Control system for controlling a blocking device of an air line, track-bound vehicle, and method for operating a control system

Abstract

The invention relates to a control system (30) for controlling a blocking device of an air line of a system (40) for mechanically and pneumatically connecting track-bound vehicles (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) in a vehicle train (21), wherein the control system (30) comprises: a central vehicle train controller (22); at least one vehicle controller (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3) which is paired with the individual vehicle; a coupling controller (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) paired with each mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f); and an actuator which is paired with the individual blocking device. The invention is characterized in that the central vehicle train controller (22) is designed such that a connection canceling request (A) can be specified in the vehicle train controller from at least two signals (EK, F) which are independent of each other, in particular which can be generated independently of each other, and the actuation of the blocking device is cleared only when both signals (EK, F) are present in the control system (30).

Description

[0001] Control system for controlling a shut-off device of an air line, a rail-bound vehicle and a method for operating the control system

[0002] The invention relates to a control system for controlling a shut-off device of an air line, a rail-bound vehicle and a method for operating the control system.

[0003] The connection of air lines, especially compressed air lines, in rail-bound vehicles, especially freight wagons, is currently performed manually using appropriate air couplings. A main air line and, if present, an existing main air reservoir line are connected using appropriate coupling hoses carrying a coupling head, creating a pneumatic connection. This manual connection process requires the physical handling and fastening of coupling hoses and coupling heads. In addition, a manually operated air shut-off valve is provided at the ends of the main air line and main air reservoir line of each vehicle. This allows the respective line to be closed and opened to interrupt or release the air flow.

[0004] These air lines, particularly the main air line and main reservoir air line, are essential components of compressed air systems in trainsets made up of rail-bound vehicles. They are used to transmit compressed air, which is required for various functions within the train, in particular for controlling the air brakes. The compressed air lines usually consist of robust pipes or flexible hoses laid along the length of the vehicles. The main air line is a special compressed air line that runs along the entire trainset and connects all vehicles. It serves to continuously supply all vehicles with compressed air. In the main air line, a flow of compressed air is usually generated by one vehicle or another lead vehicle and distributed over the entire length of the trainset. The main air line is crucial for the proper functioning of the air brakes.

[0005] The main air reservoir line is an additional line for carrying compressed air that is present on some vehicle types. It connects the main air reservoirs of the individual vehicles. Main air reservoirs are compressed air reservoirs in which compressed air is stored for braking and other air-driven systems. The main air reservoir line allows the pressure in the main air reservoirs of the various vehicles to be equalized, ensuring a consistent pressure supply throughout the entire train.

[0006] The conventional procedure of manually connecting the compressed air lines and operating the air shut-off valves is time-consuming and carries the risk of errors or carelessness. This can also lead to problems with the air supply and control of the compressed air brakes. However, as part of the planned introduction of an automatic mechanical coupling, there is also a requirement to be able to automatically couple and uncouple the main air line and, where available, the main air reservoir line between individual vehicles and to a towing vehicle, as well as to replace the function of the air shut-off valve with a controllable valve device. In this case, it must be ensured that the function of the air shut-off valve, which can be replicated by an automatically controllable valve device in a main air line, is carried out with the required reliability and, moreover, at least corresponds to the current state of the art.This requires that the valve device is activated, and thus that it does not close undesirably, in critical situations or too early. In particular, if the vehicle or train section is not fully braked before mechanical uncoupling, closing the valve device in the main air line maintains the pressure in the main air line and the vehicle or vehicle section does not brake automatically. This means that it can continue to roll or move away if it is not secured in some other way. In freight wagon transport, this type of behavior may be expressly desired, particularly in shunting areas. However, it must be ensured that a vehicle is not uncoupled without braking at an inopportune time in other operational situations.In particular, premature closing must be ruled out in the following situations: within the coupled train formation after the main air line test (as part of the brake test before the trains are used), during uncoupling if it is not permitted operationally or not expressly requested, in the event of an unintentional or forcible train separation, during shunting if it is not permitted operationally or not expressly requested, in the uncoupled state if it is not permitted operationally or not expressly requested.

[0007] The invention is therefore based on the object of creating a control system for controlling the shut-off device in an air line, in particular the main air line of a system for mechanically and pneumatically connecting two vehicles. This system reliably prevents the valve device from being activated and actuated at the wrong time and allows reliable control by a central vehicle control system, even via a communication channel with unsecured or non-application-specific properties. The hardware requirements for existing and required control units on the vehicle should be kept to a minimum.

[0008] The object is achieved according to the invention by an embodiment according to the independent claims. Further advantageous embodiments of the present invention can be found in the subclaims.

[0009] A control system designed according to the invention for controlling a shut-off device of an air line, in particular the main air line of a system for the mechanical and pneumatic connection of rail-bound vehicles in a vehicle convoy, comprising at least one mechanical coupling arranged on an individual vehicle and an air coupling for an air line having the shut-off device, in particular the main air line, comprises: a) a central vehicle convoy control; b) at least one vehicle control assigned to the individual vehicle; c) a communication unit for communication between the vehicle convoy control and the vehicle control, d) a coupling control assigned to each mechanical coupling, d) an actuator assigned to the individual shut-off device;The central vehicle control system is designed such that a connection cancellation request can be specified thereon from at least two independent, in particular independently generated, signals, and the control of the shut-off device is only released when both signals are present in the control system. A mechanical coupling is understood, in particular, to mean a coupling which, when arranged on a first vehicle, is suitable for establishing a mechanical connection between them for transmitting at least tractive forces by coupling with a compatible mechanical counter-coupling on another vehicle.

[0010] An air coupling is understood in particular to mean a coupling for connecting media-carrying lines, in particular a compressed air line between vehicles to be coupled together when interacting with a compatible counter-air coupling.

[0011] A shut-off device is understood, in particular, to be a device that is suitable for at least indirectly influencing the flow passage in a line, for allowing flow passage in at least one operating mode, and for preventing flow passage in another operating mode. The shut-off device preferably comprises a valve device.

[0012] The control system designed according to the invention offers the advantage that an unintentional actuation of the shut-off device, in particular closing of the main air line in the event of an unintentional separation of the mechanical connection or a failure of the mechanical connection, is reliably avoided by actuating the shut-off device in the main air line only when independently generated cancellation requests are present, whereby the braking function is still ensured.

[0013] In a further development, the control system is designed in such a way that only when these two independently generated pieces of information are present in the control system, the mechanical coupling is also activated for uncoupling. This ensures that only when a truly intended separation is actually carried out mechanically and pneumatically.

[0014] In a further development, the control system comprises a decoupling signal generating means for specifying the connection cancellation request, which is designed to generate a control signal for controlling a decoupling process of the mechanical clutch on a vehicle. The control system further comprises a release signal generating means, which is designed to generate a release signal separate from the control signal for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a confirmation or authorization signal for canceling the mechanical and / or pneumatic connection, as well as a vehicle-side safety means, which is designed to check the control signal and the associated release signal before the control of the shut-off device, in particular the control of the shut-off device itself and furthermore of the shut-off device and the mechanical clutch, is released.

