Equipment Capability Information Reporting Methods and Related Equipment
By adopting a hierarchical capability reporting mechanism, user equipment only reports basic capability information in an insecure state, and then reports feature information after security activation. This solves the problems of capability information leakage and unreliable network access for user equipment in an insecure state, and realizes secure and reliable access and privacy protection for user equipment in complex network environments.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611592732.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-10-14
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In the 3GPP mobile communication protocol, there is a risk that user equipment capability information may be stolen by fake base stations in an insecure state, leading to problems such as leakage of user privacy information and unreliable network access.
User equipment only reports basic capability information when it is insecure. It will report characteristic capability information after it is securely activated. The hierarchical capability reporting mechanism ensures privacy and the reliability of network access.
While ensuring user privacy, it achieves network access reliability and security, reduces the risk of fake base station attacks, and improves the service availability and privacy protection level of user equipment in complex network environments.
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Figure CN123123883A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method for reporting device capability information, user equipment, network-side equipment, electronic equipment, non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, chip, and computer program product. Background Technology
[0002] In 3GPP mobile communication protocols, UE (User Equipment) capability information is a crucial basis for network-side radio resource configuration and communication adaptation. To protect user privacy and security, 3GPP and other communication protocols explicitly stipulate that UE capability information should only be reported to the network side through an encrypted signaling channel after the Security Activation process is completed, in order to prevent sensitive features from being illegally intercepted or device fingerprints from being stolen.
[0003] In actual network deployments, some base stations (including some legitimate cells that do not strictly adhere to the protocol or malicious fake base stations) proactively initiate UE capability query requests in the initial stage before security signaling is established. Since the protocol does not explicitly prohibit such insecure queries, UEs face two types of problems: if they strictly adhere to the protocol and refuse to respond, they may misjudge a legitimate but non-compliant network as a fake base station, leading to terminal access failure and service interruption; if, to ensure service continuity, they ignore the protocol provisions and directly report complete UE capability information, some of the UE's characteristic information (such as the chip model used and supported protocol versions) may be obtained by any network in an unencrypted environment. This not only poses a risk of user privacy information leakage but also security risks such as being used by fake base stations for fingerprint recognition, user tracking, and exploiting customized vulnerabilities. Summary of the Invention
[0004] To overcome the problems existing in related technologies, this disclosure provides a method for reporting device capability information, user equipment, network-side equipment, electronic equipment, non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, chip, and computer program product.
[0005] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a method for reporting device capability information is provided, applied to a user equipment, comprising: in response to a capability query request from a network side, reporting first capability information to the network side, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
[0006] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure addresses the issue where, if a user equipment (UE) cannot confirm whether the current network is secure, it receives a capability query request from the network side. Instead of reporting characteristic capability information that identifies the UE, the UE reports the basic capability information required for access. This avoids the problem of being unable to access a legitimate network due to refusing to respond to capability query requests, and prevents fake base stations from obtaining device-specific characteristic capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability with device privacy protection, achieving secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security status, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0007] In some embodiments of this disclosure, after reporting the first capability information to the network side, the method further includes: determining whether the user equipment is in a secure active state; and in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, reporting the second capability information to the network side, wherein the second capability information includes characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
[0008] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure reports feature capability information only when the user is in a secure active state. This solves the technical problems in related technologies where user equipment either does not respond to network-side capability query requests at all when in an insecure state, resulting in the unavailability of the real network, or reports all user equipment capability information, leading to fake base stations stealing feature information such as device fingerprints. Under the premise of protecting user privacy and security, it can ensure that the real network can normally complete the dual goals of access and service adaptation, significantly improving the service availability and privacy protection level of the terminal in complex network environments.
[0009] In some embodiments of this disclosure, in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, reporting second capability information to the network side includes: in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, sending a user equipment capability update instruction to the network side; and in response to a capability update request from the network side, reporting the second capability information to the network side.
[0010] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure adopts the inherent interaction logic of "user equipment actively initiating capability update requests and the network side responding to queries on demand" in the current communication protocol specifications. The overall signaling process and interaction sequence are fully compatible with the existing user equipment capability reporting protocol, without requiring any modification or upgrade to the existing network architecture or the underlying protocol stack of user equipment, thus possessing strong protocol compatibility and universal applicability. The solution disclosed in this disclosure, while compatible with existing standardized capability update mechanisms, assigns a security verification attribute to the capability update trigger condition. Only when the user equipment completes the establishment of a secure channel and is in a legitimate and secure active state will it actively initiate a capability update instruction. The network side then triggers a capability update request and obtains the sensitive feature capability information of the user equipment. This disclosure solves the privacy leakage defects of traditional indiscriminate full capability reporting. It retains the advantages of existing protocols being mature, universal, and feasible, while also achieving a technical upgrade to hierarchical and secure reporting of capability information, effectively avoiding fake base station-induced attacks, and balancing system compatibility, communication reliability, and user equipment privacy security protection capabilities.
[0011] In some embodiments of this disclosure, determining whether the user equipment is in a secure active state includes: verifying whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize the user equipment and the network side performing at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; in response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, determining that the user equipment is in a secure active state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; and in response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, determining that the user equipment is in a non-secure active state.
[0012] By directly binding the determination of the fully active state to the verifiable protocol event of the successful establishment of a secure communication channel between the user equipment and the network side, the solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure ensures that the reporting stage of feature capability information is only allowed after both the terminal and the network have jointly completed key derivation and successfully verified message integrity. This effectively prevents fake base stations from inducing the UE to report sensitive information by forging query requests, while ensuring that the real network can fully obtain the UE's capabilities after the secure channel is established in order to optimize resource allocation. This achieves objectivity, measurability, and anti-forgery capability of the security status determination, and significantly improves the terminal's autonomous security decision-making capability and privacy protection granularity in complex network environments.
[0013] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the basic capability information is communication capability information necessary for completing the user equipment's network access and / or registration process; the characteristic capability information is information used to characterize at least one of the following capabilities of the user equipment: device hardware and software capabilities, protocol support capabilities, and service support capabilities.
[0014] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure limits basic capability information to the minimum communication parameters necessary for network access / registration (such as supported frequency bands, basic modulation, number of antennas, etc.), and clarifies characteristic capability information as device-differentiated attribute information (such as protocol version, millimeter wave support, dedicated accelerator, AI inference capability, etc.). This enables hierarchical reporting of user device capability information, making it impossible for fake base stations to obtain only general access parameters and identify characteristic capability information such as device model, manufacturer, or enhanced functions. This significantly reduces the risk of devices being tracked, targeted attacks, or exploited by firmware vulnerabilities, and improves the granular protection capability of user privacy.
[0015] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a method for reporting device capability information is provided, applied to a network-side device, comprising: sending a capability query request to a user equipment; and receiving first capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
[0016] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure allows the network-side device to send a capability query request to the user equipment (UE), after which the UE reports the basic capability information necessary for the UE to access the network. This avoids the problem of the UE being unable to access the legitimate network due to its refusal to respond to the capability query request, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining the device's unique capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability and device privacy protection, achieving secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security status, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0017] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the method further includes: receiving second capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a secure state.
[0018] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure reports characteristic capability information representing the user equipment's own attributes to the network side only when it is determined that the user equipment is in a secure active state. This enables the network side to complete the terminal's network registration based on the basic capability information reported by the user equipment. After receiving complete characteristic capability information, the network side accurately matches the terminal hardware, protocols, and service capabilities, and performs targeted network resource scheduling, service function adaptation, and parameter optimization. This effectively improves the accuracy of network service adaptation and the quality of communication services, while taking into account both network communication reliability and terminal privacy and security.
[0019] In some embodiments of this disclosure, receiving the second capability information reported by the user equipment includes: receiving a capability update indication sent when the user equipment is in a secure active state; sending a capability update request to the user equipment; and receiving the second capability information reported by the user equipment.
