Railway vehicle, associated railway system and method for composition of such a railway vehicle

Abstract

The present invention relates to a railway vehicle (12) comprising: - a plurality of cars (13) including a lead car (16) and a set of cars to be guided (18) including a trailing car (20), - a control system (15) for the integrity of the railway vehicle (12) comprising: + a transmitter (26) located on board the trailing car (20) and configured to transmit a control signal; + an electronic control unit (28) located on board the lead car (16) and configured to receive the control signal and command the railway vehicle (12) to stop if the control signal is not received; + a communication network (29) for transmitting the control signal; The control signal consists of an encrypted signal including an identification code, the electronic control unit (28) being configured to decrypt the control signal.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a railway vehicle comprising a plurality of cars, including a lead car defining one end of the railway vehicle, and a set of guide cars connected to the lead car, the set of guide cars comprising a tail car located at one end of the tail of the railway vehicle opposite the lead end, and a first railway vehicle integrity control system for controlling the attachment of each car of the set of guide cars to the lead car, the first control system comprising a transmitter configured to emit a control signal, the transmitter being located on board the tail car; an electronic control unit configured to receive the control signal and command the railway vehicle to stop in the event of failure to receive the control signal, the electronic control unit being located on board the lead car;and a communication network to carry the control signal to the electronic control unit, said communication network comprising a plurality of network nodes, including at least one on board each car of the set of cars to be guided, the communication network being configured so that the control signal passes through at least one network node on board each car of the set of cars to be guided before reaching the electronic control unit. The detachment of a car from the rest of the railway vehicle can have significant consequences and lead to serious accidents. Therefore, monitoring the integrity of the railway vehicle is a crucial element for railway safety. This monitoring of the integrity of the railway vehicle consists of checking the mechanical attachment of the constituent cars of the railway vehicle to the lead car.

[0002] We know from document WO 2010 / 057623 of controlling the integrity of a railway vehicle by receiving signals arranged on each car of the railway vehicle.

[0003] Thus, it is known to monitor the integrity of the railway vehicle in real time and to immediately stop the railway vehicle if any breach of its integrity is detected. This immediate stop helps prevent accidents.

[0004] Such a system for monitoring the integrity of a railway vehicle is described, for example, in EP 1 465 358. In this document, all the cars of a railway vehicle are equipped with several network nodes capable of transmitting or receiving a control signal. This control signal is continuously transmitted through the network formed by all the network nodes. A breach of the railway vehicle's integrity is detected by the failure of one of the network nodes to receive a signal. The railway vehicle is then brought to a stop.

[0005] However, such a solution does not protect against interference from other rail vehicles operating alongside the rail vehicle, nor against potential cyberattacks on the network. Furthermore, this solution does not allow for rapid coupling of the individual cars comprising the rail vehicle, as connecting each module to the network is a lengthy and complex process.

[0006] One aim of the invention is to enhance the security of a railway vehicle's integrity control system, particularly by preventing external interference and cyberattacks. Other objectives include minimizing the cost of such a system and enabling easy and rapid coupling of the railway vehicle's carriages.

[0007] For this purpose, the invention relates to a railway vehicle according to claim 1.

[0008] According to particular embodiments, the railway vehicle comprises one or more of the features of claims 2 to 8.

[0009] The invention also relates to a railway system according to claim 9.

[0010] The invention also relates to a method for composing railway vehicles according to claim 10.

[0011] The invention also relates to a method for composing railway vehicles according to claim 11.

[0012] The invention will be better understood upon reading the following description, given solely by way of example, and made with reference to the attached drawings, in which: there Figure 1 is a top view of a railway system according to the invention; the Figure 2 is a schematic side view of a railway vehicle of the railway system of the Figure 1 ; there Figure 3 is a schematic side view of a car equipping the railway vehicle of the Figure 2 .

[0013] The railway system 10 illustrated on the Figure 1 includes a computer server 11, a railway vehicle 12 and a railway infrastructure 14.

[0014] Computer server 11 includes a database.

