Secure transportation system operation

Abstract

To provide a multiple redundant safety system for fuel supply / transfer of a compressed / liquefied gas vehicle.SOLUTION: One or more processors in combination with one or more systems / one or more sensors, microswitches and outputs / actuators to detect any leaks / fires / explosions / voltages / hazards / vehicle position / motion / vessel motion (s) / reusable tanks / tank replacement / position (s) / arcs, sparks, and / or other hazards that require immediate mitigation by fuel supply / gas transfer lockout / stop / vehicle release / transfer line release. For various levels of safety, multiple combinations of various sensors / detectors / inputs / outputs / devices / systems / actions / actuators can all be used standalone and / or in any combination.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1A

Description

[Background technology]

[0001] Description of the issue resolved The Earth's population continues to grow, and with this growth, so do our international transportation / work vehicle needs. Utilizing clean and safe natural gas and / or hydrogen / propane / ethane / butane / ammonia and / or any of their derivatives / compounds benefits all. The use of biomethane / biogas alone or biogas blended with methane / hydrogen (hythane) blended with methane has positive carbon reduction results. Landfills, farms, and municipal waste plants are all sources of biogas. All of these fuel(s) / blends are abundant sources of bioenergy / biofuels.

[0002] The natural gas chemical family / hydrogen / propane / ethane / butane / ammonia (NGHPETB / O) contains significant value for a diverse group of transportation vehicles, from rocket and / or satellite launches to aircraft, spacecraft, ships, tugs, barges, rail locomotives / light commuter trains, construction equipment, and any / all land wheeled / tracked vehicle(s). Transportation of everyday commodities, specialty goods, and / or people is transported daily via ships / railroad yards / stations, airports / bus terminals, docks, and spaceports.

[0003] A 21st-century transportation system should feature improved / more efficient vehicle(s) with clean fuel(s) and intelligent, safe transportation methods. Multiple vehicles and / or drive / propulsion / propulsion methods are included in this patent application. Human / package / cargo transportation can utilize rockets / capsules for international / space transportation, cruise / cargo ships / trains, and / or personal / multi-personal aircraft / hovercraft transported by pod(s), drone(s), aircraft / vehicle / air vehicle / any combination(s) of these. Many feature hybrid power / power supply system(s) utilizing compressed / liquefied gas fuel system(s), along with respective safety system(s). Benefits of these air vehicles / vehicles include reducing intercity traffic congestion, further improving emissions, improving package / luggage delivery, and providing recreational / sightseeing tours. Some may utilize interchangeable fuel tanks, as disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 8,662,235. These interchangeable fuel tanks can be small and lightweight for personal aircraft and / or contain large amounts of fuel / oxidizer for international / space transport. A pod / capsule / cockpit can be set / attached onto the filled interchangeable / reusable tank(s) to complete the rocket / vehicle and prepare it for the next transport. A central location(s) serving multiple vehicles / types is ideal for refueling / transfer(s) / exchanging (or filling interchangeable tanks) tank(s) of compressed / liquefied gas.

[0004] There are also several different systems / pathways for fuel consumption. Combustion engines have been greatly improved to increase efficiency and reduce emissions, and are now near zero emissions. Vehicle emission reductions are substantial when quantified, and clean fuels are a key component of these reductions.

[0005] Turbines / microturbines, rotary engines, and various types of fuel cells also exist. Both fuel cell efficiency and internal combustion engines can improve with increasing oxygen percentage (%) in the system intake air. Oxygen / Natural Gas / Hydrogen / Propane / Ethane / Ammonia (NGHPETA / O) may be separated and / or produced on-board or may be supplied as compressed / liquefied gas; on-board reformers / on-board gas split / separation / concentration processes are also within the scope of this invention, such as on-board high temperature / steam cracking / reforming to remove H from CH-4 for use as a fuel / fuel compound / oxidizer, pressure swing adsorption system, or O concentrator / generator.

[0006] The amount of air pollution suppressed in just the past few years is solid evidence that massive / larger amounts of particulate matter and other pollutants could be significantly reduced, benefiting every human on Earth. Natural gas / hydrogen / propane / ethane / butane / ammonia / oxygen (NASA refers to oxygen filling as "fueling") as compressed / liquefied gas fuels must absolutely be considered, but handling of fuel transfer, fuel tank(s), filling / dispensing / exchange system(s), equipment / devices / tank(s), and an overall safety culture to prevent accidents and / or accidental groundings / releases are crucial. Batteries / compressed / liquefied gas(es) require a higher level of care and / or proper handling / education for widespread adoption. The reward for using compressed / liquefied gas is cleaner air for our planet. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The present invention relates to a multiple redundant safety system for fueling / transferring compressed / liquefied gas vehicles, including two independent operational isolation control systems with separate power sources for safety backup. It includes a plurality (at least two) of separate, fully integrated computerized control systems, each including processor(s) / GPU(s), controller(s), network(s), sensor(s), instrument(s), actuator(s), human interface(s), and all peripheral(s) for two independent operating systems, and separate power sources (separate isolation transformer(s), UPS / battery bank) for redundant control of the fueling / transfer safety system. This system also includes a multiple redundant safety system for fueling / transferring compressed / liquefied oxygen vehicles, including two independent operational isolation control systems with separate power sources for safety backup. There are also multiple redundant fuel supply / transport safety systems for compressed / liquefied gas vehicles that utilize internal combustion engines and / or fuel cells to generate output power (direct and / or hybrid) standalone and / or in combination for vehicle power / propulsion / motive force / motion / movement / power generation.

[0008] An object of the present invention is also a multiple redundant fuel supply / transport safety system for compressed / liquefied gas vehicles utilizing internal combustion engines and / or fuel cells, standalone and / or in combination, to generate output power (direct and / or hybrid) for vehicle motion / movement utilizing any compressed / liquefied gas such as natural gas, hydrogen, propane, ethane, butane, ammonia, syngas, biogas, and any mixture and / or compound thereof, and any gas / liquefied / vapor gas that has been split / separated / reformed on-board.

[0009] A further object of the present invention is a multiple redundant fuel supply / transport safety system for compressed / liquefied gas vehicles utilizing an internal combustion engine and / or fuel cell standalone and / or in combination to generate output power (direct and / or hybrid) for vehicle motion / movement utilizing any oxidizer including oxygen / hydrogen and / or any of their compounds (O2 / O3 / H2O2 / ozone) if compressed / liquefied gas and / or solid, and any on-board oxygen concentrator / swing absorption system.

[0010] A further object of the present invention is a standalone and / or combined multi-redundant vehicle motion / movement(s) detection method / device(s) utilizing any of a number of mechanical tethers / cords / cables, switches / microswitches, magnetic, optical, ultrasonic accelerometer(s), 3-axis accelerometer(s), inertial motion units, gyroscope(s), gyroscopic instrument(s) / device(s) to detect omnidirectional vehicle motion / movement(s) during fueling / transfer event(s) and output signal(s) if the motion exceeds first and / or second predetermined levels of detected motion / movement.

[0011] A further object of the present invention is a standalone and / or combined multiple redundant motion / movement(s) detection method / device(s) utilizing any of a number of mechanical tethers / cords / cables, switches / microswitches, magnetic, optical, ultrasonic accelerometer(s), 3-axis accelerometer(s), inertial motion units, gyroscope(s), gyroscopic instrument(s) / device(s) to detect omnidirectional vehicle motion / movement(s) during compressed / liquefied gas fueling / transfer(s) event(s) and output signal(s) if the motion exceeds first and / or second predetermined levels of detected motion / movement. [Brief explanation of the drawings]

[0012] [Figure 1A]1 illustrates two redundant control system embodiments of the present invention. [Figure 1B] 1 illustrates two redundant control system embodiments of the present invention. [Figure 2A] 1 is a chart of inputs to a process control emergency shutdown sequence. [Figure 2B] 2B is a processor chart related to FIG. 2A. [Figure 3A] 2C is a chart of inputs to a second redundant emergency shutdown system operating in parallel to the systems shown in FIGS. 2A and 2B. [Figure 3B] 3B is a processor chart related to FIG. 3A. [Figure 3C] 3A-3B are charts of outputs associated with FIGS. [Figure 4A] 1 is a chart of inputs to an instrumented emergency shutdown system. [Figure 4B] 4B is a processor chart related to FIG. 4A. [Figure 4C] 4A-4B are charts of outputs associated with FIGS. [Figure 5A] 1 is a chart of inputs to a process control shutdown system. [Figure 5B] 5B is a processor chart related to FIG. 5A. [Figure 6A] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 6B] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 6C] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 6D] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 6E] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 6F] Shut-off valve configuration is shown. [Figure 7A] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7B] 10 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7C] 10 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7D] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7E] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7F] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7G] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 7H] 1 illustrates an alternative shut-off valve configuration. [Figure 8A] 1 shows a fuel transfer system. [Figure 8B] 1 shows a fuel transfer system with a vapor management system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0013] The system may utilize advanced technology sensors / processor(s) / system(s) for SIL-3 compliance. All compressed / liquefied gas refueling / transfer / exchange(s) regardless of their physical state (gas / liquid) will be conducted safely and efficiently by mitigating hazards associated with natural gas / hydrogen / propane / ethane / butane / ammonia / oxygen refueling / transfer / exchange(s) event(s).

[0014] Algae growth and processing has provided the benefits of clean renewable fuel. Algae cultivation is a green process that provides yet another clean fuel source for vehicle use. Cleaner fuel allows everyone to achieve the overarching goal of cleaner vehicles / ships / rockets / aircraft / plant emissions with improved air quality. Algae cultivation / processing has the potential for positive future developments that will help reach the goal of clean air.

[0015] The transfer of cutting-edge technology involves the use of artificial intelligence / machine learning / deep learning, using high-speed imaging / digital high-speed camera(s) and photodiode / array sensors covering both visible and non-visible spectrums (e.g., IR) to input optical imaging into a processor for deep processor learning or "machine learning." Repetitive motions / steps / processes are "learned" by the processor(s), and then repetitive actions and / or responses are learned and executed as learned. Other input(s) / output, such as optical, magnetic, and ultrasonic input / output, are also included within the body of this invention. Deep learning utilizes one or more repeatable inputs to process information inputs for an algorithm, which then learns (deep learns) the inputs and generates acceptable outputs using optical, magnetic, and ultrasonic devices necessary to perform the task, thereby creating unique steps through "code / coding and / or flowcharting." Deep learning and / or machine learning may also utilize quantum computing over a quantum bus or network. Quantum logic gates and networks are more secure due to the ability of verification processes within the system. A quantum network may be a LAN (Local Area Network) or a WAN (Wide Area Network) wirelessly connected to multiple different network systems via radio waves and / or fiber optic links / optical wireless networks / and / or any combination of radio waves and / or light via satellite. Both analog and / or digital signals are conditioned and fed, and these are processed with complex algorithms to decipher the input(s) signal(s) and determine the precise output(s) for repetitive motions and / or actions. Quantum computing leverages high-bandwidth optical computing on the bus / network to compute at the speed at which these sophisticated algorithms compute in real time, thus enabling artificial intelligence to function at high real-time speeds. It is also within the scope of the present invention to have an array of quantum processors (including linear arrays) or a linear array of any standard binary processor(s) / binary processor(s).Also, any computer system capable of communicating with the processor(s), such as a graphics processor (GPU) and a GPUPU graphics processing unit(s) having a processing unit(s). Sensor(s) such as an accelerometer (optical / ultrasonic / magnetic) with three-dimensional (3-axis accelerometer(s)) motion, or multiple accelerometers coupled to the processor(s) / inertial motion unit(s) to calculate three-dimensional omnidirectional vector / motion / movement / distance, and a photodiode / array with high-speed photographic capability and / or an infrared photodiode / array, and / or optically filtered high-speed imaging with infrared capability utilizing analog and / or digital images as input. Cellular visual microprocessing / digital image processing / camera image processing may be utilized for input, standalone and / or in combination with other input devices. Standalone and / or combined global positioning satellite / cellular positioning may be utilized in combination with other motion sensor(s) / system(s) to perform vehicle motion / positioning for fueling / transfer / exchange event(s).

[0016] The use of artificial intelligence for performing repetitive motions for natural gas chemical / hydrogen / propane / butane / ethane / ammonia / oxygen ship / vehicle fueling / transfer / exchange / event / exchange(s) and for use in hybrid battery electric vehicle(s) is within the scope of this invention, including position (3D), mooring, mooring, anchoring, docking, parking, touchdown, positioning, height, depth, distance, movement, motion of tether lines / vehicles (whether wheeled or tracked), rails, barges (mechanical), ships, marine, spacecraft, aircraft, air vehicles, drones, rocket / capsule(s), and also includes repetitive motions for fueling connections, whether couplers, rotating couplers, coupler locking mechanisms, articulated arms, rotating arms, extensions, rotating extensions, connectors, rotating connectors, sliding arms / connectors, clamp connections, rotating sliding arms / connections, bridges, articulated bridges with sliding and / or rotating bases. Artificial intelligence capabilities ensure safe natural gas chemical family operation(s) / location / retraction and / or repeated connection to safe and accurate transfer / exchange(s) for each and every fuel supply / transfer(s) / exchange event for hydrogen / propane / butane / ethane / ammonia / oxygen. Sensors such as magnetic, optical, and ultrasonic (MOU) provide input, output, and / or feedback signals via network data transmission(s) for processor(s) to calculate safe vehicle power operation(s) / tank / fuel supply connector operation(s) / location(s) / position. Signal(s) / sensor(s) such as optical (visible / invisible / IR / UV) / ultrasonic / magnetic power / circuit breaker(s) / contactor(s) / motor control center / motor overload / automatic transfer switch(es) / tie breaker(s) / torque, strain gauge, (LVDT), force, pressure, location / position, optical target(s), detection of whether machine part is in a particular position or not, etc. may communicate by optical over wireless communication (OWC) and these inputs may communicate to or from the processor(s) system network via radio waves and / or optical / fiber optic / coaxial cable / coaxial RF cable, by wire, by bus duct, wirelessly.The processor(s) respond intelligently and the output will automatically react as programmed / learned to provide a safe vehicle fuel supply / transfer connection(s) to the vehicle / vessel / tank, or provide a feedback signal for further information / processing, such as "successful proper connection"..."failed due to error A, B, or C", which may require further action, such as manual human assistance with a joystick / controller / handheld controller, which may include a fuel supply / transfer / tank connection(s).

[0017] / = and / or, slash: Plus, fuel + oxidizer is considered fuel / fuel supply, utilizing separate storage tank(s) for each application, and magnetic / optical / ultrasonic sensor(s) / device(s) = (MOU) utilized standalone and / or in combination for each application.

[0018] Natural gas chemicals, compressed / liquefied gas(es), and derivatives are abundant clean energy sources and are the cleanest fuel option(s) available today. Blending with hydrogen and / or biomethane from landfills allows farmland / municipal digesters all to lower their carbon footprint. This blend, as well as compressed and / or liquefied gases (LNG / bioLNG / synthetic LNG), in a wide variety of compositions / vehicles / tanks / transport applications all allow this abundant, clean, renewable energy resource to be stored, transported, and utilized. Many different (%) compressed / liquefied gas fuels / mixtures are possible, including, but not limited to, hydrogen, natural gas, natural gas derivatives, natural gas chemicals, propane, ethane, butane, ammonia, biomethane, syngas, and / or any combination / mixture / compound(s), and / or any percentage mixture (e.g., hythane / syngas) with any oxidizer combination (solid / liquid / gas) of oxygen, triplet oxygen (O-3), ozone, peroxide, hydrogen peroxide, or hydrazine. Algae growth and processing has proven fuel benefits, and any / all fuel gases / liquefied gases derived from algae, algae mixtures, or algae compounds are within the scope of this invention. Algae cultivation is a clean process and could provide another green / blue fuel source for 21st-century transportation applications. Cleaner fuels would enable all to achieve global goals, such as cleaner vehicle / ship / rocket / aircraft / plant emissions for improved air quality.

[0019] While natural gas / hydrogen / propane / ethane / butane / ammonia / oxygen (NGHPETB / O) as compressed / liquefied gas fuels must be considered, electrical system(s) are also required, and higher voltage system(s) must be considered at an equally high level. Electrical combinations, such as hybrids, also add an additional level of risk / safety due to the fact that the closer the electrical and gas / liquefied gas components are to each other, the greater the risk factor. Fuel / battery transfer, fuel tank replacement / filling, filling / dispensing system(s), equipment, and devices, as well as an overall safety culture to prevent accidents and / or accidental releases / groundings, are critical. These compressed / liquefied gas(es) / battery-electric system(s) require improved safety technology, ongoing vigilance, and appropriate safety sensor(s), detector(s), and processor(s), as well as proper handling / education for widespread use and acceptance. The reward for utilization is cleaner air for the planet.

[0020] However, to ensure a high level of safety, regulatory and / or insurance agencies will assist in the application of appropriate safety protocol(s) on-site, thus overlaying safety systems to ensure each fuel supply / charging event / transfer / battery / swap / tank(s) is completed safely and efficiently.

[0021] There are many different transport and work vehicles. Marine: ships, tugboats, barges, dredgers, to name a few Roads (off-road): Construction, mining, agriculture, airport support, to name a few. Road (On): Semi-tractors, buses, delivery trucks, to name a few Aircraft: jets, airplanes, cargo planes, to name a few Rail: freight, passenger, commuter, to name a few Rockets and spacecraft: exploration, mining, transportation, to name a few

[0022] There are also several different drive / propulsion systems / pathways for power / fuel consumption. Combustion engines have been greatly improved to increase efficiency and reduce emissions, with some now achieving near-zero emissions. Vehicle emission reductions have been substantial when quantified, and clean fuels are a key component of emission / carbon reduction. Turbines / microturbines, rotary engines, and various types of fuel cells also exist. Both fuel cell efficiency and internal combustion engines can be improved with increased oxygen percentages in the system intake air. Hybrids, which can be any combination(s) of fuel cells / internal combustion engines, utilized to drive the vehicle / generate motor shaft output power and / or power for battery charging, are within the scope of the present invention. Additionally, battery electric vehicles that rely on specific batteries often require range extender(s), and thus there is a need for hybrid(s) / battery electric vehicle(s) and associated clean fuels / fuel supply / transportation(s) / delivery / driving / power safety system(s).

[0023] Liquefied / compressed gas energy can be utilized to generate oxygen on-board, and / or processed natural gas / hydrogen / propane / butane / ethane / ammonia (NGHPETBA / O) may be separated and / or generated on-board and / or supplied as compressed / liquefied gas. Additionally, any / all of the on-board reformer / gas splitting / separation processes are also within the scope of this invention, such as stripping H2 from water / CH-4 by on-board high temperature / steam cracking / reformer for use as fuel / fuel compound / oxidant to increase / enrich O2 levels to improve fuel cell / ICE performance.

[0024] The shift to adding battery-electric hybrid technology to the natural gas chemical family of fuels will significantly improve the quality of our air. However, safety is paramount, and the safe operation of natural gas chemical family (NGIPETBA / O) fueling / transfer / tank exchange requires careful planning and execution, aided by modern sensors, actuators, controller(s), and systems (processing / processor(s)).

