An efficient certificateless signcryption method and system suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle ad hoc network
This method, which utilizes a certificateless cryptography system and elliptic curve multiplication for UAV ad hoc networks, solves the communication security and computational latency issues of UAV ad hoc networks. It achieves efficient and secure authentication and key negotiation, and is suitable for the highly dynamic environment of UAV ad hoc networks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611385757.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-08
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ad hoc networks face communication security challenges in highly dynamic topologies. Existing certificate-free signature encryption schemes suffer from high computational overhead, large latency, and vulnerability to single points of failure, making it difficult to meet the requirements of real-time performance and resource constraints.
The system employs a certificateless cryptographic system. The trusted center generates a portion of the private key, while the drone generates another portion. Authentication and key negotiation for a single interaction are achieved through elliptic curve multiplication. Combined with signature and encryption operations, two-way identity authentication and secure message transmission are completed.
It effectively avoids key escrow issues, reduces computation and communication latency, enhances security, adapts to the highly dynamic and resource-constrained environment of UAV ad hoc networks, and improves the practicality and feasibility of the protocol.
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Figure CN123123890A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to an efficient certificate-free signature method and system suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) self-organizing networks. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development and continuous cost reduction of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology, Flying Ad-Hoc Networks (FANETs) have quickly expanded to numerous civilian and commercial scenarios, including disaster monitoring, agricultural plant protection, border patrol, emergency communications, and logistics delivery. As a dynamic autonomous network composed of high-speed mobile UAV nodes, FANETs do not rely on any fixed ground infrastructure and can flexibly and quickly achieve information sharing and collaborative operations within the airspace, making them a key component of future integrated air-space-ground information networks.
[0003] However, due to the highly dynamic topology, open and insecure wireless communication channels, and the limited onboard processing and storage resources of the nodes themselves, FANET's communication security faces unprecedented challenges. During missions, UAV nodes frequently exchange sensitive information such as flight paths, telemetry data, reconnaissance images, and collaborative control commands. This data is highly vulnerable to active or passive attacks such as eavesdropping, tampering, forgery, and replay attacks during transmission. If the node authentication and key negotiation mechanisms are flawed, attackers can even impersonate legitimate nodes to inject false information or infer the mission intent and affiliation of a specific UAV by long-term tracking and analysis of its communication patterns, leading to serious information leakage and even mission failure. Therefore, how to achieve low-latency, highly secure inter-node communication in the highly dynamic and resource-constrained FANET environment has become a core issue in current UAV cybersecurity research.
[0004] To address the aforementioned security requirements, academia and industry have proposed various authentication and key negotiation schemes suitable for wireless mobile networks. Early solutions largely relied on traditional digital certificate systems based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), where Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue public key certificates to each node to verify its legitimacy. However, the inherent problems of certificate generation, distribution, storage, revocation, and complex verification paths in PKI systems lead to unacceptable management overhead and communication latency in FANET scenarios with a large number of nodes frequently entering and leaving the network. To overcome the burden of certificate management, Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) has been introduced. It directly uses the node's unique identifier (such as ID or MAC address) as the public key, thereby avoiding the use of certificates. However, the IBC scheme inevitably introduces the key escrow problem, that is, the user's private key is completely escrowed by the Private Key Generator (PKG). Once the PKG is compromised or maliciously manipulated, the security of the entire network will be lost. This single point of failure is particularly fatal in the distributed, decentralized FANET.
[0005] To strike a balance between eliminating certificate management and avoiding key escrow, Certificateless Cryptography (CLC) emerged. In this type of scheme, the Key Generation Center (KGC) generates only a portion of the user's private key, while the user independently generates the remaining secret value. These two parts are combined to form the complete private key, effectively solving the key escrow problem. In recent years, many CLC-based authentication schemes have been proposed. Some schemes introduce signcryption technology, combining digital signatures and public key encryption to provide confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of messages while reducing computational and communication overhead. However, a deeper analysis of existing work reveals significant limitations.
[0006] Many existing certificateless signature schemes rely on computationally expensive bilinear pairing operations for ease of security proof, which is too burdensome for the computationally limited onboard processors of UAVs and makes it difficult to meet the stringent real-time requirements of FANET. Secondly, to achieve necessary security attributes, many existing schemes require multiple interactions to complete key negotiation. This not only increases communication latency but also poses a high risk of session interruption in highly dynamic topologies due to rapid node movement, severely impacting the practicality and deployment feasibility of the protocol. Furthermore, the scheme needs to meet essential security attributes such as two-way authentication and avoid significant security vulnerabilities such as key escrow issues.
