Access filtering of an object connected to a local communication network

The method enhances network security and privacy by using local routing equipment to assess connected objects' trustworthiness and block risky devices, addressing vulnerabilities and privacy issues in existing pairing methods.

FR3142645B1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-15ORANGE SA
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
FR2022012365
Authority / Receiving Office
FR · FR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-11-25
Publication Date
2024-11-15
Estimated Expiration
2042-11-25

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing pairing methods for connected objects in local communication networks are insecure, exposing networks to vulnerabilities and privacy risks due to lack of authentication and potential data exposure to malicious entities during the pairing process.

Method used

Implementing a method that involves local network routing equipment to detect connected objects, assign a confidence score based on object information, and notify trusted devices for informed access authorization, thereby enhancing security and privacy by blocking potentially dangerous equipment.

Benefits of technology

This approach strengthens network security and privacy by allowing informed decision-making on object access, is easily deployable with the Matter® standard, and has minimal impact on user experience.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 00000021_0000
    Figure 00000021_0000
  • Figure 00000022_0000
    Figure 00000022_0000
  • Figure 00000024_0000
    Figure 00000024_0000
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Access Filtering of a Connected Object to a Local Communication Network. The invention relates to a method for filtering access of a connected object (16) to a local communication network, implemented by a routing device (10) of the local network. According to the invention, such a method comprises the steps of: - detecting (E52) a connected object (16) awaiting pairing within the local network; - assigning (E54) a trust score to the connected object, based on information relating to the connected object; - notifying (E55) a trusted device (12) of the local network of the pairing request of the connected object and the assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a pairing refusal (E56N) from the trusted device (12), blocking (E57N) access of the connected object (16) to the local network. Figure for the abstract: Fig 3
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Title of the invention: Filtering access to an object connected to a local communication network Technical field

[0001] The field of the invention is that of local communication networks, such as corporate communication networks or domestic communication networks. More specifically, the invention relates to the interaction, with such local communication networks, of communicating or connected objects, or loT (for the English “Internet of Things”), such as computers, tablets, smart phones (in English “smartphones”), but also webcams, weather stations, sensors, thermostats, drones, smoke sensors, connected light bulbs, etc. Prior art

[0002] Such connected objects are invading the daily lives of users and businesses. Although these objects allow users access to interesting new services, they also increase the weaknesses of the communication networks in which they are integrated, by increasing the attack surface of potential malicious individuals or systems against these networks.

[0003] One of the key moments during which a local communication network is vulnerable is that of the pairing of a new object connected to this local network, in particular when it uses a wireless communication technology, such as Wi-Fi® or the communication protocol defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, also called “Thread”.

[0004] Indeed, during this pairing step, the user sends, to the newly incoming connected object, the information necessary for its connection to the local communication network, and to the wide area communication network of the Internet type to which it provides access. This information includes for example: - The name of the local communication network (or SSID for “Service Set IDentifier” in the case of a Wi-Fi® network) and the password for accessing this network; - Certain information related to the user's account (for example, their Google®, Amazon® or Apple® account ID); - Certain technical information, such as time configuration, a private cryptographic key, or an operational security certificate, as proposed in the Matter® connectivity protocol supported by the “Connectivity Standards Alliance” (CSA) group of companies.

[0005] This is the principle, for example, of the AllJoyn® protocol, which offers an “Onboarding Service”, allowing new equipment to easily join an existing WiFi® communication network, as illustrated in relation to [Fig.l].

[0006] We consider a communicating object, or loT, 11, in this case a connected light bulb, for example of the LIFX® brand. A local communication network, for example domestic, is accessible via a residential gateway (or Home Gateway HGW) 10. This network can include various communicating objects or equipment, such as a laptop, a tablet, and a smart phone or “smartphone” 12.

[0007] According to the AllJoyn® “Onboarding Service” service, a device wishing to pair with this local communication network must publish a network, i.e. create a WiFi® access point, whose SSID (for “Service Set Identifier”, in accordance with the IEEE 802.11 standard) contains a prefix AJ_ or a suffix _AJ. This access point can be secure or open. This corresponds to a preliminary step E1, not shown in [Fig.l]. For example, the connected bulb 11 publishes a WiFi® network “Lifi-A0_AJ”.