[0015] The railway vehicle 12 comprises a plurality of cars 13 and a system 15 for controlling the integrity of the railway vehicle 12.

[0016] The cars 13 consist of a leading car 16 defining one end of the railway vehicle 12 and at least one, or here a plurality, of guide cars 18, including a trailing car 20 located at one end of the trailing car 12. Advantageously, the railway vehicle is a freight train. The leading car 16 is then a locomotive and each guide car 18 is a wagon.

[0017] In an advantageous embodiment, the rail vehicle 12 is configured to travel in both directions. The rear car 20 is then also a locomotive capable of hauling the other cars 13 that make up the rail vehicle 12.

[0018] The railway infrastructure 14 includes 22 rails and 24 radio stations. The 24 radio stations are located on the side of the 22 rails.

[0019] The rail vehicle 12 is located on rails 22 and is capable of running on rails 22.

[0020] With reference to the Figure 2 The control system 15 is configured to control the attachment of the guide car or cars 18, including the tail car 20, to the lead car 16. For this purpose, the control system 15 includes a transmitter 26, an electronic control unit 28 and a communication network 29.

[0021] Transmitter 26 is located in the rear car 20. It is configured to emit a control signal.

[0022] The control signal is encrypted.

[0023] The electronic control unit 28 is located in the lead car 16.

[0024] The electronic control unit 28 is advantageously a self-contained piece of equipment that interfaces with the control and signaling equipment of the railway vehicle 12.

[0025] Alternatively, the electronic control unit 28 is integrated directly into the control and / or signalling equipment of the railway vehicle 12.

[0026] According to another variant, the electronic control unit 28 is configured to cooperate with a braking device of the vehicle 12 and to automatically transmit braking commands to the braking device to limit the risks of breaching the integrity of the railway vehicle 12.

[0027] The electronic control unit 28 is configured to receive the control signal and command the railway vehicle 12 to stop if the control signal is not received.

[0028] Alternatively, the railway vehicle 12 also includes a second control system 15 whose composition is similar to that of the first control system 15 but in which the transmitter 26 is located in the front car 16 and the electronic control unit 18 is located in the rear car 20.

[0029] The communication network 29 is capable of carrying the control signal emitted by the transmitter 26 to the electronic control unit 28. For this purpose, it comprises a plurality of network nodes 30. Each car 13 includes at least one of these network nodes 30 and the communication network 29 is configured so that the control signal passes through at least one network node 30 on board each car 13 before reaching the electronic control unit 28.

[0030] Each car 13 advantageously has a multitude of network nodes 30 allowing for redundancy of the network nodes 30. Thus, in the event of failure of a network node 30, the communication network 29 is still able to carry the control signal.

[0031] Advantageously, the network nodes 30 are adapted to transmit the control signal emitted by the transmitter 26 without deciphering or modifying it, the network nodes 30 not including an algorithm for deciphering the control signal.

[0032] Network nodes 30 can thus be formed from simple, standardized nodes, requiring no encryption or decryption devices. Network nodes 30 also do not require an IT security system, as the control signal is transmitted in encrypted form within each network node 30. The cost of supplying and installing network nodes 30 is therefore low. Furthermore, because network nodes 30 are standardized, considerable flexibility is possible in the composition of the railway vehicles 12.

[0033] Advantageously, the transmitter 26, the control unit 28, and the network nodes 30 are electrically powered independently. The communication network 29 is therefore independent of the power supply to the rail vehicle 12, making the communication network 29 more robust. Adding such a control system 15 to an unequipped rail vehicle 12 is also simplified.

[0034] To this end, each car 13 advantageously contains, as illustrated on the Figure 3 , at least one photovoltaic cell 32 capable of electrically supplying the elements which, among the transmitter 26, the control unit 28 and the network nodes 30, are on board said car 13.

[0035] Alternatively, each car 13 contains at least one vibration energy source 34 capable of electrically powering the components, including the transmitter 26, the control unit 28, and the network nodes 30, located on board said car 13. The vibration energy source 34 converts the vibration energy of the car 13 into electrical energy. The vibration energy source 34 is, for example, a piezoelectric transducer.

