Cryptographic system, encryption device, decryption device and key generation device
The cryptographic system employs Richelot isogeny sequences on abelian surfaces to enhance decryption efficiency in isogeny-based cryptography, addressing the time-consuming nature of existing SETA encryption schemes by reducing the prime number p to 1/3, thus accelerating decryption processes.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE112020007408
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2020-09-23
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-09-23
AI Technical Summary
Existing isogeny-based cryptography systems, such as SETA encryption schemes, require significant time for decryption due to their reliance on the hardness of the basic isogeny problem, necessitating additional information for security.
A cryptographic system utilizing Richelot isogeny sequences on abelian surfaces is employed, where a Richelot isogeny sequence serves as a secret key and an abelian surface as a public key, reducing the length of the prime number p to 1/3 in the SETA encryption scheme, thereby accelerating decryption.
The use of Richelot isogeny sequences significantly reduces the time required for decryption in isogeny-based cryptography by leveraging the hardness of the fundamental isogeny problem without additional information.
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Abstract
Description
Technical area
[0001] The present disclosure relates to isogeny-based cryptography. General state of the art
[0002] Isogeny-based cryptography includes types such as supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange (SIDH) and supersingular isogeny key encapsulation (SIKE).
[0003] In isogeny-based cryptography such as SIDH and SIKE, security cannot be based on the hardness of the fundamental isogeny problem. Instead, security must be based on the hardness of the SIDH-type isogeny problem, which requires giving an attacker (the decrypting party) even additional information, specified as points on an elliptic curve. Therefore, in SIDH-type isogeny-based cryptography, a scheme whose security relies on the hardness of the fundamental isogeny problem, without additional information, was expected.
[0004] Patent Literature 1 describes key generation using hyperelliptic (genus-2) curves.
[0005] Non-patent literatures 1 and 2 describe a SETA encryption scheme, which is isogeny-based cryptography of the SIDH type, whose security relies on the hardness of the basic isogeny problem without any additional information.
[0006] Non-patent literature 3 describes a Genus-2 SIDH cryptosystem using Richelot isogeny sequences. Reference listPatent literature
[0007] Patent literature 1: US 2014 / 0 105 386 A1 Non-patent literature
[0008] Non-patent literature 1: CDS Guilhem, P. Kutas, C. Petit, J. Silva, SETA: Supersingular Encryption from Torsion Attacks. In: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019 / 1291.
[0009] Non-patent literature 2: C. Petit, Faster Algorithms for Isogeny Problems using Torsion Point Images. In: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017 / 571.
[0010] Non‐patent literature 3: V. Flynn, YB Ti, Genus Two Isogeny Cryptography. In: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019 / 177. Summary of the inventionTechnical problem
[0011] The SETA encryption scheme uses the cryptanalysis method described in Non-Patent Literature 2 for a decryption algorithm. Therefore, decryption requires a significant amount of time.
[0012] The objective of the present disclosure is to reduce the time required for decryption in the SETA encryption method. Solution to the task
[0013] A cryptographic system according to the present disclosure performs a cryptographic process in which a Richelot isogeny sequence Φ s , whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is a secret key and the abelian surface A sis a public key, and the cryptographic system includes an encryption device to create an abelian surface A m by calculating the abelian area A s , which is the public key, by a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m , which is generated by encrypting a plaintext m, and the abelian surface A m as ciphertext; and a decryption device to obtain a Richelot isogeny ϕ m , whose starting point is the abelian surface A s which is the public key and whose endpoint is the abelian surface A m which is the ciphertext, based on the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is the secret key. Advantageous effects of the invention
[0014] In the present disclosure, a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s, whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is used as the secret key, and the abelian surface A s is used as the public key. This allows the length of a prime number p in the SETA encryption scheme to be reduced to 1 / 3. This allows the time required for decryption in the SETA encryption scheme to be reduced. Brief description of the drawings Fig. 1 is a configuration diagram of a cryptographic system 1 according to a first embodiment; Fig. 2 is a configuration diagram of a key generation device 10 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 3 is a configuration diagram of an encryption device 20 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 4 is a configuration diagram of a decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 5 is a flowchart of a process of calculating a genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., Cκ according to the first embodiment; Fig. Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating a SETA encryption scheme; Fig. 7 is a diagram explaining a Genus-2 SETA cryptographic scheme according to the first embodiment; Fig. 8 is a flowchart illustrating an operation of the key generating device 10 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 9 is a flowchart illustrating an operation of the encryption device 20 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 10 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of the decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment; Fig. 11 is a configuration diagram of the key generating device 10 according to a first variant; Fig. 12 is a configuration diagram of the encryption device 20 according to the first variant; and Fig. 13 is a configuration diagram of the decryption device 30 according to the first variant. Description of embodimentsFirst embodiment*** Description of configurations ***
[0015] With reference to Fig. 1, a configuration of a cryptographic system 1 according to a first embodiment is described.
