Data processing system

By integrating crypto agility through on-chip digests and off-chip code storage, the solution addresses vulnerabilities and inflexibility in secure boot systems, enhancing security and memory efficiency in embedded systems.

GB2706015APending Publication Date: 2026-11-11PQSHIELD LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
GB2025005292
Authority / Receiving Office
GB · GB
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-04-08
Publication Date
2026-11-11

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing secure boot solutions in embedded systems are vulnerable to attacks and inflexible due to reliance on fixed cryptographic algorithms and keys, which cannot be easily updated, leading to potential security breaches and memory constraints.

Method used

Implementing crypto agility by storing cryptographic software digests on-chip and code off-chip, allowing dynamic selection and update of cryptographic algorithms, and using hash-based verification to reduce storage requirements.

Benefits of technology

Enhances security and flexibility by adapting to emerging threats and reducing memory demands, ensuring long-term security and resilience against evolving cryptographic standards.

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Abstract

A data processing system is disclosed, comprising first 102 and second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 and processing circuitry; the first non-volatile storage 102 stores a cryptographic software d
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Description

Technical Field The present invention relates generally to the field of embedded systems security, and more particularly to methods and systems for establishing and maintaining a secure boot process on an integrated circuit (chip), especially in the context of preventing unauthorized software execution and maintaining system integrity. Background Modern electronic devices, ranging from smartphones and personal computers to industrial control systems and Internet of Things (loT) devices, rely heavily on software to perform their intended functions. The integrity and authenticity of this software are critical for the secure and reliable operation of these devices. Compromised software can lead to a multitude of security vulnerabilities, including data theft, denial-of-service attacks, and even physical damage in certain applications. A fundamental security mechanism employed to address these threats is secure boot. Secure boot is a process that ensures the firmware and operating system loaded during the device's startup sequence are trusted and have not been tampered with. Traditionally, secure boot implementations involve verifying cryptographic signatures of boot components before allowing them to execute. This verification typically relies on a hardware-rooted trust anchor, often embedded within the chip itself. Existing secure boot solutions often involve storing cryptographic keys in on-chip non-volatile memory, such as ROM or flash memory. While these approaches provide a degree of security, they can be susceptible to various attacks. For instance, vulnerabilities in the bootloader itself, weaknesses in the key management scheme, or physical attacks targeting the storage of sensitive information can compromise the secure boot process. Furthermore, as the complexity of embedded systems increases, so does the number of potential vulnerabilities that be exploited. Modern chips often incorporate multiple processing cores, peripherals, and complex memory hierarchies, each of which can potentially be exploited to bypass security measures. Managing the secure boot process across these diverse components presents significant challenges. Summary Aspects of the present invention are set out in the appended independent claims. Certain variations of the invention are then set out in the appended dependent claims. Brief Description of the Drawings Figure 1 is a schematic block diagram showing a data processing system according to examples; Figure 2 is a schematic block diagram showing secure boot operations performed by the data processing system according to examples; Figure 3 is a schematic block diagram showing a cryptographic verification algorithm including signature verification according to examples; Figure 4 is a schematic block diagram showing a secure boot operation in which the data processing system is provided with an initial cryptographic verification algorithm according to examples; Figure 5 is a schematic block diagram showing a secure boot operation in which the data processing selects a cryptographic software according to examples; Figure 6 is a schematic block diagram showing operations for updating cryptographic software in the data processing system according to examples; Figure 7 is a schematic block diagram showing operations for updating cryptographic software in the data processing system according to further examples; Figure 8 is a flow chart showing a method for performing secure boot according to examples. Detailed Description Traditional secure boot mechanisms often rely on fixed cryptographic algorithms and keys, which can become vulnerable over time as new cryptographic attacks emerge. An inability to replace compromised cryptographic algorithms and keys leads to inflexibility, which poses a risk to the long-term security of embedded systems. To address this challenge, it is desirable to develop secure boot solutions that incorporate crypto agility. Crypto agility refers to the capability of a system to support multiple cryptographic algorithms and to switch between them. This adaptability allows the system to respond to emerging threats and vulnerabilities by updating its cryptographic methods without replacing hardware. By integrating crypto agility into the secure boot process, embedded systems can maintain a high level of security throughout their lifecycle. Crypto agility generally involves storing code for multiple cryptographic algorithms within the bootloader or firmware. Each algorithm comes with its own library and keys, consuming valuable on-chip non-volatile storage. These cryptographic algorithms can be used to verify application software during boot, such as system firmware or essential software such as an operating system. The inclusion of multiple algorithms directly increases the size of the bootloader and overall firmware image. This can lead to either the use of larger, more expensive memory chips or undesirable trade-offs in other features. Examples of cryptographic algorithms that may be implemented include Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit (SHA-256), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Blowfish, and Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms such as CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM), CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA), FALCON (FN-DSA), SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA), Extended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and others. Certain devices that are typically configured to implement secure boot, such as embedded devices or loT devices, may have memory constraints due to several factors. These memory constraints make it difficult to provide a large number of cryptographic algorithms in embedded devices for secure boot. The factors affecting memory constraints in embedded devices include physical space, power consumption, and cost. Embedded devices such as a microcontrollers and system-on-chip (SoC) devices are generally designed to be compact, which limits the amount of physical space available for memory components. Many embedded devices are designed to operate efficiently and with minimal power consumption which can restrict the type and amount of memory used. Cost consideration may also impact the amount of memory that can be included in embedded systems, especially in mass-produced consumer electronics. Certain examples described herein provide a data processing system that is configured to operate in a sealed secure boot mode in which mutable cryptographic software is used to verify application software during boot of the data processing system. The mutable cryptographic software code may be stored in external storage, such as flash, that is outside of on-chip storage. In this way, crypto agility can be provided even in systems in which the on-chip non-volatile storage capacity is limited and unsuitable for storing increased amounts of relevant data, such as libraries and keys, for multiple cryptographic algorithms. The data processing system may comprise any computing device that is configured to perform secure boot operations. Examples of such computing devices include, but are not limited to, embedded systems, loT devices, mobile computing devices, networking equipment, medical devices, automotive systems, industrial control systems and the like. Embedded systems, such as microcontrollers and SoC devices, are used in various applications such as automotive control systems, industrial automation, and consumer electronics. Secure boot ensures that only trusted firmware is executed, protecting the embedded system from malicious code. loT devices, such as smart home appliances, wearable technology, and connected sensors, require secure boot to safeguard against unauthorized firmware updates and cyber attacks. Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets use secure boot to verify the integrity of the operating system and prevent unauthorized modifications that could compromise user data. Networking equipment such as routers, switches, and other networking hardware, implement secure boot to ensure that only authenticated firmware is loaded, maintaining the security of network infrastructure. Secure boot is critical in medical devices like pacemakers and insulin pumps to ensure that only verified software is executed, thereby protecting patient safety. Modern vehicles rely on secure boot for their electronic control units (ECUs) to prevent tampering with the firmware that controls critical functions such as braking and engine management. Secure boot is used in programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and other industrial control systems to protect against cyber threats that could disrupt manufacturing processes. Certain examples described herein aim to enhance the security of these data processing systems by providing a flexible and resilient secure boot process that can adapt to evolving cryptographic standards and threats. The examples described herein leverage a combination of hardware and software components to implement a secure boot process that supports multiple cryptographic algorithms and allows for their dynamic selection and update, or crypto agility. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a data processing system 100 configured to perform secure boot operations. The data processing system 100 may include or be used as a “post-quantum” cryptographic module or coprocessor, e.g. allowing one or more processors of a communicatively coupled computing system to offload complex cryptographic operations for quick and secure computation. The term "post-quantum" is used herein to describe cryptographic operations and functions that provide protection against attack by a quantum computer. Postquantum cryptography is a well-known term within the field of cryptography. For example, many popular public-key algorithms are not post-quantum secure, they can be efficiently broken using a sufficiently strong quantum computer. These "quantum insecure" cryptographic algorithms include those based on the integer factorisation problem, the discrete logarithm problem or the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem; these may all be easily solved on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer using Shor's algorithm. Operations and functions that have been demonstrated to be post-quantum secure include those based on one or more of: lattice-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, hash-based cryptography, code-based cryptography, and supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography. The data processing system 100 comprises a first non-volatile storage circuitry 102, a second non-volatile storage circuitry 108, a processing circuitry 116, a volatile memory 118, and one or more communications interfaces 124, for example, including input / output ports and wired or wireless network communication components. The first non-volatile storage circuitry 102, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108, the processing circuitry 116, the volatile memory 118, and the communications interface(s) 124 are operably coupled by a communications channel 120, such as a bus. In Figure 1, the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 and the processing circuitry 116 are provided in a unified processor and memory architecture 122 in the data processing system 100. In this context, the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 may be referred to as “on-chip” storage or memory. The first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 is configured to store a cryptographic software digest 104. The cryptographic software digest 104 represents a hash of program code for implementing a corresponding cryptographic software 110. The digest 104 is unique to the corresponding cryptographic software 110, meaning that even a small change in the program code corresponding to the cryptographic software 110 would produce a different digest 104 when hashed. The first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 may be implemented using any suitable combination of non-volatile storage components such as a read-only-memory, flash memory, and / or one-time-programmable (OTP) memory. The