Method for simplifying fault tree, fault tree simplification device, and program

By simplifying fault trees through selective aggregation of basic events based on importance thresholds, the method addresses the challenge of prolonged calculations in nuclear power plant risk assessments, enhancing efficiency and accuracy in risk evaluations.

JP2024165363AActive Publication Date: 2024-11-28MITSUBISHI HEAVY IND LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023081507
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-17
Publication Date
2024-11-28
Estimated Expiration
2043-05-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The large and complex fault tree structures in probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plants lead to prolonged calculation times, making it difficult to quickly assess risk fluctuations due to changes in equipment status, which can increase accident frequencies during maintenance periods.

Method used

A method and device for simplifying fault trees by identifying the highest OR gate reachable without passing through other gates and aggregating basic events under this gate, while maintaining calculation accuracy through selective aggregation based on importance thresholds.

Benefits of technology

This approach reduces computational load and shortens the time required for risk recalculations, allowing for efficient risk evaluations during equipment status changes, while ensuring minimal impact on assessment results.

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Abstract

To provide a method for simplifying a fault tree.SOLUTION: The method for simplifying a fault tree includes the steps of extracting the correspondence among a top gate, a basic event, and an intermediate gate, included in a fault tree; specifying the highest OR gate which starts from the basic event and arrives when climbing the fault tree toward the top gate according to the basic event in the correspondence relation; and summarizing basic events under the specified OR gate.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 2
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a fault tree simplification method, a fault tree simplification device, and a program. [Background technology]

[0002] Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is used for risk assessment of nuclear power plants (for example, Patent Document 1). In PRA, equipment, etc. are comprehensively extracted from the system diagram of the plant, failure modes of the extracted equipment, etc. are examined, and a fault tree and an event tree are created.

[0003] An example of a fault tree (hereinafter, sometimes referred to as FT) is shown in Figure 1A. FT100A in Figure 1A shows the combination of conditions that cause the top gate event to occur in a tree structure. The top gate of FT100A is "Failure of Mitigation Measure 1". The symbol connected to the bottom of the top gate is called an AND gate, and indicates that "Failure of Mitigation Measure 1" occurs when both "Failure of Equipment A / B" and "Failure of Equipment C" connected to the AND gate occur. Mitigation Measure 1 refers to measures or equipment taken to stop the progression of an event when an abnormality occurs in a nuclear plant so that it does not lead to a serious accident. The symbol connected to the bottom of the block of "Failure of Equipment A / B" is called an OR gate, and indicates that "Failure of Equipment A / B" occurs when either "Failure of Equipment A" or "Failure of Equipment B" connected to the OR gate occurs. The events at the bottom of the FT ("Failure of Device A", "Failure of Device B", "Failure of Device C") are called base events, and "Failure of Device A / B", which is located between the top gate and the base events, is called the intermediate gate to the top gate (here, "Failure of Mitigation Measure 1"). Base events are failures or events that cannot be broken down into smaller units. FT100A indicates that if either "Failure of Device A" or "Failure of Device B" occurs and also if a failure of Device C occurs, then mitigation measure 1 will fail.

[0004] An example of an event tree (hereinafter, sometimes referred to as ET) is shown in Figure 1B. ET100B in Figure 1B shows the progression of events that occur when an undesirable event (causing event) occurs in a nuclear power plant. The "Mitigation Measure 1" and "Mitigation Measure 2" following "Occurrence of Undesirable Event (Causing Event)" at the top of ET100B are called headings, and events that occur after the causing event are shown in order of occurrence, and the further to the right side of the figure the more advanced the events are. Below the headings, a tree diagram is shown that branches depending on whether mitigation measures 1 and 2 shown in the headings are successful or unsuccessful. If successful, the branch proceeds to the right, and if unsuccessful, the branch proceeds downward, and so on, progressing to the right side of the tree diagram. The right end of the tree diagram shows the event that finally occurs. ET100B shows that if mitigation measure 1 is successful, or if mitigation measure 1 fails but mitigation measure 2 succeeds, the causing event will be safely converged to, and if both fail, an accident will occur.

