Secure element, expiration determination method of public key certificate and computer program

By comparing expiration dates of public key certificates, secure elements without a clock function can determine revocation, ensuring secure data communication by preventing the use of expired certificates.

JP2024156578APending Publication Date: 2024-11-06DAI NIPPON PRINTING CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023071168
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-04-24
Publication Date
2024-11-06

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Secure elements without a clock function cannot determine the revocation of public key certificates, which are essential for secure data communication.

Method used

A secure element compares the expiration dates of its own and the terminal's public key certificates to determine revocation, using stored certificates and electronic signatures to verify validity.

Benefits of technology

Enables secure elements without a clock function to reliably determine the revocation of public key certificates, ensuring secure data communication by preventing expired certificates from being used.

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Abstract

To enable determining expiration of a public key certificate even in a secure element that has not a clock function.SOLUTION: A secure element 1 receives a second public key certificate 11 from a not shown terminal (step S1), and verifies an electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11 (step S2). When verification of the electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11 is succeeded, the secure element 1 compares an effective date 105a included in a first public key certificate 10 with an expiration date 105b included in the second public key certificate 11 (step S3), and determines that the second public key certificate 11 is expired (step S8) when the expiration date 105b included in the second public key certificate 11 is before the effective date 105a included in the first public key certificate 10.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 3
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present application relates to a secure element, which is an IC chip that is tamper-resistant against cyber attacks. [Background technology]

[0002] Secure elements, which are IC chips that are tamper-resistant against cyber attacks, are implemented in various devices that require high security. For example, in Patent Document 1, a secure element is implemented in a contact IC card. In Patent Document 2, a secure element is implemented in an IoT device (IoT: Internet of things) such as a smart meter.

[0003] As described in the background art of Patent Document 3, when a secure element performs secure data communication with a terminal as a communication partner, it performs mutual authentication using a public key cryptosystem with the terminal as a communication partner. When a secure element is implemented in a contact type IC card, the communication partner of the secure element is a reader / writer compatible with the contact type IC card. When a secure element is implemented in an IoT device, the communication partner of the secure element is the control circuit of the IoT device.

[0004] In mutual authentication performed between a secure element and a terminal, public keys are exchanged between the secure element and the terminal, and a shared key shared between the secure element and the terminal is derived using the Diffie-Hellman method or the like. In order to prevent spoofing of the communicating terminal, public key certificates issued by a certification authority are exchanged rather than the public keys themselves in mutual authentication performed between the communicating terminals. Public key certificates issued by a certification authority have a validity period. This is because if the same public key is used for a long period of time, it becomes easier to guess the private key that pairs with that public key. Therefore, when using a public key certificate issued by a certification authority, it must be confirmed that the validity period of the public key certificate has not expired.

[0005] If a secure element has a clock function for measuring time, the secure element can use the clock function to determine whether a public key certificate has expired. Expiration means that the validity period has passed. However, most secure elements do not have a clock function. Therefore, it is desirable that even a secure element without a clock function can determine whether a public key certificate has expired. For example, in Patent Document 4, an IC card without a clock counts the number of state changes such as power ON / OFF and command reception, and uses this to pseudo-determine whether an encryption key shared in authentication key sharing has expired. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0006] [Patent Document 1] JP 2021-117513 A [Patent Document 2] Patent No. 7226602 [Patent Document 3] Patent Publication No. 2022-77529 [Patent Document 4] JP 2007-300309 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0007] An object of the present application is to enable determination of revocation of a public key certificate even in a secure element that does not have a clock function. [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] A first invention disclosed in this application is a secure element that performs mutual authentication with a terminal. The secure element according to the first invention stores a first public key certificate in which the public key of the secure element according to the first invention is described. When performing mutual authentication, the secure element according to the first invention receives a second public key certificate in which the public key of the terminal is described from the terminal, and compares the expiration date of the second public key certificate with the effective date of the first public key certificate, and determines that the second public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the second public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the first public key certificate. Furthermore, the secure element according to the first invention compares the expiration date of the first public key certificate with the effective date of the second public key certificate, and determines that the first public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the first public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the second public key certificate.

