Virtual Network Distributed Denial of Service Scrubber

Abstract

A novel overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) is described for performing DDoS attack mitigation within a virtual network environment. Network traffic received by a network resource within an overlay network is monitored. When a potential DDoS attack is detected, the ONDMS may initiate a protection mode for the network resource. This initiation may include creating one or more shadow VNICs for the protected network resource. While in protection mode, as a result of the one or more shadow VNICs, packets are redirected to one or more alternate destinations (e.g., a DDoS scrubber system within the ONDMS) configured to filter and analyze the packets and take appropriate mitigation action as needed, thereby protecting the protected network resource from the potential DDoS attack.

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] Related Applications This application claims priority to U.S. Nonprovisional Patent Application No. 18 / 544,272, "VIRTUAL NETWORK DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE SCRUBBER," filed December 18, 2023, which claims the benefit of and priority under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 434,887, "VIRTUAL NETWORK DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE SCRUBBER," filed December 22, 2022, the entirety of which is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes.

[0002] Field The present disclosure relates generally to computer and network security, and more particularly to techniques for preventing or mitigating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in overlay networks. More particularly, a novel overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) is described for performing DDoS attack mitigation within a virtual network environment. [Background technology]

[0003] background Virtual networks enable cloud service providers (CSPs) to offer cloud services to their subscribing customers. CSPs typically provide the infrastructure used to form overlay networks and deliver cloud services to their customers. The infrastructure provided by a CSP can include a variety of physical and logical resources, including various compute, memory, and networking resources (also known as network resources). Virtual networks provide customers with a customized, private network façade on top of the shared resources provided in the CSP-provided infrastructure. Fundamental to the provision of virtual networks is the ability to isolate customers on the shared resources. Resources such as network resources, link bandwidth, and compute resources are critical to the successful delivery of cloud services and affect the user experience. Therefore, careful monitoring and management of these resources is crucial.

[0004] In today's connected world, CSP infrastructures are vulnerable to attacks by malicious actors. Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are a common example of such malicious attacks. The source of the attack may be external to the CSP's infrastructure or may be within the CSP's infrastructure. For example, one or more customers of a CSP may send large amounts of data (e.g., many packets per second) to the same destination network resource (e.g., a virtual network interface card (VNIC) or a network virtualization device (e.g., a smart NIC) implementing one or more VNICs). This high rate of data reception may cause congestion at the NVD or on the links from top-of-the-rack (TOR) switches to the NVD. This, in turn, may cause exhaustion of computational resources (e.g., CPUs) on the NVD, resulting in NVD failure or degraded NVD performance. This may adversely affect the cloud services provided by the CSP to its customers. Therefore, protecting network resources from such DDoS attacks is crucial for CSPs. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Quick Overview The present disclosure relates generally to computer and network security, and more particularly to techniques for preventing or mitigating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in overlay networks. More particularly, a novel Overlay Network DDoS Mitigation System (ONDMS) for performing DDoS attack mitigation within a virtual network environment is described. Various embodiments are described herein, including methods, systems, non-transitory computer-readable storage media storing programs, code, or instructions executable by one or more processors, and the like.

[0006] The techniques described herein may be used within a cloud environment to prevent or mitigate DDoS attacks against the cloud infrastructure and, further, against workloads deployed in the cloud. For example, a cloud service provider (CSP) may offer an overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) in its cloud infrastructure, which may be used to prevent or mitigate DDoS attacks against the CSP's infrastructure.

[0007] In one embodiment, a technique is provided that includes a method including monitoring network traffic received by a network virtualization device (NVD) in a cloud service provider infrastructure, where the NVD runs a set of one or more virtual network interface cards (VNICs) associated with a set of one or more compute instances in one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure, and monitoring that the network traffic is destined for at least one compute instance from the set of one or more compute instances; based at least in part on the monitoring, initiating a protection mode of the NVD to protect the NVD from potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks; and while the NVD is in the protection mode, causing one or more packets destined for the set of one or more compute instances to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the NVD.

[0008] In yet another embodiment, initiating the protection mode of the NVD includes determining a set of one or more VNICs to be run by the NVD, wherein the set of one or more VNICs includes a first VNIC associated with a first compute instance in the set of one or more compute instances, the first VNIC associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, and the first overlay address associated with a substrate address associated with the NVD; creating one or more sets of shadow VNICs for the set of one or more VNICs; associating the set of one or more shadow VNICs with a DDoS scrubber system; and publishing information indicating the set of one or more shadow VNICs to one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure.

[0009] In yet another embodiment, causing one or more packets destined for the set of one or more compute instances to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system includes redirecting the one or more packets to the DDoS scrubber system via the set of one or more shadow VNICs.

[0010] In yet another embodiment, the set of one or more VNICs includes multiple VNICs and the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a single shadow VNIC.

[0011] In yet another embodiment, the set of one or more VNICs includes a plurality of VNICs, the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a plurality of shadow VNICs, and the plurality of shadow VNICs includes a shadow VNIC corresponding to each VNIC in the plurality of VNICs.

[0012] In yet another embodiment, the set of one or more VNICs includes a plurality of VNICs, and the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a plurality of shadow VNICs, and the number of shadow VNICs in the plurality of shadow VNICs is less than the number of VNICs in the plurality of VNICs.

[0013] In yet another embodiment, the DDoS scrubber system includes at least one of a host machine configured to implement at least one shadow VNIC from a set of one or more shadow VNICs, or at least one NVD configured to implement at least one shadow VNIC from a set of one or more shadow VNICs.

[0014] In yet another embodiment, creating one or more sets of shadow VNICs for the set of one or more VNICs includes creating a first shadow VNIC corresponding to a first VNIC associated with the first compute instance and associating a first overlay address with the first shadow VNIC, and associating the set of one or more shadow VNICs with the DDoS scrubber system includes associating the first shadow VNIC with a substrate address associated with the DDoS scrubber system.

[0015] In yet another embodiment, causing one or more packets to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system includes, for a first packet in the one or more packets, determining that the first packet is destined for a first overlay address configured for the first computation instance, for the first overlay address, that the first packet is to be sent to a substrate address associated with the DDoS scrubber system, and sending the first packet to the DDoS scrubber system.

[0016] In yet another embodiment, the method further includes performing, by the DDoS scrubber system, at least one action on at least one of the one or more packets, the performing including dropping the one or more packets, throttling the one or more packets, or forwarding the one or more packets to the NVD.

[0017] In yet another embodiment, a potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is determined when network traffic exceeds a predetermined threshold, including an average link utilization of more than 80% for several consecutive minutes, or bursts of 100% or more link utilization for several consecutive minutes.

[0018] In yet another embodiment, the method further includes terminating the protection mode of the NVD, and after the termination, for any packet destined for a compute instance from the set of one or more compute instances, sending the packet to the NVD instead of redirecting the packet to a DDoS scrubber system.

[0019] In various embodiments, a system is provided that includes one or more data processors and a non-transitory computer-readable medium containing instructions that, when executed on the one or more data processors, cause the one or more data processors to perform some or all of one or more of the methods disclosed herein.

[0020] In one embodiment, a technique is provided that includes a method including: monitoring network traffic received by a first virtual network interface card (VNIC) associated with a first compute instance in an overlay network provided by a cloud service provider infrastructure, where the network traffic is destined for the first compute instance; initiating a protection mode for the first VNIC to protect the first VNIC from potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks based at least in part on the monitoring; and causing one or more packets destined for the first compute instance to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system while the first VNIC is in the protection mode instead of being sent to a first network virtualization device (NVD) implementing the first VNIC, wherein the first VNIC is associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, and the first overlay address is associated with a substrate address associated with the NVD implementing the first VNIC.

[0021] In one embodiment, a technique is provided that includes a method including: monitoring network traffic received by a plurality of network resources in one or more overlay networks provided by a cloud service provider infrastructure, where the network traffic is destined for a first compute instance; initiating a protection mode of a first network resource from the plurality of network resources to protect the first network resource from a potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack based at least in part on the monitoring, where the first network resource is associated with the first compute instance; and causing one or more packets destined for the first compute instance to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the first network resource while the first network resource is in the protection mode.

[0022] In various embodiments, a non-transitory computer-readable medium stores computer-executable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause one or more processors of a computer system to perform one or more methods disclosed herein.

[0023] In various embodiments, a computer program product includes computer programs / instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform any of the methods disclosed herein.

[0024] The techniques described above and below can be implemented in many ways and in many contexts. Several example implementations and contexts are provided with reference to the following figures, as described in further detail below. However, the following implementations and contexts are only some of the many implementations and contexts. [Brief explanation of the drawings]

[0025] [Figure 1] 1 is a high-level diagram of a distributed environment illustrating a virtual or overlay cloud network hosted by a cloud service provider infrastructure, according to an embodiment. [Figure 2] FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified architectural diagram of physical components in a physical network within a CSPI, according to an embodiment. [Figure 3] FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary arrangement within CSPI in which a host machine is connected to multiple network virtualization devices (NVDs), according to an embodiment. [Figure 4] A diagram illustrating connections between a host machine and an NVD to achieve I / O virtualization to support multi-tenancy functionality in accordance with one embodiment. [Figure 5] FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a physical network provided by CSPI, according to one embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary architecture for Overlay Network DDoS Mitigation (ONDMS), according to an embodiment. [Figure 7A] 10 is a flowchart illustrating a process flow for entering a protection mode for a network resource, according to an embodiment. [Figure 7B] 10 is a flowchart illustrating a process flow for exiting protection mode for a network resource, according to an embodiment. [Figure 8] 10 is a flowchart illustrating a process flow for individual VNIC protected mode, according to an embodiment. [Figure 9] 1 is a flowchart illustrating a process flow for a protected mode of a network virtualization device (NVD, e.g., a smart NIC), according to an embodiment. [Figure 10] 10 is a flowchart illustrating packet redirection in protected mode for an individual VNIC, according to an embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment. [Figure 12] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment. [Figure 13] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment. [Figure 14] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment. [Figure 15] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computer system according to at least one embodiment. [Figure 16]1 is a flowchart illustrating a generalized process flow for a protected mode of a network virtualization device (NVD, e.g., a smart NIC), according to one embodiment. [Figure 17] 1 is a flowchart illustrating a generalized process flow for individual VNIC protection mode, according to an embodiment. [Figure 18] 1 is a flowchart illustrating a generalized process flow for a protection mode of a network resource, according to one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0026] Detailed Description In the following description, for purposes of explanation, specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of certain embodiments. However, it will be apparent that various embodiments may be practiced without these specific details. The figures and descriptions are not intended to be limiting. The word "exemplary" is used herein to mean "serving as an example, instance, or illustration." Any embodiment or design described herein as "exemplary" is not necessarily to be construed as preferred or advantageous over other embodiments or designs.

[0027] The present disclosure relates generally to computer and network security, and more particularly to techniques for preventing or mitigating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in overlay networks. More particularly, a novel overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) for performing DDoS attack mitigation within a virtual network environment is described.

[0028] In one implementation, network traffic received by various networking resources (also referred to as network resources) in an overlay network provided by a cloud service provider (CSP) is monitored. The monitored networking resources may include logical resources such as virtual network interface cards (VNICs), physical resources such as network virtualization devices (NVDs), etc. For example, a packet destined for a particular compute instance (i.e., the particular compute instance is the packet's destination) may be sent to an NVD implementing a VNIC associated with the particular compute instance. Packets sent to that VNIC may be monitored. As another example, an NVD may implement multiple VNICs associated with multiple compute instances. Packets destined for the multiple compute instances are received by the NVD and then forwarded to the destination compute instance. The resource utilization and bandwidth of this NVD may be monitored.

[0029] A potential DDoS attack event is detected based on monitoring of network resources. Upon detection of a potential DDoS attack event directed at a particular network resource in the overlay network, the particular resource is transitioned into a protection mode. While in the protection mode, packets, instead of being received by the particular network resource, are redirected to one or more alternate destinations (e.g., DDoS scrubber systems) configured to filter and analyze the packets and, if necessary, perform appropriate mitigation actions. In one implementation, one or more shadow VNICs are created for the network resource to be protected, and the shadow VNICs cause the redirection of network traffic to the DDoS scrubber systems. In this manner, the network resource is protected from potential DDoS attacks.

[0030] In public clouds, virtual networks play a key role in resource utilization, security, flexibility, scalability, and cost reduction. While various customers (or tenants) perceive themselves as having their own dedicated resources within the virtualized network, the customers actually run on shared resources with sufficient security and isolation. Cloud service providers (CSPs) often rely on well-behaved customers and proper use of equipment to avoid congestion. However, if one customer mistakenly or maliciously utilizes more resources than allocated or paid for, it can affect the experience of other customers. For example, one customer may send or receive an excessive amount of data over the network, causing congestion.

[0031] Networks are expensive and limited resources that can be constrained in two ways. One aspect is bandwidth (i.e., the number of gigabits per second (Gbps) on a network link). If some customers send or receive much more network traffic than their allocated bandwidth, these customers can prevent other customers from utilizing their fair share of the bandwidth. This raises concerns that excessive traffic will limit bandwidth and available computational resources in network virtualization devices (NVDs) (e.g., smart NICs).

[0032] Another aspect is the packet rate (e.g., packets per second or PPS). Because every packet sent or received needs to be processed and occupies computational resources, too many packets on the network can consume excessive computational resources, thereby constraining resources for other customers. For example, a customer may intentionally use some large instances to send a large number of packets to smaller instances, thereby overloading the targeted small instances. On the other hand, in some cases, a customer may inadvertently misconfigure network functions (e.g., virtual traffic access points (VTAPs)). In other situations, applications may not work properly. Such situations may cause some instances of cloud resources to generate a large amount of traffic directed to a single instance or to instances (e.g., VMs) that are too small.

[0033] From a virtual network perspective, there are two primary distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) risks: transmission risks and reception risks. On the transmission side, key concerns are transmitting at high packet rates, including control packets or other packets that require additional processing at high rates, or excessive bandwidth usage from a compute instance. These factors can lead to CPU exhaustion on the NVD and noisy neighbor problems for other users sharing the same instance. Another concern is bandwidth. If the transmitter bandwidth is higher than the receiver bandwidth, this can lead to congestion on the receiving side, which can be mitigated within the compute instance by throttling to drop some packets.

[0034] On the receiving side, one or more customers may send too much data or too many packets per second to the same destination VNIC or to different destination VNICs on the same NVD (e.g., smart NIC). Excessive data rates can cause congestion on the link between the top-of-rack (TOR) switch and the NVD, and excessive packet rates can cause CPU exhaustion on the NVD. In the example shown, consider a situation where traffic is sent by many sender instances. Each instance sends traffic within its allowed limit, but the aggregate traffic of all sender instances exceeds the limit on the receiving side. Assume that each compute instance is allowed to send or receive 10 Gbps of traffic. Therefore, each of the 10 compute instances sending 10 Gbps of traffic is legal. However, if all 10 compute instances send traffic to a single compute instance, the aggregate traffic becomes 100 Gbps, far exceeding the receiving limit of the receiving compute instance. Furthermore, assume that the receiving compute instances are on a server that shares other instances in a real application cluster (RAC). In that case, other instances may be affected by aggregated traffic exceeding this limit.

[0035] Some common DDoS-like issues stem from misconfigurations of features such as virtual traffic access points and incorrect application behavior, causing excessive traffic to small instances (e.g., virtual machines). Such issues may require the CSP to become aware of the problem before they can fix it. Resolving the issue is therefore a time-consuming process. If the issue recurs or becomes a real concern, the CSP may be able to block the customer or terminate the customer's account to prevent further issues. These techniques are reactive and reactive after the fact.

[0036] As indicated above, this specification describes a novel overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) for performing DDoS attack mitigation within a virtual network environment. The ONDMS monitors networking resources, including their usage and utilization. Based on this monitoring, the ONDMS determines whether and when a protection mode is initiated for a particular network resource. When a protection mode is initiated for a particular network device, packets are redirected to one or more alternate destinations, such as a scrubber system that is part of the ONDMS, instead of being received by the particular network. The scrubber system is configured to filter and analyze the packets and take appropriate mitigation action as needed. In one implementation, one or more shadow VNICs are created for the network resource to be protected, and the shadow VNICs cause network traffic to be redirected to the ONDMS. In this manner, the network resource is protected from potential DDoS attacks.

[0037] Various network resources may be protected using the ONDMS described in this disclosure. Examples include one or more VNICs, NVDs, etc. For example, network traffic received by a particular VNIC may be monitored. Based on the results of the monitoring or during the monitoring, a protection mode is initiated. In an aspect, based on the monitoring, a particular VNIC may be detected as being under attack if a threshold related to the amount of traffic or available bandwidth associated with the VNIC is met or exceeded. A protection mode is initiated for the particular VNIC upon detecting that the particular VNIC may be under a DDoS attack. In this protection mode, a shadow VNIC is created for the particular VNIC. Information related to the shadow VNIC is published so that all network traffic (e.g., packets) received by the particular VNIC is instead redirected to the shadow VNIC. The shadow VNIC may be implemented by one or more systems of a device different from the system or device implementing the particular VNIC. In this manner, traffic is diverted to a device or system (referred to as a DDoS scrubber system) different from the device or system implementing the particular VNIC. In this way, a particular VNIC, a device (eg, NVD) or a system (eg, host machine) implementing the particular VNIC is protected from potential DDoS attacks.

[0038] The DDoS scrubber system that receives the redirected packets is configured to analyze the redirected packets and perform appropriate mitigation actions. Examples of mitigation actions may include dropping all packets while in protection mode, filtering packets so that only some filtered packets reach a particular VNIC that is the packet's intended destination, throttling packets so that a reduced rate of packets is sent to the particular VNIC, etc. In one implementation, the DDoS scrubber system includes multiple machines (e.g., a fleet of host machines) configured to run or implement multiple shadow VNICs.

[0039] As another example, network traffic received by a particular NVD may be monitored. The NVD may run or implement one or more VNICs. Based on the results of the monitoring or during the monitoring, a protection mode is initiated. In an aspect, based on the monitoring, a particular NVD may be detected to be under attack if a threshold related to the traffic volume or available bandwidth associated with the particular NVD is met or exceeded. A protection mode is initiated for the particular NVD upon detecting that the particular NVD may be under a DDoS attack. In this protection mode, one or more shadow VNICs are created for all VNICs implemented (or executed) by the particular NVD. In one implementation, a single shadow VNIC is created for all VNICs executed by the particular NVD. In another implementation, one or more shadow VNICs are created for VNICs executed by the particular NVD, such as one shadow VNIC per VNIC. Information related to the one or more shadow VNICs is published such that all network traffic (e.g., packets) received by the particular VNIC implemented / executed by the particular NVD are instead redirected to the shadow VNIC. A shadow VNIC may be implemented by one or more systems on a different device than the specific NVD. In this way, traffic is diverted from the NVD under potential DDoS attack to a different device or system, called a DDoS scrubber system. In this way, the specific NVD under attack is protected.

[0040] When continuously monitoring a network resource that has entered the protection mode, it may be determined that the network resource can be transitioned from the protection mode to a normal operation mode. In the normal operation mode, the shadow VNIC created for the VNIC or NVD is deleted, and information about the original VNIC is made public. As a result, communication of network traffic (e.g., packets) received by the original VNIC resumes without being redirected.