[0005] Fault tree analysis is widely used as a method to evaluate the reliability of a system. In many applications, it is used to quantify the risk of a system by combining FT and ET. For example, the probability of "Failure of Mitigation Measure 1" occurring is calculated from FT100A in FIG. 1A, and the calculated value is applied to the branch between success and failure of mitigation measure 1 in ET100B in FIG. 1B. Similarly, the probability of failure of mitigation measure 2 is calculated based on the FT of mitigation measure 2 (not shown), and the calculated value is applied to the branch of mitigation measure 2 in FIG. 1B. Then, based on ET100B in FIG. 1B, it is possible to calculate the occurrence frequency when both mitigation measures 1 and 2 fail after the occurrence of an initiating event, leading to an accident.

[0006] Nuclear power plants have large-scale and complex control and safety functions, and the patterns of initiating events are diverse, so the structure of the FT becomes huge, and the calculation time for the probability of top gate occurrence tends to be long. Nuclear power plants require periodic maintenance of equipment, and during that period, mitigation measures that require the equipment are unavailable, so the input information of the FT changes, and the frequency of accidents increases accordingly. For example, if equipment C is under maintenance, the failure probability of equipment C becomes 1 in the input information of FT100A in Figure 1A, and as a result, the failure probability of mitigation measure 1 increases, and the frequency of accidents in ET100B in Figure 1B also increases. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0007] [Patent Document 1] JP 2021-117092 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0008] In order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants and to ensure that risks do not exceed allowable values, it is necessary to calculate risk fluctuations associated with changes in the operating state of equipment each time. However, if the calculation time becomes long due to a huge FT structure, there is a possibility that the calculation results of risk fluctuations cannot be obtained promptly. Therefore, we provide a technology that improves calculation speed by simplifying the FT structure while maintaining the calculation accuracy of risks calculated based on FT.

[0009] The present disclosure provides a fault tree simplification method, a fault tree simplification device, and a program that can solve the above problems. [Means for solving the problem]

[0010] The method for simplifying a fault tree to be evaluated according to the present disclosure includes the steps of: extracting a correspondence between top gates and base events that constitute a fault tree and elements that exist between them; for each base event in the extracted correspondence, identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree toward the top gate starting from that base event; and aggregating the base events subordinate to the identified OR gate.

[0011] In addition, the fault tree simplification device disclosed herein includes a means for extracting a correspondence between top gates and base events that constitute a fault tree and elements that exist between them, a means for identifying, for each base event in the extracted correspondence, a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when starting from the base event and tracing the intermediate gates in the fault tree toward the top gate, and a means for aggregating the base events subordinate to the identified OR gate.

[0012] In addition, the program disclosed herein causes a computer to execute the steps of: extracting a correspondence relationship between the top gates and base events that constitute a fault tree and the intermediate gates that exist between them; for each base event in the extracted correspondence relationship, identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree starting from the base event toward the top gate; and aggregating the base events subordinate to the identified OR gate. Effect of the Invention

[0013] According to the above-described fault tree simplification method, fault tree simplification device, and program, the structure of a fault tree can be automatically simplified while maintaining calculation accuracy. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0014] [Figure 1A] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a fault tree. [Figure 1B] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of an event tree. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a fault tree simplifying device according to an embodiment. [Figure 3A] FIG. 1 is a first diagram showing an example of a simplified fault tree according to an embodiment. [Figure 3B] FIG. 2 is a second diagram showing an example of a simplified fault tree according to the embodiment. [Figure 4] 1 is a flowchart illustrating an overall fault tree simplification process according to an embodiment. [Diagram 5] 13 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process for extracting a correspondence relationship between a top gate and a base event according to an embodiment. [Figure 6A] FIG. 1 is a first diagram illustrating a correspondence table according to an embodiment. [Figure 6B] FIG. 2 is a second diagram illustrating a correspondence table according to an embodiment. [Figure 7] 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an aggregation process according to the embodiment. [Figure 8] FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating an aggregation process according to an embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of a fault tree simplification device according to an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0015] <Embodiment> Hereinafter, the fault tree simplification method of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. (System Configuration) 2 is a block diagram showing an example of a fault tree simplification device (hereinafter, referred to as an FT simplification device) according to an embodiment. The FT simplification device 10 automatically simplifies the FT while maintaining the calculation accuracy of the risk assessment.