[0025] The plan must include multiple layers of control and safety devices. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has established standard guidelines that are used to increase the risk application level. The IEC has modeled Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) numbered #1 through #4, with #4 being the highest risk level. Nuclear power plants, for example, are at a SIL-4 level.

[0026] In this patent application, Compressed / Liquefied Gas Chemical Family (NGHPETBA / O) / Safe Fuel Supply / Transfer(s) / Exchange(s) utilizes standard guidelines set forth in Safety Integrity Level SIL-3 (IEC-SIL-3).

[0027] At this safety integrity level SIL-3, all parties involved (owners, shareholders, regulators (government), public, insurance, investors) will benefit from advanced safety system protocols. SIL-3 clearly distinguishes / separates the safety instrumented system(s) from the control system(s) / system(s). SIL-3 requires independence, diversity, and physical separation for each level of protection. The safety system architecture shall be designed such that none of the components / instrument(s) / processor(s) in the process / control system layer and the safety instrumented control system layer can be combined and they must be independent of each other as a robust layer of safety / control, but the system(s) can be "parallelized" / "stacked" so that the safety factor increases by orders of magnitude.

[0028] In this invention, risk reduction / system(s) layers, including processor(s) / control system (CS) / safety instrumented system (SIS), operate independently, but at the same time, this reduces the overall safety risk to a manageable level. SIL-3 corresponds to a risk reduction factor of 1000. This beneficial combination of stacked safety features provides an exceptional safety system to achieve a near-zero discharge / accident rating. It provides assurance to governments, regulators, insurance, investors, owners, and the public that each operation / transfer / fuel supply / tank / exchange event is protected by multiple technology layers for robust / very high / levels of redundant safety.

[0029] Mitigation systems are generally a distinct part of the process / control due to the fact that they are activated after the occurrence of an event (that should have been protected against by normal CS operation). Mitigation by SIS can be, for example, emergency stop / shutdown / vehicle lockout release system(s) / device(s), vessel / vehicle / change / motion / movement detection system(s) shutdown / activation, fuel and / or transfer system shutdown, fuel and / or transfer line(s) release, fire detection system / explosion detection system / Hi-Hi tank level(s) (any / any tank in the system) / Hi-Hi oxygen content (transfer system and / or tank) / Hi-Hi transfer system flow rate / Hi-Hi High level gas detection system(s) / High-high transfer(s) system(s) pressure(s) / Low hydraulic pressure (any hydraulic source) / Power loss (any source) / High-high tank(s) pressure (any tank - all tank(s)) / Low-low transfer line pressure(s) (any line) / Temperature / Differential abnormal range / High-high seismic system(s) detection / Weather abnormality / Lightning - arcing - static detection / SIS-CS / Network communication signal loss / All monitored by a dedicated Safety Instrumented System (SIS) that operates passively over the long term (carefully monitoring for abnormalities) and, in the unlikely event of an emergency, the SIS system acts quickly with AI / pre-programmed input(s) / output(s) and associated actions to save lives and property.

[0030] All control system (CS) input(s) / system(s) and safety instrumented system (SIS) input(s) / output(s) / system(s) will be separate / separate / parallel instrument(s) / system(s). The processor(s) of both the CS and SIS will operate independently but may operate simultaneously, and both may have output signal(s), which may be identical but distinct, and may utilize signal diode(s) to maintain signal individuality to the common output device(s) and / or logic gates / circuits at the common output device(s). The input(s) / output(s) / system(s) will be standalone signal(s) / instrument(s) / system(s), and the output(s) / system(s) may utilize combined signal(s) to actuate device(s) for safety operation(s) from both the CS / SIS. They may be part of a PLC or PLC system, part of a DCS / DCS system with which they communicate, module(s), node(s), or input / output system. It may also include switch(es) (multiple styles / functions i.e., 2-pole, multi-pole, rotary, encapsulated, etc.) which may act as a bypass / override to any system for / from switch actuation in lieu of program activation / actuation / operation(s).

[0031] While process control systems (PCS) and safety instrumented systems (SIS) are virtually identical in many respects, in many configurations, the PCS may be set to a lower setpoint to act first; then, if the appropriate action is not achieved (i.e., the PCS fails), the SIS system initiates / provides the appropriate course of action. For example, as shown in Figure 1A, the internal pressure readings of the supply tank measurements (temperature, pressure, level) are rising, and the PCS supply tank transmitter is having an improper reading, indicating a fault. In this situation, the PCS allows fuel delivery / transfer to occur, but the SIS supply tank pressure transmitter is reading an abnormally high or high-high reading, and the SIS will not allow fuel delivery / transfer to occur until the situation is corrected (usually by internally recirculating the spray pump to reduce the internal tank pressure) and the PCS supply tank pressure transmitter is repaired / replaced. As can be seen, this level of redundant safety prevents over-pressurization of the supply tank and the potential release of the PRV (potentially to the atmosphere).

[0032] The same redundancy will be provided for critical instrumentation and safety systems such as temperature, pressure, level, flow, valve(s), fire detection, explosion detection, motion (land and sea) detection, automatic vehicle release system, vehicle lockout system, fuel supply / transfer lockout system, automatic vehicle identification system (utilizing AI capabilities) as well as controllers such as joystick, roller ball, track ball, mouse, touch screen, I-Pad, voice activated controller, wireless controller(s). All systems will have the capability of primary control and secondary back-up control (in case of failure of primary control).

[0033] This invention is licensed to utilize portions of USPTO Patent #10,500,954, including any and all embodiments and claimed material incorporated in this patent application, including all licensed features, provided that appropriate license agreements are executed. U.S. Patents #8,662,235, #9,434,329, #9,919,663, #10,040,680, #10,500,954, in whole or in part, and all features of #10,500,954, are licensed to utilize portions of U.S. Patents #8,662,235, #9,434,329, #9,919,663, #10,040,680, and #10,500,954, provided that appropriate license agreements are executed.

[0034] In this invention, many different sensor(s), device(s), systems, processor(s), and components redundantly secure compressed / liquefied gas / fuel supply / transport(s). The system(s) all participate / communicate with an intelligent control system / network. These include: i.e., Input(s), Device(s), Output(s), Smart / Intelligent Device(s), Temperature / Differential / Transmitter(s) (xmtr(s), Pressure (Absolute / Composite) xmtr(s), Level xmtr(s), Level Controller(s) / Computer(s), Flow Meter(s) xmtr(s), Flow / Computer / Controller(s), Valve (Multiple Styles, Designs, and Applications), Positioner(s) / xmtr(s) / PPFB (Positive Position Feedback), Analyzer(s), Piezoelectric Device(s), Nitrogen System(s), Hydraulic System(s), Accelerometer(s) (MOU) Coupled to Processor(s) to Calculate Motion, 3-Axis Accelerometer(s) (MOU) Coupled to Processor(s) to Calculate Motion, Magnetometer(s), Inertial Motion Unit(s) (MOU), Gyroscope(s) (M OU), mems device(s), mechanical gyroscope(s), multi-gas detector(s) / detection / density (MOU) system(s), oxygen detection / (MO) paramagnetic / electrochemical detection system(s), speed / RPM detection, analyzer system(s), inerting systems, combined IR and UV optics for fire detection (compare / calculate multiple viewing wavelengths / wavelengths of fires with multiple different fuels / flicker / velocity), high speed cameras, photodiodes / arrays, phototransistors / arrays, fiber optic imaging, hybrid infrared imaging / camera(s) / imaging devices, artificial vision system(s) with artificial intelligence for vehicle / vessel detection / motion / positioning / combined imaging / GPS system(s), systems, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Synthetic Intelligence (SI), Specialized AI (ANI), Machine Learning (ML), Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), Virtual Assistants,Neural Networks, Hybrid Neural Networks, Recurrent Neural Networks, Evolutionary Algorithms, Algorithms, Differential Evolution, Automatic Planning and Scheduling, Automated Reasoning, Automation, Speech Recognition, Speaker Recognition, Image Processing, Intelligent Word Recognition, Headset(s), Earphone / Microphone(s) / Array(s) thereof, Object Recognition, Gesture Identification, Gesture Recognition, Optical Mark Recognition, Silent Speech Interface, Hybrid Intelligent System(s), Intelligent Agents, Intelligent Control Data Mining, Process Mining, Information Extraction, Image Recognition, Image Retrieval, Deep Learning, Neural Model Fields, Language Identification, Natural language user interfaces, machine translation / language, nonlinear control, pattern recognition, optical character recognition, speech recognition, face recognition, iris scanning, fingerprint scanning, biometric recognition, biometric scanning (optical / ultrasound), robotics, behavior-based robotics, cognitive robotics, developmental robotics, robot navigation, cybermetrics, evolutionary robotics, speech generation devices, road-vehicle coordination systems, virtual intelligence (VI / AI), distributed artificial intelligence (DAI), open AI (OAI), system integration, automated reasoning, automated computation, automated networks, description logic, means-ends analysis, PEAS (Performance-Environment-Actuator-Sensor), ordered weighted average (OWA) weighted averaging), aggregation operations, perceptual computing, soft computing, software agents, comparison program(s), autonomous agents, hierarchical control systems, networked control systems, distributed artificial intelligence, multi-agent systems, monitoring and surveillance agents, embodied agents, situated AI (SAI), automated reasoning, reactive machines, limited memory, theory of mind, artificial neural networks, AND logic, OR logic, AND / OR logic, if logic, if then logic, pre-training, nanodevices, MEMS devices, recurrent neural networks, deep feedforward neural networks, developmental networks, where what networks, learning rules, learning, learning paradigms, reinforcement learning,Learning algorithms, convergent recursive learning, supervised learning, unsupervised learning, cerebellar model articulation controller (CMAC), CMAC neural network, computational complexity, group method of data processing (GMDH), convolutional neural network (CNN), long short-term memory (LSTM), large memory storage and retrieval neural network (LAMSTAR), stacked autoencoder, deep stacking networks (DSN), deep coding network, deep predictive coding network, compound hierarchical deep models, distributed memory, hierarchical temporal memory, neural tuning machine, differentiable neural computer (DNC), deep reservoir computing computing), artificial neural networks, multi-layer perceptrons, backpropagation algorithms, automatic identification, encoder-decoder networks, machine translation, multi-layer kernel machines (MKM), kernel principal component analysis (KPCA), principal components (CP), reactive machines, limited memory, theory of mind, differentiable functions, automatic image annotation, variable frequency drive(s), triac speed drive(s), sensor / signal diode(s), electric starters, contactor(s), transfer switches, transformers, inverter(s), UPS system(s) with bypass, batteries (stack / bank(s)), battery monitoring / temperature control system(s), fuses, circuit breakers, MCC, MOL, cross tie(s), relay(s) (multiple designs, styles, contacts, voltages, poles, coils), auxiliary relay / contact(s), reversing relay, optical relay, optical switching, ampere detector,Voltage Sensing, Current Sensing, Actuator(s), Processor(s), Microcontroller(s), Remote Terminal Unit(s), Computer, Computer Peripherals (Mouse, Touchscreen, Monitor(s), Keyboard / Keypad (Magnetic / Optical)), Magnetic Reader, Optical Reader, Mouse (Optical / Magnetic), Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), Tablet, Handheld, iPhone, iPad, Track / Rollerball (Mouse), Joystick, Controller, Microphone, Printer(s), Ink Cartridge, Monitor(s), Display(s), Speaker(s)), Power Supply, Central Processing Unit (CPU), Sequencer / Microsequencer, Hard Drive, Power Supply, Mainboard, Optical / Magnetic Drive, Optical / Magnetic Reader, Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit (GPGPU), External GPU (EGPU), Integrated Graphics Processing Unit(s) (IGPU), Memory, Hard Drive, Flash Drive, CD / DVD Drive EVE, modem, router(s), software, firmware, application software, app, operating system(s), cloud storage, cloud computing, application programming interface (API), web server, cloud distributed network, remote terminal device, telemetry device, remote control device, distributed control system (DCS), node, module(s), bandwidth, network bandwidth, data bandwidth, digital bandwidth, supervisory control and data acquisition system (SCADA), master system, master database, information system(s), bridge (network, computer network / interface(s), computer cluster, grid computer, supercomputer, quantum computing, "quant" computer, VIOP / phone(s), server, crossover cable, antenna (line of sight and / or omnidirectional), wireless transceiver(s), optical wireless communication (OWC), OWC ultra short range, OWC short range, OWC medium range, OWC long range, OWC ultra long range,Conversion of radio waves to mechanical vibrations / vibration to light / vice versa / RFoF (radio over fiber) light modulated by radio frequency signals and transmitters over optical fiber links / cables, intermediate frequency (IF over fiber) (lower radio frequencies), fiber to the antenna (FTTA), optical to electrical (O / E) converters, satellite communications in the L-band frequency band, satellite communications in the Ka-band, optical fiber amplifier(s), sector antennas, omnidirectional antennas / system(s) / processor(s) / automatic dependent surveillance (ADBS) broadcast) / controller(s) / network / data transmission network(s), Internet, Ethernet, Extranet, Wide Area Network, Local Area Network, Wired / Cable Network, Wireless Network(s), Optical Network, Coaxial Network, Bus Type Network, Network Cable(s), Fiber Optic Cable(s), Satellite (Radio and Optical / Combined) Network(s), Radio Network, Combination Radio / Optical Network, Cellular Network(s) (2G, 3G, 4G, SG, 6G, CMDA), TCP / IP Protocol Network, Diode(s) / Signal Diode(s),

[0035] Wi-Fi network(s), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), Computer System Interface(s), Cloud Computing, Operating System(s), Module(s), Distributed Control System(s), Remote Terminal Unit(s), Fire Detection System(s), Vehicle / Vessel Motion System(s), Gas Detection System(s), Explosion Detection System(s), Tank Exchange System(s), Battery / Vehicle Lockout(s), Compressed / Liquid Chemical Gas Fuel Supply / Transfer System(s) / Equipment: (Pumps, Exchangers, Evaporators, Compressors, Valves (various styles / specifications)), Controllers, Gas Combustion Units, Flares, Knockout / Surge Drums, Vacuum Pump(s), Meters, Power Supplies, Tank(s), Pipes, Fittings, Hoses, Connectors, Flow Meter(s), Insulation (Vacuum Jacket) System(s), Vehicle Release System(s), Fuel Supply / Transfer Line(s) Release System(s), Earthquake Detection System(s) / Sensor(s), Temperature, Pressure, Level, Flow Meter(s) / System(s). Detects whether mechanical parts are in a specific location / electrical control / power system(s) by optical, ultrasonic, magnetic sensor(s).

[0036] A fire detection system that combines infrared and ultraviolet fire detection (looking at specific wavelengths) for all compressed and liquefied gas fuels, including natural gas (many different mixtures / compositions / content percentages), propane, butane, ethane, hydrogen, ammonia, and also compositions / mixtures such as biogas / biomethane (landfill / digester gas), syngas, biohydrogen, and hythane / hythene (ethane / hydrogen mixed with natural gas (various mixture percentages)). Multiple mixtures / compositions can be utilized to reduce carbon emission levels. The detection system can be filtered / tuned / limited to viewing specific wavelengths (combining both IR and UV) to detect selective fire signatures for improved fire detection(s). The system can selectively display fire signatures for each different fuel mixture / composition and relay / send signals / alarms to both the CS and SIS system(s) by wired / wireless, radio / optical, and / or any combination of communication signal(s) to shut down / mitigate the fuel supply / transfer system and / or activate the automatic fuel / transfer line release system and / or vehicle lockout release.

[0037] Multiple devices / sensor(s) / processor(s) / and / or fuel supply / transfer system(s) / vehicle(s) are redundant and for safe redundant control, two independent control / operation / instrumentation systems with parallel / separate power(s) / feeds are required to operate / control the compressed gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer(s) / system(s) and the fuel supply / transfer system(s) of the vehicle(s). The power sources / batteries are separate, as are the power sources, which may be local and / or remote power system(s), and monitoring includes separate / individual voltage monitor(s), frequency monitor(s), ampere monitor(s), and kilowatt monitor(s), separate isolation transformers, separate inverters, and separate uninterruptible power sources (UPS) / batteries (with bypass), plus UPS capability to power computer(s) / processor(s) / controller(s) / remote terminal(s) / module / device(s) during shutdown / controlled outages and / or system(s) deactivation, plus backup battery power for a safety time factor. This added layer of operational protection reduces the likelihood of an accident by orders of magnitude. Redundant parallel power sources / batteries provide duplication of safety control(s) CS / SIS system(s) augmented by backup UPS / battery system(s). Human / handheld controller(s) / interface(s) / touchscreen(s) / monitor / joystick(s) may be independent, duplicated, and may include split screen / side-by-side / multiple screen operation for diverse operation recognition and system control(s). The above listed device(s) and system(s) may be in a vehicle / battery electric vehicle / marine / tank and / or fuel supply / transport supply system / apparatus and / or may be configured in parallel / dual with any / all system(s), controls, monitor(s) remotely controlled.

[0038] All compressed / liquefied gas vehicles benefit from the use of ADSB / AIT. These systems broadcast and receive radio satellite signals to and from vehicles within range of stations (often fueling / transfer stations), sending and receiving updated data / information every few seconds. This provides weather and situational awareness (other vehicles in the area), and can be enhanced to provide additional data such as tank level, temperature, and pressure for object recognition (and AI evolutionary algorithms) and operational awareness, which can be enhanced to prepare the vehicle's tanks in terms of volume and pressure to enhance operations in preparation for transferring fuel(s). This feature is useful for identifying vehicles, as a file stored in memory recalls each vehicle's ID (equipment type, size) and the type / volume / flow rate of fuel being transferred. The system notifies vehicles of available fueling / transfer locations, assists in timing travel to and from fueling / transfer areas, and gives vehicle operators awareness of other traffic in the area to aid maneuvering and avoid collisions. ADBS / AIT will implement improvements to compressed / liquefied gas fueling / transfer, improving fueling / transfer safety, vehicle handling, and tank(s) condition preparation, pre-transfer checklists, all prior to arrival, to improve the safety and efficiency of fueling / transfer events overall.

