Anti-counterfeiting verification methods, systems and equipment
By introducing random challenge codes and time-series verification of dynamic runtime context parameters into NFC verification, combined with cryptographic algorithms, the problems of NFC anti-counterfeiting being easily cloned and high-cost hardware encryption are solved, thus achieving efficient anti-counterfeiting verification for industrial and mining lighting equipment.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611493440.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-23
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing NFC anti-counterfeiting solutions are easily cloned and counterfeited, rely on high-computing-power encryption chips, are costly and difficult to promote, and are hard to apply effectively in industrial and mining lighting equipment.
By introducing a random challenge code into NFC verification, and utilizing the target device's dynamic operating context parameters and unique device identification code, combined with temporal monotonicity verification and cryptographic algorithms, a verification authentication code is generated to achieve anti-counterfeiting verification.
It effectively resists replay attacks, deeply binds to the actual physical state of the device, enables instant identification of cloned labels, improves the accuracy of anti-counterfeiting identification and the depth of anti-attack resistance, and builds a full lifecycle defense system.
Smart Images

Figure CN123123908A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of equipment verification technology, and in particular to an anti-counterfeiting verification method, system and verification equipment. Background Technology
[0002] Lighting equipment (especially industrial special lighting fixtures such as mining lamps) is crucial for ensuring the safety of personnel in high-risk working environments such as underground coal mines and tunnel projects. Because underground work sites are often accompanied by flammable and explosive gases and dust, the explosion-proof structure, electrical safety, and stability of the internal energy storage battery of mining lamps are subject to extremely high and stringent national and industry safety standards. However, counterfeit and substandard mining lamp products frequently appear on the market. These counterfeit lamps often use inferior battery cells and crude assembly processes (such as disassembling original compliant casings and replacing them with counterfeit light sources). In harsh environments, they are highly susceptible to serious safety accidents such as battery overheating and fire, casing damage, and explosion-proof failure, severely threatening the lives of on-site personnel. Therefore, reliable and efficient anti-counterfeiting authentication of mining lamps and other lighting equipment is of paramount importance.
[0003] Currently, the industry commonly uses ordinary static QR codes, laser anti-counterfeiting labels, or near field communication (NFC) technology to conduct anti-counterfeiting traceability and identity verification for lighting equipment. Among them, NFC technology usually integrates NFC radio frequency tags inside the lamp or on the outer shell. Inspection or security personnel use portable reading and writing devices to read the data of the tags non-contactly to determine the authenticity of the lamp.
[0004] However, existing NFC-based anti-counterfeiting solutions generally suffer from the following technical problems: 1. Static data is easily cloned and counterfeited: Existing anti-counterfeiting methods mainly rely on reading the static device identification code (such as the chip's physical serial number) or pre-stored static encrypted information embedded in the label. Counterfeiters only need to use common portable wireless card readers or cloning tools to easily read the complete data from the labels of legitimate genuine lighting fixtures and copy it to the blank labels of counterfeit devices. This makes the traditional NFC anti-counterfeiting mechanism based on static data extremely easy to break, and cloned products are rampant. Even when using ordinary encrypted labels, counterfeiters often completely peel off the real NFC chip from the shell of a scrapped genuine mining lamp and transplant it onto inferior counterfeit mining lamps. This means that existing anti-counterfeiting methods can only verify the authenticity of the chip itself, but cannot identify whether the chip has left the original mining lamp's life cycle. 2. High hardware modification costs and limited computing power: Although in the field of conventional smart terminals, tag copying can be resisted by adding a dedicated high-security hardware encryption chip or using asymmetric encryption algorithms inside the device, this not only requires a radical redesign of the existing underlying hardware circuit topology of the lamp, which significantly increases the size and material cost of the circuit board and destroys the original intrinsically safe explosion-proof circuit topology of the mining lamp, but also the high-intensity cryptographic operations will place an excessive computing load on the low-cost, low-power main control chip, significantly increasing the product's power consumption and failure rate. For industrial and mining lighting fixtures with highly compact structures, emphasizing intrinsically safe explosion-proof characteristics and being relatively cost-sensitive, it is difficult to promote and implement them on a large scale in actual engineering practice.
[0005] Therefore, how to effectively resist NFC cloning attacks without adding extra complex circuit structures or relying on high-performance encryption chips, simply by improving the interaction logic, has become an urgent problem to be solved in the field of security and anti-counterfeiting of industrial and mining lighting equipment. Summary of the Invention
[0006] Based on this, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an anti-counterfeiting verification method, system and verification device to solve the problems that existing devices rely on static data in NFC anti-counterfeiting, which are easily cloned and counterfeited, while relying on dedicated hardware leads to excessive costs and is not easy to promote.
[0007] According to an embodiment of the present invention, an anti-counterfeiting verification method is applied to a verification device, the method comprising: Send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; The system receives the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and parses the response data packet to extract the unique device identifier, current dynamic running context parameters, and response authentication code of the target device. The current dynamic running context parameters represent the physical running statistics recorded by the target device in its running state by its internal program in a monotonically increasing manner. The system requests the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the unique device identification code based on the device's unique identification code. The extracted current dynamic running context parameters are compared with the historical dynamic running context parameters to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. If the timing monotonicity verification passes, a preset key corresponding to the unique identification code of the device is obtained, and the preset key, the random challenge code, and the current dynamic running context parameters are used to calculate and generate a verification authentication code. Based on the results of the time-series monotonicity verification and the consistency comparison results between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code, an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device is generated. When the anti-counterfeiting verification result is successful, the current dynamic running context parameters are uploaded to the verification server to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server.
[0008] In addition, the anti-counterfeiting verification method according to the above embodiments of the present invention may also have the following additional technical features: Furthermore, before the step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface, the method further includes: Obtain the current system timestamp and local hardware random entropy source for the current verification operation; The current system timestamp is mixed with the local hardware random entropy source using a pseudo-random sequence to generate an initial random value. Retrieve historical transmission records of the initial random value within a preset time window; If the initial random value does not appear in the historical transmission record, then the initial random value is determined to be the random challenge code and recorded in the historical transmission record; If the initial random value has already appeared in the historical transmission record, the mixing operation is re-executed until a unique random challenge code is generated.
[0009] Further, the step of parsing the response data packet to extract the target device's unique identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and response authentication code includes: Perform cyclic redundancy check on the integrity of the received response data packet; After the cyclic redundancy check passes, the response data packet is parsed according to the preset data frame protocol format to extract the device identification field, the operating parameter field and the verification signature field. Decode and map the device identifier field into the device's unique identification code; The running parameter field is decoded into an unsigned integer value according to a preset numerical base, and used as the current dynamic running context parameter; The verification signature field is extracted into a fixed-length byte sequence and used as the response authentication code.
[0010] Further, the step of performing a time-series monotonicity check on the extracted current dynamic runtime context parameters and the historical dynamic runtime context parameters includes: Determine whether the value of the current dynamic running context parameter is less than the value of the historical dynamic running context parameter; If it is less than, the timing monotonicity check is determined to have failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as a data rollback anomaly. If it is not less than, then calculate the difference between the current dynamic running context parameter and the historical dynamic running context parameter to obtain the dynamic parameter increment; Get the actual physical interval between the last successful verification time and the current verification time; Calculate the theoretical maximum increment threshold based on the preset maximum physical operating consumption rate of the equipment and the actual physical interval duration; Determine whether the increment of the dynamic parameter exceeds the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold; If the time series monotonicity check is exceeded, it is determined that the time series monotonicity check has failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as parameter mutation anomaly. If the time series monotonicity check is not exceeded, then the time series monotonicity check is considered to have passed.
[0011] Further, the step of obtaining a preset key that matches the unique identification code of the device, and using the preset key, the random challenge code, and the current dynamic running context parameters to calculate and generate a verification authentication code includes: Based on the device's unique identification code, the unique device-specific key of the target device is queried from the verification server or derived locally, and used as the preset key; According to the preset byte alignment rules, the binary sequence of the random challenge code, the device unique identification code, and the current dynamic running context parameters are sequentially concatenated to generate a data string to be signed; The data string to be signed and the preset key are input into a preset hash message authentication code algorithm or block encryption algorithm for processing; Extract a specified byte segment from the calculated ciphertext sequence as the generated verification and authentication code.
[0012] Further, the step of generating an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device based on the result of the time-series monotonicity check and the consistency comparison result between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code includes: Compare the character sequences of the response authentication code and the verification authentication code bit by bit; If the timing monotonicity check passes and the response authentication code is completely consistent with the verification authentication code, then an anti-counterfeiting verification result is generated, and the target device is determined to be genuine. If the timing monotonicity check fails, or the response authentication code is inconsistent with the verification authentication code, an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result is generated, and the target device is determined to be a counterfeit cloned product. When the anti-counterfeiting verification fails, the device's unique identification code is extracted and bound to the current geographical location coordinates and the anomaly type. A security alarm event is then generated and uploaded to the verification server to lock the device.
