A secure electronic signature method based on NFC
By implementing distributed storage of the signature private key and closed-loop reconstructed signature within a hardware-level secure isolation zone on the NFC channel between the mobile terminal and the near-field signing device, the problem of insufficient single-point storage of private keys and secure binding of communication links in existing technologies is solved, thereby improving the security and compliance of electronic signatures.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611331898.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-31
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In existing technologies, electronic signature solutions using mobile terminals and near-field signing devices suffer from several problems: single-point storage of private keys makes them vulnerable to theft; near-field communication links lack two-way authentication and encryption protection; and signature operations are not performed in a hardware-level security environment. These issues make it difficult to effectively prevent security risks such as remote forgery, man-in-the-middle attacks, or memory hijacking, and thus fail to meet the compliance requirements for high-security electronic signatures.
The NFC-based secure electronic signature method is adopted. By distributing the signature private key across security domains in the secure storage area of the near-field signing device, the hardware-level secure isolation area of the mobile terminal, and the sandbox of the general environment, and by utilizing the mathematical characteristics of threshold secret sharing, the key fragmentation transmission and closed-loop reconstruction signature and instantaneous clearing in the hardware-level secure isolation area are realized. Combined with two-way identity authentication and dynamic session key encryption, a defense-in-depth system is constructed.
It effectively resists remote forgery and relay attacks, ensures the security and compliance of signature private keys during storage, transmission, and computation, achieves strong binding between the physical environment and digital signatures, and enhances the security and traceability of electronic signature systems in mixed offline/online scenarios.
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Figure CN123123892A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of near-field communication and electronic signature security technology, specifically to a secure electronic signature method based on NFC. Background Technology
[0002] Currently, in scenarios where mobile terminals and near-field signing devices collaborate to complete electronic signatures, near-field communication channels are typically used to transmit signing instructions or document data, with the signature private key stored intact in the mobile terminal or near-field device. However, such solutions suffer from several issues, including the vulnerability of single-point private key storage to theft, the lack of two-way authentication and encryption protection in the near-field communication link, and the failure to isolate and execute signature operations in a hardware-level secure environment. This means that even with near-field physical interaction as a trigger, it is still difficult to effectively prevent security risks such as remote forgery, man-in-the-middle attacks, or memory hijacking, making it difficult to meet the compliance requirements of high-security electronic signatures for full lifecycle protection of private keys and strong physical-digit binding. Summary of the Invention
[0003] To address the issues of single-point leakage risk of private keys and insufficient security binding of near-field communication links in existing technologies, this application proposes an NFC-based secure electronic signature method that achieves full-process security protection through distributed storage of signature private keys across security domains, key fragmentation during near-field channel transmission, closed-loop signature reconstruction within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, and instantaneous zeroing.
[0004] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides a secure electronic signature method based on NFC, which employs the following technical solution: This application discloses a secure electronic signature method based on NFC, applied to a mobile terminal. The mobile terminal and the near-field signature device are connected via a near-field communication channel, including: In response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device, and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication; Receive the first key fragment sent from the secure storage area of the near-field signature device through the encrypted near-field communication channel; Obtain the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal; Integrity checks are performed on the first key fragment and the second key fragment, including: calculating the hash values of the first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragment, and comparing each hash value with the pre-stored fragment commitment value one by one. When all hash values are consistent with the corresponding fragment commitment value, the integrity check is deemed to have passed. Based on the first and second key fragments that have passed integrity verification, the signing private key is reconstructed in the hardware-level security isolation zone, and the signing operation is performed on the data to be signed based on the signing private key to generate electronic signature data. Instantly clear the signing private key and intermediate data generated by the signing operation within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
[0005] Preferably, obtaining the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal includes: The core fragment is retrieved within the hardware-level security isolation zone, and the auxiliary fragment is decrypted and obtained from the sandbox in the ordinary environment storage zone.
[0006] Preferably, before obtaining the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal, the method further includes: Within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, threshold secret sharing splitting is performed on the signature private key to generate a first key fragment, a core fragment, and an auxiliary fragment; After the split is completed, the original plaintext of the signing private key is destroyed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
[0007] Preferably, two-way authentication is performed with the near-field signature device, and a session key is negotiated after successful authentication to encrypt the near-field communication channel, including: The mobile terminal generates a first random number and sends it to the near-field signature device, and receives a second random number generated by the near-field signature device; The first and second random numbers are encrypted and verified based on the pre-stored device public key; In response to successful verification, the first and second random numbers are calculated based on the key derivation function to generate a session key; The near-field communication channel is encrypted based on the session key and session timestamp.
[0008] Preferably, based on the first and second key fragments that have passed integrity verification, the signing private key is reconstructed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, including: Based on the Shamir threshold secret sharing model, a (t,n) threshold polynomial is constructed over the finite field GF(p) with the signing private key S as a constant term: In the formula, S is the private key for signing. Let be the polynomial coefficients randomly generated over the finite field GF(p), t=2 be the minimum number of fragments required for reconstruction, n=3 be the total number of fragments, and p be a number not less than 2. 256 prime numbers; The first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragment are respectively mapped to the threshold polynomial f(x) at three distinct non-zero evaluation points. , , Function value at: In the formula, the mapping relationship between the slices and the evaluation points is given by: , , For three distinct non-zero evaluation points; Select any two fragments from the first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragment. and( , The signature private key is reconstructed using the Lagrange interpolation formula: In the formula, for Modular inverse over the finite field GF(p); The signing operation is performed on the data to be signed based on the signing private key, including: In the SM2 elliptic curve over a 256-bit prime field, a signature operation is performed on the hash value e of the data to be signed, using the signing private key S and the order n of the elliptic curve base point G as parameters: In the formula, The equation of the SM2 elliptic curve, where a and b are elliptic curve parameters; Generate random numbers k∈[1,n-1] and calculate the points on the elliptic curve. Calculate the signature values r and s: In the formula, The formula for calculating the signature value r, where e is the hash value of the data to be signed. Let [k] be the x-coordinate of the point [k]G on the elliptic curve. When r=0 or r+k=n, a random number k is regenerated. Output electronic signature data containing signature values r and s; Encrypting the near-field communication channel based on the session key and session timestamp includes: The SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt data transmitted through the near-field communication channel in 128-bit block lengths. The encryption process involves 32 rounds of iterative computation, with the round function for each round being: In the formula, , , , The input data consists of 128 bits divided into four 32-bit words. rkᵢ is the 32-bit round key generated by the key expansion algorithm based on the session key in the i-th round. T is the composite transformation containing the nonlinear S-box transformation τ and the linear transformation L, and T=L(τ(·)). ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operation, i=1,2,...,32.