[0039] Parallel (two), vehicle / vessel ignition / transmission / parking / mooring / positioning / location system(s). Vessels / vehicle(s) containing magnetic, optical, ultrasonic (MOU) and / or mechanical detection device(s) / system(s) with separate power source(s) shall be locked out. Additionally, any rotary encoder(s) are within the scope of this invention. For purposes of this invention, vehicle(s) / vessel motion / movement lockout is any method, means, or technique that prevents the vehicle / vessel from moving during the change of fuel supply / transfer / compressed gas / liquefied gas tank(s) / capsule(s), including any circuit / module / relay / mechanical device(s) that can disable the fuel supply / transfer system, ignition, transmission / mooring monitoring / positioning system(s), and / or disable the vehicle / vessel movement / motion in any other way. For example, as shown in Figure 6-46 / 7-46 / 8-46 / 9-46, the output of the ignition / transmission / mechanical device(s) / parking / mooring / position sensor(s) / system(s) of the vehicle(s) / vessel movement / motion sensor(s) / device / system(s) / microcontroller(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0040] Parallel (two) override(s) are any means or technique that releases / allows the vehicle to move despite the vehicle lockout, any method or means of overriding the vehicle lockout, the override / system(s) have separate power sources and can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0041] The parallel (two) optional abuse deterrent means are any method, means, or technology that prevents abuse of the override by limiting the number of times it can be used (especially consecutively) and can be reset by a qualified individual; this feature is optional; if used, the abuse deterrent means / system(s) have a separate power source and can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0042] Parallel (two) fuel supply / transfer(s) system lockout(s) is any means or technique to prevent / stop / mitigate a fuel supply / transfer event. Some sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) have the capability / input / output and function to stop fuel supply / transfer(s). SIS and CS systems, like those with separate power sources, are observed by a video / camera monitoring system / authorized operation to remotely mitigate fuel supply / transfer(s) via a control system shutdown / stop button device(s). The stop device inputs shown in Figures 6-1 / 7-1 / 8-1 / 9-1 can be buttons / HMI / AI inputs. The human interface(s) notify who / which device triggered the control system / emergency shutdown. There are device(s) designed to close flow path isolation valve(s) / stop pump(s) / compressor(s) and / or, in some systems, separate and redirect flow (by three-way, four-way, or multi-port valve(s) (optional yellow / red mushroom button), but those skilled in the art will recognize other input(s) / output(s) that create a safe fueling / transfer lockout. They provide an audible or visual indication of the fueling / transfer lockout to everyone, both on the human interface(s) and within the transfer zone, and depending on the situation, may be re-established (reset / restarted) by the operator once the situation is rectified. Sensory alerts include (flashing) yellow, red, or xenon banners on the human interface screen(s) (computer monitor(s) or touch screen(s) or yellow, red, or xenon intrinsically safe light / strobe. The fuel delivery / transfer system lockout(s) sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0043] Parallel (two) swappable tank system lockout(s) (optional) is any means or technique that prevents vehicle motion / movement / ignition during vehicle tank swap. This can be manually / automatically activated utilizing optical, magnetic, ultrasonic, or radio frequency ID detection device(s). Pressure / valve / tank alignment / tightness / connection(s) sensor(s) can stop vehicle operation whether a swap event has been initiated or simply by manually detecting microswitch actuation / tightness / tank presence. Optional sensor(s) / microswitch(es) standalone / combined generate a signal / relay that communicates with the vehicle's fuel supply / transfer system to indicate that a tank transfer is occurring / when the transfer / connection is complete, and this sensor(s) / system can communicate the signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0044] Parallel (two) isolated / separate meters with separate power supplies for tank high level indication(s) from the supply tank(s), i.e., high level or any other tank that may be connected within the supply system. As shown in Figure 7-02 / 9-02, these inputs can trigger / signal an emergency stop / shutdown of the CS / SIS system, alert all interfaces of a high supply tank level event, and reset once corrective action is taken to clear the alarm. The level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0045] Parallel (two) separate / separate meters with separate power supplies for Hi-Hi level or tank Hi-Hi level indication(s) from any other tank(s) that may be connected within the supply tank(s), i.e., supply system. As shown in Figure 6-02 / 8-02, these inputs can trigger / signal an emergency stop / shutdown of the CS / SIS system, alert all interfaces of a Hi-Hi supply tank level event, and reset once corrective action is taken to clear the alarm. The level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0046] Parallel (two) separate / separate meters with separate power sources may be connected to the receiving tank(s), i.e., receiving system, for high level and / or tank high level indication(s) from any other tank(s). As shown in Figure 7-03 / 9-03, these inputs can trigger / signal an emergency stop / shutdown of the CS / SIS system, alert all interfaces of a high supply tank level event, and reset once corrective action is taken to clear the alarm. The level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0047] Parallel (two) separate / separate meters with separate power supplies may be connected to the receiving tank(s) i.e., receiving system for Hi-Hi level and / or tank Hi-Hi level indication(s) from any other tank(s). As shown in Figure 6-03 / 8-03, these inputs can trigger / signal an emergency stop / shutdown of the CS / SIS system, alert all interfaces of a Hi-High supply tank level event, and reset once corrective action is taken to clear the alarm. The level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0048] Two parallel, isolated / separate gas leak detection systems with separate power sources. Both shall signal / warn multi-stage gas detection levels in percentage (%) as shown in Figures 6-13 / 7-13 / 8-13 / 9-13. i.e., normal level: first stage high percentage (%) gas detected; percentage reading / alarm output relay / signal (optionally fuel supply / transfer / exchange system lockout); second high-high % reading / alarm, enabling / relaying / signaling fuel supply / transfer / exchange system shutdown for both CS and SIS. The gas detection systems may be optical, magnetic (heated wire), electrochemical, or fiber optic sensor device / analyzer(s), and the sensor(s) may be point (local and / or remote sample by pump) and / or open-path optical detectors, and / or any combination of these. The gas sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0049] Parallel (two) separate / separate Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system(s) with separate power sources for each conditioned space. The system(s) fan(s) (both supply and exhaust) maintain positive pressure in the area(s), controlling any conditioned space by selecting the location of outside air intakes to prevent the ingress of any flammable gas mixtures. Strategically positioned outside air intake(s) can be monitored for flammable gases, and the system will shut down if the intake air contains flammable gases above a predetermined level / concentration. A controller regulates air temperature, pressure, flow, and humidity to maintain a controlled environment, and the controller(s) interact with other system(s) such as gas detection to prevent harmful flammable gases from entering the ventilation system(s). The HVAC controller(s) can communicate signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor locally and / or remotely for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

[0050] High O2 level / (any / all) sensor(s) (MOU) in gas fuel supply tank(s) by parallel (two) separated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power sources may be electrochemical detector / magnetic paramagnetic / optical detection sensor(s) and system(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal shutdown of fuel supply / transfer / exchange. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optic, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optic / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0051] High-high O2 level / (any / all) sensor(s) (MOU) in gas fuel supply tank(s) with parallel (two) separated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power sources may be electrochemical detector / paramagnetic with magnetic / optical detection sensor(s) and system(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange shutdown. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0052] High O2 level / (any / all) sensor(s) in gas fuel receiving tank(s) by parallel (two) separated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power source(s) may be electrochemical detector / paramagnetic with magnetic / optical detection sensor(s) and system(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange shutdown. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0053] High-high O2 level / (any / all) sensor(s) (MOU) in gas fuel receiving tank(s) by parallel (two) separated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power sources may be electrochemical detector / paramagnetic with magnetic / optical detection sensor(s) and system(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange shutdown. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0054] High O2 levels (after cool-down / inerting / bleed systems) in the gas fuel transfer line(s) by parallel (two) isolated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power sources / (any / all) sensor(s) (MOU) may be electrochemical detector / paramagnetic with magnetic / optical detection sensor(s) system(s). High O2 in the transfer line shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system(s) shutdown as shown in Figures 7-11 / 9-11. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optic, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optic / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0055] High-high O2 levels (after cool-down / inerting / bleed systems) in gas fuel transfer line(s) by parallel (two) isolated / separate oxygen content detection system(s) with separate power sources / (any / all) sensor(s) (MOU) may be electrochemical detector / paramagnetic with magnetic / optical detection sensor(s) system(s). High O2 in the transfer line shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system(s) shutdown as shown in Figures 6-11 / 8-11. These oxygen sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optic, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optic / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0056] Parallel (two) separated / separate bi-directional flow meters (Coriolis / Ultrasonic / Vortex / d / p) / flow computer / controller(s) (MOU) with separate power supplies. High flow signal(s) (above predetermined set point) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel delivery / transfer / O2 / exchange CS / SIS system lockout(s) as shown in Figure 7-15 / 9-15. The flow meter(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0057] Parallel (two) separated / separate bi-directional flow meters (Coriolis / Ultrasonic / Vortex / d / p) with separate power supplies / flow computers / controller(s) (MOU) calculating flow / mass flow. High-high flow signal(s) (higher than predetermined set point) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal lockout of fuel supply / transfer / O2 / exchange CS / SIS system(s) as shown in Figure 6-15 / 8-15. The flow meter(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0058] Parallel (two) separate / separate vehicle / vessel motion detection system(s) (MOU) with separate power sources shall be configured with predetermined setpoints (motion / distance / movement) and the first stage setpoint(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal lockout of fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system(s) as shown in Figures 7-18 / 7-19 / 9-19 / 9-19. The motion / movement sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0059] Parallel (two) separate / separate vehicle / vessel motion detection system(s) (MOU) with separate power sources shall be set at predetermined set points (motion / distance / movement) and the second stage set point(s) shall enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout(s), fuel line release system(s) (enable / disable), and vehicle(s) release system (enable / disable) as shown in Figure 6-18 / 6-19 / 8-18 / 8-19 and may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0060] High tank pressure detection in parallel (two) isolated / separate supply tanks with separate power sources shall enable the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 7-07 / 9-07 and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0061] High-high tank pressure detection in parallel (two) isolated / separate supply tanks with separate power sources shall enable fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 6-07 / 8-07 and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0062] High tank pressure detection in parallel (two) separated / separate receiving tanks with separate power sources shall enable fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 7-06 / 9-06 and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0063] High-high tank pressure detection in parallel (two) separated / separate receiving tanks with separate power sources shall enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 6-06 / 8-06 and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0064] High pressure detection in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer systems with separate power sources shall enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 7-08 / 9-08. The pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0065] High-pressure detection of parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer systems with separate power sources shall enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout system(s) as shown in Figure 6-08 / 8-08. The pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0066] Non-detection / withdrawal of positive connected sensor(s) (MOU) on parallel (two) isolated / separate supply transfer line(s) with separate power sources, such as on a fill adapter, shall trigger / relay / signal the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS lockout as shown in Figures 6-17 / 7-17 / 8-17 / 9-17. The connected sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0067] Mechanical tether / cord / cable with parallel (two) separated / separate supply / return transfer line(s) positive connection sensor(s) (MOU) and / or switch / microswitch. Sensor(s) may be standalone or combined with separate power source(s), such as on an Emergency Release Coupler (ERC), as shown in Figures 6-16 / 7-16 / 8-16 / 9-16. Non-detection / withdrawal triggers / relays / signals disallowance or lockout of fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS, and the connected sensor(s) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0068] Parallel (two) separated / separate weather / meteorological system(s) (MOU) such as lightning / storm / seiche / tsunami alarm(s) with separate power sources may trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 6-22 / 7-22 / 8-22 / 9-22, weather sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0069] Parallel (two) separated / separate (for optional / shore based fuel supply / transfer system(s)) seismic / high seismic activity sensor(s) (MOU) with separate power sources will also trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 7-10 / 9-10 and these seismic sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0070] Parallel (two) separated / separate (optional / for onshore fuel supply / transfer system(s)) seismic / high-high seismic activity sensor(s) (MOU) with separate power sources will also trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 6-10 / 8-10 and these seismic sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0071] Parallel (two) isolated / separate supply line filters high differential pressure (dp) / (dirty filters / strainers) with separate power supply for transfer line(s) enable fuel supply / transfer system shutdown / lockout, pressure (differential pressure (DP)) sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0072] Parallel (two) isolated / separate supply line filters high-high differential pressure (dp) / (dirty filters / strainers) with separate power supply for the transfer line(s) to enable / trigger / relay / signal shutdown / lockout of the fuel supply / transfer system, and the pressure (differential / DP) sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0073] Parallel (two) isolated / separate return line filters high differential pressure (dp) / (dirty filters / strainers) with separate power supply on the transfer line(s) enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel delivery / transfer system shutdown / lockout, pressure (differential / DP) sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0074] Parallel (two) isolated / separate return line filters high-high differential pressure (dp) / (dirty filters / strainers) with separate power supply on the transfer line(s) to enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer system shutdown / lockout and pressure (differential / DP) sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0075] As shown in Figures 6-14 / 7-14 / 8-14 / 9-14, parallel (two) isolated / separate system supply line(s) with separate power supply on compressor side of electrical contactor with ampere(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) for detection compressor(s) run / shutdown and / or trip / failure also signal / relay fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0076] Pump(s) run / shutdown and / or trip / failure on parallel (two) isolated / separate system supply line(s) by ampere(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) with separate power source on pump side of electrical contactor also signals / trigger / relays / signals fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor as shown in Figure 6-14 / 7-14 / 8-14 / 9-14.

[0077] Failure of high pressure sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24 and the pressure sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0078] Failure of high-high pressure sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24 and the pressure sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0079] Failure of low level sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout as shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24 and the level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0080] As shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24, failure of low-low level sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and the level sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0081] As shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24, failure of low pressure sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0082] As shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24, failure of low-low pressure sensor(s) (MOU) in parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic system(s) with separate power sources will trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and the pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0083] Operation / operation and / or trip / fault of parallel (two) isolated / separate hydraulic pump(s) system(s) with separate power sources by auxiliary contactor(s) (MOU) / ampere(s) / voltage signal on hydraulic pump side of contactor as shown in Figure 6-24 / 7-24 / 8-24 / 9-24 shall trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout and switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0084] Parallel (two) isolated / separate battery / bank(s) power system(s) for fuel supply / transfer system(s). As shown in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, supplied power indicated by a power outage of an auxiliary contactor / breaker / voltage / ampere / (MOU) monitoring / circuit will automatically activate a transfer switch / cross tie breaker(s) to immediately switch over to the remaining "live" (also monitored) battery / bank(s) / circuit, providing power and triggering / alarming / relaying a signal of electrical circuit anomaly. Using the separate / remaining "parallel" power source, the power monitoring sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor locally and / or remotely for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

[0085] Parallel (two or more) redundant, isolated / separate battery / bank / power system(s) for hybrid battery / electric vehicle(s) that can be charged / powered by one or more compressed / liquefied gas range extenders. For example, one or more fuel cell / internal combustion engine generators (both may be very small) for generating electricity. These may be designed to supply either and / or both multiple batteries / banks and / or drive motors. All drive motor(s) are individually protected and / or monitored by fused / circuit breakers / contactor(s) / auxiliary contactor(s) / (MOU) and will (manually / automatically) isolate themselves from the power source / power supply in the event of a malfunction to protect the power / power supply of other motor(s) on the same power source / power supply circuit. All monitoring sensor(s) / processor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0086] Power monitoring of parallel (two) isolated / separate generators of power source / power delivery system(s). In case of power outage, the supply / mains power voltage / amperage / frequency / KW / auxiliary contactor (MOU) sensor(s) shall trigger / relay / signal the transfer switch / tie breaker to switch to other separate power source(s) and the power monitoring sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor as shown in Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9.

[0087] Parallel (two) isolated / separate power monitoring of compressed / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer supply system(s). In case of power outage, the supply power voltage / ampere / frequency / kW / auxiliary contactor (MOU) sensor(s) shall switch to other separate power source(s) and trigger / relay / signal the transfer switch / tie breaker to lock out the fuel supply / transfer / exchange system with the separate / other separate power source as shown in Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, and the power monitoring sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0088] Parallel (two) separated / separate power monitoring system(s) (MOU). Supply power voltage (any / all phase(s)) failure shall trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange system lockout using separate power sources as shown in Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and power monitoring sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0089] Detection by parallel (two) separate / separate fire / flame / heat / smoke detection system(s) with separate power sources shall trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout, actuation of fuel supply / transfer line(s) release system(s), and actuation of vehicle(s) system(s) release as shown in Figures 6-20 / 7-20 / 8-20 / 9-20 and the fire / flame / heat / smoke detection sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0090] Detection by parallel (two) separate / separate blast / sound / pressure / wave detection system(s) with separate power sources shall trigger / relay / signal actuation of fuel / transfer / exchange.S. / SIS system(s) lockout, fuel supply / transfer line(s) release system(s) and vehicle(s) system(s) release as shown in Figures 6-23 / 7-23 / 8-23 / 9-23 and the blast / sound / pressure / wave detection sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0091] Parallel (two) separated / separate purge systems with separate power sources. The purge system(s) utilize (MOU) sensor(s) to purge the fuel / transfer gas transfer system lines when a program (AI) is activated, and by purging the system, the purge gas inerts the area inside the transfer system and neutralizes the combustible gases therein, and the purge system(s) can communicate signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor locally and / or remotely for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC.

[0092] Detection by parallel (two) separated / separate blast / sound / pressure / wave detection system(s) with separate power source(s) shall trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system(s) lockout, fuel supply / transfer line(s) release system(s) and vehicle(s) system(s) release actuation as shown in Figures 6-23 / 7-23 / 8-23 / 9-23 and the blast / sound / pressure / wave detection sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0093] Parallel (two) separated / separate oxygen detection system(s), sensor(s) may be (MOU) / electrochemical cell / paramagnetic / analyzer(s) for oxygen transfer(s) / fuel delivery system(s), and O2 detection level in the transfer system may be read out in percentage (%) such as 0%-100% O2 as shown in Figure 6-12 / 7-12 / 8-12 / 9-12, with separate power source(s) and can communicate signal(s) to CS / SIS by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0094] Parallel (two) separate and distinct with separate power source(s) for land / onboard vehicle / ship-based, autonomous / robotic / manually assisted fuel supply / transfer / oxygen / connection / coupling system(s). The system shall have one or more (MOU) sensor(s) to guide / control / remotely control / operate fuel supply / fuel delivery / transfer(s) / oxygen system(s) / connection(s) / coupling(s) / arm(s) / fuel supply rack(s) / hose line(s) / adapter(s) / tray(s) / hose(s) / hose(s) extension(s) / hose reel(s) / coupler(s) / swivel(s) / knuckle fitting(s) / fluid type ball joint(s) / coupler(s) / pivot(s) / turret(s) / elevator(s) / lifting mechanism(s) / hoisting / lowering tank(s) / system(s) / manifold(s) / supply / receiving connection(s) / coupler(s). This dual / redundant safety system application also covers optional steam return system(s) for duplication of connection(s) / coupling(s). As disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 8,662,235, all of the sensor(s) may be (MOU) proximity sensor(s) and / or any other sensor(s) (such as rotary encoder(s)) and any method of sensing proximity and / or that a particular mechanical part is in and / or not in a particular position may be used. The sensor(s) and / or robotic system(s) may include AI / machine learning / CMAC for intelligent / predictable / repetitive motion(s). The sensor(s) / (AI) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0095] Parallel (two) isolated / separate with separate power source(s) for video / camera(s) / monitoring system(s). Multiple camera / video systems are robust and provide enhanced security / monitoring for all transfer(s) / fuel delivery / oxygen transfer event(s). Dual video / camera(s) system(s) record continuously and data / video is stored for future review. Video / camera(s) have local / remote viewing / access. Remote access can allow for remote viewing / operation(s) with remote shutdown capability so that if any abnormal event(s) occur, for example, if a leak occurs in the gas system while the local monitor needs to use the toilet and is away, a (backup) surveillance video eye can visually spot the leak and remotely shut down the operation (if other sensor(s) have not yet caught the leak). All events / operations are identified / displayed / recorded so that all parties (supplying / receiving) know who / which party (third party remotely) interrupted / stopped the transfer / fuel supply / oxygen event. The added protection of having dual (two) independent video / recording systems enhances security, protects life, property(ies), and shall pass SIL-3 compliance standards. The camera / video system(s) may communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0096] Also system / tank specific, the (optional) vapor management input(s) / output(s) trigger the fuel supply / transfer system lockout input(s) / output(s) as follows:

[0097] On the compressor side of the electrical contactor, parallel (two) isolated / separate system (optional) return line(s) with separate power supply, by ampere(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) for detection compressor(s) run / shutdown and / or trip / failure also activate / signal / trigger / relay fuel supply / transfer system lockout, switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0098] On the pump side of the electrical contactor, parallel (two) isolated / separate system (optional) return line(s) with separate power supply, by ampere(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) for detection also run / stop and / or trip / failure of pump(s) to enable / signal / trigger / relay fuel supply / transfer system lockout, switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0099] Non-detection / withdrawal of positive connected sensor(s) on parallel (two) isolated / separate (optional) return line(s) with separate power source, such as on the return transfer adapter and / or on the return emergency release coupler (ERC) (MOU), will enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel delivery / transfer lockout and the connected sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0100] Detection / signal of high pressure (MOU) sensor(s) in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system(s) return line(s) with separate power sources (at predetermined set points) signals / trigger / relays fuel supply / transfer system lockout and pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0101] Detection / signal of low pressure (MOU) sensor(s) in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system (optional) return line(s) with separate power supplies (at predetermined set points) signals / trigger / relays fuel supply / transfer system lockout and pressure sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0102] High differential pressure (dp) / dirty filter / strainer sensor(s) (MOU) / signal in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system(s) return line(s) with separate power sources (at predetermined set points) to signal / trigger / relay fuel delivery / transfer system lockout, pressure (dP) switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0103] Parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system (optional) return line(s) with separate power supplies (at predetermined set points) high-high differential pressure (dP) / dirty filter / strainer sensor(s) / signal to signal / trigger / relay fuel delivery / transfer system lockout, pressure (dP) switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0104] On compressor side of electrical contactor, parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system (optional) return line(s) compressor(s) run / shutdown and / or trip / failure with separate power supply by ampere(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) for detection also signals / trigger / relay fuel supply / transfer system lockout, switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0105] On pump side of electrical contactor, parallel (two) isolated / separate return line(s) (optional) with separate power supply, amperage(s) / voltage / auxiliary contactor (MOU) for detection when pump(s) run / shut down and / or trip / failure also signals / trigger / relays fuel supply / transfer system lockout, switch(es) / sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0106] High oxygen % content sensor(s) in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system (optional) return line(s). Oxygen Monitoring Sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) with separate power source(s) can enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel delivery / transfer system lockouts and communicate signal(s) locally and / or remotely with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

[0107] High-High Oxygen % content sensor(s) in parallel (two) isolated / separate transfer system (optional) return line(s). Oxygen Monitoring Sensor(s) (MOU) / System(s) with separate power source(s) can enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel delivery / transfer system lockouts and communicate signal(s) locally and / or remotely with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

[0108] Parallel (two) isolated / separate power monitoring transfer (optional) return system(s). Supply power voltage failure (at any / all stage(s)) will enable / trigger / relay / signal fuel supply / transfer / exchange system lockout using separate power sources, and power monitoring sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax-RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0109] As shown in Figures 6-20 / 7-20 / 8-20 / 9-20, the detection signals (MOU) of parallel (two) separated / separate fire / flame / heat / smoke detection system(s) with separate power sources enable / trigger / relay / signal the fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system lockout, actuation of fuel supply / transfer (with optional return) line(s) release system(s), and actuation of vehicle(s) system(s) release, and the fire / flame / heat / smoke detection sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0110] As shown in Figures 6-23 / 7-23 / 8-23 / 9-23, the detection signals (MOU) of parallel (two) separated / separate blast / sound / pressure / wave detection system(s) with separate power sources enable / trigger / relay / signal actuation of fuel supply / transfer / exchange CS / SIS system(s) lockout, fuel supply / transfer (with optional return) line(s) release system(s) and vehicle(s) system(s) release, and the blast / sound / pressure / wave detection sensor(s) / system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0111] Parallel (two) isolated / separate vacuum monitoring / leak detection system(s) with separate power sources, detection(s) (MOU) signals will allow monitoring of the vacuum jacketed tank(s) and piping system. Monitor and alert if abnormal readings occur. The system will enable / relay / trigger fuel supply / transfer system(s) lockout, thereby enabling transfer shutdown and investigation of the cause of the vacuum problem. The system can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0112] Parallel (two) separated / separate vibration monitoring system(s). Vibration monitoring is an indicator of pump / compressor problems. It is a mechanical imbalance / vapor phase / slagging in the system. A high / high-high vibration reading (MOU) shall signal / trigger / enable a process / fuel supply / transfer shutdown. Allows for situation monitoring / remedial / corrective action and, if necessary, reset / restart action on the same / different equipment. The vibration system(s) can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0113] All the above sensor(s) (MOU) / system(s) triggers / relays / signal(s) / actuators / sensors, which can be intelligent system(s) / sensors / actuators, are individually displayed on the human interface along with the status of each identifiable point for operator information to allow corrective action (in automatic / semi-automatic / manual mode) and reset to begin operation once safety conditions are achieved. Optional yellow, red, or xenon light systems, or yellow, red, xenon / white lights, are utilized on the HIM to identify system status: yellow = caution / warning, there is trouble / problem in the process and attention is required. A bank of colored lights in the transfer zone can alert everyone to the system status. A reset is possible after correcting the problem. red = emergency stop / shutdown. And / or red and / or xenon / white lights may be configured for visual warning. An array of different audible warnings / speakers, such as pulses, sirens, horn(s), etc., are also included in the present invention. System disruption / safety system outage / shutdown will automatically shut down pumps / compressors / close isolation valves / divert fuel supply / transfer(s) and place system(s) on standby until further corrective action is taken.

[0114] Other fuel supply / transfer / exchange redundant parallel (two) safety system lockout I / O include emergency stop manual device(s) such as button / pull cord(s), supply tank high-high level, receiving tank high-high level, supply tank low-low level, receiving tank low-low, supply tank high-high pressure, receiving tank high-high pressure, high-high transfer line pressure, high-high vapor line pressure, low-low vapor line pressure, high-high filter / strainer D / P supply line, high-high vapor line filter / strainer D / P, high-high flow, ERC coupling sensor alarm, coupler / adapter connection sensor (optional), high-high motion, fire / flame / heat / smoke sensor input(s), arc / arcing, spark(s), static electricity, lightning sensor(s), weather (high-high wind), explosion / sound / pressure / wave sensor(s) / system may all trigger an emergency shutdown / stop. Safety system emergency stop (E-Stop) / shutdown activates / deactivates pump(s) / compressor(s) shutdown(s), closes all fuel supply shutoff valves (keeps closed / safe), activates fuel supply / transfer line release system(s), activates / deactivates vehicle / vessel lockout system(s) to release vehicle / vessel for operator control, and in case of fire / flame / heat / smoke activates fire / flame / heat / smoke system alarms and relays / links / communication(s). Additionally, other cases include activation of explosive / sound / pressure / wave sensor(s) / systems. These alarms, triggers, and relays also activate purge and inerting systems.

[0115] Processor(s) / Processing Dual processors, dual programmable logic controllers, and dual cascade control systems / relay logic circuits are all within the scope of this invention. Also included are artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning / programs, routines / subroutines, smart sensor(s), smart actuator(s), quantum processor(s), quantum sensor(s), quantum actuator(s), photodiode(s) / array(s), smart photodiode(s) / array(s), and quantum diode(s) / array(s). Includes machine learning / deep learning, artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), and any / all artificial general intelligence (AGI).

[0116] To comply with SIL-3, all input(s) / processor(s) / sensor(s) / system(s) must be independent of all others (control systems). Twining / mirroring of control system signals is not permitted, but PLC / processor(s) / relay logic systems / circuit(s) may communicate and / or share output(s) and / or trigger / relay actions on the other. As a truly redundant safety system, system review / cybersecurity / review issue(s) may ensure that SIS / CS processor(s) / system(s) remain completely separate. Any / all types of human interface (HI) are within the scope of this invention; these interface(s) allow operator(s) to monitor all inputs / outputs and operate / reset device(s) for proper system control. Operators can start / stop motors, compressors, and pumps, and operate valves, actuators, and exchange systems as needed to perform transfer / exchange operations. The interface displays necessary system information, such as temperature(s), pressure(s), level(s), flow(s), oxygen content(%), LEL(%)(s), valve(s) position, and pump(s) / compressor(s) / hydraulic status, to provide the operator with situational awareness and enhance / assist operations. The interface may be a computer screen(s), personal digital assistant, or operator heads-up visor display screen for real-time system information. Voice / gesture-activated command / recognition system(s) may be incorporated into the control unit, thus allowing the operator to make audible voice / gesture commands as certain situations arise, using an earpiece / headset and / or microphone (array) for communication, without needing to access the HIM or emergency stop button. Remote viewing / operation may also be included; this "backup" may be useful for redundant monitoring / operational management.

[0117] Option: Process status display (Optional) Yellow = Caution / Warning - Yellow = System Shutdown with optional Yellow LED(s). (Optional) Red = Caution / Warning and / or White (Xenon) = Emergency Stop / Shutdown. (Optional) Different audible tones (constant / pulsing / horn-siren) for warning / emergency stop-shutdown / each. Human interface yellow light / strobe / flash / LED(s) or button / banner = indicates / system is not good / not ready to operate / fuel / transfer / exchange. An abnormal condition exists that requires corrective action and / or reset to allow operation / fuel / transfer / exchange(s) to continue.

[0118] Red light / strobe / LED(s) / flash (xenon) or button / banner on human interface(s) = Emergency stop / shutdown to stop all pump / compressor operation and all devices / valves in safe position (isolate all valve(s) in safe state / position). Emergency release can be activated when the following points are reached (high-high motion activates, which automatically disconnects fuel supply / transfer lines and activates vehicle lockout release, thereby allowing the vehicle / vessel operator full control of vehicle operation / movement). Fire / flame / heat / smoke sensor activation and / or explosion / sound / pressure / wave sensor(s) activation deactivates vehicle lockout system, which also deactivates line release lockout, allowing operator control / operation of vehicle at operator's discretion, along with relays / communications for automatic disconnection of fuel supply / transfer lines, fire alarm / extinguishing, fire pumps, and links to other fire backups.

[0119] An example: Audible / visual alarms are placed at the shore facility indicating a fire. Automatic / emergency fuel supply / transfer (interrupt / stop / isolate) and fuel line release systems are deactivated and vehicle lockout is deactivated so the operator can take control of the vehicle / vessel, thereby disengaging the vehicle and giving the operator control and moving the vehicle away from the risk of further spreading fire (from shore to onboard). Fire alarm / fire suppression / fire communication systems are relayed / activated so that additional responding fire response teams arrive within a short time from the automatic information and communication link(s).

[0120] Notable exception: When using mechanized barges that are not self-propelled, the tug will also have the appropriate dual / parallel control(s) system(s) and dual / parallel power supplies / batteries / UPS / banks in order for both the tug and / or barge to comply with SIL-3 redundancy.

[0121] Compressed / liquefied gas redundant safety control system(s) / PLC / processor(s) / computer-controlled safety system(s) are continuously powered and function in standby / connected mode. Whenever fuel / compressed / liquefied gas is present on the barge, the safety system(s) will cease functioning without power (two power sources for SIL-3), which will undermine all safe gas / liquefied gas handling operation(s) / safety objectives. Unattached / unpowered mechanized barges carrying compressed / liquefied gas will be reviewed / regulated without multiple power supplies. Additionally, two separate / independent power supplies are required for robust redundant protection(s). Appropriately sized generator(s) with adequate fuel quantity(s) and / or isolation transformer(s) can provide regulated power to the safety system(s). Unmanned mechanized barges carrying liquefied / compressed gas shall have a required operational control room with approved communication link(s) connected to the mechanized fuel barge with dual power supplies and shall only be moored at approved mooring locations (with approved power and fuel supply / transfer PLC / processor(s) and communication links) with qualified staff present. The control system(s) must operate continuously, but the vehicle release system must be reviewed to detect if the tug / barge is detached via I / O communication(s). Modifications may also be considered whereby unmanned vehicles / vessels carrying compressed / liquefied gas may be moored without safety system(s) / human supervision in a detached and / or attached and / or standby state due to weather. Barges carrying buses / compressed gas must be supervised at all times when fuel / compressed / liquefied gas is present, and communication link(s) between the tug / barge and the control room are required for monitoring and / or safety system(s). If a compressed / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer barge is moored / towed / loaded with compressed / liquefied gas on board at an uncontrolled / unmanned / unpowered tug / berth / anchor / dock, several different negative situations may arise:

[0122] Emergency stop / shutdown = Red stop / shutdown device / indication The emergency stop and / or shutdown system can be activated by a manual "red" emergency stop button / button(s) / device(s). This system may be activated locally / remotely with a human interface, or by manually applying the required pressure to an optional color "red" motion pull cord / tether / cable. To avoid unwanted activation, it is advantageous to install a recessed red button to prevent activation by someone accidentally touching the button, while still allowing easy access to press the button. Another option for the emergency stop button could include an internal, heavy-duty, intrinsically safe illuminated button, such as red LED(s), for nighttime identification and possibly flashing red during emergency stop activation.

[0123] Caution / Warning / Trouble Stop / Shutdown = Yellow (Color Options) Caution / Warning / Trouble Buttons and Devices A control system shutdown may be high or low tank level (receiving or supplying), high or low tank pressure, early motion detection, % oxygen in the lines, transfer pump or compressor failure, improper connection / line-up of ERC, (optional) coupler / adapter connection sensor, high filter / strainer D / P, (optional) mooring system signal, low level seismic sensor, gas leak detection system low level detected, high flow rate, abnormal system pressure, abnormal system temperature, system power loss, and any other abnormal system condition, which may trigger a caution / warning / trouble system shutdown, which will shut off the transfer pump / compressor, close all shut-off valves to prevent change / fuel / transfer flow, sound alarm(s), and illuminate yellow (optional color) warning light, strobe, flashlight, banner on the human interface to let everyone know it is a warning / warning / trouble system shutdown. By doing so, the system / problem that caused the warning / caution / trouble stop can be immediately identified and, if the situation can be corrected / repaired, once corrected, the trouble spot can be reset and normal operation resumed.

[0124] Gas Transfer System Instrumentation The instrumentation on the gas fuel supply / transfer(s) system must be dual redundant, complete, and robust. This transfer system generally consists of the following major components followed by the instrumentation list:

[0125] i.e., supply tank(s), receiving tank(s), pump(s), compressor(s), transfer line(s), manifold(s), interface connections / zones. Instrument List: All sensor(s) (MOU) may be "smart" sensor(s). Pressure sensor(s) with transmitter(s) (xmtr) for tank pressure(s) for any / all tanks, pressure sensor(s) for transfer line(s) (xfer), for auxiliary inerting system(s). All pressure sensor(s) may be composite / absolute / standard reading(s), pounds per square inch (PSI) / inch HG (vacuum) / metric. Temperature sensor(s) with xmtr(s) can detect temperature (temp) or temperature difference and may be optical (MOU) such as infrared / fiber optic / thermocouple(s) (TC) / resistance temperature device (RTD) to indicate process temperature in any / all tanks, flow line(s), drain / spill pan, or double (jacketed / insulated) hose line for leak detection. Flow meter(s) with xmtr may be bidirectional, internal sensing (MOU) for flow measurement, and vortex flow / differential pressure type. This can be placed inside or outside the flow line. Coriolis flow methods may use a linear variable differential transformer, or optical or ultrasonic to measure curvature for flow computer / calculation, and all may include density detection (MOU) for SG flow controller calculations; two independent flow meters must be utilized for SIL-3 approval. Level sensor(s) with xmtr (MOU) to measure level and alarm for multi-point detection / individual sensor(s) such as optical, magnetic, ultrasonic, radar / radar with guidewire, or simply float switch / or both at each given level provide robust and redundant level(s). Each sensor may be standalone and / or redundant.For example, for a SIL-3 safety system, dual-level alarm(s) / process warning / warning / shutdown-stop, such as high / high-high and low / low-low, and load cells may also be used to measure the volume of any tank, and strain gauges may also be utilized for tank level detection. Dual oxygen sensor(s) in each tank and flow line(s) to warn of multiple setpoint operation where oxygen percentage(s) exist to trigger alarm / warning / emergency stop-shutdown. All of the above instruments can provide process / control / process alarm / emergency stop / shutdown(s) inputs to either / both PLCs / processor(s) / cascade control systems / relay logic systems, but there must be independent / separate instrument(s)—one measurement (redundant) device for communication with the control system PLC and one for the SIL-3 safety emergency stop-shutdown SIL-3 processor system. The two (dual processors) may communicate with each other, but their programs and operations must be able to function standalone and independently. This separate and distinct processing / processor is robust and also an additional layer of cybersecurity protection in the event of a cyber breach / attack; the CS / SIS system has an independent and secure computer / processor(s) as a system backup.

[0126] Automatic / semi-automatic / manual fuel supply / transfer connections: Vehicle / shore fuel supply / transfer connections are for liquefied / compressed gas / oxygen supply / receiving systems. Parallel (two) dual computer-controlled system(s) for secure gas / liquefied gas connections for fuel supply / transfer. The connection(s) may utilize advanced MOU sensor(s) to automatically locate optical / magnetic recognition target(s) and adjust by articulation, pivoting, moving, extending, clamping, rotating, twisting, grasping, securing, and / or locking connections. The sensor(s) shall guide automatic / semi-automatic / manual operation(s) and detect whether mechanical parts are in specific positions, and the sensor(s) may measure distance, speed, interference, optical (visible / invisible) interference, presence / absence, and optical / magnetic recognition mark(s). The system may function automatically, with machine learning AI / SI utilizing cerebellum / CMAC technology / high-speed photodiode / camera(s) / arrays for learning / pattern recognition / predictive recognition to optimize the movement / repetitive movement / repetitive connection of the transfer / fuel supply connector. The system may also function in semi-automatic mode with some human coordination / manual mode with human(s) operating a local handheld / joystick / controller. Automatic feedback signal(s) constantly notify / alert the movement of the position(s) and assist in the movement / control(s) of the connection(s). The system / sensor may also detect negative conditions such as torque / strain / disengagement, which shall trigger / relay / signal the shutdown of the fuel supply / transfer system / disengage the fuel supply / transfer line(s) system. It may also guide the connection home for safe housekeeping. For human notification / awareness of the automated machinery in operation, an audio / visual warning (specific to the transfer system) shall be provided when operation is initiated. Dual (two) processor / control systems, along with separate / isolated power supplies, provide safe and robust operation(s), connection(s) for SIL-3 compliance.

