Key device, authentication device, authentication system, vehicle release procedure and computer-readable storage medium

The key device transmits two signals using a spreading technique to enhance security in barless key systems, ensuring only authorized keys can unlock vehicles, thereby addressing hacking vulnerabilities and complexity issues.

DE102017206008B4Active Publication Date: 2024-11-07BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG
View PDF 3 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
DE102017206008
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2017-04-07
Publication Date
2024-11-07
Estimated Expiration
2037-04-07

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current barless key systems in vehicles are vulnerable to hacking and require complex, expensive solutions like transit time measurements to ensure the key is within the vehicle, which are difficult to implement effectively.

Method used

A key device that transmits two signals - a key data signal and a confirmation data signal generated using a spreading technique, with the confirmation data signal being encoded to require knowledge of the spreading technique for reconstruction, enhancing security by making it undetectable in noise and enabling distance measurement.

Benefits of technology

The two-tier security system significantly increases theft protection by ensuring only authorized keys can unlock the vehicle, while maintaining low transmission power and complexity, thus thwarting unauthorized access.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
    Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Keying device (20), in particular for a vehicle (10), comprising: a key transmitting device (23) which is designed to: - to send a key data signal (31), in particular to the vehicle (10), wherein the key data signal (31) encodes a key data sequence (30); and - to send a confirmation data signal (41), in particular to the vehicle (10), wherein the confirmation data signal (41) encodes a confirmation data set (40), wherein a key computing device (21) configured to generate the confirmation data signal (41) using a spreading technique, characterized in that a spreading code (44) is selected such that the power density (47) of the confirmation data signal (41) at a measurement distance from the key transmitting device (23) is lower than the noise power density (61).
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[0001] The invention relates to a key device, an authentication device, an authentication system, a method for releasing a vehicle and a computer-readable storage medium.

[0002] Modern vehicles, such as cars and trucks, feature keyless key systems. These keyless keys allow access to the vehicle without the driver having to insert the key into a lock. Furthermore, it is possible to start the vehicle, for example, at the push of a button, if the keyless key is located inside the driver's passenger compartment.

[0003] Current beardless key systems can be exposed to attacks by hackers.

[0004] A well-known approach to increasing the security of keyless key systems is the use of acceleration sensors in the key. The key then only sends signals when the key is moving. Another option is to use time-of-flight measurements to ensure that a key signal is only accepted by the vehicle if the response to a request falls within its very narrow time window. By measuring the time-of-flight of the signals, the distance from the key to the receivers in the vehicle can be determined. This ensures that the key is in or near the vehicle.

[0005] Improving security using time-of-flight measurements is extremely complex. It is typically necessary for the key to be inside the passenger compartment to unlock the vehicle. The distance between the key and a receiving device located inside the vehicle is therefore very small. Since signals propagate at the speed of light, measuring the time-of-flight is very complex.

[0006] For example, multiple receivers must be installed on the vehicle. This makes the system very complex and expensive.

[0007] WO 2016 / 059451 A1 discloses a passive access system for a vehicle in which a break-in attempt can be detected and prevented by redundantly measuring a distance between the vehicle and the key and comparing the measurements.

[0008] From DE 10 2007 028 732 A1 a method is known for keeping the necessary spreading codes smaller when using passive access systems of a vehicle by spreading user data multiple times in order to enable applications over longer distances.

[0009] DE 10 2015 017 146 A1 describes a method for determining the distance between a vehicle and a key.

[0010] Based on this prior art, the object of the present invention is to provide a key device, an authentication device, an authentication system, a method for unlocking a vehicle, and a computer-readable storage medium that eliminate the aforementioned disadvantages. In particular, a key device is to be provided that increases the theft security of a vehicle. Furthermore, a corresponding authentication device, an authentication system, a method for unlocking a vehicle, and a computer-readable storage medium are to be provided.

[0011] This object is achieved by the key device according to claim 1, the authentication device according to claim 8, the authentication system according to claim 11, the method for releasing a vehicle according to claim 13 and by the computer-readable storage medium according to claim 19.

[0012] In particular, the object is achieved by a key device, in particular for a vehicle, comprising: a key transmitting device designed to: - to send a key data signal, in particular to the vehicle, wherein the key data signal encodes a key data sequence and - to send a confirmation data signal, in particular to the vehicle, wherein the confirmation data signal encodes a confirmation data set, wherein a key computing device is provided which is designed to generate the confirmation data signal using a spreading technique.