[0041] The new technology disclosed in this disclosure provides multiple advantages. Upon detecting a potential DDoS attack, the ONDMS enters protection mode to protect specific network resources. The protection mode utilizes a highly scalable DDoS scrubber system that includes multiple machines (e.g., a fleet of host machines) configured to run or implement one or more shadow VNICs to perform mitigation actions. Once the potential DDoS attack no longer exists, the ONDMS may return to normal operating mode. The DDoS mitigation process is transparent to the customer and does not involve operator intervention.

[0042] Another benefit is that, if we imagine a scenario without a separate shadow VNIC, the protected VNIC implemented by the NVD would only need to perform filtering to send 1 Gbps to each customer's compute instance at that bandwidth. However, if the aggregate traffic going to the protected VNIC reaches 100 Gbps against its 1 Gbps receiving limit, the protected VNIC could become overloaded. This situation means that each compute instance that should receive 1 Gbps of the total 100 Gbps on the network link no longer receives anything, and other compute instances cannot receive traffic either. Furthermore, packets from other customers sharing the same compute instance may be dropped and impacted by the inefficient filtering of the protected VNIC. Therefore, the impact of noisy neighbors can be mitigated by utilizing a shadow VNIC implemented by a DDoS scrubber system with more compute power, bandwidth, and dedicated mitigation capabilities (e.g., dropping, filtering, and throttling).

[0043] Finally, these new technologies can proactively redirect network traffic to the SD-VNIC to perform additional filtering, rather than waiting until a network traffic problem is analyzed and a decision is made to take action. For example, if a DDoS attack initially impacts a portion of the CSPI and leads to a noisy neighbor problem, passive reaction and network analysis may require more effort to identify the cause. The technology described in this disclosure can proactively take action by monitoring network traffic and performing DDoS attack mitigation to prevent further disruption.

[0044] Figures 1-5 and the associated description provided in the "Exemplary Virtual Network Architecture" section below describe network concepts, including network virtualization, substrate networks, overlay networks, VNICs, etc., and provide example environments in which certain embodiments described in this disclosure may be implemented. Figures 6-9 describe examples and embodiments related to the ONDMS architecture described in this disclosure. Figures 10-13 illustrate example architectures for implementing cloud infrastructures for providing one or more cloud services, which may incorporate the teachings described herein. Figure 14 illustrates a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computer system or device, according to at least one embodiment.

[0045] Exemplary Virtual Network Architecture The term cloud services is typically used to refer to services made available on-demand (e.g., through a subscription model) by a cloud service provider (CSP) to users or customers using systems and infrastructure (cloud infrastructure) provided by the CSP. Typically, the servers and systems that make up the CSP's infrastructure are separate from the customer's own on-premises servers and systems. Thus, customers can use cloud services provided by the CSP without having to purchase separate hardware and software resources for the service. Cloud services are designed to provide subscribing customers with easy and scalable access to applications and computing resources without requiring the customer to invest in procuring the infrastructure used to deliver the service.

[0046] There are multiple cloud service providers offering different types of cloud services. There are various types or models of cloud services, including Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), etc.

[0047] A customer can subscribe to one or more cloud services offered by a CSP. A customer can be any entity, such as an individual, an organization, or a business. When a customer subscribes or registers for a service offered by a CSP, a tenancy or account is created for that customer. The account then enables the customer to access one or more subscribed cloud resources associated with the account.

[0048] As mentioned above, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is a specific type of cloud computing service. In the IaaS model, a CSP provides infrastructure (called cloud services provider infrastructure or CSPI) that can be used by customers to build their own customizable networks and deploy their resources. Therefore, the customer's resources and network are hosted in a distributed environment by the infrastructure provided by the CSP. This differs from traditional computing, where the customer's resources and network are hosted by the infrastructure provided by the customer.

[0049] CSPI can comprise interconnected, high-performance computing resources, including various host machines, memory resources, and network resources that form a physical network, also known as a substrate network or underlay network. Resources in CSPI can be distributed across one or more data centers, which can be geographically distributed across one or more geographic regions. Virtualization software can be run by these physical resources to provide a virtualized, distributed environment. This virtualization creates an overlay network (also known as a software-based network, software-defined network, or virtual network) on top of the physical network. The CSPI physical network provides the underlying foundation upon which one or more overlay or virtual networks can be created on top of the physical network. The physical network (or substrate or underlay network) includes physical network devices such as physical switches, routers, computers, and host machines. An overlay network is a logical (or virtual) network that operates on top of the physical substrate network. A particular physical network can support one or more overlay networks. Overlay networks typically use encapsulation techniques to distinguish traffic belonging to different overlay networks. A virtual network or overlay network is also called a virtual cloud network (VCN). A virtual network is implemented using software virtualization technologies (e.g., hypervisors, network virtualization devices (NVDs) (e.g., smart NICs), top-of-rack (TOR) switches, virtualization functions performed by smart TORs that perform one or more functions performed by NVDs, and other mechanisms) to create a layer of network abstraction that can run on top of a physical network. Virtual networks can take many forms, including peer-to-peer networks, IP networks, etc.Virtual networks are typically either Layer 3 IP networks or Layer 2 VLANs. This method of virtual or overlay networking is often called a virtual Layer 3 network or an overlay Layer 3 network. Examples of protocols developed for virtual networks include IP-in-IP (or Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)), Virtual Extensible LAN (VXLAN - IETF RFC 7348), Virtual Private Networks (VPN) (e.g., MPLS Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (RFC 4364)), VMware's NSX, and Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation (GENEVE).

[0050] In the case of IaaS, the infrastructure provided by the CSP (CSPI) may be configured to provide virtualized computing resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet). In the IaaS model, a cloud computing service provider may host infrastructure components (e.g., servers, storage devices, network nodes (e.g., hardware), deployment software, platform virtualization (e.g., hypervisor layer), etc.). In some cases, the IaaS provider may offer various services (e.g., billing, monitoring, logging, security, load balancing, clustering, etc.) incidental to those infrastructure components. Accordingly, these services may be policy-driven, allowing IaaS users to implement policies to drive load balancing and maintain application availability and performance. CSPI provides infrastructure and a set of complementary cloud services that enable customers to build and run a wide range of applications and services within a highly available, hosted, distributed environment. CSPI provides high-performance computing resources and computing power as well as storage capacity within a flexible virtual network that can be securely accessed from various networked locations, such as from the customer's on-premises network. When a customer subscribes or registers for an IaaS service offered by a CSP, the tenancy created for that customer is a secure, isolated partition within the CSP where the customer can create, organize, and manage their cloud resources.

[0051] Customers can build their own virtual networks using the compute, memory, and network resources provided by CSPI. One or more customer resources or workloads, such as compute instances, can be deployed into these virtual networks. For example, customers can build one or more customizable private virtual networks called virtual cloud networks (VCNs) using resources provided by CSPI. Customers can deploy one or more customer resources, such as compute instances, into their VCNs. Compute instances can take the form of virtual machines, bare metal instances, etc. Thus, CSPI provides infrastructure and a set of complementary cloud services that enable customers to build and run a wide range of applications and services within a highly available, hosted virtual environment. While customers do not manage or control the underlying physical resources provided by CSPI, they have control over the operating system, storage, deployed applications, and in some cases, limited control over selected network components (e.g., firewalls).

[0052] The CSP may provide a console that allows customers and network administrators to configure, access, and manage resources deployed in the cloud using CSPI resources. In one embodiment, the console provides a web-based user interface that can be used to access and manage the CSPI. In some implementations, the console is a web-based application provided by the CSP.

[0053] CSPI may support single-tenancy or multi-tenancy architectures. In a single-tenancy architecture, a software component (e.g., an application, a database) or a hardware component (e.g., a host machine or server) serves a single customer or tenant. In a multi-tenancy architecture, a software component or hardware component serves multiple customers or tenants. Thus, in a multi-tenancy architecture, CSPI resources are shared among multiple customers or tenants. In a multi-tenancy situation, precautions are taken and safeguards are implemented within CSPI to ensure that each tenant's data remains isolated and invisible to other tenants.

[0054] In a physical network, a network endpoint (“endpoint”) refers to a computing device or system that is connected to the physical network and communicates with the connected network. Network endpoints in a physical network may be connected to a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), or other types of physical networks. Examples of traditional endpoints in a physical network include modems, hubs, bridges, switches, routers, and other network devices, physical computers (or host machines), and the like. Each physical device in a physical network has a fixed network address that can be used to communicate with the device. This fixed network address can be a Layer 2 address (e.g., a MAC address), a fixed Layer 3 address (e.g., an IP address), and the like. In a virtual environment or virtual network, endpoints can include various virtual endpoints, such as virtual machines hosted by components of the physical network (e.g., hosted by a physical host machine). These endpoints in the virtual network are addressed by overlay addresses, such as overlay Layer 2 addresses (e.g., an overlay MAC address) and overlay Layer 3 addresses (e.g., an overlay IP address). Network overlays enable flexibility by allowing network administrators to move between overlay addresses associated with network endpoints using software management (e.g., by software implementing the virtual network's control plane). Thus, unlike physical networks, in virtual networks, overlay addresses (e.g., overlay IP addresses) can be moved from one endpoint to another using network management software. Because virtual networks are built on top of physical networks, communication between components in a virtual network involves both the virtual network and the underlying physical network.To facilitate such communications, CSPI components are configured to learn and store mappings that map overlay addresses in the virtual network to actual physical addresses in the substrate network, and vice versa. These mappings are then used to facilitate communications. Customer traffic is encapsulated to facilitate routing within the virtual network.

[0055] Thus, a physical address (e.g., a physical IP address) is associated with a component in a physical network, and an overlay address (e.g., an overlay IP address) is associated with an entity in a virtual or overlay network. A physical IP address is an IP address associated with a physical device (e.g., a network device) in a substrate or physical network. For example, each NVD has an associated physical IP address. An overlay IP address is an overlay address associated with an entity in an overlay network, such as associated with a compute instance in a customer's virtual cloud network (VCN). Two different customers or tenants, each with their own private VCN, could potentially use the same overlay IP address in their VCN without any knowledge of each other. Both physical IP addresses and overlay IP addresses are types of real IP addresses. These IP addresses exist separately from virtual IP addresses. A virtual IP address is typically a single IP address that represents or maps to multiple real IP addresses. A virtual IP address provides a one-to-many mapping between a virtual IP address and multiple real IP addresses. For example, a load balancer may use a VIP to map to or represent multiple servers, each with its own real IP address.

[0056] A cloud infrastructure or CSPI is physically hosted in one or more data centers in one or more regions around the world. The CSPI may include components in a physical or substrate network and virtual components (e.g., virtual networks, compute instances, virtual machines, etc.) in a virtual network built on top of the physical network components. In one embodiment, the CSPI is organized and hosted in realms, regions, and availability domains. A region is a local geographic area that typically contains one or more data centers. Regions are generally independent of each other and may be separated by vast distances, for example, spanning multiple countries or continents. For example, a first region may be in Australia, another region may be in Japan, yet another region may be in India, etc. CSPI resources are divided among regions so that each region contains its own independent subset of CSPI resources. Each region may provide a set of core infrastructure services and resources, such as compute resources (e.g., bare metal servers, virtual machines, containers, and related infrastructure), storage resources (e.g., block volume storage, file storage, object storage, archive storage), network resources (e.g., virtual cloud networks (VCNs), load balancing resources, connectivity to on-premises networks), database resources, edge network resources (e.g., DNS), and access management and monitoring resources. Each region typically has multiple paths connecting it to other regions within the realm.

[0057] Because using nearby resources is faster than using resources that are farther away, applications are typically deployed in the region where they are most frequently used (i.e., deployed to the infrastructure associated with that region). Applications may also be deployed in different regions for a variety of reasons, such as redundancy to mitigate the risk of region-wide events such as large weather systems or earthquakes, to meet changing requirements for legal jurisdictions, tax areas, and other business or societal criteria.

[0058] Data centers within a region may be further organized and subdivided into availability domains (ADs). An availability domain may correspond to one or more data centers located within a region. A region may be composed of one or more availability domains. In such a distributed environment, CSPI resources are either specific to a region, such as a virtual cloud network (VCN), or specific to an availability domain, such as a compute instance.

[0059] ADs within a region are isolated from each other, fault-tolerant, and configured to be highly unlikely to fail simultaneously. This is achieved by ADs that do not share critical infrastructure resources, such as networks, physical cables, cable routes, or cable entry points, so that a failure in one AD within a region is unlikely to affect the availability of other ADs in the same region. ADs within the same region may be connected to each other by low-latency, high-bandwidth networks that provide highly available connectivity to other networks (e.g., the Internet, customer on-premises networks, etc.) and enable the creation of replicated systems in multiple ADs for both high availability and disaster recovery. Cloud services use multiple ADs to ensure high availability and protect against resource failures. As the infrastructure provided by an IaaS provider grows, more regions and ADs with additional capacity may be added. Traffic between availability domains is typically encrypted.

[0060] In one embodiment, regions are grouped into realms. A realm is a logical collection of regions. Realms are isolated from each other and do not share any data. Regions within the same realm may communicate with each other, but regions in different realms cannot. A customer's tenancy or account, along with a CSP, exists within a single realm and can be distributed across one or more regions belonging to that realm. Typically, when a customer subscribes to an IaaS service, a tenancy or account is created for the customer in a region designated by the customer within the realm (called the "home" region). The customer can extend their tenancy across one or more other regions within the realm. A customer cannot access regions that are not within the realm in which the customer's tenancy resides.

[0061] An IaaS provider may offer multiple realms, each catering to the requirements of a particular set of customers or users. For example, a commercial realm may be offered to commercial customers. As another example, a realm may be offered to a particular country for customers in that country. As yet another example, a government realm may be offered to a government, etc. For example, the government realm may cater to specific government requirements and may have higher security than the commercial realm. For example, Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) currently offers two realms: one for a commercial region and one for a government cloud region (e.g., FedRAMP-certified and IL5-certified).

[0062] In one embodiment, an AD can be subdivided into one or more failure domains. A failure domain is a group of infrastructure resources within an AD to provide anti-affinity. Fault domains enable the distribution of compute instances so that multiple compute instances do not reside on the same physical hardware within a single AD. This distribution is known as anti-affinity. A failure domain refers to a set of hardware components (computers, switches, etc.) that share a single point of failure. A compute pool is logically divided into failure domains. Therefore, a hardware failure or compute hardware maintenance event that affects one failure domain does not affect instances in other failure domains. Depending on the embodiment, the number of failure domains per AD may vary. For example, in one embodiment, each AD includes three failure domains. Fault domains act as logical data centers within an AD.

[0063] When a customer subscribes to an IaaS service, resources from CSPI are provisioned for the customer and associated with the customer's tenancy. The customer can use these provisioned resources to build private networks and deploy resources into these networks. A customer's network hosted in the cloud by CSPI is called a virtual cloud network (VCN). A customer can configure one or more virtual cloud networks (VCNs) using the CSPI resources allocated to the customer. A VCN is a virtual private network or software-defined private network. The customer's resources deployed within a customer's VCN can include compute instances (e.g., virtual machines, bare metal instances) and other resources. These compute instances may represent various customer workloads, such as applications, load balancers, databases, etc. Compute instances deployed in a VCN can communicate with endpoints publicly accessible over public networks such as the Internet ("public endpoints"), with other instances in the same VCN or other VCNs (e.g., other VCNs of the customer or VCNs not belonging to the customer), with the customer's on-premises data center or network, and with service endpoints and other types of endpoints.

[0064] CSPs may offer various services using CSPI. In some cases, customers of a CSPI may act as service providers themselves and offer services using CSPI resources. Service providers may expose service endpoints characterized by identifying information (e.g., IP addresses, DNS names, and DNS ports). Customer resources (e.g., compute instances) can consume a particular service by accessing the service endpoint exposed by the service for that service. These service endpoints are generally publicly accessible by users over a public communications network, such as the Internet, using the public IP address associated with the endpoint. Publicly accessible network endpoints are sometimes referred to as public endpoints.

[0065] In one embodiment, a service provider may expose a service via an endpoint for the service (sometimes referred to as a service endpoint). Customers of the service can then access the service using this service endpoint. In some implementations, a service endpoint provided for a service can be accessed by multiple customers wishing to consume the service. In other implementations, a dedicated service endpoint may be provided to a customer, allowing only that customer to access the service using that dedicated service endpoint.

[0066] In one embodiment, when a VCN is created, it is associated with a private overlay Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) address space, which is a range of private overlay IP addresses (e.g., 10.0 / 16) that is assigned to the VCN. A VCN includes associated subnets, route tables, and gateways. A VCN exists within a single region but can span one, more, or all of the region's availability domains. A gateway is a virtual interface configured for a VCN that enables traffic to and from the VCN to one or more endpoints outside the VCN. One or more different types of gateways may be configured for a VCN to enable communication with different types of endpoints.

[0067] A VCN can be subdivided into one or more subnetworks, such as one or more subnets. A subnet is thus a unit of configuration or subdivision that can be created within a VCN. A VCN can contain one or more subnets. Each subnet in a VCN is associated with a contiguous range of overlay IP addresses (e.g., 10.0.0.0 / 24 and 10.0.1.0 / 24) that represents a subset of address space within the VCN's address space and does not overlap with other subnets in that VCN.

[0068] Each compute instance is associated with a virtual network interface card (VNIC) that allows the compute instance to participate in a subnet of a VCN. A VNIC is a logical representation of a physical network interface card (NIC). In general, a VNIC is an interface between an entity (e.g., a compute instance, a service) and a virtual network. A VNIC resides in a subnet and has one or more associated IP addresses and associated security rules or policies. A VNIC is equivalent to a Layer 2 port on a switch. A VNIC is connected to a compute instance and to a subnet within a VCN. A VNIC associated with a compute instance allows the compute instance to become part of a subnet of a VCN and enables the compute instance to communicate (e.g., send and receive packets) with endpoints on the same subnet as the compute instance, endpoints in a different subnet within the VCN, or endpoints outside the VCN. Thus, the VNIC associated with a compute instance determines how the compute instance connects with endpoints inside and outside the VCN. A VNIC for a compute instance is created and associated with the compute instance when the compute instance is created and added to a subnet in a VCN. For a subnet containing a set of compute instances, the subnet contains VNICs corresponding to the set of compute instances, and each VNIC connects to one compute instance in the set of compute instances.

[0069] Each compute instance is assigned a private overlay IP address through the VNIC associated with the compute instance. This private overlay IP address is assigned to the VNIC associated with the compute instance when the compute instance is created and is used to route traffic to and from the compute instance. All VNICs within a particular subnet use the same route table, security lists, and DHCP options. As previously mentioned, each subnet within a VCN is associated with a contiguous range of overlay IP addresses (e.g., 10.0.0.0 / 24 and 10.0.1.0 / 24) that represents a subset of address space within the VCN's address space that does not overlap with other subnets within that VCN. For a VNIC on a particular subnet of a VCN, the private overlay IP address assigned to the VNIC is an address from the contiguous range of overlay IP addresses assigned to that subnet.