[0008] In parallel, a user must launch, for example with his smartphone 12, an application dedicated to the “onboarding” service. When launching this application, the smartphone 12 deactivates the WiFi® connection that it maintained with the residential gateway HGW 10 (step E2), in order to listen for communicating objects awaiting pairing. During a step E3, it connects to the access point created by the connected bulb 11, and sends to the latter the data necessary for its pairing with the residential gateway HGW 10, namely a WiFi® key and the gateway password. This data is for example entered by the user on the communication interface of the smartphone 12. It may also have been previously stored in this equipment. These AllJoyn® exchanges are encrypted, but not authenticated.

[0009] Upon receipt, the connected bulb 11 can, during a step E4, connect to the residential gateway HGW 10, using this pairing data.

[0010] At the end of this pairing phase, the smartphone 12 can then disconnect from the WiFi® network “Lifi-A0_AJ”, to reconnect to the local communication network of the residential gateway HGW 10.

[0011] This solution requires user intervention, who must actively launch the “Onboarding Service” application, in order to authorize their smartphone to scan any AllJoyn® networks present and to cut the WiFi® connection with the residential gateway.

[0012] It is not very secure, insofar as it does not implement verification of the authenticity of the communicating object to be paired: there is therefore a risk that the mobile phone 12 transmits confidential pairing data to a malicious communicating object.

[0013] More generally, and regardless of the implementation of the AllJoyn® protocol or any other alternative connection protocol, this pairing step is crucial, because it can endanger the user's privacy and / or the security of their local communication network, for two main reasons: - on the one hand, if this pairing step is deficient in terms of securing exchanges, sensitive data and information can be transmitted in clear text between the user and the connected object. They can therefore be easily accessible to a malicious third party, who can use them for fraudulent purposes; - on the other hand, even if this pairing step is carried out correctly, in compliance with strict confidentiality rules, the existence of vulnerabilities or security flaws on the connected object can also make this sensitive data accessible to a malicious third party.

[0014] Indeed, some connected objects have a low level of security, or send the user's data to third-party platforms, without their consent.

[0015] To date, the pairing procedure recommended by manufacturers of connected objects does not generally include security measures: the user is simply invited to download the application from the manufacturer of the connected object onto their smartphone or tablet, and to follow the proposed pairing procedure, which consists of a direct exchange of various data between the connected object and the user's terminal.

[0016] The main reasons for this lack of security measures are twofold: on the one hand, the manufacturer generally considers that the connected objects that it markets, and the pairing application that it offers, do not present any security problems or lack of respect for the user's privacy; if such problems exist, it is most often not aware of them. On the other hand, the manufacturer generally wishes to retain control of its ecosystem, i.e. of all the connected objects and equipment that it markets and which communicate with each other, and is reluctant to involve a third-party security mechanism or equipment.

[0017] There is therefore a need for a technique for securing the pairing of an object connected to a local communication network, which makes it possible to reinforce the security of the local communication network, whatever the possible vulnerabilities of the connected object, and to respect the privacy of the users of the network, and the confidentiality of their personal information. In particular, there is a need for such a technique which makes it possible to filter the access of objects connected to a local communication network, according to their possible vulnerabilities. There is also a need for such a technique which can be easily implemented with the de Deployment of the Matter® standard. There is still a need for such a technique that has a reduced impact on the user experience, compared to existing solutions. Finally, there is a need for such a technique that allows connected objects to be connected to a secure ecosystem, such as that of the local communication network access provider.

[0018] It should be noted that, by ecosystem, we mean here, and throughout the remainder of this document, a set of equipment which shares common parameters of security and / or respect for privacy and / or eco-design, and which are capable of communicating together.

[0019] Throughout this document, pairing of a connected object means both pairing of the object to a local communication network (to communicate with other equipment on the local network or to the Internet wide area network), and a commissioning request in an application ecosystem (for example a “Fabric” according to the Matter® protocol). Statement of the invention

[0020] The invention meets this need by proposing a method for filtering access of an object connected to a local communication network, implemented by routing equipment of the local network, which comprises steps of: - detection of a connected object waiting to be paired within the local network; - assigning a trust score to the connected object, based on information relating to the connected object; - notification, to at least one trusted device on the local network, of the pairing request of the connected object and the assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a refusal to pair the trusted equipment, blocking of access by the object connected to the local network.

[0021] Thus, the invention is based on a completely new and inventive approach to pairing an object connected to a local communication network.

[0022] Indeed, the invention proposes, on the one hand, to involve local network routing equipment in the pairing procedure which, according to the prior art, is set up directly between the connected object and the user's terminal, and on the other hand, to assign a trust score to the connected object, so as to allow an informed choice by the user as to the authorization of access of this connected object to the network.

