and the retransmission strategy.
7. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The legality determination conditions for updating the silent protocol stack include: comparing the extracted scanning behavior features with the legal scanner behavior features recorded in the shadow fingerprint asset set. If they match, the TCP option signature corresponding to the scanning behavior feature is added to the legality determination conditions; if they do not match, the source address corresponding to the scanning behavior feature is added to the temporary silent list, and the scanning traffic sent by the source address in the temporary silent list is diverted to the shadow fingerprint asset.
8. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The SDN controller is also used to: monitor the frequency of scanning of each shadow fingerprint asset in the shadow fingerprint asset set; when the frequency of scanning of a certain shadow fingerprint asset exceeds a threshold within a preset period, perform an identifier rotation for the shadow fingerprint asset; the identifier rotation includes releasing the current IP address and allocating a new unoccupied IP address, while updating the corresponding flow table redirection rules.
9. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The presentation of the controlled fake vulnerability information is adjusted by the SDN controller based on the overall scanning trend of the shadow fingerprint asset set. This adjustment includes: As the total frequency of scanning of shadow fingerprint asset sets increases, the diversity of controlled fake vulnerability information types increases; When the total frequency of scanning of shadow fingerprint asset sets decreases, the depth of controlled fake vulnerability information leakage is reduced.
10. The vulnerability scanning honeypotting interference and asset protection method integrating deception defense as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: the SDN controller generating a scanner fingerprint model based on scan packets captured from shadow fingerprint assets. This scanner fingerprint model maps scanning behavior features to scanner type identifiers and provides the scanner type identifiers to the silent protocol stack as an auxiliary reference for legality determination. When the silent protocol stack receives a scan packet carrying an unknown TCP option signature, if the scanner fingerprint model determines that the similarity between the scanning behavior features corresponding to the scan packet and the recorded authorized scanner type identifier exceeds a set threshold, then the scan packet is temporarily allowed to reach the real asset, and the complete fingerprint of the scan packet is recorded on the real asset side for subsequent verification.