[0013] A core feature of the invention is therefore that the key transmitting device transmits two signals to the vehicle. This provides a two-stage security system: first, via the confirmation data set and the associated confirmation data signal, and second, via the key data sequence and the associated key data signal. The key data signal encodes a key data sequence, and the confirmation data signal encodes a confirmation data set.

[0014] The confirmation data signal can, for example, be sent in response to a request signal from the vehicle. It thus serves to confirm that the key device is in the vicinity of the vehicle. Since the confirmation data signal is generated using a spreading technique, it can only be reconstructed with knowledge of the spreading technique used. Security is thus increased by the fact that the confirmation data signal cannot be reconstructed without knowledge of the spreading technique used.

[0015] In one embodiment, the key transmitting device can be designed to generate the confirmation data signal by bit-wise encoding, in particular by means of an XOR operation, the confirmation data set with a spreading code.

[0016] Bitwise coding provides a particularly efficient method for generating the confirmation data signal. When using a spreading code, this acts as a second code, since the signal cannot be reconstructed without it.

[0017] In one embodiment, a key synchronization device may be provided, wherein the key computing device may be configured to generate the confirmation data signal using the key synchronization device.

[0018] It is therefore possible for the confirmation data signal to be generated using a key synchronization device. For example, the confirmation data signal can be generated synchronously with a reference signal. Furthermore, knowledge of the synchronization behavior is important for the effective application of the spreading technique. The described embodiment thus increases the quality of the confirmation data signal.

[0019] In one embodiment, the key transmitting device can be designed to transmit synchronization data, in particular to a / the vehicle, wherein the synchronization data can be used to determine a distance between the key device and a / the vehicle.

[0020] The key device of the above-described embodiment further increases security by allowing measurement of the distance between the key device and the vehicle. Thus, a third level of security is provided. Distance measurement is advantageous for ensuring that the key device is inside the vehicle.

[0021] A spreading code is selected such that the power density of the confirmation data signal at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device, in particular within a measuring distance of less than 300 cm, preferably less than 100 cm, is lower than the, in particular thermal, noise power density.

[0022] By using a spreading code selected such that the power density of the confirmation data signal is lower than the noise power density, it becomes impossible for a third party to reconstruct the confirmation data signal without knowledge of the exact spreading code. The confirmation data signal is essentially lost in the noise. This results in a significant increase in security.

[0023] In one embodiment, the confirmation data record has a length of less than 128 bits, in particular less than or equal to 64 bits, preferably exactly one bit.

[0024] The confirmation data set can therefore be very short, allowing very low transmission power to be used.

[0025] In one embodiment, the confirmation data signal can be assigned a baud rate and a chip rate, wherein the ratio of chip rate and baud rate indicates a spreading factor which is in particular greater than 10 3 , preferably greater than 10 3 , is.

[0026] The baud rate specifies the number of symbols transmitted per unit of time. The chip rate specifies the number of chips transmitted per unit of time. A chip specifies a single elementary modulation state. For a spreading factor greater than 1, the chip rate is therefore higher than the baud rate. This means that a large number of chips are transmitted per symbol.

[0027] The object is further achieved in particular by an authentication device, in particular for a vehicle, in particular for a key device as described above, comprising: - a receiving device for receiving: ◯ a key data signal, wherein the key data signal encodes a key data sequence; and ◯ an acknowledgement data signal, wherein the acknowledgement data signal encodes an acknowledgement data set; - a blocking device configured to generate an enable signal when the confirmation data set and the key data sequence are validated by the blocking device, wherein a decoding device is provided configured to reconstruct the confirmation data set from the confirmation data signal using a spreading technique, wherein a spreading code is selected such that the power density of the confirmation data signal at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device is lower than the noise power density.

[0028] The authentication device processes the confirmation data set and the key data sequence to generate an enable signal. Using two separate signals to generate the enable signal increases the security of the authentication device. Security is particularly enhanced by using a spreading technique to reconstruct the confirmation data set, as described above.

[0029] In one embodiment, the decoding device may be configured to recover the confirmation data set by bit-by-bit decoding, in particular by means of an XOR operation, of the confirmation data signal with a spreading code.

