Identity based hierarchical sessions
The method and system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on HSMs through an encrypted communication channel and challenge-response protocol address the challenge of secure key association and compliance, ensuring secure and scalable key management by preventing unauthorized access and maintaining compliance-aware session hierarchies.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- GB2023007761
- Authority / Receiving Office
- GB · GB
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-24
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-27
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Current methods for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on hardware security modules (HSMs) for binding secure keys to guest systems face challenges in maintaining secure key associations and ensuring compliance across session hierarchies, leading to potential security breaches and misuses.
A computer-implemented method and system that establish an identity-based, end-to-end encrypted communication channel between the guest system and HSM, performing a challenge-response protocol to verify session ownership and ensure that child sessions do not exceed the security level of their parent sessions, thereby binding secure keys securely and maintaining compliance throughout the session hierarchy.
This approach ensures secure key management by preventing unauthorized access and misuse of HSM-generated security keys, maintaining compliance-aware session hierarchies, and allowing for efficient deallocation of resources, thus enhancing security and scalability while adhering to predefined security standards.
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Abstract
Description
BACKGROUND Field of the Invention
[0001] The invention relates generally to a secure session management method, and more specifically, to a computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system. The invention relates further to a session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module for binding secure keys to a guest system, and a computer program product. Related Art
[0002] The security of data, both physical and virtual communication lines remains one of the top priorities for the management of corporate IT (information technology). This is not only required due to government regulations (e.g., GDPR, EU General Data Protection Regulation), but also due to a loss of credibility if companies fail to reliably protect customer data at all times - and thus lost sales and profits - in the event of compromised customer data records. It turns out that data protection and providing secure computing platforms is not only a software problem but can also involve hardware modules. This may not be a natural environment yet for mass-market CPU-chips used in microcontrollers, personal computers, mobile phones or home automation devices. However, for highly trusted enterprise-class computing environments, such as those used in the financial, insurance industries, or government organization, it is essential to be able to demonstrate that from a technological perspective data breaches have a very high probability of being prevented. This may require some additional high-tech components and sophisticated software processes. However, the associated success in terms of data security pays off for the additional effort.
[0003] Although hardware security modules (HSMs) have been in use for quite some time, synchronizing their association to specific sessions of guest system and other software components that use the HSMs' service is far from trivial.
[0004] There are several disclosures related to a computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system. Document US 2020 / 0 169 401 Al discloses systems and techniques for changing cryptographic keys in high-frequency transaction environments to mitigate service disruption or loss of transactions associated with key maintenance. In some embodiments, a server device may employ a working key encrypted with the first master key to decrypt messages transmitted by a client device, where each message is encrypted with eight first cryptograms generated based on the working key encrypted with a first master key. Additionally, document US 2020 / 0 053 065 Al discloses hardware security modules (HSMs) a database system for implementing a key management system with a database starring encryption keys or other secrets. The set of HSMs may identify the first key encryption key and a second key encryption key stored in the set of HSMs. The set of HSMs may retrieve, from the database, a set of encryption keys encrypted by the first key encryption key and decrypt each encrypted key of the set of encryption keys using the first key encryption key.
[0005] A disadvantage of known solutions may be that an association with certain sessions may not be provided. Therefore, there may be a need to further improve the use of HSMs along with related guest systems. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0006] According to one aspect of the present invention, a computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system may be provided. The method may comprise establishing a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session, transferring login information of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, and maintaining a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions. Thereby, no child session may have a higher security level than its parent session. The method may additionally comprise performing a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with the guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
[0007] According to another aspect of the present invention, a session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system may be provided. The system may comprise one or more processors and a memory operatively coupled to the one or more processors, wherein the memory stores program code portions which, when executed by the one or more processors, enable the one or more processors to establish a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session, to transfer login information of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, and to maintain a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions. Thereby, no child session may have a higher security level than its associated session.
[0008] Additionally, the one or more processors may also be enabled to performing a challenge-response protocol based a session ownership verification with the guest system, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
[0009] The proposed computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system may offer multiple advantages, technical effects, contributions and / or improvements:
[0010] The proposed concept may address the above mentioned need for the industry. Thereby, the inventive concept proposes a method and a system to establish identity-based hierarchical sessions for binding secure keys to a secure guest system. The login information may be transferred through an identity-based end-to-end encrypted communication channel. The compliance level may be maintained throughout the hierarchy of sessions. No child session may be of a higher compliance level than its parent. The capability to deallocate the initial connection (i.e., common location tunnel) data and state (i.e., status) after the challenge has been returned to the initiator session may allow the proposed method and system to be implemented that operates even with back ends with severe restrictions on internal persistent storage, like with more traditional architecture at computing systems.
[0011] In general, it can be ensured that an HSM cannot be misused by a guest system other than the initiating one. The session, by which the guest system may create and use an HSM-created security key may not be as disturbed or misused by any other session.
[0012] In doing so, maintaining the compliance-aware session hierarchy can bring benefits as follows: (i) the implemented module may use this session hierarchy information to check that the parent session is a valid and active session; (ii) the proposed module may verify that the security compliance level of the parent session may be higher or equal to the compliance level of the new child session, and (iii) if either check fails, the creation of the new session will be rejected such that no session can be initiated if the security standards are not met.
