Procedures for the safe operation of an HPEM weapon

Abstract

A new method for operating an HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b) of an HPEM carrier vehicle (10, 10a, 10b) and for simultaneously protecting a radiation-sensitive front end (18, 18a, 18b) of an escort vehicle (20, 20a, 20b) comprises the following features: • the HPEM carrier vehicle (TF) (10, 10a, 10b) comprises a TF transceiver (11) and a TF computing unit (12), • the escort vehicle (BF) (20, 20a, 20b) comprises a BF transceiver (21) and a BF computing unit (22), • The procedure for operating a TF-HPEM weapon (19) comprises the following steps: a) the TF-HPEM weapon (19) transmits HPEM attack parameters of an intended attack to the TF computing unit (12), b) the TF processing unit (12) calculates a TF message to be sent, c) The TF transceiver (11) sends this TF message to the BF transceiver (21), d) the TF computing unit (12) grants an attack authorization to the HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b) upon receipt of a BF reception notification, • The procedure for protecting a front end (28, 28a, 28b) of an escort vehicle (BF) comprises the following steps a) The BF transceiver (21) receives the TF message, b) the BF transceiver (21) sends a reception notification to the TF transceiver (11) when the signal is fully received, c) The BF computing unit (12) calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) using the HPEM parameter values ​​of the TF message and switches on an HPEM protection device for the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) depending on the level of the damage value.

Description

[0001] The invention relates to a method for operating an HPEM weapon of an HPEM carrier vehicle and for simultaneously protecting a radiation-sensitive front end of an escort vehicle.

[0002] HPEM systems generate and emit powerful electromagnetic pulses capable of damaging enemy frontends such as antennas and sensors. HPEM systems are characterized by high field strengths (e.g., 0.1–1 MV / m), high power outputs (e.g., 0.1–10 GW), very short pulse durations (e.g., nanoseconds to ps), and frequencies ranging from a few tens of MHz to the high GHz range.

[0003] EP 2 656 528 B1 discloses a method for operating a reactive jammer against remotely controlled explosive devices and an electronic reconnaissance system in parallel. In one example, a reactive jammer and a reconnaissance system are installed on different vehicles and protect a convoy of vehicles. The reactive jammer and the reconnaissance system are synchronized such that the reconnaissance system receives signals only during pauses when the jammer is not transmitting. The reconnaissance system also includes a fast-switching antenna protection circuit. Synchronization is achieved, for example, via a radio link with respective transceivers.

[0004] US Patent 7,817,706 B2 discloses a method for operating a reactive jamming device to disrupt enemy radio communications without affecting one's own radio communications network with a large number of transceivers. The jamming device and the communication network are interconnected via a synchronization system. This synchronization system assigns different frequencies to the jamming device and the communication network transceivers, so that the jamming device transmits on a different carrier frequency than the communication network.

[0005] A distributed system for coordinated electronic warfare is described in US document 2012 / 0169522A1. This document describes a variety of mobile units, such as vehicles or soldiers, each equipped with an electronic module containing a jammer, receiver, and control unit. To prevent their own jamming signals from blocking communication within the group, the units coordinate with each other. This involves sharing information about detected threats and timing the jammers so that they either transmit during pauses in communication or deliver their signals in a geographically and temporally staggered manner.

[0006] The invention is based on the objective of creating a method for operating an HPEM weapon while reducing the risk to the front end of a companion vehicle.

[0007] This problem is solved according to the invention by the features of claim 1.

[0008] The advantages of the invention lie in the fact that a radiation-sensitive front end of a separate escort vehicle is protected during the deployment of a separate HPEM weapon by an HPEM carrier vehicle. The underlying idea is that the HPEM carrier vehicle with the HPEM weapon merely informs the escort vehicle with the sensitive front end, and that the escort vehicle automatically protects its front end.

[0009] The HPEM carrier vehicle (TF) comprises a TF transceiver and a TF processing unit. The escort vehicle (BF) comprises a BF transceiver and a BF processing unit. The procedure for operating a TF HPEM weapon comprises the following steps: a) The TF HPEM weapon transmits HPEM attack parameters of an intended attack to the TF computing unit, b) the TF processing unit calculates a TF message to be sent, c) The TF transceiver sends this TF message to the BF transceiver, d) the TF computing unit, after receiving a BF reception notification, grants the HPEM weapon permission to attack.