[0016] The FT simplification device 10 includes a data acquisition unit 11 that acquires various data such as the FT to be simplified, an input reception unit 12 that receives user operations, a control unit 13 that controls the execution of the FT simplification process, an output unit 14 that outputs the created FT etc. as a display device or electronic file, and a storage unit 15 that stores data acquired by the data acquisition unit 11 and data being processed. The control unit 13 includes a correspondence table creation unit 131 that creates a correspondence table that extracts the correspondence relationships between the top gates and base events that make up the FT and the various gates that exist between them, and an aggregation unit 132 that simplifies the FT by aggregating the base events based on the correspondence table. Details of these functional units will be explained in detail later using flowcharts (FIGS. 4 and 7) and the like.

[0017] The basic idea is to simplify the structure of the FT by reducing the number of base events, which are the components of the FT, and to reduce the calculation load. Figure 3A shows FT3A before simplification and FT3A' after simplification. The top gate 3A1 of FT3A is connected to base events 3A3 and 3A4 by OR gate 3A2. In this case, base events 3A3 and 3A4 can be equivalently converted to a new base event X (base event 3A5) that has an occurrence probability value that is the sum of the probability value of base event 3A3 occurring and the probability value of base event 3A4 occurring.

[0018] FIG. 3B shows FT3B before simplification and FT3B' after simplification. In FT3B, top gate 3B1, intermediate gate 3B3, and primitive event 3B4 are connected by OR gate 3B2, and intermediate gate 3B3, primitive events 3B6, 3B7, and 3B8 are connected by OR gate 3B5. FT3B is a little more complicated than FT3A in FIG. 3A, but the number of primitive events can be effectively reduced by aggregating as much upstream as possible in the FT. For example, the primitive events 3B6 to 3B8 can be aggregated into one using the same concept as in FIG. 3A, and the primitive event obtained by aggregating primitive events 3B6 to 3B8 and intermediate gate 3B3 can be expressed as a new primitive event Y (not shown). Then, primitive event Y and primitive event 3B4 connected to OR gate 3B2 can be aggregated and expressed as a single primitive event 3B9, so FT3B can be simplified as FT3B'. In this way, the number of primitive events can be reduced by aggregating as much upstream as possible, and the calculation load can be reduced.

[0019] (operation) In this embodiment, the above-mentioned simplification is realized by the two processes shown in FIG. FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing the overall FT simplification process according to the embodiment. (P1) Extract the correspondence between the top gate and the base event. (P2) Aggregate basic events. Each of the above processes will now be described in detail.

[0020] (P1) Extraction of the correspondence between top gates and basic events In aggregating base events, it is necessary to identify the destination gate of each base event. The destination gate is the OR gate as upstream as possible. In the first process (P1), in order to identify the destination gate, the correspondence between the top gate in the FT constructed for each mitigation measure, each base event, and various gates between them is extracted. This processing flow is shown in FIG. 5. The correspondence table creation unit 131 identifies the FT of the specified top gate from one or more FTs, and comprehensively traces various gates (intermediate gates, OR gates, AND gates, and base events) from the top gate of the FT downstream, and creates a correspondence table that organizes the top gate, base event, and various gates existing on the path between them.

[0021] FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of a process for extracting a correspondence relationship between a top gate and a basic event according to this embodiment. First, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires data necessary for processing, and stores the acquired data in the storage unit 15. For example, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires FT data (step S1). The FT data is data describing the structure of, for example, the FT 100A illustrated in FIG. 1A. Any description format may be used. For example, when evaluating the frequency of occurrence of an accident in the ET 100B illustrated in FIG. 1B, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires FT data of mitigation measure 1 failure and FT data of mitigation measure 2 failure. In addition, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires a list of top gates (step S2). For example, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires a top gate list including the ID of mitigation measure 1 failure and the ID of mitigation measure 2 failure. After acquiring these data, the control unit 13 instructs the correspondence table creation unit 131 to create a correspondence table.

[0022] First, the correspondence table creation unit 131 extracts a top gate ID from the FT data (step S3). The correspondence table creation unit 131 identifies a top gate from the FT data acquired in step S1 based on the IDs of mitigation measures 1 and 2 described in the top gate list acquired in step S2, and extracts the ID.

[0023] Next, the correspondence table creation unit 131 judges whether or not a primitive event is included immediately below the gate (step S4). The gate is the extracted gate, in this case the top gate. The "immediately below" refers to an intermediate gate or primitive event immediately below the gate directly connected to the top gate. The FT data acquired in step S1 includes the type of each gate (whether it is an intermediate gate, what type of gate it is, or primitive event) and the connection relationship, and it is possible to determine whether or not the gate immediately below is a primitive event based on the type information. If the element connected to the gate directly connected to the top gate is a primitive event, the correspondence table creation unit 131 judges that a primitive event is included immediately below the top gate, and if not, judges that a primitive event is not included immediately below the top gate. For example, in the case of FT3A in FIG. 3A, since both gates 3A3 and 3A4 are primitive events, the correspondence table creation unit 131 judges that a primitive event is included. If it is judged that a primitive event is not included (step S4; No), the correspondence table creation unit 131 proceeds to the processing of step S7.