[0013] Furthermore, the step of requesting the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic runtime context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code includes: Detect the wireless communication link status with the verification server; If the wireless communication link is working properly, the latest historical dynamic runtime context parameters are requested from the verification server through the remote interface. If the wireless communication link is interrupted, the local offline database is accessed to retrieve the local historical snapshot parameters that match the device's unique identifier, which are then used as the historical dynamic running context parameters. When the wireless communication link is restored, the anti-counterfeiting verification results generated in the offline state and the current dynamic running context parameters are packaged and uploaded to the verification server.
[0014] Furthermore, the step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface includes: The NFC antenna transmits radio frequency carrier signals and listens for the presence of radio frequency response carriers of the target device to be verified within the radio frequency field. If multiple radio frequency response signals are detected simultaneously in the radio frequency field, an anti-collision arbitration algorithm based on binary search tree is activated to filter and lock the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of a single target device level by level. Establish an exclusive radio frequency communication link with a target device that has the locked instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier; The generated random challenge code is packaged into a verification request command frame according to a preset frame protocol and then sent to the locked target device via a dedicated radio frequency communication link.
[0015] Another embodiment of the present invention aims to provide an anti-counterfeiting verification system for use in verification equipment, the system comprising: The request sending module is used to send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; The data parsing module is used to receive the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and to parse the response data packet to extract the device unique identifier, current dynamic running context parameters and response authentication code of the target device. The current dynamic running context parameters represent the physical running statistics recorded by the target device in its running state by its internal program in a monotonically increasing manner. The parameter acquisition module is used to request the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code based on the device's unique identification code. The timing verification module is used to perform timing monotonicity verification between the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. The authentication calculation module is used to obtain a preset key that matches the unique identification code of the device when the timing verification module determines that the verification is successful, and to calculate and generate a verification authentication code by using the preset key, the random challenge code and the current dynamic running context parameters. The result evaluation module is used to generate anti-counterfeiting verification results for the target device based on the results of the time series monotonicity verification and the consistency comparison results of the verification authentication code and the response authentication code. The data update module is used to upload the current dynamic running context parameters to the verification server when the anti-counterfeiting verification result is successful, so as to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server.
[0016] Another embodiment of the present invention aims to provide a verification device, including a memory, a processor, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the anti-counterfeiting verification method as described above.
[0017] The anti-counterfeiting verification method, system, and verification equipment provided in this invention have the following beneficial effects: 1. By introducing a random challenge code into the verification request, the data transmitted in each verification session is unique and unpredictable, which avoids the illegal interception and reuse of verification request and response data during transmission, and effectively resists replay attacks and data replay spoofing.
[0018] 2. By using the physical operation statistics recorded by the target device's internal program in a monotonically increasing manner as the current dynamic operation context parameter, and extracting them together with the device's unique identification code and response authentication code, a deep information physical binding is formed between the anti-counterfeiting certificate and the target device's actual physical operation state. This breaks the traditional anti-counterfeiting mechanism's simple reliance on static identifiers or static encrypted text within the chip, and endows the anti-counterfeiting data with irreversible unidirectional evolution physical characteristics.
[0019] 3. By retrieving pre-stored historical dynamic operating context parameters from the verification server based on the device's unique identification code, and performing a time-series monotonicity check between the current dynamic operating context parameters and the historical dynamic operating context parameters, the real-time identification and interception of cloned tags based on the time-series evolution pattern is realized, so that static cloned tags are exposed at the verification site in real time due to data rollback anomalies.
[0020] 4. By further calculating the dynamic parameter increment in the time series monotonicity check, and combining the actual physical interval between two verifications with the maximum consumption rate of the equipment's physical operation to dynamically derive the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold, multi-dimensional anti-tampering based on objective physical laws is achieved, avoiding the parameter mutation forgery by attackers who artificially fabricate excessively high data to bypass the basic monotonicity detection.
[0021] 5. By obtaining the corresponding preset key when the time monotonicity verification passes, and using the preset key, random challenge code, and current dynamic running context parameters to calculate and generate a verification authentication code, it is ensured that only genuine devices with built-in legitimate private keys can generate compliant authentication responses. This avoids the possibility of attackers forging false data out of thin air or impersonating others without a key. At the same time, the one-device-one-key key management architecture eliminates the risk of global crash caused by the leakage of a single master key.
[0022] 6. By combining the temporal monotonicity verification results with the consistency comparison results of the verification authentication code and the response authentication code, the final anti-counterfeiting verification result is generated. This achieves the joint judgment of objective physical temporal patterns and cryptographic security algorithms, thereby improving the accuracy of anti-counterfeiting identification and the depth of resistance to attacks.
[0023] 7. By uploading the current dynamic running context parameters to the verification server after successful verification to update the historical records, the irreversible dynamic forward rolling evolution of the server's baseline data is realized, building a defense system that dynamically increases throughout the target device's entire lifecycle.
[0024] In summary, this invention effectively solves the problems of existing devices relying on static data in NFC anti-counterfeiting, which are easily cloned and counterfeited, while relying on dedicated hardware leads to excessive costs and is not easy to promote. Attached Figure Description
[0025] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the anti-counterfeiting verification method in the first embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the specific process of step S50 in the first embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the anti-counterfeiting verification system in the second embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the verification device in the third embodiment of the present invention; The following detailed description of the embodiments will further illustrate the present invention in conjunction with the above-described accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation
[0026] To facilitate understanding of the present invention, a more complete description will be given below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Several embodiments of the invention are illustrated in the drawings. However, the invention can be implemented in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete.
[0027] It should be noted that when a component is said to be "fixed to" another component, it can be directly on the other component or there may be an intervening component. When a component is said to be "connected to" another component, it can be directly connected to the other component or there may be an intervening component. The terms "vertical," "horizontal," "left," "right," and similar expressions used in this document are for illustrative purposes only.
[0028] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention pertains. The terminology used herein in the description of the invention is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. The term "and / or" as used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
[0029] Example 1
[0030] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to the first embodiment of the present invention is shown. For ease of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiment of the present invention are shown. The anti-counterfeiting verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is applied to a verification device, and the method includes: Step S10: Send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; In one embodiment of the present invention, the method is applied to an intelligent inspection and anti-counterfeiting scenario for mining equipment. Specifically, it is executed by a verification device used for inspection and verification. This verification device mainly includes a handheld explosion-proof inspection terminal, a mining multi-functional intelligent detector, or an intelligent detection terminal integrated into a mining charging cabinet. Specifically, the verification device in this embodiment is actually a handheld intelligent explosion-proof inspection terminal, mainly used for anti-counterfeiting verification and daily inspection of equipment in underground coal mines, tunnel projects, or harsh industrial environments. The hardware architecture of this verification device includes, but is not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a near-field communication module, a random number generation module, a data storage module, and a power management module. The CPU serves as the core control unit, connecting all the hardware modules. The near-field communication module includes at least a near-field communication control chip, an antenna impedance matching network, and a near-field communication antenna. It is connected to the CPU via an internal serial peripheral interface and is used to establish short-range electromagnetic coupling links to the outside and perform non-contact data transmission and reception. The random number generation module includes a physical entropy source acquisition circuit, which uses a thermal noise sampling unit of the internal analog-to-digital converter with a floating analog input channel and is electrically connected to the CPU. It is used to acquire microscopic thermal disturbance physical signals in real time and convert them into random electrical signal inputs. The data storage module is used to store the underlying firmware program, historical verification record window cache, and temporary running data. The power management module includes an intrinsically safe explosion-proof battery pack and a charge / discharge management chip, which provides a continuous and stable safe power supply for the CPU and all peripheral hardware modules.
[0031] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the target device to be verified is a mining lighting fixture (such as a miner's headlamp, a small explosion-proof flashlight, or an engineering lighting fixture installed on a safety helmet) worn by mining workers, used to provide safe and explosion-proof continuous lighting in the working environment. Its overall hardware architecture includes, but is not limited to: a microcontroller unit, a near-field communication (NFC) radio frequency response module, a secure storage module, an operation status monitoring and data statistics module, a lighting unit, and a power management module. The microcontroller unit serves as the core computing and control center of the target device; the NFC radio frequency response module includes a dual-interface near-field communication (NFC) radio frequency control chip, a radio frequency tuning antenna, an impedance matching network, and a radio frequency energy harvesting rectifier circuit. It is connected to the microcontroller unit via an internal bus, supporting both wake-up via high-frequency electromagnetic field coupling emitted by the verification device in a completely power-free state and direct power supply from the device's internal power supply in a powered state; the secure storage module includes flash memory and an electrically erasable read-only memory protected by a hardware security area. Internally, it has a read-only data area, a one-way accumulating data area, and a security key area. The read-only data area contains a unique device identification code. The full key area stores a proprietary device key injected at the factory and which cannot be read externally. The one-way accumulating data area is used for controlled recording of physical operation statistics. The operation status monitoring and data statistics module includes a high-precision clock crystal oscillator, a light source circuit current sampling circuit, and a battery power meter, which are used to monitor the on / off state and duration of the lighting circuit in real time, providing a reference timing source for the monotonically increasing accumulation of operating parameters. The lighting unit consists of a high-brightness light-emitting diode array and a pulse width modulation constant current drive circuit, which is used to provide working lighting. The power management module includes an explosion-proof lithium battery pack and a charge / discharge protection circuit, which provides intrinsically safe operating power for the microcontroller unit, monitoring module, and lighting unit.