second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 shown in Figure 1 is outside of the unified processor and memory architecture 122, and may be referred to as external non-volatile storage circuitry. The second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 may be used as system ROM in the data processing system 100. For example, the second nonvolatile storage circuitry 108 may store other data, not shown in Figure 1, such as further application software, sensor data, and so forth. The second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 may be implemented using any suitable combination of non-volatile storage components such as ROM and / or flash memory such as Quad Serial Peripheral Interface (QPSI) flash. The second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 is configured to store first program code for implementing the cryptographic software 110 corresponding to the digest 104, and second program code for implementing application software 112. The application software 112 generally comprises firmware or software that is configured to be executed during or in response to a boot operation of the data processing system 100. In some examples, described further below with respect to Figure 3, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 also stores a digital signature 114 associated with the application software 112. The specific functions of the application software 112 will depend on the type of data processing system 100. For example, where the data processing system 100 is an embedded device in an industrial automation system, the application software 112 may be configured to manage basic operations and interfaces such as controlling sensors and actuators. Where the data processing system 100 is an loT device such as a smart home appliance, the application software 112 may comprise firmware configured to connect to the Internet and control lights, heating, or security cameras. In examples in which the data processing system 100 is a mobile device, such as a smartphone, the application software 112 may comprise a bootloader and radio firmware which manage the startup process and communication with cellular networks. In examples in which the data processing system 100 is network equipment, such as a router or network switch, the application software 112 may be configured to manage network traffic, security protocols, and device configuration. The processing circuitry 116 is configured to execute a boot logic 106 for implementing secure boot operations. In Figure 1, the boot logic 106 is implemented in hardware in the processing circuitry 116. However, it is to be appreciated that, in some examples, the boot logic 106 may be stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 to be executed by the processing circuitry 116. The processing circuitry 116 includes any suitable combination of processing components including, but not limited to, secure processors, central processing units (CPUs), graphic processing units (GPUs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Figure 2 illustrates operations that are performed in the data processing system 100 when the boot logic 106 is executed by the processing circuitry 116. When executed, the boot logic 106, involves computing 202 a hash value 204 that corresponds to the cryptographic software 110. Computing the hash value 204 may involve any suitable hash algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-256. The hash algorithm used will generally correspond to the hash algorithm used to generate the digest 104. The hash value 204 is compared 206 with the cryptographic software digest 104 to determine whether the hash value 204 matches the digest 104. If it is determined that the hash value 204 conforms to the digest 104 then the first program code is executed by the processing circuitry 116 to implement the cryptographic software 110. In Figure 2, this involves booting 208 the first program code for implementing the cryptographic software 110, for example by loading the cryptographic software 110 onto the volatile memory 118 and executing it using the processing circuitry 116. Executing the cryptographic software 110 in this way may be referred to as implementing a sealed secure boot mode. If the hash value 204 does not conform to the digest 104, then the cryptographic software 110 is not implemented and the data processing system 100 may prevent boot and wait for a reset 210. In this example, the boot logic 106 provides a comparatively simple hash comparison algorithm and without implementing a more complex cryptographic verification algorithm that involves signature verification. For example, the hash value 204 may be computed 202 using hashing algorithms such as SHA-256. In this way the storage requirements in the first non-volatile storage circuity 102 may be reduced. This is because the hash of the cryptographic software 110 represented by the digest 104 is generally expected to be smaller than data which would be stored to implement cryptographic verification algorithms, such as the relevant libraries and cryptographic keys. The cryptographic software 110 comprises a cryptographic verification algorithm 212, such as RS A, ECC, or a PQC algorithm, to verify the program code for implementing the application software 112. When executed, the cryptographic verification algorithm 212 verifies the authenticity of the program code corresponding to the application software 112. Dependent on an outcome of the cryptographic verification algorithm 212, the second program code is executed to implement the application software 112. If the authenticity of the second program code is verified by the cryptographic verification algorithm 212, then the second program code is executed 214, otherwise the data processing system 100 may prevent boot of the second program code and wait for a reset 216. By storing a digest 104 of the cryptographic software 110 in the on-chip nonvolatile storage 102 and storing the program code for the cryptographic software 110 in the external non-volatile storage circuitry 108, it becomes possible to implement a sophisticated cryptographic verification algorithm 212 for secure boot in an embedded system while alleviating the storage requirements for on-chip non-volatile storage 102. This is because the cryptographic software digest 104 will typically take up significantly less space in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 than data used to implement a cryptographic verification algorithm 212. In an example, the cryptographic software digest 104 may be stored in OTP memory in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. OTP memory is a type of nonvolatile storage that can be written to only once and cannot be modified or erased afterward. It is commonly used for storing permanent firmware, encryption keys, or device configuration settings that must remain unchanged for security or reliability reasons. OTP