[0009] Preferably, prior to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, it further includes: Generate a signature private key within a hardware-level secure isolation zone; Using the signature private key as a constant term, a first-order polynomial is constructed over the finite field GF(p), and the first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment are calculated based on the first-order polynomial. The first key is fragmented and transmitted to a secure storage area for storage; Destroy the original plaintext of the signature private key and the polynomial coefficients of a linear polynomial within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
[0010] Preferably, in response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, the method further includes: Receive the document identifier and device information to be signed from the near-field signing device via the near-field communication channel; Before performing the signing operation on the data to be signed based on the signing private key, the following steps are also included: Within a hardware-level security isolation zone, the document identifier to be signed is directly parsed to obtain the data to be signed, and the hash value of the data to be signed is calculated. The hash value is compared and verified with the pre-stored document hash commitment value; The signature operation is performed only when the comparison and verification pass, and the ordinary operating system of the mobile terminal does not participate in the parsing of the document identifier to be signed.
[0011] Preferably, after generating electronic signature data, the process also includes: The electronic signature data is transmitted back to the near-field signing device through the near-field communication channel, so that the near-field signing device is bound with a unique device identifier and a signing timestamp, and the electronic signature data is stored locally in the log. A signature hash value is generated based on the electronic signature data, and an audit record is generated based on the signature hash value, the device's unique identifier, and the signature timestamp. The audit record is linked to the previous audit record through a hash link to form a tamper-proof audit chain.
[0012] Preferred options also include: Upon detecting an abnormal event, terminate the signing process and clear any temporary sensitive data within the hardware-level security isolation zone; Among them, abnormal events include at least one of the following: near-field communication channel interruption, two-way authentication failure, integrity verification failure, session timeout, and abnormal operation status of hardware-level security isolation zone; Generate an exception event log that includes the exception type identifier and the time of occurrence.
[0013] Preferably, after generating electronic signature data, the process also includes: Determine whether the preset segment rotation trigger conditions are met. The segment rotation trigger conditions include at least one of the following: the number of times the signature is used reaches a preset number threshold or the time since the last rotation reaches a preset time period threshold. In response to the fulfillment of the fragmentation rotation trigger condition, a new first-order polynomial is reconstructed within the hardware-level security isolation zone using the signature private key as a constant term. The polynomial coefficients of the new first-order polynomial are different from those of the first-order polynomial. Based on the new first-order polynomial calculation, a new first key fragment, a new core fragment, and a new auxiliary fragment are obtained; The new first key fragment is transmitted to the secure storage area to replace the original first key fragment. The new core fragment replaces the original core fragment in the secure partition. The new auxiliary fragment is encrypted and stored in the sandbox to replace the original auxiliary fragment. The polynomial coefficients of the new polynomial, as well as the original first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment, are destroyed within the hardware-level security isolation zone.
[0014] Compared with existing technologies, this invention provides a secure electronic signature method based on NFC, which has the following advantages: 1. By splitting the signing private key into multiple fragments and distributing them in three heterogeneous security domains—the secure storage area of the near-field signing device, the secure partition of the mobile terminal hardware-level security isolation area, and the sandbox of the ordinary environment—the mathematical properties of threshold secret sharing are used to ensure that if any single security domain is compromised, the complete private key cannot be recovered, thus eliminating the risk of single point of leakage from the storage architecture. 2. The transmission of the first key fragment is strictly bound to a near-field communication channel that is encrypted with two-way authentication and dynamic session keys. This makes physical near-field contact not only a business trigger signal, but also a necessary cryptographic condition for key aggregation, thereby achieving a strong binding between the physical environment and digital signatures and effectively resisting remote forgery and relay attacks. 3. All key reconstruction, signature calculation, and document parsing are performed in a closed loop within a hardware-level secure isolation zone. Intermediate data is not written to disk or leaked, and is instantly cleared after signing. Combined with multiple mechanisms such as document hash commitment verification, anti-tampering audit chain, abnormal circuit breaking, and dynamic sharding rotation, a defense-in-depth system is built across the entire chain of storage, transmission, calculation, evidence storage, and operation and maintenance, significantly improving the security, compliance, and traceability of the electronic signature system in offline / online hybrid scenarios. Attached Figure Description
[0015] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a secure electronic signature method based on NFC, according to an embodiment of this application.
[0016] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps in this method to perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication.
[0017] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the method steps that need to be executed after establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device in this method. Detailed Implementation
[0018] The following is in conjunction with the appendix Figure 1-3 This application will be described in further detail.