[0020] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure adopts the inherent interaction logic of "user equipment actively initiating capability update requests and the network side responding to queries on demand" in the current communication protocol specifications. The overall signaling process and interaction sequence are fully compatible with the existing user equipment capability reporting protocol, without requiring any modification or upgrade to the existing network architecture or the underlying protocol stack of user equipment, thus possessing strong protocol compatibility and universal applicability. The solution disclosed in this disclosure, while compatible with existing standardized capability update mechanisms, assigns a security verification attribute to the capability update trigger condition. Only when the user equipment completes the establishment of a secure channel and is in a legitimate and secure active state will it actively initiate a capability update instruction. The network side then triggers a capability update request and obtains the sensitive feature capability information of the user equipment. This disclosure solves the privacy leakage defects of traditional indiscriminate full capability reporting. It retains the advantages of existing protocols being mature, universal, and feasible, while also achieving a technical upgrade to hierarchical and secure reporting of capability information, effectively avoiding fake base station-induced attacks, and balancing system compatibility, communication reliability, and user equipment privacy security protection capabilities.
[0021] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, a user equipment is provided, including: a first capability information reporting module configured to: in response to a capability query request from a network side, report first capability information to the network side, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
[0022] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure addresses the issue where, if a user equipment (UE) cannot confirm whether the current network is secure, it receives a capability query request from the network side. In such cases, the UE reports the basic capability information required for access to the network side via the first capability information reporting module, instead of reporting characteristic capability information that can identify the UE. This avoids the problem of being unable to access a legitimate network due to refusing to respond to capability query requests, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining device-specific characteristic capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability with device privacy protection, achieving secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security status, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0023] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the user equipment further includes: a security activation state verification module configured to: determine whether the user equipment is in a security activation state; and a second capability information reporting module configured to: in response to the user equipment being in a security activation state, report second capability information to the network side, wherein the second capability information includes feature capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
[0024] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure establishes a linkage mechanism between the security activation status verification module and the second capability information reporting module, enabling automated execution of automatic judgment of terminal security status and differentiated reporting of capability information without manual intervention. Through layered reporting of hardware access capabilities and device characteristic capabilities, a privacy protection barrier is constructed from the terminal side, effectively resisting malicious attacks such as fake base stations stealing device fingerprints and tracing the source of attacks, while not affecting the terminal's basic network communication functions. This balances the practicality of terminal communication with privacy and security, and improves the stable operation of the device in complex heterogeneous networks and malicious network interference scenarios.
[0025] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the secure activation state verification module is further configured to: verify whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize that the user equipment and the network side have completed at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; in response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a secure activation state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; in response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a non-secure activation state.
[0026] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure uses the established results of a standardized secure communication channel as the basis for judgment, replacing the traditional vague security status judgment method. This makes the terminal security status judgment standardized, verifiable, and tamper-proof. Through multiple mechanisms such as two-way identity authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection, the module verifies network legitimacy, accurately distinguishes between real and trusted networks and malicious fake base station networks, blocks the leakage paths of sensitive feature and capability information in insecure scenarios from the source, further refines the terminal privacy protection layers, and significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of the terminal's autonomous security decisions, adapting to various complex network security protection scenarios.
[0027] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, a network-side device is provided, comprising: a user equipment capability information query module configured to: send a capability query request to a user equipment; and a user equipment capability information acquisition module configured to: receive first capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
[0028] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure allows the network-side device to send a capability query request to the user equipment (UE) via the capability information query module. The UE's capability information acquisition module then receives the basic capability information reported by the UE, which is necessary for network access. This avoids the problem of UEs being unable to access legitimate networks due to refusing to respond to capability query requests, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining device-specific capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability with device privacy protection, enabling secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security conditions, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0029] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the user equipment capability information acquisition module is further configured to: receive second capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a safe state.
[0030] Through the solutions provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure, the capability information acquisition module of the network-side device adapts to the hierarchical reporting mechanism of user devices, acquiring capability information of user devices in different dimensions in stages and scenarios. In the initial stage of user device network access, it acquires basic access capabilities, ensuring that user devices can quickly complete network registration and network access, improving network access efficiency. After the establishment of a secure channel, it acquires complete characteristic capability information of the user device, providing accurate data support for refined resource scheduling, high-level service deployment, and differentiated service adaptation on the network side. Simultaneously, the network side receives sensitive capability data in secure scenarios, reducing the risk of malicious network data interaction and privacy leakage, and improving the security, stability, and intelligent service adaptation level of the entire communication system.
[0031] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device is provided, comprising: a processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; wherein the processor is configured to: implement the steps of the device capability information reporting method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0032] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure can be implemented in the processors of various electronic devices through executable instructions, thereby enabling rapid deployment of functions and system compatibility, and reducing the threshold for technology implementation.
[0033] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is provided, which, when the instructions in the storage medium are executed by a processor of an electronic device, enables the electronic device to perform the steps of the device capability information reporting method described above.
[0034] The device capability information reporting method provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure can be deployed in various non-temporary computer-readable storage media by means of instructions, without hardware changes, and has good portability and engineering feasibility.
[0035] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, a chip is provided, the chip including an interface circuit and a processing circuit coupled to each other, the interface circuit being used to input or output signals, and the processing circuit being used to implement the device capability information reporting method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0036] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure can integrate the device capability information reporting method provided in the embodiments of this disclosure into a dedicated chip of the terminal or network side device to achieve low power consumption and high efficiency hardware acceleration processing, and meet the requirements of real-time performance and large-scale deployment.
[0037] According to an eighth aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the device capability information reporting method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0038] The device capability information reporting method provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure can be widely deployed in various communication devices in the form of computer program products, supporting cross-platform and cross-vendor standardized implementation, and improving the flexibility and scalability of technology promotion.
[0039] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and are not intended to limit this disclosure. Attached Figure Description
[0040] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this disclosure and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this disclosure.
[0041] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a communication system architecture shown according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0042] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for reporting device capability information according to some embodiments of this disclosure.
[0043] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating an optional device capability information reporting method according to some embodiments of this disclosure.
[0044] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating yet another method for reporting device capability information according to some embodiments of this disclosure.
[0045] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for reporting device capability information to a fake base station, based on some embodiments of this disclosure.
[0046] Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for reporting device capability information to a real base station, based on some embodiments of this disclosure.
[0047] Figure 7 This is a block diagram of a user equipment according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0048] Figure 8 This is a block diagram of a network-side device according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0049] Figure 9 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation
[0050] Exemplary embodiments of this disclosure will be described in detail herein, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the drawings, the same numbers in different drawings denote the same or similar elements unless otherwise indicated. Various changes, modifications, and equivalents of the methods, apparatus, and / or systems described herein will become apparent upon understanding this disclosure. For example, the order of operations described herein is merely illustrative and is not limited to those orders set forth herein, but can be changed as will become apparent upon understanding this disclosure, except for operations that must be performed in a particular order. Furthermore, for clarity and brevity, descriptions of features known in the art may be omitted.
[0051] The embodiments described in the following examples of this disclosure are not representative of all embodiments consistent with this disclosure. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of this disclosure as detailed in the appended claims.
[0052] It should be noted that the acquisition, storage, use, and processing of data in this disclosed technical solution comply with the relevant provisions of national laws and regulations. The various types of data obtained in this disclosed implementation, such as personal identity data, operational data, and behavioral data related to individuals, customers, and groups, have all been authorized.
[0053] To facilitate understanding, before introducing the embodiments of this disclosure, the following explanations are provided for several terms involved in the embodiments of this disclosure: UE: User Equipment, refers to equipment used by end users in a mobile communication system, such as smartphones, tablets, IoT modules, smart car communication units, or AR / VR terminals, which have the ability to access wireless networks, perform signaling interactions, and send and receive data. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the UE selectively reports capability information under different security states based on the query request from the network side, in order to balance service availability and user privacy protection.
[0054] Security Activation State: This refers to the state where the UE and the network have completed authentication, key negotiation, and integrity / encryption protection parameter configuration, successfully establishing a secure communication context. In this state, the UE can securely report sensitive capability parameters including device characteristics, protocol version, and advanced feature support. This state is typically determined by the UE successfully verifying a SecurityModeComplete message from the network, protected by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or digital signature.
[0055] Insecure active state: This refers to the initial access phase where the UE and the network have not yet completed the establishment of a security context. At this time, the wireless signaling is not encrypted or protected for integrity. In this state, the UE is only allowed to report minimal, non-sensitive basic capability information to prevent device fingerprints and other characteristic capability information from being stolen by fake base stations or malicious networks.