[0030] Using bitwise decoding is a particularly efficient form of signal processing. Furthermore, the security of the authentication device is increased, since knowledge of the spreading code is necessary to reconstruct the confirmation data set.

[0031] In one embodiment, the decoding device may be configured to reconstruct the confirmation data set using synchronization data associated with the confirmation data signal.

[0032] To recover the acknowledgment data, synchronization data can be used, which, for example, specifies how the received acknowledgment data signal must be correlated with a spreading code. This further increases security, since the synchronization data must also be received to successfully recover the acknowledgment data.

[0033] The object is further achieved by an authentication system, in particular for a vehicle, comprising: - a key device as described above, - an authentication device as described above, wherein the key device and the authentication device are designed to use a common spreading code.

[0034] In one embodiment, the authentication system may comprise a decoding device that may be configured to synchronize the authentication device with the key device with respect to the spreading code.

[0035] This results in similar or identical advantages as those already described in connection with the key device and the authentication device.

[0036] The object is further achieved by a method for releasing a vehicle, which comprises the following steps: - generating an acknowledgment data signal from an acknowledgment data sequence using a spreading code; - transmitting the confirmation data signal and a key data signal encoding a key data sequence; - Receiving the confirmation data signal and the key data signal; - restoring the acknowledgment data sequence from the acknowledgment data signal using the spreading code; - Validate the confirmation data sequence and the key data sequence; - releasing a vehicle when the confirmation data sequence and the key data sequence are validated, wherein the spreading code is selected such that the power density of the confirmation data signal at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device is lower than the noise power density.

[0037] In one embodiment, validating may include comparing the key data sequence with a validation code.

[0038] In one embodiment, recovering may include correlating the received acknowledgment data signal with the spreading code.

[0039] In one embodiment, restoring may include synchronizing with respect to the spreading code.

[0040] In one embodiment, synchronization may be performed using a fixed synchronization interval.

[0041] In one embodiment, a distance measurement may be performed, wherein the distance measurement may be performed using synchronization.

[0042] The object is further achieved by a computer-readable storage medium containing instructions that cause (at least) one processor to implement a method as described above when the instructions are executed by the processor.

[0043] Similar or identical advantages arise as those already described in connection with the key device or the authentication device.

[0044] The invention is described below using exemplary embodiments, which are explained in more detail using figures.

[0045] Here we show: Fig. 1 a perspective top view of a vehicle; Fig. 2 a schematic representation of a vehicle and a vehicle key; Fig. 3a spreading a signal; Fig. 3b despreading a signal; Fig. 4 a spread signal; Fig. 5a a signal before spreading; Fig. 5b a signal after spreading, which has a power density below the noise power density; Fig. 6 is a sequence diagram showing the operation of the invention in a first embodiment; and Fig. 7 is a sequence diagram showing the operation of the invention in a second embodiment.

[0046] In the following, the same reference numbers are used for identical or equivalent parts.

[0047] Fig. 1 schematically shows an authentication system 1, which comprises a vehicle 10 and a vehicle key 20. The vehicle key 20 is in the embodiment of the Fig. 1 is arranged within the vehicle 10. In this state, the vehicle 10 is enabled for starting. This means that a driver can start the vehicle 10, for example, by pressing a start button.

[0048] In the case where the vehicle key 20 is outside the vehicle 10, the driver of the vehicle 10 cannot start the vehicle 10.

[0049] The Fig. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the authentication system 1, which includes the vehicle 10 and the vehicle key 20. The vehicle key 20 includes a key computing device 21, a key storage device 22, a key transmitting device 23, and a key synchronization device 24.

[0050] To release the vehicle 10, the vehicle key 20 sends two signals via its key transmitting device 23: a key data signal 31 and a confirmation data signal 41.

[0051] In the illustrated embodiment, the key data signal 31 comprises a key data sequence 30, which is part of an encryption method. The encryption method can be an asymmetric or a symmetric encryption method. In the simplest case, therefore, secret key data is transmitted via the key data signal 31.

[0052] The confirmation data signal 41 is an additional signal required to release the vehicle 10. The confirmation data signal 41 is a signal spread using a spreading code, which does not transmit any payload data as such. Rather, in the illustrated embodiment, only a single bit is transmitted using the confirmation data signal 41.