[0036] The network nodes 30 advantageously include overhead nodes 36. Each car 13 includes at least one overhead node 36. Each overhead node 36 is equipped with a wireless communication module and is adapted to communicate wirelessly with the overhead node(s) 36 located within a predetermined perimeter. The use of a GPS system between the network nodes 30 and at least one satellite is therefore unnecessary, as the overhead nodes 36 communicate directly with each other. The connection of the network nodes 30 is thus ensured continuously, even when the rail vehicle 12 is passing through a tunnel, for example.

[0037] In an advantageous embodiment, the predetermined perimeter has an overall spherical shape centered on the aerial node 36 and a radius advantageously less than 30 m.

[0038] Alternatively, the predetermined perimeter has an overall ellipsoidal shape oriented along the direction of the railway vehicle 12 and / or an ellipsoidal shape oriented orthogonally to the direction of the railway vehicle 12.

[0039] Advantageously, for each car 13, at least one air node 36, preferably a single air node 36 is located at each interface with another car 13.

[0040] Advantageously, the wireless communication module of each 36 air node is compatible with the Zigbee or WiFi protocol or the Bluetooth standard.

[0041] Each air node 36 is configured to communicate with a mobile terminal of an operator. The mobile terminal is, for example, a mobile phone or a digital tablet.

[0042] Each air node 36 is capable of connecting to or disconnecting from the communication network 29 by command of the operator using said mobile terminal.

[0043] The operator's mobile terminal is capable of displaying the status of the communication network 29, thus enabling the diagnosis of a defective network node 30.

[0044] Each 36 air node is associated with a unique identifier and is configured to transmit the unique identifier over the air.

[0045] The railway vehicle 12 advantageously includes a human-machine interface carried, for example, by the electronic control unit 28. The integrity status of the railway vehicle 12 is communicated to the driver of the railway vehicle 12 or to an operator by means of the human-machine interface.

[0046] The control signal consists of an encrypted signal containing an identification code. The electronic control unit 28 is configured to decrypt the control signal in order to obtain the identification code.

[0047] Thus, encrypting the control signal protects the communication network 29 against external attacks. The control signal emitted by the transmitter 26 cannot be read by a third party connecting to the communication network 29. Therefore, the third party cannot retrieve the identification code and falsify the control signal.

[0048] In an advantageous embodiment, the control signal is encrypted using a rolling code in which the encryption key exchanged between the transmitter 26 and the receiving electronic control unit 28 is not unique but changes with each transmission of a new control signal. This encryption technique prevents any replay attack. Indeed, if the control signal is recorded and repeated on the communication network 29 by an external user, the electronic control unit 28 detects the incorrect encryption key and ignores the received signal.

[0049] Advantageously, the identification code is uniquely associated with the issuer 26.

[0050] Thus, the communication network 29 of the railway vehicle 12 cannot interfere with an additional railway vehicle 12 located near said railway vehicle 12. Indeed, even if the network nodes 30 of the railway vehicle 12 and the additional railway vehicle 12 are able to connect with each other and transmit the respective control signals to the other railway vehicle 12, in the event of the control signal of the additional railway vehicle 12 being received by one of the overhead nodes 36 of said railway vehicle 12, the electronic control unit 28 detects the wrong identification code and does not consider the received control signal as valid.

[0051] According to the invention, the railway vehicle 12 comprises a plurality of accelerometers 38 advantageously dispersed among the cars 13 so that each car 13 is equipped with at least one accelerometer 38. Each network node 30 is connected to an accelerometer 38, said accelerometer 38 preferably being mounted on board the same car 13 as the network node 30.

[0052] The accelerometers 38 are configured to operate during the coupling phase of the different cars 13 as well as during the movement of the railway vehicle 12 on the rails 22.

[0053] Each network node 30 is configured to transmit on the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30.

[0054] The acceleration measurement consists of an instantaneous measurement of an acceleration value or an acceleration profile over a given period of time.