[0056] First-level capability information refers to the minimum set of capabilities that a UE can legally report in a non-secure active state. This information does not include device identification (such as IMEI / IMSI), protocol version number (such as 3GPP Release 18), proprietary hardware features, or advanced function parameters (such as millimeter-wave bands, 256QAM, 4T4R, beam management, etc.). It includes parameters necessary for basic access and initial communication, such as supported frequency band subsets, basic modulation schemes, and the number of antenna ports. The minimum capability set refers to the minimum subset of capability parameters supported by the UE in a non-secure active state that meet the requirements for basic network access and initial service procedures. Its definition is based on the "Minimum Required Capability" principle in the 3GPP protocol, ensuring that even without establishing a secure channel, the UE can still complete initial access and avoid being mistakenly identified as a fake base station and denied service.
[0057] Secondary capability information refers to the complete set of capabilities reported by the UE in the secure active state. This information includes the UE's actual technical characteristics, including but not limited to: the actual supported 3GPP protocol version number, higher-order modulation schemes (such as 256QAM), multi-antenna architecture (such as 4T4R), carrier aggregation configuration, millimeter-wave support, positioning accuracy level, dedicated accelerators, vendor-customized energy-saving strategies, or proprietary function extensions. Reporting this information is strictly prohibited in the insecure active state to ensure that user equipment characteristics are not stolen by untrusted networks.
[0058] Capability Query Request: This refers to a standardized signaling message (such as RRC Reconfiguration or UE Capability Enquiry in 3GPP TS 38.331) sent by the network side during the RRC connection establishment process to adapt to the UE's capabilities and obtain the UE's radio capability parameters.
[0059] 3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project, an international organization that develops global standards for mobile communication systems.
[0060] TS: Technical Specification, a standardized technical document published by 3GPP, used to define wireless interface protocols, parameter mappings, and operating procedures.
[0061] Internet: The Internet refers to a globally interconnected public information network based on the TCP / IP protocol suite. It consists of multiple Autonomous Systems (AS) interconnected through standardized routing protocols and is the ultimate target network for terminal devices to access Web services, cloud applications, and data content. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the terminal accesses the Internet through the core network. The optimization in this embodiment is the wireless capability information reporting process of the terminal before accessing the Internet, without changing its ability to access the Internet.
[0062] As described in the background section of this disclosure, with the rapid development of smartphones and 5G communication technologies, the capability information of User Equipment (UE) (such as frequency band support, modulation scheme, antenna configuration, protocol version, etc.) has become a key basis for network-side resource adaptation and service optimization. According to protocols such as 3GPP TS 38.331, UE capability information should only be reported after security activation is completed to prevent the illegal theft of sensitive features and protect user privacy and device security. However, in real network environments, there are many base stations that do not strictly adhere to protocol specifications, including cells that initiate UE capability query requests prematurely due to configuration errors, equipment aging, or malicious imitation (such as fake base stations). In such scenarios, traditional UEs, following the protocol's strict rule of "refusing to report if security is not activated," will directly refuse to respond, causing the user equipment to mistakenly judge the base station as illegal and thus abandon access. Even if the base station is a legitimate but non-compliant real network, it still results in service unavailability, severely impacting user experience and network coverage.
[0063] To avoid service interruptions, some terminal manufacturers or operators have adopted an "unconditional reporting of complete capabilities" approach in their engineering implementations, meaning that complete UE capability information is returned to all base stations before secure activation. While this approach ensures service continuity, it exposes user equipment characteristics (such as chip model, protocol version, and advanced feature support) to unencrypted channels, providing fake base stations with precise device profiles and attack surfaces, significantly increasing security risks such as identity spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and user tracking. It is clear that current UE capability information reporting schemes create an irreconcilable contradiction between service availability and privacy security: either connectivity must be sacrificed, or security must be sacrificed.
[0064] To address the aforementioned technical issues, this disclosure provides a method for reporting user equipment capability information. The core of this method lies in: reporting a minimal set of basic capabilities (excluding device feature information) to the network side when security is not activated, in order to maintain basic communication capabilities; and reporting complete capability information, including the device's actual protocol version, advanced functions, and proprietary hardware features, to the network side after successful security activation. This mechanism achieves a dynamic balance between security and availability through hierarchical capability reporting and state-aware response: for legitimate but non-compliant real base stations, it maintains access and service continuity; for fake base stations, it exposes basic information with no attack value, significantly reducing the risk of privacy leakage.
[0065] This disclosure aims to protect a method for dynamically distinguishing and selectively reporting capability information based on the security activation state of a user equipment (UE), thereby achieving network compatibility and service continuity while protecting user privacy. This UE capability information reporting method possesses high technical universality, protocol independence, and future evolution compatibility. It can be adapted to any wireless access network that supports UE capability information querying, including but not limited to second-generation (2G), third-generation (3G), fourth-generation (4G), fifth-generation (5G), and sixth-generation (6G) mobile communication networks. It can also cover future evolving wireless access architectures, such as non-terrestrial networks (NTN), low-Earth orbit satellite communications (LEO SAT), space-air-ground integrated networks, intelligent metasurface-aided communications (RIS-aided), and unlicensed spectrum access systems based on New Radio (NR-U).
[0066] For example, Figure 1 This disclosure illustrates a communication system architecture according to some embodiments, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the communication system includes: terminal 10 (user equipment), first access network device 20A (real base station), second access network device 20B (pseudo base station), and Internet 30.
[0067] In this process, terminal 10 establishes a communication connection with first access network device 20A via wireless link 1. First access network device 20A is a legitimate network node and is connected to the core network or Internet 30 via a backhaul link. At the same time, terminal 10 establishes a communication connection with second access network device 20B via wireless link 2. Second access network device 20B is an unauthorized or potentially malicious node (e.g., a fake base station). In the embodiments of this disclosure, "access network equipment" refers to any network entity capable of providing wireless access services to terminal devices, including but not limited to: base station, access point (AP), transmission reception point (TRP), relay base station (RBS), serving base station (SBS), base transceiver station (BTS), node B (NB), evolved node B (eNB), next generation node B (gNB), new radio node B (NR Node B), home node B (HNB), home evolved node B (HeNB), basic service set (BSS), extended service set (ESS), etc.
[0068] It should be noted that while the term "base station" is used as a typical example in the embodiments of this disclosure, it is not limited to cellular network devices as defined by 3GPP. It can also encompass any device that conforms to the definition of wireless access function, such as Wi-Fi access points, millimeter-wave access nodes, and satellite access terminals, as long as it has the ability to initiate user equipment capability query requests. Optionally, when the access device is a base station, the base station can be any type of network standard, such as a 3G base station, a 4G base station, a 5G base station, a 6G base station, or a later version of a base station. The embodiments of this disclosure do not limit the specific technology or equipment form used in the base station. In some embodiments, the base station provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be composed of a Central Unit (CU) and a Distributed Unit (DU). The CU can also be called a Control Unit. Using a CU-DU structure, the base station, for example, can have its protocol layer separated. Some protocol layer functions are centrally controlled by the CU, while the remaining or all protocol layer functions are distributed in the DU, which is centrally controlled by the CU.
[0069] In this disclosure, the terminal 10 refers to a physical or logical entity located on the user side for initiating or receiving wireless communication signals. It may also be referred to as a mobile station (MS), mobile terminal (MT), user terminal, terminal device, user equipment, etc. This disclosure does not limit the specific technical implementation, protocol stack layer, or hardware architecture of the terminal 10, which may include, but is not limited to: smartphones, tablet PCs, laptops / notebooks, personal digital assistants (PDAs), smartwatches, smart bracelets, smart headphones, smart glasses, smart jewelry (such as smart bracelets, rings, necklaces), smart clothing, wearable devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, virtual reality (VR) devices, robots, aircraft (such as drones), vehicle user equipment (VUE), shipboard terminals, pedestrian user equipment (PUE), smart home devices (such as smart refrigerators, smart TVs, smart washing machines, smart door locks, smart lighting with wireless communication capabilities), game consoles, personal computers (PCs), automated teller machines (ATMs), or self-service terminals, etc. The aforementioned terminal devices may all receive capability query requests from access network devices in a non-secure activation state, and therefore all fall under the scope of the methods disclosed herein.