[0032] In one embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the anti-counterfeiting verification activation command, the verification device first generates a random challenge code locally for single-time identity authentication and verification, and assembles the random challenge code into a verification request data message with a preset protocol format. Subsequently, the central processing unit of the verification device controls the near-field communication module to drive the near-field communication antenna to continuously radiate alternating electromagnetic carrier signals into the surrounding space, constructing an electromagnetic induction field within a short distance to perform non-contact electromagnetic excitation and energy coupling on target devices entering the induction area. After detecting and confirming the establishment of a reliable radio electromagnetic communication link with the target device, the near-field communication control chip modulates the verification request data message containing the random challenge code onto the radio frequency carrier and sends it directionally to the target device, thereby triggering the target device to perform subsequent dynamic encryption operations and context response feedback steps based on the received random challenge code.
[0033] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface includes: The NFC antenna transmits radio frequency carrier signals and listens for the presence of radio frequency response carriers of the target device to be verified within the radio frequency field. If multiple radio frequency response signals are detected simultaneously in the radio frequency field, an anti-collision arbitration algorithm based on binary search tree is activated to filter and lock the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of a single target device level by level. Establish an exclusive radio frequency communication link with the target device that has the locked instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier; The generated random challenge code is packaged into a verification request command frame according to a preset frame protocol and then sent to the locked target device via a dedicated radio frequency communication link.
[0034] Specifically, the central processing unit (CPU) of the verification device sends a radio frequency (RF) start command to the near-field communication (NFC) control chip. The NFC control chip drives the antenna impedance matching network to continuously radiate an alternating sinusoidal electromagnetic carrier signal into the external space through the NFC antenna. This electromagnetic carrier constructs a localized induced electromagnetic field in the surrounding space. When the target device to be verified approaches this induced area, its internal micro-antenna generates an induced current through mutual inductance coupling and is activated. During this period, the demodulation circuit inside the NFC control chip is in a continuous listening state, monitoring the amplitude fluctuations of the spatial carrier caused by the target device's load modulation, and determining whether a radio frequency response carrier from the target device is present in the RF field.
[0035] Next, in industrial lighting rooms or batch maintenance scenarios, if multiple target devices enter the sensing field simultaneously, each device will spontaneously attempt to respond to carrier excitation, causing the returned radio frequency response signals to superimpose in space and generate electromagnetic collisions. Once the near-field communication control chip detects a bit collision in the carrier signal, the central processing unit immediately takes over and starts an anti-collision arbitration algorithm based on a binary search tree. The near-field communication control chip broadcasts a bit collision detection command to the devices in the field, and when it receives the physical radio frequency identification code bit stream returned by each target device, it identifies the specific binary bit position where the signal collision occurred; the central processing unit dynamically generates a splitting mask based on the conflicting bits, designating a group of devices that retain specific logic values to continue responding, while instructing the remaining devices to temporarily enter a suspended silent state. Through hierarchical splitting and recursive filtering along the binary tree branches, all conflicting devices are eventually completely isolated, accurately locking the instantaneous physical radio frequency identification of a single specific target device.
[0036] Subsequently, after locking onto the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of the target device, the central processing unit controls the near-field communication interface to send a selection activation command to the target device corresponding to the identifier, formally establishing a communication session. This keeps all other devices in the radio frequency field in an unresponsive dormant state, thereby establishing an exclusive physical radio frequency communication link between the verification device and the target device with the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier, free from interference from external electromagnetic signals.
[0037] Finally, the central processing unit (CPU) assembles the generated unique random challenge code with the preset authentication operation function code according to the standard frame communication protocol, and appends a calculated cyclic redundancy check (CRC) sequence to the end of the data packet to construct a complete verification request command frame. The CPU then sends this command frame to the near-field communication (NFC) control chip, which converts it into a pulse modulation level and loads it onto the radio frequency (RF) carrier. This signal is then directionally radiated to the locked target device via the established exclusive RF communication link. The target device demodulates and receives the signal, extracting the random challenge code to complete the directional transmission of the verification request.
[0038] Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention introduce radio frequency carrier sensing and a collision prevention arbitration algorithm based on binary search tree in the radio frequency field to traverse and lock the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of a single device to establish an exclusive communication link. This enables rapid collision separation and point-to-point deterministic communication in high-density, close-range stacking scenarios such as industrial and mining lamp rooms and dense charging cabinets. It effectively avoids communication crosstalk, data trampling, and missed detections and misjudgments caused by the overlap of multiple radio frequency signals.
[0039] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface further includes: Obtain the current system timestamp and local hardware random entropy source for the current verification operation; The current system timestamp is mixed with the local hardware random entropy source to generate an initial random value by performing a pseudo-random sequence mixing operation. Retrieve historical transmission records of the initial random value within a preset time window; If the initial random value does not appear in the historical sending record, then the initial random value is determined to be a random challenge code and recorded in the historical sending record; If the initial random value has already appeared in the historical transmission record, the mixing operation is re-executed until a unique random challenge code is generated.
[0040] Specifically, before initiating a verification request, the central processing unit (CPU) of the verification device reads the current system timestamp corresponding to the current verification operation from its internal system timer in real time. This system timestamp represents the unique timing anchor point of the verification action on the physical timeline. At the same time, the CPU calls the physical entropy source acquisition circuit in the random number generation module to capture instantaneous discrete electrical signals with microscopic physical random characteristics by high-speed sampling of thermal noise or clock jitter thermal disturbance signals on the internal floating analog-to-digital converter pins, which serve as a local hardware random entropy source.
[0041] Next, the central processing unit (CPU) concatenates the current system timestamp with the local hardware random entropy source into a bitstream and inputs it into a preset pseudo-random sequence confusion algorithm program for multiple rounds of hash mixing operations. Through nonlinear substitution and position permutation operations, the regularity of the time series is fully disrupted and the unpredictability of physical thermal noise is absorbed, thereby outputting a fixed-length binary sequence with high statistical randomness as the initial random value.
[0042] Subsequently, in order to avoid communication replay attacks and data replay deception risks, the central processing unit accesses a pre-allocated sliding time window buffer in local memory and performs a reverse traversal search of all historical transmission records recorded in the sliding time window to compare and determine whether the initial random value has collided with previously transmitted historical random codes.
[0043] Finally, if the search determines that the initial random value has never appeared in the historical transmission records within the preset time window, the central processing unit (CPU) officially establishes the initial random value as the globally unique random challenge code in this verification process and simultaneously appends it to the top of the window queue of the historical transmission records. If the search determines that the initial random value already exists in the historical transmission records, the CPU immediately discards the initial random value and re-triggers the acquisition of the updated system timestamp and new hardware entropy source sampling data, and performs the mixed operation and collision detection again until a completely unique random challenge code that has never appeared before is generated. This ensures the unpredictability and uniqueness of the random challenge code data from the source.
[0044] Therefore, by obtaining the current system timestamp and the local hardware random entropy source for mixed hashing before sending the verification request, and linking it with the historical sending records within the preset time window for deduplication verification, the present invention achieves the unpredictability and absolute uniqueness of the random challenge code in physical space and time, effectively eliminating the risk of malicious nodes intercepting communication and carrying out replay attacks or replay deception.
[0045] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, after the step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the near-field communication interface, the target device responds to the verification request by generating and sending back a response data packet to the verification device. The specific execution steps include: The verification request command frame is received via inductive coupling through a radio frequency tuned antenna, demodulated and the random challenge code is extracted, and the integrity of the command frame is verified. In response to the integrity verification passing, access the read-only data area in the secure storage module and read the pre-embedded unique device identification code; Read the physical operation statistics stored in the one-way accumulating data area of the secure storage module as the current dynamic operation context parameters; The dedicated device key is retrieved from the security key area of the secure storage module, and the dedicated device key, random challenge code, device unique identification code and current dynamic running context parameters are assembled according to rules and input into the preset calculation model to generate the response authentication code. The device's unique identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and response authentication code are packaged into a response data packet according to the communication protocol, and a cyclic redundancy check sequence is appended. The control near-field communication RF response module performs antenna impedance load modulation, modulates the response data packet onto the space RF carrier, and transmits it back to the verification equipment.
[0046] Specifically, when the target device enters the electromagnetic field coverage area of the verification device, the target device's RF tuning antenna induces high-frequency alternating current from the alternating electromagnetic field in space through electromagnetic inductance. The RF energy harvesting and rectification circuit inside the near-field communication RF response module converts the induced alternating current into a DC operating voltage, triggering the microcontroller to exit the low-power sleep state and start up. The RF detection and demodulation circuit inside the microcontroller performs amplitude detection on the carrier pulse signal received by the RF tuning antenna, reconstructs the digital pulse baseband signal, and extracts the verification request command frame. Subsequently, the microcontroller compares and verifies the cyclic redundancy check sequence at the end of the command frame. If the verification fails, it is discarded without response; if the verification succeeds, the command frame is deemed valid, and the random challenge code issued by the verification device is separated from the data payload field.