[0015] The safety device has high safety relevance. This safety device plays a crucial role in ensuring a safe and reliable coupling and uncoupling process on a vehicle. The safety device ensures that the required conditions are met before the coupling process is released. The safety device functions as a control authority. This ensures that the coupling process only takes place under safe conditions and that potential accidents or damage are avoided. The safety device can perform various tests and checks. For example, it can analyze the control signal to ensure that it lies within the defined parameters and indicates the correct operating status of the coupling. It can also check the release signal to ensure that it originates from the authorized body and is valid.Furthermore, the safety device can be coupled with a monitoring system that continuously monitors the coupling process. This allows any deviations or malfunctions during the coupling process to be detected and responded to accordingly. This contributes to the rapid detection of potentially hazardous situations and enables immediate shutdown or adjustment of the coupling process if necessary. Checking the control signal and the release signal before enabling the uncoupling process ensures that all required safety criteria are met and that the vehicle can be uncoupled safely.

[0016] In a particularly advantageous embodiment, the functions of the vehicle-side safety device are assigned to or assumed by the vehicle control and / or clutch control and / or another control entity communicating with the vehicle control and / or clutch control. In particular, the vehicle control, clutch control, and control entity can be formed by separate devices, or the control entity and clutch control are integrated into a single device. This embodiment offers the advantage of keeping hardware requirements low by assigning the function as a safety device to other functions already present in the control or control units.

[0017] In a particularly advantageous embodiment, the vehicle control and / or a clutch control unit and / or a further control instance can be designed to link a control signal for controlling a decoupling process with an associated release signal for releasing the decoupling process or an actuation of the shut-off device in order to release the actuation of the shut-off device only when both corresponding signals are present.

[0018] Preferably, each mechanical clutch comprises its own clutch control unit. The clutch control unit can be located separately from the vehicle control system within the vehicle. There can be one clutch control unit for multiple clutches in a vehicle, but preferably, each individual clutch has its own clutch control unit.

[0019] The control system for controlling the shut-off devices in a main air line facilitates the coupling operations between rail vehicles by automating the process and enabling precise control. The use of such a system can increase both the efficiency and safety of rail-bound vehicles.

[0020] The control system can utilize various sensors, actuators, and control units to monitor, coordinate, and execute the individual processes involved in establishing and / or breaking the connection. It controls the corresponding commands for connecting or disconnecting the vehicles. Automation reduces human intervention, leading to increased efficiency because coupling operations can be performed faster and more precisely. Automating the coupling and uncoupling process also enables faster train dispatch, as coupling operations can be performed smoothly and without delay. Furthermore, the control system can contribute to safety in the operation of rail-bound vehicles. It can ensure precise control of coupling operations, thus minimizing potential risks and hazards.The system can detect and track coupling positions, monitor compressed air flow, and / or trigger appropriate warnings or safety measures in the event of irregularities or malfunctions. This can help prevent accidents or damage and ensure the safety of passengers, cargo, and personnel.

[0021] In particular, the control system for ensuring a flow of compressed air can prevent an untimely closing of the above-described continuous main air line and / or the main air reservoir line in the following exemplary operational scenarios: within a coupled vehicle formation after a main air line test (as part of a brake test before use of the track-bound vehicles), during uncoupling if it is not operationally permitted or not expressly requested in the event of an unwanted or forcible train separation during shunting if it is not operationally permitted or not expressly requested, in the uncoupled state if it is not operationally permitted or not expressly requested.

[0022] On the other hand, the control system can allow for the deliberate closing of the main air line described above and / or the main air reservoir line at the rearmost coupler of a train / at the last car.

[0023] Overall, the control system enables more efficient and safer coupling operations between rail-bound vehicles. It improves operational processes and reduces human error.

[0024] The control system described can significantly contribute to preventing accidental disconnection of the main air line, for example, due to unintentional uncoupling or train separation. Such a disconnection can have serious consequences, as it can lead to rupture of compressed air hoses and release of pressure from the main air line. This would result in the brakes on all vehicles in a train being automatically triggered.

[0025] The invention ensures that the shut-off device is controlled and actuated at the correct time to safely perform the desired function of the air shut-off valve. Control is preferably carried out with a safety integrity level of at least 2, although higher values ​​are also possible. This will be described below. This ensures reliable and safe control of the shut-off device to prevent unintentional uncoupling and ensure the correct operation of the coupling system.

[0026] At the same time, the invention minimizes the use of additional hardware on the vehicle-side control units. This enables efficient and cost-effective implementation without compromising the functionality and safety of the coupling system.

[0027] There are a variety of rail-bound vehicles designed for different purposes and applications. These include trams, subways, and metros, as well as freight trains. It's important to note that the vehicle types listed above are just a few examples of rail-bound vehicles. There are other specialized vehicle types such as mountain railways, industrial and workshop locomotives, rail replacement vehicles, and many others.

[0028] A convoy refers to a combination or merger of several rail-bound vehicles into a single unit. The vehicles within the convoy are linked together in such a way that they can operate together and perform their functions in a coordinated manner.

[0029] A convoy can take various forms, depending on the type of track-bound vehicle and its intended use. In rail transport, for example, trains can be considered a convoy. A convoy consists of several vehicles connected by mechanical couplings. They form a unit that travels together and coordinates its movements and functions. The vehicles in a convoy are often also called wagons.

[0030] The convoy enables efficient and safe transport. The vehicles work together to move larger loads or perform specific tasks, such as transporting people or goods. By connecting the vehicles, they also allow them to exchange information and signals with each other to ensure a safe and smooth journey.

[0031] A convoy can be designed flexibly, allowing individual vehicles to be added or removed depending on the requirements of the particular trip or transport. The coordination and control of the convoy is typically carried out by a control system that enables and monitors communication and actions between the vehicles.

[0032] A centralized vehicle control system refers to a system or device responsible for the centralized control of the mechanical and pneumatic connections in rail-bound vehicles. This control system enables coupling operations between the vehicles of a train or between different vehicles to be carried out centrally and in a coordinated manner.

[0033] Central vehicle control can be performed from a traction vehicle or another central vehicle. In the case of a traction vehicle, this is usually the locomotive that controls the train movement. Central vehicle control can then be operated from the locomotive to control the coupling operations between the locomotive and the attached vehicles, or between the vehicles themselves.

[0034] Alternatively, the central vehicle control can also be carried out from another central vehicle. This could be, for example, a control vehicle or a special control vehicle tasked with monitoring and controlling the coupling processes. This central control unit can be equipped with the necessary sensors, actuators, and communication devices to efficiently coordinate the uncoupling processes.

[0035] According to a further alternative, the function of the vehicle group control can also be formed externally from the vehicle, in particular by an externally provided unit communicating with the data bus of the vehicle, such as a portable device, shunting aids or an operations center.

[0036] Central vehicle control enables the coupling process (coupling and uncoupling) to be automated and ensures precise control of the coupling operations. It can include various functions such as detecting and tracking coupling positions, monitoring compressed air and signal lines, inter-vehicle communication, and executing coupling commands.

[0037] The vehicle control system is a system or device that receives commands from the vehicle convoy control system and, in some embodiments, can forward them to the vehicle convoy control system in the form of feedback. It enables effective communication and coordination between the vehicle convoy control system and the individual vehicles in the convoy.

[0038] The vehicle control system is designed to receive commands from the vehicle control system to release the mechanical and pneumatic connections, particularly the decoupling. It is capable of interpreting these commands and initiating appropriate actions to perform the coupling processes. The vehicle control system can control actuators and execute the necessary actions to release the mechanical and pneumatic connections or, if necessary, establish them.