[0009] A second invention disclosed in this application is a method for determining revocation of a public key certificate, the method including a step of, when a secure element receives a second public key certificate from a terminal in which a public key of the terminal is described, comparing the effective date of a first public key certificate in which the public key of the secure element is described with the expiration date of the second public key certificate, and a step of, when the secure element receives a second public key certificate in which the public key of the terminal is described from the terminal during mutual authentication, determining by the secure element that the second public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the second public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the first public key certificate. The method for determining revocation of a public key certificate according to the second invention preferably includes a step of, when the secure element receives a second public key certificate in which the public key of the terminal is described from the terminal, comparing the effective date of the first public key certificate with the effective date of the second public key certificate, and determining by the secure element that the first public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the first public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the second public key certificate.

[0010] A third invention disclosed in this application is a computer program for causing a secure element to perform, when performing mutual authentication, a step of comparing the expiration date of a first public key certificate in which the public key of the secure element is described with the expiration date of the second public key certificate, in which the public key of the terminal is described, from the terminal, and a step of determining that the second public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the second public key certificate is a date earlier than the expiration date of the first public key certificate. It is preferable that the computer program according to the third invention includes, as steps executed by a secure element, a step of the secure element comparing the expiration date of the first public key certificate with the effectiveness date of the second public key certificate, and a step of the secure element determining that the first public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the first public key certificate is a date earlier than the effectiveness date of the second public key certificate. Effect of the Invention

[0011] In the invention disclosed in this application, a secure element that does not have a clock function is able to determine whether a public key certificate has expired by comparing the validity period of a first public key certificate in which the secure element's public key is described with the validity period of a second public key certificate in which the terminal's public key is described. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0012] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a secure element. [Diagram 2] A diagram showing the format of a public key certificate. [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining the operation of a secure element. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0013] From here, an embodiment of the present invention will be described. This embodiment is intended to facilitate understanding of the invention disclosed in this application. The invention disclosed in this application is not limited to this embodiment. Furthermore, unless otherwise specified, the drawings are schematic diagrams drawn to facilitate understanding of the invention disclosed in this application.

[0014] FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a secure element 1. The secure element 1 is an IC chip that has high tamper resistance against external cyber attacks. In addition to the block diagram of the secure element 1, FIG. 1 also shows a SIM card 2 as an example of a device in which the secure element 1 according to this embodiment is implemented. The SIM card 2 in which the secure element 1 is implemented is formed in a card medium 3 of a credit card size so that it can be broken off using a slit 3a. The secure element 1 is mounted on the back side of a contact terminal 2a of the SIM card 2 in a resin-molded state.

[0015] The device in which the secure element 1 is implemented is not limited to the SIM card 2 shown in Fig. 1. The device in which the secure element 1 is implemented may be a contactless IC card as well as a contact IC card. The medium in which the secure element 1 is implemented may be a USB key or a key fob. Furthermore, the secure element 1 may be in the form of an IC chip simply molded in resin.

[0016] As shown in FIG. 1, the secure element 1 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 1a, a read only memory (ROM) 1b, a random access memory (RAM) 1c, a non-volatile memory (NVM) 1d, a coprocessor 1e, and peripheral functions 1f. The CPU 1a is a calculation device that controls the secure element. The ROM 1b is a non-volatile memory that cannot be electrically rewritten. The RAM 1c is a volatile memory that can be electrically rewritten. The NVM 1d is a non-volatile memory that can be electrically rewritten. The coprocessor 1e is a calculation device specialized for cryptographic calculations. The peripheral functions 1f are various circuits necessary for the operation of the secure element 1. For example, the peripheral functions 1f include a communication circuit.

[0017] The NVM 1d included in the secure element 1 stores secret information used in mutual authentication between the secure element 1 and a terminal not shown in the figure. The RAM 1c of the secure element 1 stores information received from the terminal when performing mutual authentication. The ROM 1b of the secure element 1 is implemented with a computer program for causing the CPU 1a to perform mutual authentication between the secure element 1 and a terminal not shown in the figure.