[0127] Vehicle / Ship Motion: To detect vehicle / vessel movement / distance in all directions (motion in any vector), two separate, isolated motion systems / sensors are required for SIL-3 compliance. Multiple sensor(s) can be utilized standalone (intelligent sensor(s)) and / or in a cascaded control system (PLC and / or relay logic) to perform various functions, including fuel supply system / change lockout and / or vehicle lockout and / or vehicle lockout release and / or automatic fuel supply / transfer line disconnection. The use of one or more sensors in conjunction with one or more microswitches can automatically mitigate excessive movement / motion, initiate fuel supply / transfer / change lockout, close shutoff valve(s) (and / or bypass / recycle / surge knockout drums with two-way / three-way / four-way valves) to prevent / disable fuel flow / transfer, and utilize optional two-way, three-way, four-way, and / or multi-port valves to recycle / loopback / bypass liquefied gas materials to avoid surgeback / insulation shock. These two-way, three-way, four-way, or multi-port valves can separate and divert / bypass / redirect fuel supply / transport flows while maintaining separation to fuel supply / transport. The sensor(s) (MOU) may be optical and / or ultrasonic and / or accelerometer(s) / piezoelectric accelerometer(s) / and / or tri-axis accelerometer(s), standalone and / or combined with gyroscope(s) (MOU) and / or magnetometer and / or inertial motion unit (IMU) / optical / ultrasonic measurement devices coupled to a processor to calculate motion.Sensor(s) for detecting excessive motion (above a predetermined stop (motion limit(s)) such as RLG / FOG / HRG / CRG / PV / TFG / VSG / CVG / WGR / MEMS Gyro / Quantum Gyro / Accelerometer(s) with Inertial Measurement Unit(s) / 3-Axis Accelerometer(s) / Piezoelectric Accelerometer(s), Optical and / or Ultrasonic Sensor(s) and / or IMU(s) (any / all IMU(s)), standalone and / or in combination with Laser / Sonar / Radar Sensor The sensor(s) may be a laser / (ring laser gyro, RLG / fiber optic FOG, gyroscope / cylindrical resonator gyroscope (CRG), piezoelectric gyroscope (PG), tuning fork gyroscope (TFG), hemispherical resonator gyroscope (HRG) and / or wine glass resonator (WGR) gyroscope, vibrating structure gyroscope (VSG), Coriolis vibratory gyroscope (CVG) / all standalone and / or other optical, ultrasonic, magnetic sensor. The sensor may be a sensor (s) / gyroscope / accelerometer(s) combined with a sensor(s) / gyroscope / accelerometer(s) or may simply be an accelerometer(s) / 3-axis accelerometer(s) / IMU coupled with a processing unit to calculate motion. Using one or more of these sensors, or possibly a multi-sensor(s) in combination, and / or other such as a mechanical tether / cable / cord / (all may be one or / dual) attached at a predetermined length from the vehicle / vessel (vehicle to vehicle) to the release system, this mechanical measurement system will trigger a micro switch / switch to indicate a predetermined level of movement / motion / tension, whereas the combination of the tether / cable / cord system(s) with an accelerometer(s) / (MOU) and / or optical, magnetic, sonar, and ultrasonic measurement(s) / IMU can provide the safest and fastest detection of movement / distance / motion / tension to activate either a fuel delivery system lockout (emergency stop) and / or emergency shutdown.The use of one or more of these sensors, or possibly multiple sensor(s), creates the safest conditions for initiating fuel supply / transfer de-escalation by maintaining other systems (vehicle lockouts) in a locked-out state and activating one or more audible or visual alarms. The fuel flow system can be reactivated by an operator at a human interface. Various vehicles / vessels may require different parameters to initiate such a motion lockout. For example, excessive motion / movement can relay, trigger, or activate an emergency stop, and under certain conditions, activate an override system to disable the vehicle lockout system but maintain the fuel supply / transfer system in lockout (safe state with shut-off valve(s) closed) and release the vehicle(s) until the appropriate control / condition is achieved and / or exists. Such conditions can activate or deactivate vehicle / vessel or automatic fuel supply line release systems that exist or are initiated by vehicle or other lockouts. Multiple variations can be used, and multiple steps and sequences can maintain the safe state. The shutoff valve(s) may be maintained in a closed position (positive position feedback indicator for all shutoff valves) and, if predetermined conditions exist, vehicle movement may be permitted by automatically activating / deactivating the fuel / transfer line(s) and / or activating (deactivating) the vehicle lockout release system.

[0128] Tank exchange system(s): Interchangeable tank(s) may be available in multiple sizes, shapes, and specifications. The use of interchangeable tanks allows for more controlled fuel supply conditions / location(s), such as segregated / controlled / permitted locations. The exchange / transport / handling of interchangeable tanks requires safe implementation using state-of-the-art sensor(s), processor(s), and actuator(s). Safe tank exchange may utilize complex mechanized machinery or simple manual replacement. Safety systems utilizing RFID optical, magnetic, and ultrasonic sensor(s) to detect tank(s), valve(s) position(s), pressure(s), weight(s), location(s), tank ID, tank contents, volume, fill count, and serial number(s) are within the scope of the present invention. Some aircraft / spacecraft may utilize standardized tank shapes to "fit" on / in the aircraft, and the tank / container(s) may be capable of handling compressed / liquefied gas fuel(s). Other spacecraft / rockets can replace the tank / container(s) that may be under the cockpit / capsule / pod, thus either swapping the capsule's position / replacing the tanks that are under it, and then raising / lifting / raising the capsule and replacing the tank(s) / container(s). For example, the system can use a capsule turret that simply (lifts) the capsule and rotates (180 / 360) / moves it to a predetermined rotational / horizontal position to hold / position it over the entire set of replaced tanks.

[0129] Rail: Heavy / long haul and light shunting / commuter rail All rail locomotives / light rail vehicles benefit greatly from the use of compressed / liquefied gas fuel / hybrid battery-electric systems. Long-distance haul(ies) will significantly reduce emissions, and commuter rail will reduce emissions from intercity traffic. These can also reduce emissions through engine size downsizing and the use of battery-electric / range extender model(s). Two or more batteries / banks for SIL-3 compliance may be pre-charged and / or charged by an on-board power source such as a hybrid fuel cell / internal combustion engine, coupled to a generator, and used independently and / or simultaneously for the power source driving the traction / electric vehicle / locomotive / commuter rail. The generator may directly drive the electric motor / generator may generate power and feed it to a battery, which then feeds the traction motor (either way being more fuel efficient). The power supply management system shall include temperature control(s), voltage regulation / monitoring, amperage / current, circuit breaker(s), and battery(ies) monitoring system with available battery capacity, automatic transfer switching, and cross-tie(s) per wiring designed for continuous operation(s), enabling safe continuation of service on the remaining battery(ies) in the event of a non-operational battery (this may be remotely operated). It shall also include on-board video / camera with recording / monitoring from the base, and dual (two) redundant systems for SIL-3 compliance. Monitoring / data communications may be wired, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wired (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communications / signals with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor. Compressed / liquefied gas fuel storage may be on-board / replaceable tanks.If tanks are installed, safety systems for a fueling event should include a vehicle lockout system (to prevent transmission / ignition / parking) due to accidental engagement during fueling / tank swapping, an automatic fuel / transfer line release system, and safety motion detector(s) (MOU) that may provide standalone or combined motion detection (accelerometer(s) / tri-axis accelerometer(s) / inertial motion unit(s) / optical / magnetic / ultrasonic sensor(s) / and mechanical device(s)) all during a fueling event. Fire / smoke / explosion / gas detection system(s) should also be included and shall include disabling of vehicle lockout if vehicle movement is required due to fire / explosion hazard(s). If tanks are swappable, monitoring (MOU) detectors on the connections (both the rail vehicle's tank / connection(s)) should temporarily override / bypass fuel cell / ICE operation until the replaced, full tank is safely connected. Oxygen detection, i.e., both in-line / tank oxygen detector(s) / detection systems, will alert operation(s) when oxygen is present in the transfer line(s) / tank(s). Long-term separation from compressed / liquefied gas interchangeable tank(s) may require an alternative plan, such as a dual-fuel internal combustion engine to operate from on-board fuel tanks or a shunting locomotive / pusher / yard locomotive / tug to assist with transportation while waiting for the interchangeable tank(s) to fill. On-board gas detection / fire / smoke / heat detection systems must be redundant with separate battery power sources for SIL-3 compliance.

[0130] Inactivation System: Compressed / liquefied gas inerting systems are very important because improper inerting can lead to very dangerous conditions within the transfer system. Typically, tanks are maintained at a consistent zero / low oxygen percentage, and oxygen only enters the tank during improper transfer. Transfer lines must be constantly monitored for elevated oxygen content (which can also indicate a leak in the transfer system), but different techniques can indicate different conditions. For example, evacuation (vacuum) methods can result in slight leakage from certain parts / components that normally do not leak under pressure. Therefore, a precise incremental vacuum (InHg - (micrometer) transmitter / display is an excellent indicator of system leaks / containment. Another inerting method is to utilize nitrogen (liquid / vapor) (N2), and close pressure monitoring of isolated systems also helps indicate system leaks during idle times. N2 is an excellent method for oxygen displacement and system pre-cooling / system cooldown when preparing for transfer. However, excess N2 can be transferred to a receiving tank without proper system gas purging procedures. Nitrogen has the advantage of cryogenic temperatures in the liquid state, which allows it to inert and cool the system simultaneously.

[0131] Arc Detection: Any arc, lightning, spark, static, or arcing in the transfer zone shall initiate a system emergency shutdown. This condition is unacceptable in the transfer zone. Any optical system that allows detection of even low energy arcing will trigger / relay a signal that arcing / lightning is present, triggering an emergency shutdown event, initiating a system purge, and idling the transfer system until the situation is corrected or the weather improves.

[0132] Ground detection: Static arcing is also a significant hazard for compressed / liquefied gas fuel supply / transport(s), and proper grounding system(s) provide an additional layer of safety, along with indications and / or interlocks with ungrounded indications. Installation monitoring systems that interlock with shutdown systems to verify proper ground(s) are functioning are within the scope of this invention to ensure safety, and the system(s) can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0133] Vibration detection system(s): Any / all vibrations in equipment are a sign of aging / misalignment / flow imbalance. Vibration detection is important to aid in preventative / predictive maintenance / repair. By utilizing state-of-the-art optical / magnetic / ultrasonic (MOU) vibration detection devices, signals such as high / high-high vibration alarms / readings indicating the condition are displayed / triggered / relayed. Corrective action(s) such as repair / replacement shall then be taken. All vibration monitoring systems are capable of communicating signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0134] Magnetic levitation / "air" bearings: Modern rotating equipment utilizes magnetic fields to levitate shafts / (air bearings), which allows for near zero friction during rotation and does not require lubrication. Any / all rotating transport / production equipment can utilize magnetic levitation technology for improved process / transport / fuel delivery systems.

[0135] Lubrication system(s): Lubrication system(s) are critical for friction reduction on rotating equipment (unless magnetically levitated). Lubrication system monitoring shall consist of temperature, pressure, level and flow monitoring. Abnormal conditions such as high / high-high shall raise an alarm and trigger / relay a signal for system shutdown. The lubrication system may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0136] Earthquake Detection / Events: Seismic events can occur anywhere at any time. Some areas of the Earth are located near "fault" lines / zones and are therefore more prone to seismic events. Some of these zones should be avoided for installation of fuel supply / transfer systems for compressed / liquefied gas. For stakeholder knowledge, detailed seismic surveys should be required before a final investment decision. All natural gas chemical fuel and / or any other compressed / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer system location(s) must be fitted with earthquake detection systems and must communicate with dedicated safety instrumented systems and / or process control systems and / or cascade control systems (PLC and relay logic). Seismic measurement systems must include configurations that include self-test / calibration capabilities to ensure proper and reliable operation. Redundant seismic sensor(s) / systems are required under SIL-3 protocols. Multi-sensor(s) / array(s) of sensors capable of measuring seismic activity (in all directions), strategically placed around the facility, will function passively, measuring and recording any / all seismic activity in real time and responding / relaying / communicating any / all seismic event(s) that exceed predetermined set points / levels / thresholds. Sensor(s) such as accelerometer(s) / 3-axis accelerometer(s) / piezoelectric accelerometer(s), optical and / or ultrasonic sensor(s) and / or IMU(s) (any / all IMU(s) RLG / FOG / HRG / CRG / PV / TFG / VSG / CVG / WGR / MEMS gyro / quantum gyro / inertial measurement unit(s) standalone and / or combined coupled to processor(s) to detect, motion, movement of each geophysical motion(s) / movement(s) / vibration(s) of any / all vector(s), and / or magnetic sensor(s) / electrodynamic sensor(s) detecting geophysical / earth / motion / vibration / seismic (omnidirectional) monitoring. Other sensors may be ultrasonic and / or optical sensors utilized to detect any earth motion(s), vibration(s), movement(s).All seismic sensor(s) can be used standalone or in combination to provide a robust seismic measurement system and can communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0137] Meteorology: Weather events can pose significant challenges for compressed / liquefied gas transfer / fueling events. Many, if not all, systems are susceptible to weather because gases naturally dissipate and few systems are shielded. Weather can therefore cause lightning, heavy rain, and strong winds in the case of hurricanes, typhoons, tropical storms, tsunamis, and / or cyclone events. Weather can change, sometimes quite rapidly, so a suitable weather system provides current conditions. This system can also communicate with the SIS to protect all parties / personnel involved. This protection shall include automatic shutdown and / or stop, and / or caution / warning / trouble alarm indicating future / present adverse weather condition conditions exist and to cease operation, and disconnect and deactivate until the conditions improve, and may communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0138] Gas detection systems: Natural gas chemical family, propane, butane, ethane, hydrogen, ammonia (anhydrous) and / or any mixture(s) containing derivatives (e.g., hythane), or rich ethane for transport / subsequent separation, can be detected using optical, electrochemical, magnetic, mass / spectrometer analyzer(s), optical sensor(s), Raman spectroscopy, analyzer(s), catalytic beads, point (cell) sensor(s) and / or optical point / open-path sensor(s), all of which may be passive or flow-directed to a remote detector location. Hydrocarbons / fuel gases have graphic signatures / prints, and each gas / liquefied gas is identifiable by its "signature." Proper selection and hydrocarbon-specific detection, as well as type and / or location, improve the performance of the gas detection system(s). A redundant (two) parallel system with separate power supply systems (SIS and CS) and different detector types provides the best overall protection. All systems, warning(s), high alarm(s), high-high alarm / trip are reported to processor(s) for action, which may be to shut down and isolate fuel supply / transfer(s) system(s) and / or release fuel supply line(s) and / or release vehicle lockout(s) for safety purposes to locate the cause / complete system shutdown and vehicle disarm until suitable atmospheric conditions are achieved / exist, and signal(s) may be communicated locally and / or remotely to a central detection system / microcontroller / processor for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

[0139] System Power: The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and Control System (CS) will be powered by an Uninterruptible Power System (UPS), with the UPS system(s) powered from separate, reliable, parallel power supplies. These power supplies may be a combination of grid power / grid power and on-site generators, or, if offshore, dual generators (both functioning before, during, and after a transfer / fueling event), with automatic cross-tie(s) / transfer switches to provide reliable power for operations. The generators may be dual-fuel, with one fuel being natural gas, propane, butane, ethane, hydrogen, or ammonia, of which the supplier / receiver has an abundant supply. Dual / parallel isolation transformers with automatic transfer switches will generate clean, uniform power distribution throughout the system. The inverter will balance the incoming power and condition it to provide clean power for the PLCs and meters, and the UPS battery system will be able to maintain a full charge at all times and will have enough power to provide uninterrupted power to the SIS and CS system(s) and human interface during a power outage to control all valves and safely shut down and operate the inert and purge systems. The system will have meters capable of monitoring system voltage / frequency / amperage / KW for power feeds, as well as a UPS power system, and will be able to communicate signal(s) by wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coax / coax RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0140] Variable Drive: VDs are useful for controlling process(es) / speed / flow rate(s) and / or conserving energy. Variable drives may be variable frequency drives or may be triac variable drives. VDs can be operated manually / automatically. VDs can operate / modulate multiple different types of equipment. VDs can communicate signal(s) by wire, wirelessly by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wirelessly by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0141] communication: Local Network: Communication between the instruments / transmitters / intelligent sensor(s) / intelligent actuator(s) and the PLC and / or processor(s) can be wireless via radio or light, including hardwired systems, fiber optics, fiber optic "cable," or coaxial transmission. This also includes PLC-to-PLC communication / networks / interfaces / bus ducts / distributed control systems / process control systems / safety instrumented systems / emergency shutdown systems / emergency stop systems / Internet / Ethernet connections. Signal(s) can be communicated by wire, wireless via radio / light, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / light / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor to provide high-quality information and data transmission for high-level safety system(s) communication.

[0142] network: Communications between network systems may be radio / optical or hardwired. This includes all communications between the fuel supply / transfer vehicle and the fuel transfer system(s). Communications may be optical, such as via fiber optic cable or OWC. It may also be radio, via satellite and / or local broadcast waves. Additionally, separate frequencies may be utilized for stable signal(s) / redundant safety. All communications between the vehicle and the fuel / transfer supply must be robust and redundant, with loss of communication signals transmitted to the system and possible shutdown. A communication signal voting system may be utilized to verify communication signals, such as when two out of three signals are valid, to prevent unnecessary fuel supply / transfer communication error shutdowns.

[0143] Additionally, remote monitoring / reporting of compressed / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer via networked computers allows for live video streams as well as data monitoring via radio / optical communications. All communications networks also include options for remote control, so operations can be local or remote and communicate / interact with local fuel supply / transfer operations via voice commands.

[0144] Emergency Stop / Shutdown: The processor at SIS level SIL-3 may be a standalone, dedicated PLC / processor, but may communicate with the process control processor / processing (relay logic cascade control system) via bus line / coaxial / optical fiber / FO cable / hardwire / or wirelessly by radio wave or light. This optional communication allows the SIL-2 (process control) to operate independently and notify the SIL-3 processor of the status of the SIL-2 control and vice versa. The SIS system level SIL-3 performs system emergency stop / shutdown processing in response to the following system events / inputs: i.e., high-high tank levels (both supply and receiving tanks); low-low level(s) (both supply and receiving tanks); high-high tank pressure(s) (both supply and receiving tanks); high oxygen percentage (%) in the transfer line during fuel supply / transfer; high LEL percentage (%) (lower explosive limit) input, any high percentage (%) leak detection / device(s); cryogenic, point detection, open path, or other (optical, magnetic) leak detection in insulation or spill pan; high-high flow rate (above a predetermined flow rate) in the transfer line during fuel supply / transfer (can be optical, ultrasonic, or magnetic flow meter). Motion above a predetermined high-high motion, standalone or in combination with any sensor(s) that detect movement / motion detection (optical, magnetic, sonar, radar, or ultrasonic / by any means such as tether, cord, cable, etc., switch / microswitch, and / or laser / radar and / or multiple types / styles / 3-axis accelerometer(s), accelerometer(s) / inertial motion unit(s) / RLG / FOG / HRG / CRG / PV / TFG / VSG / CVG / WGR / mems gyro / quantum gyro, standalone or coupled to processor(s) that calculate the motion such as optical, magnetic, or ultrasonic that detects the movement / motion of the vehicle / vessel.A fire detection system, which may include one or more sensor(s) (infrared and / or ultraviolet) (with selected lenses), can, standalone or in combination with one or more microswitches, automatically close shutoff valve(s) to prevent / disable fuel supply / transfer, activate audible and visual communication alerts / fire alarms, pumps, and communication links, and links such as fire extinguishing devices. Such optical or magnetic sensors can detect infrared, ultraviolet, heat, or rate of temperature rise, and / or smoke. Such devices can activate fire alarms, etc. Any fire / flame scanner or laser sensor(s), fusible / friable link(s), are within the scope of the present invention. Optical sensor(s), such as infrared and ultraviolet (with appropriate lens wavelength focus), individually and / or in combination, can detect fire and / or heat and / or flash frequencies. This includes any means of detecting a fire hazard, and it is common for a complex reset (high-level reset) to be required for the system after the event. The described sensor(s) may be used in conjunction with a standard fire detection system as a cascade (cascaded control system). Any flame, fire, heat, or smoke sensor(s) / system may activate / deactivate automatic vehicle / vessel lockout / release to release the vehicle / vessel for operator control. An explosion detection, sensor, and / or receiver system may detect large, sudden noises / sound waves / pressure waves, such as those caused by the rapid expansion of molecules in a confined (or possibly non-O2 confined) space / environment, or an explosion. Activation of any sensor(s) also typically activates a system to close shutoff valve(s) and stop / relieve fuel supply / transport flow, as well as stop or activate any vehicle or automatic fuel supply line releases that may be present or disarm systems initiated by the lockout. This explosion detection system may also activate / deactivate vehicle lockout to release the vehicle / vessel for operator control to move the vehicle for safety purposes.