[0039] Preferably, the vehicle control system is capable of providing feedback to the vehicle convoy control system. This feedback can be used to communicate the current status of the coupling processes. It can contain information about the success or failure of a connection release or other relevant data. This allows the vehicle convoy control system to monitor the progress of the coupling processes and issue further instructions if necessary.

[0040] Preferably, each vehicle in a convoy is equipped with such a vehicle control system. This means that each vehicle has its own vehicle control system that can communicate with the coupling control and / or an actuator of the shut-off device. This ensures that all vehicles in the convoy can operate in a synchronized and coordinated manner. The vehicle control systems preferably work together to carry out the disengagement processes efficiently and safely and to provide any possible feedback to the convoy control system.

[0041] The communication unit enables communication between the vehicle convoy control system and the individual vehicle control systems. It acts as an interface and transmission medium for exchanging information, commands, and feedback between the two systems. The communication unit ensures reliable and secure data transmission to enable efficient control of the coupling processes. There are various communication channels through which the communication unit can transmit data. For example, wired connections such as cables or buses can be used to enable communication between the vehicle convoy control system and the vehicle control system. Control can also take place via switch-based transmission channels. For example, these can involve at least two securely demarcated channels or securely demarcated command chains within a single data network.These connections can ensure fast and reliable data transmission. Wireless communication channels can also be used to exchange information between systems. Radio links or other wireless transmission technologies can be used, for example. These enable flexible communication, especially in large convoys of vehicles where wired connections may not be practical.

[0042] With regard to communication security, the communication unit can have a safety integrity level greater than 2. This means that the communication unit has been developed and validated according to the safety requirements. It ensures robust communication availability, integrity (no unintentional modification of the processed data), authenticity (unambiguous identity of the communication partners is ensured), and timely communication classification (preventing significantly delayed command transmission). It also minimizes the risk of data loss, misinterpretation, or unintentional interference. The increased safety integrity level indicates that special measures have been taken to ensure secure and reliable communication between the vehicle control system and the vehicle control system, thus improving the safety of the entire system.

[0043] This solution enables the transmission of control commands with a safety integrity level greater than 2 via at least two sufficiently independent channels. With this method, each safety-relevant function is performed by at least two units. Each of these units must be independent of all others to avoid common-cause errors. This provides increased safety during the transmission of control commands. The control commands can be identical or different and can be transmitted independently of the network technology and protocol used. This allows flexibility in the implementation of the control system, as different communication paths and protocols can be used to transmit the control commands. The ability to send the control commands in one or two separate messages enables increased communication reliability.The channels must be independent, and their outputs must be monitored, and a safe state is initiated when a fault is detected (i.e., when the output signals from all channels are not identical). This prevents a single fault or common-cause faults from causing malfunction.

[0044] Furthermore, various integrity measures can be implemented regardless of the network technology and protocol used. This allows for a customized security configuration to meet the specific requirements of the control system. For example, cryptographic methods, checksums, or other mechanisms can be used to ensure the integrity of the transmitted data.

[0045] Overall, the invention enables the transmission of control commands with a high level of safety integrity, offering flexibility, reliability, and fault tolerance in communication between the control system and the vehicle. This improves the efficiency and safety of the overall system and ensures reliable control of a disconnection.

[0046] The actuators for controlling the valve device of the shut-off device can preferably be formed from the group of mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic and electrical actuators.

[0047] The controllability of the shut-off device offers the advantage of automated control of the disconnection process. For example, the shut-off device can be opened automatically when the vehicles are coupled and closed automatically when the vehicles are uncoupled. This eliminates the need for manual operation of the air shut-off valve at the ends of the main air line and / or the main air reservoir line.

[0048] In a further development, the control system includes sensors that detect the position and / or status of mechanical couplings and / or shut-off devices. These sensors help ensure precise and reliable control of individual processes and enable accurate monitoring of the connection. In a further development of the control system, communication for controlling decoupling processes in particular is divided into several communication phases. These phases include:

[0049] - Setting up or modifying the safety network: In this phase, the safety network is configured and parameterized. The necessary settings are made to ensure secure and reliable communication between the components involved.

[0050] - Startup with initialization: In this phase, the connection is established and communication is initialized between the individual components. This phase establishes the necessary connections and prepares the involved devices for communication.

[0051] - Operation: This phase encompasses the actual exchange of control commands and / or safety data during operation. This is where the control commands for decoupling and actuating the shut-off device are transmitted, and where available, status feedback is received. Continuous communication is preferred to ensure safe and efficient operation.

[0052] - Warm restart after transitioning from a faulty state: If a faulty state or communication disruption occurs, a warm restart is performed after the problem is resolved. This restores communication and brings the systems to a safe operating state.

[0053] - Shutdown: In this phase, communication is terminated in an orderly manner and connections are severed. This occurs, for example, when the control system is shut down or when operations are terminated. This does not necessarily involve a physical disconnection, but rather a disconnection of communication.

[0054] When designing communication for safety-relevant functions, priority is given to ensuring that a safe state can be achieved on the receiving side. This applies particularly during all communication phases of the safety network to ensure a high level of safety and reliability of the control system.

[0055] In a further development of the control system, the communication for controlling disconnection processes comprises at least one security feature from the group with the command origin, completeness and

[0056] Integrity or immutability of the command and timely command transmission.

[0057] The command origin security feature ensures that communication originates from authorized sources and cannot be tampered with by unauthorized third parties. This ensures that the decoupling and actuation processes for the shut-off device can only be controlled by trusted sources.

[0058] The safety feature of command completeness ensures that the transmitted commands reach the receivers complete and unchanged. This ensures that the coupling operations can be carried out correctly and that no incorrect or incomplete commands lead to malfunctions. The safety feature of timely command transmission ensures that the commands for controlling the coupling operations reach the receivers in the required time. This is particularly important to ensure smooth and precise control of the shut-off device and mechanical coupling, to enable time-critical processes, and to prevent delayed command execution.

[0059] By integrating at least one of these safety features into the communication system, the reliability and safety of the control system is further improved. This minimizes potential risks and malfunctions, resulting in efficient and safe coupling operations.

[0060] In a further development of the control system, the communication security feature includes at least one security feature from the group consisting of a sequential number, a timestamp, an address, and a checksum. In addition, there are other possible security features that can ensure secure and reliable communication.

[0061] Using a sequential number makes it possible to check the order of the commands received and ensure that no commands are lost or executed in the wrong order.

[0062] A timestamp enables the precise chronological assignment of received commands. This allows time-critical processes to be synchronized and safety-relevant procedures to be monitored in real time. Instead of timestamps, command sequences exchanged between sender and receiver can also be used, ensuring command and command execution within a specified maximum time period even without a timestamp.

[0063] Addressing ensures that commands are directed to the correct recipients. Each recipient is uniquely identified to ensure that commands are received and executed only by the intended coupling controllers.

[0064] The use of a checksum allows the integrity of the transmitted data to be verified. Calculating a checksum can detect errors or tampering during data transmission. This ensures that the received commands are unchanged and error-free.

[0065] Other possible security features could include, for example, the encryption of transmitted data, the use of digital certificates to authenticate communication partners or the implementation of redundancy mechanisms to ensure error-free transmission.

[0066] In a further development of the control system, the communication safety feature can also include a feedback status. This feedback status serves to inform the sender about the successful receipt and execution of the sent command. This enables bidirectional communication, in which the sender receives feedback on the status of its commands.