[0007] In summary, UAV ad hoc networks urgently require an authentication key negotiation scheme that balances lightweight design, strong security, and high efficiency in a single interaction. Specifically, this scheme should meet the following core requirements: First, it should adopt a certificateless system, leveraging its cryptographic characteristic of "the administrator holding half the secret, and the node itself holding the other half," thus eliminating single points of failure. Second, it should completely eliminate reliance on bilinear pairing operations, relying entirely on the more computationally efficient elliptic curve multiplication operation to suit the resource-constrained characteristics of UAV nodes. Third, authentication and key negotiation should be completed in a single communication interaction, minimizing communication latency and connection interruption risks, thereby ensuring the confidentiality and trustworthiness of communication between nodes while truly adapting to the highly dynamic, low-latency, and resource-constrained operating environment of FANET. Fourth, it should achieve highly secure two-way authentication to guarantee the security of authentication key negotiation. Summary of the Invention
[0008] In view of this, this application provides an efficient certificate-free signature method and system suitable for UAV self-organizing networks.
[0009] This application discloses an efficient certificate-free signature encryption method suitable for UAV ad hoc networks, which includes: Step 1: Before the deployment of the UAV self-organizing network, the Trust Center performs the system parameter generation process, randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the corresponding system master public key, publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, and provides a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation stages; Step 2: Before each drone officially joins the self-organizing network and performs tasks, it initiates a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel. Upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center returns an auxiliary public value and a portion of the private key to the drone. Based on the received information, the drone calculates the complete signature private key and public key, thus completing the drone's registration. Step 3: When a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and simultaneously establish a secure session key, the source node uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, system public parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve dot product operations. This secret value is then used as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. The source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters. Finally, it combines the ciphertext and the signature value into a single authentication message and sends it to the target node in one go. Upon receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and system public parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way and uses this secret value to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. Simultaneously, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process only requires one round trip.
[0010] Furthermore, step 1 only needs to be performed once, and the system parameters remain unchanged during the operation of the self-organizing network unless the system security parameters need to be updated.
[0011] Further, step 1 includes; Before system deployment, the Trust Center selects an elliptic curve and its cyclic additive subgroup and base point defined on a finite field, defines the required hash function and key derivation function, generates the system master private key, calculates its public counterpart, and publishes all public parameters. Select elliptic curve Base point and basic level Cyclic addition subgroup ,in Defined in a finite field superior, ,and , It is a large prime number; Selected As a symmetric key derivation function; Derived functions for symmetric keys; Randomly select the system master private key , Given an integer additive group modulo q, compute the system's master public key. ; Publish system parameters .
[0012] Furthermore, it also includes defining the following cryptographic hash function:
[0013] in, Used to map real, unique identifiers to elements on a computational G (Real Identity). To calculate the binding hash function (Partial Private Key) to prevent tampering of the partial key, To calculate the binding hash function (Message) to prevent message tampering, A binding hash function (Public Key) for calculating publicly identifiable information to prevent tampering; For 3 cyclic addition subgroups The cross product (Cartesian product). For two cyclic addition subgroups cross product, For 4 cyclic addition subgroups The cross product.
[0014] Further, step 2 includes: After receiving the registration request, the Trust Center generates a secret random number for the drone, calculates the corresponding auxiliary public value, and generates a partial private key based on the system master private key and the drone's derived identity. Finally, the auxiliary public value and the partial private key are returned to the drone through a secure link. After receiving the auxiliary public value and part of the private key, the drone randomly selects another secret value as the other half of its private key and calculates the complete signature private key and public key accordingly. At this point, the drone has completed its registration and will participate in all secure communications in the ad hoc network using this derived identity and the complete key pair.
[0015] Furthermore, step 2 specifically includes: Before launching, new drones can securely authenticate and register at a trusted center, obtaining a public key and derived identity. First, drones Calculate its identity identifier and request a portion of the private key to map the true identity of drone i to elements in the group. And calculate the points on the elliptic curve corresponding to the real identity. Then, calculate the derived identities registered under the current system master key for that identity. Send to the Trusted Center through secure channels ; After receiving the registration request, the Trust Center provides the drone with... Issue a portion of the private key and receive Randomly select a secret value exclusively held by a trusted center. Map the secret value onto an elliptic curve The known public identity of this node is bound using a hash value to prevent tampering. Calculate a portion of the drone's private key using the above information and the secret value. to drones through secure channels Send partial key drones Receive a portion of the private key and complete its full key pair; Drone reception Randomly select i to exclusively store a portion of the secret value. Calculate the partial public key corresponding to the secret value. Obtain the complete key pair and .