[0070] In one embodiment, a compute instance may optionally be assigned an additional overlay IP address in addition to the private overlay IP address, such as one or more public IP addresses if it is in a public subnet. These multiple addresses may be assigned to the same VNIC or across multiple VNICs associated with the compute instance. However, each instance has a primary VNIC that is created during instance launch and associated with the overlay private IP address assigned to the instance, and this primary VNIC cannot be removed. Additional VNICs, called secondary VNICs, may be added to an existing instance in the same availability domain as the primary VNIC. All VNICs are in the same availability domain as the instance. The secondary VNICs can be in a subnet in the same VCN as the primary VNIC or in a different subnet, either in the same VCN or in a different VCN.

[0071] If a compute instance is in a public subnet, the compute instance may optionally be assigned a public IP address. When a subnet is created, it can be specified as either a public subnet or a private subnet. A private subnet means that resources (e.g., compute instances) and associated VNICs in the subnet cannot have public overlay IP addresses. A public subnet means that resources and associated VNICs in the subnet can have public IP addresses. Customers can specify a subnet to exist in a single availability domain or across multiple availability domains within a region or realm.

[0072] As mentioned above, a VCN may be subdivided into one or more subnets. In one embodiment, a virtual router (VR) configured for a VCN (referred to as a VCN VR or simply VR) enables communication between subnets of the VCN. For a subnet within a VCN, the VR represents the logical gateway for that subnet, allowing the subnet (i.e., the compute instances on that subnet) to communicate with endpoints on other subnets within the VCN and with other endpoints outside the VCN. A VCN VR is a logical entity configured to route traffic between VNICs within a VCN and a virtual gateway ("gateway") associated with the VCN. Gateways are further described below with respect to FIG. 1. A VCN VR is a Layer 3 / IP layer concept. In one embodiment, there is one VCN VR per VCN, and the VCN VR has a potentially unlimited number of ports addressed by IP addresses, one port for each subnet of the VCN. In this way, the VCN VR has a different IP address for each subnet within the VCN to which the VCN VR is connected. The VRs are also connected to various gateways configured for the VCN. In one embodiment, a specific overlay IP address from a subnet's overlay IP address range is reserved for ports in that subnet's VCN VR. For example, consider a VCN that includes two subnets with associated address ranges 10.0 / 16 and 10.1 / 16, respectively. For the first subnet in the VCN with address range 10.0 / 16, an address from this range is reserved for ports in that subnet's VCN VR. In some cases, the first IP address from this range may be reserved for a VCN VR. For example, for a subnet with overlay IP address range 10.0 / 16, IP address 10.0.0.1 may be reserved for ports in that subnet's VCN VR.For a second subnet in the same VCN with address range 10.1 / 16, the VCN VR may have a port in that second subnet with IP address 10.1.0.1. The VCN VR has a different IP address for each of the subnets in the VCN.

[0073] In some other embodiments, each subnet in a VCN may include a VR associated with it that is addressable by the subnet using a reserved or default IP address associated with the VR. The reserved or default IP address may, for example, be the first IP address from a range of IP addresses associated with the subnet. VNICs in a subnet can use this default or reserved IP address to communicate with (e.g., send and receive packets from) the VR associated with the subnet. In such embodiments, a VR is an ingress / egress point for that subnet. VRs associated with a subnet in a VCN can communicate with other VRs associated with other subnets in the VCN. VRs can also communicate with gateways associated with the VCN. The VR functions for a subnet are running on or performed by one or more NVDs that are performing the VNIC functions for VNICs in the subnet.

[0074] Route tables, security rules, and DHCP options may be configured for a VCN. A route table is a virtual route table for a VCN and contains rules for routing traffic from subnets within the VCN to destinations outside the VCN via gateways or specially configured instances. A VCN's route table can be customized to control how packets are forwarded / routed to and from the VCN. DHCP options refer to configuration information that is automatically provided to instances when they launch.

[0075] Security rules configured for a VCN represent the overlay firewall rules for the VCN. Security rules include ingress and egress rules and can specify the type of traffic (e.g., based on protocol and port) allowed in and out of instances within the VCN. Customers can choose whether a particular rule is stateful or stateless. For example, a customer can allow incoming SSH traffic from any location to a set of instances by configuring a stateful ingress rule with source CIDR 0.0.0.0 / 0 and destination TCP port 22. Security rules can be implemented using network security groups or security lists. A network security group consists of a set of security rules that apply only to resources within that group. A security list, on the other hand, contains rules that apply to all resources in any subnet that uses the security list. A VCN may have a default security list that contains default security rules. DHCP options configured for a VCN provide configuration information that is automatically provided to instances within the VCN when the instances launch.

[0076] In one embodiment, configuration information for a VCN is determined and stored by a VCN control plane. The configuration information for a VCN may include, for example, information about address ranges associated with the VCN, subnets and associated information within the VCN, one or more VRs associated with the VCN, compute instances and associated VNICs within the VCN, NVDs (e.g., VNICs, VRs, gateways) performing various virtualized network functions associated with the VCN, VCN state information, and other VCN-related information. In one embodiment, a VCN distribution service publishes the configuration information stored by the VCN control plane or portions thereof to the NVD. The distributed information may be used to update information (e.g., forwarding tables, routing tables, etc.) stored and used by the NVD to forward packets to and from compute instances within the VCN.

[0077] In one embodiment, VCN and subnet creation is handled by a VCN Control Plane (CP), and compute instance launch is handled by the Compute Control Plane. The Compute Control Plane is responsible for allocating physical resources to compute instances and then calls the VCN Control Plane to create and attach VNICs to the compute instances. The VCN CP also sends VCN data mappings to a VCN Data Plane configured to perform packet forwarding and routing functions. In one embodiment, the VCN CP provides a distribution service that is responsible for providing updates to the VCN Data Plane. Examples of VCN Control Planes are also shown in Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 (see reference numbers 1116, 1216, 1316, and 1416) and are described below.

[0078] A customer may create one or more VCNs using resources hosted by CSPI. Compute instances deployed in a customer's VCN may communicate with various endpoints. These endpoints may include endpoints hosted by CSPI and endpoints external to CSPI.

[0079] Various different architectures for implementing cloud-based services using CSPI are shown in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, and 15 and are described below. Figure 1 is a high-level diagram of a distributed environment 100 illustrating an overlay VCN or customer VCN hosted by CSPI according to an embodiment. The distributed environment shown in Figure 1 includes multiple components within an overlay network. The distributed environment 100 shown in Figure 1 is merely an example and is not intended to unduly limit the scope of the claimed embodiments. Many variations, alternatives, and modifications are possible. For example, in some implementations, the distributed environment shown in Figure 1 may include more or fewer systems or components than those shown in Figure 1, may combine two or more subsystems, or may include a different configuration or arrangement of systems.

[0080] As shown in the example depicted in FIG. 1 , distributed environment 100 includes CSPI 101, which provides services and resources that customers can subscribe to and use to build their own virtual cloud networks (VCNs). In one embodiment, CSPI 101 provides IaaS services to subscribing customers. Data centers within CSPI 101 may be organized into one or more regions. One exemplary region, “Region US” 102, is shown in FIG. 1 . A customer configures their VCN 104 with respect to region 102. The customer may deploy various compute instances into VCN 104, which may include virtual machines or bare metal instances. Example instances include applications, databases, load balancers, etc.

[0081] In the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 , customer VCN 104 includes two subnets, "Subnet 1" and "Subnet 2," each with its own CIDR IP address range. In FIG. 1 , Subnet 1's overlay IP address range is 10.0 / 16, and Subnet 2's address range is 10.1 / 16. VCN virtual router 105 represents the VCN's logical gateway, enabling communication between subnets in VCN 104 and with other endpoints outside the VCN. VCN VR 105 is configured to route traffic between VNICs in VCN 104 and the gateway associated with VCN 104. VCN VR 105 provides a port for each subnet in VCN 104. For example, VR 105 may provide a port with IP address 10.0.0.1 for Subnet 1 and a port with IP address 10.1.0.1 for Subnet 2.

[0082] Multiple compute instances may be deployed in each subnet, and the compute instances can be virtual machine instances and / or bare metal instances. The compute instances in a subnet may be hosted by one or more host machines in CSPI101. A compute instance joins a subnet through a VNIC associated with the compute instance. For example, as shown in FIG. 1, compute instance C1 becomes part of subnet 1 through a VNIC associated with the compute instance. Similarly, compute instance C2 becomes part of subnet 1 through a VNIC associated with C2. In a similar manner, multiple compute instances, which may be virtual machine instances or bare metal instances, may become part of subnet 1. Each compute instance is assigned a private overlay IP address and a MAC address through its associated VNIC. For example, in FIG. 1, compute instance C1 has an overlay IP address of 10.0.0.2 and a MAC address of M1, while compute instance C2 has a private overlay IP address of 10.0.0.3 and a MAC address of M2. Each compute instance in Subnet 1, including compute instances C1 and C2, has a default route to VCN VR105 using IP address 10.0.0.1, which is the IP address of a port in VCN VR105 in Subnet 1.

[0083] Subnet2 may have multiple compute instances deployed, including virtual machine instances and / or bare metal instances. For example, as shown in FIG. 1, compute instances D1 and D2 become part of Subnet2 through VNICs associated with the respective compute instances. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, compute instance D1 has an overlay IP address of 10.1.0.2 and a MAC address of MM1, while compute instance D2 has a private overlay IP address of 10.1.0.3 and a MAC address of MM2. Each compute instance in Subnet2, including compute instances D1 and D2, has a default route to VCN VR105 using IP address 10.1.0.1, which is the IP address of a port in VCN VR105 in Subnet2.

[0084] VCN A 104 may include one or more load balancers. For example, a load balancer may be provided for a subnet and configured to load balance traffic across multiple compute instances on the subnet. A load balancer may be provided to load balance traffic across multiple subnets within a VCN.

[0085] A particular compute instance deployed in VCN 104 can communicate with various endpoints. These endpoints may include endpoints hosted by CSPI 200 and endpoints outside of CSPI 200. Endpoints hosted by CSPI 101 may include endpoints on the same subnet as the particular compute instance (e.g., communication between two compute instances in Subnet 1), endpoints on a different subnet but within the same VCN (e.g., communication between a compute instance in Subnet 1 and a compute instance in Subnet 2), endpoints in a different VCN within the same region (e.g., communication between a compute instance in Subnet 1 and an endpoint in a VCN within the same region 106 or 110, communication between a compute instance in Subnet 1 and an endpoint within the service network 110 within the same region), or endpoints in a VCN in a different region (e.g., communication between a compute instance in Subnet 1 and an endpoint in a VCN in a different region 108). Compute instances in a subnet hosted by CSPI 101 may communicate with endpoints not hosted by CSPI 101 (i.e., outside of CSPI 101). These external endpoints include endpoints within the customer's on-premise network 116, endpoints within other remote cloud-hosted networks 118, public endpoints 114 accessible via public networks such as the Internet, and other endpoints.

[0086] Communication between compute instances on the same subnet is facilitated using VNICs associated with the source and destination compute instances. For example, compute instance C1 in Subnet 1 may want to send a packet to compute instance C2 in Subnet 1. For a packet originating from the source compute instance and destined for another compute instance in the same subnet, the packet is first processed by the VNIC associated with the source compute instance. The processing performed by the VNIC associated with the source compute instance may include determining the packet's destination information from the packet header, identifying any policies (e.g., security lists) configured for the VNIC associated with the source compute instance, determining the packet's next hop, performing any packet encapsulation / decapsulation functions as needed, and then forwarding / routing the packet to the next hop to facilitate communication of the packet with its intended destination. If the destination compute instance is in the same subnet as the source compute instance, the VNIC associated with the source compute instance is configured to identify the VNIC associated with the destination compute instance and forward the packet to that VNIC for processing. The VNIC associated with the destination compute instance then executes and forwards the packet to the destination compute instance.

[0087] For packets traveling from a compute instance in a subnet to an endpoint in a different subnet within the same VCN, this communication is facilitated by the VNICs and VCN VRs associated with the source and destination compute instances. For example, if compute instance C1 in Subnet 1 in Figure 1 wants to send a packet to compute instance D1 in Subnet 2, the packet is first processed by the VNIC associated with compute instance C1. The VNIC associated with compute instance C1 is configured to route the packet to VCN VR105 using the VCN VR's default route or port 10.0.0.1. VCN VR105 is configured to route the packet to Subnet 2 using port 10.1.0.1. The packet is then received and processed by the VNIC associated with D1, which forwards the packet to compute instance D1.

[0088] For packets traveling from a compute instance within VCN 104 to an endpoint outside VCN 104, the communication is facilitated by a VNIC associated with the source compute instance, VCN VR 105, and a gateway associated with VCN 104. One or more types of gateways may be associated with VCN 104. A gateway is an interface between a VCN and another endpoint, where the other endpoint is outside the VCN. A gateway is a Layer 3 / IP layer concept that allows a VCN to communicate with endpoints outside the VCN. Thus, a gateway facilitates traffic flow between a VCN and other VCNs or networks. Different types of gateways may be configured for a VCN to facilitate different types of communication with different types of endpoints. Depending on the gateway, the communication may go over a public network (e.g., the Internet) or a private network. Various communication protocols may be used for these communications.

[0089] For example, compute instance C1 may wish to communicate with an endpoint outside VCN 104. The packet may first be processed by a VNIC associated with the source compute instance C1. This VNIC processing determines that the packet's destination is outside of Subnet 1 of C1. The VNIC associated with C1 may forward the packet to VCN VR105 of VCN 104. VCN VR105 then processes the packet and, as part of this processing, determines a particular gateway associated with VCN 104 as the packet's next hop based on the packet's destination. VCN VR105 may then forward the packet to the particular identified gateway. For example, if the destination is an endpoint within a customer's on-premises network, VCN VR105 may forward the packet to a dynamic routing gateway (DRG) gateway 122 configured for VCN 104. The packet may then be forwarded from the gateway to the next hop to facilitate propagation of the packet to its final intended destination.

[0090] Various types of gateways may be configured for a VCN. Examples of gateways that may be configured for a VCN are shown in FIG. 1 and described below. Examples of gateways associated with a VCN are also shown in FIGS. 11, 12, 13, and 14 (e.g., gateways referenced by reference numbers 1134, 1136, 1138, 1234, 1236, 1238, 1334, 1336, 1338, 1434, 1436, and 1438) and described below. As shown in the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, a dynamic routing gateway (DRG) 122 may be added to or associated with a customer's VCN 104 to provide a path for private network traffic communication between the customer's VCN 104 and another endpoint, which could be the customer's on-premises network 116, a VCN 108 in a different region of CSPI 101, or another remote cloud network 118 not hosted by CSPI 101. The customer on-premises network 116 may be a customer network or a customer data center built using the customer's resources. Access to the customer on-premises network 116 is typically highly restricted. For customers with both a customer on-premises network 116 and one or more VCNs 104 deployed or hosted in the cloud by CSPI 101, the customer may want the customer on-premises network 116 and the customer's cloud-based VCNs 104 to be able to communicate with each other. This allows the customer to build an extended hybrid environment that encompasses the customer VCNs 104 hosted by CSPI 101 and the customer on-premises network 116. The DRG 122 enables this communication. To enable such communication, a communication channel 124 is set up, with one endpoint of the channel in the customer on-premises network 116 and the other endpoint in CSPI 101 connected to the customer VCN 104. The communication channel 124 can traverse a public or private communication network, such as the Internet.Various communication protocols may be used, such as IPsec VPN technology over a public communication network such as the Internet, or Oracle's FastConnect technology, which uses a private network instead of a public network. A device or equipment in the customer's on-premises network 116 that forms one endpoint of the communication channel 124 is called customer premise equipment (CPE), such as CPE 126 shown in Figure 1. On the CSPI 101 side, the endpoint may be a host machine running DRG 122.

[0091] In one embodiment, a Remote Peering Connection (RPC) can be added to a DRG, allowing a customer to peer one VCN with another VCN in a different region. Using such an RPC, a customer's VCN 104 can connect with a VCN 108 in another region using the DRG 122. The DRG 122 may also be used to communicate with other remote cloud networks 118 not hosted by CSPI 101, such as the Microsoft Azure cloud, the Amazon AWS cloud, etc.

[0092] 1, an Internet Gateway (IGW) 120 may be configured for a customer's VCN 104, enabling compute instances on VCN 104 to communicate with public endpoints 114 accessible over a public network, such as the Internet. IGW 120 is a gateway that connects a VCN to a public network, such as the Internet. IGW 120 enables direct access for public subnets within a VCN, such as VCN 104 (resources within the public subnet have public overlay IP addresses) to public endpoints 112 on the public network 114, such as the Internet. Using IGW 120, connections can be initiated from subnets within VCN 104 or from the Internet.

[0093] A Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway 128 is configured for customer VCN 104 to enable access to the Internet for cloud resources in the customer's VCN that do not have dedicated public overlay IP addresses, without exposing those resources to direct incoming Internet connections (e.g., L4-L7 connections). This allows private subnets in the VCN, such as Private Subnet 1 in VCN 104, to private endpoints on the Internet. The NAT gateway only allows connections to be initiated from the private subnet to the public Internet; connections cannot be initiated from the Internet to the private subnet.

[0094] In one embodiment, a service gateway (SGW) 126 may be configured for a customer's VCN 104 and provides a pathway for private network traffic between VCN 104 and supported service endpoints in service network 110. In one embodiment, service network 110 may be provided by a CSP and may offer a variety of services. An example of such a service network is Oracle's Services Network, which offers a variety of services that may be used by customers. For example, a compute instance (e.g., a database system) in a private subnet of a customer's VCN 104 can back up data to a service endpoint (e.g., object storage) without requiring a public IP address or access to the Internet. In one embodiment, a VCN may include only one SGW, and connections can be initiated only from subnets within the VCN, not from service network 110. When a VCN is peered with another VCN, resources in the other VCN typically do not have access to the SGW. Resources in an on-premises network connected to a VCN using a FastConnect or VPN connection can also use a service gateway configured for that VCN.

[0095] In one implementation, SGW 126 uses the concept of a service classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) label, which is a string that represents the public IP address range of all regions for a service or group of services of interest. A customer uses the service CIDR label when configuring the SGW and associated route rules to control traffic to the service. A customer can optionally utilize the service CIDR label when configuring security rules, avoiding the need to adjust those security rules if the service's public IP address changes in the future.

[0096] A Local Peering Gateway (LPG) 132 is a gateway that can be added to a customer's VCN 104, allowing the VCN 104 to peer with another VCN in the same region. Peering means that the VCNs communicate using private IP addresses without the traffic traversing a public network such as the Internet or routing the traffic through the customer's on-premises network 116. In a preferred embodiment, a VCN includes a separate LPG for each peering it establishes. Local peering or VCN peering is a common method used to establish network connectivity between different applications or infrastructure management functions.

[0097] A service provider, such as a provider of a service in service network 110, may provide access to the service using various access models. According to a public access model, the service may be exposed as a public endpoint, which may be publicly accessible by compute instances in the customer's VCN over a public network such as the Internet, and / or privately accessible through SGW 126. According to a specific private access model, the service is made accessible as a private IP endpoint in a private subnet in the customer's VCN. This access is called Private Endpoint (PE) access and allows service providers to expose services as instances in the customer's private network. A private endpoint resource represents a service in a customer's VCN. Each PE appears as a VNIC (referred to as a PE-VNIC with one or more private IPs) in a customer-selected subnet in the customer's VCN. Thus, the PE provides a way to present services in a subnet of the private customer's VCN using VNICs. Because the endpoints are exposed as VNICs, all features associated with the VNIC, such as routing rules, security lists, etc., are available to the PE VNIC.