[0067] The feedback status can contain various information, such as confirmation of successful command execution, error messages in case of incorrect execution or failed operations, the current state, or other relevant information. The feedback status allows the sender to ensure that the sent commands were received and executed correctly.

[0068] The feedback status helps to make communication between the clutch control and other components in the system more efficient and safer.

[0069] By combining various security features, the security and reliability of communication within the control system is increased. Potential risks such as data manipulation, unauthorized access, or transmission errors can be effectively minimized.

[0070] In a further development of the control system, the vehicle control unit and / or the clutch control unit are configured to check disconnection commands for errors before they are implemented within the vehicle. This serves to ensure error-free and safe execution of the clutch operations.

[0071] The vehicle control system and / or the clutch control unit preferably have mechanisms and algorithms to check incoming commands. This can take into account various error sources, such as faulty or incorrect commands, faulty sensor values, inadmissible states, or other deviating parameters.

[0072] Command checking is preferably performed in real time, allowing potential errors to be quickly identified before the commands are executed. If an error is detected, the system can take appropriate action, such as rejecting the command, triggering an error alarm, or initiating safety procedures.

[0073] By checking commands before they are implemented, increased safety and reliability of the control system can be ensured. Potential errors or malfunctions are detected early and can be corrected before they lead to safety-critical situations. This further increases efficiency and safety in rail transport.

[0074] Two basic variants are conceivable for the design and thus also the control options for the actuator of the shut-off device. According to a first basic variant, the actuator is positively coupled to the mechanical coupling via a fixed connection. Preferably, this is coupled to the mechanical coupling or the actuator of the shut-off device is formed by components of the mechanical coupling. Particularly preferably, the mechanical coupling is designed with a rotary lock which, when the mechanical coupling moves against a compatible mating coupling, is configured to actuate the shut-off device in such a way as to release the main air line and, upon decoupling from the mating coupling, to actuate the shut-off device in such a way as to shut off the main air line. The actuation can take place, for example, via a cam coupled to the main bolt of the rotary lock.

[0075] For systems according to the first basic variant, the release signal generating means is designed to generate a release signal for canceling the mechanical connection, in particular a release signal for confirming the uncoupling signal or a signal for shutting off the main air line, which is independent of the control signal for controlling a decoupling process, wherein a) in a first alternative, the vehicle assembly control is designed such that

[0076] to transmit the uncoupling signal and the release signal to the vehicle control system and the vehicle control system is designed in such a way that the uncoupling signal and the release signal are transmitted to the coupling control system as the testing unit and the actuation of the shut-off device is carried out by the release and actuation of the mechanical coupling via the coupling control system; b) in a second alternative, when the uncoupling signal and the release signal are present at the vehicle control system, the uncoupling signal is carried out via the coupling control system to the control unit and the release signal according to b1) is transmitted from the vehicle control system to the control unit or b2) from the central vehicle control system to the control unit and when the signals have been tested, the actuation of the shut-off device is carried out by the release and actuation of the mechanical coupling via the coupling control system.

[0077] In a second basic variant, the actuator for operating the shut-off device can be controlled separately or independently and without any mechanical coupling with the mechanical clutch.

[0078] The release signal generating means is designed to generate a release signal for shutting off the main air line that is independent of the control signal for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a separate release signal, wherein a) in a first alternative, the control system is designed to transmit the decoupling signal and the release signal from the vehicle control system via the vehicle control system to the coupling control system as the control entity, to check the same and to control the shut-off device; b) in a second alternative, the control system is designed to transmit the decoupling signal via the vehicle control system, the coupling control system to the control entity and the release signal via the vehicle control system directly to the control entity, to check the same and to control the shut-off device;c) in a third alternative, the control system is designed to transmit the uncoupling signal via the vehicle control system, the coupling control system to the control unit and the release signal from the vehicle control system directly to the control unit, to check it and to activate the shut-off device; d) in a fourth alternative, the control system is designed to;

[0079] The vehicle control system directly controls the barrier device. According to the invention, a track-bound vehicle, in particular a rail vehicle, comprises:

[0080] - mechanical couplings arranged at opposite ends for mechanically coupling with a compatible counter-coupling of an adjacent vehicle to form a vehicle combination;

[0081] - air line couplings arranged at opposite ends and connected to an air line, in particular a main air line with a shut-off device, for pneumatic connection to the main air line of an adjacent vehicle and, if appropriate, also to the main air tank lines, with a control system in one of the designs described above.

[0082] Several such rail-bound vehicles form a convoy. The control system is capable of selectively separating selected rail-bound vehicles, separating them or groups of vehicles.

[0083] The method according to the invention for operating a control system for controlling the mechanical and pneumatic connection, in particular for canceling a mechanical and pneumatic connection between rail-bound vehicles, is characterized in that a connection cancellation request for the mechanical and pneumatic connection is specified from at least two independent, in particular independently generateable signals and the control of the shut-off device and the mechanical uncoupling process is only released when the two signals are present in the control system and checked.

[0084] In detail, a control signal for controlling a decoupling process on a vehicle and a release signal separate from the control signal for releasing the decoupling process on the vehicle are specified or generated in the control system, wherein the control signal is transmitted via a communication unit from a vehicle control system to a vehicle control system of the vehicle and an actuator for controlling the shut-off device implements the control signal when the control signal and the associated release signal are present.

[0085] Advantageously, the responsibility for a safe control of the uncoupling function on the vehicle side is divided between two independent devices, in particular control units, preferably the clutch control and the vehicle control, and the control signals and release signals of the other control unit are checked by a mutual check of the respective signals before the coupling process is implemented.

[0086] The invention is explained below with reference to the figures. The following is shown: Figure 1a shows a simplified schematic representation of a vehicle with a control system;

[0087] Figure 1b shows a simplified schematic representation of a vehicle convoy with a control system;

[0088] Figure 2a illustrates, using a flow chart, the control of the shut-off device for an embodiment of the system for mechanical and pneumatic connection in a first basic variant;

[0089] Figure 2b illustrates, using a flow chart, the control of the shut-off device for a design of the system for mechanical and pneumatic connection in a second basic variant;

[0090] Figures 3a to 3c show, by way of example, the structure and functioning of the control system when dissolving the connection for a system for mechanical and pneumatic connection in a first basic variant;

[0091] Figures 4a to 4d show, by way of example, the structure and functioning of the control system when dissolving the connection for a system for mechanical and pneumatic connection in a second basic variant.

[0092] Figures 1a and 1b show, in a simplified schematic representation, the system architecture of a control system 30 for controlling a system 40 for mechanically and pneumatically connecting adjacently arranged rail-bound vehicles 20.1 to 20.3 to form and / or dissolve a vehicle convoy 21. Figure 1a shows, by way of example, the components of the control system 30 on a single vehicle 20.1, while Figure 1b shows the control system 30 in an exemplary vehicle convoy 21 comprising three vehicles 20.1, 20.2, and 20.3. The statements for vehicle 20.1 also apply analogously to vehicles 20.2 and 20.3 in Figure 1b.

[0093] To establish a mechanical connection with other, particularly neighboring, vehicles, the individual vehicle 20.1 in Figure 1a has at least one, preferably a front mechanical coupling 10a and a rear mechanical coupling 10b at its ends. The individual mechanical coupling is an automatic coupling suitable for automatic coupling and uncoupling with a compatible mating coupling. A coupling control unit 14a, 14b is assigned to this coupling.