[0055] Advantageously, the electronic control unit 28 is configured to directly receive the acceleration measurement emitted by each accelerometer 38.

[0056] Alternatively, the transmitter 26 is configured to receive the acceleration measurement transmitted by each network node 30. The transmitter 26 is also configured to include this acceleration measurement in the control signal. The electronic control unit 28 is then configured to retrieve, from the control signal, the acceleration measurement taken by each network node 30.

[0057] The control unit 28 is also configured to compare said acceleration measurements with each other.

[0058] The electronic control unit 28 is thus capable of detecting a breach of integrity of the rail vehicle 12 in the event that at least two of said acceleration measurements measured by at least two network nodes 30 diverge significantly. Two acceleration measurements are considered to diverge when the difference between two acceleration measurements exceeds a predetermined threshold, for example, equal to 10% of the larger of the two measured acceleration values. The electronic control unit 28 is also configured to issue a warning signal and / or to trigger the stopping of the rail vehicle 12 when such a breach of integrity is detected. Advantageously, the electronic control unit 28 is capable of transmitting the warning signal to a rail traffic control center 22, which is then capable of taking appropriate safety measures, such as stopping vehicle traffic on the rails 22 of the infrastructure.

[0059] The detection of the breach of integrity of the railway vehicle 12 is thus very rapid and therefore allows for enhanced railway safety.

[0060] The electronic control unit 28 is configured to transmit on the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by at least one accelerometer 38 located in the lead car 16.

[0061] Each network node 30 is configured to receive said acceleration measurement emitted by the electronic control unit 28.

[0062] Each network node 30 is also configured to compare said acceleration measurement emitted by the electronic control unit 28 to the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30.

[0063] Each network node 30 is able to connect to the communication network 29 if the acceleration measurement emitted by the electronic control unit 28 is compatible with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 associated with the network node 30.

[0064] According to a preferred variant of the invention, the railway vehicle 12 is a freight transport train.

[0065] The database of computer server 11 then contains information relating to transported goods, each piece of information being associated with at least one unique identifier of an air node 36 of the railway vehicle 12.

[0066] Each radio station 24 located on the side of the rails 22 is also configured to receive the unique identifier emitted by at least one air node 36 of the rail vehicle 12 when the radio station 24 is within the predetermined perimeter of at least one air node 36.

[0067] Radio station 24 is also configured to, when it has received such a unique identifier, send to computer server 11 an information signal including this unique identifier.

[0068] The computer server 11 is then able to deduce from this information signal, by comparing the one or each unique identifier included in this signal with the database, the position of goods in the railway infrastructure 14.

[0069] A first method for composing railway vehicle 12 will now be described.

[0070] This composition comprises two steps: the creation of the communication network 29 from the different network nodes 30 and then the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28.

[0071] The creation of communication network 29 takes place in the following manner.

[0072] Initially, a lead car 16 is located on rails 22.

[0073] An operator creates a communication network linking the electronic control unit 28 and the aerial nodes 36 of the lead car 16 by means of a dedicated application installed on his mobile terminal.

[0074] Advantageously, the operator associates a unique identifier with this communication network, which it communicates to all nodes of the network.

[0075] A guide car 18 is then juxtaposed with the lead car 16.

[0076] The guide car 18 is then mechanically linked to the lead car 16.

[0077] Then, the operator, equipped with a mobile terminal, positions themselves near the guide car 18. When the operator is within the predetermined range of an air node 36 of the guide car 18, the operator connects to the air node 36 using the mobile terminal. The operator receives from the air node 36 its associated unique identifier and an identification number associated with the car 13 containing said air node 36. If the information received by the operator is consistent, they connect said air node 36 to the communication network of the lead car 16 using the mobile terminal and transmit to it the unique identifier associated with said communication network.

[0078] Next, a new guide car 18 is juxtaposed with the previously attached guide car 18. It is then mechanically linked to the lead car 16 via the previously attached guide car 18, and its aerial nodes 36 are connected to the previously mentioned communication network using the method described above.