[0047] Next, after confirming the validity of the verification command, the microcontroller unit of the target device begins to collect characteristic parameters of the current state. The microcontroller unit first addresses and accesses the read-only data area in the secure storage module to read the unique device identification code burned and solidified at the factory. Simultaneously, the microcontroller unit accesses the one-way accumulating data area in the secure storage module to read the latest physical operation statistics stored therein, using it as the current dynamic operating context parameter. Further, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the aforementioned current dynamic operating context parameter is a genuine, unforgeable, and physically irreversible operating indicator generated by the target device during actual physical operation. Specifically, it includes at least one of the following: the cumulative lighting duration of the target device's main light source and the cumulative number of charge-discharge cycles of the internal energy storage battery. The cumulative lighting duration is updated in real time based on the duration of the lighting drive state, or the cumulative number of charge-discharge cycles is updated in real time based on the cycle period of the charge-discharge management state. For example, when the target device is used as a lighting device, whenever the light-emitting unit is lit, the operation status monitoring and data statistics module generates a reference pulse based on the internal clock oscillator. The microcontroller's internal program performs a timed accumulation of the cumulative working time, and the accumulated data is periodically solidified and written into the accumulated data area in a unidirectional increment. Furthermore, the microcontroller's underlying firmware prohibits any operation that clears or reduces the value of this physical statistic, thereby ensuring that the extracted current dynamic operating context parameters truly reflect the irreversible historical operating consumption of the target device.
[0048] Subsequently, the target device's microcontroller unit retrieves the device's unique, dedicated device key from the security key area. Following a preset byte alignment rule perfectly symmetrical with the verification device, the microcontroller unit converts the random challenge code, the device's unique identifier, and the current dynamic operating context parameters into a binary data string, which is then concatenated end-to-end to form the original data block to be authenticated. Next, the microcontroller unit initiates a preset hash message authentication code algorithm or block symmetric encryption algorithm, using the dedicated device key as the encryption base, and performs a one-way hash confusion iterative calculation on the original data block to be authenticated, generating a fixed-width encrypted string. A preset-length byte segment is then extracted from this encrypted string as the response authentication code. This response authentication code not only deeply binds to the random challenge code specific to this session but also cryptographically signs the device's actual cumulative operating status at the current moment.
[0049] Finally, the target device's microcontroller encapsulates the unique device identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and generated response authentication code into a response data packet according to a preset data communication protocol frame format. A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) sequence corresponding to the response data packet is appended to the end of the packet. After packetization, the microcontroller transmits the response data packet to the near-field communication (NFC) RF response module. The NFC antenna uses impedance load modulation to reflect the response data packet back to the verification device. Specifically, the high-speed field-effect transistor inside the NFC RF response module switches the impedance loop of its own RF tuning antenna at high frequency according to the binary logic level of the response data packet. Through load modulation, it generates controlled amplitude disturbances in the external radiated electromagnetic field, thereby transmitting the response data packet back to the verification device's NFC antenna in the form of a reflected modulated wave, completing the target device's response processing.
[0050] Step S20: Receive the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and parse the response data packet to extract the target device's unique identification code, current dynamic operating context parameters, and response authentication code; The verification device's near-field communication antenna continuously senses the electromagnetic echo signal fed back by the target device within the radio frequency field. The near-field communication control chip captures the minute amplitude modulation fluctuations caused by the target device's antenna load impedance transformation and demodulates this high-frequency alternating analog signal back into a binary serial data stream, reconstructing a complete response data packet. Subsequently, the verification device's central processing unit initiates low-level communication protocol verification on the received response data packet. Assuming the response data packet has not been damaged by industrial electromagnetic interference during wireless transmission, it deconstructs and separates the response data packet according to a preset frame structure, extracting the device's unique identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and the response authentication code encrypted and generated by the target device. Specifically, the current dynamic operating context parameters represent the physical operating statistics monotonically accumulated by the target device's internal program during operation.
[0051] Specifically, when the target device completes the internal authentication code calculation and initiates load modulation based on the aforementioned steps, the radio frequency alternating voltage at both ends of the transmitting antenna of the verification device will experience slight periodic amplitude drops and phase disturbances due to spatial mutual inductance coupling. The radio frequency analog front-end of the near-field communication control chip inside the verification device filters out the high-intensity main carrier energy radiated by itself through a high-pass filter and directional coupling circuit composed of capacitors and inductors, and extracts the weak backscattered modulation signal of the subcarrier fed back by the target device. Subsequently, the low-noise amplifier inside the near-field communication control chip amplifies the weak analog signal and eliminates spatial electromagnetic pulse noise caused by underground motors or transformers through an envelope detector and a hysteresis comparator, shaping the weak analog level step signal into a digital pulse square wave with steep edges, which is finally restored by the baseband decoder to the original binary serial data stream.
[0052] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the steps of parsing the response data packet and extracting the target device's unique identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and response authentication code include: Perform cyclic redundancy check on the integrity of the received response data packet; After the cyclic redundancy check passes, the response data packet is parsed according to the preset data frame protocol format to extract the device identification field, operating parameter field and verification signature field. Decode and map the device identification field into a unique device identifier; The runtime parameter field is decoded into an unsigned integer value according to a preset numerical base and used as the current dynamic runtime context parameter; The signature verification field is extracted into a fixed-length byte sequence and used as the response authentication code.
[0053] Specifically, the near-field communication control chip continuously monitors the binary data stream. Once a preset frame start delimiter is matched, it automatically aligns the byte clock and pushes subsequent arriving bit streams into the internal buffer according to byte boundaries, reconstructing a complete response data packet containing a header, length indicator, valid data payload, and tail checksum. Next, the verification device's central processing unit (CPU) substitutes all received preceding data bytes as the divisor into a preset generator polynomial for modulo-2 division iteration. The final calculated checksum result is then compared bit-by-bit with the checksum sequence appended to the end of the data packet. If the comparison is inconsistent, it indicates that a bit flip error or packet loss occurred during the data packet's propagation in the complex electromagnetic space underground. The CPU immediately blocks subsequent verification logic and discards the corrupted frame. If the comparison is completely consistent, it confirms that the response data packet possesses physical integrity and has not been damaged by channel noise.
[0054] Subsequently, after passing the cyclic redundancy check, the CPU performs pointer offset truncation on the payload area according to the preset application layer interactive data frame specification. The frame protocol strictly defines the start and end offsets and byte lengths of each functional field. The CPU sequentially segments the device identifier field at the beginning of the segment, followed by the operating parameter field, and then the verification signature field at the end, according to a preset template. For the captured device identifier field, the CPU converts it into a hexadecimal string sequence consisting of several bytes, based on the factory-defined one-dimensional byte array mapping rules. This string is logically strictly bound to the physical hardware serial number burned into the target device at the factory, thereby decoding to obtain the unique device identifier that represents the global entity identity of the device.
[0055] Finally, for the segmented operating parameter field, the central processing unit (CPU) reconstructs its data type according to the factory-preset numerical base rules. Specifically, the operating parameter field is divided into two subfields: the first four bytes are defined as the cumulative lighting operating time subfield, and the last two bytes are defined as the cumulative battery charge-discharge cycle count subfield. The CPU reads the first four bytes, performs logical shifting and assembly according to the high-order-first unsigned 32-bit integer data format, converts it into a time value measured in seconds, to truly represent the cumulative physical total number of seconds that the main light source of the mining lamp has been lit since the factory. Then, it reads the last two bytes, decodes them according to the unsigned 16-bit integer data format into a charge-discharge cycle integer value, which is used as the equivalent full-capacity cycle count of the battery. The two quantitative data generated by the above two numerical type strong conversions are combined to form the current dynamic operating context parameters. At the same time, the CPU maps the extracted verification signature field as a fixed-length (e.g., 16 bytes or 32 bytes) fixed-length encrypted ciphertext byte sequence, which serves as the response authentication code generated by the target device using its own private key. At this point, the verification device has extracted all the core parameters required to determine the authenticity of the target device locally on the system.
[0056] Step S30: Request the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code based on the device's unique identification code; In one embodiment of the present invention, the step of requesting the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic runtime context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code includes: Detect and verify the status of the server's wireless communication link; If the wireless communication link is working properly, the latest historical dynamic runtime context parameters are requested from the verification server through the remote interface. If the wireless communication link is interrupted, the local offline database is accessed to retrieve the local historical snapshot parameters that match the device's unique identifier, which are then used as historical dynamic running context parameters. When the wireless communication link is restored, the anti-counterfeiting verification results generated in the offline state and the current dynamic running context parameters are packaged and uploaded to the verification server.
[0057] Specifically, after the central processing unit of the verification equipment reads the unique device identification code obtained from the previous steps, it first controls the wireless communication module integrated within the verification equipment to send a two-way handshake probe message to the preset network service address of the verification server. The wireless communication module performs real-time evaluation of the received signal strength indication, data round-trip time, and packet loss rate to determine whether the verification equipment has established a highly reliable long connection with the ground verification server through an industrial wireless LAN or a mining cellular mobile communication network, or is in an offline isolated state where electromagnetic signals are blocked by the rock strata in the tunnel. If a confirmation handshake signal is successfully received from the verification server within the preset timeout threshold, the wireless network communication link is considered to be in a working state; if no response is received after the set number of retries or the radio frequency signal strength is lower than the minimum operating threshold, the wireless network communication link is considered to be interrupted.