[0070] In this embodiment, when terminal 10 is in a non-secure activation state (i.e., before completing RRC security context establishment or encryption key negotiation), if it receives a UE capability query request initiated by any access network device, terminal 10 will not immediately reject the request, nor will it directly report complete UE capability information containing device-specific attributes (such as supported frequency band combinations, carrier aggregation capability, MIMO layer number, dual connectivity capability, specific codec support, etc.). Instead, it reports a minimum necessary capability set (i.e., first capability information) to the access network device. This minimum necessary capability set includes capability parameters necessary to maintain basic access and initial connection, such as: supported Radio Access Technology (RAT), basic frequency band range, whether CA is supported, basic scheduling type, etc. Through this mechanism, even if the access network device is a malicious fake base station, it cannot obtain key feature information for device fingerprinting, tracking, or targeted attacks, thereby significantly reducing the risk of privacy leakage and man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0071] After reporting the first capability information, terminal 10 continues to execute subsequent network access procedures (such as identity authentication, key negotiation, security mode commands, etc.). If the access network device is a legitimate network node (such as the first access network device 20A), after completing security activation, terminal 10 sends a UE Capability Update Indication message to the network side, notifying the network that it has a more complete capability set; the network then initiates a second capability query, and terminal 10 subsequently reports complete capability information containing all feature capabilities (i.e., second capability information) to support the establishment of high-order services (such as multi-stream MIMO, millimeter-wave connection, ultra-low latency communication, etc.). If the access network device is a fake base station (such as the second access network device 20B), the subsequent security process will inevitably fail because the fake base station lacks a legitimate key. The device can only obtain low-granularity basic capability information and cannot pose a long-term threat.
[0072] As can be seen, the user equipment capability information reporting method provided in this embodiment, through a hierarchical capability reporting mechanism based on security status, can minimize the exposure of user equipment privacy while ensuring network compatibility, effectively resist fake base station attacks, and improve service continuity for users in non-ideal network environments. Basic capability information represents the minimum communication capabilities necessary for a user equipment to access the network, used to complete basic communication processes such as network registration and setup. Feature capability information is not a basic capability necessary for a user equipment to access the network and can characterize the capability attributes corresponding to the user equipment's hardware and model. When the user equipment is in a secure inactive state, if it receives a capability query request from the network side, it reports basic capability information but not feature capability information to avoid leakage of device characteristics. When the user equipment is in a secure active state, if it receives a capability query request from the network side, it reports second capability information containing feature capability information to the network side, allowing the network side to provide the user equipment with corresponding advanced communication services.
[0073] Optionally, the base station in this embodiment can be any network standard base station, such as a 3G base station, a 4G base station, a 5G base station, a 6G base station, or a later version base station. This embodiment does not limit the specific technology or equipment form used in the base station. In some embodiments, the base station provided in this embodiment can be composed of a Central Unit (CU) and a Distributed Unit (DU), where the CU can also be called a Control Unit. Using a CU-DU structure, the base station, for example, can have its protocol layer separated. Some protocol layer functions are centrally controlled by the CU, while the remaining part or all of the protocol layer functions are distributed in the DU, which is centrally controlled by the CU.
[0074] For example, Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a device capability information reporting method according to some embodiments of this disclosure, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the method includes the following steps: S202, in response to the capability query request from the network side, reports the first capability information to the network side. The first capability information includes the basic capability information necessary to support the user equipment to access the network.
[0075] In S202 above, when the user equipment is in a non-secure active state, it responds to the first capability query request issued by the network side and reports the basic capability information necessary for it to support network access to the network. This process does not rely on the establishment of a security context, nor does it involve the transmission of any parameters related to user equipment-specific functions or differentiated capabilities. It can be the minimum set of capabilities necessary to maintain a basic communication connection, thereby avoiding the exposure of the complete capability characteristics of the user equipment without completing security authentication, and ensuring that basic access interaction can still be completed even when the security mechanism is not ready.
[0076] In this embodiment, the secure activated state refers to the state in which the user equipment has completed secure activation and the security context has been established; the insecure activated state refers to the state in which the user equipment has not yet completed secure activation and the security context has not been established.
[0077] During the establishment of the secure active state, the User Equipment (UE) independently derives shared key material (such as KgNB) for RRC layer encryption and integrity protection based on the security configuration information received from the network side, combined with locally stored long-term keys and random numbers. The network side synchronously generates the same key and uses it to protect the integrity of the secure mode completion message. The UE verifies the integrity of the received secure mode completion message to determine whether secure activation is successful. Since the KgNB is derived from the shared key by the core network and the UE, the network-side base station cannot generate or forge valid integrity protection messages without authorization from the core network. Therefore, the UE can only successfully verify the message and enter the secure active state when the network is legitimate. If it is a fake base station, because it cannot access the core network to obtain legitimate key material, the response message it sends will fail the UE's integrity verification, and the UE will remain in the insecure active state, reporting basic capability information to it, thereby preventing the leakage of sensitive feature capabilities.
[0078] It should be noted that the secure active state is only confirmed when the KgNB is generated through a trusted key derivation mechanism (based on the long-term key K shared by the UE and the core network and a random number), and not forged by the base station. Fake base stations, unable to access the core network, cannot obtain the KgNB and therefore cannot enter this state.
[0079] In some embodiments of this disclosure, such as Figure 3 As shown, after S202 above, the device capability information reporting method provided in this embodiment of the disclosure further includes the following steps: S204, Determine whether the user equipment is in a secure activation state; S206, in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, reports second capability information to the network side, the second capability information including characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
[0080] In this embodiment, after receiving a capability query request from the network side, if it is uncertain whether the user equipment is in a secure state, it reports the first capability information (basic capability information) necessary for the user equipment to access the network. Only after it is determined that the user equipment is in a secure activated state is the reporting of the second capability information triggered. The second capability query request is an explicit instruction initiated by the network side after secure activation, and its triggering condition strictly depends on the establishment of the secure activated state. The second capability information includes characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes. This information content is directly related to the device's unique functional parameters, which are different from the basic capabilities. Its reporting action is only allowed after secure activation, ensuring that the disclosure of characteristic capability information is controlled by the establishment of a security mechanism.
[0081] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure reports feature capability information only when the user is in a secure active state. This solves the technical problems in related technologies where user equipment either does not respond to network-side capability query requests at all when in an insecure state, resulting in the unavailability of the real network, or reports all user equipment capability information, leading to fake base stations stealing feature information such as device fingerprints. Under the premise of protecting user privacy and security, it can ensure that the real network can normally complete the dual goals of access and service adaptation, significantly improving the service availability and privacy protection level of the terminal in complex network environments.
[0082] The first capability information (i.e., basic capability information) in this disclosure refers to the minimum set of capabilities that a user equipment must disclose to the network side to maintain basic network access capabilities. Its content is limited to general radio parameters necessary for supporting RRC connection establishment, cell camping, and initial registration. It does not contain any sensitive parameters that can be used for device identification, model inference, or attack surface expansion, and allows reporting to any network even without establishing a secure communication channel. In some embodiments, the first capability information includes, but is not limited to: supported frequency band indications (e.g., n1, n3, n28), maximum modulation scheme (e.g., 64QAM or below), number of antenna ports (≤2), whether carrier aggregation (CA) is supported but not specified, whether basic positioning functions are supported, etc. It explicitly excludes: device unique identifiers (e.g., IMEI), protocol version numbers (e.g., Release 18), 256QAM, 4T4R / 8T8R MIMO, millimeter wave band support, beam management capabilities, vendor-specific feature identifiers, AI enhancement features, and other highly sensitive parameters that can be used for device fingerprinting or attack customization.
[0083] The second capability information (i.e., characteristic capability information) in this embodiment refers to the complete set of capabilities that the user equipment actively reports in order to achieve fine-grained resource configuration and high-performance service adaptation on the network side. Its content includes all device-differentiated characteristics other than the first capability information mentioned above, such as the actual protocol version supported by the user equipment, proprietary function support, hardware characteristics, or sensitive capability parameters customized and enhanced by the manufacturer. Its reporting may reveal the identity or configuration characteristics of the user equipment, and it is strictly prohibited to be actively or passively triggered to report when a secure communication channel has not been established. In some embodiments, the second capability information includes, but is not limited to: actual protocol version number (e.g., 3GPP Release 17 / 18), support for 256QAM modulation, support for millimeter wave bands (e.g., n257, n258, n261), support for 4T4R or higher order MIMO, support for multi-TRP collaboration, support for enhanced positioning (e.g., NTS / OTDOA accuracy level), support for proprietary power-saving strategies (e.g., Deep Sleep mode), support for network slice awareness, support for AI inference acceleration, and support for V2X direct communication. This type of information can only be reported after a secure channel is established and explicitly requested by the network to ensure that it is not stolen by untrusted entities.