[0013] Furthermore, the challenge-response based concept may enable additional advantages: (i) based on the login information in any potential additional context information provided by the initiator session, the proposed module may generate a challenge session token as well as the expected response session token; (ii) the challenge session token may be encrypted using the former derived encryption token and sent back to the initiator through the protected communication channel; (iii) only the original initiator session will be able to decrypt the challenge session token and to obtain the expected response session token; and (iv) the initiator session will present the response session token on each request to the module that requires a proof-of-possession authentication.
[0014] Furthermore, the deallocation of the initial data and state may enable additional advantages: (i) after a creation of the response session token and the encrypted challenge session token may have been sent to the initiator session, the proposed module will deallocate all initial connection data and state (i.e., status) for the sake of resource austerity, and (ii) only the subject key identifier (SKI) of the initiators public key as well as the response session token will be retained for a later verification.
[0015] Hence, no session could be started or terminated without being compliant with the high and predefined security standards. It also means that sessions and tokens may not be intermixed and misused by any compromising activity. The system and the session communication between the guest system and a related HSM may - so to speak - be sealed (i.e., “tunnelled”, implying an end-to-end trusted relationship through mutual identifications of the participants). Moreover, this goal may be achieved with a comparably lean protocol which may be achieved by only little overhead if compared to a standard session management between a guest system and an HSM.
[0016] Additionally, using the concept of the hierarchical tree structure of the parent child relationships of the sessions, I may also be advantageous to log-out a complete branch of the session tree with a single action. Furthermore, also the implemented concept of supervisor sessions may allow for a log-out of all supervisor sessions at the same time. This may increase security and liability of the chosen concept if compared to traditional solutions. The hierarchical grouping inherent in the proposed system may also provide scalability, since the well-defined hierarchy of sessions may allow a compact representation of entire sub-hierarchies. By performing operations on sessions, one may imply operations on sessions beneath it, or implicit operations a session will perform in relationship to those above it.
[0017] In the following, additional embodiments of the inventive concept - applicable for the method as well as for the system - will be described.
[0018] According to an advantageous embodiment, the method may also comprise transmitting a challenge of the challenge-response protocol via the communication channel from the HSM to the guest system. This may lead to a response to the received challenge from the guest system in order to identify itself as a correctly connected guest system.
[0019] According to another advantageous embodiment of the method, the establishing the communication channel may be based on a public / private key pair of the HSM and a transmitted code - which may also be seen as a shared secret - allowing to derive a symmetrical encryption / decryption key. A similar mechanism based on public and private key pairs may be used by other secure transmission protocols. It may be easily implementable by a skilled person.
[0020] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the method, the deriving the symmetrical encryption / decryption key may be based on a Diffie-Hellman algorithm. However, also other algorithms for deriving symmetrical encryption / decryption keys based on a shared secret may be used. However, it was found that the Diffie-Hellman algorithm requires only little overhead with a solid security level.
[0021] According to an advanced embodiment, the method may also comprise using the communication channel to configure a new session to be a child session of an existing session such that the child session is cryptographically dependent on the parent session. This may require that a parent session exists. Using this approach, the requirement that no child session may have a higher security level than its parent session may become manageable without any additional overhead operations.
[0022] According to an interesting embodiment of the method, the guest system may be executed on a hypervisor. Such a virtual operation approach may represent a typical use case for large computer systems, where a large plurality of guest systems may share common hardware resources. This may also enable a close interaction between trusted firmware on top of which the hypervisor may be operated such that a secure communication may be established from the guest system via the hypervisor to the trusted firmware and further to the HSM.
[0023] Hence, and according to another useful embodiment of the method, a function of a firmware or trusted firmware of a computer system may facilitate a communication between the guest system and the HSM. Such a setup may be a solid basis for the highest levels of computing and communication security.
[0024] According to an interesting embodiment, the method may also comprise deallocating the communication channel and a related state of the guest system and / or a related session. This may be a natural addition to the general concept proposed here because it may allow to finally terminate the binding between the HSM and the related guest system. This may also be necessary if the guest system is a virtual guest system. If the virtual guest system may be terminated, the related binding to the HSM needs to be decommissioned or deallocated.
[0025] According to an additional interesting embodiment, the method may also comprise deallocating the session and a related state of the guest system, and / or deallocating all child sessions that have been associated with a parent session upon deallocation of the parent session.
[0026] According to another interesting embodiment, the method may also comprise marking a session as supervisor session, and / or providing a separate interface for deallocating all sessions bound to the HSM and their child sessions that have been marked as a supervisor session. This would ease the management of the guest system sessions significantly.
[0027] According to another and further developed embodiment, the method may also comprise: upon determining that a child session has a lower security level than its targeted parent session, rejecting the request to open a child session. If this would not be the case, the creation of the new session would be rejected. This feature may enable and support the hierarchical organization of the sessions, as described above. I.e., the method may also comprise determining, during the establishing of the communication channel, that a child session may have a higher security level than its parent session.