[0016] Further, step 3 includes: When the sender (holding identification) Public key Private key Hope to communicate with the recipient (hold , , Establish a session, negotiate the session key, and transmit messages. At that time, the sender Perform the following operations: Random noise value of the message is randomly selected. And encrypted as elements on an elliptic curve. To prevent tampering, a hash value is used to bind the identities of the sender and receiver. , , Calculate the shared secret value for this authentication key negotiation. Calculate the symmetric key based on the shared secret value. Use this symmetric key to encrypt messages Calculate the tamper-proof hash value of this message. Calculate the signature of this message. ; to the recipient send ; Recipient Upon receipt, perform the following operations: calculate , , , , ; Verify the equation: If the verification fails, the calculation will be stopped. Decrypt to obtain the plaintext message At this point, both parties share the same session key, completing the exchange of authentication keys.
[0017] Furthermore, it also includes: sender With the recipient Share secret value The correctness is verified as follows:
[0018] The signature's correctness is verified as follows: .
[0019] Furthermore, the Trusted Center only possesses information about the generation of a portion of the node's private key, but cannot know the other part of the secret value chosen by the node itself. It does not participate in the subsequent authentication key negotiation process, and all session establishment and message exchange between drone nodes are completed in a decentralized manner.
[0020] This application also discloses a high-efficiency certificate-free signature encryption system suitable for UAV self-organizing networks, which implements the above-described method and includes: The computing module is used to perform the system parameter generation process by the trusted center before the deployment of the UAV self-organizing network. It randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the corresponding system master public key, publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, and provides a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation stages. The registration module is used by each drone to initiate a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel before officially joining the self-organizing network and performing tasks. Upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center returns an auxiliary public value and a portion of the private key to the drone. Based on the received information, the drone calculates the complete signature private key and public key, thus completing the registration. The signature module is used when a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and simultaneously establish a secure session key. The source node uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, publicly available system parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve multiplication operations. This secret value is then used as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. The source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters. Finally, it combines the ciphertext and signature value into a single authenticated message and sends it to the target node. Upon receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and publicly available system parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. Simultaneously, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process requires only one round trip.
[0021] Due to the adoption of the above technical solution, this application has the following advantages: 1. At the cryptographic level, this scheme abandons the reliance on certificate management in traditional public key infrastructures and the inherent key escrow defects of identity-based cryptography, adopting a certificate-free cryptography as its security foundation. Under this system, the trusted center is only responsible for generating a portion of the private keys for the drone nodes, while the nodes themselves independently generate the other part of the secret value locally. Together, they constitute the complete signing private key. This mechanism, where "the administrator holds half the secret and the node itself holds the other half," ensures that even if the trusted center is attacked or malicious behavior occurs internally, attackers cannot forge the complete private key of any legitimate node. This effectively eliminates the risk of single points of failure and significantly enhances the key security of drone ad hoc networks in a distributed, decentralized environment.
[0022] 2. At the security level, this scheme employs a meticulously designed protocol to simultaneously achieve two-way authentication between the sender and receiver during the authentication key negotiation process. Specifically, the initiator generates a signature value containing identity information using its private key, and the receiver verifies the legitimacy of the initiator's identity through a verification equation upon receiving the message. Simultaneously, the receiver's participation in reconstructing the shared secret value and decrypting the message implicitly proves its own legitimacy to the initiator through the use of its own private key. This two-way authentication mechanism effectively resists man-in-the-middle attacks, forgery attacks, and replay attacks, ensuring that both communicating parties can confidently confirm the authenticity of the other's identity, thus providing reliable security for the exchange of sensitive information between drone nodes.
[0023] 3. In terms of computational efficiency, this scheme completely abandons the bilinear pairing operation widely used in many existing certificateless signature schemes, and constructs all cryptographic operations entirely based on elliptic curve dot multiplication. Since the computational overhead of bilinear pairing is far higher than that of elliptic curve dot multiplication, and the computing power of UAV onboard processors is generally limited, this scheme significantly reduces the computational burden on individual nodes during the authentication key negotiation process. This allows the protocol to significantly reduce computational latency and energy consumption while maintaining the same level of security, fully meeting the stringent requirements of UAV ad hoc networks for real-time performance and node endurance.