[0084] The device capability information reporting method provided in this disclosure reports basic capability information (the minimum communication capabilities necessary for a user device to access the network and complete basic communication processes such as device network access and registration) in a non-secure active state, and reports characteristic capability information (capability information that can characterize the user device in addition to the basic capabilities, including but not limited to device hardware enhancement capabilities, advanced wireless communication capabilities, and dedicated service support capabilities, which can be used by the network side to provide corresponding advanced services to the user device after secure activation) in a secure active state. This solves the technical problems in related technologies where user devices either do not respond to network-side capability query requests at all in an insecure state, resulting in the unavailability of the real network, or report all capability information of the user device, resulting in fake base stations stealing characteristic information such as device fingerprints. It can ensure that the real network can normally complete the dual goals of access and service adaptation while protecting user privacy and security, and significantly improve the service availability and privacy protection level of the terminal in complex network environments.
[0085] For example, in some embodiments of this disclosure, the second capability information may include characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes, without repeatedly reporting the basic capability information already provided in the first capability information. This reporting method can effectively reduce signaling overhead, reduce the length and processing latency of RRC layer reconfiguration messages, and improve the efficiency of the network side in quickly obtaining differentiated capabilities after security activation. It is particularly suitable for high-density networks or low-power IoT terminal scenarios that are sensitive to signaling load.
[0086] In other embodiments, the second capability information may simultaneously include basic capability information and characteristic capability information, meaning that all capability parameters are re-carried when reporting the complete capability set. This reporting method, through redundant reporting of all capability information, ensures that the network side can obtain a complete, consistent, and verifiable UE capability view after the security context is established, regardless of whether the previous basic capabilities are cached. This avoids capability misjudgments caused by network-side cache loss, state asynchrony, or failure of intermediate nodes to transmit information, significantly enhancing the robustness and reliability of network adaptation. It is particularly suitable for complex deployment environments involving multi-vendor equipment interoperability, network upgrades, or coexistence of heterogeneous network elements.
[0087] It should be noted that the second capability information reported in this embodiment can be selected from two reporting modes, namely, reporting only feature capability information or reporting both basic capability information and feature capability information, depending on network policy, terminal capability, or security context status. The former optimizes efficiency, while the latter ensures consistency. This disclosure does not limit its specific implementation form, and all of them fall within the protection scope of this invention.
[0088] The device capability information reporting scheme provided in this disclosure only reports the first capability information, which includes basic capability information, to the network side in the non-secure active state. This avoids the leakage of the user device's characteristic capability information before a security mechanism is established, thereby effectively protecting device privacy and security while ensuring the continuous availability of network access functions. After entering the secure active state, the second capability information, which includes characteristic capability information, is reported to the network side, enabling the network side to fully obtain the device's attribute capabilities for accurate adaptation and optimized communication configuration. Through the above two-stage hierarchical reporting mechanism, the parallel maintenance of security protection and network access capabilities in the non-secure state, as well as the complete capability negotiation after the establishment of the secure state, are achieved. This directly solves the technical problem that traditional device capability information reporting methods cannot simultaneously protect user device characteristic capability information and maintain network access capabilities in the non-secure active state, achieving a comprehensive technical effect of improving user device security, ensuring network access continuity, and optimizing network adaptation efficiency.
[0089] It should be noted that the current 3GPP protocol does not support user equipment (UE) proactively reporting its complete or updated capability information to the network side without request. If the UE's capability information is updated (such as due to software upgrades, hardware configuration changes, or protocol version updates), it can only send a UE Capability Change Indication to the core network via a Non-Access Stratum (NAS) message. Only after receiving this indication will the core network trigger the Access Stratum (AS) procedure, whereby the base station proactively initiates a capability query to the UE via an RRC reconfiguration message or a UE Capability Enquiry signaling message to obtain the latest capability information.
[0090] To adapt to existing communication protocols, in some embodiments of this disclosure, such as Figure 3 As shown, the device capability information reporting method provided in this embodiment can report second capability information to the network side through the following steps: S302, in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, sends a user equipment capability update instruction to the network side; S304, in response to a capability update request from the network side, reports the second capability information to the network side.
[0091] In this embodiment, when a user equipment (UE) switches from a non-secure active state to a secure active state, it does not proactively or spontaneously report second capability information containing UE characteristic capability information to the network side. Instead, after confirming that it has entered the secure active state, it sends a UE capability update instruction to the network side. Once the network side triggers and sends a second capability query request based on this update instruction, the UE then reports the second capability information containing characteristic capability information to the network side. This embodiment, by introducing only a capability information update instruction, achieves protocol-level control over the reporting behavior of characteristic capability information without modifying any existing communication protocols (such as 3GPP NAS, RRC, or UECapability Information procedures).
[0092] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure adopts the inherent interaction logic of "user equipment actively initiating capability update requests and the network side responding to queries on demand" in the current communication protocol specifications. The overall signaling process and interaction sequence are fully compatible with the existing user equipment capability reporting protocol, without requiring any modification or upgrade to the existing network architecture or the underlying protocol stack of user equipment, thus possessing strong protocol compatibility and universal applicability. The solution disclosed in this disclosure, while compatible with existing standardized capability update mechanisms, assigns a security verification attribute to the capability update trigger condition. Only when the user equipment completes the establishment of a secure channel and is in a legitimate and secure active state will it actively initiate a capability update instruction. The network side then triggers a capability update request and obtains the sensitive feature capability information of the user equipment. This disclosure solves the privacy leakage defects of traditional indiscriminate full capability reporting. It retains the advantages of existing protocols being mature, universal, and feasible, while also achieving a technical upgrade to hierarchical and secure reporting of capability information, effectively avoiding fake base station-induced attacks, and balancing system compatibility, communication reliability, and user equipment privacy security protection capabilities.
[0093] In some embodiments of this disclosure, determining that a user equipment is in a secure active state includes: verifying whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize that the user equipment and the network side have completed at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; in response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, determining that the user equipment is in a secure active state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; and in response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, determining that the user equipment is in a non-secure active state.
[0094] In this embodiment, the user equipment is determined to be in a secure active state in response to the successful establishment of a secure communication channel. This secure communication channel is used to realize identity authentication, key negotiation, and / or integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side, providing an objective and verifiable security environment basis for the reporting of feature capability information. When the secure communication channel is successfully established, the user equipment sends a capability information update instruction to the network side, and only reports feature capability information containing the user equipment's own attributes to the network side after receiving a second capability query request from the network side. This ensures that the sensitive information is only exposed after confirming that the communication link has complete security protection capabilities, avoiding the problem of premature leakage of feature information or inaccurate reporting timing due to misjudgment or delayed judgment in a non-secure active state. This achieves refined protection of the user equipment's sensitive capability information and improves the security and controllability of the network access process.
[0095] By directly binding the determination of the fully active state to the verifiable protocol event of the successful establishment of a secure communication channel between the user equipment and the network side, the solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure ensures that the reporting stage of feature capability information is only allowed after both the terminal and the network have jointly completed key derivation and successfully verified message integrity. This effectively prevents fake base stations from inducing the UE to report sensitive information by forging query requests, while ensuring that the real network can fully obtain the UE's capabilities after the secure channel is established in order to optimize resource allocation. This achieves objectivity, measurability, and anti-forgery capability of the security status determination, and significantly improves the terminal's autonomous security decision-making capability and privacy protection granularity in complex network environments.
[0096] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the basic capability information is the communication capability information necessary for completing the user equipment's network access and / or registration process; the characteristic capability information is information used to characterize at least one of the following capabilities of the user equipment: device hardware and software capabilities, protocol support capabilities, and service support capabilities.