[0016] The cryptographic system 1 comprises a key generation device 10, an encryption device 20 and a decryption device 30. The key generation device 10, the encryption device 20 and the decryption device 30 are connected via a communication channel 40 such as a local area network (LAN) or the Internet.
[0017] With reference to Fig. 2, a configuration of the key generation device 10 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0018] The key generation device 10 is a computer.
[0019] The key generation device 10 comprises hardware comprising a processor 11, a main memory 12, a data memory 13, and a communication interface 14. The processor 11 is connected to other hardware components via signal lines and controls these other hardware components.
[0020] The key generation device 10 has, as functional components, a procurement unit 111, an allocation calculation unit 112, and a key setting unit 113. The functions of the functional components of the key generation device 10 are implemented by software.
[0021] The data memory 13 stores programs that implement the functions of the functional components of the key generation device 10. These programs are read into the main memory 12 by the processor 11 and executed by the processor 11. This implements the functions of the functional components of the key generation device 10.
[0022] With reference to Fig. 3, a configuration of the encryption device 20 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0023] The encryption device 20 is a computer.
[0024] The encryption device 20 comprises, as hardware, a processor 21, a main memory 22, a data memory 23, and a communication interface 24. The processor 21 is connected to other hardware components via signal lines and controls these other hardware components.
[0025] The encryption device 20 has an acquisition unit 211 and an encryption unit 212 as functional components. The functions of the functional components of the encryption device 20 are implemented by software.
[0026] The data memory 23 stores programs that implement the functions of the functional components of the encryption device 20. These programs are read into the main memory 22 by the processor 21 and executed by the processor 21. This implements the functions of the functional components of the encryption device 20.
[0027] With reference to Fig. 4, a configuration of the decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0028] The decryption device 30 is a computer.
[0029] The decryption device 30 comprises hardware comprising a processor 31, a main memory 32, a data memory 33, and a communication interface 34. The processor 31 is connected to other hardware components via signal lines and controls these other hardware components.
[0030] The decryption device 30 has an acquisition unit 311 and a decryption unit 312 as functional components. The functions of the functional components of the decryption device 30 are implemented by software.
[0031] The data memory 33 stores programs that implement the functions of the functional components of the decryption device 30. These programs are read into the main memory 32 by the processor 31 and executed by the processor 31. This implements the functions of the functional components of the decryption device 30.
[0032] Each of processors 11, 21, and 31 is an integrated circuit (IC) that performs processing. Specific examples of each of processors 11, 21, and 31 include a central processing unit (CPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), and a graphics processing unit (GPU).
[0033] Each of the memory units 12, 22, and 32 is a storage device for temporarily storing data. Specific examples of each of the memory units 12, 22, and 32 are a static random-access memory (SRAM) and a dynamic random-access memory (DRAM).
[0034] Each of the data storage devices 13, 23, and 33 is a storage device for storing data. A specific example of each of the data storage devices 13, 23, and 33 is a hard disk drive (HDD). Each of the data storage devices 13, 23, and 33 can be a portable storage medium, such as a Secure Digital data storage card (SD, registered trademark), Compact Flash (CF, registered trademark), NAND Flash, a flexible disk, an optical disk, a compact disk, a Blu-ray disk (registered trademark), or a digital versatile disk (DVD).
[0035] Each of the communication interfaces 14, 24, and 34 is an interface for communication with external devices. Specific examples of each of the communication interfaces 14, 24, and 34 are an Ethernet (registered trademark) port, a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port, or a High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI, registered trademark) port.