[0053] The vehicle 10 comprises a vehicle receiving device 11 for receiving the key data signal 31 and the confirmation data signal 41. Furthermore, the vehicle 10 comprises a vehicle computing device 14 for processing the received signals 31 and 41, as well as a vehicle storage device 15 for storing the transmitted data. For communication between the key device 20 and the vehicle 10, the vehicle 10 further comprises a vehicle transmitting device 13. If the vehicle computing device 14 determines that the key data signal 31 has transmitted a permissible key data sequence 30, and if the vehicle computing device 14 determines that the confirmation data signal 41 has been received, the vehicle locking device 12 releases the vehicle 10. This means that the driver of the vehicle 10 can then start the vehicle 10.

[0054] The Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b show the spreading and despreading of a signal. In the example of the Fig. 3a, a confirmation data set 40 is to be spread using a spreading code 44, so that the confirmation data signal 41 is generated. In the illustrated embodiment, the confirmation data set 40 comprises only a single bit, which is set to the value 1. The confirmation data set 40 is vectorially converted into confirmation data 45 using an XOR operation with the spreading code 44. This means that each bit of the spreading code 44 is individually processed with the bit of the confirmation data set 14 using the XOR operation. The spread confirmation data 45 is transmitted from the key device 20 to the vehicle 10 in the confirmation data signal 41.

[0055] The Fig. Figure 3b shows how the vehicle 10 reconstructs the confirmation data set 40 from the received confirmation data signal 41. For this purpose, the spreading code 44 is stored in the vehicle memory device 15 and is processed with the received confirmation data 45 using the XOR operation. This results in confirmation data 46 after decoding, from which the confirmation data set 40 can be reconstructed.

[0056] The Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the confirmation data set 40 and the confirmation data signal 41. In the upper section of the Fig. Figure 4 shows how the confirmation data set 40 behaves over time. Since the confirmation data set 40 consists of only a single bit with the value 1, the value is 1 over all times t0-t7. In contrast, the lower part of the Fig. 4 the confirmation data signal 41 over the times t0-t7. As the Fig. 3a and Fig. As can be seen from Figure 3b, the confirmation data signal 41 has the value 0 at times t0 and t1. At times t2, t3, and t4, the signal 41 has the value 1. At times t5, t6, and t7, the value drops back to the value 0. Thus, for one value of the confirmation data set 40, eight values ​​are transmitted in the confirmation data signal 41. The values ​​of the confirmation data set 40 are called symbols, and the values ​​of the confirmation data signal 41 are called chips.

[0057] The Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b show how the confirmation data signal 41 can be hidden in the thermal noise floor 60 by a suitable spreading code 44.

[0058] The Fig. Figure 5a shows how the confirmation data signal 41 is transmitted over a plurality of frequencies f when no code spreading is used. The power density of the confirmation data signal 47 is significantly higher than the power density 61 of the noise floor 60. In the illustrated embodiment, the signal 41 therefore has a signal-to-noise ratio that is significantly greater than 1.

[0059] The background noise 60 is determined, for example, by thermal influences.

[0060] The Fig. Figure 5b shows the confirmation data signal 41 after code spreading. The spreading code 44 is selected such that the power density 47 of the confirmation data signal 41 is below the power density 61 of the background noise 60. The confirmation data signal 41 therefore has a signal-to-noise ratio less than 1.

[0061] Because the power density 47 of the confirmation data signal 41 is below the power density 61 of the background noise signal 60, the confirmation data signal 41 can only be recognized by the vehicle receiving device 11 if the spreading code 44 is known on the vehicle side. The spreading code 44 therefore acts as a security mechanism.

[0062] Fig. 6 shows a sequence diagram illustrating the transmitted and received signals of the vehicle 10 and the key 20. In a first step, the vehicle 10 sends a request signal 50 to the vehicle key 20. In step S1, the vehicle key 20 generates a confirmation data signal 41 using a spreading code 44 in response to the request signal 50. A key data signal 31 is also generated, with which key data 30 is transmitted. The confirmation data signal 41 and the key data signal 31 are transmitted in parallel or approximately parallel to the vehicle 10. The vehicle 10 reconstructs the confirmation data sequence 40 from the confirmation data signal 41 in step S4 using the spreading code 44. In step S5, it is then checked whether the confirmation data sequence 40 is correct and whether the transmitted key data sequence 30 is correct.For this purpose, the received key data sequence 30 is compared with data stored in the vehicle memory device 15. Preferably, the data is already stored in the key device 20 and in the vehicle memory device 15 at the factory.