[0024] 4. In terms of communication efficiency, this solution integrates authentication, session key negotiation, and message transmission into a single communication round trip. The initiator only needs to send a single authentication message containing ciphertext and a signature value to the receiver. Upon receiving the message, the receiver can simultaneously complete verification, decryption, and key derivation. The entire process requires no multiple rounds of interaction or additional confirmation messages. This single-interaction design minimizes the number of communication rounds between nodes, effectively reducing the risk of link interruption caused by the high-speed movement of drones, and also compressing communication latency and bandwidth usage. This significantly improves the practicality and deployment feasibility of the protocol in highly dynamic drone ad hoc network environments. Attached Figure Description
[0025] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings.
[0026] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an efficient certificate-free signature method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ad hoc networks, according to an embodiment of this application. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of authentication key negotiation in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0027] The present application will be further described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. The described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art should fall within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.
[0028] See Figure 1 and Figure 2 This application provides an embodiment of an efficient certificate-free signature method suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ad hoc networks, which includes the following steps: a. System Initialization Phase. Before deploying the UAV self-organizing network, the Trusted Center (TA) first executes the system parameter generation process. This process includes selecting an elliptic curve defined on a finite field, its cyclic additive subgroup, and base points; setting multiple cryptographic hash functions and symmetric key derivation functions; then randomly selecting the system master private key and calculating the corresponding system master public key. After completing the above calculations, the Trusted Center publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, providing a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation phases. This phase only needs to be executed once; unless the system security parameters need to be updated, the system parameters remain unchanged during the operation of the self-organizing network.
[0029] b. Member Drone Registration Phase. Before officially joining the ad hoc network and performing tasks, each drone must initiate a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel. During this phase, upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center generates a secret random number for the drone, calculates the corresponding auxiliary public value, and generates a partial private key based on the system's master private key and the drone's derived identity. Finally, the auxiliary public value and partial private key are returned to the drone via a secure link. Upon receiving this information, the drone randomly selects another secret value as its other half of the private key and calculates the complete signing private and public keys accordingly. At this point, the drone completes its registration and will subsequently participate in all secure communications within the ad hoc network using this derived identity and complete key pair.
[0030] c. Authentication Key Negotiation Phase. When a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and simultaneously establish a secure session key, the source node first uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, system public parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve multiplication operations. This secret value is then used as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. Next, the source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters. Finally, the ciphertext and signature value are combined into a single authentication message, which is sent to the target node in one go. Upon receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and system public parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way, and uses this secret value to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext (including the random number (elements on the elliptic curve)). ,sign (and encrypted ciphertext); simultaneously, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process only requires one round trip.
[0031] The specific implementation process of this application embodiment is as follows: a. System Initialization Before system deployment, the Trusted Center (TA) selects elliptic curve parameters, defines the required hash function and key derivation function, generates the system master private key, calculates its public counterpart, and publishes all public parameters.
[0032] Select elliptic curve Base point and basic level Cyclic addition subgroup ,in Defined in a finite field superior, ,and , It is a large prime number.
[0033] Define the following cryptographic hash function:
[0034] Represents a subgroup of n cyclic additions The cross product (Cartesian product) of the hash function, where n takes the values 2, 3, or 4, refers to the hash function taking n groups as input. Elements on, for example It can be achieved as ; This represents an element in the cyclic additive subgroup G.
[0035] Selected As a symmetric key derivation function.
[0036] Randomly select the system master private key
[0037] Computing system master public key
[0038] Publish system parameters
[0039] b. Drone registration This phase allows new drones to securely authenticate and register with the Trusted Authority (TA) before launch, obtaining a public key and derived identity.