[0010] The aforementioned steps reflect the perspective of the TF-HPEM weapon and clarify that, prior to deployment, the TF-HPEM weapon merely informs an escort vehicle equipped with a radiation-sensitive front end and waits for the information to be transmitted correctly. Then, combat operations commence. The procedure for protecting the front end of an escort vehicle (EV) comprises the following steps: a) The BF transceiver receives a TF message from the TF transceiver, b) When the TF message has been fully received, the BF transceiver sends a reception notification to the TF transceiver, c) The BF computing unit calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end using the HPEM parameter values ​​of the TF message and activates an HPEM protection device for the radiation-sensitive front end depending on the level of the damage value.

[0011] The aforementioned steps reflect the perspective of the front end to be protected. First, calculations are made to determine the extent to which the front end could be damaged during an independent deployment of the TF-HPEM weapon. Protective measures are only taken if a threat is identified. Both the TF-HPEM weapon and the front end remain autonomous and self-governing. The HPEM weapon merely provides information, and the escort vehicle with the sensitive front end independently decides on any necessary protective measures.

[0012] The TF transceivers and the BF transceiver are either HPEM-insensitive transceivers specifically designed for the procedure or HPEM-insensitive transceivers from existing radio equipment. The additional transceivers can be designed precisely for the intended purpose.

[0013] According to an advantageous embodiment of the invention, the radiation-sensitive front end is part of a communication system, a radar system, or a reconnaissance system. These front ends are particularly vulnerable.

[0014] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the invention, the protective means for protecting the radiation-sensitive front end is a protective circuit. Protective circuits are characterized by rapid switching on and off.

[0015] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the invention, the HPEM parameter values ​​include at least: a) Start, frequency and field strength of an HPEM countermeasure signal, b) Position, orientation and frequency-dependent directional characteristic of the TF-HPEM weapon.

[0016] These parameter values ​​can be used to calculate a meaningful damage value for a frontend.

[0017] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the invention, the HPEM control signal comprises control pulses with intervening pauses. A protective device that is switched on is switched off during these pauses. If the protective device is switched off during the pauses, the front end can be used during these pauses, and the system assigned to the front end can be used to a limited extent.

[0018] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the invention, in the case of a convoy with either one HPEM carrier vehicle and several escort vehicles or several HPEM carrier vehicles and several escort vehicles, the method of claims 1 to 6 is applied bilaterally between the HPEM carrier vehicle(s) and the several escort vehicles, which is simple and manageable.

[0019] Exemplary embodiments of the invention are described in more detail below with reference to the drawings. These show: Fig. 1 an HPEM carrier vehicle with an HPEM weapon, an escort vehicle with a radiation-sensitive front end and an attacking combat drone; Fig. 2 two HPEM carrier vehicles each with an HPEM weapon, two escort vehicles each with a radiation-sensitive front end and an attacking combat drone.

[0020] The Fig. Figure 1 illustrates a first embodiment of a method for operating an HPEM weapon 19 of an HPEM carrier vehicle 10 and for simultaneously protecting a radiation-sensitive front end 28 of an escort vehicle 20.

[0021] The HPEM carrier vehicle (TF) 10 comprises a TF transceiver 11 and a TF processing unit 12. The TF processing unit 12 includes a communication interface to both the TF HPEM weapon 19 and the TF transceiver 11. The escort vehicle (BF) 20 comprises a BF transceiver 21 and a BF processing unit 22. The BF processing unit 22 includes a BF communication interface to both the radiation-sensitive BF front end 28 and the BF transceiver 21.

[0022] The procedure for operating a TF-HPEM weapon 19 comprises the following steps: a) The TF-HPEM weapon 19 transmits HPEM attack parameters of an intended attack to the TF computing unit 12, b) The TF processing unit 12 calculates a TF message to be sent, c) TF transceiver 11 sends this TF message to BF transceiver 21, d) The TF computing unit 12 grants an attack authorization to the HPEM weapon 19 upon receipt of a BF reception message.