[0028] According to a further advantageous embodiment of the method, the session ownership verification may comprise generating a session token as well as an expected response token, decrypting a received encrypted session token, and deriving the received expected response token. Hence, only if the expected response token and the derivation of the received expected response token are identical, the protocol may succeed. Such a protocol may guarantee one of the highest possible security level.
[0029] Furthermore, embodiments may take the form of a related computer program product, accessible from a computer-usable or computer-readable medium providing program code for use by or in connection with a computer or any instruction execution system by or in connection with a computer or any instruction execution system. For the purpose of this description, a computer-usable or computer-readable medium may be any apparatus that may contain means for storing, communicating, propagating or transporting the program for use by or in connection, with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0030] It should be noted that embodiments of the invention are described with reference to different subject-matters. In particular, some embodiments are described with reference to method type claims, whereas other embodiments are described with reference to apparatus type claims. However, a person skilled in the art will gather from the above and the following description that, unless otherwise notified, in addition to any combination of features belonging to one type of subject-matter, also any combination between features relating to different subject-matters, in particular, between features of the method type claims, and features of the apparatus type claims, is considered as to be disclosed within this document. [0031 ] The aspects defined above and further aspects of the present invention are apparent from the examples of embodiments to be described hereinafter and are explained with reference to the examples of embodiments to which the invention is not limited.
[0032] Preferred embodiments of the invention will be described, by way of example only, and with reference to the following drawings:
[0033] Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of a flowchart of an embodiment of the inventive computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system.
[0034] Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of a flowchart embodiment of establishing the secure communication channel.
[0035] Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of an interaction between the client, the communication channel and the hierarchical session / identity assignment.
[0036] Fig. 4 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of the inventive components of the session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system.
[0037] Fig. 5 shows an embodiment of a computing system comprising the system according to Fig- 4. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0038] In the context of this description, the following technical conventions, terms and / or expressions may be used:
[0039] The term 'hardware security module' - or in short HSM - may denote a physical computing device that safeguards and manages digital keys, performs encryption and decryption functions of digital signatures, strong authentication and other cryptographic functions. These modules traditionally come in the form of a plug-in card or an external device that attaches directly to a computer or network server. They may also comprise one or more secure crypto-processor chips. HSMs are typically used for managing, controlling and safeguarding security keys or master keys used in other components of a computer or network system. Although stored safely in the HSM, security protocols require that also such master keys are renewed from time to time, i.e., undergo a master key roll process.
[0040] The term 'guest system’ may denote a physical or virtual computer resource under control of an operating system or a hypervisor. The guest system may also referred to as 'guest' or be operated as a secure guest system. One typical implementation of this may be a virtual machine running an application. However, it may also be a system process or (optimally, network- attached) physical control unit.
[0041] The term 'binding a secure keys to a guest system' may denote that the secure key may only be used by and in conjunction with the dedicated guest system.
[0042] The term 'communication channel' may denote a sequence of physical and logical components in a computer system enabled to be managed under predefined conditions and security protocols.
[0043] The term 'identity-based' may denote that an access to a computer resource may be bound to a specific identifier. Another component that does not have information about the specific identifier cannot access the resource. What’s more: if unauthorized access may be attempted without permission, an alarm can be activated.
[0044] The term 'end-to-end' may denote that a communication between two components A and B may not be disturbed or misused by a third component. If, e.g., a communication between A and B may be encrypted, no decryption option between A and B along a communication path may exist.
[0045] The term 'encrypted' may denote the concept that no access to a plaintext may be possible unless a decryption key may be used de-cipher the encrypted plaintext. Well known are asymmetric as well as symmetric encryption / decryption concepts. Thereby, asymmetric rely on a combination of the public and a private key, whereas symmetric encryption / decryption keys are identical.
[0046] The term 'session' may denote a collaboration between two components of a computer system, e.g., a guest system and an HSM. A session may have a starting point and an endpoint; i.e., it exists for a manageable period of time. During the session, the two different components may collaborate on manipulating or exchanging data.
[0047] The term 'login information' may denote here at least a personal identification number (i.e., PIN). Additionally, optional login information or credentials can be a Nonce - i.e., a onetime secret code, and / or context information.
[0048] The term 'predefined security level' may denote that, e.g., a communication may be compliant to a certain level of security standards.
[0049] The term 'hierarchy of the sessions' may denote starting from an original or initial session that additional sessions are organized as leaves below the initial session. Thereby, child sessions of a parent session may also act as parent session themselves for subsequent child sessions.
[0050] The term 'challenge-response protocol' may denote a concept by which a response may be compared with an expected response. I.e., two components A and B may be in communication action exchange. If component A sends out a challenge to component B and if component B generates the expected response, which - after transmission to component A -may be compared with the expected response, it may become clear that the two components are intended to collaborate.
[0051] The term 'session possession ownership' may denote a concept by which the guest system demonstrates its ownership of the session by presenting the expected response token which only the guest system could have been able to derive from the challenge token retrieved through the end-to-end encrypted channel.