[0145] Shut-off valves for fuel supply / transfer system(s): Proper shutoff valve design, layout, and installation are paramount to a safe fuel supply / transfer system. There are many different styles, combinations, and applications for various types of shutoff valves. Many shutoff valves are control valves; some are manual, some have a manual override, and some are self-controlled. There are many different control valve operations, including air-operated, spring-operated, electrically operated, temperature-operated, hydraulically operated, and pressure-operated, to name a few. These operations can be configured in many different ways, including air-to-open, air-to-close, fail-open, fail-close, spring-pressure open, spring-pressure close, contactor / relay reversal to open / close; different hydraulic pressure(s); multiple pressure regulation (spring / weight) set points for self-, pilot-, and internal differential pressure (D / P) regulation / relief / lift, to name a few.

[0146] There are many different valve port isolation and flow configurations for many different applications, including two-way, three-way, and four-way valves, as well as multiport valves. These are utilized with two, three, four, or multiple ports utilized to separate / recirculate flow in system-specific layouts such as recycle systems, loops, diversion, and bypass applications. Liquefied / compressed gas fuel supply / transfer systems can benefit from specific valve design layouts. For example, recycle / diverter / bypass / multiport / shutoff valve(s) are utilized on the supply / receiving / vapor line outside the "interface / between" line. One concept provides isolation to the supply / receiving side while avoiding line pressure surges by diverting the gas / liquefied gas to one of several optional paths. The diverted / bypassed / recycled / looped flow may be directed to a recycle line, a surge or knockout drum, a gas combustion unit, or, if an evaporator is installed, to the evaporator supply line for consumption on the vehicle. PRV = Relief / Reduction / Regulation. Pressure relief valves (PRVs) and / or pressure regulating valves (PRVs) may be classified as shutoff valve(s), and pressure relief valves can be operated by pressure, temperature, or both. For example, millions of homes in North America have hot water heaters (electric or gas), all of which have temperature / pressure relief shutoff valves. When other systems malfunction, such as high water pressure and / or high water temperature, the tank remains filled with water and only "relieves." That is, the "relief valve" activates, stops the shutoff, and water "relieves" to the floor / drain to prevent the hot water heater tank from bursting. PRVs only activate when excessive temperature and / or pressure is present, passively protecting the water tank / home / business over the long term. Another type of PRV is the pressure regulating valve, which is also a shutoff valve with many different uses. It can be controlled by a "pilot valve" or "internal pressure differential" or system pressure using a PLC program. These pressure regulators also function as shut-off valves because they are one-way flow.For example, if two shutoff valves are closed and the cryogenic liquid is locked between them, the system will require some form of "pressure relief / regulation" due to naturally occurring thermal expansion between the two shutoff valves. A pressure regulating valve with a pilot regulating valve / internal differential pressure (DP) regulating shutoff valve can sense a pressure higher than normal internal pressure (in this example, the cryogenic material between the two shutoff valves) and self-actuate, shutting off the isolation normally provided and reducing the pressure created by the naturally occurring thermal expansion. This pressure regulating valve will continue to operate until the pressure created by the thermal expansion no longer exceeds its operating / actuation pressure setpoint / the system returns to normal operating conditions, the cryogenic medium stops increasing in pressure / all other mediums have been removed from the system.

[0147] Some valves have the same acronym, such as PRV, and can perform similar shutoffs, but have different actuation mechanisms (differential pressure / pilot valve control vs. spring / weight) and different names (pressure relief valve vs. pressure regulating valve), as well as different materials / internal component(s).

[0148] Valve arrangements are also specifically designed for safety instrumented systems. The valves listed above can achieve SIL-3 isolation certification in multiple valve design configurations. These may include twin (two) two-way valves in-line, a three-port valve in-line with a two-port valve, a four-port valve in-line with a two-port valve, any multi-port valve in-line with a two-way valve, twin three-port valves in-line, a three-port valve in-line with a four-port valve, a three-port valve in-line with a multi-port valve (MPV), twin four-port valves in-line, and any multi-port valve in-line with a four-port valve, or a multi-port valve in-line with a multi-port valve. Many different isolation / diverter valve / valve combinations / arrangements exist to achieve the desired safety outcome, but there is a possibility of fluid sticking, and multiple arrangements of "relief / adjustment" (or "reliefs / adjustments") may be required depending on the valve(s) arrangement. All listed valves / two-way valves / three-way valves / four-way valves / multiport valves / reversing valves in the safety instrumented system should have independent positive position feedback positioners / PPFBs. The PPFBs relay the indicated valve position back to the PLC / CS / processor(s) as a signal independent / separate from the valve(s)' output supply signal. The SIS and CS system(s) also compare the valve output signal(s) with the PPFB signal(s) to verify matching. This redundant verification of signals reduces manageable risks to a more tolerable level by providing redundant positive valve positions, thus significantly increasing the safety of the fuel supply / transfer(s) of the NGPATBA / O operation. The positioner, sensor(s) may be magnetic, optical, or ultrasonic and communicate back to the SIS and / or CS.

[0149] Of course, there are many multiple shutoff valve combinations for supply / receive NGPATBA / O fuel supply / transfer / gas systems. The diagram illustrates several arrangements showing the multiple connections and orientations / designs of the shutoff valve(s), and while this diagram is instructive and illustrates some of the over one hundred (100+) different combinations, this list is not intended to convey all shutoff valve(s) / combinations. Therefore, any / all shutoff valve(s) / combinations that may be utilized to provide safe NGPATBA / O gas / liquefied gas transfer / fuel supply / valve conditioning / separation(s) are included in this patent / application, although many are not depicted or shown. These valve combinations are for the supply and recipient; the valve arrangements can be reversed (combinations can be doubled), and of course, these combinations are also doubled if the system arrangement(s) / systems of the vapor management system = supply and recipient system(s) (tank specific) are utilized.

[0150] For example: some combinations, but all can be reversed, and the steam management system(s) can be doubled. Two-way valve with PRV (pressure relief) and two-way valve in series --- Two-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and two-way valve in series Two-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line two-way valve --- Two-way valve with isolation bleed valve + pressure reducing valve and in-line two-way valve Three-way valves and two-way valves in line with / without PRV (relief) --- Three-way valves and two-way valves in line with isolation bleed valves The two-way valve in line with the three-way valve with or without PRV (pressure reducing) may also have or not have a shut-off bleed valve. Four-way valve with PRV (relief) and two-way valve in line --- Four-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and two-way valve in line The two-way valve in line with the four-way valve with or without PRV (pressure reducing) may also have or not have a shut-off bleed valve. Multiport valve with PRV (relief) and two-way valve in series---Multiport valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and two-way valve in series MPV with isolation bleed valve and in-line two-way valve --- MPV with isolation bleed valve + PRV (pressure reducing) and in-line two-way valve Two-way valve with PRV (relief) and three-way valve in series --- Two-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and three-way valve in series Two-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve --- Two-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing valve) Three-way valve with PRV (relief) and three-way valve in series --- Three-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and three-way valve in series Three-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve --- Three-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing valve) Four-way valve with PRV (relief) and three-way valve in line --- Four-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and three-way valve in line Four-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve --- Four-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing valve) MPV with PRV (Relief) and in-line three-way valve --- MPV with PRV (Reducing Pressure) and in-line three-way valve MPV with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve---MPV with isolation bleed valve and in-line three-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) Four-way valve with PRV (relief) and four-way valve in line --- Four-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) and four-way valve in line Four-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line four-way valve --- Four-way valve with isolation bleed valve and in-line four-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing valve) MPV with PRV (Relief) and in-line four-way valve --- MPV with PRV (Reducing Pressure) and in-line four-way valve MPV with isolation bleed valve and in-line four-way valve---MPV with isolation bleed valve and in-line four-way valve with PRV (pressure reducing) MPV with PRV (relief) and in-line MPV --- MPV with PRV (depressurization) and in-line MPV MPV with shut-off bleed valve and in-line MPV---MPV with shut-off bleed valve and in-line MPV with PRV (pressure reducing)

[0151] As shown in Figure 6A, this example includes two automatic control valve(s), two-way valves in a fail-close position with positive position feedback, and a normally closed pressure relief valve #403 between them. Valve #401(A), a two-way control valve, directs flow from the supply system / tank, and valve #402(B), also a two-way control valve, directs flow to the receiving tank, with valve #403 being a pressure relief valve located between #401(A) and #402(B). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #401(A), through open #402(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, the system can close one or both valves, at the designer's option (with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary), and recognize that if a system shutdown closes both valves, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves and the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, opening pressure relief valve #403 until pressure drops / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #401 and #402. When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #401 and #402 are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer "stop / relieve." Redundant in-line flow control valves #401 and #402 provide SIL-3 positive shutoff, with the valve control signals coming from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #401(A) and #402(B), pressure relief valve #403 will activate and release pressure until the problem is corrected or until all of the cryogenic material has expanded and is below the setting of pressure relief valve #403.

[0152] As shown in Figure 6B, this example includes two automatic control valves, two-way valves in a fail-close position with positive position feedback, and a normally closed pressure reducing / pressure relief / pressure regulating valve #413 between them. Valve #411(A), a two-way control valve, directs flow from the supply system / tank, and valve #412(B), also a two-way control valve, directs flow to the receiving tank. Valve #413 is a pressure regulating / pressure reducing / pressure relief valve located between valves #411(A) and #412(B). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #411(A), through open valve #412(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, the system can close one or both valves, at the designer's option (with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizes that if a system shutdown closes both valves, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves and the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, opening pressure regulating / relief / pressure reducing valve #413 until pressure drops / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #411 and #412. When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #411 and #412 are "shut down / mitigated" to close / isolate for positive flow / transfer. Redundant in-line flow control valves #411 and #412 provide SIL-3 positive shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #411(A) and #412(B), pressure regulation / pressure relief / reduction / valve #413 will activate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all cryogenic materials have expanded and the pressure drops below the setting of pressure regulation / pressure relief / pressure relief valve #413.

[0153] As shown in FIG. 6C, this example includes three automatic control valves, i.e., three two-way control valves with positive position feedback. Valves #421 and #422 fail closed, and valve #423 fails open. Two-way control valve #421(A) directs flow from the supply system / tank, while two-way control valve #422(B) directs flow to the receiving tank. Valve #423 is a two-way control valve for a pressure regulation / bleed valve located between valves #421(A) and #422(B). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #421(A), open valve #422(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, the system can close one or both valves, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognize that if a system shutdown closes both valves, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves and the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, opening pressure regulation / bleed valve #423 until pressure drops / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #421(A) and #422(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #421(A) and #422(B) are "shut down / mitigated" by closing / isolating for positive flow / transfer. Redundant in-line flow control valves #421(A) and #422(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #421(A) and #422(B), pressure regulating / bleeding valve #423 will operate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all of the cryogenic material has expanded and is below the setting of pressure regulating / bleeding valve #423. Use of valve #423 requires a pressure sensor / transmitter(s) signal for pressure control operation.

[0154] As shown in Figure 6D, this example includes three automatic control valves, i.e., three two-way control valves with positive position feedback. Valves #431(A) and #432(B) fail-close, valve #433 fails-open, and valve #434 is a pressure regulating / reducing valve in line after valve #433. Valve #431(A), a two-way control valve, directs flow from the supply system / tank, and valve #432(B), also a two-way control valve, directs flow to the receiving tank. Valve #433 is a two-way control valve for the pressure regulating / bleed valve located between valves #431(A) and #432(B). Additionally, there is pilot-regulated pressure reducing / regulating valve #434. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flows from the supply tank through open valve #431(A), open valve #432(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, one or both valves can be closed, at the designer's option (with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary), and recognizing that closing both valves due to a system shutdown will create a fluid lock between the isolation valves and cause the cryogenic product to gain heat and expand, pressure regulation / bleed valve #433 and pressure regulation valve #434 are opened until pressure is reduced / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #431(A) and #432(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #431 and #432 are "shut down / mitigated" to close / isolate for positive flow / transfer. Redundant in-line flow control valves #431(A) and #432(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #431(A) and #432(B), pressure regulating / bleeding valves #433 and #434 will operate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all of the cryogenic material has expanded below the setting of pressure regulating / bleeding valves #433 and #434. The use of valve #433 requires a pressure sensor / transmitter(s) signal for pressure control operation.

[0155] As shown in Figure 6E, this example includes two automatic control valves: one two-way control valve and one three-way control valve with positive position feedback. Valves #441(A) and #442(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #442(B) fails open to the recycle line. Flow through valve #441(A), the two-way control valve, is from the supply system / tank, and flow through valve #442(B), the three-way control valve, is to the receiving tank or recycle line. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flows from the supply tank through open valve #441(A), through open valve #442(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, the system closes valve #441(A) and diverter / recycle valve #442(B) to relieve trapped pressure, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizes that if a system shutdown closes both valves, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves, the cryogenic product will gain heat, expand, and increase pressure between valves #441(A) and #442(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #441(A) and #442(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #441(A) and #442(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valve #441(A) and isolation valve #442(B), pressure diverter / recycle valve #442 will activate and release pressure until the problem is corrected and / or all cryogenic material has expanded and the pressure has dropped below the recycle line pressure.

[0156] As shown in Figure 6F, this example includes two automatic control valves: two two-way control valves with positive position feedback and one three-way control valve. Valves #445(A) and #446(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #447(B) fails open to the recycle line. Flow through two-way control valve #445(A) is from the supply system / tank, and flow through two-way control valve #446(B) is to the receiving tank or recycle line. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flows from the supply tank through open valve #445(A), through open valves #446(B) and #447(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, valves #445(A) and #446(B) and diverter / recycle valve #447 are closed to relieve trapped pressure, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizing that closing both valves due to a system shutdown would create a fluid lock between the isolation valves, causing the cryogenic product to gain heat and expand, increasing pressure between valves #445(A) and #446(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #445(A) and #446(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #445(A) and #446(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valve #445(A) and isolation valve #446(B), pressure diverter / recycle valve #447 will activate and release pressure until the problem is corrected and / or all cryogenic material has expanded and the pressure has dropped below the recycle line pressure.

[0157] As shown in Figure 7A, this example includes two automatic control valves: one two-way control valve and one three-way control valve with positive position feedback. Valves #451(A) and #452(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #451(B) fails open to the recycle line. Valve #453 is a pressure relief valve between valves #451 and #452. Flow through valve #451(A), a three-way control valve, is from the supply system / tank, and flow through valve #452(B), a two-way control valve, is to the receiving tank. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #451(A), open #452(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, valve #452(B) and recycle valve #451(A) are closed to recycle product / pressure in the lines, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizing that if a system shutdown isolates both, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves, the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, increasing pressure between valves #451(A) and #452(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #451(A) and #452(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer, "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #451(A) and #452(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #451(A) and #452(B), pressure relief valve #453 will activate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all cryogenic material has expanded and the pressure drops below the relief valve pressure set point.

[0158] As shown in Figure 7B, this example includes two automatic control valves: one two-way control valve and one three-way control valve with positive position feedback. Valves #461(A) and #462(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #461(A) fails open to the recycle line. Valve #461(A), a three-way control valve, directs flow from the supply system / tank to the recycle line, while valve #462(B), a two-way control valve, directs flow to the receiving tank. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #461(A), through open valve #462(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, the system closes valve #462(B) and recycle valve #461(A) to recycle product / pressure in the lines, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizes that if a system shutdown isolates both, a fluid jam will occur between the isolation valves, the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, increasing pressure between valves #461(A) and #462(B). If an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #461(A) and #462(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer, "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #461(A) and #462(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between shutoff valves #461(A) and #462(B), pressure relief can be provided through valve #461, but additional pressure sensor(s) / transmitter(s) must be activated until the problem is corrected or until all the cryogenic material has expanded and the pressure drops below the pressure set point of the relief valve.

[0159] As shown in Figure 7C, this example includes two automatic control valves: one two-way control valve and one three-way control valve with positive position feedback. Valves #471(A) and #472(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #471(A) fails open to the recycle line. Valve #473 is a pressure regulation / relief valve between valves #471 and #472. Flow through valve #471(A), a three-way control valve, is from the supply system / tank to the recycle line, while flow through valve #472(B), a two-way control valve, is to the receiving tank. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #471(A), open valve #472(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, valve #472(B) is closed and recycle valve #471(A) is closed to recycle product / pressure in the lines, at the designer's option (understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and recognizing that if a system shutdown isolates both, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves, the cryogenic product will gain heat, expand, and increase pressure between valves #471(A) and #472(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #471(A) and #472(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer, "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #471(A) and #472(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #471(A) and #472(B), pressure regulating / relief valve #473 will activate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all cryogenic material has expanded and the pressure falls below the pressure set point of the regulating / relief valve.

[0160] As shown in Figure 7D, this example includes three automatic control valves: two two-way control valves with positive position feedback and one three-way control valve. Valves #481(A) and #482(B) are fail-close / recycle valves, valve #483 is fail-open, and valve #484 is a pressure regulating / reducing valve in line after valve #483. Valve #481(A), a three-way control valve, directs flow from the supply system / tank, and valve #482(B), a two-way control valve, directs flow to the receiving tank. Valve #483 is a two-way control valve for the pressure regulating / bleed valve located between valves #431(A) and #432(B). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #481(A), open valve #482(B), and continues to the receiving tank. At the designer's option (one or both may be closed if a system shutdown is initiated, with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary), if both valves are closed due to a system shutdown, a fluid lock will occur between the isolation valves, and the cryogenic product will gain heat and expand, so open pressure regulation / bleed valve #483 and pressure regulation valve #484 until pressure drops / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #481(A) and #482(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #481(A) and #482(B) are "shut down / mitigated" by recycling / closing / isolating for positive flow / transfer. Redundant in-line flow control valves #481(A) and #482(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow shutoff, with the valve control signal provided by an independent source and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #481(A) and #482(B), pressure regulating / bleeding valves #483 and #484 will operate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all cryogenic material has expanded and is below the setting of pressure regulating / bleeding valve #483. Use of valve #483 requires a pressure sensor / transmitter(s) signal for pressure control operation.