[0023] The procedure for protecting a front end 28 of an escort vehicle (BF) comprises the following steps: a) The BF transceiver 21 receives a TF message, b) When the TF message has been fully received, the BF transceiver 21 sends a reception notification to the TF transceiver 11, c) The BF computing unit 12 calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive frontend 28 using the HPEM parameter values ​​of the TF message and switches on an HPEM protective agent for the radiation-sensitive frontend 28 depending on the level of the damage value.

[0024] The HPEM parameter values ​​include: a) Start, frequency and field strength of the HPEM countermeasures signal, b) Position, orientation and frequency-dependent directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19.

[0025] The aforementioned HPEM parameter values ​​ensure a high degree of accuracy in calculating the damage value. The frequency of the HPEM countermeasure signal must be considered, as a front end exhibits varying sensitivity to different frequencies of the HPEM countermeasure signal. Here, frequency can also be understood as a finite bandwidth of frequencies around a center frequency. Information regarding the position, orientation, and frequency-dependent directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19 is required to determine the effective field strength at the front end.

[0026] The in Fig. The indicated direction 16 shows the orientation of the HPEM weapon 19 towards the combat drone 30. The escort vehicle 20 knows its own position and, using the parameter value of the HPEM weapon 19's position, determines the indicated direction 16' from the HPEM weapon 19 to the front end 28. It also determines the distance to the front end 28. Directions 16 and 16' define a spatial radiation angle. This spatial radiation angle is necessary to determine the effective field strength at the front end from the directional characteristic. Together with the radiated field strength, which is a maximum equivalent field strength value in the far field normalized to a distance of 1 m and possibly also frequency-dependent, and the calculated distance to the front end, the expected effective field strength at the front end 28 is finally obtained.

[0027] The damage value is a value that represents the sensitivity of the front end 28 to the frequency of the HPEM countermeasures signal and the associated expected field strength at the front end. Threshold values ​​for the damage value are stored in the BF processing unit 22 of the escort vehicle 20.

[0028] The following options exist for terminating the procedure for operating a TF-HPEM weapon 19 and the procedure for protecting a front end 28 of an escort vehicle (BF): a) One simple possibility is that the HPEM parameter values ​​additionally include a parameter for the end of the treatment. Any protective measures activated by the radiation-sensitive front end 28 are deactivated when the end of the treatment is reached. • Another option is to use a stop signal. The stop signal informs the escort vehicle 20 that the treatment has ended, allowing the escort vehicle 20 to deactivate the protective agent early. The TF transceiver 11 and the BF transceiver 21 are used for this purpose. • The aforementioned options are combined. If the target is successfully engaged before the maximum combat duration is reached, a stop signal is issued so that the escort vehicle 20 can deactivate the protective device of the front end 28 at an early stage.

[0029] The radiation-sensitive front end 28 is a radar antenna of a radar system. The protective device for the radiation-sensitive front end 28 is a protective circuit. The protective circuit can be an interrupt circuit, a voltage suppression circuit, a filter circuit, or a combination thereof.

[0030] The HPEM control signal comprises control pulses with intervening pauses. An active, switched-on protective agent is switched off during these pauses. The pause length can be derived from the pulse repetition rate and the pulse duration.

[0031] The TF transceiver 11 and the BF transceiver 21 are HPEM-insensitive transceivers specifically configured for this procedure. This means that the TF transceiver 11 and the BF transceiver 21 are, for example, not connected to the voice communication system.

[0032] The escort vehicle 20 can briefly delay the receiving message that must be received by the carrier vehicle in order for the HPEM weapon 19 to become active, in order to be able to switch on an HPEM protective agent for the radiation-sensitive front end 28 in time, depending on the level of damage.

[0033] The Fig.Figure 2 illustrates, in a second embodiment, the application of the aforementioned method to a convoy with a first HPEM carrier vehicle 10a, a second HPEM carrier vehicle 10b, a first escort vehicle 20a, and a second escort vehicle 20b. The HPEM carrier vehicles 10a and 10b each have no radiation-sensitive front ends.