[0019] This embodiment provides a secure electronic signature method based on NFC, applied to a mobile terminal. The mobile terminal is connected to a near-field signature device via a near-field communication channel. This embodiment takes a complete electronic signature business process as the main thread, linking key lifecycle management, near-field secure interaction, cross-domain fragmentation aggregation, trusted signature computation, and audit and evidence storage into a coherent technical solution, referencing... Figure 1 ,include: S1. In response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device, and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication; S2. Receive the first key fragment sent from the secure storage area of the near-field signature device through the encrypted near-field communication channel; S3. Obtain the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal. The second key fragment includes a core fragment stored in the security partition of the hardware-level security isolation zone, and an auxiliary fragment encrypted and stored in the sandbox of the normal environment storage zone of the mobile terminal. S4. Perform integrity verification on the first key fragment and the second key fragment respectively, including: calculating the hash value of the first key fragment, the core fragment and the auxiliary fragment respectively, and comparing each hash value with the pre-stored fragment commitment value one by one. When all hash values are consistent with the corresponding fragment commitment value, the integrity verification is deemed to have passed. S5. Based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment that have passed the integrity verification, reconstruct the signature private key in the hardware-level security isolation zone, and perform signature operation on the data to be signed based on the signature private key to generate electronic signature data. S6. Instantly clear the signing private key and intermediate data generated during signature computation within a hardware-level secure isolation zone. Prior to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, the following are also included: S1a. Generate a signature private key within a hardware-level secure isolation zone; S1b. Using the signature private key as a constant term, construct a first-order polynomial over the finite field GF(p), and calculate the first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment based on the first-order polynomial. S1c: The first key is fragmented and transmitted to a secure storage area for storage; S1d, destroying the original plaintext of the signature private key and the polynomial coefficients of a linear polynomial within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
[0020] Within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, the signing private key is split into threshold secret sharing fragments to generate a first key fragment, a core fragment, and an auxiliary fragment. After the splitting is completed, the original plaintext of the signing private key is destroyed.
[0021] Specifically, the mobile terminal's hardware-level security isolation zone is implemented based on the ARM TrustZone architecture, dividing the processor's execution environment into two isolated domains: a secure world and a normal world. The secure world has its own independent memory address space, interrupt controller, and secure memory interface. No process in the normal world, including the operating system kernel with the highest privileges, can directly access the memory region of the secure world. Within this secure world, a 256-bit SM2 signed private key S is generated using a hardware true random number generator. This true random number generator is based on thermal noise sampling using a ring oscillator. After each sampling, Von Neumann debiasing is performed on the original bitstream to ensure the statistical uniformity and unpredictability of the output bitstream.
[0022] Construct a (t,n) threshold polynomial over the finite field GF(p) with the signing private key S as a constant term: In the formula: S is the signature private key. Let be the polynomial coefficients randomly generated over the finite field GF(p), t=2 be the minimum number of fragments required for reconstruction, n=3 be the total number of fragments, and p be a number not less than 2. 256 prime numbers Among them, polynomial coefficients Also generated by a hardware true random number generator, ensuring the unpredictability of each constructed polynomial. The selection of evaluation points employs an incremental positive integer strategy, i.e. This strategy simplifies the computational complexity of the modular inverse in subsequent Lagrange interpolation operations, while ensuring that the evaluation points are distinct and non-zero. Based on this first-order polynomial calculation, three partitions are obtained, corresponding to the threshold polynomial f(x) at three distinct non-zero evaluation points. , , Function value at: Formula description: The mapping relationship between slices and evaluation points, where , , These are three distinct non-zero evaluation points.
[0023] Furthermore, two-way authentication is performed with the near-field signature device, and a session key is negotiated after successful authentication to encrypt the near-field communication channel, as described above. Figure 2 ,include: S11. The mobile terminal generates a first random number and sends it to the near-field signature device, and receives a second random number generated by the near-field signature device; S12. Encrypt and verify the first random number and the second random number based on the pre-stored device public key; S13. In response to successful verification, the first random number and the second random number are calculated based on the key derivation function to generate a session key; S14. Encrypt the near-field communication channel based on the session key and session timestamp.
[0024] Fragment the first key The data is transmitted via a secure transmission protocol to the secure storage area of the near-field signing device. This secure storage area is the encrypted flash memory region within the security chip built into the signing device, protected by AES-256 encryption using the device's unique key. The core is then fragmented. Storage is located within a secure partition in a hardware-level security isolation zone. This secure partition is a persistent storage area reserved within the TEE and is only accessible within the secure world. Auxiliary fragments will be used. The encrypted storage is located in a sandbox within the normal storage area of the mobile terminal. The encryption key is derived from the device's unique identifier and the user's PIN code through a key derivation function, ensuring that even if the sandbox file is extracted, attackers cannot decrypt and obtain fragmented plaintext without the user's PIN code.
[0025] After the fragment distribution is completed, a three-stage overwrite and destruction process is immediately executed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone: the first stage overwrites the memory area containing the signing private key S and the polynomial coefficients a1 with all random bits; the second stage overwrites the same area with all zero bits; and the third stage overwrites the same area with all one bits. Finally, it is verified that the content of this area is unrecoverable. This multi-stage overwrite mechanism complies with the cleanup level requirements of the NIST SP 800-88 media cleanup standard, ensuring that the signing private key does not exist in its complete form in any physical medium or memory space from its inception. Even if an attacker subsequently attempts to recover the data through a cold start attack or memory dump, they will not be able to obtain any meaningful residual information, thus eliminating the risk of static retention of the private key at its source.
[0026] In response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device, and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication.
[0027] Specifically, the near-field communication channel is established based on the ISO / IEC 14443 Type A standard, operating at a frequency of 13.56MHz, and supporting adaptive negotiation of communication rates from 106kbps to 424kbps. When the mobile terminal enters the radio frequency field of the near-field signature device, both parties first complete anti-collision identification and protocol layer handshake, followed by the security authentication phase. Within a hardware-level security isolation zone, the mobile terminal generates a 128-bit first random number using a true random number generator. It is sent to the near-field signature device, and simultaneously receives a 128-bit second random number generated by the near-field signature device. Both parties use their pre-stored public keys to perform SM2 encryption verification on the received random challenge number; that is, the mobile terminal uses its pre-stored signing device public key to verify the number. The encryption is performed and the ciphertext is sent back. The signing device uses the pre-stored mobile terminal public key to... The system encrypts the data and sends the ciphertext back. Both parties then decrypt the data to verify whether the ciphertext sent back by the other party matches the original challenge number they generated, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the other party's identity.
[0028] Upon successful two-way verification, the first and second random numbers are processed using the key derivation function to generate a session key specific to this session. The key derivation function is constructed using HMAC based on SM3. Formula description: Session key derivation formula, where The first random number, The second random number, For 64-bit session timestamps, HMAC-SM3 is a message authentication code function based on the SM3 hash algorithm. Among them, session timestamp The timestamp is a 64-bit Unix timestamp, accurate to the millisecond level. Authentication will be rejected if the timestamp deviation between the two parties exceeds a preset 5-minute tolerance window, effectively preventing the replay and reuse of historical session keys. Since the number of random challenges is different for each signing session, the derived session key is unique and has forward security; even if a session key is leaked, it cannot be used to derive keys for other sessions.