[0079] This step is repeated for any number of cars to be guided 18, until a tail car 20 is attached. The communication network thus obtained by adding the aerial nodes 36 of the different cars 16, 18, 20 constitutes the communication network 29.

[0080] All the air nodes 36 of the communication network 29 are thus connected and can communicate with each other. Advantageously, each air node 36 adds the identifier of the communication network 29 to the signals that the air node 36 transmits on the network. Each air node 36 receives the signals transmitted by other air nodes 36 but only transmits the received signal to the rest of the communication network 29 if the identifier read in the signal corresponds to the unique identifier associated with said communication network 29.

[0081] Once the tail car 20 is attached, the transmitter 26 of said tail car 20 is coupled to the electronic control unit 28 so that the electronic control unit 28 identifies the identification code of the transmitter 26 and associates it with the transmitter 26. This step constitutes the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28.

[0082] To do this, the operator, for example, connects the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 by connecting the transmitter 26 directly to the electronic control unit 28. Once the connection between the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 is established, the transmitter 26 is disconnected from the electronic control unit 28 and positioned in the rear car 20. Advantageously, the transmitter 26 is physically fixed to a network node 30 of the rear car 20.

[0083] Alternatively, the operator performs the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 using the mobile terminal, with the transmitter 26 remaining located in the rear car 20.

[0084] According to another variant, the electronic control unit 28 is configured to be coupled with a single transmitter 26 in order to avoid safety problems in the event that additional cars are added to the vehicle and the transmitter 26 is not removed.

[0085] The composition of the railway vehicle 12 is therefore easily done, obtaining the communication network 29 is done quickly by means of a mobile terminal.

[0086] A second method for composing a railway vehicle 12 will now be described.

[0087] Initially, a guide car 18 is juxtaposed with the lead car 16.

[0088] The guide car 18 is then mechanically linked to the lead car 16.

[0089] The electronic control unit 28 transmits on the communication network 29 the acceleration measurement measured at the moment of mechanical connection by at least one accelerometer 38 located in the lead car 16.

[0090] Acceleration measurement is an instantaneous value or an acceleration profile over a given period of time.

[0091] This acceleration measurement is broadcast by at least one air node 36 of the lead car 16 and is captured by at least one air node 36 of the car to be guided 18. This latter air node 36 compares the acceleration measurement thus received with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 associated with said air node 36 and connects to the communication network 29 if said acceleration measurements are compatible.

[0092] Alternatively, each accelerometer 38 transmits to the communication network 29 the acceleration measurement measured at the time of the mechanical link.

[0093] Each air node 36 of the car to be guided 18 connects to the communication network 29 if one of the received acceleration measurements is compatible with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 linked to said air node 36.

[0094] Alternatively, the connection of each air node to the communication network 29 must be validated / approved by the operator with their terminal.

[0095] Next, a new guide car 18 is juxtaposed with the previously attached guide car 18. It is then mechanically linked to the lead car 16 via the previously attached guide car 18, and its overhead nodes 36 are connected to the communication network 29 by means of the process described above.

[0096] This step is repeated for any number of cars to be guided 18, until a tail car 20 is attached.

[0097] Once the tail car 20 is attached, the transmitter 26 of said tail car 20 is coupled to the electronic control unit 28 so that the electronic control unit 28 associates the identification code with the transmitter 26. This coupling is typically done in a similar manner to that described for the first composition method.

[0098] The composition of the railway vehicle 12 is thus done in a very simple way, no action from the operator being necessary in order to obtain the communication network 29.

[0099] An operating procedure for the integrity control system 15 will now be described.

[0100] Initially, the railway vehicle 12 travels on the rails 22, the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 being ensured.

[0101] Transmitter 26 continuously emits an encrypted control signal comprising a unique identification code associated with transmitter 26. Advantageously, the unique identification code is changed with each new transmission of information by a rolling code algorithm.

[0102] The communication network 29 carries this control signal to the electronic control unit 28, the control signal passing through at least one network node 30 of each car 13. The electronic control unit 28 receives and deciphers the control signal. The electronic control unit 29 verifies that the received unique identification code corresponds to that of the transmitter 26 with which the electronic control unit 28 is coupled.