[0052] The term 'Diffie-Hellman algorithm' may denote the well-known mathematical method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over to public channel. The protocol was first published in 1976 by Diffie and Hermann. It basically relies on a generated secret code derived from a combination of public and private key pair components. If the first and the second component A and B communicate with each other and if each component has its own private / public key pair (pubK / privK), the secret code may be generated by a combination of pubK-A and privK-B as well as PrivK-A and pubK-B. Hence, both sides may generate the secret code independently of each other.
[0053] The term 'hypervisor' - also known as virtual machine monitor - may denote a softer layer between the physical hardware of a computer system and an operating system. By the concept of virtualization using the hypervisor, a plurality of virtual machines may be operated atop the hypervisor on one single physical machine. The different virtual machines cannot and do not influence each other (apart from performance bottlenecks). The hypervisor may collaborate with a fair number of the computer system in order to implement secure computing concepts.
[0054] The term 'firmware of a computer system' may denote software code which may be deeply integrated into the hardware of a computer system and that may be executed by the process or all any other computer code executing controllers. Typically, end-user programs may not access the firmware directly. The access may be restricted to operating systems and / or hypervisors.
[0055] The term 'session token' may denote a secret code used by both sides of a session; i.e., component A and component B may both know the session token. Computing components outside the session may not have access to the session token. Hence, privacy and secure data exchange between the components A and B may be enabled.
[0056] The term 'expected response token' may denote the expected shared secret of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
[0057] Last but not least, the term 'supervisor session' may denote may denote a session that is not bound to any user related activities but which may be initiated and controlled by an intermediate layer process, e.g., of the firmware or a system process, e.g. a hypervisor. The intermediate layer might also prevent the user from opening supervisor sessions on its own.
[0058] In the following, a detailed description of the figures will be given. All instructions in the figures are schematic. Firstly, a block diagram of an embodiment of the inventive computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system is given. Afterwards, further embodiments, as well as embodiments of the session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system will be described.
[0059] Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of the computer-implemented method 100 for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system. The guest system may also be a plurality of guest systems and / or secure guest systems. The method comprises establishing, 102, a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM. Such a communication channel shall be identity-based, have end-to-end characteristic and allow an encrypted data transfer when in use. This way, the sessions are enabled.
[0060] The method 100 comprises additionally transferring, 104, login information / credentials - in particular, at least a PIN (i.e., personal identification number) and optionally a Nonce (temporary value) and also optional context data - of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM. It may be noted that only the PIN needs the secure communication channel. The rest of the login information can be communicated through other channels.
[0061] Additionally, the method 100 comprises further maintaining, 106, a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions. Thereby, not any child session has a higher security level than its parent session. Hence, child sessions have a lower or - in maximum - an equal security level. The security level applied here may denote that the applied security protocols should be compliant to a predefined security standard.
[0062] Last but not least, the method 100 comprises performing, 108, a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with the guest system such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated guest system session. Thereby, the challenge message is sent by the HSM and the required response together with the token is sent by the guest system, allowing a use of the session for, e.g., key generation purposes.
[0063] Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of an embodiment 200 of how the secure communication channel can be established. Firstly, the guest system gets, 202, the “publicly” available key of the public / private key pair of the HSM. Secondly and based on this, the guest system uses, 204, its own private key and the received public key of the HSM to define a code (i.e., shared secret) to derive a symmetrical key, i.e., an encryption / decryption key which uses for a decryption and an encryption the identical key.
[0064] Then, the guest system uses, 206, the symmetric key to encrypt login information / credentials - in particular, a login PIN - and sends it to the HSM. In additional, parameters like a Nonce (i.e., random value) and / or context parameter values can also be send using the same route but also other communication channels. Hence, the guest system sends, 208, also its own public key, and optionally the Nonce and the context parameter values to the HSM.
[0065] As a response, 210, the HSM applies the Diffie-Hellmann algorithm to derive the same code / shared secret. With this, the symmetric key is derived, and finally, the symmetric key is used to decrypt the PIN. In case of a match with a stored key, the secure communication channel has been established in a secure way.
[0066] Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of a more implementation-near embodiment 300 of the proposed concept as physical components. Firstly, the login initiator or initiating session component 306 provides PIN / login information via a common location channel to the HSM through a communication channel 302. By the described key exchange between the initiating session 306 and the HSM, a secured communication channel has been enabled, i.e., the protected connection can be initiated. This established protected communication channel is based on an encrypted message transmission using identity-bound key material.
[0067] As a prerequisite, the public key 3 08A of the initiators session 302 and the public key 308B of the HSM should be available within the underlying system(s).
[0068] Hence, the secure communication channel 302 may have been established according to the activities described in the context of Fig. 2. Thus, based on a key exchange 310 to retrieve / decrypt initiators / connection-specific data, a session ID may be derived as a combination of initiator plus parent data plus context data, 312.
[0069] Thereby, as an example, the designated parent 314 of the hierarchy of sessions 304 and its data are used to add another leave 316 on the hierarchy tree for the new session. Based on this, a challenge from the HSM may provoke a response 318 - which flows through the secure communication channel 302 - where the response may be reconstructed to a complete response 320 to the HSM challenge. This is possible only with access to data available to the initiator / importer. Based on this complete response 320, a session ownership verification check is possible to confirm the new session 316 in the hierarchy of the session / the identity assignments.