[0097] In this embodiment, the user equipment (UE) distinguishes the content of the reported capability information based on its current secure activation state: when the UE is in a non-secure activation state, it only reports the communication capability information necessary for completing the network entry and / or registration process to the network side, ensuring that no sensitive capabilities related to the device's own attributes are disclosed, thereby effectively protecting user privacy while maintaining basic network access functions; when the UE is in a secure activation state, it reports characteristic capability information including the device's hardware and software capabilities, protocol support capabilities, and service support capabilities, to fully support the network's identification and service adaptation of the device's differentiated capabilities. By clearly defining the boundaries and content scope of the two types of information, it achieves minimal information exposure in the non-secure state and accurate capability transmission in the secure state, thereby fundamentally solving the problem of privacy leakage risk and incomplete capability expression caused by ambiguous information reporting boundaries while maintaining network access continuity.
[0098] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure limits basic capability information to the minimum communication parameters necessary for network access / registration (such as supported frequency bands, basic modulation, number of antennas, etc.), and clarifies characteristic capability information as device-differentiated attribute information (such as protocol version, millimeter wave support, dedicated accelerator, AI inference capability, etc.). This enables hierarchical reporting of user device capability information, making it impossible for fake base stations to obtain only general access parameters and identify characteristic capability information such as device model, manufacturer, or enhanced functions. This significantly reduces the risk of devices being tracked, targeted attacks, or exploited by firmware vulnerabilities, and improves the granular protection capability of user privacy.
[0099] For example, Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating yet another method for reporting device capability information according to some embodiments of this disclosure, such as... Figure 4As shown, this device capability information is applied to network-side devices, specifically including the following steps: S402, Send a capability query request to the user equipment; S404a: Receive first capability information reported by the user equipment. The first capability information includes basic capability information necessary to support the user equipment's access to the network.
[0100] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure allows the network-side device to send a capability query request to the user equipment (UE), after which the UE reports the basic capability information necessary for the UE to access the network. This avoids the problem of the UE being unable to access the legitimate network due to its refusal to respond to the capability query request, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining the device's unique capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability and device privacy protection, achieving secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security status, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0101] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the device capability information reporting method provided in these embodiments further includes the following steps: S404b, Receive second capability information reported by the user equipment. The second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a safe state.
[0102] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure reports characteristic capability information representing the user equipment's own attributes to the network side only when it is determined that the user equipment is in a secure active state. This enables the network side to complete the terminal's network registration based on the basic capability information reported by the user equipment. After receiving complete characteristic capability information, the network side accurately matches the terminal hardware, protocols, and service capabilities, and performs targeted network resource scheduling, service function adaptation, and parameter optimization. This effectively improves the accuracy of network service adaptation and the quality of communication services, while taking into account both network communication reliability and terminal privacy and security.
[0103] Through the device capability information reporting scheme provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure, after the network-side device sends a capability query request to the user equipment, the user equipment reports capability information to the network-side device in a hierarchical manner according to its own status. If the user equipment is in a non-secure active state, it only reports the basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network to the network, avoiding the theft of sensitive feature information by potential illegal base stations. If the user equipment is in a secure active state, it reports the feature capability information that represents the user equipment's own attributes to the network-side device. Under the premise of ensuring user privacy and security, it can ensure that the real network can normally complete the dual goals of access and service adaptation, significantly improving the service availability and privacy protection level of the terminal in complex network environments.
[0104] In some embodiments of this disclosure, receiving second capability information reported by a user equipment includes: receiving a capability update indication sent when the user equipment is in a secure active state; sending a capability update request to the user equipment; and receiving the second capability information reported by the user equipment.
[0105] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure adopts the inherent interaction logic of "user equipment actively initiating capability update requests and the network side responding to queries on demand" in the current communication protocol specifications. The overall signaling process and interaction sequence are fully compatible with the existing user equipment capability reporting protocol, without requiring any modification or upgrade to the existing network architecture or the underlying protocol stack of user equipment, thus possessing strong protocol compatibility and universal applicability. The solution disclosed in this disclosure, while compatible with existing standardized capability update mechanisms, assigns a security verification attribute to the capability update trigger condition. Only when the user equipment completes the establishment of a secure channel and is in a legitimate and secure active state will it actively initiate a capability update instruction. The network side then triggers a capability update request and obtains the sensitive feature capability information of the user equipment. This disclosure solves the privacy leakage defects of traditional indiscriminate full capability reporting. It retains the advantages of existing protocols being mature, universal, and feasible, while also achieving a technical upgrade to hierarchical and secure reporting of capability information, effectively avoiding fake base station-induced attacks, and balancing system compatibility, communication reliability, and user equipment privacy security protection capabilities.
[0106] For example, Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for reporting device capability information to a fake base station according to some embodiments of this disclosure, such as... Figure 5 As shown, it includes the following steps: S502, Protocol Flow Phase: In the initial communication phase, the UE and the network (here, the fake base station) begin a standard protocol interaction process. At this time, security mechanisms are not yet activated, and the network side (fake base station) has not yet completed key negotiation and authentication, making it impossible to encrypt communication information. This phase is a pre-process for UE capability query and is a normal process defined by the protocol.
[0107] S504, Fake base station initiates UE Capability Enquiry: The fake base station, acting as a malicious base station, disguises itself as a legitimate base station and sends a "UE Capability Enquiry" message to the UE, requesting the UE to report its supported wireless communication capabilities, such as supported frequency bands, modulation methods, coding rates, multiple-antenna technology (MIMO), and supported protocol versions.
[0108] S506, UE reports basic capability information (UE Capability Info - Base Capability): After receiving a query from a fake base station, the UE does not report its complete capability information, but only reports basic capability information (BaseCapability). For example, the UE only reports general capabilities such as the lowest supported protocol version, standard modulation method (such as QPSK), and basic frequency band support, while hiding its advanced capability information, such as high-order modulation (64QAM / 256QAM), carrier aggregation (CA), beamforming, 5G NR features, etc.
[0109] At this point, the UE's response information is legitimate and conforms to the protocol specifications, so it will not be intercepted or rejected; however, the UE does not expose its true device capabilities, making it impossible for the fake base station to obtain detailed information that can be used for subsequent attacks.
[0110] S508, Encryption Flow - Fail: After reporting basic capability information, the encryption phase begins. At this point, the legitimate network negotiates a security key based on the capability information reported by the UE and initiates the encrypted communication process. However, the fake base station lacks crucial key information (such as KASME, IK, CK, etc.) and cannot verify the complete capabilities and identity consistency of the UE, causing the encryption process to fail.
[0111] Because the fake base station cannot obtain the complete capabilities of the UE, it cannot correctly generate or negotiate encryption keys. At the same time, the UE may interact with the fake base station in subsequent processes based on standard integrity protection mechanisms (such as integrity protection and encryption algorithm negotiation), but due to parameter mismatch, encryption fails. Ultimately, the fake base station fails because it cannot complete the secure communication process, and the attack ends.
[0112] As can be seen from the above, the device capability information reporting method provided in this embodiment of the present disclosure reports only basic capability information during the UE capability query stage. By utilizing the dependence of the encryption process on the key and capability information, the fake base station is unable to complete subsequent secure communication due to the lack of key information, thereby effectively preventing fake base station attacks without changing the terminal behavior.
[0113] For example, Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for reporting device capability information to a real base station, based on some embodiments of this disclosure. Figure 6 As shown, it includes the following steps: S602, Protocol Flow Phase: The initial phase of user equipment accessing the network, including but not limited to RRC connection establishment, random access, NAS signaling, etc. At this time, security mechanisms are not yet activated (encryption keys have not been generated).
[0114] S604, The real base station initiates a UE Capability Enquiry: The network (base station) sends a UE Capability Enquiry message to the UE to obtain the UE's basic capability information for subsequent RRC connection configuration and resource allocation. No encrypted transmission is established here; the basic capability information is transmitted in plaintext.
[0115] S606, UE reports basic capability information (UE Capability Info - Base Capability): After receiving a query from a fake base station, the UE does not report its complete capability information, but only reports basic capability information (BaseCapability).
[0116] S608, Encryption Flow Succ: The network and UE complete security authentication (such as KASME, key derivation) and establish an encrypted channel. Thereafter, all signaling is transmitted using encryption to ensure security.