[0058] When the link is determined to be in a smooth state, the central processing unit (CPU) concatenates the device's unique identifier, current timestamp, and terminal hardware number of the verification device according to rules, and calculates a hash message authentication code using a preset session security key, assembling a data query request packet with tamper-proof characteristics. Subsequently, the wireless communication module pushes this request packet to the remote verification server via a secure transport layer protocol socket. Upon receiving the request, the verification server first verifies the validity of its timestamp and digital signature to prevent replay attacks. After confirming its legitimacy, it uses the device's unique identifier as a unique index key to retrieve the database in the server's backend. It then retrieves the historical operating indicators (i.e., historical dynamic operating context parameters) of the target device from its lifecycle archive, specifically the historical cumulative lighting time of the main light source, the historical cumulative total number of battery charge / discharge cycles, and the absolute timestamp of the last successful verification. This data is then encrypted and encapsulated into a response packet and sent back to the verification device. The verification device receives and decrypts this data, extracting it as the baseline input for subsequent judgments.
[0059] When the link is determined to be interrupted, to ensure the continuous and normal inspection of mine safety personnel in underground work areas without network access, the verification equipment does not need to wait for a network connection. Instead, the central processing unit directly redirects the address to a secure offline storage area opened in the internal data storage module. This offline storage area contains an offline database file. This database is a snapshot table of the latest status of mining equipment assets that is fully retrieved and encrypted and stored locally when the safety personnel, before going down the mine, use the handheld verification equipment placed on the ground dispatch room or the base of the mine lamp smart charging rack to synchronize data with the verification server. The central processing unit uses a locally preset data decryption key to unlock the access permissions of this local offline database. It also uses the parsed unique identification code of the equipment as the index condition to perform a local query, reads the historical cumulative lighting time of the main light source and the historical battery charge and discharge cycles recorded in the last synchronization before going down the mine, and directly uses them as the historical dynamic operating context parameters for this on-site judgment, so as to ensure the high availability and uninterrupted operation of the anti-counterfeiting identification logic under spatial network outage conditions.
[0060] Finally, when subsequent safety inspectors carry the verification equipment to complete all underground inspection work and return to the surface, or move to an area with wireless signal coverage, once the verification equipment senses that the wireless network communication link has been restored, it will proactively package the historical snapshot comparison benchmarks executed during the network outage, the current dynamic operating context parameters collected on-site, the generated final anti-counterfeiting judgment results, and the locally stamped event timestamps into a unified package and push them to the verification server in batches, thus completing the traceability, supplementation, and version overwriting of the historical data in the cloud database.
[0061] Therefore, by detecting the status of the communication link and adaptively accessing the offline database snapshot stored locally when the network is interrupted, and asynchronously packaging and uploading the reconciliation after the link is restored, the embodiments of the present invention achieve a smooth switch between online high-reliability verification and offline weak network / no network emergency disaster recovery. This solves the problem of anti-counterfeiting verification paralysis caused by the lack of wireless network coverage in closed and shielded spaces such as underground coal mines and deep tunnels, and ensures the uninterrupted availability and eventual consistency of data for industrial inspection and anti-counterfeiting around the clock and in all regions.
[0062] Step S40: Perform a time-series monotonicity check on the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. In one embodiment of the present invention, the step of performing time-series monotonicity verification between the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and historical dynamic running context parameters includes: Determine whether the value of the current dynamic runtime context parameter is less than the value of the historical dynamic runtime context parameter; If it is less than, the timing monotonicity check is determined to have failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as a data rollback anomaly. If it is not less than, then calculate the difference between the current dynamic runtime context parameter and the historical dynamic runtime context parameter to obtain the dynamic parameter increment; Get the actual physical interval between the last successful verification time and the current verification time; The theoretical maximum increment threshold is calculated based on the preset maximum physical consumption rate of the equipment and the actual physical interval duration. Determine whether the increment of dynamic parameters exceeds the theoretical maximum increment threshold. If the value exceeds the limit, the timing monotonicity check is deemed to have failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as parameter mutation anomaly. If the time series monotonicity check is not exceeded, the time series monotonicity check is considered to have passed.
[0063] Specifically, the central processing unit of the verification equipment performs an unsigned integer subtraction operation between the obtained current dynamic operating context parameters and the historical dynamic operating context parameters obtained from the verification server to check the sign of the difference. In the normal usage cycle of a genuine mining lamp, as the user continuously operates the lighting underground, the cumulative working time of the main light source can only accumulate or remain unchanged when the lamp is off; therefore, the current value must be greater than or equal to the historical value. Correspondingly, the current value of its cumulative charge-discharge cycles must also be greater than or equal to the historical value.
[0064] Conversely, if a counterfeiter illegally clones the near-field communication tag data of the target device at a certain point in history, and the genuine device continues to be used in production and the historical time is constantly updated and accumulated on the verification server, the accumulated duration recorded by the statically cloned tag held by the counterfeiter will remain at the moment of cloning. At this point, once the cloned tag is scanned and verified by security personnel, the central processing unit of the verification device will calculate an abnormal result where the current value is strictly less than the historical value. Based on this, the central processing unit will set the verification status to "failed" and qualitatively mark the abnormal log as a data rollback anomaly, thus solving the problem of static copy attacks with zero computational overhead.
[0065] Therefore, by performing a time-series monotonicity check between the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters pre-stored on the verification server, this embodiment of the invention achieves real-time interception and accurate identification of cloned and counterfeit tags in a static data stagnation state. This ensures that cloned tags are exposed on the spot due to data rollback after the legitimate genuine device is continuously used and the verification server data is refreshed, thus thwarting the cloning and copying attacks of static near-field communication cards.
[0066] Furthermore, under the legitimate premise that the current value is greater than or equal to the historical value, in order to further defend against more covert parameter fabrication attacks (i.e., after learning that the system has monotonicity verification rules, counterfeiters deliberately write an extremely large fake running time into the firmware of the counterfeit device), the central processing unit (CPU) not only calculates the arithmetic difference between the two to obtain the dynamic parameter increment of the device since the last verification, but also actively retrieves a time reference for cross-verification. The CPU extracts the standard timestamp bound when the anti-counterfeiting verification was passed from the historical data structure, and reads the current timestamp when the current verification operation was initiated from the local clock source. The CPU subtracts the historical timestamp from the current timestamp to deduce the actual physical time interval between the two verification actions in the real world.
[0067] Subsequently, the central processing unit (CPU) retrieves the pre-calibrated maximum physical operating consumption rate for this type of lighting equipment. Taking the cumulative lighting time of the main light source as an example, under the constraints of real physical laws, one second of actual elapsed time can only be converted into one second of main light source lighting time. Therefore, the theoretical maximum consumption rate benchmark for the main light source duration is one second per second (considering the frequency drift of the microcontroller crystal oscillator under extreme low or high temperature conditions, a slight physical redundancy coefficient can be set, for example, calibrated to 1.05 seconds per second). The CPU multiplies this maximum physical operating consumption rate with the calculated actual physical time interval, thereby rigorously deriving the maximum cumulative main light source working time limit that can be generated within this real time span, regardless of how continuously the equipment operates under high load, i.e., the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold.
[0068] Next, the central processing unit (CPU) compares the aforementioned dynamic parameter increment with the theoretical maximum increment threshold. If the dynamic parameter increment exceeds the theoretical maximum increment threshold (for example, only two hours have passed between two verifications, but the reported duration of the main light source suddenly increases by fifty hours), it is confirmed that the abnormal increment is completely out of the objective physical reality. The CPU then determines that the data is externally forged input, sets the verification status to failed, and precisely marks the cause as abnormal parameter mutation.
[0069] Finally, only when the dynamic parameter increment neither shows negative regression nor exceeds the maximum theoretical upper limit threshold of objective physical time, does the CPU determine that the dynamic operating data carried by the target device conforms to the irreversible temporal monotonicity law and the laws of reality. At this point, the CPU marks the temporal monotonicity check as passed.
[0070] Therefore, by further calculating the parameter increment in the time monotonicity verification and combining the actual physical interval between the two verifications with the maximum consumption rate of the equipment's physical operation to dynamically derive the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold, the present invention achieves multi-dimensional anti-tampering based on objective physical laws, eliminates the possibility of attackers attempting to bypass the basic monotonicity detection by artificially fabricating excessively high data, and ensures that the judgment benchmark matches the data of the actual physical world's operating state.
[0071] Step S50: If the timing monotonicity verification passes, obtain the preset key that matches the device's unique identification code, and use the preset key, random challenge code, and current dynamic running context parameters to calculate and generate a verification authentication code. In one embodiment of the present invention, reference is made to Figure 2 As shown, the steps described above for obtaining the preset key that matches the device's unique identification code, and then using the preset key, the random challenge code, and the current dynamic running context parameters to calculate and generate the verification authentication code include: Step S51: Query the unique device-specific key of the target device from the verification server or derive it locally based on the device's unique identification code, and use it as the preset key; Step S52: According to the preset byte alignment rules, the binary sequence of the random challenge code, the device unique identification code, and the current dynamic running context parameters are sequentially concatenated to generate a data string to be signed; Step S53: Input the data string to be signed and the preset key into the preset hash message authentication code algorithm or block encryption algorithm for calculation; Step S54: Extract a specified byte segment from the calculated ciphertext sequence as the generated verification and authentication code.