[0023] Such an intelligent network access filtering mechanism has the advantage of being easily implemented with the deployment of the Matter® standard which standardizes the pairing commands. It should be remembered that Matter® is designed to connect equipment in IPv6 using the Ethernet, Wi-Fi® or Thread® protocols at the link layer.

[0024] Furthermore, this solution has no impact on the user experience, but improves the protection of their privacy, as well as the security of their network, by making it possible to block access to the network of potentially dangerous equipment.

[0025] It is also quick to implement: as soon as it detects the presence of a connected object awaiting pairing, the routing equipment can carry out the various steps, more quickly than the time required for a user to download, on their smartphone or tablet, the application from the manufacturer of the connected object and launch a direct classic pairing procedure. This ensures that the routing equipment can implement this secure pairing procedure, instead of the classic pairing procedure proposed by the IoT manufacturer.

[0026] Furthermore, the routing equipment can advantageously support several communication protocols (Wi-Fi®, Bluetooth®, Ethernet, etc.), and therefore detect the attempt to pair a new loT, regardless of the communication protocol it uses.

[0027] According to a first characteristic of the invention, the information relating to the connected object is received from the connected object and / or obtained by the routing equipment upon request addressed to a remote server.

[0028] Indeed, some of the information may be received directly from the connected object by the routing equipment, because it is transmitted by the connected object as part of its pairing attempt. Other information may be retrieved by the routing equipment at the IP (Internet Protocol) level, for example from a certificate present on a web server, which may contain interesting information about the connected object, and useful for deciding the trust score to assign to it.

[0029] For example, such information relating to the connected object belongs to the group comprising: - a MAC address of the connected object; - a power of a signal received from the connected object; - a connection identifier for the connected object; - a product identifier of the connected object; - a manufacturer identifier of the connected object; - a validity period of a security certificate associated with the connected object; - a security level of a security certificate associated with the connected object; - an identifier of the organization that issued a security certificate associated with the connected object.

[0030] According to another characteristic of the invention, the assigned confidence score results from an aggregation of at least some of the elements belonging to the group comprising: - a vulnerability score of the connected object; - a score of respect for the privacy of a user of the connected object; - an eco-design score for the connected object.

[0031] Indeed, the assigned trust score can take into account the evaluation of different aspects of the strengths and weaknesses of the connected object, in the areas of security and resistance to malicious attacks, respect for the privacy of users, but also in the area of ​​the impact of the connected object on the environment. Other aspects could also be taken into account, such as the corporate social responsibility of the manufacturer, etc.

[0032] To facilitate the user's decision-making as to whether or not to block access of the object connected to the network, it is however advantageous for these different evaluations taken into account to be aggregated within a single trust score, transmitted to the user's trusted equipment. This trust score can for example take a value chosen from the triplet "good, average, bad", or a color chosen from the palette "green, yellow, red". The user can thus quickly make an informed decision based on this simple and accessible trust score, as to whether or not to accept the pairing of the object connected to its local communication network.

[0033] According to one aspect, the trusted equipment to which the pairing request is notified is the trusted equipment closest to the connected object and / or a trusted equipment belonging to an administrator of the local network.

[0034] For example, the trusted equipment closest to the connected object is identified on the basis of the RSSI (in English "Received Signal Strength Indicator", which represents the power of the received signal). It is in fact particularly practical for the user to receive the pairing request on equipment close to the connected object that he is installing, and which has a high probability of being his personal smartphone.

[0035] Alternatively, the pairing request is notified to a trusted device of the network administrator, for example the parents in the case of a home network, who can thus control the installation of new connected objects by the children, and oppose it if necessary.

[0036] According to an optional variant, such an access filtering method also comprises: - a transmission, to the trusted equipment, of a request to obtain a code associated with the connected object; - a connection of the routing equipment, from the code obtained from the trusted equipment, to the connected object, in order to obtain information relating to the connected object.

[0037] For example, the request to obtain a code is a request to scan a QR code associated with the connected object, and the scanned QR code is received by the routing equipment from the trusted equipment.

[0038] This advantageously ensures that the user of the trusted equipment is located near the connected object, and further strengthens the security of the pairing by preventing a malicious third party outside the local communication network from remotely taking control of a connected object. For example, in the case of a camera installed at Alice's home, this prevents a malicious neighbor, Bob, from detecting the presence of the camera, carrying out a pairing with his own network, and seeing, without authorization, what is happening at Alice's home.

[0039] According to another optional variant, at the end of a pairing of the connected object with the routing equipment of the local communication network, it comprises a transmission, to the trusted equipment, of a request for pairing of the connected object with the trusted equipment, and, in the event of receipt of a request for pairing with the trusted equipment, a transmission, to the connected object, of a request for opening a pairing sequence.