memory is often implemented using fuse-based, anti-fuse, or electrically programmable technologies. Due to its tamper-resistant nature, it is used in secure applications such as authentication tokens, smart cards, and embedded systems. An OTP memory portion of the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 may include written portions, which are hard coded prior to distribution of the data processing system 100, and unwritten portions, which are available to be written to once. The written portions may be made permanent using electrical programming, mask ROM, and / or polyfused technology. The unwritten portions of the OTP memory may be available for writing to once and thereafter are immutable. Figure 3 illustrates an example of a cryptographic verification algorithm 212 that may be implemented by the cryptographic software 110. In this example, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 is configured to store a digital signature 114 corresponding to the application software 112. The digital signature 114 is generated by computing a hash of the program code associated with the application software 112 and signing the hash of that program code with a private key using a cryptographic algorithm, such as RSA, ECDSA, or a PQC algorithm. The digital signature 114 is unique to the application software 112 and private key that are used and is generally provided along with the application software 112. The application software 112 and the digital signature 114 may be provided during manufacture of the data processing system 100 and pre-loaded onto the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 prior to distribution. In some cases, the application software 112 may be updated or obtained after distribution of the data processing system 100. For example, a software update may be performed based on data received over-the-air (OTA) using the communication interface(s) 124. The cryptographic software 110 includes a public key 302 that corresponds to the private key used to generate the digital signature 114. To verify the program code of the application software 112, a hash value 304 of that program code is generated 306 using a hash function corresponding to that used by the signer to generate the digital signature 114. This produces a fixed-length hash value 304 corresponding to the program code of the application software 112. Signature verification 308 is performed by using the public key 302 to decrypt the digital signature 114 and obtain the hash value that was signed. The hash obtained from the decrypted digital signature 114 is compared to the hash value 304 to verify the authenticity of the program code of the application software 112. Figure 4 shows an example in which the processing circuitry 116 is configured to implement an initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402. In this example, the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is implemented in hardware in the processing circuitry 116. However, it is to be appreciated that program code for implementing the cryptographic verification algorithm 402 may be stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 to be executed by the processing circuitry 116. The initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 includes any suitable cryptographic algorithm such as, for example, RSA, ECDSA, or a PQC algorithm. The initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is associated with a corresponding public key 404. The public key 404 may be stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102, for example in a portion of OTP memory provided and hard-coded during manufacture of the data processing system 100. Where the processing circuitry 116 is configured to implement the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402, executing the boot logic 106 may be dependent on a determination 406 that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is compromised. In this way, the data processing system 100 may implement crypto agility during secure boot, in which the data processing system 100 can switch between using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 and the cryptographic software 110. Enabling crypto agility in this way reduces the burden on the first non volatile storage circuitry 102, which may increase if many cryptographic verification algorithms were to be stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 or configured in hardware in the processing circuitry 116. In an example, determining 406 that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is compromised involves receiving a secure message from an external computing device. The secure message comprises an indication of the integrity of the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402. The secure message may be processed to determine whether the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is compromised. The external computing device may be connected to the data processing system 100 using the communications interface(s) 124. For example, where the data processing system 100 is included in a computing device, such as a smart phone, the smart phone may comprise additional processors and / or storage and be configured to send secure messages to the data processing system 100 over the interface 124. In other examples, the external computing device may be a separate computing device such as a computer, that is connected to the data processing system 100 over a cable connected to the interface 124. In other examples, the secure message may be sent over-the-air (OTA) to the interface 124. For example, an external computing device or server may be configured to push the secure message to the data processing system 100 over a network such as the Internet. The data processing system 100 may then receive the secure message over the Internet using the one or more interface(s) 124. The secure message may include a relatively small amount of data, for example, including an indication of the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 and a binary value “0” or “1” indicating whether the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 has been compromised. In this example, if it is determined 406 that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 has been compromised then the processing circuitry 116 executes the boot logic 106 as described above with respect to Figures 2 and 3. If it is determined 406 that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 has not been compromised then the processing circuitry 116 instead implements the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 to verify the application software 112. In other examples, selecting between the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 and the cryptographic software 110 to implement secure boot in the data processing system 100 may be dependent on other factors. For example, the data processing