[0072] Specifically, to prevent the collapse of the entire anti-counterfeiting system due to the leakage of a key from a single device, this invention employs an asymmetric distributed or symmetric algorithm-based one-device-one-key key management architecture at the underlying technology level. That is, each mining lamp is assigned a globally unique device-specific key during factory programming. Once the verification device confirms that the target device's dynamic timing is normal, the verification device needs to obtain this preset key, which proceeds through two specific paths depending on the current communication mode: In scenarios with a smooth online network, the central processing unit encapsulates the parsed device unique identification code into an encrypted secure session packet and sends a query to the verification server. The verification server accesses the root key store with the appropriate permissions, calculates the exclusive key corresponding to the device's unique identification code using a preset key derivation function, and sends it back to the verification device's temporary secure working memory through a two-way encrypted secure channel. In scenarios where there is no network or offline inspection in underground mines, the handheld verification device is equipped with a dedicated hardware security chip (i.e., a secure access module) that has passed industrial and mining explosion-proof certification. The authorized master root key is pre-embedded in the hardware security chip at the factory. The central processing unit inputs the device's unique identification code into the hardware security chip, and the dedicated coprocessor inside the chip runs a one-way key distribution algorithm in a completely hardware-isolated environment. The chip directly derives the exclusive device key of the target device and outputs it to memory, avoiding the key from being exposed to external communication lines. Thus, while taking into account the convenience of offline inspection, it eliminates the possibility of the underlying key being illegally extracted in complex industrial and mining sites.
[0073] Next, to ensure absolute consistency between the result derived by the verification device and the ciphertext generated internally by the target device, the central processing unit (CPU) strictly adheres to the data alignment standards agreed upon in the factory protocol when organizing the computational input. The CPU first places the fixed-length binary random challenge code generated in the preceding steps at the beginning of the data buffer; immediately following, it appends the unique device identifier representing the physical identity of the mining lamp in byte order; then, it extracts the current dynamic runtime context parameters parsed from the preceding steps and which have passed the monotonicity check, appending them to the end in high-order byte order. This assembles a continuous binary string to be signed.
[0074] Subsequently, the central processing unit (CPU) uses the pre-set key obtained above as the encryption operation key and the assembled data string to be signed as the input plaintext, and sends them together to the preset hash message authentication code algorithm module (such as a double hash authentication algorithm based on a secure hash algorithm architecture, or a ciphertext message authentication code algorithm based on an advanced symmetric block cipher) to perform encryption calculations. Because the hash message authentication code algorithm itself has extremely strict avalanche effect and unidirectional irreversibility, the operation process has extremely high diffusion sensitivity to every bit change in the data string to be signed. If the target device is a counterfeit mining lamp, even if it can read and copy the genuine device's unique identification code and random challenge code exactly, or even fabricate a time parameter that conforms to monotonicity, the counterfeit device's main control chip cannot know the exclusive pre-set key derived from the official master key. Mathematically, the counterfeit device cannot calculate the authentication ciphertext that matches the verification device. Through multiple rounds of iterative permutation and compression calculations of the cryptographic algorithm, a fixed-length (e.g., 256-bit wide) initial encrypted digest sequence is finally output.
[0075] Finally, the central processing unit (CPU) extracts a pre-defined byte segment (e.g., the first sixteen or thirty-two bytes) from the generated initial encrypted digest sequence according to the ciphertext extraction template specified in the factory protocol. This binary segment is then converted into a standard fixed-length hexadecimal character sequence, which serves as the locally derived verification code. At this point, the verification code logically possesses three security attributes: first, a dynamic random number factor resistant to replay; second, a one-way operating parameter factor verified by physical timing; and third, an anti-counterfeiting key factor binding to the device's hardware identity.
[0076] Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention query the verification server based on the device's unique identification code or derive the device's unique exclusive key locally, and input the random challenge code, device identifier and dynamic parameters into the hash message authentication code algorithm or block encryption algorithm for calculation according to the deterministic byte alignment rule. This not only eliminates the risk of global collapse caused by the leakage of a single master key in the entire system, but also ensures that the legitimate response authentication code has the mathematical hard constraint of being unforgeable and underivable.
[0077] Step S60: Based on the results of the timing monotonicity check and the consistency comparison results of the verification authentication code and the response authentication code, generate the anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device. In one embodiment of the present invention, it should be noted that the result of the timing monotonicity check is a prerequisite for whether step S50 above is executed. The central processing unit first determines whether to execute the specific steps of step S50 above based on the result of the timing monotonicity check. For example, when the result of the timing monotonicity check is a failure, an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result is directly generated, and the target device is determined to be a counterfeit cloned product. When the result of the timing monotonicity check is a pass, the specific steps in step S50 above are executed, and the received response authentication code is matched bit by bit with the locally calculated verification authentication code to determine whether the response authentication code and the verification authentication code are completely consistent. If they are completely consistent, an anti-counterfeiting verification pass result is generated, and the target device is determined to be genuine. Otherwise, an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result is generated, and the target device is determined to be a counterfeit cloned product.
[0078] In one embodiment of the present invention, the step of generating an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device based on the result of the time-series monotonicity check and the consistency comparison result of the verification authentication code and the response authentication code includes: Compare the character sequences of the response authentication code and the verification authentication code digit by digit; If the timing monotonicity check passes and the response authentication code is completely consistent with the verification authentication code, then the anti-counterfeiting verification result is generated, and the target device is determined to be genuine. If the timing monotonicity check fails, or the response authentication code does not match the verification authentication code, an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result will be generated, and the target device will be determined to be a counterfeit cloned product. When the anti-counterfeiting verification fails, the device's unique identification code is extracted and bound to the current geographical location coordinates and the anomaly type. A security alarm event is then generated and uploaded to the verification server to lock the device.
[0079] Specifically, the response authentication code and the verification authentication code are arranged in byte or character width alignment, and a full traversal scan is performed from the start bit to the end bit. Each character is XORed with the target character at the corresponding position, and the XOR differences of all bits are continuously accumulated until the last bit is compared. When the continuously accumulated value is always equal to zero, the central processing unit confirms that the two character sequences are completely consistent.
[0080] Furthermore, if any of the above-mentioned timing monotonicity check results or the consistency comparison results between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code fail, the central processing unit immediately generates an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result, determining that the target device is a counterfeit or compromised cloned product. During this period, the central processing unit refines and classifies the counterfeiting pattern based on the source of the failure: If the authentication codes do not match, it indicates that the device's main control chip lacks a protected, legitimate, proprietary key, and is therefore identified as hardware forgery and an unauthorized counterfeit. If the timing monotonicity check indicates a data rollback anomaly, it means that although the device may have copied the past dynamic data of a genuine product, the current recorded time is earlier than the historical progress already existing in the cloud, and it is determined to be a clone card attack that statically mirrors and copies the historical genuine product label. If the time series monotonicity check indicates abnormal parameter mutation, it means that the attacker is trying to illegally inject excessive data through software means to evade the time series monotonicity check, and it is determined to be a parameter fabrication attack.
[0081] Finally, when generating a failed anti-counterfeiting verification result, the central processing unit (CPU) first reads the instantaneous latitude, longitude, elevation, and three-dimensional spatial geographic coordinates of the tunnel work position output by the built-in spatial location sensing module (calling the Beidou satellite navigation and positioning unit in the ground environment, and the microcellular radio frequency or ultra-wideband tunnel positioning sensor in the underground mine environment). Then, the CPU packages the unique identification code of the counterfeit miner's lamp, the aforementioned spatial geographic coordinates, the current system timestamp, and the specific abnormal failure type identified above, generating a security alarm event data packet with a digital signature. The verification device then immediately pushes this security alarm event data packet to the verification server via the wireless network channel. Upon parsing the alarm event, the verification server immediately sets the status of the device's unique identification code to an illegal clone lock mark in the global database. It not only issues an audible and visual alarm to the security dispatch department at the security inspection dispatch center and marks the specific physical coordinates of the counterfeit equipment, but also broadcasts the unique identification code synchronously to all handheld inspection devices and smart charging cabinets throughout the mine area. Once the counterfeit device with the locked identifier contacts any verification terminal again, each terminal will directly refuse communication and lock the response, thus achieving spatial locking of the counterfeit device and physical blocking within the entire industrial network.