[0070] Fig. 4 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of the session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system. The system comprises at least one or more processors 402 and a memory 404 operatively coupled to the one or more processors 402. Thereby, the memory 404 stores program code portions which, when executed by the one or more processors 402, enable the one or more processors 402 to establish a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session. This activity can be performed by a communication channel establishment module 406.
[0071] The one or more processors 402 are also enabled to transfer login information - in particular by a transfer unit 408 - of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, and to maintain a predefined security level - in particular by a maintenance module 410 throughout a hierarchy of the sessions, wherein no child session has a higher security level than its parent session.
[0072] Last but not least, the one or more processors are also enabled to perform a challengeresponse protocol - in particular, by a protocol execution unit - based on a session ownership verification with the guest system, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session, in particular an associated guest system session.
[0073] It shall also be mentioned that all functional units, modules and functional blocks - in particular, the one or more processors 402, the memory 404, the communication channel establishment module, the transfer unit, the maintenance module and, the protocol execution unit 412 - may be communicatively coupled to each other for signal or message exchange in a selected 1:1 manner. Alternatively the functional units, modules and functional blocks can be linked to a system internal bus system 414 for a selective signal or message exchange.
[0074] Various aspects of the present disclosure are described by narrative text, flowcharts, block diagrams of computer systems and / or block diagrams of the machine logic included in computer program product (CPP) embodiments. With respect to any flowcharts, depending upon the technology involved, the operations can be performed in a different order than what is shown in a given flowchart. For example, again depending upon the technology involved, two operations shown in successive flowchart blocks may be performed in reverse order, as a single integrated step, concurrently, or in a manner at least partially overlapping in time.
[0075] A computer program product embodiment (CPP embodiment or CPP) is a term used in the present disclosure to describe any set of one, or more, storage media (also called mediums) collectively included in a set of one, or more, storage devices that collectively include machine readable code corresponding to instructions and / or data for performing computer operations specified in a given CPP claim. A storage device is any tangible device that can retain and store instructions for use by a computer processor. Without limitation, the computer readable storage medium may be an electronic storage medium, a magnetic storage medium, an optical storage medium, an electromagnetic storage medium, a semiconductor storage medium, a mechanical storage medium, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Some known types of storage devices that include these mediums include diskette, hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), static random access memory (SRAM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD), memory stick, floppy disk, mechanically encoded device (such as punch cards or pits / lands formed in a major surface of a disc) or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A computer readable storage medium, as that term is used in the present disclosure, is not to be construed as storage in the form of transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide, light pulses passing through a fiber optic cable, electrical signals communicated through a wire, and / or other transmission media. As will be understood by those of skill in the art, data is typically moved at some occasional points in time during normal operations of a storage device, such as during access, de-fragmentation or garbage collection, but this does not render the storage device as transitory because the data is not transitory while it is stored.
[0076] Fig. 5 shows a computing environment 500 comprising an example of an environment for the execution of at least some of the computer code involved in performing the inventive methods, such as the computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system 550.
[0077] In addition to block 550, computing environment 500 includes, for example, computer 501, wide area network (WAN) 502, end user device (EUD) 503, remote server 504, public cloud 505, and private cloud 506. In this embodiment, computer 501 includes processor set 510 (including processing circuitry 520 and cache 521), communication fabric 511, volatile memory 512, persistent storage 513 (including operating system 522 and block 550, as identified above), peripheral device set 514 (including user interface (UI), device set 523, storage 524, and Internet of Things (loT) sensor set 525), and network module 515. Remote server 504 includes remote database 530. Public cloud 505 includes gateway 540, cloud orchestration module 541, host physical machine set 542, virtual machine set 543, and container set 544.
[0078] COMPUTER 501 may take the form of a desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet computer, smart phone, smart watch or other wearable computer, mainframe computer, quantum computer or any other form of computer or mobile device now known or to be developed in the future that is capable of running a program, accessing a network or querying a database, such as remote database 530. As is well understood in the art of computer technology, and depending upon the technology, performance of a computer-implemented method may be distributed among multiple computers and / or between multiple locations. On the other hand, in this presentation of computing environment 500, detailed discussion is focused on a single computer, specifically computer 501, to keep the presentation as simple as possible. Computer 501 may be located in a cloud, even though it is not shown in a cloud in Figure 5. On the other hand, computer 501 is not required to be in a cloud except to any extent as may be affirmatively indicated.
[0079] PROCESSOR SET 510 includes one, or more, computer processors of any type now known or to be developed in the future. Processing circuitry 520 may be distributed over multiple packages, for example, multiple, coordinated integrated circuit chips. Processing circuitry 520 may implement multiple processor threads and / or multiple processor cores. Cache 521 is memory that is located in the processor chip package(s) and is typically used for data or code that should be available for rapid access by the threads or cores running on processor set 510. Cache memories are typically organized into multiple levels depending upon relative proximity to the processing circuitry. Alternatively, some, or all, of the cache for the processor set may be located “off chip.” In some computing environments, processor set 510 may be designed for working with qubits and performing quantum computing.
