Quality assurance system and quality assurance method
The quality assurance system uses a blockchain to verify measurement values and functions, addressing the cost and time inefficiencies of existing methods by ensuring reliability and reducing tampering risks through composite and inverse function verification.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023081450
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-17
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-05-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods for ensuring the reliability of measurement values passing through multiple nodes are costly and time-consuming due to the need for obtaining evidence at each node, which increases the risk and cost of tampering.
A quality assurance system that utilizes a measurement node, a measurement device, and a blockchain system to record and verify measurement values and functions, allowing determination of tampering by using composite or inverse functions and thresholds, ensuring reliability without the need for evidence at each node.
This system guarantees the quality of measurement values while reducing costs and time by eliminating the need for evidence collection at each node, enhancing reliability and expandability, and improving accuracy through threshold-based verification.
Smart Images

Figure 2024165335000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a quality assurance system and a quality assurance method. [Background technology]
[0002] There are known technologies for improving the reliability of recording of measurement values, etc. Patent Document 1 describes a technology for recording data related to carbon emissions, etc., using a blockchain platform. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0003] [Patent Document 1] Special Publication No. 2021-510223 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0004] Data such as measured values can be utilized by passing through multiple nodes such as devices. Values passing through each node may be subject to tampering. Conventionally, in order to guarantee the quality (or reliability) of the final value, for example, evidence of the value output from each node has been obtained. Obtaining evidence at each node is costly and time-consuming.
[0005] The present disclosure aims to provide a technique that enables quality assurance of values. [Means for solving the problem]
[0006] A quality assurance system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device that outputs a first measurement value obtained by measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node, a group of nodes that relays a second measurement value obtained by measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node and outputs a final value obtained by performing at least one operation on the second measurement value, and a blockchain system that records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain and determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the group of nodes using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0007] A quality assurance method according to one aspect of the present disclosure is executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system. The quality assurance method includes the steps of: outputting a first measurement value obtained by measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device, relaying a second measurement value obtained by measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node by the node group and outputting a final value obtained by performing at least one operation on the second measurement value, and recording, by the blockchain system, the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the node group on the blockchain, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0008] In the quality assurance system or quality assurance method, a first measurement value and a second measurement value are measured for a physical quantity of a measurement node. Information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function is recorded on the blockchain. This ensures the reliability of the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. Then, the first measurement value, the final value, and the function are used to determine whether or not there has been tampering in the node group. This makes it possible to guarantee the quality of the second measurement value that passes through the node group.
[0009] The function information may be a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group. The blockchain system may use the first measurement value and the composite function to calculate an estimate of the final value, and compare the final value with the estimate of the final value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. In this case, an estimate of the final value after passing through the node group is calculated by substituting the first measurement value into the composite function. The presence or absence of tampering in the node group is determined by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the value.
[0010] The information on the function may be an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the group of nodes. The blockchain system may determine whether or not the data has been tampered with by calculating an estimate of the second measurement value using the final value and the inverse function, and comparing the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value. In this case, an estimate of the second measurement value before passing through the group of nodes is calculated by substituting the final value into the inverse function of the composite function. The estimate of the first measurement value is compared with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not the data has been tampered with in the group of nodes. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the values.
[0011] The blockchain system may further use a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The final value may have an error due to passing through the node group. In contrast, the first measurement value does not pass through the node group, so the error tends to be smaller than that of the final value and can be considered negligible. By using the predetermined threshold to determine whether or not tampering has occurred, the accuracy of determining whether or not tampering has occurred is improved.
[0012] The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be values that evaluate an environmental value. The value that evaluates an environmental value is required to be reliable, and may be relayed and utilized at various nodes. According to the quality assurance system of the present disclosure, the quality assurance of the value that evaluates an environmental value can be performed in a simple manner.
[0013] The measuring device may output a first measurement value via a first route. The node group may relay a second measurement value via a second route different from the first route. In this case, the first measurement value and the second measurement value are linked by branching into the first route and the second route. This ensures the independence of the first measurement value and the second measurement value. As a result, the reliability of the determination of the presence or absence of tampering can be improved. Effect of the Invention
[0014] According to the present disclosure, it is possible to provide a technique that enables quality assurance of values. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0015] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the application of a quality assurance system. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of relaying a value. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not data has been tampered with using a composite function. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not data has been tampered with using an inverse function of a composite function. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the operation of the quality assurance system. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration related to the quality assurance system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0016] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the drawings, the same elements are given the same reference numerals and duplicated explanations will be omitted.