[0094] The automatic coupling 10a, 10b can be designed in various ways with regard to the coupling profile and coupling mechanism. In an advantageous embodiment, this comprises at least one coupling head with a coupling lock, which is suitable for automatic coupling with a compatible mating coupling. In the case of the automatic coupling with a funnel-cone profile, the coupling lock is designed as a rotary lock, which can move into different positions to establish the coupling with a mating coupling upon interaction with it or to release the coupling. The individual coupling 14a, 14b further comprises a decoupling device for automatic decoupling.

[0095] To establish a pneumatic connection between adjacent vehicles, the lines running between their end sections must be connected. The pneumatic connections between vehicles 20.1 to 20.3 are established by connecting the individual lines for carrying compressed air, in particular the main air lines HL. This is generally done via corresponding air couplings 11a, 11b, which are suitable for coupling with compatible air couplings on the adjacent vehicles.

[0096] A shut-off device 50a, 50b is provided for shutting off the air line connecting the air couplings 11a, 11b of a vehicle, in particular the main air line HL. This device comprises a valve device arranged in the air coupling 11a, 11b or outside it in the main air line HL, in particular a valve 51a, 51b operable in at least two basic positions, and an actuator device 52a, 52b for moving the valve 51a, 51b at least to the respective basic positions.

[0097] The continuity of the main air line HL and the main air reservoir line in vehicle formation 21 serves a safety function, as this provides both the air supply and the control of the compressed air brakes. An unforeseen separation of the main air line HL (e.g., due to inadvertent uncoupling or train separation) results in the coupling hoses rupturing and pressure escaping from the main air line HL, which leads to the automatic release of the brakes on all vehicles in the train. The control of the shut-off devices 50a, 50b is coordinated with the mechanical uncoupling to ensure the safe functioning of the entire system when the mechanical and pneumatic connection is desired to be released.

[0098] Two basic designs of system 40 are conceivable for this purpose. According to a first basic variant, the individual mechanical coupling 10a, 10b is mechanically coupled to the respective shut-off device 50a, 50b in such a way that closing of the main air line HL is reliably prevented when there is an existing mechanical connection to another vehicle (engaged mechanical coupling 10a, 10b), and release occurs upon mechanical uncoupling. For this purpose, the mechanical connection is realized via the mechanical couplings 10a, 10b and the actuation of the shut-off device 50a, 50b and also their release are forcibly coupled to one another. This can occur directly or indirectly. The forced coupling is physical, i.e., mechanical, or can also be designed in another way.

[0099] In an advantageous embodiment of the automatic mechanical coupling 10a, 10b with an automatically actuated mechanical coupling lock in the form of a rotary lock that can be rotated about a main axis between a coupled position and an uncoupled position, the forced coupling can be achieved directly by connecting the actuator 52a, 52b of the shut-off device 50a, 50b to the coupling lock designed as a rotary lock. This comprises a frog that can be rotated about the main axis and has a hinged coupling eye and a jaw for receiving a coupling eye of a compatible mating coupling. The frog is mounted on a main bolt that describes the main axis.The switching of the valve device 51a, 51b, with which the flow cross-section of a main air line HL can be selectively blocked in a closed position and released in an open position, is then mechanically coupled to a rotation of the rotary closure. The valve device comprises a valve body which can be alternately displaced in a translational manner to block and release the flow cross-section of the main air line. For this purpose, a driver rotatable about the main axis is preferably provided, which, in a mechanical operative connection, engages at least indirectly on the valve device 51a, 51b, in particular its valve body, in order to move it from the open position to the closed position. The driver can be formed integrally with the main bolt describing the main axis or can be connected to it. Figures 1a and 1b schematically illustrate the first basic variant.In a second basic variant, there is no mechanical connection between the mechanical clutch and the shut-off device. The actuator device 52a, 52b is then controlled separately. This means that separate control processes are required to uncouple the mechanical clutch 10a, 10b and to actuate the shut-off device 50a, 50b. The control system 30 comprises a central vehicle control unit 22 and at least one vehicle control unit 15.1 to 15.3 assigned to the individual vehicle 20.1 in Figure 1a and 20.1 to 20.3 in Figure 1b. Furthermore, a communication unit is provided for each vehicle.

[0100] 18.1 to 18.3 on each vehicle 20.1 to 20.3 for communication between the vehicle control system 22 and the individual vehicle controls 15.1 to 15.3. Furthermore, each individual mechanical clutch 10a to 10f is assigned a clutch control unit 14a to 14f. Specifically, for vehicle 20.1, this means that each clutch 10a, 10b is equipped with its own clutch control unit 14a, 14b, with the front clutch 10a being assigned the clutch control unit 14a and the rear clutch 10b being assigned the clutch control unit 14b. These clutch control units enable the control of the coupling processes and communication with the vehicle control system 15.1. The vehicle control 15.1 is responsible for the higher-level control of the vehicle 20.1 and enables communication with other vehicle controls 15.2, 15.3 of neighboring vehicles 20.2, 20.3 and a central vehicle group control 22.This not only controls the coupling processes, but also other functions of the vehicles.

[0101] 20.1 to 20.3.

[0102] Data couplings 16a, 16b are provided for communication with other vehicles 20.2 and 20.3 or the central vehicle convoy control system 22. These data couplings enable the exchange of control and operating data between other vehicles. They serve both to coordinate coupling processes and to exchange data for other purposes within a vehicle convoy 21. Alternatively, other transmission rates, such as radio, are also conceivable.

[0103] The vehicle control unit 22 can be provided on a vehicle, for example, vehicle 20.1. This is connected to the vehicle control units 15.1 to 15.3 via appropriate communication devices.

[0104] Conceivably, but not shown, the function of the vehicle assembly control 22 can also be performed externally by the vehicle, in particular by an externally provided unit that communicates with the vehicle's data bus, such as a portable device, shunting aids, or by a connected operations center. The vehicle assembly control 22 is designed such that a connection cancellation request A can be specified thereon from at least two independently generated signals: a decoupling signal EK and a release signal F. The release signal F can contain various information, all of which, however, include confirmation of a mechanical decoupling of the mechanical coupling 10 accompanied by actuation of the shut-off device 50, in particular a mechanical decoupling with simultaneous desired closing of the valve device of the main air line.For this purpose, the control system 30 for generating the two independent signals at the central vehicle convoy control 22 preferably comprises a decoupling signal generating means 23 which is designed to generate a control signal EK for controlling a decoupling process of the respective mechanical coupling on a vehicle and a release signal generating means 24 which is designed to generate a release signal F separate from the control signal for controlling a decoupling process, in particular for canceling the mechanical and / or pneumatic connection. The two generating means 23 and 24 can be coupled to the vehicle convoy control 22, for example, via separate interfaces or can be equipped with two independent interfaces for inputting the signals. There are no restrictions regarding the type and manner of specifying the signals.In the simplest case, these can be specified, for example, via a display with different input procedures or key switches.

[0105] The presence of the two independent signals is a prerequisite for breaking the connection at a connection point in the vehicle assembly 21. For verification purposes, safety means are provided on the vehicle side, which are designed to check the control signal for uncoupling EK and the associated release signal F. The vehicle-side safety means are preferably taken over by the components already present in the control system, in particular the vehicle control or coupling control or a separate additional control instance, which in the simplest case can be simple electronic functional units that allow comparison.