[0080] Computer readable program instructions are typically loaded onto computer 501 to cause a series of operational steps to be performed by processor set 510 of computer 501 and thereby effect a computer-implemented method, such that the instructions thus executed will instantiate the methods specified in flowcharts and / or narrative descriptions of computer- implemented methods included in this document (collectively referred to as “the inventive methods”). These computer readable program instructions are stored in various types of computer readable storage media, such as cache 521 and the other storage media discussed below. The program instructions, and associated data, are accessed by processor set 510 to control and direct performance of the inventive methods. In computing environment 500, at least some of the instructions for performing the inventive methods may be stored in block 550 in persistent storage 513.
[0081] COMMUNICATION FABRIC 511 is the signal conduction paths that allow the various components of computer 501 to communicate with each other. Typically, this fabric is made of switches and electrically conductive paths, such as the switches and electrically conductive paths that make up busses, bridges, physical input / output ports and the like. Other types of signal communication paths may be used, such as fiber optic communication paths and / or wireless communication paths.
[0082] VOLATILE MEMORY 512 is any type of volatile memory now known or to be developed in the future. Examples include dynamic type random access memory (RAM) or static type RAM. Typically, the volatile memory is characterized by random access, but this is not required unless affirmatively indicated. In computer 501, the volatile memory 512 is located in a single package and is internal to computer 501, but, alternatively or additionally, the volatile memory may be distributed over multiple packages and / or located externally with respect to computer 501.
[0083] PERSISTENT STORAGE 513 is any form of non-volatile storage for computers that is now known or to be developed in the future. The non-volatility of this storage means that the stored data is maintained regardless of whether power is being supplied to computer 501 and / or directly to persistent storage 513. Persistent storage 513 may be a read only memory (ROM), but typically at least a portion of the persistent storage allows writing of data, deletion of data and re-writing of data. Some familiar forms of persistent storage include magnetic disks and solid state storage devices. Operating system 522 may take several forms, such as various known proprietary operating systems or open source Portable Operating System Interface type operating systems that employ a kernel. The code included in block 550 typically includes at least some of the computer code involved in performing the inventive methods.
[0084] PERIPHERAL DEVICE SET 514 includes the set of peripheral devices of computer 501. Data communication connections between the peripheral devices and the other components of computer 501 may be implemented in various ways, such as Bluetooth connections, Near-Field Communication (NFC) connections, connections made by cables (such as universal serial bus (USB) type cables), insertion type connections (e.g., secure digital (SD) card), connections made though local area communication networks and even connections made through wide area networks such as the internet. In various embodiments, UI device set 523 may include components such as a display screen, speaker, microphone, wearable devices (such as goggles and smart watches), keyboard, mouse, printer, touchpad, game controllers, and haptic devices. Storage 524 is external storage, such as an external hard drive, or insertable storage, such as an SD card. Storage 524 may be persistent and / or volatile. In some embodiments, storage 524 may take the form of a quantum computing storage device for storing data in the form of qubits. In embodiments where computer 501 is required to have a large amount of storage (for example, where computer 501 locally stores and manages a large database) then this storage may be provided by peripheral storage devices designed for storing very large amounts of data, such as a storage area network (SAN) that is shared by multiple, geographically distributed computers. loT sensor set 525 is made up of sensors that can be used in Internet of Things applications. For example, one sensor may be a thermometer and another sensor may be a motion detector.
[0085] NETWORK MODULE 515 is the collection of computer software, hardware, and firmware that allows computer 501 to communicate with other computers through WAN 502. Network module 515 may include hardware, such as modems or Wi-Fi signal transceivers, software for packetizing and / or de-packetizing data for communication network transmission, and / or web browser software for communicating data over the internet. In some embodiments, network control functions and network forwarding functions of network module 515 are performed on the same physical hardware device. In other embodiments (e.g., embodiments that utilize software-defined networking (SDN)), the control functions and the forwarding functions of network module 515 are performed on physically separate devices, such that the control functions manage several different network hardware devices. Computer readable program instructions for performing the inventive methods can typically be downloaded to computer 501 from an external computer or external storage device through a network adapter card or network interface included in network module 515.
[0086] WAN 502 is any wide area network (for example, the internet) capable of communicating computer data over non-local distances by any technology for communicating computer data, now known or to be developed in the future. In some embodiments, the WAN may be replaced and / or supplemented by local area networks (LANs) designed to communicate data between devices located in a local area, such as a Wi-Fi network. The WAN and / or LANs typically include computer hardware such as copper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and edge servers.
[0087] END USER DEVICE (EUD) 503 is any computer system that is used and controlled by an end user (for example, a customer of an enterprise that operates computer 501), and may take any of the forms discussed above in connection with computer 501. EUD 503 typically receives helpful and useful data from the operations of computer 501. For example, in a hypothetical case where computer 501 is designed to provide a recommendation to an end user, this recommendation would typically be communicated from network module 515 of computer 501 through WAN 502 to EUD 503. In this way, EUD 503 can display, or otherwise present, the recommendation to an end user. In some embodiments, EUD 503 may be a client device, such as thin client, heavy client, mainframe computer, desktop computer and so on.