[0024] If it is determined that a base event is included (step S4; Yes), the correspondence table creation unit 131 extracts all of the base events immediately below (step S5). In the case of FT 3A, the correspondence table creation unit 131 extracts base events 3A3 and 3A4. Next, the correspondence table creation unit 131 creates a correspondence table of top gate IDs, intermediate gate IDs, and base event IDs (step S6). In the case of the FT in FIG. 3A, the correspondence table creation unit 131 generates a correspondence table including row data in which the top gate 3A1 and the base event 3A3 are associated with each other through an OR gate (there is no corresponding intermediate gate), and row data in which the top gate 3A1 and the base event 3A4 are associated with each other through an OR gate (there is no corresponding intermediate gate).

[0025] Next, the correspondence table creation unit 131 judges whether or not an intermediate gate is included immediately below the gate in question (step S7). For example, in the case of FT3A in FIG. 3A, an intermediate gate is not included immediately below the top gate, so this judgment is No. In the case of FT3B in FIG. 3B, an intermediate gate 3B3 is included immediately below the top gate, so this judgment is Yes. If it is judged that an intermediate gate is not included (step S7; No), the process proceeds to step S9.

[0026] If it is determined that an intermediate gate is included (step S7; Yes), the correspondence table creation unit 131 identifies an intermediate gate immediately below the top gate from the FT data and extracts its ID (step S8). In the case of FT 3B in FIG. 3B, intermediate gate 3B3 is extracted. Then, the processing from step S4 onwards is repeated. In this example, the gate in step S4 is the identified intermediate gate 3B3. Since the intermediate gate 3B3 includes the base events 3B6-3B8 directly below it, the correspondence table creation unit 131 extracts the base events 3B6-3B8 (step S5), and generates a correspondence table including row data associating the top gate 3B1, the intermediate gate 3B3, the base event 3B6, and the connections (types of gates that are connected) of each gate, row data associating the top gate 3B1, the intermediate gate 3B3, the base event 3B7, and the connections therebetween, and row data associating the top gate 3B1, the intermediate gate 3B3, the base event 3B8, and the connections therebetween (step S6). Then, the determination is made in step S7. If the determination is Yes, the processing in steps S8 and S4-S6 is repeated. If the determination is No in step S7, the correspondence table thus far generated is output to the control unit 13, a display device, or the like (step S9), and the flow chart in FIG. 5 is terminated.

[0027] FIG. 6A shows FT5 as an example of a processing target. In FT5, top gate G1 is connected to intermediate gate G2 and base event A through an AND gate, intermediate gate G2 is connected to intermediate gate G3, base event B, and base event C through an OR gate, and intermediate gate G3 is connected to base event D through an OR gate. When correspondence relationships are extracted for this FT5 by the processing flow described with reference to FIG. 5, a correspondence table as shown in FIG. 6B is obtained. As shown in the figure, in the correspondence table, row data (each row of the table) of correspondence relationships is generated by the number of top gates x the number of base events. After generating the correspondence table, the control unit 13 proceeds to the next process (P2).

[0028] (P2) Aggregation of basic events In this process (P2), the FT structure is simplified by aggregating the base events at an OR gate as upstream as possible based on the correspondence table between the top gate and base events generated in the previous process (P1). The flow of the aggregation process is shown in FIG. 7. In the first judgment logic (step S17 in FIG. 7), base events that do not affect the risk evaluation results due to aggregation in the logical structure of the FT are selected. In the next judgment logic (step S19 in FIG. 7), although the risk evaluation results may be affected by aggregating in the logical structure, the impact on the evaluation results is suppressed by selecting aggregation targets limited to base events with low importance (i.e., the contribution of the base event to the risk). Note that the threshold of importance that determines whether or not to aggregate can be specified by the evaluator, and the input receiving unit 12 sets the specified threshold in the storage unit 15. After identifying the aggregation destination gates of all base events, the probability values ​​of base events with the same aggregation destination gate are summed up, and the FT structure after aggregation is reflected in the original FT data, thereby obtaining the final simplified FT data.