[0161] As shown in Figure 7E, this example includes three automatic control valves: two two-way control valves and one three-way control valve with positive position feedback. Valves #491(A) and #492(B) are fail-closed / recycle, and bleed valve #493 is fail-open. Flow through valve #491(A), a three-way control valve, is from the supply system / tank; flow through valve #492(B), a two-way control valve, is to the receiving tank; and valve #493 is a two-way control valve for the pressure regulation / bleed valve located between valves #491(A) and #492(B). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas from the supply tank flows through open valve #491(A), through open valve #492(B), and continues to the receiving tank. If a system shutdown is initiated, one or both valves can be closed, at the designer's option (with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary), and recognizing that closing both valves due to a system shutdown will create a fluid lock between the isolation valves and cause the cryogenic product to gain heat and expand, pressure regulation / bleed valve #493 opens until pressure is reduced / normal pressure / flow is achieved / product is cleared between valves #491(A) and #492(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #491 and #492 are "shut down / mitigated" to close / isolate for positive flow / transfer. Redundant in-line flow control valves #491(A) and #492(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow shutoff, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner. If thermal expansion is occurring due to fluid sticking between isolation valves #491(A) and #492(B), pressure regulating / bleeding valve #493 will operate and relieve pressure until the problem is corrected or until all cryogenic material has expanded and is below the setting of pressure regulating / bleeding valve #493. Use of valve #493 requires a pressure sensor / transmitter(s) signal for pressure control operation.

[0162] As shown in FIG. 7F, this example includes two automatic control valves, i.e., two three-way control valves with positive position feedback. Valve #501(A) and valve #502(B) fail closed (in-line), and valve #501(A) fails open to the recycle line. Valve #502 fails open to the recycle line. Three-way control valve #501(A) flows from the supply system / tank to a receiving tank or to the recycle line, while three-way control valve #502(B) flows to the receiving tank, also fail closed to the recycle line. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flows from the supply tank through open valve #501(A), through open valve #502(B), and continues to the receiving tank. When a system shutdown is initiated, the system closes in-line flow valve #502(B) and recycle valve #501(A) to recycle product / pressure in the lines, recognizing that at the designer's option (with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary) and if both are isolated during system shutdown, any fluid stuck between the isolation valves is vented to the recycle line by three-way valve #502(B). When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #501(A) and #502(B) are closed / isolated for positive flow / transfer, "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #501(A) and #502(B) shut off the SIL-3 positive flow / transfer system, and the valve control signals are provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner.

[0163] As shown in Figure 7G, this example includes two automatic control valves: one two-way control valve #505 and a multi-port four-way or greater control valve #506 with positive position feedback. The valves fail-close to inline flow / multi-port fail-close to recycle / flare / GCU line(s). Valve #505 flow is from the supply tank(s) through valve #506 to the receiving or recycle / GCU line(s). During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flow from the supply tank(s) flows through open valve #505 (A), through valve #506 (B), and continues to the receiving tank. When a system shutdown is initiated, in-line flow valve #505(A) and recycle valve #506(B) close to send in-line product to recycle or GCU, recognizing that if both valves are isolated during a system shutdown (designer's choice, with the understanding that the system shutdown is only temporary), any fluid stuck between the isolation valves can be vented to the recycle / GCU line by valve #506. When an emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #505(A) and #506(B) are closed / recycle / isolated for positive flow / transfer "Shutdown / Relief / Recycle / GCU." Redundant in-line flow control valves #505(A) and #506(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff to the supply and receiving tanks, with the valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently provided) by the PPFB positioner.

[0164] As shown in Figure 7H, this example includes two automatic control valves: one three-way control valve with positive position feedback and one four-way (multiport) control valve. Valve #511(A) and valve #512(B) fail closed (in-line), with valve #511(A) failing open to the recycle line. Valve #512 fails open to the recycle line. Flow through valve #511(A), a three-way control valve, is from the supply system / tank to the receiving tank or to the recycle line, while flow through valve #512(B), a four-way control valve, is to the receiving tank and fails open to the recycle line. During normal gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer operation, gas / liquefied gas flows from the supply tank through open valve #511(A), through open valve #512(B), and continues to the receiving tank. When a system shutdown is initiated, in-line flow valve #512(B) can be closed and opened to the recycle / flare line. Valve #511(A) recycles in-line product / pressure and, at the designer's option, pressure is relieved to the recycle line by three-way valve #512(B). When the emergency shutdown is activated, both valves #511(A) and #512(B) are closed / recycled / isolated for positive flow / transfer "Shutdown / Relieve / Recycle." Redundant in-line flow control valves #511(A) and #512(B) provide SIL-3 positive flow / transfer shutoff to the receiving tank, with valve control signals provided from independent sources and verified (or independently supplied) by the PPFB positioner.

[0165] As shown in Figure 8A, this example has two sides (the fuel supply / transfer system and the vehicle / barge being fueled / transferred / filled). This example has two automatic control valves on the vehicle and two automatic control valves on the fuel / transfer system. All four valves have positive position feedback positioners for safety. In the fuel supply / transfer system, one control valve #520 (A) is a two-way NC shutoff valve, and the other valve is a three-way shutoff / normal diverter valve #521 (B). The receiving vehicle / barge has one three-way shutoff / normal diverter valve #522 (A) and one two-way NC shutoff valve #523 (B). The gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer fuel path flows from the supply tank through valve #520(A), then through valve #521(B) to the fuel supply / transfer system and the vehicle's fuel supply / transfer line quick release system connection / typically a flexible hose with internal valves and sensors, then through valve #522(A), through valve #523(B) to the receiving vehicle / barge's fuel tank where it is safely monitored and stored for future consumption. When a system shutdown is initiated, the following sequence occurs: That is, an audible / visual alarm is activated, the pump(s) / compressor(s) are stopped, shutoff valve #520(A) closes, valve #521(B) isolates the valve port to the vehicle, and the diverter port is open to the recycle line for relief between #520(A) and #521(B), shutoff valve #523(B) closes, valve #522(A) isolates the valve port from the vehicle supply, and the diverter port is open to the recycle line for relief between valve #523(B) and valve #522(A). A process stoppage could be an abnormal temperature, pressure, level, flow, motion, gas detection (leak) or communication failure; once these anomalies are corrected, the system is reset and the valve line-up and system(s) (pump(s) / compressor(s)) may be restarted.In the event of an emergency, such as a high-high vehicle / earthquake motion event, that exceeds a second predetermined motion limit set point, the same shutdown / mitigation / safety shut-off (valve) actions as listed in Figure 8A occur, and additionally, automatic fuel supply / transfer line releases are activated / deactivated, and any / all vehicle lockouts are released, releasing the vehicle and allowing operator control and / or the ability to safely maneuver the vehicle. This safety feature allows for vehicle control during high-high motion / movement of the fuel supply / transfer system (which may be on-board or land-based), and / or vehicle / barge control during rough seas. Figure 8A: Activation of the fire and / or explosion sensor(s) also isolates the shutdown / mitigation / safety shut-off valves. (Any / all abnormal acoustic / pressure / sound waves as well as fire / flame / heat / arc / spark / optical fire detection / sensing) also relays to fire alarms / communication links / fire suppression systems, disarms automatic release systems for fuel supply / transfer lines, and any / all vehicle lockout systems, which allows operator control of the vehicle and / or the ability to safely maneuver the vehicle (away from other fuel supply / transfer vehicles or away from the fuel source / fuel supply / transfer system / tank(s) in the event of a fire / explosion). These redundant safety system(s) with intelligent sensor(s), along with AI processes, improve safety by orders of magnitude. These safety features protect life and property by quickly and safely reacting to negative inputs when action is required.

[0166] Figure 8B: The fuel supply / transfer supply line system(s) are the same as Figure 8A, but Figure 8B also includes an optional vapor return line. Many gas / liquefied gas tank systems require vapor management, of which there are three effective forms: a vapor return line to the supply tank, a tank re-liquefaction system, and an in-tank recirculation spray pressure reduction system(s). This Figure 8B shows one type of vapor management for a gas / liquefied gas tank: a vapor return line (returning vented vapor from the filling / receiving tank to the supply tank). This valve arrangement may be the same or similar as the gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer supply line, with redundant safety features / isolation / mitigation, and any / all features listed in Figure 8A are also included in / on the vapor return line of Figure 8B.

[0167] As shown in Figure 8B, this example has two sides (fuel supply / transfer system and vehicle / barge being fueled / transferred / filled). This example has two automatic control valves on the vehicle and two automatic control valves on the fuel supply / transfer system. All four valves have positive position feedback positioners for safety. In the fuel supply / transfer system, one control valve #520(A) is a two-way NC shutoff valve, and the other valve is a three-way (B) shutoff / normal diverter valve #521. The receiving vehicle / barge has one three-way shutoff / normal diverter valve #522(A) and one two-way NC shutoff valve #523(B). The gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer fuel path flows from the supply tank through valve #520(A), then through valve #521(B) to the fuel supply / transfer system and the vehicle's fuel supply / transfer line quick release system connection / typically a flexible hose with internal valves and sensors, then through valve #522(A), through valve #523(B) to the receiving vehicle / barge's fuel tank where it is safely monitored and stored for future consumption. When a system shutdown is initiated, the following sequence occurs: That is, an audible / visual alarm is activated, the pump(s) / compressor(s) are stopped, shutoff valve #520(A) closes, valve #521(B) isolates the valve port to the vehicle, the diverter port is open to the recycle line for relief between #520(A) and #521(B), shutoff valve #523(B) closes, valve #522(A) isolates the valve port from the vehicle supply, the diverter port is open to the recycle line for relief between valve #523(B) and valve #522(A). A process stoppage could be an abnormal temperature, pressure, level, flow, motion, gas detection (leak) or communication failure; once these anomalies are corrected, the system is reset and the valve line-up and system(s) (pump(s) / compressor(s)) may be restarted.In the event of an emergency, such as a vehicle / earthquake high-high motion event, that exceeds a second predetermined motion limit set point, the same stop / mitigation / safety shut-off (valve) actions as listed in Figure 8A occur, and in addition, automatic fuel supply / transfer line releases are activated / deactivated, any / all vehicle lockouts are released, and the vehicle is released, thereby allowing operator control and / or safe maneuvering of the vehicle. This safety feature allows for vehicle control during high-high motion / movement of the fuel supply / transfer system (which may be on-board or land-based) and / or vehicle / barge control during rough seas. Figure 8B: The stop / mitigation / safety shut-off valves are also isolated when the fire and / or explosion sensor(s) are activated. (Any / all abnormal acoustic / pressure / sound waves as well as fire / flame / heat / arc / spark / optical fire detection / sensing) also relays to fire alarms / communication links / fire suppression systems, disarms automatic release systems for fuel supply / transfer lines, and any / all vehicle lockout systems, which allows operator control of the vehicle and / or the ability to safely maneuver the vehicle (away from other fuel supply / transfer vehicles or away from the fuel source / fuel supply / transfer system / tank(s) in the event of a fire / explosion). These redundant safety system(s) with intelligent sensor(s), along with AI processes, improve safety by orders of magnitude. These safety features protect life and property by quickly and safely reacting to negative inputs when action is required.

[0168] As shown in Figure 8B, this example has two sides (the fuel supply / transfer system and the vehicle / barge being fueled / transferred / filled). This example has two automatic control valves on the vehicle and three automatic control valves on the vapor line of the fuel supply / transfer system. All four two-way control valves have positive position feedback positioners for safety. On the vapor line of the fuel supply / transfer system, one control valve #524 (A) is a two-way NC shutoff valve, the other is a two-way control shutoff / open valve #526 (B), and the third valve is a two-way automatic pilot pressure relief valve, so if high pressure exists between valves #524 and #526, it is relieved by valve #525. The receiving vehicle / barge has one two-way shutoff / normally closed valve #527 (A) and one two-way NC shutoff valve #528 (B). The gas / liquefied gas vapor return line fuel path runs from the receiving tank through valve #528(A), then through valve #527(B), through both the fuel supply / transfer system and the vehicle's fuel supply / transfer line quick release system connection with internal valves and sensors / typically flexible hoses, then through valve #526(B), through valve #524(A), and into the receiving tank / vehicle / barge's fuel tank where it is safely monitored and stored for future processing / consumption. When a system shutdown is initiated, the following sequence shall occur: audible / visual alarms shall be activated, pump(s) / compressor(s) shall be shut off, shut-off valve #524(A) shall close, valve #526(B) shall close / isolate the valve port to the vehicle, and a steady state shall be maintained between #524(A) and #526(B) by PRV #525. Isolation valve #527(B) closes and valve #528(A) isolates / closes the valve port from the supply side to the vehicle, maintaining a constant pressure through pressure relief between valve #527(B) and valve #528(A). A process stoppage can be an abnormal temperature, pressure, level, flow, motion, or communication failure; once these anomalies are corrected, the system can be reset and the valve line-up and system(s) (pump(s) / compressor(s)) can be restarted.In the event of an emergency, such as a high-high motion event due to a vehicle / earthquake exceeding a second predetermined motion limit set point, the same shutdown / mitigation / safety shut-off (valve) actions as listed in FIG. 8B occur, and in addition, automatic fuel supply / transfer line releases are activated / deactivated, and any / all vehicle lockouts are released, freeing the vehicle to allow operator control and / or safe maneuvering of the vehicle. This safety feature allows vehicle control during high-high motion / movement of the fuel supply / transfer system (which may be on-board or land-based) and / or vehicle / barge control during rough seas. FIG. 8B; the shutdown / mitigation / safety shut-off valves are also isolated when the fire and / or explosion sensor(s) are activated. (Any / all abnormal acoustic / pressure / sound waves as well as fire / flame / heat / arc / spark / optical fire detection / sensing) also relays to fire alarms / communication links / fire suppression systems, disarms automatic release systems for fuel supply / transfer lines, and any / all vehicle lockout systems, which allows operator control of the vehicle and / or the ability to safely maneuver the vehicle (away from other fuel supply / transfer vehicles or away from the fuel source / fuel supply / transfer system / tank(s) in the event of a fire / explosion). These redundant safety system(s) with intelligent sensor(s), along with AI processes, improve safety by orders of magnitude. These safety features protect life and property by quickly and safely reacting to negative inputs when action is required.

[0169] Figures 1-5 (including A, B, and C) each show many different input / output, power, UPS systems, and communication(s) systems. Many device(s) / system(s) are duplicated, some are shown / omitted for clarity, and some are system-specific / optional (i.e., vapor return lines; specific tanks).

[0170] In Figure 1A, the fuel supply / transfer supply-side control processing (CP) system and safety instrumented system (SIS) are shown with the major system(s) / devices. While power and some instrumentation are intentionally omitted for clarity, the I / O required for system function—power, valve(s) / location, temperature / pressure / level / flow rate xmtr locations—are shown / listed and documented in detail. Key features include two redundant processors backed by redundant power supplies / power supplies, redundant safety controller(s), fire / explosion monitoring, redundant shutoff valve(s), and redundant communications (both methods and systems for voting two of the three required to maintain established communications), which can utilize wired / radio / optical / all-of-the-kind communications simultaneously using different methods / frequencies for robust redundancy. The redundancy described here achieves Safety Instrumented Level 3 (SIL3), which carries a premium safety rating from insurers, governments, regulators, investors, and the host community.

[0171] In Figure 1B, the fuel supply / transfer receiving control and processing (CP) system and safety instrumented system (SIS) are shown with the major system(s) / devices. While power and some instrumentation are intentionally omitted for clarity, the I / O required for system function—power, valve(s) / location, temperature / pressure / level / flow rate xmtr locations—are shown / listed and documented in detail. Key features include two redundant processors backed by redundant power supplies / power supplies, redundant safety controller(s), fire / explosion monitoring, redundant shutoff valve(s), and redundant communications (both methods and systems for voting two of the three required to maintain established communications). This can utilize wired / radio / optical / all-of-the-kind communications, simultaneously utilizing different methods / frequencies for robust redundancy. The redundancy described here achieves Safety Instrumented Level 3 (SIL3), which carries a premium safety rating from insurers, governments, regulators, investors, and the host community.

[0172] 2A, 2B, 2C and 5A, 5B, 5C include flows for the I / O of the process control system, which is substantially identical to the SIS, but the set points of some of the process controls may be slightly lower than the set points of the SIS, allowing the process control system to be triggered / activated / operate before the SIS system, and if the process control system fails (for whatever reason), the SIS system is available redundantly to operate / activate as a backup for the process control system.

[0173] Figures 3A, B, C and 4A, B, C include the flow of the safety instrumented system IO. This system is designed for robust and redundant backup to the process control system (PC), as described above, and some SIS set points may be set slightly higher than the PC system, so that the SIS can react if the first set point limit is exceeded. This system idle monitors the entire gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer system and reliably functions when needed. Safe fuel supply / transfer of gas / liquefied gas is essential to the success of clean fuels. People and property are protected by utilizing redundant backup safety systems.

[0174] Also, in any / all instances, the diagrams show a "recycle" line, which can have multiple interpretations. For the purposes of this invention, all interpretations are as follows: "recycle" can be a true recycle line (recycling product to the top of the plant, or to a reliquefaction unit, or back to tank), or for the purposes of this invention, recycle can also include sending to a gas combustion unit (GCU), or a thermal oxidizer (TO), or a knockout (KO) drum, or a flare. Either is permitted / regulated by local codes / standards / practices.

[0175] Proper valve design, specification, material(s), class, operator / operation(s), and location(s) will achieve a high level of safety instrumented system(s), thereby providing safe and reliable operation with operational control / savings and favorable insurance premium ratings.

[0176] As will be recognized, there are many different arrangements of valves (multiple designs / operations) and / or numerous configurations of gas / liquefied gas and / or vapor line(s) for both the supplying and / or receiving side, and in particular multi-port valves / isolation(s), possible combinations, and consideration of all valve(s) / port(s) / design(s) / layout(s) / combination(s) / configurations are considered to be within the scope of this patent, and while a limited number of design examples have been provided, hundreds of combinations exist, and modifying a system with a simple valve rearrangement for all designs, types, transfer systems, and materials is not considered or construed as a different / improved design and is intended to be within the scope of application of this invention.

[0177] A robustly designed control system combined with properly specified and installed shut-off valve(s) achieves SIL-3 (Safety Integrity Level) levels, which improves safety by an order of magnitude. Natural gas chemical family, NGPATBA / O and all compressed gas / liquid fuels achieve higher risk management levels and utilize "redundant shut-off" valve design(s) for fuel supply / transfer to improve operational safety.