[0063] If the correct data has been received, the vehicle 10 is released in step S6. This means that the driver can now start the vehicle 10.

[0064] In the Fig. 7 shows an embodiment in which, in addition to the Fig. 6, a synchronization and distance measurement is carried out.

[0065] To this end, vehicle 10 first sends a wake-up signal 90 to vehicle key 20. Upon receipt of wake-up signal 90, key 20 sends a confirmation signal 91 to vehicle 10. Vehicle 10 then sends two signals. First, a request signal 92 is sent to vehicle key 20, and second, a first synchronization signal 93 is sent using a spreading technique as described above. After a predetermined and constant synchronization interval Sync1 has elapsed, vehicle key 20 sends a second synchronization signal 94 to vehicle 10.

[0066] Vehicle 10 now determines a synchronization interval Sync2, which indicates the time elapsed since the first synchronization signal 93 was sent and the second synchronization signal 94 was received. If the synchronization interval Sync1 and the synchronization interval Sync2 are known on vehicle 10, the propagation time of the signals between vehicle 10 and key device 20 can be determined, since the speed of the signals is determined by the speed of light.

[0067] Using the determined propagation times of the signals, the vehicle 10 can determine the distance of the key 20 from the vehicle 10. If it is determined that the key 20 is most likely located within the vehicle 10, the vehicle 10 sends a third synchronization signal 95 to the key device 20. All synchronization signals 93, 94, 95 are generated using a spreading technique. Using the third synchronization signal 95, the vehicle key 20 generates a key data signal 96 associated with the request signal 92. The key data signal 96 includes a code that can be verified by the vehicle 10.

[0068] The Fig.The embodiment shown in Figure 7 has a variety of security mechanisms. First, it is necessary for the key device 20 and the vehicle 10 to know the spreading code used to generate and receive the synchronization signals 93, 94, 95. Furthermore, the data transmitted via the key data signal 96 must be correct.

[0069] At this point, it should be noted that all parts described above, viewed individually and in any combination, particularly the details shown in the drawings, are claimed as essential to the invention. Modifications to these are familiar to those skilled in the art. List of reference symbols: 1 authentication system 10 vehicles 11 Vehicle receiving device 12 Vehicle locking device 13 Vehicle transmitter 14 Vehicle computing device; decoding device 15 Vehicle storage device 20 vehicle keys 21 Key computing device 22 Key storage device 23 Key transmitting device 24 key synchronization device 30 key data sequence 31 Key data signal 40 Confirmation record 41 Confirmation data signal 42 Length of the confirmation data sequence 43 spread confirmation data signal 44 spreading code 45 Confirmation data after spreading 46 Confirmation data after decoding 47 Power density of the confirmation data signal 50 request signals 60 background noise signal 61 Power density of the background noise 70 synchronization data 80 Release signal XOR XOR operation S1-S6 process steps 90 Wake-up signal 91 Confirmation signal 92 request signal 93 first synchronization signal 94 second synchronization signal 95 third synchronization signal 96 Key data signal t1-t7 time points Sync1 synchronization interval Sync2 synchronization interval