[0036] Fig. 2 depicts only one processor 11. However, there may be a plurality of processors 11, and the plurality of processors 11 may cooperatively execute the programs that implement the functions. Similarly, there may be a plurality of processors 21 and a plurality of processors 31. *** Description of a function***
[0037] With reference to Fig. 5 to 10, an operation of the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment is described.
[0038] A sequence of operations of the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a cryptographic process according to the first embodiment. A program that implements the operation of the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a cryptographic program according to the first embodiment. ** Brief description of a concept **
[0039] A concept will be described that forms the basis of a cryptographic scheme realized by the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment.
[0040] Non-patent literature 1 uses elliptic curves. Cryptographic system 1 uses genus-2 curves instead of elliptic curves.
[0041] A genus-2 curve used by cryptographic system 1 is an algebraic curve given in formula 11, where a degree deg(f(X)) is 5 or 6. C:Y2=f(X)
[0042] As stated in Formula 12, it is assumed that genus-2 curves with a genus-2 curve C0 as the starting point and a genus-2 curve Cκ as the end point are transformed by repeating Richelot isogenies κ times, where κ is an integer of 2 or more. C0→φ0C1→φ1⋯→φκ−2Cκ−1→φκ−1Cκ
[0043] The basic problem of cryptographic security of the cryptographic system 1 is to find a Richelot isogeny sequence φ0, φ1, ..., φ κ-1 to find (calculate) the genus-2 curves C0 and C κ interpolated if two genus-2 curves of the genus-2 curves C0 and C κ are given. Cryptographic System 1 constructs a genus-2 SETA cryptography based on the hardness of this basic problem.
[0044] Each genus-2 curve is calculated using three polynomials G j (X) with deg(G j (X)) ≤ 2, as given in Formula 13. Note that deg(G j (X)) the degree of a polynomial G j (X) is. C:Y2=f(X)=dΠj=02Gj(X)
[0045] Three new polynomials G ~ j (X) are defined as given in Formula 14. [Gj+1(X),Gj+2(X)]:=Gj+1'(X)Gj+2(X)−Gj+2'(X)Gj+1(X),G˜j(X):=τj−1[Gj+1(X),Gj+2(X)]
[0046] It should be noted that τ j the highest degree coefficient of [G j+1 (X), G j+2 (X)]. Therefore, G ~ j (X) is a polynomial whose coefficient of highest degree is 1. G' j+1 (X) is a derivative of G j+1 (X) and G' j+2 (X) is a derivative of G j+2 (X). The indices are assigned under the assumption that the three polynomials G j be treated as a permutation, so that G j+1 (X), if j = 0, G1(X), G j+1 (X), if j = 1, G2(X), G j+1 (X), if j = 2, G0(X). Similarly, G j+2 (X), if j = 0, G2(X), G j+2 (X), if j = 1, G0(X) and G j+2 (X), if j = 2, G1(X).
[0047] A new Genus 2 curve C ~ is defined as given in formula 15. C˜:Y2=f˜(X)=d˜Πj=02G˜j(X)with d˜=d⋅τ0τ1τ2⋅det((gj,k)0≤j,k≤2)−1
[0048] A correspondence (mapping) between the genus-2 curve C and the genus-2 curve C ~ is called Richelot isogeny. The Richelot isogeny of the genus-2 curve C is determined based on a partition (G0(X), G1(X), G2(X)) of f(X). This corresponds to a partition of zero points of f(X) into three pairs (a0, a1), (a2, a3), and (a4, a5). Note that g is described below. ** Description of a method for calculating a genus-2 curve sequence **
[0049] The cryptographic system 1 calculates a genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C κ by repeating Richelot isogenies from a genus-2 curve C0. Calculating a Richelot isogeny based on three polynomials G ~ j(X), however, leads back to the genus-2 curve C. Therefore, the cryptographic system 1 calculates a Richelot isogeny once, then assigns each root (zero point) of each polynomial G ~ j (X) for a change into three new polynomials and then calculates a Richelot isogeny.
[0050] In Fig. 5, a process of calculating the genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C κ according to the first embodiment.