[0040] Thus, after pairing the object connected to the local communication network (and therefore after connecting the object to an ecosystem of which the routing equipment is a part, e.g. that of the operator or access provider), the routing equipment can ask the user if he wishes this connected object to join other ecosystems (e.g. that of the manufacturer or seller of the connected object).

[0041] This solution allows users to use their connected objects in several secure environments: for example, that of their access provider but also possibly that of third parties. This avoids the confinement of connected objects in a single ecosystem.

[0042] In this case, optionally, if the connected object paired with the routing equipment is unable to also be paired with the trusted equipment, the routing equipment plays the role of proxy server between the trusted equipment and the connected object.

[0043] This is advantageous in the case of a connected object which, due to its communication protocol, can only pair with one ecosystem at a time, because this proxy role played by the routing equipment makes it possible to circumvent this limitation. The trusted equipment then connects to the routing equipment, thinking that it is the connected object, and the routing equipment plays the role of transparent intermediary between the IoT and the trusted equipment.

[0044] According to an advantageous aspect, the routing equipment is an access gateway to the local communication network. The access provider, owner of the gateway, can thus remain an intermediary between its customer and the various connected objects that it uses.

[0045] The invention also relates to a computer program product comprising program code instructions for implementing an access filtering method as described above, when executed by a processor.

[0046] The invention also relates to a computer-readable recording medium on which is recorded a computer program comprising program code instructions for executing the steps of the access filtering method according to the invention as described above.

[0047] Such a recording medium may be any entity or device capable of storing the program. For example, the medium may comprise a storage means, such as a ROM, for example a CD ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM, or a magnetic recording means, for example a USB key or a hard disk.

[0048] On the other hand, such a recording medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal, which may be conveyed via an electrical or optical cable, by radio or by other means, so that the computer program it contains is remotely executable. The program according to the invention may in particular be downloaded over a network, for example the Internet.

[0049] Alternatively, the recording medium may be an integrated circuit in which the program is incorporated, the circuit being adapted to execute or to be used in the execution of the aforementioned access filtering method.

[0050] The invention also relates to routing equipment for a local communication network, which comprises a processor configured to execute steps of: - detecting a connected object awaiting pairing within the local network; - assigning a confidence score to the connected object, based on information relating to the connected object; - notification, to a trusted device on the local network, of the pairing request of the connected object and the assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a refusal to pair the trusted equipment, blocking of access by the object connected to the local network.

[0051] The invention further relates to a residential gateway which comprises a processor configured to execute steps of: - detection of a connected object waiting to be paired within the local network; - assigning a trust score to the connected object, based on information relating to the connected object; - notification, to a trusted device on the local network, of the pairing request of the connected object and the assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a refusal to pair the trusted equipment, blocking of access by the object connected to the local network.

[0052] The routing equipment, the access gateway and the corresponding computer program The aforementioned pondants have at least the same advantages as those conferred by the access filtering method according to the present invention. Presentation of figures

[0053] Other aims, characteristics and advantages of the invention will appear more clearly on reading the following description, given as a simple illustrative, and non-limiting, example, in relation to the figures, among which:

[0054] [Fig-1] illustrates a method of pairing a communicating object to a communication network local communication, implementing the prior art AllJoyn® Onboarding service;

[0055] [Fig.2] presents a schematic view of a local communication network and the different communicating objects which are connected to it, according to one embodiment of the invention;

[0056] [Fig.3] presents in the form of a flowchart the different stages of the access filtering method according to one embodiment of the invention;

[0057] [Fig.4] presents a block diagram of routing equipment implementing the method of [Fig.3].

[0058] Detailed description of embodiments of the invention

[0059] The general principle of the invention is based on the filtering of access of an object connected to a local communication network, by routing equipment of this network, according to a decision of a user based on a confidence score assigned to the connected object by the routing equipment.

[0060] The remainder of this document will describe in more detail the implementation of an embodiment of the invention in the context of a home network, at a particular user's home, in which different devices form a star network around a central point, namely an access gateway, for example the Orange® Livebox®. The invention of course also applies to any other type of local communication network (LAN, for "Local Area Network"), to which a plurality of communication devices are connected.