[0106] The schematic representations in Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the basic structure and functioning of a coupling 11 according to the type described above. Through the precise control of the coupling processes and the clear identification of the coupling 11, this coupling 11 enables efficient and reliable use of rail-bound vehicle convoys. Figure 1b shows a schematic vehicle convoy 21. In this example, the vehicle convoy 21 consists of three vehicles 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, each of which is designed according to the vehicle description in Figure 1a. The first vehicle 20.1 in this vehicle convoy 21 is equipped with the central vehicle convoy control 22. This central vehicle convoy control 22 assumes the overall control and coordination of the vehicle convoy 21. It is able to send control signals to the vehicle controls 15.1, 15.2, 15.3 of the individual vehicles 20.1, 20.2, 20.3 and to enable data exchange between the vehicles. The vehicles 20.2, 20.3 of the vehicle convoy 21 are also equipped according to the vehicle description in Figure 1a. They each have a front coupling 10c, 10e, a rear coupling 10d, 10f, coupling control units 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f, vehicle controllers 15.2, 15.3, data couplings 16c, 16d, 16e, 16f, and communication units 18.1, 18.2, 18.3. The vehicles 20.1, 20.2, 20.3 are connected to one another via their couplings, with the first vehicle 20.1 acting as the leading vehicle with the central vehicle convoy control 22. The exchange of control and operating data between the vehicles 20.2, 20.2, 20.3 and the central vehicle control system 22 takes place via the data couplings 16a, 16b, 16c, 16d, 16e, 16f.

[0107] Figure 2a shows a schematic flow diagram illustrating the sequence and implementation of a connection cancellation request in the vehicle convoy 21 from Figure 1b for the connection between vehicles 20.1 and 20.2. According to the first basic variant, the actuation of the individual shut-off devices 50a to 50f is coupled here to the actuation of the mechanical coupling. The connection cancellation request A, which should contain the two independently generated signals EK and F, is generated by the central vehicle convoy control 22 of the first vehicle 20.1, and the connection cancellation process between the two vehicles is initiated. Preferably, the connection cancellation request A is transmitted synchronously to the vehicle control systems of the two vehicles 20.1, 20.2 involved in the respective connection.The connection cancellation process comprises several steps, the transmission of the connection cancellation request A to the vehicle control systems 15.2, 15.3 of the respective vehicles 20.1, 20.2 and the verification of this before the shut-off device 50b, 50c is actuated by carrying out the uncoupling process of the mechanical couplings 10b, 10c, in particular the valve device closes the main air line HL. The connection cancellation request A comprises two separately transmitted pieces of information. Firstly, it contains the uncoupling request EK for the corresponding coupling itself - here EK-10b for coupling 10b and EK-10c for coupling 10c - and secondly, a safety feature F, which indicates a decoupling release and the associated closing of the valve device of the main air line.The safety feature can, for example, contain a confirmation of the uncoupling request or an authorization for the actuation of the locking device. Communication then takes place between the vehicle control units 15.1 and 15.2 and the corresponding device.

[0108] Clutch control unit 14b, 14c. The respective clutch control unit 14b, 14c receives the uncoupling request EK-10b, EK-10c and initiates the uncoupling process on the corresponding mechanical clutch 10b, 10c after a test step in which it is checked whether, in addition to the uncoupling request EK-10b, EK-10c, the safety feature F also indicates a release for uncoupling. Only if both are present is the uncoupling process completed, and thus, due to the mechanical coupling between the mechanical clutch 10b, 10c and the valve device 51b, 51c of the shut-off device 50b, 50c, the latter is actuated in such a way that it closes the flow cross-section of the main air line HL. The mechanical coupling 10b, 10c acts here as actuator 52b, 52c for the shut-off device 50b, 50c.

[0109] The respective command path for shutting off the main air line, in particular closing it, which is linked to the uncoupling signal EK, is directed from the central vehicle control unit 22 directly to the respective vehicle control units 15.2 and 15.3 and can be evaluated and implemented there or forwarded to the clutch control unit 14b, 14c. The command path for uncoupling the mechanical clutches 10b, 10c and thus actuating the valve device 51b, 51c of the main air line HL is forwarded unchanged by the respective vehicle control units 15.2 and 15.3 to the respective clutch control units 14b and 14c. The respective clutch control units 14b and 14c check all required integrity measures themselves in the test step. If a response is received from the central vehicle control unit 22, the respective clutch control units 14d and 14e can generate the required integrity measures themselves.As a result, both the central train control unit 22 and the respective coupling control units 14b and 14c can independently determine, by means of suitable measures (checksums, counters, time, address), that the uncoupling command has actually not been changed and actually originates from the respective control unit and is intended for them.

[0110] Only linking the output signals of both control units in the same direction via a logical cross-comparison within the test step can lead to decoupling. Faulty behavior of the other control unit can be detected by mutual testing of the output signals (e.g., stuck-at) or relay positions. This allows potential errors to be detected (no output, continuous output) and a safe state to be assumed (no control, feedback to the central train control unit 22 (feedback also through non-response)).

[0111] Since neither data transmission nor control units need to be permanently available, no continuous monitoring is required for the decoupling function (watchdog, live signal, and mutual monitoring can be omitted). The flowchart ends with the completion of the decoupling process and the completion of the decoupling request. The vehicle convoy controller 22 can now receive and process further commands or signals for controlling the vehicle convoy 21.

[0112] Figure 2b shows a schematic flow diagram illustrating an example of the sequence of a decoupling request in a vehicle convoy 21 as an alternative to Figure 2a. In this vehicle convoy 21, the shut-off device 50b, 50c of the main air lines HL is free of any direct coupling, in particular mechanical coupling, with the mechanical coupling 10b, 10c and is present as a separately controlled unit.

[0113] The shut-off device and the mechanical coupling are controlled separately, with separate control commands being communicated for each component. This means that the controllable valve device 51b, 51c in the main air line HL is controlled independently, while the mechanical couplings 10b, 10c, which connect the vehicles 20.1, 20.2 to form a vehicle convoy 21, receive their own control commands. This separate control allows specific requirements and functions of both the pneumatic and mechanical connections, in particular the shut-off device in the main air line and the mechanical coupling, to be individually considered. This ensures, in particular, that the control system is guaranteed with a safety integrity level of at least 2.The connection cancellation request A, which should contain the two independently generated signals EK and F, is also generated here by the central vehicle control system 22 of the first vehicle 20.1, and the connection cancellation process between the two vehicles is initiated. Preferably, the connection cancellation request A is transmitted synchronously to the vehicle controls of the two vehicles 20.1, 20.2 involved in the respective connection. The connection cancellation process comprises several steps, the transmission of the connection cancellation request A to the vehicle controls 15.2, 15.3 of the respective vehicles 20.1, 20.2 and the testing of these before the shut-off device 50b, 50c is activated and actuated, in particular the valve device closes the main air line HL.

[0114] The disconnection request A comprises two separately transmitted pieces of information. First, it contains the decoupling request EK for the corresponding mechanical coupling—here, EK-10b for coupling 10b—and a safety feature in the form of a release signal F, which allows the valve device 51b, 51c to close.

[0115] The disconnection request is transmitted to the two drive controllers 15.1, 15.2. This comprises two separately transmitted pieces of information. First, it contains the decoupling request EK-10b and EK-10c for the corresponding mechanical coupling, and second, it contains a safety feature that releases the mechanical coupling and closes the shut-off device 50b, 50c.