[0051] A new Genus 2 curve C i is defined as given in formula 16. Ci / F¯p:Y2=fi(X)=dΠj=02Gi,j(X) where Gi,j=∑k=02gi,j,kXk={(X−ai,2j)(X−ai,2j+1) if deg(Gi,j)=2X−ai,2j or X−ai,2j+1 if deg(Gi,j)=1
[0052] In step S11, three new polynomials (G i,j (X)) j = 0,1,2 from the genus-2 curve C0 according to formula 14. In this way, a genus-2 curve C1 is calculated.
[0053] In step S12, as indicated in formula 17, three polynomials G ~ 1,j to calculate a Richelot isogeny ϕ0. Note that τ 0,j the highest degree coefficient of [G 0,j+1 (X), G 0,j+2 (X)]. G˜1,j(X):=τ0,j−1[G0,j+1(X),G0,j+2(X)]for rj=0,1,2
[0054] Then, the processes of step S13 and step S14 are performed for each integer i of i = 1, ..., κ-1 in ascending order.
[0055] In step S13, the zero points (a i,m ) m =0,...,5 of f i (X) are rearranged. Then three new polynomials (G i,j (X)) j = 0,1,2 in accordance with formula 14. In this way, a genus-2 curve C i+1 calculated.
[0056] In step S14, as indicated in formula 18, three polynomials G ~ i +1,j calculated to obtain a Richelot isogeny ϕi to calculate. It should be noted that τ i,j the highest degree coefficient of [G i,j+1 (X), G i,j+2 (X)]. G˜i+1,j(X):=τi,j−1[Gi,j+1(X),Gi,j+2(X)]for rj=0,1,2 ** SETA encryption scheme **
[0057] In Non-Patent Literature 1, a SETA encryption method is proposed with reference to Fig. 6 described.
[0058] In the SETA encryption scheme, the elliptic curves E0, E s and E m used. The elliptic curve E0 is a public parameter. The elliptic curve E0 is a special curve whose endomorphism ring is simple. <Schlüsselerzeugungsprozess>
[0059] First, an isogeny sequence ϕ s which is a secret key. Then the elliptic curve E0 is defined by the isogeny sequence ϕ s converted to an elliptic curve E sto calculate, and the elliptic curve E s is set as the public key. <Verschlüsselungsprozess>
[0060] First, a plaintext m is encoded in a suitable way and converted into an isogeny sequence ϕ m transformed. Then the elliptic curve E s , which is the public key, by the isogeny sequence ϕ m converted to an elliptic curve E m to calculate. The elliptic curve E m is set as ciphertext. <Entschlüsselungsprozess>
[0061] An endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve E s can be calculated by calculating an endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve E0 using the isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is the secret key, can be calculated. Therefore, an isogeny problem in which the elliptic curve E s is the starting point and the elliptic curve E mis the endpoint, can be solved in polynomial time, and the isogeny sequence ϕ m can be obtained. The plaintext m is calculated from the isogeny sequence ϕ m calculated by performing a decoding operation, which is the reverse operation of an encryption operation at the time of encryption.
[0062] The purpose of decryption is that a user who has the isogeny sequence ϕ s which is the secret key, the calculation of the endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve E s on the calculation of the endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve E0 by the isogeny sequence ϕ s can reduce. ** Cryptographic Genus-2 SETA Scheme **
[0063] With reference to Fig. 7 to 10, a Genus-2 SETA cryptographic scheme realized by the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0064] As in Fig. As shown in Figure 7, the cryptographic Genus-2 SETA scheme is realized by using the elliptic curves E0, E s and E m in the SETA encryption scheme by genus-2 curves C0, C s and C m be replaced and the isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m each by Richelot isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m be replaced.
[0065] With reference to Fig. 8, the operation of the key generating device 10 according to the first embodiment is described.
[0066] A sequence of operations of the key generation device 10 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a key generation method according to the first embodiment. A program that implements the operation of the key generation device 10 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a key generation program according to the first embodiment. (Step S111: Procurement process)
[0067] The procurement unit 111 procures a Genus-2 curve C0, which is a public parameter.
[0068] The procurement unit 111 writes the genus-2 curve C0 into the working memory 12. (Step S112: Allocation calculation process)
[0069] The mapping calculation unit 112 calculates a Richelot isogeny ϕ0 of the genus-2 curve C0 acquired in step S111 to calculate a genus-2 curve C1. The mapping calculation unit 112 calculates a Richelot isogeny ϕ i to create a genus 2 curve C i+1 to be calculated by zero points of a genus-2 curve C i for each integer i of i = 1, ..., κ-1, rearranged in ascending order using an integer κ of 2 or more.