system 100 may be configured occasionally, or periodically, to switch between the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 and the cryptographic software 110. In other examples, the data processing system 100 may receive an instruction via a secure message to select one of the cryptographic software 110 and the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402. This instruction may be received from an external computing device such as controller connected to the data processing system 100 over the interface 124, from a computing device comprising the data processing system 100, and / or via an OTA push message from a network such as the Internet. As described above, the digital signature 114 associated with the application software 112 is generally unique to the private keys and algorithms used to generate the digital signature. As such, where the data processing system 100 is configured to implement an initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 may store an additional digital signature 408 associated with the application software 112, the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402, and an associated public key used to generate the digital signature 408. For example, the additional digital signature 408 may be generated using an encryption algorithm and private key that corresponds to the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 and the public key 404. In another example illustrated in Figure 5, the data processing system 100 may be configured to handle, or be compatible with, a plurality of cryptographic software modules 504, which may also be referred to as cryptographic software programs 504. In Figure 5, the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 is configured to store a plurality of cryptographic software digests 502, each of which is provided with a respective reference 104A to 104C in Figure 5. The second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 is configured to store program code for implementing a plurality of cryptographic software modules 504, each of which is provided with a respective reference 110A to 110C in Figure 5. The plurality of cryptographic software modules 504 corresponds to the respective cryptographic software digests 502. The cryptographic software digests 502 may be derived from the program code of the plurality of cryptographic software modules 504 in a similar manner to that described above with respect to Figure 2. In some examples, one or more of the cryptographic software digests 502 may be generated using hash algorithms that are different from the other ones of the cryptographic software digests 502. In Figure 5, the boot logic 106, when executed, involves selecting 506 a cryptographic software module 110A from the plurality of cryptographic software modules 504. A corresponding cryptographic software digest 104A is also selected 508. The boot logic 106 then proceeds to generate a hash of the selected cryptographic software module 110A and compares the hash to the selected cryptographic software digest 104A. The boot logic 106 then proceeds, as described above with respect to Figures 2 and 3, to use the selected cryptographic software module 110A to verify the application software 112. In some examples, the cryptographic software digest 104A may be selected 508 first and then a corresponding cryptographic software module 110A may be selected 506 based on the cryptographic software digest 104A. The selection of a cryptographic software module 110A and / or a cryptographic software digest 104A may be dependent on a determination of the integrity of an underlying cryptographic verification algorithm implemented by the corresponding cryptographic software 110A. For example, if it is determined that one or more of the cryptographic software modules HOB and 110C are compromised then a different one 110A of the plurality of cryptographic software modules 504 may be selected. In other examples, the cryptographic software digests 502 are stored in a set of registers in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. The most recently stored cryptographic software digest 104A may then be selected based on, for example, the register in which it is stored. The cryptographic software digests 502 may be stored in OTP memory in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. In some examples, the plurality of cryptographic software digests 502 are stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 prior to deployment of the data processing system 100. In other examples, one or more of the plurality of cryptographic software digests 502 may be stored after deployment of the data processing system 100 using techniques such as those described below with respect to Figures 6 and 7. It is to be appreciated that, while a plurality of cryptographic software modules 504 are shown in Figure 5, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 may be configured to store program code for cryptographic software corresponding to a subset of the cryptographic software digests 502. In this case, the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108 could store program code for just one cryptographic software module 110A while the second non-volatile storage medium stores the plurality of cryptographic software digests 104A to 104C. This may be the case where, for example, the cryptographic software module 110A is an updated version of one of the other cryptographic software modules HOB or HOC, and, when stored in the second nonvolatile storage circuitry 108, overwrites the program code of the previous version 110B or HOC. Where the cryptographic software digests 502 are stored in OTP memory in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102, it may not be possible to delete or overwrite expired or out-dated digests 104B and 104C, and the plurality of digests 502 may continue to be stored. Turning to Figure 6, a process for updating cryptographic software to be implemented in the sealed secure boot mode is shown. In this example, the cryptographic software digest 104 is a first cryptographic software digest and the data processing system 100 obtains a second cryptographic software digest 602 and stores it in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. The cryptographic software 110 is a first cryptographic software and the data processing system 100 obtains program code for implementing a second cryptographic software 604 which is stored in the second nonvolatile storage circuitry 108. The second cryptographic verification software 604 generally implements a different cryptographic verification algorithm than the cryptographic verification algorithm 212 implemented by the first cryptographic software 110. When executing the boot logic 106, one of first cryptographic software 110 and the second cryptographic software 604 is selected to be executed in the sealed secure boot mode. Selecting