[0116] Communication then takes place between the vehicle control unit 15a, 15b and the corresponding clutch control unit 14b, 14c. In the illustrated case, the respective clutch control unit 14b, 14c can implement the uncoupling command. However, the command to close the shut-off device is only implemented after the test step for the presence of the uncoupling signal EK and the release signal.

[0117] Figures 3a to 3c illustrate, in a simplified schematic representation, possible embodiments of the interaction of the control system 30 with the system 40 according to the first basic variant with a mechanical coupling between the mechanical coupling and the shut-off device. The interaction is shown for a connection between the vehicles 20.1 and 20.2 and concerns the mechanical couplings 19b, 10c and the shut-off devices 50b, 50c. Two signals are generated in the vehicle control system 22 as a connection cancellation request: a decoupling signal EK-10b, EK10c, which contains a request in some form to uncouple the mechanical coupling 10b, 10c, and a release signal F, which contains information for enabling the uncoupling of the mechanical coupling and thus also the actuation of the shut-off device 50b, 50c, in particular a closing of the valve device 51b, 51c.Both specifications for these signals can be specified independently of each other, for example, via a display or remote control. In all versions, the connection termination specification is preferably transmitted synchronously to both vehicles involved in the connection to be terminated. For this purpose, the data bus connection between the vehicles is used, for example.

[0118] According to Figure 3b, both signals are transmitted via the respective vehicle controllers 15.1, 15.2. The central train control 22 communicates with the vehicle controllers 15.1, 15.2 and the coupling controllers 14b, 14c in parallel, individually and synchronously. The signals are passed on to the coupling controller 14b, 14c, where, in its function as a safety device, a check is carried out for completeness and the presence of the connection cancellation requirement and, if necessary, a check of these signals for further requirements, in particular validity, compliance with the time interval between the signals, etc. Only after comparison and a positive test are the mechanical couplings 10b, 10c activated, in particular their uncoupling actuators, and thus the shut-off device 50b, 50c actuated, in particular the valve device 51b, 51c in the main air line HL closed due to the mechanical connection.

[0119] In Figure 3a, the handling of the connection task request up to the vehicle control 15.1 , 15.2 is analogous to Figure 3b. The central train control 22 communicates with the vehicle control 15.1 , 15.2 and the

[0120] Coupling controls 14b, 14c are parallel, individual, and synchronized. From the vehicle control unit 22, the two signals are forwarded via the vehicle control unit 15.1, 15.2 to the coupling control unit and a control unit 25 in such a way that, ideally, the authenticity and integrity of at least one of the signals can be independently verified. The control unit 25 can, for example, be a simple electrical circuit. This then receives the uncoupling request EK-10b, EK-10c from the coupling control unit 14b, 14c, which then receives the uncoupling request from the vehicle control unit 22. In the control unit 25, acting as a safety device, a check for completeness and the presence of the connection cancellation specification is performed, and if necessary, a check of these signals for further requirements, in particular validity, compliance with the time interval, etc.Only after the adjustment and positive testing, the control of the mechanical couplings 10b, 10c, in particular the decoupling actuators thereof, takes place and thus an actuation of the shut-off device 50bm, 50c, in particular a closing of the valve device 51b, 51c in the main air line HL due to the mechanical connection.

[0121] In contrast, Figure 3c shows an embodiment in which the release information is routed directly to the control instance 25b, 25c via the train bus, i.e., it is not first sent to the vehicle control 15.1, 15.2. The further procedure is analogous to Figure 3a.

[0122] Figures 4a to 4d illustrate, in a simplified schematic representation, possible embodiments of the interaction of the control system 30 with the system 40 according to the second basic variant, free of a mechanical coupling between the mechanical coupling and the shut-off device. The interaction is shown for a connection between the vehicles 20.1 and 20.2 and concerns the mechanical couplings 19b, 10c and the shut-off devices 50b, 50c. Two signals are generated in the vehicle control system 22 as a connection cancellation request: a decoupling signal EK-10b, EK10c, which contains a request in some form to uncouple the mechanical coupling 10b, 10c, and a release signal F, which contains information for enabling the connection cancellation, in particular an actuation of the shut-off device 50b, 50c, in particular a closing of the valve device 51b, 51c.

[0123] According to Figures 4a and 4b, both signals are transmitted via the respective vehicle controls 15.1, 15.2. The central train control 22 communicates with the vehicle controls 15.1, 15.2 and the

[0124] Coupling controls 14b, 14c are parallel, individual, and synchronized. The signals are routed in Figure 4a to the coupling control 14b, 14c, where, as a safety measure, a check is carried out for completeness and the presence of the connection cancellation requirement. If necessary, these signals are checked for further requirements, in particular validity, compliance with the time interval between the signals, etc. Only after the comparison and positive test are the mechanical couplings 10b, 10c activated, in particular their decoupling actuators, and the shut-off device 50b, 50c actuated, in particular closing the valve device 51b, 51c in the main air line HL by actuating the actuators 52b, 52c.

[0125] According to Figure 4c, the control of the shut-off device 50b, 50c and the couplings 10b, 10c is triggered in parallel by the vehicle control 15.1, 15.2.

[0126] Figure 4d shows an embodiment according to Figure 4a, but the release signal F is not transmitted via the vehicle control unit 15.1, 15.2, but directly via the data bus to the control unit 25. In this case, the clutch control unit directly controls the clutch via the transmitted signals EK10b, EK10c, but the shut-off device 50b, 50c is only actuated when the complete connection release request from EK and F is present. The integrity of the uncoupling signal EK10b, EK10c is already checked in the clutch control unit and only then forwarded to the control unit 25.

[0127] LIST OF REFERENCE SYMBOLS

[0128] 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f mechanical clutch

[0129] 14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f Clutch control

[0130] 15.1, 15.2, 15.3 Vehicle control

[0131] 16a, 16b, 16c, 16d, 16e, 16f data coupling

[0132] 18.1, 18.2, 18.3 Communication unit

[0133] 20.1 , 20.2, 20.3 Vehicle

[0134] 21 vehicle group

[0135] 23 Uncoupling signal generating means

[0136] 24 Release signal generating means

[0137] 22 Vehicle group control

[0138] 30 Control system

[0139] 40 System for mechanical and pneumatic

[0140] Connect

[0141] 50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f Shut-off device 51a, 51b, 51c, 51d, 51e, 51f Valve device 52a, 52b, 52c, 52d, 52e, 52f Actuator A Disconnect request

[0142] EK; EK-10b; EK-10c Uncoupling signal Release signal main air line

Claims

Claims 1 . Control system (30) for controlling a shut-off device of an air line, in particular the main air line of a system (40) for the mechanical and pneumatic connection of rail-bound vehicles (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) in a vehicle convoy (21), comprising a mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) arranged on an individual vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) and an air coupling (11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, 11e, 11f) for an air line having the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50dd, 50e, 50f), in particular the main air line (HL), wherein the control system (30) comprises: a) a central vehicle convoy control (22); b) at least one vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3) assigned to the individual vehicle; c) a communication unit (18.1, 18.2, 18.3) for communication between the vehicle group control (22) and the vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3), d) a clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) assigned to each mechanical clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f), d) an actuator assigned to the individual shut-off device; e) the central vehicle control (22) is designed in such a way that a connection cancellation request (A) from at least two mutually independent, in particular independently generateable signals (EK, F) can be specified thereon and the control of the shut-off device is only released when the two signals (EK, F) are present in the control system (30).