[0029] Subsequently, the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the data transmitted through the near-field communication channel with a 128-bit block length and CBC mode. The encryption process performs 32 rounds of iterative operations, and the round function for each round is as follows: Formula description: SM4 round function, where , , , The 128-bit input data is divided into four 32-bit words. Let T be the 32-bit round key generated by the key expansion algorithm based on the session key in the i-th round, where T is a composite transformation including a nonlinear S-box transformation τ and a linear transformation L, and T = L(τ(·)), ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operation, and i = 1, 2, ..., 32. The initialization vector (IV) in CBC mode is generated by truncating the first 128 bits of the session key after SM3 hashing, ensuring the unpredictability of the IV for each session and preventing attackers from exploiting the encrypted pattern. This two-way dynamic challenge-response mechanism, combined with a timestamp-bound encrypted channel, not only effectively prevents device forgery and man-in-the-middle attacks but also ensures the uniqueness and timeliness of communication content in each signing session, completely resisting sniffing and replay attacks targeting the NFC link.
[0030] The system receives the first key fragment sent from the secure storage area of the near-field signing device via an encrypted near-field communication channel; it then obtains the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation area of the mobile terminal and performs integrity verification on all fragments.
[0031] Specifically, the mobile terminal securely receives the first key fragment from the near-field signature device via an SM4 encrypted channel. Simultaneously, it directly retrieves the core fragment within a hardware-level secure isolation zone and decrypts auxiliary fragments from a sandbox in the ordinary environment storage area. During sandbox decryption, the system first reads the device's unique identifier from the device's security chip, combines it with the user-input PIN code, and regenerates the sandbox encryption key using a key derivation function. This key is then used to perform AES-256-GCM decryption on the auxiliary fragment ciphertext in the sandbox. GCM mode performs ciphertext integrity verification during decryption; if the ciphertext is tampered with during storage, decryption will fail directly and trigger an abnormal circuit breaker. These three elements together constitute the complete set of the second key fragment.
[0032] Subsequently, the SM3 hash values of the first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragments are calculated respectively. The SM3 algorithm uses a Merkle-Damgard structure and outputs a 256-bit digest, possessing collision resistance and image-insensitive properties. Each hash value is compared one by one with the pre-stored fragment commitment value. The fragment commitment value is generated synchronously during the fragment distribution phase and stored in the read-only commitment area of the hardware-level secure isolation zone. Its construction method is as follows: Formula description: The formula for constructing the piecewise commitment value, where Let i be the function value of the i-th slice. It provides a 128-bit random salt value; SM3 is the Chinese national cryptographic hash algorithm. Introducing random salt values The purpose is to prevent attackers from retrieving fragment content from the commitment value using rainbow tables or brute-force methods. Integrity verification is only considered successful when all hash values match the corresponding fragment commitment value. This embodiment distributes key fragments across three heterogeneous security domains: a near-field device, a hardware-level security isolation zone, and a normal environment sandbox. This ensures that if any single security domain is compromised, it will be impossible to obtain enough fragments to reconstruct the private key. Furthermore, the hash commitment verification mechanism further ensures that the fragments are not tampered with during storage and transmission, providing a reliable data foundation for subsequent private key reconstruction.
[0033] Based on the first and second key fragments that have passed integrity verification, the signing private key is reconstructed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, and the signing operation is performed on the data to be signed based on the signing private key to generate electronic signature data.
[0034] Furthermore, refer to Figure 3 In response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, it also includes: S21. Receive the document identifier and device information to be signed sent by the near-field signing device through the near-field communication channel; S22. Before performing the signature operation on the data to be signed based on the signature private key, the following steps are also included: S23. Directly parse the document identifier to be signed within the hardware-level security isolation zone to obtain the data to be signed, and calculate the hash value of the data to be signed; S24. Compare and verify the hash value with the pre-stored document hash commitment value; S25. The signature operation is performed only when the comparison and verification pass, and the ordinary operating system of the mobile terminal does not participate in the parsing of the document identifier to be signed.
[0035] Specifically, before performing the signature operation, the document identifier to be signed, received through the encrypted channel, is first parsed directly within a hardware-level secure isolation zone to obtain the data to be signed and calculate its SM3 hash value e. This hash value is then compared and verified with a pre-stored document hash commitment value. The signature operation is only performed if the comparison and verification pass, and the mobile terminal's ordinary operating system does not participate in parsing the document identifier to be signed. This prevents malicious software under ordinary systems from tampering with or replacing the content to be signed, ensuring that the signed object is strictly consistent with the user's intent.
[0036] Optionally, before the signature operation, the user's biometric data can be collected within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, and a stable authentication token can be generated using a fuzzy extractor. The fuzzy extractor's operation is divided into a generation phase and a reproduction phase. In the generation phase, the collected biometric template (bio) is encoded to generate helper data and the authentication token (token). Formula description: Fuzzy extractor generation stage, where The biometric template is denoted by BCH, the error correction coding function is denoted by BCH, and the token is a randomly generated authentication token.
[0037] During the reproduction phase, the noisy newly acquired bio feature is combined with the helper data to perform error correction decoding and recover the original token. Formula description: Fuzzy extractor reproduction stage, where For newly collected noisy biological features, For error correction decoding function Due to inherent noise interference in biometric data acquisition, direct comparison with original features is prone to failure. The fuzzy extractor, using BCH error correction coding technology, can extract stable and reproducible tokens from noisy biometrics. This solves the problem of biometric variability and avoids the risks of storing and leaking the original biometric template, because auxiliary data... It does not contain enough information to recover the original biometrics. This authentication token can be embedded in signature data to achieve multi-factor authentication.