[0018] 1, NVM 1d of the secure element 1 stores a first public key certificate 10, which is a public key certificate describing the public key of the secure element 1, and a public key certificate 12 of the certification authority that issued the first public key certificate 10, as confidential information required for mutual authentication between the secure element 1 and a terminal not shown in the figure. Furthermore, a private key 13 that pairs with the public key described in the first public key certificate 10 is stored in NVM 1d. Moreover, RAM 1c of the secure element 1 stores a second public key certificate 11 that the secure element 1 has received from a terminal not shown in the figure, as confidential information required for mutual authentication between the secure element 1 and a terminal not shown in the figure. The second public key certificate 11 is a public key certificate describing the public key of the terminal.

[0019] The format of a public key certificate is shown in Fig. 2. The format of the public key certificate shown in Fig. 2 complies with X.509 defined by the International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector. The format of the public key certificate shown in Fig. 2 includes certificate information 100, a signature algorithm 110 used to generate a digital signature, and a digital signature 111 of the certificate information 100.

[0020] The certificate information 100 includes a format version 101, a serial number 102 assigned to the public key certificate, a signature algorithm 103 used to generate the electronic signature, the name of the issuer of the public key certificate 104, the validity period of the public key certificate 105, the subject (main entity) of the public key certificate 106, the encryption algorithm 107, and the public key 108.

[0021] 2, the validity period 105 of the public key certificate used in this application includes an effective date 105a, which is the date on which the public key certificate becomes valid, and an expiration date 105b, which is the date on which the public key certificate expires. The validity period 105 of the public key certificate is information included in the certificate information 100 of the public key certificate. Therefore, the secure element 1 can determine that the validity period 105 described in the certificate information 100 of the public key certificate has not been tampered with by verifying the digital signature 111 of the public key certificate. However, the secure element 1, which does not have a clock function, cannot determine the expiration of the public key certificate.

[0022] To solve this problem, the secure element 1 according to this embodiment compares the validity periods 105 of two public key certificates (second public key certificate 11 and first public key certificate 10) used in mutual authentication with a terminal not shown in the figure, thereby determining whether each public key certificate has expired. The validity period 105 of a public key certificate is the period that begins with the effective date 105a on which the public key certificate becomes valid and ends with the expiration date 105b on which the public key certificate expires. Therefore, whether a public key certificate has expired can be determined based on whether the expiration date 105b of one public key certificate is a date that precedes (but does not include) the effective date 105a of the other public key certificate.

[0023] 1, when mutual authentication is performed between terminals not shown in the figure, the secure element 1 stores a first public key certificate 10 and a second public key certificate 11. The first public key certificate 10 is permanently stored in NVM 1d of the secure element 1. The second public key certificate 11 is information that the secure element 1 receives from a terminal when mutual authentication is performed between terminals, and is temporarily stored in RAM 1c of the secure element 1.

[0024] In this embodiment, if the expiration date of the second public key certificate 11 is a date prior to the effective date of the first public key certificate 10, the secure element 1 treats the second public key certificate 11 as a revoked public key certificate. Also, if the expiration date of the first public key certificate 10 is a date prior to the effective date of the second public key certificate 11, the secure element 1 treats the first public key certificate 10 as a revoked public key certificate.

[0025] From here, we will explain the operation of the secure element 1. Fig. 3 is a diagram explaining the operation of the secure element 1. The explanation of Fig. 3 also includes an explanation of the method of determining whether a public key certificate is revoked according to the present application.

[0026] When performing mutual authentication between the secure element 1 and a terminal, the secure element 1 receives the second public key certificate 11 from a terminal not shown in the figure (step S1). When the secure element 1 receives the second public key certificate 11 from the terminal, it first verifies the electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11 (step S2). The public key described in the public key certificate 12 of the certification authority is used to verify the electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11. When verifying the electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11, the value obtained by decrypting the electronic signature 111 using the public key of the certification authority is compared with the hash value of the certificate information 100 included in the second public key certificate 11.