[0082] Step S70: When the anti-counterfeiting verification result is that the verification is successful, the current dynamic running context parameters are uploaded to the verification server to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server. In one embodiment of the present invention, after the anti-counterfeiting verification result is successful, the verification device packages the current dynamic operating context parameters collected and verified on-site, along with the target device's unique identification code, the timestamp of the current operation, and the verification device's own terminal identifier, and digitally signs them using the terminal's private key to construct an update transaction data packet. Subsequently, the verification device selects a route based on the current network connectivity status. If the network is online, it immediately reports to the verification server via a secure wireless communication channel; if the device is in an underground network outage environment, the update transaction data packet is written to an independent data storage module within the verification device, and automatically pushed asynchronously in batches after the device is brought to the surface or the network is restored. Finally, after verifying the identity of the update transaction data packet, the verification server overwrites and updates the previously recorded historical dynamic operating context parameters of the device in the database with the latest parameters, and simultaneously writes an irreversible anti-counterfeiting audit log, thereby establishing an updated timeline benchmark for anti-counterfeiting identification in the next lifecycle cycle of the device.
[0083] In summary, the anti-counterfeiting verification method in the above embodiments of the present invention, by introducing a random challenge code into the verification request, avoids the illegal interception and reuse of the verification request and data during transmission; by using the physical operation statistics recorded monotonically by the internal program of the target device in its running state as the current dynamic operation context parameter, and extracting it together with the device's unique identification code and response authentication code, it achieves a deep physical binding of anti-counterfeiting credentials with the actual physical operation state of the target device, breaking the traditional anti-counterfeiting mechanism's simple reliance on static identifiers or static encrypted text within the chip, and endowing the anti-counterfeiting data with irreversible unidirectional evolution physical characteristics; by retrieving pre-stored historical dynamic operation context parameters from the verification server based on the device's unique identification code, and performing a time-series monotonicity check between the current dynamic operation context parameter and the historical dynamic operation context parameter, it achieves real-time identification and interception of cloned tags based on time-series evolution laws; and by obtaining the verification code when the time-series monotonicity check passes, it achieves the real-time identification and interception of cloned tags based on time-series evolution laws. The system uses a pre-set key, a random challenge code, and current dynamic operating context parameters to calculate and generate a verification authentication code. This ensures that only genuine devices with a built-in legitimate private key can generate a compliant authentication response, eliminating the possibility of attackers forging false data or impersonating devices without a key. By combining the temporal monotonicity verification result with the consistency comparison result between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code, the system generates the final anti-counterfeiting verification result. This achieves joint judgment based on objective physical temporal patterns and cryptographic security algorithms, improving the accuracy and attack resistance of anti-counterfeiting identification. After successful verification, the system uploads the current dynamic operating context parameters to the verification server to update the historical records, enabling irreversible dynamic forward evolution of the server's baseline data and building a dynamically increasing defense system throughout the target device's lifecycle. This solves the problems of existing devices relying on static data in NFC anti-counterfeiting, which are easily cloned and counterfeited, while relying on dedicated hardware leads to excessive costs and is difficult to promote.
[0084] Example 2
[0085] Please see Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an anti-counterfeiting verification system provided in the second embodiment of the present invention. For ease of explanation, only the parts related to the embodiment of the present invention are shown. The anti-counterfeiting verification system in this embodiment of the present invention is applied to a verification device, and the system includes: The request sending module 11 is used to send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; Data parsing module 12 is used to receive the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and to parse the response data packet to extract the device unique identifier, current dynamic running context parameters and response authentication code of the target device. The current dynamic running context parameters represent the physical running statistics recorded by the target device in its running state by its internal program in a monotonically increasing manner. Parameter acquisition module 13 is used to request the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code based on the device's unique identification code; The timing verification module 14 is used to perform timing monotonicity verification between the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters, so as to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. The authentication calculation module 15 is used to obtain a preset key that matches the unique identification code of the device when the timing verification module determines that the verification is successful, and to calculate and generate a verification authentication code by using the preset key, the random challenge code and the current dynamic running context parameters. The result evaluation module 16 is used to generate an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device based on the result of the time series monotonicity verification and the consistency comparison result between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code. The data update module 17 is used to upload the current dynamic running context parameters to the verification server when the anti-counterfeiting verification result is verified as passed, so as to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server.
[0086] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the request sending module 11 includes: The data acquisition unit is used to acquire the current system timestamp and the local hardware random entropy source of the current verification operation; The sequence operation unit is used to perform pseudo-random sequence mixing operation on the current system timestamp and the local hardware random entropy source to generate an initial random value; A record retrieval unit is used to retrieve historical transmission records of the initial random value within a preset time window; The challenge code determination unit is used to determine the initial random value as the random challenge code if the initial random value does not appear in the historical transmission record, and record it in the historical transmission record; The cyclic recalculation unit is used to re-trigger the sequence operation unit to perform mixed operations until a unique random challenge code is generated if the initial random value has already appeared in the historical transmission record.
[0087] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the data parsing module 12 includes: The redundancy check unit is used to perform cyclic redundancy check on the integrity of the received response data packet; The protocol parsing unit is used to parse the response data packet according to the preset data frame protocol format after the cyclic redundancy check passes, and extract the device identification field, the operating parameter field and the verification signature field. An identifier decoding unit is used to decode and map the device identifier field into a unique device identification code; The parameter parsing unit is used to decode the running parameter field into an unsigned integer value according to a preset numerical base, and use it as the current dynamic running context parameter. The signature extraction unit is used to extract the verification signature field into a fixed-length byte sequence as the response authentication code.
[0088] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the timing verification module 14 includes: A parameter determination unit is used to determine whether the value of the current dynamic running context parameter is less than the value of the historical dynamic running context parameter; The rollback determination unit is used to determine that the timing monotonicity check has failed if the parameter determination unit determines that the parameter is less than the specified value, and to mark the reason for the check failure as a data rollback anomaly. An incremental calculation unit is used to calculate the difference between the current dynamic running context parameter and the historical dynamic running context parameter if the parameter judgment unit determines that the parameter is not less than the parameter value, thereby obtaining the dynamic parameter increment. The latency acquisition unit is used to acquire the actual physical interval duration from the last successful verification time to the current verification time. The upper limit calculation unit is used to calculate the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold based on the preset maximum physical operating consumption rate of the device and the actual physical interval duration. An upper limit determination unit is used to determine whether the dynamic parameter increment exceeds the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold. The mutation determination unit is used to determine that the timing monotonicity check has failed if the upper limit determination unit determines that the time limit exceeds the time limit, and to mark the reason for the check failure as parameter mutation abnormality. The verification unit is used to determine that the timing monotonicity verification is passed if the upper limit judgment unit determines that it has not exceeded the limit.
[0089] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the authentication calculation module 15 includes: The key acquisition unit is used to query the verification server or derive the unique device-specific key of the target device based on the device's unique identification code, and use it as the preset key. The data splicing unit is used to sequentially splice the binary sequence of the random challenge code, the device unique identification code, and the current dynamic running context parameters according to a preset byte alignment rule to generate a data string to be signed. The cryptographic operation unit is used to input the data string to be signed and the preset key into a preset hash message authentication code algorithm or block encryption algorithm for operation; The ciphertext extraction unit is used to extract a specified byte segment from the calculated ciphertext sequence as the generated verification and authentication code.
[0090] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the result evaluation module 16 includes: A character comparison unit is used to compare the character sequences of the response authentication code and the verification authentication code bit by bit; The genuine product determination unit is used to generate an anti-counterfeiting verification result and determine that the target device is genuine if the timing monotonicity verification passes and the response authentication code is completely consistent with the verification authentication code. The counterfeit detection unit is used to generate an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result and determine that the target device is a counterfeit clone product if the timing monotonicity verification fails or the response authentication code is inconsistent with the verification authentication code. The alarm locking unit is used to extract the unique identification code of the device and bind the current geographical location coordinates and the anomaly type when the anti-counterfeiting verification fails, and to generate a security alarm event and upload it to the verification server to lock the device.
[0091] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the parameter acquisition module 13 includes: A link detection unit is used to detect the wireless communication link status with the verification server; The remote acquisition unit is used to request the latest historical dynamic running context parameters from the verification server through a remote interface if the wireless communication link is working properly. An offline retrieval unit is used to access a locally stored offline database if the wireless communication link is interrupted, and retrieve local historical snapshot parameters that match the device's unique identifier as the historical dynamic running context parameters. The offline synchronization unit is used to package and upload the anti-counterfeiting verification results generated in the offline state and the current dynamic running context parameters to the verification server when the wireless communication link is restored.
[0092] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the request sending module 11 includes: The carrier sensing unit is used to transmit radio frequency carrier signals through the NFC antenna and to listen for the presence of radio frequency response carriers of the target device to be verified in the radio frequency field. The anti-collision arbitration unit is used to initiate an anti-collision arbitration algorithm based on a binary search tree if multiple radio frequency response signals are detected simultaneously in the radio frequency field, and to filter and lock the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of a single target device step by step. The link establishment unit is used to establish an exclusive radio frequency communication link with a target device having the locked instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier based on the locked instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier; The directional transmission unit is used to package the generated random challenge code into a verification request instruction frame according to a preset frame protocol, and then send it to the locked target device via a dedicated radio frequency communication link.
[0093] The anti-counterfeiting verification system provided in this embodiment of the invention has the same implementation principle and technical effect as the aforementioned method embodiment. For the sake of brevity, any parts not mentioned in the device embodiment can be referred to the corresponding content in the aforementioned method embodiment.