2. Control system (30) according to claim 1, characterized in that the central vehicle control (22) is designed in such a way that the control of the mechanical clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) for uncoupling is released only when the two signals (EK, F) are present in the control system.

3. Control system (30) according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that it comprises, for specifying the connection cancellation request (A): a decoupling signal generating means (23), which is designed to generate a control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process of the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f), in particular a decoupling signal on a vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) f) a release signal generating means (24) which is designed to generate a release signal (F) independent of the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular for canceling the mechanical and / or pneumatic connection (4), g) a vehicle-side safety means (25) which is designed to check the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process and the associated release signal (F) before the control of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f), in particular the control of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) and the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) is released becomes.

4. Control system (30) according to claim 3, characterized in that the function of the vehicle-side safety means (25) is assigned to the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) and / or clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) and / or a further control instance (25) communicating with the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) and / or clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f), wherein in particular the clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) and the control instance (25) are formed by separate devices or the control instance (25) and the clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) are integrated into one facility.

5. Control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that communication interfaces for communication with at least one other of the functional units are provided on the functional units - central vehicle control (22), vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3), coupling control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) and / or separate control instance (25).

6. Control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the actuator (52a, 52b, 52c, 52d, 52e, 52f) of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) is mechanically coupled to the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) or the actuator (52a, 52b, 52c, 52d, 52e, 52f) of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) is formed by components of the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f), in particular the mechanical Coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) is designed as an automatic coupling with a rotary lock, which is connected to a compatible counter-coupling, which is set up to actuate the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) in such a way as to release the air line, in particular the main air line (HL) and, if present, the main air tank line, and when uncoupling the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) from the counter-coupling, to actuate the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) in such a way as to shut off the air line, in particular the main air line (HL) and, if present, the main air tank line.

7. Control system (30) according to one of claims 3 to 6, characterized in that the release signal generating means (24) is designed to generate a release signal (F) for canceling the mechanical connection, which is independent of the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a separate release signal (F) for confirming the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process or a decoupling signal or a signal for shutting off the air line, in particular the main air line (HL) and, if present, the main air reservoir line, wherein a) in a first alternative, the vehicle assembly control (22) is designed such that Control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular decoupling signal and the release signal (F) to the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) and the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) is designed to transmit the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular decoupling signal and the release signal (F) to the clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) as a test instance and the control of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) by the release and control of the mechanical clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) via the clutch control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f); b) in a second alternative, when the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) is present for Control of a decoupling process, in particular the decoupling signal and the release signal (F) on the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3), the decoupling signal is transmitted via the coupling control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) to the control instance (F) and the release signal (F) according to b1) a first alternative from the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) to the control instance (25) or b2) a second alternative from the central vehicle control (22) to the control instance (25) and the actuation of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) by the release and actuation of the mechanical Clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) is operated via the clutch control (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f).

8. Control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the actuator (52a, 52b, 52c, 52d, 52e, 52f) of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) can be controlled separately and free from a mechanical coupling with the mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f).

9. Control system (30) according to claim 8, characterized in that the release signal generating means (24) is designed to generate a release signal (F) for shutting off the air line, in particular the main air line (HL), which is independent of the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a separate release signal (F), wherein a) in a first alternative, the control system (30) is designed to transmit the control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a decoupling signal, and the release signal (F) from the vehicle assembly control (22) via the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) to the coupling control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) as a control instance, to check it and to control the shut-off device; b) in a second alternative, the control system (30) is designed such that Control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular decoupling signal via the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3), the coupling control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) to the control instance (25) and the release signal (F) via the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) directly to the control instance (25); c) in a third alternative, the control system (30) is designed such that Control signal (EK, EK-10b, EK-10c) for controlling a decoupling process, in particular a decoupling signal via the vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3), the coupling control (14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f) to the control instance (25) and the release signal (f) from the vehicle control (22) directly to the control instance (25), to check and to control the shut-off device; d) in a fourth alternative, the control system (30) is designed such that the Vehicle control (15.1, 15.2, 15.3) as control instance (25) directly controls the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f).

10. Control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 9; characterized in that the communication for controlling coupling processes includes at least one security feature from the group consisting of command origin, completeness of the command and timely command transmission; integrity; authenticity; authorization.

11. Control system (30) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the control system (30) comprises: a user interface for interaction with the control system (30) and / or a communication device for wireless communication with an external infrastructure, preferably the external infrastructure can transmit control signals for controlling uncoupling processes and / or release signals.

12. Control system (30) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the control signals of the connection cancellation request (A) for canceling the connection between two vehicles can be transmitted synchronously to the vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3) of the vehicles (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) of the individual mechanical and pneumatic connections to be released.

13. Control system (30) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the central vehicle control (30) is arranged on a vehicle or the central vehicle control (30) is formed by an external unit which is suitable for communicating with the data bus, in particular a portable device or an infrastructurally connected unit or shunting aids.

14. Rail-bound vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3), in particular a rail vehicle comprising: - mechanical couplings (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) arranged at the opposite ends for mechanically coupling with a compatible counter-coupling of an adjacent vehicle to form a vehicle combination (21); - air line couplings (11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, 11e, 11f) arranged at the opposite ends and connected to an air line, in particular a main air line with a shut-off device and, if applicable, a main air tank line, for pneumatic connection to the air line, in particular the main air line and, if applicable, the main air tank line of a neighboring vehicle; - a control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 13.

15. Method for operating a control system (30) for controlling a system (40) for mechanically and pneumatically connecting track-bound vehicles (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) in a vehicle convoy (21), comprising a mechanical coupling (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) arranged on an individual vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) and an air coupling (11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, 11e, 11f) for an air line having the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50dd, 50e, 50f), in particular a main air line (HL), characterized in that, in order to cancel the connection, a connection cancellation request (A) consisting of at least two mutually independent, in particular independently generateable signals (EK, F) is specified and the control of the shut-off device and the uncoupling process is only released when the two signals (EK, F) are present in the control system (30).

16. Method according to claim 15, characterized in that the control system (30) according to one of claims 1 to 13 is used.

17. Method according to claim 15 or 16, characterized in that as a connection cancellation request (A) a request for controlling a decoupling process (EK), in particular of the mechanical clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) on a vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3), in particular a decoupling signal and a release signal (F) for releasing the decoupling process on the vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) is specified at the vehicle group control (22) and control signals (EK, F) are generated therefrom, wherein the control signals are transmitted via a communication unit (18.1, 18.2, 18.3) from a vehicle group control (22) to a vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3) of the vehicle (20.1, 20.2, 20.3) and an actuator (52. a, 52b, 52c, 52d, 52e, 52f) for controlling the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) implements the control signal when the control signal and the associated release signal are present in the control system.

18. Method according to claim 15 to 17, characterized in that the responsibility for a safe control of the shut-off device (50a, 50b, 50c, 50d, 50e, 50f) on the vehicle side is divided between two independent control units, preferably the clutch control (22) and the vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3), and the responsibility for a safe control of the shut-off device and the mechanical clutch (10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 10e, 10f) on the vehicle side is preferably divided between two independent control units, preferably the clutch control (22) and the vehicle control (15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3) and / or a separate control instance.

19. Method according to claim 18, characterized in that Control signals and release signals of the other control unit are checked by mutual testing of the respective signals before the coupling process is implemented.

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