[0027] If the verification of the electronic signature 111 included in the second public key certificate 11 is successful, the secure element 1 compares the expiration date 105b included in the second public key certificate 11 with the effective date 105a included in the first public key certificate 10 (step S3). The secure element 1 branches the process depending on the result of this comparison (step S4). If the expiration date 105b included in the second public key certificate 11 is a date earlier than the effective date 105a included in the first public key certificate 10, the secure element 1 determines that the second public key certificate 11 has expired (step S8) and discontinues mutual authentication with the terminal.

[0028] If the expiration date 105b included in the second public key certificate 11 is later than the effective date included in the first public key certificate 10 (including the same date), the secure element 1 compares the expiration date 105b included in the first public key certificate 10 with the effective date 105a included in the second public key certificate 11 (step S5). The secure element 1 branches the process depending on the result of this comparison (step S6). If the expiration date 105b included in the first public key certificate 10 is earlier than the effective date 106a included in the second public key certificate 11, the secure element 1 determines that the first public key certificate 10 has expired (step S9) and discontinues mutual authentication with the terminal.

[0029] If the expiration date 105b included in the first public key certificate 10 is later than (including the same day as) the effective date 105a included in the second public key certificate 11, the secure element 1 transmits the first public key certificate 10 to the terminal (step S7), and the procedure shown in Fig. 3 ends. In the process of Fig. 3, the process of step S3 in Fig. 3 corresponds to the process in which the secure element 1 determines whether the second public key certificate 11 has expired. Also, the process of step S5 in Fig. 3 corresponds to the process in which the secure element 1 determines whether the first public key certificate 10 has expired. [Explanation of symbols]

[0030] 1. Secure Element 10 First Public Key Certificate 11 Second Public Key Certificate 105 Validity Period 105a Effective Date 105b Expiration Date

Claims

1. A secure element that performs mutual authentication with a terminal, storing a first public key certificate in which a public key of the secure element is described; When performing mutual authentication, when a second public key certificate containing the public key of the terminal is received from the terminal, the secure element compares the expiration date of the second public key certificate with the effective date of the first public key certificate, and determines that the second public key certificate has expired if the expiration date of the second public key certificate is earlier than the effective date of the first public key certificate.

2. 2. The secure element of claim 1, further comprising: a first public key certificate having a validity date that is earlier than the validity date of the second public key certificate; a second public key certificate having a validity date that is earlier than the validity date of the second public key certificate;

3. a step of, when performing mutual authentication, a secure element, upon receiving from a terminal a second public key certificate in which a public key of the terminal is described, comparing an effective date of a first public key certificate in which the public key of the secure element is described with an expiration date of the second public key certificate; the secure element determining that the second public key certificate has been revoked if the revocation date of the second public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the first public key certificate; A method for determining whether a public key certificate has expired, comprising:

4. the secure element comparing the expiration date of the first public key certificate with the effective date of the second public key certificate; the secure element determining that the first public key certificate has been revoked if the revocation date of the first public key certificate is a date prior to the validity date of the second public key certificate; 4. The method for determining whether a public key certificate has expired according to claim 3, comprising:

5. a step of, when performing mutual authentication, a secure element, upon receiving from a terminal a second public key certificate in which a public key of the terminal is described, comparing an effective date of a first public key certificate in which the public key of the secure element is described with an expiration date of the second public key certificate; determining that the second public key certificate has been revoked if the revocation date of the second public key certificate is a date prior to the effective date of the first public key certificate; A computer program for causing a secure element to perform the above.

6. the secure element comparing the expiration date of the first public key certificate with the effective date of the second public key certificate; the secure element determining that the first public key certificate has been revoked if the revocation date of the first public key certificate is a date prior to the validity date of the second public key certificate; 6. A computer program according to claim 5, comprising:

Citation Information

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