[0103] Optionally, each network node 30 simultaneously transmits to the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30. The electronic control unit 28 retrieves the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to each network node 30 and compares said acceleration measurements with each other.

[0104] As long as the electronic control unit 28 receives the unique identification code associated with the transmitter 26 and as long as the acceleration measures remain compatible, the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 is ensured.

[0105] In the event of a breach in the integrity of the rail vehicle 12, the distance between the two cars 13 on either side of the breached interface increases. When the distance between the overhead network nodes 36 located on either side of the breached interface exceeds the radius of the predetermined perimeter, the transmission of the control signal between the two overhead network nodes 36 is interrupted. Since the electronic control unit 28 no longer receives the unique identification code from the transmitter 26, it deduces the breach in the integrity of the rail vehicle 12 and commands the rail vehicle 12 to stop.

[0106] The breach of the integrity of the rail vehicle 12 also results in the acceleration measurements of at least two network nodes 30 located on either side of the breached interface diverging. This divergence will be detected by the electronic control unit 28 when it compares these two acceleration measurements, which will also deduce the breach of the integrity of the rail vehicle 12 and consequently command the rail vehicle 12 to stop.

[0107] This comparison of acceleration measurements thus allows for faster detection of integrity breaches than by simply detecting a break in the transmission of the control signal. Furthermore, it enables redundancy in the means of monitoring the integrity of railway vehicle 12.

[0108] Alternatively, the electronic control unit 28 only emits a warning signal when a breach of integrity in the rail vehicle 12 is detected by comparing acceleration measurements. The rail vehicle 12 is then only brought to a stop when the breach of integrity is detected due to the failure to receive the identification code.

[0109] Thanks to the invention described above, it is possible to strengthen the security of the integrity control system 15 of a railway vehicle 12, in particular in order to avoid external interference and computer attacks, while minimizing the cost of such a system.

[0110] This invention also allows for easy and rapid composition of a railway vehicle 12 as well as simple, responsive and redundant operation of the railway vehicle 12 integrity control system 15.

Claims

1. Railway vehicle (12) including: - a plurality of carriages (13) of which a leading carriage (16) defining a leading end of the railway vehicle (12), and a set of carriages to be guided (18) connected to the leading carriage (16), the set of carriages to be guided (18) comprising a trailing carriage (20) located at a trailing end of the railway vehicle (12) opposite the leading end, and - a first system (15) for controlling the integrity of the railway vehicle (12) for controlling the attachment of each carriage of the set of carriages to be guided (18) to the leading carriage (16), the first control system (15) comprising: + a transmitter (26) configured to transmit a control signal, the transmitter (26) being located on board the trailing carriage (20); + an electronic control unit (28) configured to receive the control signal and command the stopping of the railway vehicle (12) in the event of no reception of the control signal, the electronic control unit (28) being located on board the leading carriage (16); and + a communication network (29) for routing the control signal to the electronic control unit (28), said communication network (29) comprising a plurality of network nodes (30), of which at least one on board each carriage of the set of carriages to be guided (18), the communication network (29) being configured so that the control signal transits through at least one network node (30) on board each carriage of the set of carriages to be guided (18) before reaching the electronic control unit (28), wherein the control signal consists of an encrypted signal comprising an identification code uniquely associated with the transmitter (26), the electronic control unit (28) being configured to decrypt the control signal in such a way as to obtain the identification code, the railway vehicle (12) comprises a plurality of accelerometers (38), each carriage (13) being equipped with at least one accelerometer (38), each network node (30) being connected to an accelerometer (38), and: - each network node (30) is configured to transmit over the communication network (29) an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer (38) connected to said network node (30), the acceleration measurement consisting of an instantaneous measurement of an acceleration value or by an acceleration profile over a given period of time; - the electronic control unit (28) is configured to receive the acceleration measurement measured by each network node (30), and to compare said acceleration measurements with each other; and - the electronic control unit (28) is capable of detecting a break in the integrity of the railway vehicle in the case where at least two of said acceleration measurements measured by at least two network nodes diverge, therefore when a difference between two acceleration measurements, measured by two accelerometers, is greater than a predetermined threshold value; the electronic control unit being configured to transmit a warning signal and / or trigger the stopping of the railway vehicle (12) when such a break in integrity is detected.