[0038] After successful verification, select any two fragments from the first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragments. and The signature private key is reconstructed using the Lagrange interpolation formula: Formula description: Lagrange interpolation reconstruction formula, where for In a finite field Modular inverse in, for In a finite field The modular inverse of the data is calculated using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Since this embodiment uses a (2,3) threshold configuration, reconstruction can be completed with only any two shards, and the third shard serves as a redundant backup. Signing can still be completed when a storage domain is temporarily unavailable, thus improving system availability.
[0039] Subsequently, in the SM2 elliptic curve over a 256-bit prime field, a signature operation is performed on the hash value e of the data to be signed, using the signing private key S and the order n of the elliptic curve base point G as parameters. The SM2 elliptic curve adopts the curve parameters recommended by the Chinese national cryptographic standard GM / T 0003, where the curve equation is: Formula description: SM2 elliptic curve equation, where a and b are elliptic curve parameters. Generate random numbers k∈[1,n-1], which are generated by a hardware true random number generator and ensured to fall within the valid interval through rejection sampling. Calculate the elliptic curve points. Scalar multiplication employs a sliding window algorithm with a window width of 4, decomposing the 256-bit scalar k into approximately 64 window operations. Each window operation includes a pre-computed doubling-point lookup table and a single point addition operation. While ensuring computational efficiency, the randomization of the window's starting position resists simple power analysis attacks. The signature values r and s are calculated as follows: Formula description: The formula for calculating the signature value r, where e is the hash value of the data to be signed. Let [k] be the x-coordinate of the elliptic curve point G. When r=0 or r+k=n, a random number k is regenerated. The expression for the signature value s is: Where: the formula for calculating the signature value s, where Let (1+S) be the multiplicative inverse of (1+S) modulo n. This represents a scalar multiplication operation of base point G by k, and a random number k is regenerated when s=0.
[0040] in, Let (1+S) be the multiplicative inverse of (1+S) modulo n, and [k]G denote the k-fold scalar multiplication operation of base point G. A random number k is regenerated when r=0 or r+k=n, and also when s=0. The final output is an electronic signature containing the signature values r and s. All cryptographic operations are performed in a closed loop within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the key reconstruction and signing process.
[0041] After generating the electronic signature data, it also includes: S51. Electronic signature data is transmitted back to the near-field signing device through the near-field communication channel, so that the near-field signing device is bound with a unique device identifier and a signing timestamp, the electronic signature data is locally logged and evidenced, and an anti-tampering audit chain is formed. S52. Generate a signature hash value based on the electronic signature data, and generate an audit record based on the signature hash value, the device's unique identifier, and the signature timestamp; S53. Link the audit record with the previous audit record using a hash link to form a tamper-proof audit chain. Specifically, the generated electronic signature data is transmitted back to the near-field signing device via an encrypted channel, binding the device's unique identifier and signature timestamp to the device for local log storage of the electronic signature data. Simultaneously, a signature hash value is generated based on the electronic signature data, and an audit record is generated based on the signature hash value, the device's unique identifier, and the signature timestamp. The current audit record is linked with the previous audit record via a hash link, forming a tamper-proof audit chain. The hash link is constructed as follows: Formula description: Audit chain hash link formula, where This is a summary of the content of the nth audit record. As a unique identifier for the device, For the signature timestamp, The hash value of the previous audit record. The preset genesis hash value in, This is the genesis hash value preset during system initialization. This chain structure ensures that any tampering with any historical audit record will cause all subsequent links to become invalid, because modifying the content of any record will change its hash value, thus causing the hash link verification of all subsequent records to fail. Combined with the physical binding of device UID and timestamp, it achieves full traceability and judicial-grade evidence preservation capabilities for signing activities. For large-scale deployment scenarios, the root hash value of the audit chain can also be periodically uploaded to a blockchain evidence preservation platform or a trusted timestamp service provider for anchoring, further enhancing the credibility and non-repudiation of the audit chain.
[0042] The signature private key and intermediate data generated by the signature operation are instantly cleared within the hardware-level secure isolation zone, and the fragmentation is performed as needed.
[0043] Specifically, immediately after the signature operation is completed, all temporary sensitive data, including the signature private key S, random number k, and intermediate point coordinates, are instantly zeroed out within a hardware-level secure isolation zone. The zeroing operation employs a three-pass overwrite strategy: the first pass overwrites the target memory region with all random bits; the second pass overwrites the same region with the bitwise inversion of the target bits; and the third pass overwrites the same region with all zero bits. A readback verification is performed after each pass to ensure the overwrite operation has actually taken effect. This multi-pass overwrite strategy effectively combats memory data recovery attacks based on residual charge analysis, preventing residual memory data from being stolen by cold start attacks or memory dumps.
[0044] After generating the electronic signature data, it also includes: S61. Determine whether the preset segment rotation trigger conditions are met. The segment rotation trigger conditions include at least one of the following: the number of times the signature is used reaches a preset number threshold or the time since the last rotation reaches a preset time period threshold. S62. In response to the fulfillment of the fragmentation rotation trigger condition, a new first-order polynomial is reconstructed in the hardware-level security isolation zone with the signature private key S as a constant term. The polynomial coefficients of the new first-order polynomial are different from those of the first-order polynomial. S63. Based on the new first-order polynomial calculation, a new first key fragment, a new core fragment, and a new auxiliary fragment are obtained; S64. Transmit the new first key fragment to the secure storage area to replace the original first key fragment, replace the original core fragment in the secure partition with the new core fragment, and encrypt and store the new auxiliary fragment in the sandbox to replace the original auxiliary fragment. S65. Destroy the polynomial coefficients of the new polynomial, as well as the original first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment, within the hardware-level security isolation zone.
[0045] The polynomial coefficients of the new first-order polynomial differ from those of the original first-order polynomial. Based on the new first-order polynomial, a new first-key fragment, a new core fragment, and new auxiliary fragments are calculated and transmitted to a secure storage area, a secure partition, and a sandbox, respectively, to replace the original fragments. Finally, the polynomial coefficients of the new first-order polynomial and all the original old fragments are destroyed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone. This "private key unchanged, coefficient updated" rotation mechanism achieves forward security because the old fragments are completely destroyed after each rotation. Even if an attacker accumulates some historical fragment information through long-term side-channel monitoring, the historical fragments cannot be combined with the current fragments because the new and old fragments come from different polynomials (different coefficients), and cannot be used to reconstruct the current or future private key state, effectively addressing the risk of cumulative attacks in long-term deployment scenarios.