[0029] FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an example of the simplification process according to the present embodiment. First, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires data necessary for processing, and stores the acquired data in the storage unit 15. For example, the data acquisition unit 11 acquires FT data (step S11). The data acquisition unit 11 also acquires the correspondence table created in the previous process (P1) (step S12). When an FT with mitigation measure 1 failure and an FT with mitigation measure 2 failure exist, the correspondence table contains row data for the total number of base events extracted in each of the two FTs. The data acquisition unit 11 also acquires a list of base events not to be aggregated (step S13). The base event list contains IDs of base events not to be aggregated. For example, the evaluator registers IDs of base events to be evaluated individually without aggregation in the base event list, and inputs the base event list to the FT simplification device 10. The base event to be evaluated individually without aggregation is, for example, the base event "device C failure" in the case where device C of FT 100A in FIG. 1A is to be subjected to maintenance. By excluding "equipment C failure" from the aggregation target and aggregating other base events (assuming that no maintenance, etc. is planned), there is no need to repeatedly calculate the other base events, and it becomes possible to perform risk assessments for periods when equipment C is undergoing maintenance and for periods when it is not, with less calculation time.

[0030] The data acquiring unit 11 also acquires an importance list of the base events (step S14). The importance list describes the importance of the base events included in the FT data. The importance indicates the contribution of the base event to risk, and is acquired, for example, by performing a separate risk evaluation. The data acquiring unit 11 also acquires a probability value list of the base events (step S15). The probability value list describes the occurrence probability of the base event. The occurrence probability is set by an engineer with knowledge, for example, based on past failure performance data, etc. After acquiring these data, the control unit 13 instructs the aggregation unit 132 to aggregate the base events.

[0031] First, the aggregation unit 132 extracts base events to be aggregated from the correspondence table (step S16). The aggregation unit 132 extracts IDs of base events that are not registered in the list of base events not to be aggregated obtained in step S13 from the correspondence table obtained in step S12. In the following process, the base events extracted here are processed.

[0032] Next, the aggregation unit 132 judges whether there is only one OR gate at the top of the hierarchy counting from the base event (step S17). The top OR gate is the OR gate immediately before the gate other than the OR gate when tracing the FT from the base event to the top gate (the top OR gate that can be reached without passing through the gate other than the OR gate). Regarding whether there is only one, for example, if a base event is included only in the FT of mitigation measure 1 failure and there is only one top OR gate when tracing from the base event to the top gate, this judgment is Yes, and if the base event is included in both the FT of mitigation measure 1 failure and the FT of mitigation measure 2 failure, one top OR gate is found in each FT, and these two OR gates are different, there are two top OR gates, so this judgment is No. A specific example of the judgment in step S17 will be described later with reference to FIG. 8. The aggregation unit 132 makes this judgment for all base events to be processed.

[0033] If there is only one OR gate at the highest level counting from the base event (step S17; Yes), the aggregation unit 132 identifies and extracts this OR gate as the aggregation destination of the base event (step S18). In this case, aggregating the base event does not affect the risk assessment result. The aggregation unit 132 performs a process to extract an aggregation destination OR gate for all base events for which the determination in step S17 is Yes. For the base event for which an aggregation destination OR gate has been extracted, the process proceeds to step S22.

[0034] If there is not only one OR gate at the top of the hierarchy from the base event (step S17; No), the aggregation unit 132 refers to the importance list acquired in step S14 and determines whether the importance of the base event is equal to or lower than a threshold (step S19). It is assumed that the threshold is set in advance by the evaluator. The aggregation unit 132 performs the determination in step S19 for all base events determined as No in step S17. If the importance of the base event exceeds the threshold (step S19; No), the aggregation unit 132 sets the base event whose importance exceeds the threshold as not to be aggregated (step S20), and the processing of the base event set as not to be aggregated is completed in step S20, and subsequent processing is not performed.

[0035] If the importance of the base event is equal to or lower than the threshold (step S19; Yes), the aggregation unit 132 targets the base event and extracts the top-level OR gates counting from the base event as aggregation destinations (step S21). In this case, aggregating the base events may affect the risk assessment, but by aggregating only base events with low importance, this effect is suppressed. The effect of aggregation on the risk assessment result will be described with reference to FIG. 8.