Claims

[1] Key device (20), in particular for a vehicle (10), comprising: a key transmitting device (23) which is designed to: - to send a key data signal (31), in particular to the vehicle (10), wherein the key data signal (31) encodes a key data sequence (30); and - to send a confirmation data signal (41), in particular to the vehicle (10), wherein the confirmation data signal (41) encodes a confirmation data set (40), wherein a key computing device (21) configured to generate the confirmation data signal (41) using a spreading technique characterized by , that a spreading code (44) is selected such that the power density (47) of the confirmation data signal (41) at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device (23) is lower than the noise power density (61). [2] Key device (20) according to claim 1, characterized bythat the key transmitting device (23) is designed to generate the confirmation data signal (41) by bit-by-bit coding, in particular by means of an XOR operation (XOR), of the confirmation data record (40) with a spreading code (44). [3] Key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by : a key synchronization device (24), wherein the key computing device (21) is designed to generate the confirmation data signal (41) using the key synchronization device (24). [4] Key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, in particular according to claim 3, characterized by in that the key transmitting device (23) is designed to transmit synchronization data (94), in particular to a / the vehicle (10), wherein the synchronization data (94) can be used to determine a distance between the key device (20) and a / the vehicle (10). [5] Key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the measuring distance from the key transmitting device (23) is less than 300 cm, preferably less than 100 cm, wherein the power density within the measuring distance is lower than the, in particular thermal, noise power density (61). [6] Key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the confirmation data record (40) has a length (42) less than or equal to 128 bits, in particular less than or equal to 64 bits, preferably exactly 1 bit. [7] Key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the confirmation data signal (41) is assigned a baud rate and a chip rate, wherein the ratio of chip rate and baud rate indicates a spreading factor which is in particular greater than 10 3 , preferably greater than 10 5 , is. [8] Authentication device (10), in particular for a vehicle (10), in particular for a key device (20) according to one of the preceding claims, comprising: - a receiving device (11) for receiving o a key data signal (31), wherein the key data signal (31) encodes a key data sequence (30); and o a confirmation data signal (41), wherein the confirmation data signal (40) encodes a confirmation data set (41); - a blocking device (12) designed to generate an enable signal (80) when the confirmation data set (40) and the key data sequence (30) are validated by the blocking device (12), where a decoding device (14) which is designed to recover the confirmation data set (40) from the confirmation data signal (41) using a spreading technique, characterized by , that a spreading code (44) is selected such that the power density (47) of the confirmation data signal (41) at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device (23) is lower than the noise power density (61). [9] Authentication device according to claim 8, characterized by that the decoding device (14) is designed to restore the confirmation data record (40) by bit-by-bit decoding, in particular by means of an XOR operation (XOR), of the confirmation data signal (41) with a spreading code (44). [10] Authentication device according to claim 8 or 9, characterized by that the decoding device (14) is designed to restore the confirmation data set (40) using synchronization data (70) associated with the confirmation data signal (41). [11] Authentication system (1), in particular for a vehicle (10), comprising: - a key device (20) according to one of claims 1 to 7; - an authentication device (10) according to one of claims 8 to 10, characterized by that the key device (20) and the authentication device (10) are designed to use a common spreading code (44). [12] Authentication system (1) according to claim 1, characterized by a / the decoding device (14) which is designed to synchronize the authentication device (10) with the key device (20) with regard to the spreading code (44). [13] Method for releasing a vehicle (10), comprising the following steps: - generating (S1) an acknowledgment data signal (41) from an acknowledgment data sequence (40) using a spreading code (44); - transmitting (S2) the confirmation data signal (41) and a key data signal (31) encoding a key data sequence (30); - receiving (S3) the confirmation data signal (41) and the key data signal (31); - restoring (S4) the confirmation data sequence (40) from the confirmation data signal (41) using the spreading code (44); - validating (S5) the confirmation data sequence (40) and the key data sequence (30); - releasing (S6) a vehicle (10) when the confirmation data sequence (40) and the key data sequence (30) are validated, characterized by that a spreading code (44) is selected such that the power density (47) of the confirmation data signal (41) at a measuring distance from the key transmitting device (23) is lower than the noise power density (61). [14] Method according to claim 13, characterized by that the validation (S6) comprises comparing the key data sequence (30) with a validation code (32). [15] Method according to one of claims 13 or 14, characterized by that the restoring (S4) comprises a correlation of the received confirmation data signal (41) with the spreading code (44). [16] Method according to one of claims 13 to 15, characterized by that the restoring (S4) comprises synchronizing with respect to the spreading code (44). [17] Method according to one of claims 13 to 16, in particular according to claim 16, characterized by that synchronization is performed using a specified synchronization interval. [18] Method according to one of claims 13 to 16, in particular according to claim 17, characterized by a distance measurement, wherein the distance measurement is carried out using a / the synchronization. [19] A computer-readable storage medium containing instructions that cause (at least) one processor to implement a method according to any one of claims 13-18 when the instructions are executed by the processor.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • multiple spreading / despreading of spread spectrum signals by multiple spreading sequences

    DE102007028732A1

  • Methods and devices for determining distance, in particular by transit time-based distance measurement with multiple devices

    DE102015017146A1

  • Method and system for detecting relay attack for PASE system

    WO2016059451A1