[0117] S610, the UE sends a UE Capability Update Indication: The UE detects that the current network is a real network (not a simulated or attacked network) and finds that the network only has basic capabilities. It sends a UE Capability Update Indication message to the network to notify the network that its actual capabilities have changed.
[0118] S612, the real base station initiates a secondary query (re-query) of UE capability information: After receiving the update instruction, the network sends the UE Capability Enquiry again according to the protocol. At this point, security is established, the message can be transmitted encrypted, and security is guaranteed.
[0119] S614, UE reports real capability information UE Capability Info (Real Capability): The network receives the real capability information (including characteristic capability information) reported by the UE and performs more refined scheduling and service support (such as supporting URLLC, high throughput, large connections, etc.).
[0120] As can be seen from the above, the device capability information reporting method provided in this embodiment can still complete the security activation process normally after the UE reports basic capability information for real base stations that do not strictly comply with the protocol but have a complete key system. After the security context is established, the UE actively triggers the capability information update instruction, prompting the network side to initiate a secondary capability query. Thus, without interrupting the service, the UE can fully report the feature capability information to the real network, achieve service adaptation and resource optimization, and take into account the triple goals of network compliance, service continuity and privacy security.
[0121] It should be noted that the above figures are merely illustrative representations of the processes included in methods according to some embodiments of this disclosure, and are not intended to be limiting. It is readily understood that the processes shown in the above figures do not indicate or limit the temporal order of these processes. Furthermore, it is also readily understood that these processes may be executed synchronously or asynchronously, for example, in multiple modules.
[0122] The following are embodiments of the apparatus disclosed herein, which can be used to execute embodiments of the method disclosed herein. For details not disclosed in the apparatus embodiments of this disclosure, please refer to the embodiments of the method disclosed herein.
[0123] For example, Figure 7 This is a block diagram illustrating a user equipment according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. (Refer to...) Figure 7 The user equipment includes: a first capability information reporting module 701.
[0124] The first capability information reporting module 701 is used to report first capability information to the network side in response to a capability query request from the network side. The first capability information includes basic capability information necessary to support the user equipment to access the network.
[0125] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure addresses the issue where, if a user equipment (UE) cannot confirm whether the current network is secure, it receives a capability query request from the network side. In such cases, the UE reports the basic capability information required for access to the network side via the first capability information reporting module, instead of reporting characteristic capability information that can identify the UE. This avoids the problem of being unable to access a legitimate network due to refusing to respond to capability query requests, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining device-specific characteristic capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability with device privacy protection, achieving secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security status, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0126] In some embodiments, the user equipment provided in this disclosure further includes: a security activation state verification module 702, configured to: determine whether the user equipment is in a security activation state; and a second capability information reporting module 703, configured to: in response to the user equipment being in a security activation state, report second capability information to the network side, wherein the second capability information includes feature capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
[0127] Through the solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure, the security activation status verification module 702 and the second capability information reporting module 703 form a linkage mechanism to achieve automated execution of automatic judgment of terminal security status and differentiated reporting of capability information, without manual intervention. By hierarchically reporting hardware access capabilities and device characteristic capabilities, a privacy protection barrier is built from the terminal side, effectively resisting malicious attacks such as fake base stations stealing device fingerprints and tracing the source, while not affecting the terminal's basic network communication functions. This balances the practicality of terminal communication with privacy and security, and improves the stable operation capability of the device in complex heterogeneous networks and malicious network interference scenarios.
[0128] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure, through the first capability information reporting module 701 and the second capability information reporting module 703 set inside the user equipment, enables hierarchical reporting of user equipment capability information. Under the premise of protecting user privacy and security, it can ensure that the real network can normally complete the dual goals of access and service adaptation, and significantly improve the service availability and privacy protection level of the terminal in complex network environments.
[0129] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the second capability information reporting module 703 is further configured to: receive a capability update indication sent by the user equipment when it is in a secure active state; send a capability update request to the user equipment; and receive the second capability information reported by the user equipment.
[0130] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure adopts the inherent interaction logic of "user equipment actively initiating capability update requests and the network side responding to queries on demand" in the current communication protocol specifications. The overall signaling process and interaction sequence are fully compatible with the existing user equipment capability reporting protocol, without requiring any modification or upgrade to the existing network architecture or the underlying protocol stack of user equipment, and has strong protocol compatibility and universal applicability. The solution disclosed in this disclosure, while compatible with existing standardized capability update mechanisms, assigns a security verification attribute to the capability update trigger condition. Only when the user equipment completes the establishment of a secure channel and is in a legitimate and secure active state will it actively initiate a capability update instruction. The network side then triggers a capability update request and obtains the sensitive feature capability information of the user equipment. This disclosure solves the privacy leakage defect of traditional indiscriminate full capability reporting. It retains the advantages of existing protocols being mature, universal, and feasible, while also achieving a technical upgrade to hierarchical and secure reporting of capability information. It effectively avoids fake base station-induced attacks, and balances system compatibility, communication reliability, and user equipment privacy and security protection capabilities.
[0131] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the aforementioned secure activation state verification module 702 is further configured to: verify whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize that the user equipment and the network side have completed at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; in response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a secure activation state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; in response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a non-secure activation state.
[0132] The security activation status verification module 702, through the solutions provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure, uses the standardized secure communication channel establishment result as the judgment basis, replacing the traditional vague security status discrimination method, thus enabling the terminal security status judgment to have standardized, verifiable, and anti-counterfeiting characteristics. By verifying network legitimacy through multiple mechanisms such as two-way identity authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection, it accurately distinguishes between real and trusted networks and malicious fake base station networks, blocking the leakage path of sensitive feature capability information in insecure scenarios from the source, further refining the terminal privacy protection layers, and significantly improving the accuracy and reliability of the terminal's autonomous security decisions, adapting to various complex network security protection scenarios.
[0133] For example, Figure 8 This is a block diagram illustrating a network-side device according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. (Refer to...) Figure 8The network-side device includes: a user equipment capability information query module 801 and a user equipment capability information acquisition module 802.
[0134] The user equipment capability information query module 801 is configured to send a capability query request to the user equipment; the user equipment capability information acquisition module 802 is configured to receive the first capability information reported by the user equipment, the first capability information containing the basic capability information necessary to support the user equipment to access the network.
[0135] The solution provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure allows the network-side device to send a capability query request to the user equipment (UE) via the capability information query module. The UE's capability information acquisition module then receives the basic capability information reported by the UE, which is necessary for network access. This avoids the problem of UEs being unable to access legitimate networks due to refusing to respond to capability query requests, and also prevents fake base stations from obtaining device-specific capability information through capability queries, effectively resisting information theft by fake base stations. This solution balances network access reliability with device privacy protection, enabling secure and controllable capability reporting in scenarios with uncertain network security conditions, and improving the terminal's resistance to attacks in complex wireless network environments with fake base stations.
[0136] In some embodiments of this disclosure, the user equipment capability information acquisition module 802 is further configured to: receive second capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a safe state.
[0137] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure allows the network-side device's capability information acquisition module to adapt to the hierarchical reporting mechanism of user devices, acquiring different dimensions of user device capability information in stages and scenarios. In the initial stage of user device network access, only basic access capabilities are acquired, ensuring that user devices can quickly complete network registration and network access, improving network access efficiency. After the establishment of a secure channel, complete user device characteristic capability information is acquired, providing accurate data support for refined resource scheduling, high-level service deployment, and differentiated service adaptation on the network side. Simultaneously, the network side only receives sensitive capability data in secure scenarios, reducing the risk of malicious network data interaction and privacy leaks, and improving the security, stability, and intelligent service adaptation level of the entire communication system.
[0138] Regarding the user equipment and network-side equipment in the above embodiments, the specific methods by which each module performs operations have been described in detail in the embodiments of the method, and will not be elaborated here.
[0139] Figure 9 This is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. (Refer to...) Figure 9The electronic device 900 may include one or more of the following components: a processing component 902, a memory 904, a power supply component 906, a multimedia component 908, an audio component 910, an input / output (I / O) interface 912, a sensor component 914, and a communication component 916.
[0140] Processing component 902 typically controls the overall operation of device 900, such as operations associated with display, telephone calls, data communication, camera operation, and recording. Processing component 902 may include one or more processors 918 to execute instructions to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described above. Furthermore, processing component 902 may include one or more modules to facilitate interaction between processing component 902 and other components. For example, processing component 902 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between multimedia component 908 and processing component 902.