between the first cryptographic software 110 and the second cryptographic software 604 may be performed based on a determination of software integrity, as described above with respect to Figure 4, or another suitable method. In this way, the data processing system 100 is able to obtain and execute new cryptographic software 604 to verify the application software 112 in the sealed secure boot mode. By providing the ability to update or obtain new cryptographic software 604, the data processing system 100 is able to provide crypto agility during secure boot. Additionally, by enabling the new cryptographic software 604 to be obtained and executed for secure boot, the data processing system 100 is able to execute new and future cryptographic verification algorithms that have not yet been developed. This makes the data processing system 100 robust against emerging threats and increases the long-term security of the data processing system 100 over its lifecycle. While not shown in Figure 6, it is to be appreciated that the second cryptographic software 604 may implement a digital signature verification algorithm as shown in Figure 3. In this case, the data processing system 100 may also obtain a new digital signature for the application software 112 that has been signed according to a cryptographic verification algorithm corresponding to the new cryptographic software 604. In some cases, a plurality of digital signatures corresponding to the application software 112 may be stored in the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108, each of the plurality of digital signatures being generated using a cryptographic verification algorithm corresponding to a different one of the first cryptographic software 110 and the second cryptographic software 604. The second cryptographic digest 602 may be received by the data processing system 100 in a secure message 606. For example, after a previous boot operation, and while the data processing system 100 is operational, a secure message 606 may be received from an external device. The external device, not shown, may be connected to the data processing system 100 directly, via an input / output port in the data processing system 100, or may be received over a wired or wireless network interface. The secure message 606 may be secured using any suitable for example, Transport Layer Security / Datagram TLS (TLS / DTLS), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), Secure Shell (SSH), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) with DTLS or Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), or proprietary secure messaging protocols, for example based on AES, ECC, or RSA. The second cryptographic digest 602 may be stored in OTP memory in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. For example, a portion of the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 comprising unwritten portions of OTP memory may be available and used to store the second cryptographic digest 602. In an example illustrated in Figure 7, the data processing system 100 may use the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 to verify a new cryptographic software 604 to be used in the sealed secure boot mode. According to the example illustrated in Figure 7, program code for implementing the second cryptographic software 604 is obtained and stored in the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108. The initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402 is then used to verify the program code for the second cryptographic software 604. In the example shown, a digital signature 702 corresponding to the second cryptographic software 604 is also obtained and used to perform signature verification. If the verification of the program code for the second cryptographic software 604 is successful, then the second cryptographic software digest 602 may be generated and stored in the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. In this way the second cryptographic software digest 602 may be stored on the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102 and hence available for use in a subsequent boot operation of the data processing system 100. In the example shown, generating and storing the second cryptographic software digest 602 is performed as part of the operations of the second cryptographic software 604 when it is first executed. The execution of which may be dependent on the verification of the program code of the second cryptographic software 604 using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm 402. Figure 8 illustrates a flow chart of a method 800 for secure boot performed by the data processing system 100. The method 800 comprises storing 802 a cryptographic software digest 104 on the first non-volatile storage circuitry 102. First program code for implementing cryptographic software 110 and second program code for implementing application software 112 are stored 804 on the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108. A secure boot operation is then performed 806. The secure boot operation comprises computing 808 a hash value 204 corresponding to the cryptographic software 110 stored in the second non-volatile storage circuitry 108. The hash value 204 is compared 810 with the cryptographic software digest 104. If it is determined that the hash value 204 conforms to the cryptographic software digest 104 based on the comparing 810, the first program code for implementing the cryptographic software 110 is executed 812. Implementing the cryptographic software 110 comprises executing 814 a cryptographic verification algorithm 212 to verify the second program code. Dependent on an outcome of the cryptographic verification algorithm 212, the second program code is subsequently executed 816. It is to be appreciated that the specific examples and variations of the operations of the data processing system 100 described above may also apply to the method 800. The above examples are to be understood as illustrative. Further examples are envisaged. Although certain components of each example have been separately described, it is to be understood that functionality described with reference to one example may be suitably implemented in another example, and that certain components may be omitted depending on the implementation. It is to be understood that any feature described in relation to any one example may be used alone, or in combination with other features described, and may also be used in combination with one or more features of any other of the examples, or any combination of any other of the examples. For example, features described with respect to the system components may also be adapted to be performed as part of the described methods. Furthermore, equivalents and modifications not described above may also be employed without departing from the scope of the invention, which is defined in the accompanying claims