[0046] Furthermore, an exception circuit breaker mechanism is consistently implemented throughout the above process. Upon detecting an abnormal event, the signing process is immediately terminated, and all temporary sensitive data within the hardware-level security isolation zone is cleared.
[0047] Specifically, abnormal events include at least one of the following: near-field communication channel interruption, two-way authentication failure, integrity verification failure, session timeout, and abnormal operation of the hardware-level security isolation zone. For near-field communication channel interruption, the hardware-level security isolation zone is equipped with a power-loss protection capacitor, providing an emergency power supply window of approximately 50 milliseconds after the main power is disconnected, sufficient to perform an emergency clearing operation of temporary sensitive data in memory. For abnormal operation of the hardware-level security isolation zone, the system integrates a voltage monitoring sensor and frequency monitoring circuit within the security chip. When the power supply voltage deviates from the normal range by more than 10% or the clock frequency deviates abnormally, it is determined that a physical intrusion attack may have occurred, immediately triggering a fuse and locking the secure storage zone. Session timeout is monitored by a hardware watchdog timer with a default timeout threshold of 30 seconds. If the entire signing process is not completed within the timeout period, the timer will trigger a hardware-level reset, forcibly clearing all temporary data in the security isolation zone. Once any of the above abnormalities is detected, the system will not only block subsequent operations to prevent information leakage in a partially completed state but also generate an abnormal event log containing an abnormality type identifier and the precise time of occurrence, facilitating post-event security auditing and accountability. This proactive defense mechanism, which runs through the entire process, significantly enhances the system's robustness and security under complex physical and network conditions.
[0048] This embodiment uses an offline contract signing scenario in a government service hall as an example to further illustrate the specific application process and synergistic effects of the aforementioned NFC-based secure electronic signature method in a high-security, offline, and high-frequency business environment. In this scenario, the mobile terminal is the user's smartphone, and the near-field signing device is a self-service signing machine deployed at the government service window. The two interact through the NFC near-field communication channel, completing the legally valid electronic signing and evidence storage without relying on an external internet connection.
[0049] Specifically, after a citizen completes contract information entry at the government service window, the self-service signing machine generates a document identifier for the contract to be signed and enters a waiting-for-signing state. The user holds their mobile phone close to the NFC sensing area of the machine; this physical contact not only wakes up the device's NFC module but also triggers the two-way authentication and encrypted channel establishment process. During this process, the mobile phone and the machine exchange 128-bit random challenge numbers and complete SM2 public key verification. Based on the HMAC-SM3 derivation function, a 256-bit SM4 encryption key specific to this session is negotiated, with the session timestamp accurate to the millisecond level. This design transforms the "proof of presence" in physical space into a "communication license" in digital space, effectively preventing remote relay attacks or malware from forging signature requests in a contactless state. Subsequently, the machine securely transmits the first key fragment and the document identifier to be signed to the mobile phone's hardware-level secure isolation area through this encrypted channel. Here, the NFC channel carries not only business instructions but also the cryptographic materials necessary for reconstructing the private key, making physical contact an indispensable prerequisite for signature operations and achieving a strong binding between the physical environment and digital security.
[0050] Upon receiving the first key fragment, the phone's hardware-level secure isolation zone immediately retrieves the core fragment stored in the secure partition and obtains the auxiliary fragment from the ordinary environment sandbox using AES-256-GCM decryption. These three fragments together form a complete key fragment set. The system then calculates the hash value of each fragment using the SM3 algorithm and compares it one by one with the pre-stored commitment value to ensure that the fragments have not been tampered with during storage and transmission. After successful verification, the document identifier is directly parsed within the isolation zone to obtain the original contract text and calculate the SM3 hash value. Only after a match with the pre-stored document hash commitment value is a private key reconstruction and SM2 signature operation triggered. The entire parsing, verification, reconstruction, and signing process is completely enclosed within the hardware-level secure isolation zone. Ordinary operating systems and any applications running on them cannot access the plaintext contract, key fragments, or intermediate signature data. This architecture completely blocks the path for mobile malware to steal sensitive information through memory injection, screen recording, or clipboard hijacking, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of government contract signing. The complete processing time for a single signature is controlled within 2 seconds, meeting the timeliness requirements of high-frequency processing at government service windows.
[0051] After signing, the electronic signature data is transmitted back to the self-service signing machine via an encrypted channel. The machine binds the signature data with its unique device identifier (UID) and precise timestamp, drives the printing module to output the stamped page, and simultaneously generates an audit record in its local secure storage area. This audit record contains the SM3 hash value of the signature data, the device UID, and the timestamp, linked via hash. Linked to the previous audit record, an immutable and tamper-proof audit chain is formed. In government scenarios, this means that the signing of each contract is anchored to a specific physical device and time point, and any alteration to the historical record will cause the subsequent chain to break, providing solid technical support for subsequent judicial evidence collection and accountability. Even when the device is offline, the audit chain can continue to accumulate locally, and then be synchronized to the cloud evidence storage platform after the device is connected to the network, balancing offline availability and data traceability.
[0052] It is worth noting that in this high-frequency government service scenario, the actual triggering of the abnormal circuit breaker mechanism and the segmented rotation mechanism demonstrates the robustness and forward security of the solution. For example, if a user removes their phone prematurely during the signature calculation process, causing an unexpected interruption of the NFC channel, the hardware-level security isolation zone will immediately detect the abnormal event and use the power-loss protection capacitor to complete the emergency zeroing of all temporary sensitive data in memory within 50 milliseconds, while generating an abnormal log containing a "channel interruption" type identifier and the precise time.
[0053] This avoids the possibility of partially completed signature data remaining in memory being extracted by cold start attacks, and also prevents incomplete signatures from being misused.