[0098] A service provider can register a service to make it accessible through the PE. The provider can associate a policy with the service that limits the visibility of the service to the customer's tenancy. The provider can register multiple services under a single virtual IP address (VIP), especially for multi-tenant services. There can be multiple such private endpoints (in multiple VCNs) representing the same service.

[0099] Compute instances in the private subnet can then access the service using the private IP address of the PE VNIC or the DNS name of the service. Compute instances in a customer's VCN can access the service by sending traffic to the private IP address of the PE in the customer's VCN. A Private Access Gateway (PAGW) 130 is a gateway resource that can be connected to a service provider's VCN (e.g., a VCN in service network 110) and serves as the ingress / egress point for all traffic to and from private endpoints in customer subnets. The PAGW 130 allows providers to scale the number of PE connections without utilizing internal IP address resources. A provider needs to configure only one PAGW for any number of services registered within a single VCN. A provider can represent services as private endpoints in multiple VCNs for one or more customers. From the customer's perspective, the PE VNIC appears to be connected to the service with which the customer wants to interact, instead of to a customer instance. Traffic destined for the private endpoint is routed to the service through the PAGW 130. These are called customer-to-service private connections (C2S (customer-to-service) connections).

[0100] The PE concept can also be used to extend private access of services to customer on-premises networks and data centers by allowing traffic to flow through FastConnect / IPsec links and private endpoints in the customer's VCN. Private access of services can also be extended to customer peered VCNs by allowing traffic to flow between LPG 132 and PEs in the customer's VCN.

[0101] A customer can control routing within a VCN at the subnet level, allowing the customer to specify which subnets within a customer's VCN, such as VCN 104, use each gateway. A VCN's route tables are used to determine whether traffic is allowed to exit a VCN through a particular gateway. For example, in a particular example, a route table for a public subnet within a customer's VCN 104 may send non-local traffic through IGW 120. A route table for a private subnet within the same customer's VCN 104 may send traffic destined for CSP services through SGW 126. All remaining traffic may be sent through NAT gateway 128. Route tables only control traffic that exits a VCN.

[0102] Security lists associated with a VCN are used to control traffic entering the VCN through the gateway via inbound connections. All resources within a subnet use the same route table and security lists. Security lists may be used to control the specific types of traffic allowed into and out of instances within a VCN's subnet. Security list rules may include ingress (inbound) rules and egress (outbound) rules. For example, ingress rules may specify allowed source address ranges, while egress rules may specify allowed destination address ranges. Security rules may specify a specific protocol (e.g., TCP, ICMP), a specific port (e.g., 22 for SSH, 3389 for Windows RDP), etc. In some implementations, the instance's operating system may enforce its own firewall rules that match the security list rules. Rules may be stateful (e.g., connections are tracked and responses are automatically allowed without explicit security list rules for the response traffic) or stateless.

[0103] Access from a customer's VCN (i.e., by resources or compute instances deployed in VCN 104) can be categorized as public access, private access, or dedicated access. Public access refers to an access model in which public IP addresses or NATs are used to access public endpoints. Private access allows customer workloads in VCN 104 with private IP addresses (e.g., resources in a private subnet) to access services without traversing a public network such as the Internet. In one embodiment, CSPI 101 enables workloads in a customer's VCN with private IP addresses to access (public service endpoints of) services using a service gateway. Thus, the service gateway provides a private access model by establishing a virtual link between the customer's VCN and the service's public endpoints, which reside outside the customer's private network.

[0104] Additionally, CSPI may provide dedicated public access using technologies such as FastConnect public peering, where a customer's on-premises instances can use a FastConnect connection to access one or more services in the customer's VCN without traversing a public network such as the internet. CSPI may also provide dedicated private access using FastConnect private peering, where a customer's on-premises instances with private IP addresses can use a FastConnect connection to access workloads in the customer's VCN. FastConnect is a network connectivity alternative to using the public internet for connecting a customer's on-premises network to CSPI and its services. FastConnect provides an easy, resilient, and economical way to create dedicated private connections with higher bandwidth options and a more reliable and consistent network experience when compared to internet-based connections.

[0105] FIG. 1 and the accompanying discussion above describe various virtual components within an exemplary virtual network. As previously mentioned, a virtual network is built on top of an underlying physical or substrate network. FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified architectural diagram of physical components in a physical network within CSPI 200 that serves as the foundation for a virtual network, according to one embodiment. As illustrated, CSPI 200 provides a distributed environment that includes components and resources (e.g., compute, memory, and network resources) provided by a cloud service provider (CSP). These components and resources are used to provide cloud services (e.g., IaaS services) to subscribing customers, i.e., customers who subscribe to one or more services offered by the CSP. Based on the services to which the customer subscribes, a subset of CSPI 200's resources (e.g., compute, memory, and network resources) is provisioned for the customer. The customer can then build their own cloud-based (i.e., CSPI-hosted), customizable private virtual network using the physical compute, memory, and network resources provided by CSPI 200. As previously indicated, these customer networks are called virtual cloud networks (VCNs). Customers can deploy one or more customer resources, such as compute instances, into these customer VCNs. The compute instances can be in the form of virtual machines, bare metal instances, etc. CSPI 200 provides infrastructure and a set of complementary cloud services that enable customers to build and run a wide range of applications and services within a highly available hosted environment.

[0106] In the example embodiment shown in FIG. 2, the physical components of CSPI 200 include one or more physical host machines or servers (e.g., 202, 206, 208), network virtualization devices (NVDs) (e.g., 210, 212), top-of-rack (TOR) switches (e.g., 214, 216), and a physical network (e.g., 218), as well as switches within physical network 218. The physical host machines or servers may host and execute various compute instances that participate in one or more subnets of the VCN. The compute instances may include virtual machine instances and bare metal instances. For example, the various compute instances shown in FIG. 1 may be hosted by the physical host machines shown in FIG. 2. The virtual machine compute instances in the VCN may be executed by one host machine or by multiple different host machines. The physical host machines may host virtual host machines, container-based hosts or functions, etc. The VNICs and VCN VRs shown in FIG. 1 may be executed by the NVDs shown in FIG. 2. The gateway shown in FIG. 1 may be executed by a host machine and / or by the NVD shown in FIG.

[0107] A host machine or server may run a hypervisor (also called a virtual machine monitor or VMM) that creates and enables a virtual environment on the host machine. The virtualized environment facilitates cloud-based computing. One or more compute instances may be created, run, and managed on the host machine by the hypervisor on the host machine. The hypervisor on the host machine enables the host machine's physical computing resources (e.g., compute, memory, and network resources) to be shared among the various compute instances executed by the host machine.

[0108] For example, as shown in FIG. 2, host machines 202 and 208 execute hypervisors 260 and 266, respectively. These hypervisors may be implemented using software, firmware, or hardware, or a combination thereof. Typically, a hypervisor is a process or software layer that resides on a host machine's operating system (OS), which executes on the host machine's hardware processor. A hypervisor provides a virtual environment by allowing the host machine's physical computing resources (e.g., processing resources such as processors / cores, memory resources, and network resources) to be shared among various virtual machine computing instances executed by the host machine. For example, in FIG. 2, hypervisor 260 may reside on top of host machine 202's OS and allow host machine 202's computing resources (e.g., processing resources, memory resources, and network resources) to be shared among computing instances (e.g., virtual machines) executed by host machine 202. A virtual machine can have its own operating system (referred to as a guest operating system), which may be the same as or different from the host machine's OS. The operating system of a virtual machine executed by a host machine may be the same as or different from the operating system of another virtual machine executed by the same host machine. Thus, a hypervisor allows multiple operating systems to run side by side with each other while sharing the same computing resources of the host machine. The host machines shown in Figure 2 may have the same or different types of hypervisors.

[0109] A compute instance can be a virtual machine instance or a bare metal instance. In Figure 2, compute instance 268 on host machine 202 and compute instance 274 on host machine 208 are examples of virtual machine instances. Host machine 206 is an example of a bare metal instance being offered to a customer.

[0110] In some examples, an entire host machine may be provisioned to a single customer, and one or more compute instances (either virtual machines or bare metal instances) hosted by that host machine all belong to that same customer. In other examples, a host machine may be shared among multiple customers (i.e., multiple tenants). In such a multi-tenancy situation, a host machine may host virtual machine compute instances belonging to different customers. These compute instances may be members of different VCNs for different customers. In some embodiments, bare metal compute instances are hosted by bare metal servers that do not have a hypervisor. When a bare metal compute instance is provisioned, a single customer or tenant maintains control of the physical CPU, memory, and network interfaces of the host machine hosting the bare metal instance, and the host machine is not shared with other customers or tenants.

[0111] As previously mentioned, each compute instance that is part of a VCN is associated with a VNIC that enables the compute instance to be a member of a subnet of the VCN. The VNIC associated with a compute instance facilitates communication of packets or frames to and from the compute instance. The VNIC is associated with the compute instance when the compute instance is created. In one embodiment, for a compute instance executed by a host machine, the VNIC associated with the compute instance is executed by an NVD connected to the host machine. For example, in FIG. 2, host machine 202 executes virtual machine compute instance 268 that is associated with VNIC 276, which is executed by NVD 210 connected to host machine 202. As another example, bare metal instance 272 hosted by host machine 206 is associated with VNIC 280, which is executed by NVD 212 connected to host machine 206. As yet another example, VNIC 284 is associated with compute instance 274 executed by host machine 208, which is executed by NVD 212 connected to host machine 208.

[0112] For compute instances hosted by a host machine, the NVD connected to that host machine also executes VCN VRs corresponding to the VCNs of which those compute instances are members. For example, in the embodiment shown in Figure 2, NVD 210 executes VCN VR 277 corresponding to the VCN of which compute instance 268 is a member. NVD 212 may execute one or more VCN VRs 283 corresponding to the VCNs corresponding to the compute instances hosted by host machines 206 and 208.

[0113] A host machine may include one or more network interface cards (NICs) that allow the host machine to be connected to other devices. The NICs on the host machine may provide one or more ports (or interfaces) that allow the host machine to be communicatively connected to another device. For example, a host machine may be connected to an NVD using one or more ports (or interfaces) provided on the host machine and the NVD. A host machine may also be connected to other devices, such as another host machine.

[0114] 2, host machine 202 is connected to NVD 210 using link 220 extending between port 234 provided by NIC 232 of host machine 202 and port 236 of NVD 210. Host machine 206 is connected to NVD 212 using link 224 extending between port 246 provided by NIC 244 of host machine 206 and port 248 of NVD 212. Host machine 208 is connected to NVD 212 using link 226 extending between port 252 provided by NIC 250 of host machine 208 and port 254 of NVD 212.

[0115] The NVDs are then connected via communication links to top-of-rack (TOR) switches (also called switch fabrics) that are connected to a physical network 218. In one embodiment, the links between the host machines and the NVDs and between the NVDs and the TOR switches are Ethernet links. For example, in Figure 2, links 228 and 230 are used to connect NVDs 210 and 212 to TOR switches 214 and 216, respectively. In one embodiment, links 220, 224, 226, 228, and 230 are Ethernet links. The collection of host machines and NVDs connected to a TOR may be referred to as a rack.

[0116] The physical network 218 provides a communications fabric that allows the TOR switches to communicate with each other. The physical network 218 can be a multi-tier network. In one implementation, the physical network 218 is a multi-tier Clos network of switches, with the TOR switches 214 and 216 representing leaf-level nodes of the multi-tier, multi-node physical switching network 218. Various Clos network configurations are possible, including, but not limited to, 2-tier networks, 3-tier networks, 4-tier networks, 5-tier networks, and generally, "n"-tier networks. An example Clos network is shown in FIG. 5 and described below.

[0117] Various connection configurations are possible between host machines and NVDs, such as one-to-one, many-to-one, and one-to-many configurations. In a one-to-one implementation, each host machine is connected to its own separate NVD. For example, in FIG. 2, host machine 202 is connected to NVD 210 via NIC 232 on host machine 202. In a many-to-one configuration, multiple host machines are connected to a single NVD. For example, in FIG. 2, host machines 206 and 208 are connected to the same NVD 212 via NICs 244 and 250, respectively.

[0118] In a one-to-many configuration, one host machine is connected to multiple NVDs. FIG. 3 illustrates an example of a CSPI 300 in which a host machine is connected to multiple NVDs. As illustrated in FIG. 3, a host machine 302 includes a network interface card (NIC) 304 including multiple ports 306 and 308. The host machine 300 is connected to a first NVD 310 via port 306 and link 320, and to a second NVD 312 via port 308 and link 322. Ports 306 and 308 may be Ethernet ports, and links 320 and 322 between the host machine 302 and the NVDs 310 and 312 may be Ethernet links. The NVD 310 is then connected to a first TOR switch 314, and the NVD 312 is connected to a second TOR switch 316. The links between the NVDs 310 and 312 and the TOR switches 314 and 316 may be Ethernet links. TOR switches 314 and 316 represent layer 0 switching devices within a multi-tier physical network 318 .

[0119] 3 provides two separate physical network paths between the physical switch network 318 and the host machine 302: a first path traversing the TOR switch 314, through the NVD 310, and to the host machine 302, and a second path traversing the TOR switch 316, through the NVD 312, and to the host machine 302. The separate paths result in improved availability (referred to as high availability) of the host machine 302. If there is a problem with one of the paths (e.g., a link in one of the paths fails) or devices (e.g., a particular NVD is not functioning), the other path may be used for communication to and from the host machine 302.

[0120] In the configuration shown in Figure 3, the host machine is connected to two different NVDs using two different ports provided by the host machine's NIC. In other embodiments, the host machine may include multiple NICs that allow the host machine to be connected to multiple NVDs.

[0121] Referring again to Figure 2, an NVD is a physical device or component that performs one or more network and / or storage virtualization functions. An NVD may be any device that has one or more processing units (e.g., a CPU, Network Processing Units (NPUs), FPGAs, packet processing pipelines, etc.), memory including cache, and ports. Various virtualization functions may be performed by software / firmware executed by the one or more processing units of the NVD.

[0122] The NVD may be implemented in various forms. For example, in one embodiment, the NVD is implemented as an interface card called a smart NIC or intelligent NIC that contains an embedded processor. A smart NIC is a separate device from the NIC on the host machine. In Figure 2, NVDs 210 and 212 may be implemented as smart NICs connected to host machine 202 and host machines 206 and 208, respectively.

[0123] However, a smart NIC is just one example of an implementation of an NVD. Various other implementations are possible. For example, in some other implementations, the NVD or one or more functions performed by the NVD may be incorporated into or performed by one or more host machines, one or more TOR switches, and other components of CSPI200. For example, the NVD may be embodied in a host machine, and the functions performed by the NVD may be performed by the host machine. As another example, the NVD may be part of a TOR switch, or a TOR switch may be configured to perform the functions performed by the NVD, allowing the TOR switch to perform various complex packet transformations used in public clouds. A TOR that performs the functions of an NVD may be referred to as a smart TOR. In yet other implementations where customers are provided with virtual machine (VM) instances rather than bare metal (BM) instances, the functions performed by the NVD may be implemented inside the hypervisor of the host machine. In some other implementations, some of the NVD's functions may be offloaded to a centralized service running on a set of host machines.

[0124] In one embodiment, such as when implemented as a smart NIC as shown in FIG. 2, the NVD may include multiple physical ports that allow the NVD to be connected to one or more host machines and one or more TOR switches. Ports on the NVD may be classified as host-facing ports (also referred to as "south ports") or network-facing or TOR-facing ports (also referred to as "north ports"). Host-facing ports of an NVD are ports used to connect the NVD to host machines. Examples of host-facing ports in FIG. 2 include port 236 on NVD 210 and ports 248 and 254 on NVD 212. Network-facing ports of an NVD are ports used to connect the NVD to TOR switches. Examples of network-facing ports in FIG. 2 include port 256 on NVD 210 and port 258 on NVD 212. As shown in FIG. 2, the NVD 210 is connected to the TOR switch 214 using link 228 extending from port 256 of the NVD 210 to the TOR switch 214. Similarly, the NVD 212 is connected to the TOR switch 216 using a link 230 that extends from a port 258 of the NVD 212 to the TOR switch 216 .

[0125] The NVD may receive packets and frames from the host machine (e.g., packets and frames generated by compute instances hosted by the host machine) via a host-facing port, and after performing any necessary packet processing, may forward those packets and frames to the TOR switch via the NVD's network-facing port. The NVD may receive packets and frames from the TOR switch via the NVD's network-facing port, and after performing any necessary packet processing, may forward those packets and frames to the host machine via the NVD's host-facing port.

[0126] In one embodiment, there may be multiple ports and associated links between the NVD and the TOR switch. These ports and links may be aggregated to form a link aggregator group (called a LAG) of multiple ports or links. Link aggregation allows multiple physical links between two endpoints (e.g., between the NVD and the TOR switch) to be treated as a single logical link. All physical links within a particular LAG may operate in full-duplex mode at the same speed. LAGs help increase bandwidth and improve the reliability of the connection between two endpoints. If one of the physical links in the LAG fails, traffic is dynamically and transparently reassigned to one of the other physical links in the LAG. The aggregated physical link provides higher bandwidth than an individual link. Multiple ports associated with a LAG are treated as a single logical port. Traffic can be load-balanced across the multiple physical links in a LAG. One or more LAGs may be configured between two endpoints. Two endpoints may exist between the NVD and the TOR switch, between a host machine and the NVD, etc.

[0127] The NVD implements or performs network virtualization functions. These functions are performed by software / firmware executed by the NVD. Examples of network virtualization functions include, but are not limited to, packet encapsulation and decapsulation functions, functions for creating VCN networks, functions for enforcing network policies such as VCN security list (firewall) functions, and functions for facilitating routing and forwarding of packets to and from compute instances in the VCN. In one embodiment, upon receiving a packet, the NVD is configured to execute a packet processing pipeline to process the packet and determine how the packet should be forwarded or routed. As part of this packet processing pipeline, the NVD may perform one or more virtual functions associated with the overlay network, such as running VNICs associated with compute instances in the VCN, running virtual routers (VRs) associated with the VCN, encapsulating and decapsulating packets to facilitate forwarding or routing within the virtual network, running certain gateways (e.g., local peering gateways), enforcing security lists, network security groups, network address translation (NAT) functions (e.g., per-host public IP to private IP translation), bandwidth throttling functions, and other functions.

[0128] In one embodiment, the packet processing data path within the NVD may comprise multiple packet pipelines, each consisting of a series of packet transformation stages. In one implementation, upon receipt of a packet, the packet is parsed and sorted into a single pipeline. The packet is then processed in a linear fashion, one stage at a time, until the packet is either dropped or transmitted through an interface of the NVD. These stages provide basic functional packet processing building blocks (e.g., header validation, performing bandwidth throttling, inserting a new Layer 2 header, performing L4 firewalling, VCN encapsulation / decapsulation, etc.), such that new pipelines can be constructed by assembling existing stages, and new functionality can be added by creating and inserting new stages into existing pipelines.