Claims

1. A data processing system comprising:first non-volatile storage circuitry configured to store a cryptographic software digest;second non-volatile storage circuitry configured to store first program code for implementing a cryptographic software and second program code for implementing application software; andprocessing circuitry coupled to the first non-volatile storage circuitry and the second non-volatile storage circuitry, wherein the processing circuitry is configured to execute boot logic comprising:computing a hash value corresponding to the cryptographic software stored in the second non-volatile storage circuitry;comparing the hash value with the cryptographic software digest; andif it is determined that the hash value conforms to the cryptographic software digest based on the comparing, executing the first program code to implement the cryptographic software,wherein implementing the cryptographic software comprises:executing a cryptographic verification algorithm to verify the second program code; anddependent on an outcome of the cryptographic verification algorithm, executing the second program code.

2. The data processing system of claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is configured to implement an initial cryptographic verification algorithm, and wherein executing the boot logic is dependent on a determination that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is compromised.

3. The data processing system of claim 2, wherein determining that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is compromised comprises:receiving a secure message comprising an indication of the integrity of the initial cryptographic verification algorithm; andprocessing the secure message to determine whether the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is compromised.

4. The data processing system of any preceding claim, wherein at least a portion of the first non-volatile storage circuitry is implemented as one-time-programmable (OTP) memory.