[0141] Memory 904 is configured to store various types of data to support the operation of device 900. Examples of this data include instructions for any application or method operating on device 900, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, videos, etc. Memory 904 can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic storage, flash memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk.
[0142] Power supply component 906 provides power to various components of device 900. Power supply component 906 may include a power management system, one or more power supplies, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power to device 900.
[0143] Multimedia component 908 includes a screen that provides an output interface between the device 900 and the user. In some embodiments, the screen may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) and a touch panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touchscreen to receive input signals from the user. The touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensors may sense not only the boundaries of the touch or swipe action but also the duration and pressure associated with the touch or swipe operation. In some embodiments, multimedia component 908 includes a front-facing camera and / or a rear-facing camera. When the device 900 is in an operating mode, such as a shooting mode or a video mode, the front-facing camera and / or the rear-facing camera may receive external multimedia data. Each front-facing camera and rear-facing camera may be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capabilities.
[0144] Audio component 910 is configured to output and / or input audio signals. For example, audio component 910 includes a microphone (MIC) configured to receive external audio signals when device 900 is in an operating mode, such as call mode, recording mode, and voice recognition mode. The received audio signals may be further stored in memory 904 or transmitted via communication component 916. In some embodiments, audio component 910 also includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.
[0145] I / O interface 912 provides an interface between processing component 902 and peripheral interface modules, such as keyboards, click wheels, buttons, etc. These buttons may include, but are not limited to, home buttons, volume buttons, power buttons, and lock buttons.
[0146] Sensor assembly 914 includes one or more sensors for providing status assessments of various aspects of device 900. For example, sensor assembly 914 can detect the on / off state of device 900, the relative positioning of components such as the display and keypad of device 900, changes in the position of device 900 or its components, the presence or absence of user contact with device 900, the orientation or acceleration / deceleration of device 900, and temperature changes of device 900. Sensor assembly 914 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects without any physical contact. Sensor assembly 914 may include a voice sensor configured to acquire voice data. Sensor assembly 914 may also include a light sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications. In some embodiments, sensor assembly 914 may also include a heart rate sensor, blood pressure sensor, accelerometer, magnetic sensor, pressure sensor, or temperature sensor.
[0147] Communication component 916 is configured to facilitate wired or wireless communication between device 900 and other devices. Device 900 can access wireless networks based on communication standards, such as WiFi, 3G, 4G, 5G, other communication standards, or combinations thereof. In some embodiments of this disclosure, communication component 916 receives broadcast signals or broadcast-related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel. In some embodiments of this disclosure, communication component 916 further includes a near-field communication (NFC) module to facilitate short-range communication. For example, the NFC module may be implemented based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, Infrared Data Association (IrDA) technology, ultra-wideband (UWB) technology, Bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.
[0148] In some embodiments of this disclosure, device 900 may be implemented by one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components to perform the methods described above.
[0149] In some embodiments of this disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions is also provided. When the instructions in the storage medium are executed by a processor of an electronic device, the electronic device is able to perform the steps of any of the aforementioned device capability information reporting methods. For example, a memory 904 including instructions, which can be executed by a processor 918 of device 900 to complete the aforementioned method. For example, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be a ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage device, etc.
[0150] Optionally, when the instructions in the storage medium are executed by the processor of the mobile terminal, the mobile terminal is enabled to execute the device capability information reporting method of the above embodiments.
[0151] The device capability information reporting method provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure can be deployed in various non-temporary computer-readable storage media by means of instructions, without hardware changes, and has good portability and engineering feasibility.
[0152] In some embodiments of this disclosure, a chip is also provided, including an interface circuit and a processing circuit coupled to each other. The interface circuit is used to input or output signals, and the processing circuit is used to implement the device capability information reporting method of the above embodiments.
[0153] The solution provided by the above embodiments of this disclosure can integrate the device capability information reporting method provided in the embodiments of this disclosure into a dedicated chip of the terminal or network side device to achieve low power consumption and high efficiency hardware acceleration processing, and meet the requirements of real-time performance and large-scale deployment.
[0154] In some embodiments of this disclosure, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the device capability information reporting method described above.
[0155] The device capability information reporting method provided in the above embodiments of this disclosure can be widely deployed in various communication devices in the form of computer program products, supporting cross-platform and cross-vendor standardized implementation, and improving the flexibility and scalability of technology promotion.
[0156] Other embodiments of this disclosure will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. This application is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of this disclosure that follow the general principles of this disclosure and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein. The specification and embodiments are to be considered exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of this disclosure are indicated by the following claims.
[0157] It should be understood that this disclosure is not limited to the precise structures described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of this disclosure is limited only by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A device capability information reporting method, characterized in that, include: In response to a capability query request from the network side, the system reports first capability information to the network side, the first capability information including basic capability information necessary to support user equipment access to the network.
2. The method of reporting device capability information according to claim 1, wherein, After reporting the first capability information to the network side, the method further includes: Determine whether the user equipment is in a secure activation state; In response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, a second capability information is reported to the network side, the second capability information including characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
3. The equipment capability information reporting method according to claim 2, characterized in that, In response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, the second capability information is reported to the network side, including: In response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, a user equipment capability update instruction is sent to the network side; In response to the capability update request from the network side, the second capability information is reported to the network side.
4. The equipment capability information reporting method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Determining whether the user equipment is in a secure activation state includes: Verify whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize that the user equipment and the network side have completed at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; In response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, it is determined that the user equipment is in a secure active state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for identity authentication, key negotiation and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; In response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, the user equipment is determined to be in an insecure active state.
5. The equipment capability information reporting method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The basic capability information is the communication capability information necessary to complete the user equipment's network access and / or registration process; the characteristic capability information is information used to characterize the user equipment's at least one of the following capabilities: equipment hardware and software capabilities, protocol support capabilities, and service support capabilities.
6. A method for reporting equipment capability information, characterized in that, include: Send a capability query request to the user equipment; The system receives first capability information reported by the user equipment, the first capability information containing basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
7. The equipment capability information reporting method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: The system receives second capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a safe state.
8. The equipment capability information reporting method according to claim 7, characterized in that, Receiving the second capability information reported by the user equipment includes: Receive a capability update indication sent when the user equipment is in a secure active state; Send a capability update request to the user equipment; Receive the second capability information reported by the user equipment.
9. A user equipment, characterized in that, include: The first capability information reporting module is configured to: in response to a capability query request from the network side, report first capability information to the network side, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary to support the user equipment to access the network.
10. The user equipment according to claim 9, characterized in that, The user equipment also includes: The security activation status verification module is configured to: determine whether the user equipment is in a secure activation state; The second capability information reporting module is configured to: in response to the user equipment being in a secure active state, report second capability information to the network side, wherein the second capability information includes feature capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes.
11. The user equipment according to claim 10, characterized in that, The secure activation state verification module is further configured to: verify whether a secure communication channel has been successfully established, wherein the secure communication channel is used to characterize that the user equipment and the network side have completed at least one of the following operations: two-way authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection; in response to the successful establishment of the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a secure activation state, wherein the secure communication channel is used for authentication, key negotiation, and integrity protection between the user equipment and the network side; in response to the failure to establish the secure communication channel, determine that the user equipment is in a non-secure activation state.
12. A network-side device, characterized in that, include: The user equipment capability information query module is configured to send capability query requests to user equipment. The user equipment capability information acquisition module is configured to receive first capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the first capability information includes basic capability information necessary for the user equipment to access the network.
13. The network-side device according to claim 12, characterized in that, The user equipment capability information acquisition module is further configured to: receive second capability information reported by the user equipment, wherein the second capability information is characteristic capability information used to characterize the user equipment's own attributes when the user equipment is in a safe state.
14. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to implement the steps of the device capability information reporting method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
15. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, When the instructions in the storage medium are executed by the processor of the electronic device, the electronic device is able to perform the steps of the device capability information reporting method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
16. A chip, characterized in that, The chip includes an interface circuit and a processing circuit that are coupled to each other. The interface circuit is used to input or output signals, and the processing circuit is used to implement the device capability information reporting method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
17. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the device capability information reporting method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