[0036] Next, the aggregating unit 132 refers to the probability value list acquired in step S15 to acquire the probability value of the occurrence probability of each base event for all base events that exist under the OR gate extracted in step S18 or step S21 and are not to be aggregated (base events removed in step S16 and base events set as not to be aggregated in step S20). The aggregating unit 132 sums up the probability values ​​of the acquired base events for each OR gate extracted as the aggregation destination, and generates a new base event by aggregating the base events to be aggregated (step S22).

[0037] Next, the aggregation unit 132 executes two processes on the FT data acquired in step S11: overwriting the generated base event and deleting the aggregated base event (step S23). For example, when generating base event c by aggregating base events a and b, base events a and b are deleted from the original FT data and overwritten with base event c (base events a and b are replaced with base event c). In addition, for base event c, the probability value summed up in step S22 may be included in the FT data in association with base event c, or the probability value of base event c occurring may be added to the probability value list acquired in step S15. Next, the output unit 14 outputs the simplified FT data, etc. to a display device, an electronic file, etc. (step S24).

[0038] Next, the judgment in step S17 in FIG. 7 will be described with reference to FIG. 8. The top gates T1, T2, and T3 illustrated in FIG. 8 are, for example, failures of mitigation measures 1, 2, and 3. FIG. 8 shows three FTs with these as top gates, and describes common configurations among the three FTs in a format that makes it clear that they are common to the structures of multiple FTs. In the FT in FIG. 8, the basic events A, B, and C are connected to the top gates T1 and T2, but in both the top gates T1 and T2, the most upstream OR gate is the OR gate G2, and there is only one. Therefore, the judgment result in step S17 is Yes, and the OR gate G2 is extracted as the aggregation destination of the basic events A, B, and C (step S18). On the other hand, base event D exists in two places and is connected to top gates T1, T2, and T3, but the most upstream OR gate in the case of top gates T1 and T2 is gate G2, whereas the most upstream OR gate in the case of top gate T3 is gate G7, and there are multiple most upstream OR gates. Therefore, the judgment result in step S17 for base event D is No. If the importance of base event D is greater than the threshold (step S19; No), base event D is not aggregated. If the importance of base event D is equal to or less than the threshold (step S19; Yes), base event D is aggregated for both OR gate G2 and OR gate G7.

[0039] If the base event D is aggregated for both OR gate G2 and OR gate G7, it may affect the risk assessment results. For ease of explanation, assume that top gate T1 corresponds to the heading "Failure of mitigation measure 1" of ET100B in FIG. 1B, top gate T3 corresponds to "Failure of mitigation measure 2," and there are no gates other than base events A to D in FIG. 8 and the various gates on the path from base events A to D to the top gate. In this case, when base event D occurs, the structure is such that both failure of mitigation measure 1 and failure of mitigation measure 2 occur. In the simplified FT in which base event D is aggregated and simplified for both OR gate G2 and OR gate G7, it is unclear whether the failure of mitigation measure 1 or mitigation measure 2 is caused by base event D. When the probability of failure of mitigation measure 1 and the probability of failure of mitigation measure 2 based on the simplified FT in which base event D is aggregated to both OR gate G2 and OR gate G7 are applied to ET100B in FIG. 1B, in reality, when base event D occurs, both mitigation measures 1 and 2 fail, but this is not taken into consideration, and the probability of failure of mitigation measure 2 is calculated assuming that an event in which mitigation measure 1 fails and mitigation measure 2 succeeds even if base event D occurs. In other words, in the case of an evaluation using ET in FIG. 1B as an example, the expected value of failure of mitigation measures 1 and 2 is underestimated due to aggregation of base event D. This is the impact of aggregating base events that were judged No in step S17. However, such an impact on the risk evaluation result can be reduced by adjusting the threshold of importance related to the judgment in step S19.

[0040] (effect) As described above, according to this embodiment, the calculation load can be reduced by simplifying the structure of a huge and complicated FT, and the time required for repeated calculation of risks associated with changes in the state of the system can be shortened. For example, when a calculation is required for a state change such as maintenance for equipment C, the base event of the failure of equipment C is registered in a list of base events not to be aggregated, and a simplified FT is prepared by aggregating base events other than equipment C by the process of FIG. 7, and the probability values ​​of the aggregated base events are calculated. Then, for example, when maintenance is performed on equipment C, the probability value of the base event of equipment C can be changed based on the simplified FT, and the probability of occurrence of a top gate can be calculated for other base events simply by applying the probability values ​​calculated in advance. This makes it possible to perform risk evaluation with less calculation amount and calculation time than when calculation is performed for all elements every time a state change occurs for equipment C based on an unsimplified FT. Note that the simplification process itself of this embodiment also involves calculation processing, but by specifying all equipment to be maintained as not to be aggregated in advance, the simplified FT can be repeatedly used for calculations of various plant states, so that the calculation amount and calculation time can be reduced from a long-term perspective.