[0040] First, drones Calculate its identity and request a portion of the private key to launch the drone. i The real identity is mapped to the elements in the group. And calculate the points on the elliptic curve corresponding to the real identity. Then, calculate the derived identities registered under the current system master key for that identity. Send to the Trusted Center through secure channels ; After receiving the registration request, the Trust Center provides the drone with... After receiving a registration request, the trusted center that issues partial private keys to the drone... Issue a portion of the private key and receive Randomly select a secret value exclusively held by a trusted center. Map the secret value onto an elliptic curve The known public identity of this node is bound using a hash value to prevent tampering. Calculate a portion of the drone's private key using the above information and the secret value. to drones through secure channels Send partial key drones Receive a portion of the private key and complete its full key pair; Drone reception Random selection i Exclusive custody of a portion of the secret value Calculate the partial public key corresponding to the secret value. Obtain the complete key pair and .
[0041] c. Authentication Key Negotiation When the sender (holding identification) Public key Private key Hope to communicate with the recipient (hold , , Establish a session, negotiate the session key, and transmit messages. At that time, the sender Perform the following operations: Random noise value of the message is randomly selected. And encrypted as elements on an elliptic curve. To prevent tampering, a hash value is used to bind the identities of the sender and receiver. , , Calculate the shared secret value for this authentication key negotiation. Calculate the symmetric key based on the shared secret value. Use this symmetric key to encrypt messages Calculate the tamper-proof hash value of this message. Calculate the signature of this message. ; to the recipient send ; Recipient Upon receipt, perform the following operations: calculate
[0042] calculate
[0043] calculate
[0044] calculate
[0045] calculate .
[0046] Verify the equation: If the verification fails, the calculation will be stopped. Decrypt to obtain the plaintext message At this point, both parties share the same session key, completing the exchange of authentication keys.
[0047] d. Correctness verification sender With the recipient Share secret value The correctness is verified as follows:
[0048] The signature's correctness is verified as follows: .
[0049] This application also provides an embodiment of an efficient certificate-free signature encryption system suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) self-organizing networks, which implements the method described in the above embodiment, and includes: The computing module is used to perform the system parameter generation process by the trusted center before the deployment of the UAV self-organizing network. It randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the corresponding system master public key, publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, and provides a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation stages. The registration module is used by each drone to initiate a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel before officially joining the self-organizing network and performing tasks. Upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center returns an auxiliary public value and a portion of the private key to the drone. Based on the received information, the drone calculates the complete signature private key and public key, thus completing the registration. The signature module is used when a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and simultaneously establish a secure session key. The source node uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, publicly available system parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve multiplication operations. This secret value is then used as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. The source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters. Finally, it combines the ciphertext and signature value into a single authenticated message and sends it to the target node. Upon receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and publicly available system parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. Simultaneously, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process requires only one round trip.
[0050] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application and not to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can still be made to the specific implementation of this application. Any modifications or equivalent substitutions that do not depart from the spirit and scope of this application should be covered within the protection scope of the claims of this application.
Claims
1. A highly efficient certificate-free signature encryption method suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) self-organizing networks, characterized in that, include: Step 1: Before the deployment of the UAV self-organizing network, the Trust Center performs the system parameter generation process, randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the corresponding system master public key, publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, and provides a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation stages; Step 2: Before each drone officially joins the self-organizing network and performs tasks, it initiates a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel. Upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center returns an auxiliary public value and a portion of the private key to the drone. Based on the received information, the drone calculates the complete signature private key and public key, thus completing the drone's registration. Step 3: When a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and establish a secure session key at the same time, the source node uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, the system's public parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve dot product operations, and uses this secret value as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. The source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters, and finally combines the ciphertext and signature value into a single authentication message, which is then sent to the target node in one go. After receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and the system's public parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way, and uses this secret value to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. At the same time, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process only requires one round trip of communication.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 1 only needs to be performed once, and the system parameters remain unchanged during the operation of the self-organizing network unless the system security parameters need to be updated.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 1 includes: Before system deployment, the Trust Center selects an elliptic curve and its cyclic additive subgroup and base point defined on a finite field, defines the required hash function and key derivation function, generates the system master private key, calculates its public counterpart, and publishes all public parameters. Select elliptic curve Base point and basic level Cyclic addition subgroup ,in Defined in a finite field superior, ,and , It is a large prime number; Selected As a symmetric key derivation function; Derived functions for symmetric keys; Randomly select the system master private key , Given an integer additive group modulo q, compute the system's master public key. ; Publish system parameters .