[0088] REMOTE SERVER 504 is any computer system that serves at least some data and / or functionality to computer 501. Remote server 504 may be controlled and used by the same entity that operates computer 501. Remote server 504 represents the machine(s) that collect and store helpful and useful data for use by other computers, such as computer 501. For example, in a hypothetical case where computer 501 is designed and programmed to provide a recommendation based on historical data, then this historical data may be provided to computer 501 from remote database 530 of remote server 504.
[0089] PUBLIC CLOUD 505 is any computer system available for use by multiple entities that provides on-demand availability of computer system resources and / or other computer capabilities, especially data storage (cloud storage) and computing power, without direct active management by the user. Cloud computing typically leverages sharing of resources to achieve coherence and economies of scale. The direct and active management of the computing resources of public cloud 505 is performed by the computer hardware and / or software of cloud orchestration module 541. The computing resources provided by public cloud 505 are typically implemented by virtual computing environments that run on various computers making up the computers of host physical machine set 542, which is the universe of physical computers in and / or available to public cloud 505. The virtual computing environments (VCEs) typically take the form of virtual machines from virtual machine set 543 and / or containers from container set 544. It is understood that these VCEs may be stored as images and may be transferred among and between the various physical machine hosts, either as images or after instantiation of the VCE. Cloud orchestration module 541 manages the transfer and storage of images, deploys new instantiations of VCEs and manages active instantiations of VCE deployments. Gateway 540 is the collection of computer software, hardware, and firmware that allows public cloud 505 to communicate through WAN 502.
[0090] Some further explanation of virtualized computing environments (VCEs) will now be provided. VCEs can be stored as “images.” A new active instance of the VCE can be instantiated from the image. Two familiar types of VCEs are virtual machines and containers. A container is a VCE that uses operating-system-level virtualization. This refers to an operating system feature in which the kernel allows the existence of multiple isolated user-space instances, called containers. These isolated user-space instances typically behave as real computers from the point of view of programs running in them. A computer program running on an ordinary operating system can utilize all resources of that computer, such as connected devices, files and folders, network shares, CPU power, and quantifiable hardware capabilities. However, programs running inside a container can only use the contents of the container and devices assigned to the container, a feature which is known as containerization.
[0091] PRIVATE CLOUD 506 is similar to public cloud 505, except that the computing resources are only available for use by a single enterprise. While private cloud 506 is depicted as being in communication with WAN 502, in other embodiments a private cloud may be disconnected from the internet entirely and only accessible through a local / private network. A hybrid cloud is a composition of multiple clouds of different types (for example, private, community or public cloud types), often respectively implemented by different vendors. Each of the multiple clouds remains a separate and discrete entity, but the larger hybrid cloud architecture is bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables orchestration, management, and / or data / application portability between the multiple constituent clouds. In this embodiment, public cloud 505 and private cloud 506 are both part of a larger hybrid cloud.
[0092] It should also be mentioned that the session management system 400 for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system can be an operational sub-system of the computer 501 and may be attached to a computer-internal bus system.
[0093] The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the invention. As used herein, the singular forms a, an and the are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will further be understood that the terms comprises and / or comprising, when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or groups thereof.
[0094] The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of all means or steps plus function elements in the claims below are intended to include any structure, material, or act for performing the function in combination with other claimed elements, as specifically claimed. The description of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the invention in the form disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skills in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. The embodiments are chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skills in the art to understand the invention for various embodiments with various modifications, as are suited to the particular use contemplated.