[0017] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an example of application of a quality assurance system 1. The quality assurance system 1 of the present disclosure performs quality assurance of a measurement value of a measurement target. Values for which quality assurance is performed include, but are not limited to, values for evaluating environmental value, or values used by an IoT (Internet of Things) platform. Measurement values include, but are not limited to, current, voltage, power, vibration, rotation speed, or temperature. Values for evaluating environmental value include, but are not limited to, CO 2 Examples of the emissions include, but are not limited to, methane or greenhouse gases. An example in which the quality assurance system 1 is applied to a situation in which quality assurance is performed on a measurement value of electric current will be described below.
[0018] The quality assurance system 1 includes a measurement node 2, a first measuring device 3 (measurement device), a node group 4, and a blockchain system 5. The quality assurance system 1 includes a first route R1 and a second route R2 that start from the measurement node 2 and end at the blockchain system 5. The first route R1 and the second route R2 are different from each other. The first measuring device 3 is disposed on the first route R1. The node group 4 is disposed on the second route R2. The measurement node 2, the first measuring device 3, and some or all of the node group 4 may be managed by different organizations.
[0019] The measurement node 2 is a device to be measured. The measurement node 2 outputs a physical quantity. In one example, the measurement node 2 is a solar panel. In this case, the measurement node 2 outputs a current or the like. The measurement node 2 may be under lock and key management.
[0020] The first measuring device 3 is a device that measures a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The first measuring device 3 has, for example, a sensor function that measures a physical quantity, a conversion function that converts the measurement value into digital data, and an output function that outputs the measurement value converted into digital data. The first measuring device 3 outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. For example, the first measuring device 3 converts a current value, which is analog data measured at the measurement node 2, into digital data and outputs it as a first measurement value. The first measuring device 3 transmits the first measurement value to the blockchain system 5. The first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value via a first route. The first measuring device 3 may have a tamper-proof function. The tamper-proof function may be realized by an instrument approved for a specific industry.
[0021] The node group 4 relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2, and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one calculation on the second measurement value. The configuration of the node group 4 is not limited. The node group 4 includes, for example, a second measuring device 6, a conversion module 7, an edge device 8, and clouds 9 and 10. The node group 4 relays the second measurement value via a second route R2. The node group 4 may include a node that does not perform a calculation on the second measurement value during relay. A node that does not perform a calculation may be considered as a node that performs a calculation using a function that does not change a value. In the node group 4, the order of relaying may be predetermined. The node group 4 transmits information on the function related to the calculation in the node group 4 to the blockchain system 5. The calculation may include, for example, a calculation to obtain power [kW] from current [A], a calculation to obtain the amount of power "kWh" from power [kW], or a calculation to obtain the amount of power "kWh" by using the amount of power [kWh] and a predetermined coefficient. 2 Examples of calculations that may be used include, but are not limited to, calculations to determine emissions.
[0022] The second measuring device 6 is a device that measures a physical quantity of the measurement node 2. For example, the second measuring device 6 is a current sensor. The second measuring device 6 outputs a current value, which is analog data obtained by measuring the measurement node 2, as a second measured value. The second measured value may be a value measured under the same conditions as the first measured value.
[0023] The conversion module 7 is a device that converts the second measurement value, which is analog data, into digital data. The conversion module 7 relays between the second measuring device 6 and the edge device 8. The conversion module 7 functions as an interface that converts protocols between the second measuring device 6 and the edge device 8. The conversion module 7 may be incorporated in the second measuring device 6.
[0024] The edge device 8 is a device that relays the second measurement value to the cloud 9. The edge device 8 may process the second measurement value into a predetermined format. The type of edge device is not limited. For example, the edge device may be a personal computer. The edge device 8 may be a highly functional mobile phone (smartphone), a tablet terminal, a wearable terminal, or the like.
[0025] Each of the clouds 9 and 10 is a combination of any computers available through a network. For example, the clouds 9 and 10 are computer systems used by multiple organizations. There may be multiple nodes (e.g., clouds) between the clouds 9 and 10. The organization that uses the cloud 9 may be different from the organization that uses the cloud 10.
[0026] The blockchain system 5 is a computer system composed of multiple nodes. For example, the blockchain system 5 shares a ledger on the blockchain. The blockchain system 5 publishes transaction information as transaction information. The blockchain system 5 verifies the validity of the transaction information. The nodes in the blockchain system 5 are different from each node in the node group 4.