[0061] In particular, such a local network could have a Thread® type mesh network structure, using a wireless radio protocol alternative to Wi-Fi®. It is recalled that Thread® technology is comparable to the Zigbee® technique, but has better performance in terms of energy consumption, is more robust and also easier to extend. In such a network, the access gateway, for example the Orange® Livebox®, can play the role of Thread® routing equipment. What will be described below in the particular example of a star network organized around an access gateway can easily be extended to any other type of local network, and in particular a Thread® type mesh network, in which the different steps of the access filtering method according to the invention are implemented. by any of the routing equipment on the local network.

[0062] In the home network shown schematically in [Fig.2], a residential gateway HGW referenced 10 makes it possible to connect a local communication network and a wide area network such as the Internet network (not shown). Such a residential gateway HGW 10 integrates a DHCP server: it performs the routing of data packets on the network, and can also act as a firewall, proxy, etc.

[0063] In the example of [Fig.2], numerous devices are present on the local network, namely: - a connected bulb 11; - a smartphone 12; - a PC 13 type computer; - a 14 tablet; - a weather station 15; - a 16 webcam; - a thermostat 17; - a laptop 18.

[0064] This list is of course not exhaustive, and many other communicating objects may be present on the user's local network. These communicating objects may be connected to the network by wire (Ethernet cable, USB port (for "Universal Serial Bus"), etc.) or wirelessly (Wi-Fi®, Bluetooth®, zigbee®). They include all types of physical objects, capable of communicating digitally on the local network, for the purpose of exchanging data, and which are compatible with the DHCP network. They also include software applications associated with certain non-IP ("Internet Protocol") connected objects, operating on wireless technologies such as BLE (for "Bluetooth® Low Energy"), Z-wave®, Thread®, etc.

[0065] Such communicating objects can be designated by the acronym loT, for the English “Internet of Things”, in French “Internet des objets”.

[0066] We will examine in more detail below the attempt to pair these communicating objects on the user's local communication network, for example according to the WiFi® wireless radio transmission protocol.

[0067] We now present, in relation to [Fig. 3], the different steps of the method for filtering access of an loT connected object referenced 16 (for example, the webcam of [Fig. 2]) to a local communication network according to an embodiment of the invention.

[0068] In this example, we consider that this method is implemented in an HGW access gateway referenced 10, for example an Orange® Livebox®.

[0069] We are interested in the arrival of the loT connected object referenced 16 in the local network. When it is powered up, this connected object 16 goes into pairing mode, and broadcasts in its surroundings pairing requests which can be carried, according to the communication protocol embedded in the IoT 16, by a communication technology of the Wi-Fi®, Bluetooth® or Ethernet type for example. This phase called “advertising” is shown diagrammatically in [Fig.3] by the step referenced E51.

[0070] The residential gateway HGW 10 continuously detects (step referenced E52) which objects are present around it. In particular, it is capable of detecting objects in pairing mode: - at the Wi-Fi® level (for example, in the Matter® standard, objects in pairing mode open an open Matter-xxx access point; in the proprietary Tuya® protocol, objects open a SmartLife-xxx access point); - at the Bluetooth® level (for example, the object referenced 16 emits “advertising” packets with a specific name like DCS-xxx for D-Link® cameras);

[0071] - at the Ethernet level (for example, in the Matter standard, the objects will emit specific mDNS queries).

[0072] During a step referenced E53, the HGW gateway 10 retrieves information on the loT object referenced 16 (for example at the Wi-Fi radio level: @MAC, SSID name, signal strength, etc.). In addition, the HGW gateway 10 can also retrieve information at the IP level, if it is capable of connecting to the object. This information can for example be retrieved from a certificate present on a Web server. This certificate can contain interesting information such as a product identifier of the connected object 16 (in English “product ID”), an identifier of the seller of the connected object 16 (in English “vendor ID”), the name of the organization that issued this certificate, a validity period, a security level, etc.

[0073] This information on the loT connected object referenced 16 can thus be recovered directly from the object itself, or obtained from local and / or external sources. From the information thus collected, the HGW gateway 10 calculates, during a step referenced E54, a confidence score to be assigned to the object referenced 16.

[0074] To do this, it can in particular query remote or local databases to check whether the manufacturer of the connected object 16, or the certificate associated with it, is “trusted”: - has the certificate been revoked (in particular, is it present in one or more certificate revocation lists (CRL for “Certificate Revocation List”, namely a list of digital certificates which have been revoked by the issuing certification authority before their scheduled expiry date and must no longer be reliable) - Is the certificate valid (e.g. by querying the Matter® Distributed Compliance Ledger, called DCL in English for “Distributed Compliance”)? Ledger")? Matter's DCL is a cryptographically secured, distributed storage network based on blockchain technology. It allows the Connectivity Standards Alliance (CSA) and authorized vendors to publish information about their Matter® devices. This information can then be retrieved using DCL clients. With all this device information stored in the DCL, Matter® ecosystems can consult the DCL to verify the device's certification compliance status, or for example, obtain commissioning instructions, links to manuals, and product information. - Does the product have any known public vulnerabilities (CVEs, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, which is a dictionary of public information about security vulnerabilities maintained by MITRE, supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security)? - Does the manufacturer have a physical presence in Europe (which can be an interesting guarantee of compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), EU Regulation 2016 / 679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data); - etc.