[0129] The NVD may perform both control plane and data plane functions corresponding to the VCN's control plane and data plane. Examples of the VCN control plane are also shown in Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 (see reference numbers 1116, 1216, 1316, and 1416) and described below. Examples of the VCN data plane are shown in Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 (see reference numbers 1118, 1218, 1318, and 1418) and described below. Control plane functions include functions used to configure the network (e.g., set up routes and route tables, configure VNICs, etc.) that control how data is forwarded. In one embodiment, a VCN control plane is provided that centrally computes mappings between all overlays and substrates and publishes these mappings to the NVD and to virtual network edge devices such as various gateways, such as DRGs, SGWs, and IGWs. Firewall rules may also be published using the same mechanism. In one embodiment, the NVD retrieves only mappings that are relevant to the NVD. The data plane functions include functionality for the actual routing / forwarding of packets based on configuration settings using the control plane. The VCN data plane is implemented by encapsulating customer network packets before they traverse the substrate network. The encapsulation / decapsulation functions are implemented in the NVD. In one embodiment, the NVD is configured to intercept all network packets entering and leaving the host machine and perform network virtualization functions.

[0130] As indicated above, the NVD performs various virtualization functions, including VNICs and VCN VRs. The NVD may execute VNICs associated with compute instances hosted by one or more host machines connected to the VNICs. For example, as shown in FIG. 2, NVD 210 executes the functions of VNIC 276 associated with compute instance 268 hosted by host machine 202 connected to NVD 210. As another example, NVD 212 executes VNIC 280 associated with bare metal compute instance 272 hosted by host machine 206 and VNIC 284 associated with compute instance 274 hosted by host machine 208. The host machines may host compute instances belonging to different VCNs that belong to different customers, and the NVDs connected to the host machines may execute VNICs (i.e., perform functions related to the VNICs) corresponding to the compute instances.

[0131] NVDs also execute VCN virtual routers corresponding to the VCNs of the compute instances. For example, in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2, NVD 210 executes VCN VR 277 corresponding to the VCN to which compute instance 268 belongs. NVD 212 executes one or more VCN VRs 283 corresponding to one or more VCNs to which compute instances hosted by host machines 206 and 208 belong. In one embodiment, a VCN VR corresponding to that VCN is executed by all NVDs connected to a host machine that hosts at least one compute instance belonging to that VCN. If a host machine hosts compute instances that belong to different VCNs, the NVDs connected to that host machine may execute VCN VRs corresponding to those different VCNs.

[0132] In addition to VNICs and VCN VRs, the NVD may run various software (e.g., daemons) and may include one or more hardware components that facilitate the various network virtualization functions performed by the NVD. For simplicity, these various components are grouped together as a “packet processing component” shown in FIG. 2 . For example, NVD 210 includes packet processing component 286, and NVD 212 includes packet processing component 288. For example, the packet processing component of the NVD may include a packet processor configured to interact with the NVD's ports and hardware interfaces, monitor all packets received by and transmitted using the NVD, and store network information. The network information may include, for example, network flow information and per-flow information (e.g., per-flow statistics) that identify the various network flows processed by the NVD. In one embodiment, the network flow information may be stored per VNIC. In addition to performing per-packet operations, the packet processor may implement a stateful NAT and an L4 firewall (FW). As another example, the packet processing component may include a replication agent configured to replicate information stored by the NVD to one or more different replication target stores. As yet another example, the packet processing component may include a logging agent configured to perform the logging functions of the NVD. The packet processing component may also include software for monitoring the performance and health of the NVD, and possibly software for monitoring the status and health of other components connected to the NVD.

[0133] FIG. 1 illustrates components of an exemplary virtual network or overlay network, including a VCN, subnets within the VCN, compute instances deployed to the subnets, VNICs associated with the compute instances, VRs for the VCN, and a set of gateways configured for the VCN. The overlay components illustrated in FIG. 1 may be executed or hosted by one or more of the physical components illustrated in FIG. 2. For example, compute instances within a VCN may be executed or hosted by one or more host machines illustrated in FIG. 2. For compute instances hosted by a host machine, the VNICs associated with the compute instance are typically executed by an NVD connected to the host machine (i.e., the VNIC functionality is provided by the NVD connected to the host machine). The VCN VR functionality for the VCN is performed by all NVDs connected to host machines hosting or running compute instances that are part of the VCN. The gateways associated with a VCN may be executed by one or more different types of NVDs. For example, some gateways may be executed by smart NICs, while other gateways may be executed by one or more host machines or other implementations of NVDs.

[0134] As previously mentioned, compute instances within a customer's VCN may communicate with various endpoints, which can be in the same subnet as the source compute instance, or in a different subnet within the same VCN as the source compute instance, or the endpoints are outside the VCN of the source compute instance. These communications are facilitated using VNICs associated with the compute instances, VCN VRs, and gateways associated with the VCN.

[0135] For communication between two compute instances on the same subnet within a VCN, the communication is facilitated using VNICs associated with the source and destination compute instances. The source and destination compute instances may be hosted by the same host machine or by different host machines. A packet originating from the source compute instance may be forwarded from the host machine hosting the source compute instance to an NVD connected to that host machine. In the NVD, the packet is processed using a packet processing pipeline, which may include execution of the VNIC associated with the source compute instance. Because the packet's destination endpoint is within the same subnet, execution of the VNIC associated with the source compute instance causes the packet to be forwarded to an NVD running the VNIC associated with the destination compute instance, which then processes the packet and forwards it to the destination compute instance. The VNICs associated with the source and destination compute instances may run on the same NVD (e.g., when the source and destination compute instances are both hosted by the same host machine) or on different NVDs (e.g., when the source and destination compute instances are hosted by different host machines connected to different NVDs). The VNICs may use routing / forwarding tables stored by the NVDs to determine the next hop of a packet.

[0136] For packets traveling from a compute instance in a subnet to an endpoint in a different subnet within the same VCN, the packet originating from the source compute instance travels from the host machine hosting the source compute instance to the NVD connected to that host machine. In the NVD, the packet is processed using a packet processing pipeline, which may include running one or more VNICs and VRs associated with the VCN. For example, as part of the packet processing pipeline, the NVD executes or invokes a function corresponding to the VNIC associated with the source compute instance (also referred to as executing the VNIC). The function executed by the VNIC may include examining the VLAN tag on the packet. Because the packet's destination is outside the subnet, a VCN VR function is then invoked and executed by the NVD. The VCN VR then routes the packet to the NVD running the VNIC associated with the destination compute instance. The VNIC associated with the destination compute instance then processes the packet and forwards the packet to the destination compute instance. The VNICs associated with the source compute instance and the destination compute instance may run on the same NVD (e.g., when the source compute instance and the destination compute instance are both hosted by the same host machine) or on different NVDs (e.g., when the source compute instance and the destination compute instance are hosted by different host machines connected to different NVDs).

[0137] If the packet's destination is outside the VCN of the source compute instance, the packet originating from the source compute instance is propagated from the host machine hosting the source compute instance to the NVD connected to that host machine. The NVD runs the VNIC associated with the source compute instance. Because the packet's destination endpoint is outside the VCN, the packet is then processed by the VCN VR for that VCN. The NVD may invoke a VCN VR function to cause the packet to be forwarded to an NVD running the appropriate gateway associated with the VCN. For example, if the destination is an endpoint in a customer's on-premises network, the packet may be forwarded by the VCN VR to an NVD running a DRG gateway configured for the VCN. The VCN VR may run on the same NVD as the NVD running the VNIC associated with the source compute instance or by a different NVD. The gateway may be run by the NVD, which can be a smart NIC, a host machine, or another NVD implementation. The packet is then processed by the gateway and forwarded to the next hop, which facilitates the packet's propagation to the intended destination endpoint. 2, a packet originating from compute instance 268 may be communicated from host machine 202 (using NIC 232) over link 220 to NVD 210. At NVD 210, VNIC 276 is invoked because it is the VNIC associated with source compute instance 268. VNIC 276 is configured to examine information encapsulated within the packet, determine a next hop for forwarding the packet in order to facilitate communication of the packet to its intended destination endpoint, and then forward the packet to the determined next hop.

[0138] Compute instances deployed in a VCN can communicate with various endpoints. These endpoints may include endpoints hosted by CSPI200 and endpoints external to CSPI200. Endpoints hosted by CSPI200 may include instances in the same VCN or other VCNs, which may be the customer's VCN or VCNs not belonging to the customer. Communication between endpoints hosted by CSPI200 may occur via physical network 218. Compute instances may communicate with endpoints not hosted by CSPI200 or external to CSPI200. Examples of these endpoints include endpoints within a customer's on-premises network or data center, or public endpoints accessible via a public network such as the Internet. Communication with endpoints external to CSPI200 may occur via a public network (e.g., the Internet) (not shown in FIG. 2) or a private network (not shown in FIG. 2) using various communication protocols.

[0139] The architecture of CSPI 200 shown in FIG. 2 is merely exemplary and is not intended to be limiting. Variations, substitutions, and modifications are possible in alternative embodiments. For example, in some implementations, CSPI 200 may include more or fewer systems or components than those shown in FIG. 2, may combine two or more systems, or may include a different configuration or arrangement of systems. The systems, subsystems, and other components shown in FIG. 2 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, using hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device).

[0140] FIG. 4 illustrates connections between host machines and an NVD to achieve I / O virtualization to support multitenancy functionality, according to one embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4, host machine 402 runs hypervisor 404, which provides a virtual environment. Host machine 402 runs two virtual machine instances: VM1 406 belonging to customer / tenant #1 and VM2 408 belonging to customer / tenant #2. Host machine 402 includes a physical NIC 410 connected to an NVD 412 via link 414. Each of the compute instances is connected to a VNIC run by NVD 412. In the embodiment of FIG. 4, VM1 406 is connected to VNIC-VM1 420, and VM2 408 is connected to VNIC-VM2 422.

[0141] 4, NIC 410 includes two logical NICs: logical NIC A 416 and logical NIC B 418. Each virtual machine is connected to and configured to function with its own logical NIC. For example, VM1 406 is connected to logical NIC A 416, and VM2 408 is connected to logical NIC B 418. Because of the logical NICs, each tenant's virtual machine believes it has its own host machine and NIC, even though host machine 402 includes only one physical NIC 410 that is shared by multiple tenants.

[0142] In one embodiment, each logical NIC is assigned its own VLAN ID. Thus, a particular VLAN ID is assigned to logical NIC A 416 for Tenant 1, and another VLAN ID is assigned to logical NIC B 418 for Tenant 2. When a packet is communicated from VM1 406, a tag assigned to Tenant 1 is attached to the packet by the hypervisor, and the packet is then communicated from host machine 402 to NVD 412 via link 414. In a similar manner, when a packet is communicated from VM2 408, a tag assigned to Tenant 2 is attached to the packet by the hypervisor, and the packet is then communicated from host machine 402 to NVD 412 via link 414. Thus, a packet 424 communicated from host machine 402 to NVD 412 has an associated tag 426 that identifies the particular tenant and associated VM. At the NVD, for a packet 424 received from host machine 402, a tag 426 associated with the packet is used to determine whether the packet should be processed by VNIC-VM1 420 or VNIC-VM2 422. The packet is then processed by the corresponding VNIC. The configuration shown in Figure 4 allows each tenant's compute instance to be confident that it owns its own host machine and NIC. The setup shown in Figure 4 enables I / O virtualization to support multi-tenancy capabilities.

[0143] FIG. 5 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a physical network 500, according to one embodiment. The embodiment illustrated in FIG. 5 is structured as a Clos network. A Clos network is a specific type of network topology designed to provide connection redundancy while maintaining high bisection bandwidth and maximum resource utilization. A Clos network is a type of nonblocking multi-stage or multi-layer switching network, and the number of stages or layers can be two, three, four, five, etc. The embodiment illustrated in FIG. 5 is a three-layer network, including layers 1, 2, and 3. TOR switch 504 represents a layer 0 switch in the Clos network. One or more NVDs are connected to the TOR switch. Layer 0 switches are also referred to as edge devices of the physical network. Layer 0 switches are connected to layer 1 switches, also referred to as leaf switches. In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 5, a set of “n” layer 0 TOR switches are connected to a set of “n” layer 1 switches, together forming a pod. Each layer 0 switch in a pod is interconnected to all layer 1 switches within the pod, but there are no switch connections between pods. In one implementation, the two pods are referred to as blocks. Each block is served by or connected to a set of "n" layer 2 switches (sometimes called spine switches). There can be multiple blocks in a physical network topology. The layer 2 switches are then connected to "n" layer 3 switches (sometimes called super spine switches). Communication of packets through the physical network 500 is typically performed using one or more layer 3 communication protocols. Typically, all layers of the physical network except the TOR layer have n-way redundancy, thus enabling high availability. Policies may be specified for pods and blocks to control the visibility of switches to each other within the physical network to enable scaling of the physical network.

[0144] A characteristic of Clos networks is that the maximum number of hops required to reach from one tier-0 switch to another tier-0 switch (or from an NVD connected to a tier-0 switch to another NVD connected to a tier-0 switch) is fixed. For example, in a three-tier Clos network, a maximum of seven hops are required for a packet to reach from one NVD to another, with the source and target NVDs connected to the leaf layers of the Clos network. Similarly, in a four-tier Clos network, a maximum of nine hops are required for a packet to reach from one NVD to another, with the source and target NVDs connected to the leaf layers of the Clos network. Therefore, the Clos network architecture maintains consistent latency throughout the network, which is important for intra- and inter-datacenter communications. Clos topologies scale horizontally and are cost-effective. The network's bandwidth / throughput capacity can be easily increased by adding more switches (e.g., more leaf switches and spine switches) to various tiers and by increasing the number of links between switches at adjacent tiers.

[0145] In one embodiment, each resource in CSPI is assigned a unique identifier called a Cloud Identifier (CID). This identifier is included as part of the resource's information and can be used to manage the resource, for example, via a console or via an API. An exemplary syntax for a CID is as follows: ocid1.<resource type>.<realm>.[region][.future use].<unique ID> where: ocid1: A literal column that indicates the version of the CID. Resource Type: The type of resource (e.g., instance, volume, VCN, subnet, user, group, etc.). Realm: The realm the resource resides in. Example values ​​are "c1" for the commercial realm, "c2" for the government cloud realm, or "c3" for the federal cloud realm. Each realm may have its own domain name. Region: The region the resource is in. If a region is not applicable to the resource, this part may be blank. Future Use: Reserved for future use. Unique ID: The unique part of the ID. This format may vary depending on the type of resource or service.

[0146] Overlay Network DDoS Mitigation System (ONDMS) For purposes of this application, a virtual network interface card (VNIC) provides a virtual network interface to a compute instance associated with the VNIC, allowing the compute instance to become part of or connect to a virtual cloud network (VCN). A VNIC may be implemented or executed by an NVD. When a customer launches a compute instance on a server or host machine containing a NIC, the instance communicates using a networking service VNIC. The VNIC enables the instance to connect to a virtual cloud network (VCN) and determines how the instance connects with endpoints inside and outside the VCN. Each VNIC resides in a subnet within a VCN. A VNIC may include a primary private IPv4 address from the subnet in which the VNIC resides. If an IPv6 prefix is ​​assigned to the subnet, the primary IP address can be an IPv6 address. A VNIC may further include a MAC address, a VLAN tag, a flag to enable or disable source / destination checks on the VNIC's network traffic, etc. In some embodiments, a compute instance can have multiple associated VNICs, allowing it to participate in multiple different VCNs. In one implementation, each VNIC is treated as a resource (e.g., a logical resource) within the CSP's infrastructure and is associated with a unique resource ID (e.g., an Oracle cloud ID within the Oracle cloud infrastructure). Each compute instance has a primary VNIC that is automatically created and connected when the compute instance is created and launched. The primary VNIC is associated with an IP address that resides in a subnet specified by the customer at launch time.

[0147] An NVD is a physical device or component that performs one or more network and / or storage virtualization functions. An NVD may be any device that has one or more processing units (e.g., a CPU, Network Processing Units (NPUs), FPGAs, packet processing pipelines, etc.), memory including cache, and ports. Various virtualization functions may be performed by software / firmware executed by the one or more processing units of the NVD. An NVD may be implemented in various forms. For example, in one embodiment, an NVD is implemented as an interface card called a smart NIC or intelligent NIC that contains an embedded processor. A smart NIC is a device separate from the server or host machine on which the compute instance is running and is separate from the physical NIC on the server or host machine.

[0148] The NVD can take various forms and implementations. In one implementation, the NVD may comprise multiple physical ports that allow the NVD to be connected to one or more host machines and one or more TOR switches. The NVD may receive packets (e.g., packets and frames generated by compute instances hosted by the host machines) from the host machines via the host-facing ports and, after performing any necessary packet processing, may forward those packets to the TOR switch via the NVD's network-facing ports. The NVD may receive packets from the TOR switch via the NVD's network-facing ports and, after performing any necessary packet processing, may forward those packets to the host machine via the NVD's host-facing ports. In this disclosure, the terms NVD and smart NIC may be used interchangeably.

[0149] FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a distributed environment 600 incorporating an exemplary overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS), according to one embodiment. The distributed environment 600 including an ONDMS illustrated in FIG. 6 is merely an example and is not intended to unduly limit the scope of the claimed embodiments. Many variations, alternatives, and modifications are possible. For example, in some implementations, the distributed environment 600 may include more or fewer systems or components than those illustrated in FIG. 6, may combine two or more systems, or may include a different configuration or arrangement of systems. The systems, subsystems, and other components illustrated in FIG. 6 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, using hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device).

[0150] As shown in FIG. 6, distributed environment 600 includes CSPI 601 and one or more senders 602a-n. A sender is a source of network traffic including packets. Some senders may be external to CSPI, and some senders may be internal to CSPI. CSPI may include (1) a receiver for receiving network traffic from a sender, such as a compute instance hosted by host machine 650, (2) a receiver NVD (or receive NVD), such as NVD-Rx 620, that functions as a routing device and is between the sender and the receiver, (3) an ONDMS 690 for performing DDoS attack mitigation, and (4) a control plane (e.g., a VCN control plane) 640.

[0151] In some embodiments, a sender may send a packet to a receiver via two different paths. The first path is for senders within the CSPI. For example, a compute instance on a sender machine (e.g., 602a) may originate a packet, which may pass through the sender's NVD (e.g., 604a), reach the receiver's NVD (e.g., 620), and then reach the host machine 650 hosting the compute instance (the ultimate recipient). The second path is for senders external to the CSPI. For example, a compute instance on a sender machine (e.g., 602n) may originate a packet, which may pass through the sender's gateway (e.g., 604n), reach the receiver's NVD (e.g., 620), and then reach the host machine 650 hosting the compute instance (the ultimate recipient).

[0152] In FIG. 6, 604a-n are NVDs capable of performing transmit and receive functions. In the context of the DDoS mitigation described in FIG. 6, 604a-n perform transmit functions for transmitting packets to receivers within the CSPI and may be referred to as NVD-Tx1, NVD-Tx2, etc. The VNICs implemented by NVDs 604a-n may also be referred to as VNIC-Tx1, VNIC-Tx2, etc. Similarly, 620 and 621a-n are NVDs capable of performing transmit and receive functions. However, in the context of the DDoS mitigation described in FIG. 6, 620, these NVDs perform receive functions for receiving packets from senders 602a-n and may also be referred to as NVD-Rx or receiver NVDs. The VNICs implemented by NVD 620 may also be referred to as VNIC-Rx1, VNIC-Rx2, etc.