2. Railway vehicle (12) according to claim 1, wherein the railway vehicle (12) also comprises a second control system (15) the composition of which is similar to that of the first control system (15) but for which the corresponding transmitter (26) is located on board the leading carriage (16) and the corresponding electronic control unit (28) is located on board the trailing carriage (20).

3. Railway vehicle (12) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the network nodes (30) are adapted to transmit the control signal without decrypting it.

4. Railway vehicle (12) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the network nodes (30) comprise aerial nodes (36), of which at least one on board each carriage of the set of carriages to be guided (18), each aerial node (36) being provided with a wireless communication module and being adapted to communicate by air with the or each other aerial node (36) located within a predetermined perimeter.

5. Railway vehicle (12) according to claim 4, wherein the wireless communication module is compatible with the Zigbee or WiFi protocol or the Bluetooth standard.

6. Railway vehicle (12) according to one of claims 4 or 5, wherein each aerial node (36) is configured to communicate with a mobile terminal of an operator.

7. Railway vehicle (12) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein at least one element from the transmitter (26), the electronic control unit (28) and the network nodes (30) is autonomously electrically powered by at least one photovoltaic cell (32) and / or at least one vibrational energy source (34).

8. Railway vehicle (12) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: - the electronic control unit (28) is configured to transmit over the communication network (29) an acceleration measurement measured by at least one accelerometer (38) located in the leading carriage (16); - each network node (30) is configured to receive said acceleration measurement and to compare this acceleration measurement to an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer (38) connected to said network node (30).

9. Railway system (10) comprising: - a railway vehicle (12) according to any one of claims 4 to 6, said railway vehicle (12) constituting a goods transport vehicle, each aerial node (36) of said railway vehicle (12) being configured to transmit an associated unique identifier; - a computer server (11) comprising a database, the database containing information relating to goods transported by the railway vehicle (12) and, associated with each of this information, at least one unique aerial node identifier (36), - a railway infrastructure (14) configured to enable the circulation of the railway vehicle (12), the railway infrastructure (14) comprising at least one radio station (24) configured to receive at least one unique identifier transmitted by at least one aerial node (36) and send an information signal comprising the at least one unique identifier to the computer server (11), the computer server (11) being capable of deducing from the unique identifier the position of the goods in the railway infrastructure (14) by comparison with the database.

10. Method for composing a railway vehicle (12) according to claim 6, including the following steps: - juxtaposing a carriage to be guided (18) to the leading carriage (16) or to a carriage (13) linked to the leading carriage (16); - mechanically connecting the carriage to be guided (18) to the leading carriage (16) or to the carriage (13) linked to the leading carriage; - connecting each aerial node (36) of the carriage to be guided (18) to the communication network (29) by an operator by means of a mobile terminal.

11. Method for composing a railway vehicle (12) according to claim 8 including the following steps: - juxtaposing a carriage to be guided (18) to the leading carriage (16) or to a carriage (13) linked to the leading carriage (16); - mechanically connecting the carriage to be guided (18) to the leading carriage (16) or to the carriage linked to the leading carriage (13); - transmitting, by the electronic control unit (28), an acceleration measurement measured by at least one accelerometer (38) located in the leading carriage (16); - receiving, by the network nodes (30) of the carriage to be guided (18), said measurement of the acceleration transmitted by the electronic control unit (28); - for each network node (30) of the carriage to be guided (18), comparing said acceleration measurement transmitted by the electronic control unit (28) with an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer (38) connected to said network node (30), and - when said measurement of the acceleration transmitted by the electronic control unit (28) is substantially equal to said measurement of the acceleration measured by the accelerometer (38) connected to said network node (30), connecting said network node (30) to the communication network (29).

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