[0095] In a nutshell, the inventive concept may be summarized by the following clauss: 1. A computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, the method comprising - establishing a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session, - transferring login information of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, - maintaining a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions, wherein not any child session has a higher security level than its parent session, - performing a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with the guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session. 2. The method according to clause 1, also comprising - transmitting a challenge of the challenge-response protocol via the communication channel from the HSM to the guest system. 3. The method according to clause 1 or 2, wherein the establishing the communication channel is based on a public / pnvate key pair of the HSM and a transmitted code allowing to derive a symmetrical encryption / decryption key. 4. The method according to clause 3, wherein the deriving the symmetrical encryption / decrypt!on key is based on a Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 5. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, also comprising - using the communication channel to configure a new session to be a child session of an existing session such that the child session is cryptographically dependent on the parent session. 6. The method according to any of the preceding clauses , wherein the guest system is executed on a hypervisor. 7. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, wherein a function of a firmware of a computer system facilitates a communication between the guest system and the HSM. 8. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, also comprising - deallocating the communication channel and an associated state of the guest system and / or a related session. 9. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, also comprising - deallocating the session and an associated state of the guest system, and / or - deallocating all child sessions that have been associated with a parent session upon deallocation of the parent session. 10. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, also comprising - marking a session as supervisor session, and / or - a separate interface for deallocating all sessions and their child sessions that have been marked as a supervisor session. 11. The method according to any of the preceding clauses, also comprising - upon determining that a child session has a lower security level than its targeted parent session, rejecting the request to open a child session. 12. A session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, the system comprising - one or more processors and a memory operatively coupled to the one or more processors, wherein the memory stores program code portions which, when executed by the one or more processors, enable the one or more processors to - establish a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session, - transfer login information of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, - maintain a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions, wherein no child session has a higher security level than its parent session, - performing a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with the guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session. 13. The session management system according to clause 12, wherein the one or more processors are also enabled to - transmit a challenge of the challenge-response protocol via the communication channel from the HSM to the guest system. 14. The session management system according to clause 12 or 13, wherein the establishing the communication channel is based on a public / private key pair of the HSM and a transmitted code allowing to derive a symmetrical encryption / decryption key. 15. The session management system according to clause 14, wherein the deriving the symmetrical encryption / decryption key is based on a Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 16. The session management system according to any of the clauses 12 to 15, wherein the one or more processors are also to - use the communication channel to configure a new session to be a child session of an existing session such that the child session is cryptographically dependent on the parent session. 17. The session management system according to any of the clauses 12 to 16, also comprising a hypervisor on which the guest system is executed. 18. The session management system according to any of the clauses 12 to 17, wherein a function of a firmware of a computer system facilitates a communication between the guest system and the HSM. 19. The session management system according to any of the clauses 12 to 18, wherein the one or more processors are also to - deallocate the communication channel and a related state of the guest system and / or a related session. 20. A computer program product for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, the program instructions being executable by one or more computing systems or controllers to cause the one or more computing systems to - establish a communication channel between the guest system and the HSM, wherein the communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session, - transfer login information of the guest system through the communication channel to the HSM, - maintain a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of the sessions, wherein no child session has a higher security level than its parent session, - performing a challenge-response protocol based a session ownership verification with the guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
Claims
1. A computer-implemented method for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, said method comprising- establishing a communication channel between said guest system and said HSM, wherein said communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session,- transferring login information of said guest system through said communication channel to said HSM,- maintaining a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of said sessions, wherein not any child session has a higher security level than its parent session,- performing a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with said guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
2. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- transmitting a challenge of said challenge-response protocol via said communication channel from said HSM to said guest system.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein said establishing said communication channel is based on a public / private key pair of said HSM and a transmitted code allowing to derive a symmetrical encryption / decryption key.
4. The method according to claim 3, wherein said deriving said symmetrical encryption / decryption key is based on a Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
5. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- using said communication channel to configure a new session to be a child session of an existing session such that said child session is cryptographically dependent on said parent session.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein said guest system is executed on a hypervisor.
7. The method according to claim 1, wherein a function of a firmware of a computer system facilitates a communication between said guest system and said HSM.
8. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- deallocating said communication channel and an associated state of said guest system and / or a related session.
9. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- deallocating said session and an associated state of said guest system, and / or- deallocating all child sessions that have been associated with a parent session upon deallocation of said parent session.
10. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- marking a session as supervisor session, and / or- a separate interface for deallocating all sessions and their child sessions that have been marked as a supervisor session.
11. The method according to claim 1, also comprising- upon determining that a child session has a lower security level than its targeted parent session, rejecting said request to open a child session.
12. A session management system for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, said system comprising- one or more processors and a memory operatively coupled to said one or more processors, wherein said memory stores program code portions which, when executed by said one or more processors, enable said one or more processors to- establish a communication channel between said guest system and said HSM, wherein said communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session,- transfer login information of said guest system through said communication channel to said HSM,- maintain a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of said sessions, wherein no child session has a higher security level than its parent session,- performing a challenge-response protocol based on a session ownership verification with said guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
13. The session management system according to claim 12, wherein said one or more processors are also enabled to- transmit a challenge of said challenge-response protocol via said communication channel from said HSM to said guest system.
14. The session management system according to claim 12, wherein said establishing said communication channel is based on a public / private key pair of said HSM and atransmitted code allowing to derive a symmetrical encryption / decryption key.
15. The session management system according to claim 14, wherein said deriving said symmetrical encryption / decryption key is based on a Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
16. The session management system according to claim 12, wherein said one or more processors are also to- use said communication channel to configure a new session to be a child session of an existing session such that said child session is cryptographically dependent on said parent session.
17. The session management system according to claim 12, also comprising a hypervisor on which said guest system is executed.
18. The session management system according to claim 12, wherein a function of a firmware of a computer system facilitates a communication between said guest system and said HSM.
19. The session management system according to claim 12, wherein said one or more processors are also to- deallocate said communication channel and a related state of said guest system and / or a related session.
20. A computer program product for establishing identity-based hierarchical sessions on a hardware security module (HSM) for binding secure keys to a guest system, said program instructions being executable by one or more computing systems or controllers to cause said one or more computing systems to- establish a communication channel between said guest system and said HSM, wherein said communication channel is identity-based, end-to-end and encrypted, thereby establishing a session,- transfer login information of said guest system through said communication channel to said HSM,- maintain a predefined security level throughout a hierarchy of said sessions, wherein no child session has a higher security level than its parent session,- performing a challenge-response protocol based a session ownership verification with said guest, such that an HSM generated and secured key is bound to an associated session.
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