[0027] The blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on the function related to the calculation in the node group 4 on the blockchain. The blockchain system 5 may record the information on the function in advance. The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not there has been tampering in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function. The blockchain system 5 may record the tampering information, which is the determination result, on the blockchain, or may output it to an external system. The tampering information may be represented by, for example, 1 or 0.
[0028] The terminal 11 is a node constituting the blockchain system 5. The terminal 11 displays the tampering information recorded in the blockchain system 5 on a display device. The terminal 11 may select and display a message based on the tampering information. For example, a message saying "Tampering has been detected" may be displayed on the display device of the terminal 11. The terminal 11 may be a computer device of an external system.
[0029] FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of value relay. FIG. 2 shows an example in which a value "x" is relayed by multiple nodes, and a value "y" is finally output. In FIG. 2, a start node ux, and relay nodes u1, u2, and uy are arranged in this order. One or more relay nodes may exist between relay node u2 and relay node uy. The start node ux corresponds to, for example, measurement node 2. The relay nodes u1, u2, and uy correspond to, for example, node group 4. A function corresponds to each of the relay nodes u1, u2, and uy.
[0030] The starting node ux outputs a physical quantity "x". The relay node u1 obtains "x" from the starting node ux as an input value. For example, the relay node u1 obtains the measured value "x" of the starting node ux as an input value. The relay node u1 uses the function "f1(x)" to output the calculation result "u1". The relay node u2 obtains "u1" from the relay node u1 as an input value. The relay node u2 uses the function "f2(u1)" to output the calculation result "u2". In this way, the value is relayed and the calculation is performed. The value in the middle of the relay can also be called a relay value. The relay node uy obtains "un", which is the calculation result of the previous relay node in the order, as an input value. The relay node uy uses the function "fn+1(un)" to output the calculation result "y". y is the final value that is finally output.
[0031] Here, the calculation result "y" can be expressed by a composite function, which is a function obtained by combining multiple functions. The composite function is a function obtained by combining functions in the order of the relay nodes u1, u2, and uy. For example, the composite function can be expressed by the following formula. y=fn+1(un) =fn+1(fn( f2(f1(x))) ) = F(x) (1)
[0032] In equation (1), F(x) is as follows: F(x)=fn+1(fn(··f2(f1(x)))··)
[0033] The inverse function of equation (1) can be expressed by the following equation. x=F -1 (y) (2)
[0034] Equation (1), which is a composite function, can calculate an estimate of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may record equation (1) as information on the function. Equation (2), which is an inverse function of the composite function, can calculate an estimate of the second measurement value before it is relayed. The blockchain system 5 may record equation (2) as information on the function.
[0035] FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not data has been tampered with using a composite function. The blockchain system 5 acquires a first measurement value x1 from the first measuring device 3. The first measurement value x1 is a measurement value of the measurement node 2 by the first measuring device 3. The blockchain system 5 acquires a final value y and a composite function F(x) as function information from the node group 4. The composite function F(x) is a function represented by formula (1). The blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value x1, the final value y, and the composite function F(x) on the blockchain.
[0036] The blockchain system 5 uses the first measurement value x1 and the composite function F(x) to calculate an estimated value y' of the final value y. For example, the blockchain system 5 substitutes the first measurement value x1 into the composite function F(x) to calculate the estimated value y' of the final value y.
[0037] The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value y with the estimated value y' of the final value y. For example, the blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been no tampering when there is no difference between the final value y and the estimated value y' of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been tampering when there is a difference between the final value y and the estimated value y' of the final value y.
[0038] The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold value θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The method of determining the predetermined threshold value θ is not limited. For example, the predetermined threshold value θ may be determined based on an error in the node group 4. When passing through the node group 4, an error may occur due to factors such as the performance or environment of each node. The predetermined threshold value θ may be determined so as to allow for such an error. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using the following formula. |F(x)-y|<θ (3)
[0039] The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been no tampering when the condition of formula (3) is satisfied. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been tampering when the condition of formula (3) is not satisfied.
[0040] 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not falsification has occurred using an inverse function of a composite function. The blockchain system 5 acquires a first measurement value x1 from a first measuring device 3. The blockchain system 5 acquires a final value y and an inverse function F of the composite function as function information. -1 (y) is obtained from node group 4. The inverse function of the composite function F -1 (y) is the function shown in equation (2). The blockchain system 5 receives the first measurement value x1, the final value y, and the inverse function F of the composite function. -1 (y) is recorded on the blockchain.