5. The data processing system of claim 4, wherein the cryptographic software digest is stored in the OTP memory.

6. The data processing system of any preceding claim, wherein:the first non-volatile storage circuitry is configured to store a plurality of cryptographic software digests,the second non-volatile storage circuitry is configured to store program code for implementing a plurality of cryptographic software modules corresponding to the cryptographic software digests, andthe boot logic comprises selecting the cryptographic software from the plurality of cryptographic software modules.

7. The data processing system of any preceding claim, wherein the cryptographic software is a first cryptographic software, the cryptographic software digest is a first cryptographic software digest, and the processing circuitry is configured to:obtain program code representing a second cryptographic software; andstore a second cryptographic software digest corresponding to the second cryptographic software in the first non-volatile storage circuitry,wherein executing the boot logic comprises selecting between the first cryptographic software and the second cryptographic software.

8. The data processing system of claim 7, wherein the second cryptographic software digest is obtained from a secure message received by the data processing system.

9. The data processing system of any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein processing circuitry is configured to implement an initial cryptographic verification algorithm, and wherein the processing circuitry is configured to:obtain program code for implementing a second cryptographic software;verify the program code for implementing the second cryptographic software using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm;dependent on successful verification of the program code for implementing the second cryptographic software using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm, execute the program code, wherein executing the program code comprises:generating a second cryptographic software digest; andstoring the second cryptographic software digest in the first non-volatile storage circuitry.

10. The data processing system of any preceding claim, wherein the second nonvolatile storage circuitry is configured to store a signature corresponding to the application software, and the cryptographic verification algorithm implemented by the cryptographic software comprises verifying the second program code using the signature and a public key.

11. A method of performing secure boot in a data processing system comprising first non-volatile storage circuitry and second non-volatile storage circuitry, the method comprising:storing a cryptographic software digest on the first non-volatile storage circuitry;storing first program code for implementing cryptographic software and second code for implementing application software on the second non-volatile storage circuitry;performing a secure boot operation by:computing a hash value corresponding to the cryptographic software stored in the second non-volatile storage circuitry;comparing the hash value with the cryptographic software digest; andif it is determined that the hash value conforms to the cryptographic software digest based on the comparing, executing the first program code to implement the cryptographic software,wherein implementing the cryptographic software comprises:executing a cryptographic verification algorithm to verify the second program code; anddependent on an outcome of the cryptographic verification algorithm, executing the second program code.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the method comprises providing an initial cryptographic verification algorithm, and wherein performing the secure boot operation is dependent on a determination that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is compromised.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the method comprises determining that the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is comprised by:receiving a secure message comprising an indication of the integrity of the initial cryptographic verification algorithm; andprocessing the secure message to determine whether the initial cryptographic verification algorithm is compromised.

14. The method of any one of claims 11 to 13, wherein at least a portion of the first non-volatile storage circuitry is implemented as one-time-programmable (OTP) memory.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein the cryptographic software digest is stored in the OTP memory.

16. The method of any one of claims 11 to 15, the method comprising:storing a plurality of cryptographic software digests on the first non-volatile storage circuitry;storing program code for implementing a plurality of cryptographic software modules corresponding to the cryptographic software digests; andperforming the secure boot operation comprises selecting the cryptographic software from the plurality of cryptographic software modules.

17. The method of any one of claims 11 to 16, wherein the cryptographic software is a first cryptographic software, the cryptographic software digest is a first cryptographic software digest, and the method comprises:obtaining program code representing a second cryptographic software; andstoring a second cryptographic software digest corresponding to the second cryptographic software in the first non-volatile storage circuitry,wherein performing the secure boot operation comprises selecting either the first cryptographic software or the second cryptographic software.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein storing the second cryptographic software digest comprises obtaining the second cryptographic software digest from a secure message.

19. The method of any one of claims 11 to 16, wherein the method comprises: providing an initial cryptographic verification algorithm;obtaining program code for implementing a second cryptographic software;verifying the program code for implementing the second cryptographic software using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm; anddependent on successful verification of the program code for implementing the second cryptographic software using the initial cryptographic verification algorithm, execute the program code, wherein executing program code comprises:generating a second cryptographic software digest; andstoring the second cryptographic software digest in the first non-volatile storage circuitry.

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