[0153] In FIG. 6, on the sender side, as described above, some senders may be external to the CSPI and some may be internal to the CSPI. In the case of external senders, the senders communicate with components within the CSPI using a gateway. For example, senders 602a and 602b are internal to the CSPI, while sender 602n is external to the CSPI. An NVD (e.g., NVD-Tx) or gateway may be associated with each sender. As an example, in FIG. 6, a sender (e.g., 602a) may be in the same VCN as the receiving NVD 620. Therefore, a transmitting NVD (NVD-Tx1) 604a may be associated with sender 602a. However, a sender (e.g., 602n) is external to the CSPI in which the receiving NVD 620 is located. Therefore, an Internet gateway (IGW) 604n may be associated with sender 602n.

[0154] A gateway may be a virtual interface configured for a VCN and enables communication of traffic into and out of the VCN to one or more endpoints outside the VCN. The gateway 604n may include various types of gateways, such as a dynamic routing gateway (DRG) for facilitating communication of traffic between the cloud infrastructure and a customer's on-premises network, an internet gateway (IGW) for facilitating communication of traffic between the cloud infrastructure and a public network such as the internet, etc.

[0155] Various technologies may be used to implement the gateway 604n. The gateway may be implemented using software only, using hardware, or using a combination of software and hardware. The gateway may be implemented as a logical or virtual network structure or an overlay network structure, such as a virtual router, run by a host machine or server, a Linux device, an NVD, etc. The gateway may also be implemented as a physical network device, such as a physical router. The gateway may be dynamically configured as needed.

[0156] On the receiving side, a receiving NVD, NVD-Rx (e.g., smart NIC), 620 is shown, which includes VNIC-Rx1 622a. In some embodiments, NVD-Rx 620 may include two or more receiving NVDs, VNIC-Rx, which may be labeled 622a, 622b, ..., 622n (not shown). NVD-Rx 620 further includes a usage information collector (UIC) 624 having a telemetry service that communicates collected usage information to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) monitor 642. Further details regarding UICs are described below.

[0157] 6, an overlay network DDoS mitigation system (ONDMS) 690 for performing DDoS mitigation in an overlay network within a CSPI may include a DDoS scrubber system 662 and a DDoS monitoring service that includes a DDoS monitor 642 and multiple usage information collectors (UICs), such as a UIC 624 in a receiving NVD 620 and a UIC 664 in the DDoS scrubber system 662. In some embodiments, the DDoS monitoring service may monitor network traffic (e.g., packets) received by a receiving NVD (e.g., 624), which may forward the packets to the receiver. If the DDoS monitoring service determines that a potential DDoS attack is occurring, the network traffic may be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system 662.

[0158] In one embodiment, the DDoS scrubber system 662 may be configured to analyze the redirected packets and perform appropriate mitigation actions (e.g., filtering and throttling). The DDoS scrubber system 662 may scrub the redirected packets through one or more shadow VNICs (e.g., SD-VNIC1 660a and additional SD-VNICs labeled 660b, ..., 660n, not shown in FIG. 6). 2~N The shadow VNIC may be implemented by one or more systems on a device different from the receiving NVD (e.g., NVD-Rx620).

[0159] In some embodiments, a TOR switch (e.g., 680) may be connected to many receiving NVDs (e.g., 612a-612n) in addition to NVD-Rx 620. Thus, a packet destined for receiver 650 first arrives at TOR switch 680, which forwards the packet to different receiving NVDs, including receiving NVD 620 associated with receiver 650.

[0160] The ONDMS, in one embodiment, may include a DDoS monitoring service that includes a UIC 624 in the receiving NVD 620, a UIC 664 in the DDoS scrubber system 662, and a DDoS monitor 642. The UIC 624 may monitor and collect resource utilization information (including network usage, bandwidth, and utilization information 641) of network devices (or network resources) in the receiving NVD (NVD-Rx) 620 (e.g., smart NICs), while the UIC 664 may monitor and collect network usage, bandwidth, and utilization information 641 of one or more shadow VNICs (SD-VNICs) in the DDoS scrubber system 662. The DDoS monitor 642 cooperates with both the UIC 624 and the UIC 664 to analyze the collected network information related to the various network devices. The collected information may include, but is not limited to, CPU utilization information of the receiving NVD 620, information about individual receiving VNICs (e.g., VNIC-Rx1 622a) run by the receiving NVD 620, bandwidth utilization information of the smart NIC's link (to the TOR, facing the host machine), etc. The types of information collected may include, but are not limited to, packet rate (i.e., packets per second (PPS)) information, bandwidth-related information, traffic patterns, and trends. In some embodiments, the DDoS monitor 642 may be part of the control plane 640. In other embodiments, the DDoS monitor 642 may be a separate entity from the control plane 640.

[0161] In one embodiment, the UIC 624 may be placed in many network locations, including the TOR, because significant DDoS indicators (e.g., high traffic or heavy traffic) may not be observed at the NVD level. For example, heavy aggregated traffic may occur at the TOR level but not at individual NVDs. The UIC 624 may monitor traffic from all senders sent to VNICs on the receiving NVD 620 and may also aggregate traffic at the smart NIC level. In some embodiments, the UIC 624 may be placed outside the NVD (e.g., smart NIC). For example, to protect the receiving NVD (e.g., 620), the UIC 624 may monitor the link between the NVD and the top-of-rack (TOR) and the link between the NVD and the host machine. The monitored and collected traffic (and usage) information is sent to a DDoS monitor to determine whether the traffic meets DoS requirements and thresholds.

[0162] Another reason why a DDoS monitoring service can benefit from placing UICs 624 in many network locations is when the NVD is receiving an excessive amount of data, such as packets containing large data, even though the packet rate (or PPS) is still within limits. Such a situation can make it difficult for metrics to measure and report to the DDoS monitor whether excessive traffic is present. As a result, DDoS attacks become difficult to detect. In such situations, the DDoS monitoring service can rely on metrics collected from various locations to get a complete picture of the receiving NVD and receiving VNIC.

[0163] In some implementations, DDoS monitoring services perform fine-grained utilization measurements of packet rate (or PPS) and bandwidth utilization. Measurements are also performed at short intervals to capture microbursts, which are compared to significant congestion events not captured by one-minute averages. DDoS monitoring services also have bandwidth metrics at the TOR, because at the NVD level, the NVD may not recognize that it is receiving more traffic than it can handle. Thus, the TOR can detect such situations, for example, due to backpressure. As an example, a link at a TOR switch (e.g., 626_tor) is 100 Gbps. The NVD (e.g., link 626_tor) may not recognize network traffic exceeding 100 Gbps, but the TOR does because packets are dropped at the TOR. Limited bandwidth between the rack and the TOR can still cause noisy neighbor problems.

[0164] The DDoS monitoring service makes decisions to redirect (or remap) traffic based on collected metrics, taking into account the sender, receiver, and TOR. When thresholds at different locations are reached, the monitoring service can send a message or trigger event (referred to herein as a DDoS event) at the CP (e.g., VCN CP) to add protection to a specific VNIC or all VNICs implemented by the NVD, and the protection state is referred to herein as a protection mode. Detection of a DDoS attack may be based on aggregating received information (e.g., each sending instance is within the traffic limit, but the aggregated traffic at the receiving end exceeds the traffic limit). In one embodiment, some pre-defined threshold (also referred to as DDoS criteria 643) for triggering a DDoS event (e.g., a potential DDoS attack), which is a type of network congestion event, may be used. For example, a DDoS event may be triggered if network congestion has a burst of 100% or greater link utilization for a number of consecutive minutes (e.g., 3-5 minutes) on the receiving link 626a of the protected VNIC 622a of the receiving NVD 620, or a burst of average link utilization of greater than 80% for 5-10 consecutive minutes on the receiving link 626a. In some embodiments, the duration of the congestion burst or average link utilization may be shorter or longer depending on the application and the need for sensitivity to DDoS events. A DDoS monitoring service monitors inbound, outbound, and traffic patterns or trends running on the NVD or external to the NVD and communicates the information to the VCN CP using a telemetry service.

[0165] 6, after a DDoS monitor 642 of a DDoS monitoring service determines that a DDoS event has been triggered (i.e., the DDoS criteria are met), the DDoS monitor 642 notifies the CP 640 via API 644 to enter protection mode. The protection mode may be (1) to protect an individual receiving VNIC 622a on the receiving NVD, or (2) to protect the receiving NVD 620.

[0166] In some embodiments, a shadow VNIC generator 645 in control plane 640 may receive the protection mode notification from DDoS monitor 642 and perform processing to create a shadow VNIC. When protecting a receiving NVD (e.g., 620), shadow VNIC generator 645 may determine all VNICs or specific selected VNICs implemented by the NVD to be protected and then create shadow VNICs for these VNICs. Shadow VNIC generator 645 may then send a signal to distribution service 646 to publish the VNIC mapping.

[0167] For individual VNIC protection, in one embodiment, the NVD 620 identifies an inbound VNIC of the NVD to be protected due to excessive traffic for the VNIC and notifies the VCN CP to create a shadow VNIC (SD-VNIC) for that inbound VNIC (referred to herein as the protected VNIC). The ONDMS may redirect traffic received by the protected VNIC to the newly created SD-VNIC. For example, if inbound VNIC VNIC-Rx1 622a is selected for protection, a shadow VNIC SD-VNIC1 660a may be created by the CP 640. If additional VNIC-Rx 622b-n (not shown) in the NVD 620 are selected for protection, other SD-VNICs 660b-n (not shown) may be created by the CP 640. For example, another receiving VNIC (e.g., VNIC-Rx2 622b, not shown) is selected for protection, and then an additional SD-VNIC (e.g., SD-VNIC2 660b) is created to protect VNIC-Rx2 622b.

[0168] In some implementations, the ONDMS may track protected VNICs by storing resource identifications (IDs) corresponding to the protected VNICs in a repository, such as the memory or database of the CP 640. Resources in a cloud infrastructure are typically identified using unique resource identifiers (resource IDs). When a resource is created, the resource may be assigned a resource ID. When the UICs 624 and 664 collect usage information, the VNIC's resource IDs may be tagged with the usage information and sent to the DDoS monitor 642. The DDoS monitor can look up the resource IDs stored in the repository to determine whether any of the protected VNICs are receiving excessive traffic.

[0169] To protect the NVD, in some embodiments, due to excessive traffic at the NVD level, the entire receiving NVD 620, including VNIC-Rx 622a-n (if multiple receiving VNICs exist in the receiving NVD 620), may be protected. In other words, a number of shadow VNICs (SD-VNICs 660a-n) equal to the number of receiving VNICs may be created to protect the receiving VNICs (VNIC-Rx 622a-n) corresponding to those shadow VNICs (i.e., a one-to-one mapping between SD-VNICs and protected VNICs, or one SD-VNIC per VNIC). For example, SD-VNIC1 660a is created to protect VNIC-Rx1 622a, SD-VNIC2 660b (not shown) is created to protect VNIC-Rx2 622b (not shown), and SD-VNICn 660n (not shown) is created to protect VNIC-Rxn 622n (not shown).

[0170] In some alternative embodiments, a single SD-VNIC may be created for multiple protected VNICs (i.e., a one-to-many mapping between SD-VNICs and protected VNICs). For example, during protection of an individual VNIC, an SD-VNIC is created for that protected VNIC in the NVD, as described above. If an additional receiving VNIC is protected, this second VNIC may also be protected by the same SD-VNIC. In other words, the number of SD-VNICs may be less than the total number of protected VNICs in the NVD. To further illustrate, for protection of the NVD, all receiving VNICs on the NVD may be protected by a single SD-VNIC. For example, VNIC-Rx 622a-n may be protected by a single SD-VNIC1 660a.

[0171] In some embodiments, certain network configurations, such as IP and routing configurations and security configurations, may be the same between the SD-VNIC and the protected VNIC. For example, the SD-VNIC may have the same IP configuration (e.g., DHCP or static), routing configuration (e.g., policy-based or dynamic routing), and security configuration (e.g., firewall and access control) as the protected VNIC (i.e., the original destination). The SD-VNIC (e.g., 660a) may be a service VNIC that is invisible to customers but is hosted (or implemented) by a dedicated DDoS scrubber system 662 and can perform DDoS filtering and / or throttling. In some embodiments, the SD-VNIC may be run separately by an individual host on the network link between the sender and the protected VNIC in the NVD. The SD-VNIC may be considered a copy of the original protected VNIC (e.g., 622a) in the NVD (e.g., 620) that receives packets from senders 602a-n. For example, after a DDoS monitoring service detects a DDoS event, traffic is redirected from the protected VNIC to the SD-VNIC. The SD-VNIC has a similar configuration to the protected VNIC and can check security rules, but it does not process and send packets directly to the receiver 650 (e.g., one or more compute instances for a customer). Instead, the SD-VNIC (e.g., 660a) receives network traffic on behalf of the original protected VNIC (622a) so that a hosting DDoS scrubber system can perform throttling (i.e., intentionally controlling network traffic to regulate the flow of data packets) and / or filtering (i.e., selectively allowing or blocking certain types of network traffic based on defined filter criteria or rules), which may include, but are not limited to, DDoS scrubbing and stateless security rule enforcement, and delivers filtered packets to the original protected VNIC.The filtering may be performed by a DDoS scrubber system 662 based on specific filter criteria 663 .

[0172] DDoS attack mitigation or scrubbing may include Layer 3 / 4 mitigation and Layer 7 mitigation. For example, Layer 3 / 4 mitigation can detect and mitigate attacks such as SYN / ACK floods, UDP reflection amplification, and DNS query floods. Layer 7 mitigation can use web application firewall (WAF) services to detect and block malicious HTTP / HTTPS traffic.

[0173] Stateless security rule enforcement refers to security rules that are stateless. A stateless security rule means that connection tracking is not used for traffic that matches the rule. In contrast to stateful security rules, which track the state of established connections and allow return traffic associated with those connections, a stateless security rule evaluates each packet independently without considering previous connections. Security rules are used to control traffic at the packet level and may include, but are not limited to, security lists and network security groups. A security list specifies the type of traffic that is allowed and contains a set of ingress and egress rules that apply to all VNICs within a particular subnet. A network security group contains a set of ingress and egress security rules that apply only to a set of VNICs within a single VCN.

[0174] Because the SD-VNIC has higher bandwidth than the protected VNIC, excess traffic does not directly impact other customers. The SD-VNIC helps handle and prioritize traffic, for example, by applying security rules to drop certain packets or by throttling excess traffic to meet the required limits of the protected VNIC. Thus, the SD-VNIC ensures that traffic delivered to the protected VNIC is legitimate and within allowed limits.

[0175] When the ONDMS enters protection mode for a particular protected VNIC or NVD, traffic received by the protected VNIC may be redirected to one or more shadow VNICs implemented by the DDoS scrubber system by updating the VNIC mapping. In some embodiments, the VNIC mapping may be an association between an overlay address and a board address. As previously described in FIG. 6, an overlay address may be configured for the receiver (e.g., compute instance) 650. The VNIC 622a, which enables the receiver 650 to be part of the virtual cloud network, may also be associated with an overlay address. The NVD 620 implementing the VNIC 622a may be configured with a board address in the CSPI. Similarly, the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing the SD-VNIC 660a may be configured with a board address in the CSPI.

[0176] When the ONDMS redirects traffic received by a protected VNIC to the newly created SD-VNIC, it may update the VNIC mapping stored in a repository (e.g., non-volatile memory, database, etc.) of a network component, such as an NVD or gateway, associated with the source (i.e., sender) of the traffic. The repository of each network component (e.g., NVD or gateway) may be internal or external to the component. For example, the VNIC mapping may include a table containing the overlay address of the destination receiver and the board address of the NVD to which the overlay address is mapped, so that packets with the destination overlay address can be forwarded to the mapped board address in the CSPI. As an example, in normal operation mode, the destination overlay address may be the overlay IP address X of the receiver (compute instance) 650, and the mapped board address may be the board IP address X of the receiver NVD 620 implementing the VNIC 622a associated with the receiver 650. After updating 628 the VNIC mapping to enter protection mode, the same overlay IP address X of the receiver (compute instance) 650 is mapped to a different substrate address, e.g., substrate IP address Y of the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing the shadow VNIC (SD-VNIC1 660a). In other words, the mapping update may be as follows: Normal operation mode mapping: (receiving overlay IP address X, receiving NVD board IP address X) Protection mode mapping: (Recipient overlay IP address X, DDoS scrubber system substrate IP address Y) In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 6, a distributed service 646 of CP 640 performs the VNIC mapping updates. The distributed service 646 is a service that distributes the new mapping to all NVDs (e.g., 604a and 604b) or gateways (e.g., 604n) associated with a sender, depending on the location of the sender. For example, in one embodiment, if sender 602a is in the same VCN as receiving NVD 620, a packet may be sent from a different subnet over the local network. The NVD 604a associated with the sender may store the VNIC mapping, and the NVD 604a of sender 1 602a need only look up the VNIC mapping table to find the destination of the received packet. In another embodiment, if the sender (e.g., 602n) is in a different VCN than where receiving NVD 620 is located, the VNIC mapping table may be stored in the local peering gateway (LPG, e.g., 604n). In another embodiment, if the sender (e.g., 602n) is in a different region than where the receiving NVD 620 is located, the VNIC mapping table may be stored in a dynamic routing gateway (DRG, e.g., 604n). In yet another embodiment, if the sender (e.g., 602n) is outside the cloud infrastructure where the receiving NVD 620 is located, the VNIC mapping table may be stored in an Internet gateway (IGW, e.g., 604n).

[0177] 6, with respect to individual VNIC protection, assume that prior to updating the VNIC mapping, traffic 606a from sender NVD 604a, traffic 606b from sender NVD 604b, and traffic 606n from sender gateway 604n all go to the same VNIC-Rx1 622a in receiver NVD 602. Received traffic 626a at VNIC-Rx1 622a, monitored by a DDoS monitoring service, may exceed a preset threshold, causing DDoS monitor 642 to notify CP 640 via API 622 to enter protection mode. Distributed service 646 of CP 640 may be configured to update the VNIC mapping stored in the NVD or gateway 604a-n via control link 628 by changing the mapped substrate IP address from receiver NVD 620 to DDoS scrubber system 662. As a result, packets of outbound traffic 606a-n are redirected to SD-VNIC1 660a through different routes 666a-n. In some embodiments, the new VNIC mapping may cause the NVD and gateways 604a-n to encapsulate packet headers containing the destination address to SD-VNIC1 660a. The DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNIC1 660a may perform DDoS filtering and / or throttling and forward the packets to protected VNIC-Rx1 622a via route 668_tor and then 668a by removing the added / encapsulated packet headers. Protected VNIC-Rx1 622a can then perform normal packet processing and forward the processed packets to the receiver 650.