[0041] The blockchain system 5 calculates the final value y and the inverse function F -1 Using (y), the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2 is calculated. The second measurement value x2 is a measurement value of the measurement node 2 by a measurement device (e.g., the second measurement device 6) of the node group 4. For example, the blockchain system 5 calculates an inverse function F -1 The final value y is substituted into (y) to calculate the estimated value x2' of the second measured value x2.
[0042] The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value x1 with the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. For example, the blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been no tampering if there is no difference between the first measurement value x1 and the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been tampering if there is a difference between the first measurement value x1 and the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2.
[0043] The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold value θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using the following formula. |F-1 (y)-x1|<θ (4)
[0044] The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been no tampering when the condition of formula (4) is satisfied. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there has been tampering when the condition of formula (4) is not satisfied.
[0045] [Quality Assurance System Operation] An example of an operation method (quality assurance method) by the quality assurance system 1 will be described with reference to Fig. 5. Fig. 5 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the operation of the quality assurance system 1. In Fig. 5, the blockchain system 5 will be described assuming that information on functions related to operations in the node group 4 is recorded in advance.
[0046] In step S1, the measurement node 2 outputs a physical quantity. For example, the measurement node 2 outputs “x” as a current value.
[0047] In step S2, the first measuring instrument 3 acquires a first measurement value. For example, the first measuring instrument 3 acquires a first measurement value x1 obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The first measurement value x1 corresponds to “x” of the current value output by the measurement node 2.
[0048] In step S3, the node group 4 acquires a second measurement value. For example, the second measuring device 6 acquires a second measurement value x2 obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The second measurement value x2 corresponds to “x” of the current value output by the measurement node 2.
[0049] In step S4, the first measuring device 3 outputs a first measurement value. For example, the first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value x1 to the blockchain system 5. The first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value x1 via the first route R1.
[0050] In step S5, the node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2. The node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2 via the second route R2. The node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2 and calculates a final value y obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value x2.
[0051] In step S6, the node group 4 outputs the final value y. For example, the node group 4 outputs the final value y to the blockchain system 5.
[0052] In step S7, the blockchain system 5 records various information on the blockchain. For example, the blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value x1 and the final value y on the blockchain. Here, information on functions related to the calculations in the node group 4 is pre-recorded on the blockchain.
[0053] In step S8, the blockchain system 5 determines whether or not there has been tampering in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not there has been tampering in the node group 4, using the first measurement value, the final value, and information on the function.
[0054] The blockchain system 5 may calculate an estimated value y' of the final value y using the first measurement value x1 and a composite function F(x). The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value y with the estimated value y' of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may further determine whether or not tampering has occurred using a predetermined threshold value θ. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using equation (3).
[0055] The blockchain system 5 calculates the final value y and the inverse function F -1(y) may be used to calculate an estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value x1 with the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold value θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using formula (4).
[0056] In step S9, the blockchain system 5 outputs the presence or absence of tampering. For example, the blockchain system 5 may record the tampering presence or absence information, which is the determination result of the presence or absence of tampering, on the blockchain, or may output it to an external system. For example, the terminal 11 constituting the blockchain system 5 may display the tampering presence or absence information recorded in the blockchain system 5 on a display device.
[0057] The quality assurance method is not limited to the examples in the above embodiment. For example, some of the above steps (processing) may be omitted, or each step may be performed in a different order. In addition, any two or more of the above steps may be combined, or some of the steps may be modified or deleted. Alternatively, other steps may be performed in addition to the above steps.
[0058] [Hardware configuration] Fig. 6 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration related to the quality assurance system 1. Fig. 6 shows a computer 100 functioning as a terminal 11. The computer 100 has a processor 101, a main memory unit 102, an auxiliary memory unit 103, a communication control unit 104, an input device 105, and an output device 106. The terminal 11 is composed of one or more computers 100 constituted by these pieces of hardware and software such as programs.
[0059] When the terminal 11 is composed of multiple computers 100, these computers 100 may be connected locally or via a communication network such as the Internet or an intranet. This connection logically constitutes one terminal 11.