[0034] The first HPEM weapon 19a of the first HPEM carrier vehicle 10a operates in the MHz range.

[0035] The second HPEM weapon 19a of the second HPEM carrier vehicle 10b also operates in the MHz range.

[0036] The first escort vehicle 20a is a reconnaissance vehicle with a front end 28a in the form of a reconnaissance antenna, which is an array of various receiving antennas for different frequency bands. The reconnaissance antenna is sensitive to the frequency range of the first and second HPEM weapons 19a and 19b.

[0037] The second escort vehicle, 20b, is a combat vehicle equipped with an armored reconnaissance radar. The radiation-sensitive front end, 28b, is a radar antenna. This radar antenna operates in the GHz range and is less sensitive to HPEM countermeasures signals in the MHz range.

[0038] The previously described procedure for operating an HPEM weapon on an HPEM carrier vehicle and simultaneously protecting a radiation-sensitive front end of an escort vehicle is performed bilaterally. The first escort vehicle 20a and the second escort vehicle 20b each receive the HPEM parameter values ​​from the first carrier vehicle 10a and the second carrier vehicle 10b, respectively. a) Start, frequency and field strength of the HPEM countermeasures signal, b) Position, orientation and frequency-dependent directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19a or 19b.

[0039] A first bilateral procedure is applied between the first HPEM weapon 19a of the first HPEM carrier vehicle 10a and the first front end 28a of the first escort vehicle 20a. The BF processing unit of the escort vehicle 20a calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end 28a using the HPEM parameter values. The first direction shown, 16a, indicates the orientation of the HPEM weapon 19a towards the combat drone 30. The second direction shown, 16a', runs from the HPEM weapon 19a to the front end 28a. Directions 16a and 16a' define the spatial beam angle used in the directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19a. The directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19a shows significant rearward lobes. Furthermore, the frontend 28a exhibits a high sensitivity to the frequency of the HPEM countermeasures signal.Therefore, the damage level is so high that a limit value is exceeded and a protective device for the radiation-sensitive front end 28a is activated. The reconnaissance antenna is out of service and protected from damage during the use of the HPEM weapon 19a.

[0040] A second bilateral procedure is applied between the first HPEM weapon 19a of the first HPEM carrier vehicle 10a and the second front end 28b of the second escort vehicle 20b. The BF processing unit of the escort vehicle 20b calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end 28b using the HPEM parameter values. The first indicated direction 16a shows the orientation of the HPEM weapon 19a towards the combat drone 30. The second indicated direction 16a'' runs from the HPEM weapon 19a to the front end 28b. Both directions 16a and 16a'' define the spatial beam angle for applying the directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19a. The rear lobes of the directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19a are not pronounced at this spatial beam angle. The distance is greater than before. The sensitivity of the frontend 28b to the frequency of the HPEM attack signal is low because the frontend 28b operates in the GHz range and not in the MHz range.Consequently, a low damage value is calculated and no HPEM protection is activated for the radiation-sensitive front end 28b. The radar antenna remains operational during the use of the HPEM weapon 19a.

[0041] A third bilateral procedure is applied between the second HPEM weapon 19b of the second HPEM carrier vehicle 10b and the first front end 28a of the first escort vehicle 20a. The BF processing unit of the first escort vehicle 20a calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end 28a using the HPEM parameter values. The first indicated direction 16b shows the orientation from the HPEM weapon 19b towards the combat drone 30. The second indicated direction 16b' runs from the HPEM weapon 19b to the front end 28a. Both directions 16b and 16b' define the spatial radiation angle. The directional characteristic of the HPEM weapon 19b results in a high field strength value at the front end 28a for the small spatial radiation angle. A high damage value is determined because the frontend 28a has a high sensitivity to the frequency of the HPEM countermeasures signal.The HPEM weapon 19b's directional characteristic indicates high expected field strength values ​​at the front end 28a due to its small spatial radiation angle. An HPEM shielding device must be activated for the radiation-sensitive front end 28a. The reconnaissance antenna remains inactive during the use of the HPEM weapon 19b.