[0070] In particular, the assignment calculation unit 112 calculates a genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C κ and a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ0, ..., ϕ κ-1 by using the Fig. 5 described process of calculating the genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C k carries out.
[0071] The assignment calculation unit 112 writes the genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C k and the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ0, ..., ϕκ-1 into the main memory 12. (Step S113: Key setting process)
[0072] The key setting unit 113 sets the Genus-2 curve C calculated in step S112 κ as genus 2 curve C s as the public key. The key setting unit 113 sets the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ calculated in step S112 s := {ϕ0, ..., ϕ κ-1} as the secret key. That is, the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , whose starting point is the genus-2 curve C0 and whose end point is the genus-2 curve C s is set as the secret key.
[0073] The key setting unit 113 transmits the public key via the communication interface 14 to the encryption device 20 and the decryption device 30. The key setting unit 113 secretly transmits the secret key via the communication interface 14 to the decryption device 30. Secret transmission means, for example, that the transmission takes place after encryption according to an existing encryption scheme.
[0074] The secret key is the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s . Essentially, this means that a procedure of permutations σ0, ..., σ κ-1 , with which the roots in the process of step 13 in the process of calculating the genus-2 curve sequence C0, ..., C κ be rearranged, corresponds to the secret key.
[0075] With reference to Fig. 9, the operation of the decryption device 20 according to the first embodiment is described.
[0076] A sequence of operations of the decryption device 20 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to an encryption method according to the first embodiment. A program that implements the operation of the encryption device 20 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to an encryption program according to the first embodiment. (Step S211: Procurement process)
[0077] Procurement Unit 211 procures the Genus 2 Curve C s , which is the public key generated by the key generation device 10. The acquisition unit 211 acquires a plaintext m. The plaintext m is entered by a user of the encryption device 20.
[0078] The procurement unit 211 writes the Genus 2 curve C s and the plaintext m into memory 22. (Step S212: Encryption process)
[0079] The encryption unit 212 encrypts the plaintext m obtained in step S211 to convert the plaintext into a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m The encryption unit 212 converts the genus-2 curve C obtained in step S211 s , which is the public key, by the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m to create a genus 2 curve C m Then, the encryption unit 212 provides the genus-2 curve C m as ciphertext.
[0080] The encryption unit 212 transmits the ciphertext to the decryption device 30 via the communication interface 24.
[0081] With reference to Fig. 10, the operation of the decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment is described.
[0082] A sequence of operations of the decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a decryption method according to the first embodiment. A program that implements the operation of the decryption device 30 according to the first embodiment is equivalent to a decryption program according to the first embodiment. (Step S311: Procurement process)
[0083] The acquisition unit 311 acquires the public parameter and acquires the public key and the secret key generated by the key generation device 10. The acquisition unit 311 acquires the ciphertext generated by the encryption device 20.
[0084] The acquisition unit 311 writes the public parameter, the public key, the secret key and the ciphertext into the working memory 32. (Step S312: Decryption process)
[0085] The decryption unit 312 calculates a Richelot isogeny ϕ m , whose starting point is the genus-2 curve C obtained in step S311 s which is the public key, and whose endpoint is the genus-2 curve C obtained in step S311 m which is the ciphertext, based on the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is the secret key, and the genus-2 curve C0, which is the public key obtained in step S311. Subsequently, the decryption unit 312 decrypts the Richelot isogeny ϕ m to calculate a plaintext m' = m. This decoding is the reverse operation of the encoding performed in step S212.
[0086] The decryption unit 312 outputs the plaintext m' via the communication interface 14. *** Effects of the first embodiment ***
[0087] As described above, the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment implements the Genus-2 SETA cryptographic scheme by using the elliptic curves E0, E s and E m in the SETA encryption scheme by genus-2 curves C0, C s and C m be replaced and the isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m by the Richelot isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m be replaced.