[0060] The processor 101 is a CPU (Central Processing Unit) that executes an operating system, application programs, etc. The main memory 102 is composed of a ROM (Read Only Memory) and a RAM (Random Access Memory). The auxiliary memory 103 is a storage medium composed of a hard disk, a flash memory, etc. The auxiliary memory 103 generally stores a larger amount of data than the main memory 102. The communication control unit 104 is composed of a network card or a wireless communication module. At least a part of the communication function with other devices in the terminal 11 may be realized by the communication control unit 104. The input device 105 is composed of a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a microphone for voice input, etc. The output device 106 is composed of a display, a printer, etc.
[0061] The auxiliary storage unit 103 stores in advance a program 110 (quality assurance program) and data necessary for processing. The program 110 causes the computer 100 to execute each functional element of the terminal 11. The program 110 causes, for example, processing related to the above-mentioned quality assurance method to be executed in the computer 100. For example, the program 110 is read by the processor 101 or the main storage unit 102, and causes at least one of the processor 101, the main storage unit 102, the auxiliary storage unit 103, the communication control unit 104, the input device 105, and the output device 106 to operate. For example, the program 110 reads and writes data in the main storage unit 102 and the auxiliary storage unit 103.
[0062] The program 110 may be provided in a form recorded on a tangible storage medium such as a CD-ROM, a DVD-ROM, a semiconductor memory, etc. The program 110 may be provided as a data signal via a communication network.
[0063] The computer devices constituting the edge device 8 and the clouds 9 and 10, and each node constituting the blockchain system 5 may also have the same hardware configuration as the terminal 11.
[0064] As described above, a quality assurance system 1 according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a measurement node 2 to be measured, a measurement device (first measurement device 3) that outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2, a node group 4 that relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value, and a blockchain system 5 that records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the node group on a blockchain and determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0065] A quality assurance method according to one aspect of the present disclosure is executed by a quality assurance system 1 including a measurement node 2 to be measured, a measurement device (a first measurement device 3), a node group 4, and a blockchain system 5. The quality assurance method includes the steps of: outputting a first measurement value obtained by measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 using the measurement device; relaying a second measurement value obtained by measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 using the node group 4, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and recording, by the blockchain system 5, the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the node group 4 on the blockchain, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0066] In the quality assurance system 1 or the quality assurance method, a first measurement value and a second measurement value are measured for a physical quantity of the measurement node 2. Information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function is recorded on the blockchain. This ensures the reliability of the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. Then, the presence or absence of tampering in the node group 4 is determined using the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. This makes it possible to guarantee the quality of the second measurement value that passes through the node group 4.
[0067] In the conventional method, for example, when relaying through multiple nodes, work such as taking evidence of the value relayed by the multiple nodes may occur. As the number of relaying nodes increases, the number of places where there is a possibility of tampering increases. Therefore, as the number of relaying nodes increases, the cost and time of taking evidence also increase. In contrast, according to the quality assurance system 1 disclosed herein, since it is not necessary to obtain evidence in the node group 4, it is possible to suppress an increase in cost and time. In addition, even if a new node is added to the node group 4, it is only necessary to add information on the corresponding function. For example, when the relay order in the node group 4 is changed due to the addition of a new node, the blockchain system 5 may record information on the function corresponding to the changed order. Therefore, the quality assurance system 1 disclosed herein can improve scalability.
[0068] The function information is a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 uses the first measurement value and the composite function to calculate an estimate of the final value, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. In this case, by substituting the first measurement value into the composite function, an estimate of the final value after passing through the node group 4 is calculated. The presence or absence of tampering in the node group 4 is determined by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the value.
[0069] The function information is an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 uses the final value and the inverse function to calculate an estimate of the second measurement value, and compares the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. In this case, an estimate of the second measurement value before passing through the node group 4 is calculated by substituting the final value into the inverse function of the composite function. The estimate of the first measurement value is compared with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the values.
[0070] The blockchain system 5 further uses a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group 4 to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The final value may have an error due to passing through the node group 4. In contrast, the first measurement value does not pass through the node group 4, so the error tends to be smaller than the final value and can be considered negligible. By using the predetermined threshold to determine whether or not tampering has occurred, the accuracy of determining whether or not tampering has occurred is improved.
[0071] The first measurement value and the second measurement value are values for evaluating an environmental value. The value for evaluating an environmental value is required to be reliable, and may be relayed and utilized at various nodes. According to the quality assurance system 1 of the present disclosure, the quality assurance of the value for evaluating an environmental value can be performed in a simple manner.