[0075] The HGW gateway 10 can also collect information on the manufacturing methods of the connected object 16: does it meet certain eco-design standards? has its manufacturer implemented a corporate social responsibility policy? what is its carbon impact?

[0076] Depending on the information received, the HGW gateway 10 assigns a trust score to the referenced connected object 16, which may take, for example, a value chosen from the triplet (low, medium, high), or a color chosen from the palette (red, yellow, green). This trust score aggregates, for example in the form of a weighted average, the different scores obtained by the loT connected object 16 in terms of security, respect for privacy, eco-design, etc.

[0077] During a step referenced E55, the HGW gateway 10 transmits this trust score to at least one trusted device EQPT referenced 12, for example the smartphone of the user who powered up the connected object 16, and / or that of the administrator of the local network, or an Orange TV decoder (in English set-top box). In the following, for the sake of simplification, we will speak of a single trusted device EQPT referenced 12; all of the teachings below can however be directly extended to the case where the HGW access gateway referenced 10 is in communication with several separate trusted devices.

[0078] This confidence score is transmitted in a notification which also contains a asks the user to accept or not the connection of this new object 16 to his local network. This notification may also contain a request, for the user, to know if he wishes this object 16 to join the Orange trusted ecosystem (“Fabric” in the Matter® standard; in this standard, the term “Fabric” designates a logical collection of communicating nodes, sharing a common root of trust, and a common distributed configuration state). This notification or “targeted advertising” (step E55) may be sent to the trusted terminal(s) closest to the referenced loT connected object 16 (for example using the RSSI, namely the strength of the signal received from the loT object 16) or to that of the network administrators, for example the “parents” in the case of a home network. The notification may contain a link to an Orange application and / or detailed information on the detected referenced object 16.

[0079] Depending on the decision of the user of the trusted equipment referenced 12, two situations may arise (reference ALT in [Fig.3]).

[0080] The user may decide, on the basis of the notification received in the step referenced E55 and the trust score it contains, that he refuses to pair this new object connected to his local network, because he considers that he cannot grant it a sufficient degree of trust. In this case, the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 sends a refusal notification to the gateway HGW 10 during a step referenced E56N.

[0081] This will probably be the case in particular if the trust score assigned by the HGW access gateway referenced 10 is “bad” or “red”, but also, if the user is cautious, also in the case where the trust score is “average” or “yellow”.

[0082] During a step referenced E57N, the HGW gateway 10 then implements a blocking of access of the loT object referenced 16 to the local communication network, or isolates it from the latter. To do this, the HGW gateway 10 can set up firewall rules using the IP address, or block the Wi-Fi connection using the MAC address, or not respond to DNS (Domain Name Server) requests, etc.

[0083] The user can also decide, as an alternative, on the basis of the notification received in the step referenced E55 and the confidence score that it contains, that he accepts to pair this new object connected to his local network, because he considers that he can grant it a sufficient degree of confidence. In this case, the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 sends to the gateway HGW 10 an acceptance notification during a step referenced E56Y.

[0084] This will likely be the case if the confidence score received is “good” or “green”; it may also be the case if the confidence score received is “orange” or "medium", and the user decides so.

[0085] During a step referenced E57Y, the HGW access gateway 10 then sends to the connected object 16 all of the configuration parameters that are necessary for it to connect to the local network, such as the SSID, the network password, data relating to the “Fabric” of the Orange® ecosystem, etc. During a step referenced E58Y, the loT connected object referenced 16 can then connect to the HGW gateway 10, and access all of the resources of the local network and the “Fabric” of the Orange® ecosystem.

[0086] [Fig.3] also shows two optional variants OPT1 and OPT2 which can be implemented jointly, or independently of each other.

[0087] The variant referenced OPT1 comprises a set of steps referenced E61 to E66 and aims to reinforce the reliability of the assignment of the trust score to the connected object 16. To do this, during a step referenced E61, the HGW gateway 10 sends to the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 a notification of entry of a code. For example, the HGW gateway 10 can ask the user to scan a QR-code present on the connected object referenced 16, or to manually enter a code which will allow the HGW gateway 10 to connect to the connected object referenced 16 to retrieve a certificate (for example the “Device Attestation Certificate” in the Matter® standard, in French “device attestation certificate”).