[0088] In the Genus-2 SETA cryptographic scheme, the value of the prime number p used in the SETA encryption scheme can be reduced to 1 / 3. This allows the time required for decryption to be reduced. *** Other configurations ***<Erste Variante>
[0089] In the first embodiment, the case was described where the genus-2 curves C0, C s and C m The genus-2 curves C0, C used by the cryptographic system 1 according to the first embodiment s and C m can, however, be considered as abelian surfaces A0, A s and A m That is, a cryptographic scheme that has essentially the same effects as the Genus-2 SETA encryption scheme can be realized by using the elliptic curves E0, E s and E m in the SETA encryption scheme by the abelian surfaces A0, A s and A m be replaced and the isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m each by the Richelot isogeny sequences ϕ s and ϕ m be replaced.
[0090] When a genus-2 curve is used as in the first embodiment, it is desirable that the genus-2 curve be the genus-2 curve corresponding to a part of the abelian surface that is not decomposed into a direct product of the elliptic curve E0 and adjacent to a part of the abelian surface that is decomposed into a direct product of the elliptic curve E0.
[0091] If no genus-2 curve is used, it is desirable to use the part of the abelian surface that is decomposed into the direct product of the elliptic curve.
[0092] The elliptic curve E0 used in the direct product of the elliptic curve decomposing the abelian surface is E0 / F p : y 2 = x 3 + x, if the remainder of the division of the prime number p by 4 is 3, or E0 / F p : y 2 = x 3+ c, if the remainder of the division of the prime number p by 4 is 1, where c is a constant. Note that F p is a field modulo the prime number p. <Zweite Variante>
[0093] In the first embodiment, the functional components are implemented by software. In the second variant, the functional components can be implemented by hardware. With regard to this second variant, differences from the first embodiment are described.
[0094] Referring to Fig. 11, a configuration of the key generating device 10 according to the second variant is described.
[0095] When the functional components are implemented by hardware, the key generation device 10 includes an electronic circuit 15 instead of the processor 11, the main memory 12, and the data memory 13. The electronic circuit 15 is a dedicated circuit that implements the functions of the functional components, the main memory 12, and the data memory 13.
[0096] Referring to Fig. 12 describes a configuration of the encryption device 20 according to the second variant.
[0097] When the functional components are implemented by hardware, the encryption device 20 includes an electronic circuit 25 instead of the processor 21, the main memory 22, and the data memory 23. The electronic circuit 25 is a dedicated circuit that implements the functions of the functional components, the main memory 22, and the data memory 23.
[0098] Referring to Fig. 13, a configuration of the decryption device 30 according to the second variant is described.
[0099] When the functional components are implemented by hardware, the decryption device 30 includes an electronic circuit 35 instead of the processor 31, the RAM 32, and the data memory 33. The electronic circuit 35 is a dedicated circuit that implements the functions of the functional components, the RAM 32, and the data memory 33.
[0100] Each of the electronic circuits 15, 25 and 35 is assumed to be a single circuit, a composite circuit, a programmed processor, a parallel-programmed processor, a logic IC, a gate array (GA), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a field-programmable gate array (FPGA).
[0101] The functional components may be implemented by one electronic circuit 15, one electronic circuit 25, and one electronic circuit 35, or the functional components may be distributed among and implemented by a plurality of electronic circuits 15, a plurality of electronic circuits 25, and a plurality of electronic circuits 35. <Dritte Variante>
[0102] As a third variant, some of the functional components can be realized by hardware, and the remaining functional components can be realized by software.
[0103] Each of the processors 11, 21, 31, the main memory 12, 22, 32, the data storage 13, 23, 33, and the electronic circuits 15, 25, and 35 is referred to as a processing circuit. This means that the functions of the functional components are realized by the processing circuit.
[0104] The embodiments and variants of the present disclosure have been explained above. Two or more of these embodiments and variants may be implemented in combination. Alternatively, one or more of them may be partially implemented. The present disclosure is not limited to these embodiments and variants, and various modifications may be made as needed. List of reference symbols
[0105] 1: Cryptographic system, 10: Key generating device, 11: Processor, 12: Working memory, 13: Data storage, 14: Communication interface, 15: Electronic circuit, 111: Acquisition unit, 112: Allocation calculation unit, 113: Key setting unit, 20: Encryption device, 21: Processor, 22: Working memory, 23: Data storage, 24: Communication interface, 25: Electronic circuit, 211: Acquisition unit, 212: Encryption unit, 30: Decryption device, 31: Processor, 32: Working memory, 33: Data storage, 34: Communication interface, 35: Electronic circuit, 311: Acquisition unit, 312: Decryption unit.