[0054] On the other hand, considering the high daily signing volume at government service windows, the system presets a fragment rotation trigger condition of 50 signature uses. Once a single machine has accumulated 50 signed contracts in a day, the next time a signature is completed, the hardware-level security isolation zone automatically reconstructs a polynomial using the same private key as a constant term but with entirely new random coefficients. This generates a new set of fragments to replace the old ones, and completely destroys the new polynomial coefficients and all old fragments. This "unchanged private key, refreshed fragments" mechanism ensures that even if attackers accumulate historical fragment information through long-term side-channel monitoring, they cannot use it to reconstruct the current or future private key state. This effectively addresses persistent advanced threats to high-value targets and significantly extends the security lifecycle of the key system in real-world business environments.
[0055] This embodiment provides an extended variant of the threshold parameter for high-security scenarios, suitable for business scenarios with higher key security requirements, such as large-value contract signing in financial institutions and the issuance of judicial notarized documents. Unlike the (2,3) threshold configuration used in Embodiment 1, this embodiment adopts a (3,5) threshold secret sharing configuration, splitting the signing private key into five fragments. Any three fragments are required to reconstruct the private key, further increasing the difficulty for attackers to obtain enough fragments.
[0056] Specifically, within the hardware-level secure isolation zone, a quadratic polynomial is constructed over the finite field GF(p) with the signing private key S as a constant term: Formula description: (3,5) threshold quadratic polynomial, where S is the signature private key. and Let be the coefficients of a polynomial randomly generated over the finite field GF(p), where p is not less than 2. 256 prime numbers.
[0057] in, and All are in a finite field The coefficients of a randomly generated polynomial are used. Based on this quadratic polynomial, five partitions are calculated, each corresponding to a threshold polynomial. At five distinct non-zero evaluation points , , , , The function value at the specified location. The storage distribution of the five fragments is as follows: the first fragment is transmitted to the secure storage area of the near-field signature device; the second and third fragments are stored in two independent secure partitions of the hardware-level secure isolation area; the fourth fragment is encrypted and stored in the sandbox of the mobile terminal's ordinary environment storage area; and the fifth fragment is transmitted through a TLS encrypted channel to the hardware security module of the remote key escrow server for storage.
[0058] During the signing phase, the mobile terminal needs to simultaneously aggregate fragments from four different sources: the first fragment is obtained from the near-field signing device via an NFC encrypted channel; the second and third fragments are retrieved from the local secure isolation zone; the fourth fragment is obtained by decryption from the sandbox; and the fifth fragment is obtained from a remote key escrow server via a TLS encrypted channel. Any three fragments can then be selected from these five fragments. , and The signature private key is reconstructed using a quadratic Lagrange interpolation formula, and it is applicable to a (3,5) threshold configuration. This embodiment distributes shards across four heterogeneous security domains: near-field devices, a local security isolation zone, a local sandbox, and a remote server. This forces attackers to compromise at least three different security domains simultaneously to obtain enough shards to reconstruct the private key, significantly increasing the attack cost. Simultaneously, the (3,5) threshold configuration provides stronger fault tolerance, allowing signature operations to be completed even if two storage domains are temporarily unavailable. The introduction of a remote key escrow server also brings additional management advantages, such as centralized key lifecycle management, remote revocation capabilities, and cross-device key synchronization support, making it suitable for large-scale enterprise deployments.
[0059] It should be understood that although this embodiment uses a (3,5) threshold configuration as an example, other threshold parameter configurations, such as (2,4), (3,4), (4,7), etc., can be used without departing from the inventive concept of this application, as long as the minimum number of fragments t required for reconstruction is less than the total number of fragments n. Similarly, the storage distribution of fragments can also be adjusted according to actual security requirements, such as storing multiple fragments in different sub-partitions of the same security domain, or storing fragments in different types of hardware security modules.
[0060] In summary, this embodiment organically integrates technical features such as NFC physical interaction, cross-domain sharding storage, TEE closed-loop operation, hash audit chain, abnormal circuit breaking, and dynamic rotation into the entire electronic signature process. It not only verifies the feasibility and synergistic effect of each technical solution in real industrial scenarios, but also demonstrates its unique advantages in achieving highly secure, compliant, and available electronic signatures without network dependence, fully reflecting the industrial practicality and creative value of this application.
[0061] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. For example, although the foregoing embodiments have been described in detail using the SM2 signature algorithm, the SM4 encryption algorithm, and the (2,3) and (3,5) threshold secret sharing schemes as examples, those skilled in the art can also use other equivalent national or international cryptographic algorithms, different threshold parameter configurations, or other trusted execution environments with hardware-level security isolation capabilities to achieve the same technical effect without departing from the inventive concept of this application. Similarly, the establishment method of the near-field communication channel, the triggering conditions for fragment rotation, the specific judgment logic for abnormal circuit breaking, and the hash link structure of the audit chain can all be adaptively adjusted or replaced according to actual business needs and security level requirements. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of protection of the claims.
Claims
1. A secure electronic signature method based on NFC, applied to a mobile terminal, wherein the mobile terminal and a near-field signature device are connected via a near-field communication channel, characterized in that, include: In response to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device, and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication; Receive the first key fragment sent from the secure storage area of the near-field signature device through the encrypted near-field communication channel; Obtain the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal; Integrity verification is performed on the first key fragment and the second key fragment respectively, including: calculating the hash value of the first key fragment, the core fragment and the auxiliary fragment respectively, and comparing each hash value with the pre-stored fragment commitment value one by one. When all hash values are consistent with the corresponding fragment commitment value, the integrity verification is deemed to have passed. Based on the first and second key fragments that have passed integrity verification, the signing private key is reconstructed in the hardware-level security isolation zone, and the signing operation is performed on the data to be signed based on the signing private key to generate electronic signature data. Instantly clear the signing private key and intermediate data generated by the signing operation within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
2. The NFC-based secure electronic signature method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Obtaining the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal includes: The core fragment is retrieved within the hardware-level security isolation zone, and the auxiliary fragment is decrypted and obtained from the sandbox in the ordinary environment storage zone.