[0041] 7 and 8, the effect on the risk evaluation result can be minimized by using logic that narrows down the aggregation targets to basic events that are logically equivalent or have low importance even if FTs are aggregated. In other words, according to this embodiment, the FT structure can be simplified while maintaining the calculation accuracy of the risk evaluation.

[0042] In the above embodiment, the FT used in risk assessment of nuclear plants is simplified, but the application field of the FT simplification device 10 is not limited to risk assessment of nuclear plants, and it can also be applied to other industrial fields where reliability assessment is performed using FT.

[0043] 9 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration of a fault tree simplifying device according to an embodiment. A computer 900 includes a CPU 901, a main storage device 902, an auxiliary storage device 903, an input / output interface 904, and a communication interface 905. The above-described fault tree simplification device 10 is implemented in a computer 900. Each of the above-described functions is stored in the auxiliary storage device 903 in the form of a program. The CPU 901 reads the program from the auxiliary storage device 903, loads it in the main storage device 902, and executes the above-described processing in accordance with the program. The CPU 901 also reserves a storage area in the main storage device 902 in accordance with the program. The CPU 901 also reserves a storage area in the auxiliary storage device 903 for storing data being processed in accordance with the program.

[0044] In addition, a program for realizing all or part of the functions of the fault tree simplification device 10 may be recorded in a computer-readable recording medium, and the program recorded in the recording medium may be read into a computer system and executed to perform processing by each functional unit. The term "computer system" as used herein includes hardware such as an OS and peripheral devices. In addition, if a WWW system is used, the term "computer system" also includes a homepage providing environment (or display environment). In addition, the term "computer-readable recording medium" refers to a portable medium such as a CD, DVD, or USB, and a storage device such as a hard disk built into a computer system. In addition, if the program is distributed to the computer 900 through a communication line, the computer 900 that receives the program may load the program into the main storage device 902 and execute the above processing. In addition, the above program may be for realizing part of the above-mentioned functions, and may further be capable of realizing the above-mentioned functions in combination with a program already recorded in the computer system.

[0045] As described above, several embodiments according to the present disclosure have been described, but all of these embodiments are presented as examples and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. These embodiments can be implemented in various other forms, and various omissions, substitutions, and modifications can be made without departing from the gist of the invention. These embodiments and their modifications are included in the scope of the invention and its equivalents as described in the claims, as well as in the scope and gist of the invention.

[0046] <Additional Notes> The fault tree simplifying method, the fault tree simplifying device, and the program described in each embodiment can be understood, for example, as follows.

[0047] (1) A method for simplifying a fault tree to be evaluated according to a first aspect includes the steps of: extracting a correspondence between top gates and base events constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them (intermediate gates and their gate types (e.g., OR gate, AND gate, etc.)); for each base event in the extracted correspondence, identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree from the base event toward the top gate; and aggregating base events subordinate to the identified OR gate. This allows the fault tree to be automatically simplified.

[0048] (2) A second aspect of the fault tree simplification method for an evaluation target is the fault tree simplification method of (1), in which, in the aggregating step, when there is only one identified OR gate for each of the base events, the base event is the target for aggregation. This makes it possible to simplify the structure of the FT while maintaining the accuracy of the risks represented by the FT before aggregation.

[0049] (3) A fault tree simplification method according to a third aspect is a fault tree simplification method according to (1) to (2), wherein in the aggregating step, when there are multiple identified OR gates for each of the base events, if the importance of the base event is equal to or lower than a threshold, the base event is targeted for aggregation for each of the OR gates. This makes it possible to simplify the structure of the FT while maintaining the accuracy of the risks represented by the FT before aggregation.

[0050] (4) A fault tree simplification method according to a fourth aspect is a fault tree simplification method according to any one of (1) to (3), wherein in the aggregating step, when there are multiple identified OR gates for each of the base events, if the importance of the base event is greater than a threshold, the base event is not targeted for aggregation. By excluding base events with high importance from the aggregation targets, it is possible to simplify the structure of the FT while maintaining the accuracy of the risks expressed by the FT before aggregation.