Claims
[1] Cryptographic system (1) for performing a cryptographic process in which a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is a secret key and the abelian surface A s is a public key, wherein the cryptographic system (1) comprises: an encryption device (20) for generating an abelian surface A m by calculating the abelian area A s , which is the public key, by a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m , which is generated by encrypting a plaintext m, and the abelian surface A m as ciphertext; and a decryption device (30) for determining a Richelot isogeny ϕ m , whose starting point is the abelian surface A s which is the public key and whose endpoint is the abelian surface Am which is the ciphertext, based on the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is the secret key. [2] Cryptographic system (1) according to claim 1, further comprising a key generating means (10) for calculating a Richelot isogeny ϕ0 of an abelian surface A0, for calculating an abelian surface A1, a Richelot isogeny ϕ i to calculate an abelian surface A i+1 to calculate by zero points of the abelian surface A i for each integer i of i = 1, ..., κ-1 rearranged in ascending order, using an integer κ of 2 or more, the abelian surface A s , which has an abelian surface A κ is to set the public key, and the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is a set of Richelot isogenies ϕ i for integers i of i = 0, ..., κ-1, as the secret key. [3] Cryptographic system (1) according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the cryptographic system (1) uses as the abelian surface A0 a genus-2 curve corresponding to the abelian surface A0. [4] Cryptographic system (1) according to claim 3, wherein the genus-2 curve corresponds to a part of the abelian surface A0 which is not decomposed into a direct product of an elliptic curve E0 and which is adjacent to a part of the abelian surface which is decomposed into a direct product of the elliptic curve E0. [5] Cryptographic system (1) according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the cryptographic system (1) uses as the Abelian surface A0 a part of the Abelian surface which is decomposed into a direct product of an elliptic curve E0. [6] Cryptographic system (1) according to claim 4 or 5, wherein the elliptic curve E0 E0 / F p : y 2 = x 3+ x if a remainder of the division of a prime number p by 4 is 3, or E0 / F p : y 2 = x 3 + c if the remainder of dividing the prime number p by 4 is 1, where c is a constant. [7] Encryption device (20) in a cryptographic system (1) for carrying out a cryptographic process in which a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is a secret key and the abelian surface A s is a public key, wherein the encryption device (20) comprises an encryption unit (212) for generating an abelian surface A m by calculating the abelian area A s , which is the public key, by a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m , which is generated by encrypting a plaintext m, and the abelian surface Am as ciphertext. [8] Decryption device (30) in a cryptographic system (1) for carrying out a cryptographic process in which a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is a secret key and the abelian surface A s is a public key, wherein the decryption device (30) comprises: a procurement unit (311) for obtaining a ciphertext having an abelian surface A m which is calculated by calculating the abelian surface A s , which is the public key, by a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ m , which is generated by encoding a plaintext m; and a decryption unit (312) to calculate a Richelot isogeny ϕ m , whose starting point is the abelian surface A swhich is the public key and whose endpoint is the abelian surface A m which is the ciphertext acquired by the acquisition unit (311), based on the Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , which is the secret key. [9] Key generating device (10) in a cryptographic system (1) for carrying out a cryptographic process in which a Richelot isogeny sequence ϕ s , whose starting point is an abelian surface A0 and whose end point is an abelian surface A s is a secret key and the abelian surface A s is a public key, wherein the key generating device (10) comprises: an acquisition unit (111) for acquiring an abelian surface A0 which is a public parameter; an allocation calculation unit (112) for calculating a Richelot isogeny ϕ0 of the abelian surface A0 acquired by the acquisition unit (111), for calculating an abelian surface A1 and for calculating a Richelot isogeny ϕ i to calculate an abelian surface A i+1 to calculate by zero points of the abelian surface A i for each integer i of i = 1, ..., κ-1, rearrange in ascending order using an integer κ of 2 or more; and a key setting unit (113) for calculating an abelian surface A calculated by the allocation calculation unit (112) k as the public key and a Richelot isogeny sequence, which is a set of Richelot isogenies ϕ i for integers i of i = 0, ..., κ-1, as the secret key.
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Patent Citations
Computing genus-2 curves using general isogenies
US20140105386A1