[0178] In one embodiment, as described above, for NVD protection, a similar mechanism as described above is applied, and CP 640 may further create additional SD-VNIC2 660b through SD-VNICn 660n (not shown) for corresponding protected VNIC-Rx2 622b through VNIC-Rxn 622n (not shown) if there are multiple receiving VNICs in NVD 620. Packets from the sender go to routes 666a-n instead of 626a-n (626b goes to VNIC-Rx2 622b, and 626n goes to VNIC-Rxn 622n separately (not shown)). After DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNICs 660a-n performs DDoS filtering and / or throttling, the packet is forwarded through route 668_tor and then through 668a-n to protected VNIC-Rx 622a-n (668b goes to VNIC-Rx2 622b and 668n goes to VNIC-Rxn 622n separately (not shown)). Protected VNIC-Rx 622a in NVD 620 can then perform normal packet processing and forward the processed packet to receiver 650.

[0179] In one embodiment, in addition to performing filtering and / or throttling at the receiving end 666a-n, the ONDMS may also notify the sending side (e.g., 602a-n) to perform throttling on outgoing traffic after detecting a DDoS event.

[0180] In one embodiment, a DDoS monitor service UIC 664 similar to UIC 624 on the receiving NVD 620 is also available in DDoS scrubber system 662 to monitor and collect traffic information related to the SD-VNIC (e.g., 660a) of an individual protected VNIC or all SD-VNICs (e.g., 660a-n) of the receiving NVD 620 to collect and communicate traffic information to DDoS monitor 642 to determine whether the collected information meets DDoS criteria 643 for entering / exiting protection mode. For example, if network link utilization falls below a predetermined threshold for a predetermined period of time, e.g., if the aggregated traffic to the protected VNICs falls below 80% link utilization for 10 consecutive minutes (e.g., 5-10 minutes), DDoS monitor 642 may notify CP 640 that the protection mode exit conditions have been met. DDoS monitor 642 coordinates with both UIC 624 and UIC 664 to ensure proper transitions into and out of protection mode, as the DDoS monitor has visibility into both UICs 624 and 664. CP 640 may send a command to distributed service 624 to remove SD-VNIC 660a for protected VNIC 622a and update the VNIC mapping in the sender's NVD or gateways 604a-n. For example, the mapping update may be as follows: Mapping before update (i.e., in protection mode): (overlay IP address of the receiver, IP address of the DDoS scrubber system) Updated mapping (i.e., in normal operation mode): (receiving overlay IP address, receiving NVD board IP address) The ONDMS can then return to normal operating mode. In some embodiments, the SD-VNIC in the DDoS scrubber system 662 may not be deleted, only the VNIC mapping is updated.

[0181] FIG. 7A is a flowchart 700 illustrating a process flow for entering a protection mode for a network resource, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 7A may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of a respective system, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 7A and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 7A depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0182] As shown in FIG. 7A , the process begins at 702. At 702, resource utilization information of network resources, such as the receiving VNIC, the receiving NVD, and their associated TORs, may be monitored and collected. For example, the UIC 624 of the NVD 620 of FIG. 6 collects usage information at different levels of the network resources, such as the VNIC level, the NVD level, and the TOR level. At 704, based on the information collected at 702, a DDoS event condition for the protected network resource may be determined based on the DDoS criteria 643 set by the ONDMS. For example, the DDoS monitor 642 of FIG. 6 may determine whether aggregated traffic received on link 626a of the protected VNIC-Rx1 622a meets the conditions for a DDoS event, e.g., a predefined threshold as described in connection with FIG. 6 . If the DDoS event condition for the receiving VNIC to be protected is not met, the process proceeds to 702 and continues monitoring and collecting network information. If the DDoS event conditions for the receiving VNIC to be protected are met, the process proceeds to 706 .

[0183] At 706, a network resource associated with the satisfied DDoS event condition may be identified. The network resource may be a VNIC (e.g., 622a) or an NVD (e.g., 620) implementing one or more VNICs. For example, if the network resource is a VNIC, VNIC-Rx1 622a implemented (or executed) by the NVD 620 may be identified for protection by the CP 640 based on its resource identification number (e.g., Oracle cloud ID or OCID) when aggregated received network traffic of VNIC-Rx1 622a meets the DDoS event condition. If the network resource is a receiver NVD 620, all VNICs (622a-n) implemented by the receiver NVD 620 may be identified based on their resource identification numbers when aggregated received network traffic at the NVD level of the receiver NVD 620 meets the DDoS event condition. In some embodiments, even if the network resource is an NVD, multiple, but not all, VNICs in the NVD (ie, a small number of selected VNICs) may be identified for protection.

[0184] 708 may cover 710 through 716. At 708, the ONDMS enters protection mode for the network resource identified at 706. For example, in one embodiment, the DDoS monitoring service may enter a state or particular state in a state machine that indicates that protection mode has been activated for protected VNIC-Rx1 622a.

[0185] At 710, the CP is notified of a particular network resource to be protected. For example, the DDoS monitor 642 of FIG. 6 may notify the CP 640 of a particular VNIC 622a having aggregated received traffic that meets a DDoS event condition by providing the corresponding resource ID of the VNIC to be protected. At 712, the CP (or a shadow VNIC generator 645 within the CP) creates one or more SD-VNICs for the network resource identified at 706. For example, if the network resource is a VNIC, the CP 640 of FIG. 6 may use the resource ID information of the identified VNIC (e.g., 622a) provided by the DDoS monitor 642 to request the cloud resource manager to allocate appropriate resources for creating a shadow VNIC (SD-VNIC) (e.g., 660a) for that VNIC-Rx1 622a.

[0186] For example, if the network resource is an NVD (e.g., 620), the CP 640 of FIG. 6 may use the resource ID information of the identified VNICs (e.g., 622a-n) provided by the DDoS monitor 642 to request the cloud resource manager to allocate appropriate resources to create one or more SD-VNICs for the receiving NVD 620, depending on whether a single SD-VNIC 660a is used to protect the receiving NVD (i.e., a one-to-many mapping between the SD-VNIC and its selectively protected VNICs) or whether an equivalent number of SD-VNICs (660a-n) are used to protect all VNICs (622a-n) or selected VNICs implemented by the receiving NVD 620 (i.e., a one-to-one mapping).

[0187] At 714, the CP may publish information related to the one or more shadow VNICs created at 712, thereby causing packets received by the network resource to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system implementing the SD-VNIC. In other words, the VNIC mappings stored in the NVDs and / or gateways associated with the sources of traffic received by the protected VNICs or NVDs are updated by the CP or other entities in the VCN so that traffic received by the protected VNICs or NVDs is redirected to the DDoS scrubber system. For example, in FIG. 6, the VNIC mappings, e.g., mapping tables in the NVDs and / or gateways 604a-n associated with senders 602a-n, may be updated so that SD-VNIC1 660a can replace VNIC-Rx1 622a and become the new destination of senders 602a-n. As a result, packets received by protected VNIC 622a implemented by receiving NVD 620 may instead be redirected to DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNIC 660a. For example, in FIG. 6, outgoing packets from senders 602a-n may go through routes 666a-n to SD-VNIC1 660a instead of going through route 626_tor and then 626a to VNIC-Rx1 622a.

[0188] At 716, for packets redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, the DDoS scrubber system performs actions (e.g., filtering, throttling, etc.) on the packets to control which packets are forwarded to the protected network resource. In other words, during protection mode, the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing one or more SD-VNICs performs DDoS scrubbing, security rule checks, and / or throttling on redirected packets it receives before forwarding them to the protected VNIC-Rx1 622a or the receiving NVD 620.

[0189] FIG. 7B is a flowchart illustrating a process flow for exiting a protection mode for a network resource, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 7B may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 7B and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 7B depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0190] At 718 in FIG. 7B, for a network resource in protection mode, resource utilization information may continue to be monitored and collected for one or more shadow VNICs protecting the network resource. Because the ONDMS is in protection mode and packets are redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, resource utilization information for the protected network resource is observed at one or more receiving SD-VNICs. For example, the UIC 664 in FIG. 6 may collect resource utilization or network usage information for SD-VNIC1 660a, which protects VNIC 622a, and communicate this information to the DDoS monitor 642 about the state of the network during protection mode.

[0191] At 720, based on the information collected at 718, a protection mode exit condition for the protected VNIC may be determined based on the DDoS criteria set by the ONDMS, as described above in connection with Figure 6. If the protection mode exit condition is not met, the process proceeds to 718 to continue monitoring and collecting resource utilization information. If the protection mode exit condition is met, the process proceeds to 722.

[0192] 722 may cover 724 through 728. At 722, the ONDMS may terminate the protection mode for the network resource and return to normal mode. For example, in one embodiment, in FIG. 6, the DDoS monitor 642 of the DDoS monitoring service may enter a state or state of a state machine indicating that the protection mode has been deactivated for the protected VNIC-Rx1 622a. At 724, the CP may be notified of the protection mode exit condition and the change in mode. For example, in FIG. 6, the DDoS monitor 642 may prepare to terminate the protection mode for the protected VNIC-Rx1 622a by notifying the CP 640 that the protection mode exit condition has been met and providing the corresponding resource ID.

[0193] At 726, one or more SD-VNICs created for the network resources may be deleted or removed to redirect traffic back to the protected network resources. For example, in one embodiment, the shadow VNIC generator 645 in CP 640 of FIG. 6 may provide the resource ID of SD-VNIC1 660a to the cloud resource manager to reuse the resources corresponding to SD-VNIC 660a.

[0194] At 728, the CP may again publish information (e.g., the network resource) so that packets that were received by the network resource but are being redirected to the DDoS scrubber system are now received by the network resource and no longer redirected. In other words, the VNIC mapping stored in the NVD and / or gateway associated with the source of the traffic is again updated by the CP (e.g., either the VCN CP or another entity within the VCN) to reflect the change in mode so that traffic that was redirected to the DDoS scrubber system is again received by the protected network resource. For example, in FIG. 6, the VNIC mapping, such as a mapping table in the NVD and / or gateway 604a-n associated with senders 602a-n, may be updated so that the DDoS scrubber system's backbone IP address is removed and replaced with the receiver NVD 620's backbone IP address. In other words, the mapping changes from protection mode to normal operation mode. The process then repeats, proceeding to 702.

[0195] FIG. 8 is a flowchart 800 illustrating a process performed in protected mode for an individual VNIC, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 8 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 8 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 8 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0196] At 802, the network resource to be protected is determined to be a particular VNIC to be protected. For example, in Figure 6, VNIC1 (or VNIC-Rx1) 622a implemented by NVD 620 may be identified for protection based on its resource identification number.

[0197] At 804, the CP may be notified that a particular VNIC should be protected. For example, the DDoS monitor 642 of FIG. 6 may notify the CP 640 of a particular VNIC 622a that has aggregated incoming traffic that meets the DDoS event condition by providing the corresponding resource ID of that VNIC to be protected.

[0198] At 808, a shadow VNIC may be created by the CP for the particular VNIC identified at 802. For example, the CP 640 of FIG. 6 may use the resource ID information of the identified VNIC (e.g., 622a) provided by the DDoS monitor 642 to request the cloud resource manager to allocate appropriate resources for creating a shadow VNIC (SD-VNIC) (e.g., 660a) for that VNIC-Rx1 622a.

[0199] At 810, the CP may publish information related to the shadow VNIC created at 808, thereby causing packets received by the particular VNIC to be protected to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system implementing the shadow VNIC created at 808. For example, in FIG. 6, the VNIC mapping tables of the NVDs and / or gateways 604a-n associated with senders 602a-n may be updated so that the normal operation mode mapping (overlay IP address of receiver, substrate IP address of receiver NVD) is updated to become the protection mode mapping (overlay IP address of receiver, substrate IP address of DDoS scrubber system). As a result, packets received by the protected VNIC 622a implemented by the receiver NVD 620 may instead be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNIC 660a.

[0200] At 812, for packets redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, the DDoS scrubber system performs actions (e.g., filtering, throttling, etc.) on the packets to control which packets are forwarded to the protected network resource. In other words, during protection mode, the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNIC 660a may perform DDoS scrubbing, security rule checks, and / or throttling on redirected packets it receives before forwarding them to the protected VNIC-Rx1 622a.

[0201] FIG. 9 is a flowchart 900 illustrating a process performed in a protected mode of an NVD (e.g., a smart NIC) according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 9 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective system, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 9 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 9 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0202] As shown in Figure 9, the process begins at 902. The network resource to be protected is determined to be the particular NVD to be protected. For example, in Figure 6, the network resource to be protected is the receiving NVD 620, so all VNICs (622a-n) implemented by the receiving NVD 620 may be identified based on their resource identification numbers. In some embodiments, instead of all VNICs implemented by the NVD, a small number of selected VNICs within the NVD may be identified for protection.

[0203] At 904, the CP is notified of the particular network resources to be protected. For example, the DDoS monitor 642 of Figure 6 may notify the CP 640 of the particular protected recipient NVDs 620 that have aggregated received traffic that meets the DDoS event criteria.

[0204] At 906, the CP may determine a set of one or more VNICs implemented by the NVD to be protected. For example, when the CP creates the receiving NVD 620, the CP may have information about which VNICs implemented by the NVD should be protected in the event of a DDoS attack. Resource IDs of these selected / identified VNICs to be protected in the receiving NVD 620 may be obtained.

[0205] At 908, one or more shadow VNICs for the one or more VNICs identified at 906 are created by the CP. For example, the CP 640 of FIG. 6 may use the resource IDs of the selected / identified VNICs to be protected to request the cloud resource manager to allocate appropriate resources for creating one or more SD-VNICs for the identified VNICs. In some embodiments, a single SD-VNIC 660a may be created to protect the identified VNICs, as in the one-to-many mapping relationship described in FIG. 6. In other embodiments, one SD-VNIC may be created to protect each identified VNIC, as in the one-to-one mapping relationship described in FIG. 6.

[0206] At 910, the CP may publish information related to the one or more shadow VNICs created at 908, thereby causing packets received by the NVD to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system implementing the shadow VNICs created at 908. For example, in FIG. 6, the VNIC mapping table of the NVD and / or gateway 604a-n associated with the sender 602a-n may be updated so that the normal operation mode mapping (overlay IP address of the receiver, substrate IP address of the receiver NVD) is updated to become the protection mode mapping (overlay IP address of the receiver, substrate IP address of the DDoS scrubber system). As a result, packets received by the receiver NVD 620 are redirected to the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing the one or more shadow VNICs.

[0207] At 912, for packets redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, the DDoS scrubber system performs actions (e.g., filtering, throttling, etc.) on the packets to control which packets are forwarded to the protected NVD. In other words, during protection mode, the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing one or more SD-VNICs performs DDoS scrubbing, security rule checks, and / or throttling on redirected packets it receives before forwarding them to the protected recipient NVD 620.

[0208] FIG. 10 is a flowchart 1000 illustrating packet redirection in protected mode for an individual VNIC, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 10 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 10 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 10 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0209] Figure 10 shows further details of 716 in Figure 7A. At 1002, a sender originates a packet destined for a receiving entity associated with a protected VNIC. For example, in Figure 6, one of senders 602a-n (e.g., 602a) may originate a packet destined for a receiving entity (e.g., compute instance) 650 associated with protected VNIC-Rx1 622a executed by NVD 620. The packet may be transmitted via one of network links 606a-n (e.g., 606a), then via 626_tor and 626a, and arrive at 652.

[0210] At 1004, based on the updated VNIC mapping, during protection mode, instead of transmitting the packet to the NVD implementing the protected VNIC, the packet is redirected to a DDoS scrubber system implementing a shadow VNIC corresponding to the protected VNIC. For example, in FIG. 6, the updated VNIC mapping in NVD 604a associated with sender 602a causes the packet on link 606a to be redirected to network link 666a to reach SD-VNIC1 660a instead of being redirected to protected VNIC-Rx1 622a via network links 626_tor65 and 626a. At 1006, the packet is received by the DDoS scrubber system implementing the SD-VNIC. For example, in FIG. 6, after the VNIC mapping update, the packet is received by SD-VNIC 660a created for protected VNIC 622a rather than protected VNIC 622a.

[0211] At 1008, the DDoS scrubber system performs an action (e.g., filtering, throttling, etc.) on the received packet. 908 may be further decomposed into substeps 1010-1017. At 1010, the DDoS scrubber system determines whether the received packet should be forwarded to the NVD implementing the protected VNIC. For example, the DDoS scrubber system may perform throttling and / or filtering by dropping certain packets to manage bandwidth usage, reduce congestion, or enforce policies on data transfer rates. The DDoS scrubber system may also perform DDoS scrubbing and enforcement of stateless security rules for filtering packets, as described in connection with FIG. 6.

[0212] If the packet is filtered at 1012, the packet may be dropped at 1016. If the packet is not filtered, processing continues at 1013. If the packet is throttled at 1013, the DDoS scrubber system performs throttling at 1017. If the packet is not throttled, processing continues at 1014. Packets that are neither filtered nor throttled are forwarded at 1014 to the NVD implementing the protected VNIC. For example, in FIG. 6, the DDoS scrubber system 662 implementing SD-VNIC1 660a may forward packets that are allowed after throttling and / or filtering to the receiving NVD 620 implementing the protected VNIC 622a, which may then further forward the packets to the receiving side, e.g., compute instance 650.

[0213] FIG. 16 is a flowchart 1600 illustrating a generalized process flow of a protected mode of a network virtualization device (NVD, e.g., a smart NIC), according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 16 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of a respective system, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 16 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 16 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0214] As shown in Figure 16, the process begins at 1602. Network traffic received by the NVD in the CSPI is monitored. The NVD may run a set of one or more VNICs associated with a set of one or more compute instances in one or more overlay networks provided by the CSPI. This network traffic may be destined for at least one compute instance from the set of one or more compute instances.

[0215] At 1604, a protection mode of the NVD may be initiated based at least in part on the monitoring to protect the NVD from potential DDoS attacks.

[0216] At 1606, while the NVD is in protection mode, one or more packets destined for the set of one or more compute instances may be caused to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the NVD.

[0217] FIG. 17 is a flowchart 1700 illustrating a generalized process flow for a protected mode for an individual VNIC, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 17 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 17 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 17 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0218] As shown in Figure 17, the process begins at 1702. Network traffic received by a first VNIC associated with a first compute instance in an overlay network provided by the CSPI may be monitored. This network traffic may be destined for the first compute instance. The first VNIC may be associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance.

[0219] At 1704, a protection mode may be initiated for the first VINC to protect the first VINC from potential DDoS attacks based at least in part on the monitoring.

[0220] At 1706, while the first VINC is in protection mode, one or more packets destined for the first compute instance may be caused to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to a first NVD implementing the first VNIC. The first overlay address may be associated with a substrate address associated with the NVD.

[0221] FIG. 18 is a flowchart 1800 illustrating a generalized process flow of a network resource protection mode, according to an embodiment. The process illustrated in FIG. 18 may be implemented in software (e.g., code, instructions, programs) executed by one or more processing units (e.g., processors, cores) of the respective systems, hardware, or a combination thereof. The software may be stored in a non-transitory storage medium (e.g., a memory device). The method presented in FIG. 18 and described below is intended to be exemplary and non-limiting. While FIG. 18 depicts various processing steps occurring in a particular sequence or order, this is not intended to be limiting. In an alternative embodiment, these steps may be performed in some different order, or some steps may be performed in parallel.