[0042] A fourth bilateral procedure is applied between the second HPEM weapon 19b of the second HPEM carrier vehicle 10b and the second front end 28b of the second escort vehicle 20b. The BF processing unit of the second escort vehicle 20b calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end 28b of the second escort vehicle using the HPEM parameter values. The first indicated direction 16b shows the orientation of the HPEM weapon 19b towards the combat drone 30. The second indicated direction 16b'' runs from the HPEM weapon 19b to the front end 28b. Both directions 16 and 16b'' define the spatial radiation angle for applying the directional characteristics of the HPEM weapon 19b. The spatial radiation angle is larger than before. The sensitivity of the front end 28b is not critical with respect to the frequency of the HPEM weapon 19b. No HPEM protection is activated for the radiation-sensitive frontend 28b. The radar antenna remains operational during the use of the HPEM weapon. Reference symbol list 10 HPEM carrier vehicles (TF) 10a first HPEM carrier vehicle 10b second HPEM carrier vehicle 11 TF transceivers 12 TF computing unit 16 Direction towards the drone of HPEM weapon 19 16' towards the front end 28 of HPEM weapon 19 16a Direction towards the drone of HPEM weapon 19a 16a' Direction to the front end 28a of HPEM weapon 19a 16a'' direction towards the front end 28b of HPEM weapon 19a 16b Direction towards the drone of HPEM weapon 19b 16b' Direction to the front end 28a of HPEM weapon 19b 16b'' direction to the front end 28b of HPEM weapon 19b 19 HPEM weapon 19a HPEM weapon of the first TF 19b HPEM weapon of the second TF 20 escort vehicle (BF) 20a first escort vehicle 20b second escort vehicle 21 BF transceivers 22 BF computing unit 28 BF-Frontend 28a BF-Frontend of the first BF 28b BF-Frontend of the second BF 30 attack drones

Claims

[1] Method for operating an HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b) of an HPEM carrier vehicle (10, 10a, 10b) and for simultaneously protecting a radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) of an escort vehicle (20, 20a, 20b) having the following features: • the HPEM carrier vehicle (TF) (10, 10a, 10b) comprises a TF transceiver (11) and a TF computing unit (12), • the escort vehicle (BF) (20, 20a, 20b) comprises a BF transceiver (21) and a BF computing unit (22), • The procedure for operating a TF-HPEM weapon (19) comprises the following steps: a) the TF-HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b) transmits HPEM attack parameters of an intended attack to the TF computing unit (12), b) the TF processing unit (12) calculates a TF message to be sent, c) The TF transceiver (11) sends this TF message to the BF transceiver (21), d) the TF computing unit (12) grants an attack authorization to the HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b) upon receipt of a BF reception notification, • The procedure for protecting a front end (28, 28a, 28b) of an escort vehicle (BF) comprises the following steps: a) The BF transceiver (21) receives the TF message, b) After a complete reception, the BF transceiver (21) sends a reception notification to the TF transceiver (11), c) The BF processing unit (12) calculates a damage value for the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) using the HPEM parameter values ​​of the TF message and, depending on the level of the damage value, activates an HPEM protective agent for the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b). d) The TF transceiver (11) and the BF transceiver (21) are specially set up for the procedure and are HPEM-insensitive. [2] Method according to claim 1, wherein the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) is part of a communication system, a radar system or a reconnaissance system. [3] Method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the protective means for protecting the radiation-sensitive front end (28, 28a, 28b) is a protective circuit. [4] Method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the HPEM parameter values ​​comprise at least: a) Start, frequency and field strength of the HPEM countermeasures signal, b) Position, orientation and frequency-dependent directional characteristic of the TF-HPEM weapon (19, 19a, 19b). [5] Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the HPEM control signal comprises control pulses with pauses in between, and wherein an activated protective device is deactivated during the pauses. [6] Method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein in the case of a convoy with either one HPEM carrier vehicle (10, 10a, 10b) and several escort vehicles (20, 20a, 20b) or several HPEM carrier vehicles (10, 10a, 10b) and several escort vehicles (20, 20a, 20b) the method of claims 1 to 6 is applied bilaterally between the HPEM carrier vehicle(s) (10, 10a, 10b) and the several escort vehicles (20, 20a, 20a).

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