[0094] Example 3
[0095] In another aspect, the present invention also proposes a verification device, please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 4 The verification device shown in the third embodiment of the present invention includes a memory 20, a processor 10, and a program 30 stored in the memory 20 and executable on the processor 10. When the processor 10 executes the program 30, it implements the anti-counterfeiting verification method as described in the foregoing embodiments.
[0096] In some embodiments, the processor 10 may be a central processing unit (CPU), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor or other data processing chip, used to run program code stored in memory 20 or process data, such as executing access restriction programs.
[0097] The memory 20 includes at least one type of readable storage medium, such as flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory (e.g., SD or DX memory), magnetic memory, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc. In some embodiments, the memory 20 may be an internal storage unit of the verification device, such as the hard disk of the verification device. In other embodiments, the memory 20 may be an external storage device of the verification device, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, etc., equipped on the verification device. Furthermore, the memory 20 may include both internal and external storage units of the verification device. The memory 20 can be used not only to store application software and various types of data installed on the verification device, but also to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.
[0098] It should be pointed out that, Figure 4 The structure shown does not constitute a limitation on the verification device. In other embodiments, the verification device may include fewer or more components than shown, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.
[0099] This invention also proposes a computer-readable medium storing a program that, when executed by a processor, implements the anti-counterfeiting verification method as described in the foregoing method embodiments.
[0100] Those skilled in the art will understand that the logic and / or steps represented in the flowcharts or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as a ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device (such as a computer-based system, a processor-included system, or other system that can fetch and execute instructions from, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device). For the purposes of this specification, "medium" can mean any means that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transmit programs for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
[0101] More specific examples of media (a non-exhaustive list) include: electrical connections (electronic devices) with one or more wires, portable computer disk drives (magnetic devices), random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable and editable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), fiber optic devices, and portable optical disc read-only memory (CDROM). Additionally, computer-readable media can even be paper or other suitable media on which the program can be printed, since the program can be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, interpreting, or otherwise processing as necessary, and then stored in computer memory.
[0102] It should be understood that various parts of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented in software or firmware stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented using any one or a combination of the following techniques known in the art: discrete logic circuits having logic gates for implementing logical functions on data signals, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) having suitable combinational logic gates, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.
[0103] In the description of this specification, references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.
[0104] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementations of the present invention, and while the descriptions are specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these modifications and improvements all fall within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A method for verifying anti-counterfeiting, characterized in that, Applied to a verification device, the method includes: Send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; The system receives the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and parses the response data packet to extract the unique device identifier, current dynamic running context parameters, and response authentication code of the target device. The current dynamic running context parameters represent the physical running statistics recorded by the target device in its running state by its internal program in a monotonically increasing manner. The system requests the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the unique device identification code based on the device's unique identification code. The extracted current dynamic running context parameters are compared with the historical dynamic running context parameters to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. If the timing monotonicity verification passes, a preset key corresponding to the unique identification code of the device is obtained, and the preset key, the random challenge code, and the current dynamic running context parameters are used to calculate and generate a verification authentication code. Based on the results of the time-series monotonicity verification and the consistency comparison results between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code, an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device is generated. When the anti-counterfeiting verification result is successful, the current dynamic running context parameters are uploaded to the verification server to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server.
2. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface also includes: Obtain the current system timestamp and local hardware random entropy source for the current verification operation; The current system timestamp is mixed with the local hardware random entropy source using a pseudo-random sequence to generate an initial random value. Retrieve historical transmission records of the initial random value within a preset time window; If the initial random value does not appear in the historical transmission record, then the initial random value is determined to be the random challenge code and recorded in the historical transmission record; If the initial random value has already appeared in the historical transmission record, the mixing operation is re-executed until a unique random challenge code is generated.
3. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of parsing the response data packet to extract the target device's unique identifier, current dynamic operating context parameters, and response authentication code includes: Perform cyclic redundancy check on the integrity of the received response data packet; After the cyclic redundancy check passes, the response data packet is parsed according to the preset data frame protocol format to extract the device identification field, the operating parameter field and the verification signature field. Decode and map the device identifier field into the device's unique identification code; The running parameter field is decoded into an unsigned integer value according to a preset numerical base, and used as the current dynamic running context parameter; The verification signature field is extracted into a fixed-length byte sequence and used as the response authentication code.
4. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of performing a time-series monotonicity check on the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters includes: Determine whether the value of the current dynamic running context parameter is less than the value of the historical dynamic running context parameter; If it is less than, the timing monotonicity check is determined to have failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as a data rollback anomaly. If it is not less than, then calculate the difference between the current dynamic running context parameter and the historical dynamic running context parameter to obtain the dynamic parameter increment; Get the actual physical interval between the last successful verification time and the current verification time; Calculate the theoretical maximum increment threshold based on the preset maximum physical operating consumption rate of the equipment and the actual physical interval duration; Determine whether the increment of the dynamic parameter exceeds the theoretical maximum increment upper limit threshold; If the time series monotonicity check is exceeded, it is determined that the time series monotonicity check has failed, and the reason for the check failure is marked as parameter mutation anomaly. If the time series monotonicity check is not exceeded, then the time series monotonicity check is considered to have passed.
5. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of obtaining a preset key that matches the unique identification code of the device, and using the preset key, the random challenge code, and the current dynamic running context parameters to calculate and generate a verification authentication code includes: Based on the device's unique identification code, the unique device-specific key of the target device is queried from the verification server or derived locally, and used as the preset key; According to the preset byte alignment rules, the binary sequence of the random challenge code, the device unique identification code, and the current dynamic running context parameters are sequentially concatenated to generate a data string to be signed; The data string to be signed and the preset key are input into a preset hash message authentication code algorithm or block encryption algorithm for processing; Extract a specified byte segment from the calculated ciphertext sequence as the generated verification and authentication code.
6. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating an anti-counterfeiting verification result for the target device based on the result of the time-series monotonicity check and the consistency comparison result between the verification authentication code and the response authentication code includes: Compare the character sequences of the response authentication code and the verification authentication code bit by bit; If the timing monotonicity check passes and the response authentication code is completely consistent with the verification authentication code, then an anti-counterfeiting verification result is generated, and the target device is determined to be genuine. If the timing monotonicity check fails, or the response authentication code is inconsistent with the verification authentication code, an anti-counterfeiting verification failure result is generated, and the target device is determined to be a counterfeit cloned product. When the anti-counterfeiting verification fails, the device's unique identification code is extracted and bound to the current geographical location coordinates and the anomaly type. A security alarm event is then generated and uploaded to the verification server to lock the device.
7. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of requesting the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic runtime context parameters corresponding to the unique device identification code includes: Detect the wireless communication link status with the verification server; If the wireless communication link is working properly, the latest historical dynamic runtime context parameters are requested from the verification server through the remote interface. If the wireless communication link is interrupted, the local offline database is accessed to retrieve the local historical snapshot parameters that match the device's unique identifier, which are then used as the historical dynamic running context parameters. When the wireless communication link is restored, the anti-counterfeiting verification results generated in the offline state and the current dynamic running context parameters are packaged and uploaded to the verification server.
8. The anti-counterfeiting verification method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface includes: The NFC antenna transmits radio frequency carrier signals and listens for the presence of radio frequency response carriers of the target device to be verified within the radio frequency field. If multiple radio frequency response signals are detected simultaneously in the radio frequency field, an anti-collision arbitration algorithm based on binary search tree is activated to filter and lock the instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier of a single target device level by level. Establish an exclusive radio frequency communication link with a target device that has the locked instantaneous physical radio frequency identifier; The generated random challenge code is packaged into a verification request command frame according to a preset frame protocol and then sent to the locked target device via a dedicated radio frequency communication link.
9. An anti-counterfeiting verification system, characterized in that, The system, applied to verification equipment, includes: The request sending module is used to send a verification request containing a random challenge code to the target device to be verified via the NFC interface; The data parsing module is used to receive the response data packet returned by the target device in response to the verification request through the NFC interface, and to parse the response data packet to extract the device unique identifier, current dynamic running context parameters and response authentication code of the target device. The current dynamic running context parameters represent the physical running statistics recorded by the target device in its running state by its internal program in a monotonically increasing manner. The parameter acquisition module is used to request the verification server to obtain the pre-stored historical dynamic running context parameters corresponding to the device's unique identification code based on the device's unique identification code. The timing verification module is used to perform timing monotonicity verification between the extracted current dynamic running context parameters and the historical dynamic running context parameters to determine whether the current dynamic running context parameters are greater than or equal to the historical dynamic running context parameters. The authentication calculation module is used to obtain a preset key that matches the unique identification code of the device when the timing verification module determines that the verification is successful, and to calculate and generate a verification authentication code by using the preset key, the random challenge code and the current dynamic running context parameters. The result evaluation module is used to generate anti-counterfeiting verification results for the target device based on the results of the time series monotonicity verification and the consistency comparison results of the verification authentication code and the response authentication code. The data update module is used to upload the current dynamic running context parameters to the verification server when the anti-counterfeiting verification result is successful, so as to update the historical dynamic running context parameters stored in the verification server.
10. A verification device, characterized in that, It includes a memory, a processor, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the program, implements the anti-counterfeiting verification method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.