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, This also includes defining the following cryptographic hash functions: in, Used to map real, unique identifiers to elements on a computational G. To calculate a binding hash function to prevent tampering with a portion of the key, To calculate the binding hash function to prevent message tampering, A binding hash function for calculating publicly available identity information to prevent tampering; For 3 cyclic addition subgroups cross product, For two cyclic addition subgroups cross product, For 4 cyclic addition subgroups The cross product.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 includes: After receiving the registration request, the Trust Center generates a secret random number for the drone, calculates the corresponding auxiliary public value, and generates a partial private key based on the system master private key and the drone's derived identity. Finally, the auxiliary public value and the partial private key are returned to the drone through a secure link. After receiving the auxiliary public value and part of the private key, the drone randomly selects another secret value as the other half of its private key and calculates the complete signature private key and public key accordingly. At this point, the drone has completed its registration and will participate in all secure communications in the ad hoc network using this derived identity and the complete key pair.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 specifically includes: Before launching, new drones can securely authenticate and register at a trusted center, obtaining a public key and derived identity. First, drones Calculate its identity identifier and request a portion of the private key to map the true identity of drone i to elements in the group. And calculate the points on the elliptic curve corresponding to the real identity. Then, calculate the derived identities registered under the current system master key for that identity. Send to the Trusted Center through secure channels ; After receiving the registration request, the Trust Center provides the drone with... Issue a portion of the private key and receive Randomly select a secret value exclusively held by a trusted center. Map the secret value onto an elliptic curve The known public identity of this node is bound using a hash value to prevent tampering. Calculate a portion of the drone's private key using the above information and the secret value. to drones through secure channels Send partial key drones Receive a portion of the private key and complete its full key pair; Drone reception Randomly select i to exclusively store a portion of the secret value. Calculate the partial public key corresponding to the secret value. Obtain the complete key pair and .
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 3 includes: sender Hold identity token Public key Private key Recipient hold , , When the sender Hope and the recipient Establish a session, negotiate the session key, and transmit messages. At that time, the sender Perform the following operations: Random noise value of the message is randomly selected. And encrypted as elements on an elliptic curve. To prevent tampering, a hash value is used to bind the identities of the sender and receiver. , , Calculate the shared secret value for this authentication key negotiation. Calculate the symmetric key based on the shared secret value. Use this symmetric key to encrypt messages Calculate the tamper-proof hash value of this message. Calculate the signature of this message. ; to the recipient send ; Recipient Upon receipt, perform the following operations: calculate , , , , ; Verify the equation: If the verification fails, the calculation will be stopped. Decrypt to obtain the plaintext message At this point, both parties share the same session key, completing the exchange of authentication keys.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: sender With the recipient Share secret value The correctness is verified as follows: The signature's validity is verified as follows: 。 9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The Trust Center only possesses information about the generation of a portion of the node's private key, but cannot know the other part of the secret value chosen by the node itself. It does not participate in the subsequent authentication key negotiation process, and all session establishment and message exchange between drone nodes are completed in a decentralized manner.
10. A high-efficiency certificate-free signature encryption system suitable for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) self-organizing networks, implementing the method described in any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, include: The computing module is used to perform the system parameter generation process by the trusted center before the deployment of the UAV self-organizing network. It randomly selects the system master private key and calculates the corresponding system master public key, publishes all public parameters to each UAV node in the network through a secure channel, and provides a unified cryptographic foundation for the subsequent registration and authentication key negotiation stages. The registration module is used by each drone to initiate a registration request to the Trusted Center through a secure channel before officially joining the self-organizing network and performing tasks. Upon receiving the registration request, the Trusted Center returns an auxiliary public value and a portion of the private key to the drone. Based on the received information, the drone calculates the complete signature private key and public key, thus completing the registration. The signature module is used when a registered source drone node needs to send a message to a target drone node and establish a secure session key at the same time. The source node uses its own complete private key, the target node's public key, the system's public parameters, and the current timestamp to calculate a shared secret value through a series of elliptic curve dot product operations, and uses this secret value as a symmetric key to encrypt the transmitted message. The source node generates a signature value for authentication based on its own private key and session-related parameters, and finally combines the ciphertext and signature value into a single authentication message, which is then sent to the target node in one go. After receiving the message, the target node uses its own private key, the source node's public key, and the system's public parameters to reconstruct the shared secret value in the same way, and uses this secret value to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. At the same time, the target node performs an equality verification on the signature value to confirm the legitimacy of the source node's identity and the integrity of the message. If the verification passes, both parties share the same session key in this round of communication, completing two-way authentication and secure message transmission. The entire interaction process only requires one round trip of communication.