[0088] The use of a QR code has several advantages. First of all, this step imposed on the user makes it possible to verify that he is in fact close to the loT connected object referenced 16. In addition, this QR code can contain various useful information, such as the Matter® certificate, but also the various “advertising” channels (Wi-Fi®, Bluetooth®, etc.) that the loT connected object incorporates.

[0089] Thus, during a step referenced E62, the user uses the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 to scan the QR code present on the connected object loT referenced 16. The information that it contains is transmitted to the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 during a step referenced E63, then transferred during a step referenced E64 to the access gateway HGW referenced 10.

[0090] According to the Matter® standard, this QR code, printed on the loT connected object referenced 16, allows the user to obtain all the information necessary for configuring the device. The QR code contains a binary code encoded in base38 including the values: - Version - Seller ID - Product ID - Custom feed - Discovery skills - Discriminator - Access code - Stuffing - TLV data (optional) (used to configure the custom flow).

[0091] During a step referenced E65, the HGW access gateway referenced 10 uses the QR code received to connect to the loT connected object referenced 16. During a step referenced E66, the loT connected object referenced 16 transmits advanced information to the HGW access gateway referenced 10, for example the Matter® certificate.

[0092] The variant referenced OPT2, which may or may not be combined with the variant referenced OPT1, comprises a set of steps referenced E71 to E75 and aims to extend the pairing of the loT connected object referenced 16 to several ecosystems.

[0093] Indeed, once the loT connected object referenced 16 has been connected to the Orange® ecosystem (or “Fabric” in the Matter® standard), the HGW access gateway referenced 10 can ask the user if he wants this object referenced 16 to join other ecosystems or “Fabrics” (e.g. that of Amazon®, Google®, Apple®, etc.). It should be remembered that Matter® treats networks as shared resources: it does not stipulate ownership or exclusive access to networks. Consequently, it is possible to operate several Matter networks, called “fabrics”, on the same set of constituent networks.

[0094] Thus, during a step referenced E71, the HGW access gateway referenced 10 sends a notification to the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 to ask it whether a connection to a third-party ecosystem is desired.

[0095] In the event of a positive response sent by the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 during a step referenced E72, the access gateway HGW referenced 10 sends (step referenced E73), to the connected object loT referenced 16, a request to open a new pairing procedure (for example, using the procedure “Basic Commissioning Method” or “Enhanced Commissioning Method” in Matter®, in French, “Basic Commissioning Method” or “Enhanced Commissioning Method”).

[0096] During a step referenced E74, the loT connected object referenced 16 then launches a new “advertising” phase (in Wi-Fi®, in Bluetooth®, etc. depending on the communication channels at its disposal), intended for the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12. The latter, during a step referenced E75, sends it in return the configuration parameters necessary for it to join the chosen third-party ecosystem, for example the Amazon® Fabric.

[0097] It will be noted that, in the context of this OPT2 variant, if the loT connected object referenced 16 is not capable of opening a new pairing procedure (eg because that its proprietary protocol does not allow it to do so, for example the Tuya® protocol), the HGW access gateway referenced 10 can simulate the loT connected object referenced 16 with the trusted EQPT equipment referenced 12, and play the role of proxy server between these two equipments.

[0098] We now present, in relation to [Fig.4], the hardware structure of a routing device, for example a residential gateway HGW referenced 10, implementing the steps of the logic diagram of [Fig.3], in any one of its embodiments.

[0099] Such a residential gateway HGW 10 comprises a random access memory 33 (for example a RAM memory), a processing unit 32 equipped for example with a processor, and controlled by a computer program, stored in a read-only memory 31 (for example a ROM memory or a hard disk). Upon initialization, the code instructions of the computer program are for example loaded into the random access memory 33 before being executed by the processor of the processing unit 32.

[0100] The term unit can correspond to a software component as well as to a hardware component or a set of hardware and software components, a software component itself corresponding to one or more computer programs or sub-programs or more generally to any element of a program capable of implementing a function or a set of functions.

[0101] The RAM 33 contains in particular the information collected on the connected object referenced 16 during the step E53, as well as the various parameters necessary for calculating the confidence score, and the calculated confidence score itself. The processor of the processing unit 32 controls the transmission and reception of the various notifications addressed to the trusted equipment EQPT referenced 12 and to the connected object loT referenced 16 according to the flowchart of [Fig.3], as well as the calculation of the confidence score during the step referenced E54.