[0051] (5) A fault tree simplification method according to a fifth aspect is a fault tree simplification method according to any one of (1) to (4), wherein in the aggregating step, for the base events, occurrence probabilities of the base events to be aggregated are summed up, and the base events before aggregation in the fault tree are replaced with the base events after aggregation. This makes it possible to simplify the structure of the FT while maintaining the accuracy of the risks represented by the FT before aggregation.

[0052] (6) A fault tree simplification method according to a sixth aspect is a fault tree simplification method according to any one of (1) to (5), further comprising a step of obtaining a list in which base events not to be aggregated are registered, and in the identifying step, the top-level OR gate is identified for a base event not registered in the list from among the base events in the extracted correspondence. This allows you to specify base events that you do not want to aggregate, and simplify FT by only targeting other base events for aggregation.

[0053] (7) A fault tree simplification method according to a seventh aspect is a fault tree simplification method according to any one of (1) to (6), wherein in the extraction step, data indicating the correspondence is extracted for a value obtained by multiplying the number of basic events by the number of top gates. This makes it possible to extract the correspondence between the base events, intermediate gates, top gates, and their connections (OR gates, AND gates, etc.) for all base events to be aggregated, and to identify the top-level OR gate when tracing from each base event to the top gate.

[0054] (8) A fault tree simplification device 10 according to an eighth aspect has a means for extracting a correspondence between top gates and base events constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them, a means for identifying, for each base event in the extracted correspondence, a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree starting from the base event toward the top gate, and a means for aggregating base events subordinate to the identified OR gate.

[0055] (9) A program according to a ninth aspect causes a computer 900 to execute the steps of: extracting a correspondence between top gates and base events constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them; for each base event in the extracted correspondence, identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree starting from the base event toward the top gate; and aggregating the base events subordinate to the identified OR gate. [Explanation of symbols]

[0056] 10. Fault Tree Simplification Device 11 Data acquisition section 12 Input reception section 13. Control section 131 Correspondence table creation section 132....Aggregation section 14 Output section 15...Storage section 900...Computer 901···CPU 902...Main memory 903...Auxiliary storage device 904 Input / Output Interface 905 Communication Interface

Claims

1. extracting a correspondence relationship between a top gate and a base event constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them; Identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree toward the top gate starting from the base event for each base event in the extracted correspondence relationship; aggregating the identified basic events under the OR gate; A fault tree simplification method having

2. In the step of aggregating, when there is only one identified OR gate for each of the basic events, the basic event is selected as a target for aggregation.

2. The method of claim 1 .

3. In the aggregating step, when there are a plurality of the identified OR gates for each of the base events, if the importance of the base event is equal to or less than a threshold, the base event is set as a target for aggregation for each of the OR gates.

2. The method of claim 1 .

4. In the aggregating step, when there are a plurality of the identified OR gates for each of the base events, if the importance of the base event is greater than a threshold, the base event is not targeted for aggregation.

4. A method for simplifying a fault tree according to claim 1 or 3.

5. In the step of aggregating, occurrence probabilities of the base events to be aggregated are summed up, and the base events before aggregation in the fault tree are replaced with the base events after aggregation. A method for simplifying a fault tree according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

6. The method further includes a step of acquiring a list in which base events not to be aggregated are registered, In the step of specifying, the topmost OR gate is specified for the basic event not registered in the list from among the basic events in the extracted correspondence relationship. A method for simplifying a fault tree according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

7. In the extracting step, data indicating the correspondence relationship is extracted in an amount equal to a value obtained by multiplying the number of basic events by the number of top gates. A method for simplifying a fault tree according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

8. A means for extracting a correspondence relationship between a top gate and a base event constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them; a means for identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree from the base event to the top gate, for each base event in the extracted correspondence relationship; A means for aggregating the specified basic events subordinate to the OR gate; A fault tree simplification apparatus having

9. On the computer, extracting a correspondence relationship between a top gate and a base event constituting a fault tree and elements existing between them; Identifying a top-level OR gate that can be reached without passing through any gate other than an OR gate when tracing the fault tree toward the top gate starting from the base event for each base event in the extracted correspondence relationship; aggregating the identified basic events under the OR gate; A program that executes the following.

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