[0178] The present invention involves the use of multiple redundant isolation valves / layout(s) and SIS control system(s) and CS systems with operational design and SIL-3 configuration. Consequently, valves are designed, specified, function, and controlled independently with appropriate dedicated inputs / outputs, including valve positioners for positive position feedback and independent signals for independent verification of each valve's position. These safety valves ensure safe and proper transfer / fuel isolation when controlled actuation is required. These valves may communicate via hardwire, fiber optics, fiber optic cable, wirelessly via radio or light, coaxial cable, or any combination of wired and wireless via radio / light. The safest systems can utilize multiple forms of communication for redundant signal transmission.

[0179] Tank (pressurized / atmospheric): Vapor management systems (vapor return to supply) are specific to fuel supply / transfer (tank) systems, and Type (C) tanks may utilize internally recirculating spray "bars / balls / headers" for vapor (pressure) management. That is, not all systems require vapor management (vapor return to supply), but because other "atmospheric" type tank(s) / systems exist and are "in use," vapor management must be included in the SIS / CS system design. Fuel supply / transfer systems utilizing vapor management also require double isolation and / or isolation relief / regulating valve designs on the vapor lines to be SIL-3 certified. While the double isolation and / or relief / regulating isolation valve designs are functionally similar to compressed / liquefied gas supplies, certain vehicle / vessel storage containment systems require vapor pressure transfer, and many designs require vapors to be returned to supply through a vapor management system, "other" type storage containment, and the vapor / pressure is managed internally. The SIS / CS system of the present invention provides appropriate safety control of optional steam management system(s) and provides redundant safety systems for use depending on the specific application requirements of those systems.

[0180] Pressurized "C" tanks may include an internal recirculation method to mix / homogenize the tank contents and maintain separation of the NGPATBA product. This internal recirculation should be split into parallel (two) systems with separate pumps, spray bars / bowls / headers, and separate, independent power feeds / power sources, providing redundant mixing capacity and allowing one recirculation system to recirculate if the other fails. This redundant safety feature ensures that fuel separation is prevented.

[0181] Jacket / Pipe Insulation Monitoring System for Vacuum Tank(s): Jacket / pipe insulation of vacuum tank(s) is the most efficient insulation system for cryogenics. Monitoring vacuum level by synthetic (negative / absolute) pressure transmitter(s) indicates if a leak is occurring. If vacuum cannot be maintained in the segment jacket / tank(s) jacket, the situation requires resolution. A vacuum pump / system can be utilized to (re)vent the jacket(s). All vacuum systems can communicate signal(s) via wire, wireless by radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless by radio / optical / OWC for local and / or remote network communication / signal(s) with a central detection system / microcontroller / processor.

[0182] System Access - Sign On: System operation will be limited to personnel authorized / certified to refuel / transfer / exchange these hazardous liquefied / compressed gases. System operator(s) will log in via a human interface prior to a refueling / transfer event and complete mandatory checklists / forms / archive report transfers before and after the refueling / transfer event. Each operator's report and actions will be logged and recorded. Optional / AI-based high-level sign-on, such as optical / ultrasound scanning of iris, fingerprint, or facial recognition systems, will help prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing the system. The system may also utilize magnetic / RF / ID card scanning for more robust security. Security is a top priority. Unauthorized individuals will be prohibited from entering the transfer zone, and gate access will be controlled with proper authorization by designated authorized personnel. Scanning / security clearance should be provided at entrances.

[0183] Quality control: Inline Fuel Supply / Transfer: Several different methods may be utilized for inline gas identification. The utilization of gas identification is important for several reasons, including the fact that the engine consuming the fuel may require a specific gas / liquefied gas specification / mixture. Additionally, the flow measurement system requires the appropriate density coefficient to calculate the appropriate flow rate / volume. Gas identification systems may include spectrometers, mass spectrometers, analyzers, tunable diode laser absorption, Raman spectroscopy, or fiber optic inputs via slipstream or inline / immersion probe / detection devices, and the system / sample may utilize optical / ultrasonic / electrochemical methods for gas identification. Another such gas / liquefied gas detection system utilizes ultrasonic / optical techniques to achieve an inline product density level, and this density reading is necessary for mass flow calculations to ensure accurate mass flow / transfer volumes of the gas / liquefied gas. Quality control instrumentation for gas / liquefied gas fuel supply / transfer systems is crucial for product identification and product measurement.

[0184] Gas Processing / Separation: This section provides an overview of quality control and describes appropriate methods for producing a high-quality product. In this case, liquefied natural gas has a variety of different compositions / components. Therefore, several QC steps are required in the pipeline / associated gas gathering and compression, scrubbing, refrigeration, and condensation processes. First, the gas supply requires analysis to determine its composition, from which a scrubbing (stripping) method can be determined. Most gas is separated in pressure swing adsorption / separation tower(s); some may contain molecular sieve material (some may be carried over); some systems may not separate as well as others. Also, the ammine process is utilized to strip sulfur, by-products, and carbon dioxide. Appropriate dehydration may utilize refrigerant / desiccant drying system(s), employing alternating drying towers, one for drying and one for heat drying. This heat source is necessary to save time, but it also breaks down the desiccant material, which is carried over into the system. If the dehydration system is insufficient, hydrates will form within the system / transport / fuel supply system. These hydrates can accumulate on metal surfaces and cause incomplete poppet / spring valve(s) closure, which is challenging because the hydrates can continue to accumulate at the leak site, worsening / uncontrollable conditions. Additionally, if the "heavies" (heavy hydrocarbons) are not completely stripped, they may accumulate in the storage tank(s) and be transferred / fed into the receiving tank. While in the storage tank(s) (either tank), they may "settle" / stratify / separate (heavier ones at the bottom, lighter ones at the top). In systems without internal recirculation spray balls, which perform the dual function of mixing / homogenizing the product and maintaining / reducing the vapor headspace temperature and reducing tank pressure, the liquefied gas components will continue to separate, stratify, and accumulate in the tank (which can be prolonged) in the absence of an internal recirculation pump. Guided wire radar level measurements detect product phase / density differences, which can be multiple (solid / gel / liquid / vapor). They may be paraffin wax and / or gel formation from the bottom.Some suppliers are aware of this effect (caused by design / QC issues) and have raised the pumps off the bottom to correct for it, but raising the pumps causes a loss of head pressure, reducing net pump output. A rotary encoder with an xmtr signals the exact movement of the pump up into the tank. Since the tank is stored at cryogenic temperatures, there are no noticeable issues when emptied, as the heavy materials and wax / gel dissipate when warmed and evacuated. The bottom flange of this type of vessel (cryogenic material) is considered a hazard, so all flanges / instruments / and pumps are entered from the top, and the pump is lowered into the tank for product removal. Several possible solutions exist: improving the gas supply specifications, improving the plant head / separation / QC operations, and better separating the heavy materials. A positive displacement pump will be periodically lowered to the tank bottom (boot) and pumped to a separate tank and / or to the plant head for re-separation (a guided wire radar level gauge will assist with the timetable for "pumping" using the PD pump). An internal recirculating spray ball system will be installed to better homogenize the product consistently within the tank. For Type "C" tanks, different lengths of "dip tubes" can be specified to be installed, and a vapor headspace push method (compressed gas pressure over the liquid) can be used to draw / remove the product level from the tank. A bottom strainer of appropriate mesh / size will retain larger broken desiccant pieces within the tank boot. Broken desiccant pieces may migrate throughout the system and block the filter(s) / strainer(s). The system will include differential pressure xmtr(s) over the filter(s) / strainer(s) with high D / P, high-high D / P alarm / shutdown to indicate the presence of a dirty filter / strainer. Dual filter(s) / strainer systems are ideal for maintaining the filter(s) without interrupting the process. Some utilize removable / replaceable core desiccant filters to aid in dewatering and can be of various sizes and lengths.They are easy to maintain and provide good protection for the pump(s) / compressor(s). A proper gas separation process at the top of the plant results in a higher quality liquefied gas product.

[0185] All safety systems, login / sign on / off, sensor(s), relays, triggers, microswitches, actuator(s) movement, motion sensor(s) override, lockout, reset, emergency stop / shutdown, start and stop, alarm, reset(s), and any / all events are continuously recorded, identifying all logical data, all recorded with current time and date stamp and operator ID login and available for printing as needed. Data recording may be local and / or remote, or both. Data viewing / interface / HMI(s) may be local / remote and may communicate via wired, radio and / or optical / wireless. Data may be transmitted wirelessly to a remote location, and data may be transmitted over a network such as the Internet and / or intranet / private / leased communications / server(s) / network(s) as desired. The data system(s) can communicate the signal(s) with the central detection system / microcontroller / processor locally and / or remotely for network communication / signal(s) via wire, wireless via radio / optical, and / or any combination of wire (coaxial / coaxial RF / RFoF) and wireless via radio / optical / OWC.

Claims

1. 1. A multi-redundant safety control system for use involving compressed or liquefied gas transfer, vehicle fueling, or storage operations, said multi-redundant safety control system comprising: one or more of the following for use with each of the at least two independent operational isolation control systems: a processor, a network, a set of sensors, a set of actuators, a human interface, and peripherals; two or more redundant seismic or vehicle omnidirectional vector motion systems, each motion system utilizing one or more first sensors for detecting one or more of the following conditions: vehicle motion, seismic activity, and a fuel transfer event; two or more gas detection systems, each gas detection system utilizing one or more second sensors from one or more of the following group: magnetic sensors, catalytic sensors, and optical sensors; two or more fire and / or explosion systems, each utilizing a third sensor of one or more of the following types: magnetic, optical, ultrasonic, infrasonic, and sonic; At least two independent operational isolation control systems with separate power sources, At least one of the at least two independent operational isolation control systems is a multiple redundant safety control system configured to shut down or disable gas transfer or fuel supply upon detection of one or more of the following conditions: vehicle motion greater than a predetermined value, gas concentration above a predetermined level, fire or explosion, exceeding predetermined sensor input limits, and seismic activity greater than a predetermined level.

2. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the gas comprises compressed or liquefied gas and the first sensor comprises one or more of the following: a mechanical tether, a switch, a magnetic sensor, an optical sensor, an ultrasonic sensor, an accelerometer, an inertial motion unit, a gyro, and a gyroscopic instrument (MEMS).

3. At least one of the at least two independent operational isolation control systems comprises a processor or an array of processors that functions standalone or arrayed or combined via one or more networks selected from one or more of the following group: CPU, GPU, GPUPU, GPU with optically enhanced communication and / or processing, OPU, quantum processing unit, neural processing unit, quantum logic gate, distributed control system, distributed network, and cloud computing system; The system includes or utilizes one or more of the following: evolutionary algorithms, automated planning and scheduling, global language identification, language models, deep learning, machine translation, machine language, speech generation devices, natural language user interfaces, long and short-term memory, mass memory storage and retrieval, neural networks, group methods of data processing, and deep stacking networks; 2. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1.

4. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein at least one of the at least two independent operational isolation control systems comprises one or more of the following: a module, a node, a network fencing system, a cybersecurity element, a network interface, a computer cluster, an electrical-to-optical or optical-to-electrical converter, optical computing, binary computing, a wide area network, a local area network, a bridge network, optical communications including optical fiber or free space optical communications, optical wireless communications, a qubit, a qutrit, a quantum network, a quantum internet, and a data, communication, and diode including a quantum diode.

5. At least one of the at least two independent operational isolation control systems is one of the following: Satellite communications, including satellite-to-satellite, satellite-to-ground, satellite-to-vehicle, satellite-to-phone, and / or PDA (Personal Digital Assistant / Device); and One or more antennas or arrays of antennas that communicate wirelessly by radio or light and may automatically include tunable or sector antennas that utilize multiple wavelengths or frequencies for wireless data communication by radio or light.

10. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1, used for one or more of:

6. the two or more gas detection systems are capable of detecting one or more of the following gases: methane, hydrogen, ammonia, propane, ethane, butane, biomethane, syngas, ammonia, carbon dioxide, and oxygen; The motion system operates standalone or in combination and is selected from one or more of the following group: optical, magnetic, ultrasonic, inertial motion unit, gyro, MEMS unit quantum gyro (including MEMS gyro), accelerometer including 3-axis accelerometer, FOG, RLG, CRG, PG, PV, TFG, VSG, CVG, WGR, and Q-gyro sensors; 2. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1.

7. the vehicle comprises one or more of the following: a ship, a tugboat, a barge, an aircraft, a spacecraft, a rocket, and a drone; The vehicle may be an on-road, off-road, rail, or marine vehicle, or a vehicle capable of fighting or overcoming the forces of gravity; The vehicle may be powered by an internal combustion engine, a turbine, hydrogen fuel, a fuel cell, a fuel cell electric, or a combination thereof, including a hybrid battery or electric, and the vehicle may include one or more inerting systems; the vehicle is equipped with an emissions quantification system within which data can be recorded, logged, and emissions data can be live streamed; The vehicle may include improved fuel cells and / or I.C.E. performance enhancements, or oxygen concentration systems for turbo or compressors that increase air, oxygen, or augmented air with oxygen flow to the system intake.

2. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1.

8. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the gas transfer, vehicle fuel supply, or fuel storage system is monitored by a redundant video system that may be live streamed or recorded, may use infrared cameras to detect fires or explosions, and may utilize relay alerts to facilitate monitoring of fire or explosion systems.

9. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, further comprising one or more redundant system shutdowns or emergency shutdowns that may be accomplished by either a human, a processor, or a control system based on monitoring of one or more of the following predetermined parameters: pressure, temperature, level, flow, vibration, motion, gas detection, fire and / or explosion detection, local or remote operation, automated or manual operation, communication, signal loss, power interruption, reset, human assistance (override), and process equipment disruption.

10. The system comprises: One or more of the following: artificial intelligence, machine learning, and language model systems that process information (data); and one or more of the following for communication or security protocols: gesture recognition, speech recognition, voice-activated commands, optical mark recognition, biometric recognition, convolutional neural networks, neural networks, hybrid neural networks, microphones, speakers, photodiodes, cameras, infrared readers, and optical readers or arrays; mass memory storage and retrieval; long and short-term memory; data recall; and image recall.

2. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein:

11. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the system utilizes a robotic system with cerebellar model articulation transfer and / or fuel delivery controls for compressed and / or liquefied gas handling, storage, transfer, or fuel delivery systems.

12. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the system utilizes a vacuum jacketed storage tank system and vacuum jacketed transfer lines including one or more of the following: a vacuum monitoring system, an earthquake detection system, an earthquake shutoff connection sensor, a pressure regulating valve positioning system, two or more internal recirculating spray bar or ball tank cooling systems, and two or more reliquefaction systems.

13. 13. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 12, wherein the system employs one or more storage tank systems comprising cryogenic vacuum jacketed double-walled storage tanks of the Type "C" or "A" variety, and the one or more storage tank systems may, but need not, have only top access with no bottom connections, flanges, or instrumentation connections.

14. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the vehicle may be charged externally or may use power generated on-board via redundant batteries, inverters, and a power distribution system, and one or more of the following may be used: electric motor monitoring systems, power monitoring systems, battery monitoring systems, VFD or TRIAC drives or inverters, magnetic levitation drive systems, electrically redundant safety devices such as overloads, breakers, MOLs, and transfer switches (manual or automatic).

15. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, further comprising a storage tank system including inlet and outlet safety valves and pressure regulators, one or more level control systems, one or more pressure control systems, and one or more temperature control systems, wherein the one or more storage tanks may be vehicle-based replaceable tanks having sensors for tank position detection, and wherein the meter, power, and fuel connections utilize one or more magnetic, ultrasonic, or optical sensors for connection detection.

16. the processor is used for one of the following vehicle operations: positioning, navigation, routing, mapping, GPS, altitude, omnidirectional vehicle positioning or motion, collision avoidance, vehicle clearance, distance detection, fuel monitoring, ETA, traffic avoidance, on-board Wi-Fi connectivity, voice activated commands, and voice recognition; The multi-redundant safety control system further comprises a vehicle positioning system (VPS) that provides independent, redundant, and blocked vehicle position data, the VPS performing comparative updates to data provided by a GPS system and self-correcting based on the comparison, the VPS including one or more of the following attributes of the vehicle: location, position, heading, speed, height, vector, roll axis, pitch axis, and yaw axis.

4. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 3.

17. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the system comprises one or more quality control gas analyzers selected from the following group: gas chromatographs, spectrometers, optical spectrometers, and TDLAs capable of utilizing fiber optic sensors and fiber optic communications.

18. 3. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 2, comprising an on-board separation system for the separation of air molecules utilizing an oxygen concentrator or oxygen generator that splits or decomposes molecules of compressed or liquefied gas or that comprises one or more of the following processes: reforming, high temperature reforming, decomposition reforming or reaction, swing absorption system, electrothermal, MEMS system, micro-reformer, photovoltaic reformer or generator, optical and / or optically assisted decomposition, and electrothermal reformer or generator.

19. The system includes the following on-board chemical processes: With respect to hydrogen, splitting, decomposition, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: water, natural gas, ammonia, and carbon dioxide; With respect to ammonia, splitting, decomposition, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: natural gas, hydrogen, and carbon dioxide; With respect to natural gas, splitting, splitting, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: syngas, biogas, carbon dioxide, wellhead gas, propane, natural gas, and cumene; With respect to butane, splitting, splitting, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: natural gas, wellhead gas, and butane; With respect to ethane, splitting, decomposition, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: natural gas, and wellhead gas; For propane, splitting, splitting, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: natural gas, hydrogen, and cumene; With respect to oxygen, the division, splitting, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: oxygen, air, and ozone; With respect to ozone, the division, splitting, modification or generation from one or more of the following: oxygen, and air; With respect to nitrogen, the division, splitting, reforming or evolution from one or more of the following: oxygen, air, and ammonia; For carbon dioxide, splitting, decomposition, reforming or generation from one or more of the following: tail gas (exhaust gas), and wellhead gas; 20. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 18, capable of providing one or more of:

20. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the compressed and / or liquefied gas can be one or more from the group comprising methane, natural gas, LNG, propane, ethane, butane, hydrogen, ammonia, oxygen, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, syngas, biomethane, and biogas.

21. the multiple redundant safety control system is used for remote vehicle operation and / or remote vehicle control; the remote vehicle operation includes remote operation of one or more vehicles, and the remote control of the vehicle operation includes control of one or more of the following vehicle attributes: velocity, vector, path, height, roll, pitch, and yaw; One or more control inputs and outputs are selected from one or more of the group comprising optical, magnetic, ultrasonic, IMU, accelerometer, 3-axis accelerometer, gyro, MEMS gyro, quantum gyro, FOG, RLG, CRG, PG, PV, TFG, CRG, WGR, and live streaming video; 2. The multiple redundant safety control system of claim 1.

22. 10. The multi-redundant safety control system of claim 1, wherein the system utilizes one or more storage tanks selected from the group consisting of Type "C" or "A" cryogenic insulated storage tanks with top access only and no bottom connections, flanges, or instrumentation connections, and further comprising one or more of the following for land-based tanks: an earthquake detection system, a seismic connection sensor, a pressure regulation system, two or more internal recirculation spray bar or ball systems, and two or more reliquefaction systems, wherein the one or more cryogenic storage tanks may, but need not, have a vacuum jacketed insulation system.

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