[0102] [Fig. 4] illustrates only one particular way, among several possible ways, of producing the residential gateway HGW 10, so that it performs the steps of the method detailed above, in relation to [Fig. 3] (in any one of the different embodiments, or in a combination of these embodiments). Indeed, these steps can be performed indifferently on a reprogrammable computing machine (a PC computer, a DSP processor or a microcontroller) executing a program comprising a sequence of instructions, or on a dedicated computing machine (for example a set of logic gates such as an FPGA or an ASIC, or any other hardware module).

[0103] In the case where the residential gateway HGW 10 is produced with a reprogrammable computing machine, the corresponding program (i.e. the sequence of instructions) may be stored in a removable storage medium (such as example a floppy disk, a CD-ROM or a DVD-ROM) or not, this storage medium being partially or totally readable by a computer or a processor.

[0104] The different embodiments have been described above in relation to a residential gateway of the Livebox® type, but can more generally be implemented in all Wi-Fi® or Thread® gateways, routers or access points (Wi-Fi® repeater, 4G access point, etc.)

Claims

Claims

1. Method for filtering access of a connected object (16) to a local communication network, implemented by routing equipment (10) of said local network, characterized in that it comprises steps of: - detection (E52) of a connected object (16) awaiting pairing within said local network; - allocation (E54) of a trust score to said connected object, from information relating to said connected object; - notification (E55), to at least one trusted equipment (12) of said local network, of the request for pairing of said connected object and of said assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a pairing refusal (E56N) of said at least one trusted equipment (12), blocking (E57N) access of said connected object (16) to said local network.

2. Access filtering method according to claim 1, characterized in that said information relating to said connected object (16) is received (E53) from said connected object and / or obtained by said routing equipment upon request addressed to a remote server.

3. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 and 2, characterized in that said information relating to said connected object belongs to the group comprising: - a MAC address of said connected object; - a power of a signal received from said connected object; - a connection identifier of said connected object; - a product identifier of said connected object; - a manufacturer identifier of said connected object; - a validity period of a security certificate associated with said connected object; - a security level of a security certificate associated with said connected object; - an identifier of an organization having issued a security certificate associated with said connected object.

4. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that said assigned confidence score results from an aggregation of at least some of the elements belonging to the group comprising: - a vulnerability score for said connected object; - a privacy score for a user of said connected object; - an eco-design score for said connected object.

5. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that said at least one trusted device to which said pairing request is notified is said trusted device closest to said connected object or trusted device belonging to an administrator of said local network.

6. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that it also comprises: - a transmission (E61), to said at least one trusted device (12), of a request to obtain a code associated with said connected object; - a connection (E65) of said routing device, from said code obtained from said at least one trusted device, to said connected object, in order to obtain said information relating to said connected object.

7. Access filtering method according to claim 6, characterized in that said request to obtain a code is a request to scan a QR-code associated with said connected object, and in that the scanned QR-code is received (E63) by said routing equipment from said at least one trusted equipment.

8. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, at the end of a pairing of said object connected to said routing equipment of said local communication network, it comprises a transmission (E71), to said at least one trusted equipment, of a request for a wish to pair said object connected to said at least one trusted equipment, and, in the event of reception (E72) of a wish to pair with said at least one trusted equipment, a transmission (E73), to said connected object, of a request to open a pairing sequence.

9. Access filtering method according to claim 8, characterized in that, if said connected object paired with said routing equipment is unable to also be paired with said at least one trusted equipment, said routing equipment plays the role of proxy server between said at least one trusted equipment and said connected object.

10. Access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that said routing equipment is an access gateway to said local communication network.

11. A computer program product comprising program code instructions for implementing an access filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, when executed by a processor.

12. Routing equipment for a local communication network, characterized in that it comprises a processor configured to execute steps of: - detecting a connected object awaiting pairing within said local network; - assigning a trust score to said connected object, based on information relating to said connected object; - notifying at least one trusted device of said local network of the request for pairing of said connected object and said assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a refusal to pair said at least one trusted device, blocking access of said connected object to said local network.

13. Residential gateway (HGW), characterized in that it comprises a processor configured to execute steps of: - detecting a connected object awaiting pairing within said local network; - assigning a trust score to said connected object, based on information relating to said connected object; - notifying at least one trusted device of said local network of the request for pairing of said connected object and said assigned trust score; - upon receipt of a refusal to pair said at least one trusted device, blocking access of said connected object to said local network.