[0072] The measuring device outputs a first measurement value via a first route. The node group 4 relays a second measurement value via a second route different from the first route. In this case, the first measurement value and the second measurement value are linked by branching into the first route and the second route. This ensures the independence of the first measurement value and the second measurement value. As a result, the reliability of the determination of the presence or absence of tampering can be improved.
[0073] [Variations] The present disclosure is not necessarily limited to the above-described embodiments, and various modifications are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.
[0074] In the above embodiment, an example in which the first measurement value and the second measurement value are current values has been described, but this is not limited thereto. The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be a voltage value, a power value, a vibration value, a rotation speed, or a temperature, etc. The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be different from each other. In one example, the first measurement value may be a current value, and the second measurement value may be a vibration value. In this case, the blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using the composite function shown in formula (1).
[0075] In the above embodiment, it has been explained that the first measurement value does not pass through the node group 4, so that the error tends to be smaller than that of the final value and can be considered negligible, but the error may be taken into consideration. If the measuring device (first measuring device 3) has been calibrated, the error of the first measurement value is quantitatively determined. Therefore, the error of the first measurement value may be used to determine the predetermined threshold value θ shown in formula (3) or formula (4).
[0076] In the above embodiment, an example has been described in which the blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by further using a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group 4, but this is not limiting. The predetermined threshold may be a threshold determined by a specific industry.
[0077] When comparing the magnitude of two numerical values, either of the two criteria "greater than or equal to" or "greater than" may be used, or either of the two criteria "less than or equal to" or "less than".
[0078] [Note] The following is a summary of the present disclosure. [1] a measurement node to be measured; a measurement device that outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node; a node group that relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node, and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; a blockchain system that records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to an operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain, and determines whether or not the group of nodes has been tampered with by using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function; Quality assurance system. [2] the information on the function is a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group, The blockchain system calculates an estimate of the final value using the first measurement value and the composite function, and determines whether or not the tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. The quality assurance system described in [1]. [3] the information on the function is an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group, The blockchain system calculates an estimate of the second measurement value using the final value and the inverse function, and determines whether or not the tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value. The quality assurance system described in [1] or [2]. [4] The quality assurance system described in any of [1] to [3], wherein the blockchain system further uses a predetermined threshold determined based on an error of the group of nodes to determine whether or not the tampering has occurred. [5] The quality assurance system according to any one of [1] to [4], wherein the first measurement value and the second measurement value are values for evaluating environmental value. [6] the measuring device outputs the first measurement value via a first path; the group of nodes relays the second measurement value via a second route different from the first route; A quality assurance system according to any one of [1] to [5]. [7] A quality assurance method executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system, outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device; relaying, by the group of nodes, a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and recording, by the blockchain system, the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to an operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain, and determining whether or not the group of nodes has been tampered with using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function. Quality assurance methods. [Explanation of symbols]
[0079] 1. Quality Assurance System 2 Measurement Node 3. First Measuring Instrument (Measuring Instrument) 4 Node Group 5. Blockchain System 6. Second Measuring Instrument 7 Conversion Module 8 Edge Devices 9. Cloud 10. Cloud 11 Terminal y final value R1 First Route R2 Second Route x1 First measurement x2 Second measurement y´ Estimated value x2´ Estimated value θ Threshold
Claims
1. a measurement node to be measured; a measurement device that outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node; a node group that relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node, and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; a blockchain system that records information on the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to an operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain, and determines whether or not the group of nodes has been tampered with by using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function; Quality assurance system.
2. the information on the function is a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group, The blockchain system calculates an estimate of the final value using the first measurement value and the composite function, and determines whether or not the tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. The quality assurance system according to claim 1.
3. the information on the function is an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the node group, The blockchain system calculates an estimate of the second measurement value using the final value and the inverse function, and determines whether or not the tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value. The quality assurance system according to claim 1.
4. The quality assurance system of claim 1 , wherein the blockchain system further uses a predetermined threshold determined based on an error of the group of nodes to determine whether or not the tampering has occurred.
5. The quality assurance system according to claim 1 , wherein the first measurement value and the second measurement value are values that evaluate environmental value.
6. the measuring device outputs the first measurement value via a first path; the group of nodes relays the second measurement value via a second route different from the first route; The quality assurance system according to claim 1.
7. A quality assurance method executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system, outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device; relaying, by the group of nodes, a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and recording, by the blockchain system, the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to an operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain, and determining whether or not the group of nodes has been tampered with using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function. Quality assurance methods.
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