3. The NFC-based secure electronic signature method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Before obtaining the second key fragment within the hardware-level security isolation zone of the mobile terminal, the process also includes: Within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, threshold secret sharing splitting is performed on the signature private key to generate a first key fragment, a core fragment, and an auxiliary fragment; After the split is completed, the original plaintext of the signing private key is destroyed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
4. The NFC-based secure electronic signature method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Perform two-way authentication with the near-field signature device, and negotiate a session key to encrypt the near-field communication channel after successful authentication, including: The mobile terminal generates a first random number and sends it to the near-field signature device, and receives a second random number generated by the near-field signature device; The first and second random numbers are encrypted and verified based on the pre-stored device public key; In response to successful verification, the first and second random numbers are calculated based on the key derivation function to generate a session key; The near-field communication channel is encrypted based on the session key and session timestamp.
5. The NFC-based secure electronic signature method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Based on the first and second key fragments that have passed integrity verification, the signing private key is reconstructed within a hardware-level secure isolation zone, including: Based on the Shamir threshold secret sharing model, a (t,n) threshold polynomial is constructed over the finite field GF(p) with the signing private key S as a constant term: In the formula, S is the private key for signing. Let be the polynomial coefficients randomly generated over the finite field GF(p), t=2 be the minimum number of fragments required for reconstruction, n=3 be the total number of fragments, and p be a number not less than 2. 256 prime numbers; The first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragment are respectively mapped to the threshold polynomial f(x) at three distinct non-zero evaluation points. , , Function value at: In the formula, the mapping relationship between the slices and the evaluation points is given by: , , For three distinct non-zero evaluation points; Select any two fragments from the first key fragment, the core fragment, and the auxiliary fragment. and( , The signature private key is reconstructed using the Lagrange interpolation formula: In the formula, for Modular inverse over the finite field GF(p); The signing operation is performed on the data to be signed based on the signing private key, including: In the SM2 elliptic curve over a 256-bit prime field, a signature operation is performed on the hash value e of the data to be signed, using the signing private key S and the order n of the elliptic curve base point G as parameters: In the formula, The equation of the SM2 elliptic curve, where a and b are elliptic curve parameters; Generate random numbers k∈[1,n-1] and calculate the points on the elliptic curve. Calculate the signature values r and s: In the formula, The formula for calculating the signature value r, where e is the hash value of the data to be signed. Let [k] be the x-coordinate of the point [k]G on the elliptic curve. When r=0 or r+k=n, a random number k is regenerated. Output electronic signature data containing signature values r and s; Encrypting the near-field communication channel based on the session key and session timestamp includes: The SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt data transmitted through the near-field communication channel in 128-bit block lengths. The encryption process involves 32 rounds of iterative computation, with the round function for each round being: In the formula, , , , The 128-bit input data is divided into four 32-bit words. Let T be the 32-bit round key generated by the key expansion algorithm based on the session key in the i-th round, T be the composite transformation containing the nonlinear S-box transformation τ and the linear transformation L and T=L(τ(·)), ⊕ be the bitwise XOR operation, and i=1,2,...,32.
6. The secure electronic signature method based on NFC according to claim 5, characterized in that, Prior to establishing a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, the following also applies: Generate a signature private key within a hardware-level secure isolation zone; Using the signature private key as a constant term, a first-order polynomial is constructed over the finite field GF(p), and the first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment are calculated based on the first-order polynomial. The first key is fragmented and transmitted to a secure storage area for storage; Destroy the original plaintext of the signature private key and the polynomial coefficients of a linear polynomial within a hardware-level secure isolation zone.
7. The secure electronic signature method based on NFC according to claim 1, characterized in that, Following the establishment of a near-field communication channel with the near-field signature device, the following are also included: Receive the document identifier and device information to be signed from the near-field signing device via the near-field communication channel; Before performing the signing operation on the data to be signed based on the signing private key, the following steps are also included: Within a hardware-level security isolation zone, the document identifier to be signed is directly parsed to obtain the data to be signed, and the hash value of the data to be signed is calculated. The hash value is compared and verified with the pre-stored document hash commitment value; The signature operation is performed only when the comparison and verification pass, and the ordinary operating system of the mobile terminal does not participate in the parsing of the document identifier to be signed.
8. The NFC-based secure electronic signature method according to claim 7, characterized in that, After generating the electronic signature data, the following is also included: The electronic signature data is transmitted back to the near-field signing device through the near-field communication channel, so that the near-field signing device is bound with a unique device identifier and a signing timestamp, and the electronic signature data is stored locally in the log. A signature hash value is generated based on the electronic signature data, and an audit record is generated based on the signature hash value, the device's unique identifier, and the signature timestamp. The audit record is linked to the previous audit record through a hash link to form a tamper-proof audit chain.
9. A secure electronic signature method based on NFC according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Upon detecting an abnormal event, terminate the signing process and clear any temporary sensitive data within the hardware-level security isolation zone; Among them, abnormal events include at least one of the following: near-field communication channel interruption, two-way authentication failure, integrity verification failure, session timeout, and abnormal operation status of hardware-level security isolation zone; Generate an exception event log that includes the exception type identifier and the time of occurrence.
10. A secure electronic signature method based on NFC according to claim 6, characterized in that, After generating the electronic signature data, the following is also included: Determine whether the preset segment rotation trigger conditions are met. The segment rotation trigger conditions include at least one of the following: the number of times the signature is used reaches a preset number threshold or the time since the last rotation reaches a preset time period threshold. In response to the fulfillment of the fragmentation rotation trigger condition, a new first-order polynomial is reconstructed within the hardware-level security isolation zone using the signature private key as a constant term. The polynomial coefficients of the new first-order polynomial are different from those of the first-order polynomial. A new first key fragment, a new core fragment, and a new auxiliary fragment are obtained based on the new first-order polynomial calculation. The new first key fragment is transmitted to the secure storage area to replace the original first key fragment. The new core fragment replaces the original core fragment in the secure partition. The new auxiliary fragment is encrypted and stored in the sandbox to replace the original auxiliary fragment. The polynomial coefficients of the new polynomial, as well as the original first key fragment, core fragment, and auxiliary fragment, are destroyed within the hardware-level security isolation zone.