[0222] As shown in Figure 18, the process begins at 1802. Network traffic received by multiple network resources in one or more overlay networks provided by the CSPI may be monitored. This network traffic may be destined for a compute instance.

[0223] At 1804, a protection mode may be initiated for a first network resource from the plurality of network resources to protect the first network resource from a potential DDoS attack based at least in part on the monitoring. The first network resource may be associated with a first compute instance.

[0224] At 1806, while the first network resource is in protection mode, one or more packets destined for the first compute instance may be caused to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the first network resource.

[0225] Exemplary Cloud Architecture As mentioned above, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is a specific type of cloud computing. IaaS can be configured to provide virtualized computing resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet). In the IaaS model, a cloud computing provider can host infrastructure components (e.g., servers, storage devices, network nodes (e.g., hardware), deployment software, platform virtualization (e.g., hypervisor layer), etc.). In some cases, an IaaS provider may also offer various services incidental to those infrastructure components (example services include billing software, monitoring software, logging software, load balancing software, clustering software, etc.). Accordingly, these services can be policy-driven, allowing IaaS users to implement policies to drive load balancing and maintain application availability and performance.

[0226] In some cases, IaaS customers may access resources and services over a wide area network (WAN), such as the Internet, and can use the cloud provider's services to install the remaining elements of their application stack. For example, a user may log into an IaaS platform to create virtual machines (VMs), install an operating system (OS) on each VM, deploy middleware such as databases, create storage buckets for workloads and backups, and even install enterprise software on the VMs. The customer can then use the provider's services to perform a variety of functions, including balancing network traffic, troubleshooting application issues, monitoring performance, managing disaster recovery, etc.

[0227] In most cases, the cloud computing model requires the participation of a cloud provider. A cloud provider may be, but need not be, a third-party service that specializes in providing (e.g., offering, renting, selling) IaaS. An entity may choose to deploy a private cloud and become its own provider of infrastructure services.

[0228] In some examples, IaaS deployment is the process of connecting a new application or a new version of an application to a prepared application server or the like. This process may include the process of preparing the server (e.g., installing libraries, daemons, etc.). This process is often managed by the cloud provider below the hypervisor layer (e.g., server, storage, network hardware, and virtualization). Thus, the customer may be responsible for handling the deployment of the OS, middleware, and / or application (e.g., on self-service virtual machines (e.g., that can be spun up on demand)).

[0229] In some examples, IaaS provisioning may also refer to obtaining computers or virtual hosts for use and installing needed libraries or services on those computers or virtual hosts. In most cases, deployment does not include provisioning, which may need to be performed first.

[0230] In some cases, IaaS provisioning presents two distinct challenges. First, there is the initial challenge of provisioning an initial set of infrastructure before anything can be run. Second, there is the challenge of evolving the existing infrastructure (e.g., adding new services, modifying services, removing services, etc.) after everything has been provisioned. In some cases, these two challenges may be addressed by allowing the configuration of the infrastructure to be defined declaratively. In other words, the infrastructure (e.g., which components are needed and how those components interact) may be defined by one or more configuration files. In this way, the entire topology of the infrastructure (e.g., which resources depend on which resources and how each of those resources works together) may be described declaratively. In some cases, after the topology is defined, workflows may be generated to create and / or manage the various components described in the configuration files.

[0231] In some examples, the infrastructure may include many interconnected elements. For example, there may be one or more virtual private clouds (VPCs) (e.g., configurable and / or shared, possibly on-demand pools of computing resources), also known as a core network. In some examples, there may also be one or more inbound / outbound traffic group rules, as well as one or more virtual machines (VMs), provisioned to define how the network's inbound and / or outbound traffic is configured. Other infrastructure elements, such as load balancers, databases, etc., may also be provisioned. The infrastructure can evolve over time as more infrastructure elements are desired and / or added.

[0232] In some cases, continuous deployment techniques may be employed to enable deployment of infrastructure code across various virtual computing environments. Additionally, the described techniques may enable infrastructure management within these environments. In some examples, a service team may write code that is desired to be deployed to one or more, but often many, different production environments (e.g., across various geographic locations, sometimes across the world). However, in some examples, the infrastructure onto which the code will be deployed must first be set up. In some cases, provisioning can be done manually, and provisioning tools may be utilized to provision the resources and / or deployment tools may be utilized to deploy the code after the infrastructure has been provisioned.

[0233] 11 is a block diagram 1100 illustrating an example pattern of an IaaS architecture according to at least one embodiment. A service operator 1102 may be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1104, which may include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1106 and a secure host subnet 1108. In some examples, the service operator 1102 may employ one or more client computing devices, which may be portable handheld devices (e.g., iPhones, mobile phones, iPads, computing tablets, personal digital assistants (PDAs)) or wearable devices (e.g., Google Glass head-mounted displays) that are Internet, email, short message service (SMS), Blackberry, or other communication protocol enabled, running software such as Microsoft Windows Mobile, and / or various mobile operating systems such as iOS, Windows Phone, Android, BlackBerry 8, Palm OS, etc. Alternatively, the client computing devices may be general-purpose personal computers, including, by way of example, personal and / or laptop computers running various versions of the Microsoft Windows, Apple Macintosh, and / or Linux operating systems. The client computing devices may be workstation computers running any of a variety of commercially available UNIX or UNIX-like operating systems, including, but not limited to, various GNU / Linux operating systems, such as Google Chrome OS.Alternatively or additionally, the client computing device may be any other electronic device, such as a thin client computer, an Internet-enabled gaming system (e.g., a Microsoft Xbox gaming console with or without a Kinect® gesture input device), and / or a personal messaging device, that can communicate over a network accessible to VCN 1106 and / or the Internet.

[0234] VCN 1106 may include a local peering gateway (LPG) 1110, which may be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1112 via an LPG 1110 included in SSH VCN 1112. SSH VCN 1112 may include an SSH subnet 1114, which may be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 1116 via an LPG 1110 included in control plane VCN 1116. SSH VCN 1112 may also be communicatively coupled to a data plane VCN 1118 via LPG 1110. The control plane VCN 1116 and the data plane VCN 1118 may be included in a service tenancy 1119, which may be owned and / or operated by the IaaS provider.

[0235] The control plane VCN 1116 may include a control plane demilitarized zone (DMZ) tier 1120 that serves as a perimeter network (e.g., a portion of an enterprise network between the enterprise intranet and an external network). Servers based in the DMZ may have limited responsibility and help keep breaches contained. Additionally, the DMZ tier 1120 may include one or more load balancer (LB) subnets 1122, a control plane app tier 1124 that may include an app subnet 1126, and a control plane data tier 1128 that may include a database (DB) subnet 1130 (e.g., a front-end DB subnet and / or a back-end DB subnet). The LB subnet 1122 included in the control plane DMZ tier 1120 can be communicatively coupled to an app subnet 1126 and an Internet gateway 1134 included in the control plane app tier 1124, which may be included in the control plane VCN 1116, and the app subnet 1126 can be communicatively coupled to a DB subnet 1130 included in the control plane data tier 1128, as well as a service gateway 1136 and a network address translation (NAT) gateway 1138. The control plane VCN 1116 can include the service gateway 1136 and the NAT gateway 1138.

[0236] The control plane VCN 1116 can include a data plane mirror app layer 1140, which can include an app subnet 1126. The app subnet 1126 included in the data plane mirror app layer 1140 can include a virtual network interface controller (VNIC) 1142, which can run a compute instance 1144. The compute instance 1144 can communicatively couple the app subnet 1126 of the data plane mirror app layer 1140 to the app subnet 1126, which can be included in the data plane app layer 1146.

[0237] The data plane VCN 1118 may include a data plane app layer 1146, a data plane DMZ layer 1148, and a data plane data layer 1150. The data plane DMZ layer 1148 may include a LB subnet 1122, which may be communicatively coupled to an app subnet 1126 of the data plane app layer 1146 and an Internet gateway 1134 of the data plane VCN 1118. The app subnet 1126 may be communicatively coupled to a service gateway 1136 of the data plane VCN 1118 and a NAT gateway 1138 of the data plane VCN 1118. The data plane data layer 1150 may also include a DB subnet 1130, which may be communicatively coupled to the app subnet 1126 of the data plane app layer 1146.

[0238] The internet gateways 1134 of the control plane VCN 1116 and of the data plane VCN 1118 may be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1152, which may be communicatively coupled to the public internet 1154. The public internet 1154 may be communicatively coupled to NAT gateways 1138 of the control plane VCN 1116 and of the data plane VCN 1118. The service gateways 1136 of the control plane VCN 1116 and of the data plane VCN 1118 may be communicatively coupled to cloud services 1156.

[0239] In some examples, a service gateway 1136 in the control plane VCN 1116 or in the data plane VCN 1118 can make application programming interface (API) calls to a cloud service 1156 without traversing the public internet 1154. The API calls from the service gateway 1136 to the cloud service 1156 can be one-way: the service gateway 1136 can make the API call to the cloud service 1156, and the cloud service 1156 can send the requested data to the service gateway 1136. However, the cloud service 1156 need not initiate the API call to the service gateway 1136.

[0240] In some examples, secure host tenancy 1104 can be directly connected to service tenancy 1119 or may be otherwise separate. Secure host subnet 1108 can communicate with SSH subnet 1114 through LPG 1110, which can enable bidirectional communication on otherwise separate systems. Connecting secure host subnet 1108 to SSH subnet 1114 may give secure host subnet 1108 access to other entities within service tenancy 1119.

[0241] The control plane VCN 1116 may enable users of the service tenancy 1119 to configure or otherwise provision desired resources. The desired resources provisioned in the control plane VCN 1116 may be deployed or otherwise used in the data plane VCN 1118. In some examples, the control plane VCN 1116 may be separate from the data plane VCN 1118, and the data plane mirror app layer 1140 of the control plane VCN 1116 may communicate with the data plane app layer 1146 of the data plane VCN 1118 via a VNIC 1142, which may be included in the data plane mirror app layer 1140 and the data plane app layer 1146.

[0242] In some examples, a user or customer of the system may make a request, for example, a create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operation, via the public internet 1154, which may communicate the request to a metadata management service 1152. The metadata management service 1152 may communicate the request to the control plane VCN 1116 via an internet gateway 1134. The request may be received by a LB subnet 1122 included in the control plane DMZ tier 1120. The LB subnet 1122 may determine that the request is valid, and in response to this determination, the LB subnet 1122 may send the request to an app subnet 1126 included in the control plane app tier 1124. If the validity of the request is confirmed and the request requires a call to the public internet 1154, the call to the public internet 1154 may be sent to a NAT gateway 1138, which may make the call to the public internet 1154. Metadata that may be desirable to store with the request may be stored within the DB subnet 1130.

[0243] In some examples, the data plane mirror app layer 1140 can facilitate direct communication between the control plane VCN 1116 and the data plane VCN 1118. For example, it may be desirable for changes, updates, or other appropriate modifications to the configuration to be applied to resources included in the data plane VCN 1118. Via the VNIC 1142, the control plane VCN 1116 communicates directly with the resources included in the data plane VCN 1118, thereby enabling the control plane VCN 1116 to perform changes, updates, or other appropriate modifications to the configuration of the resources.

[0244] In some embodiments, the control plane VCN 1116 and the data plane VCN 1118 may be included in the service tenancy 1119. In this case, a user or customer of the system may not own or operate either the control plane VCN 1116 or the data plane VCN 1118. Instead, an IaaS provider may own or operate the control plane VCN 1116 and the data plane VCN 1118, which may both be included in the service tenancy 1119. This embodiment may enable network isolation that can prevent users or customers from interacting with other users' or other customers' resources. This embodiment may also enable users or customers of the system to store databases privately without having to rely on the public internet 1154 for storage, which may not have a desirable level of threat protection.

[0245] In another embodiment, the LB subnet 1122 included in the control plane VCN 1116 may be configured to receive signals from the service gateway 1136. In this embodiment, the control plane VCN 1116 and the data plane VCN 1118 may be configured to be called by the IaaS provider's customers without calling the public Internet 1154. The IaaS provider's customers may desire this embodiment because databases used by the customers may be stored in a service tenancy 1119 that may be controlled by the IaaS provider and isolated from the public Internet 1154.

[0246] 12 is a block diagram 1200 illustrating another exemplary pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. A service operator 1202 (e.g., service operator 1102 in FIG. 11 ) may be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1204 (e.g., secure host tenancy 1104 in FIG. 11 ), which may include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1206 (e.g., VCN 1106 in FIG. 11 ) and a secure host subnet 1208 (e.g., secure host subnet 1108 in FIG. 11 ). VCN 1206 may include a local peering gateway (LPG) 1210 (e.g., LPG 1110 in FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1212 (e.g., SSH VCN 1112 in FIG. 11 ) via an LPG 1110 included in an SSH VCN 1212. SSH VCN 1212 can include SSH subnet 1214 (e.g., SSH subnet 1114 in FIG. 11 ), and SSH VCN 1212 can be communicatively coupled to control plane VCN 1216 (e.g., control plane VCN 1116 in FIG. 11 ) via LPG 1210 included in control plane VCN 1216. Control plane VCN 1216 can be included in service tenancy 1219 (e.g., service tenancy 1119 in FIG. 11 ), and data plane VCN 1218 (e.g., data plane VCN 1118 in FIG. 11 ) can be included in customer tenancy 1221, which can be owned or operated by a user or customer of the system.

[0247] The control plane VCN 1216 may include a control plane DMZ layer 1220 (e.g., the control plane DMZ layer 1120 of FIG. 11 ) that may include a LB subnet 1222 (e.g., the LB subnet 1122 of FIG. 11 ), a control plane app layer 1224 (e.g., the control plane app layer 1124 of FIG. 11 ) that may include an app subnet 1226 (e.g., the app subnet 1126 of FIG. 11 ), and a control plane data layer 1228 (e.g., the control plane data layer 1128 of FIG. 11 ) that may include a database (DB) subnet 1230 (e.g., similar to the database (DB) subnet 1130 of FIG. 11 ). LB subnet 1222 included in control plane DMZ tier 1220 can be communicatively coupled to app subnet 1226 included in control plane app tier 1224, which may be included in control plane VCN 1216, and to Internet gateway 1234 (e.g., Internet gateway 1134 in FIG. 11 ), and app subnet 1226 can be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1230 included in control plane data tier 1228, as well as to service gateway 1236 (e.g., service gateway 1136 in FIG. 11 ) and network address translation (NAT) gateway 1238 (e.g., NAT gateway 1138 in FIG. 11 ). Control plane VCN 1216 can include service gateway 1236 and NAT gateway 1238.

[0248] Control plane VCN 1216 can include a data plane mirror app layer 1240 (e.g., data plane mirror app layer 1140 of FIG. 11 ), which can include an app subnet 1226. App subnet 1226 included in data plane mirror app layer 1240 can include a virtual network interface controller (VNIC) 1242 (e.g., VNIC 1142) that can run compute instance 1244 (e.g., similar to compute instance 1144 of FIG. 11 ). Compute instance 1244 can facilitate communication between app subnet 1226 of data plane mirror app layer 1240 and app subnet 1226 that can be included in data plane app layer 1246 (e.g., data plane app layer 1146 of FIG. 11 ) via VNIC 1242 included in data plane mirror app layer 1240 and VNIC 1242 included in data plane app layer 1246.

[0249] An internet gateway 1234 included in the control plane VCN 1216 may be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1252 (e.g., metadata management service 1152 of FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to a public internet 1254 (e.g., public internet 1154 of FIG. 11 ). The public internet 1254 may be communicatively coupled to a NAT gateway 1238 included in the control plane VCN 1216. A service gateway 1236 included in the control plane VCN 1216 may be communicatively coupled to a cloud service 1256 (e.g., cloud service 1156 of FIG. 11 ).

[0250] In some examples, data plane VCN 1218 may be included in customer tenancy 1221. In this case, the IaaS provider may provide a control plane VCN 1216 for each customer, and the IaaS provider may configure a unique compute instance 1244 for each customer that is included in service tenancy 1219. Each compute instance 1244 may enable communication between the control plane VCN 1216 included in service tenancy 1219 and the data plane VCN 1218 included in customer tenancy 1221. The compute instance 1244 may enable resources provisioned in the control plane VCN 1216 included in service tenancy 1219 to be deployed or otherwise used in the data plane VCN 1218 included in customer tenancy 1221.

[0251] In another example, an IaaS provider customer may have a database that resides in customer tenancy 1221. In this example, control plane VCN 1216 may include data plane mirror app tier 1240, which may include app subnet 1226. Data plane mirror app tier 1240 may reside in data plane VCN 1218, but data plane mirror app tier 1240 may not reside in data plane VCN 1218. That is, data plane mirror app tier 1240 may have access to customer tenancy 1221, but data plane mirror app tier 1240 may not reside in data plane VCN 1218 and may not be owned or operated by the IaaS provider customer. Data plane mirror app tier 1240 may be configured to make calls to data plane VCN 1218, but may not be configured to make calls to any entities included in control plane VCN 1216. A customer may desire to deploy or otherwise use resources in data plane VCN 1218 that have been provisioned in control plane VCN 1216, and data plane mirror app layer 1240 can facilitate the desired deployment or other use of the customer's resources.

[0252] In some embodiments, the IaaS provider's customer can apply filters to the data plane VCN 1218. In this embodiment, the customer can determine which data plane VCNs 1218 are accessible, and the customer may restrict access from the data plane VCN 1218 to the public internet 1254. The IaaS provider may not be able to apply filters or otherwise control the data plane VCN 1218's access to any external networks or databases. Applying filters and controls by the customer to the data plane VCN 1218 contained in the customer's tenancy 1221 can help isolate the data plane VCN 1218 from other customers and from the public internet 1254.

[0253] In some embodiments, cloud services 1256 may be called by service gateway 1236 to access services that may not reside on public internet 1254, control plane VCN 1216, or data plane VCN 1218. The connection between cloud services 1256 and control plane VCN 1216 or data plane VCN 1218 may not be up and running or continuous. Cloud services 1256 may reside on different networks owned or operated by the IaaS provider. Cloud services 1256 may be configured to receive calls from service gateway 1236 and may not be configured to receive calls from public internet 1254. Some cloud services 1256 may be isolated from other cloud services 1256, and control plane VCN 1216 may be isolated from cloud services 1256 that may not be in the same region as control plane VCN 1216. For example, control plane VCN 1216 may be located in "Region 1," and cloud service "Deployment 11" may be located in Region 1 and Region 2. If a call to deployment 11 is made by service gateway 1236 included in control plane VCN 1216 located in Region 1, the call may be sent to deployment 11 in Region 1. In this example, control plane VCN 1216, or deployment 11 in Region 1, may not be communicatively coupled to or otherwise in communication with deployment 11 in Region 2.

[0254] 13 is a block diagram 1300 illustrating another example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. A service operator 1302 (e.g., service operator 1102 in FIG. 11 ) may be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1304 (e.g., secure host tenancy 1104 in FIG. 11 ), which may include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1306 (e.g., VCN 1106 in FIG. 11 ) and a secure host subnet 1308 (e.g., secure host subnet 1108 in FIG. 11 ). VCN 1306 may include an LPG 1310 (e.g., LPG 1110 in FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to an SSH VCN 1312 (e.g., SSH VCN 1112 in FIG. 11 ) via an LPG 1310 included in SSH VCN 1312. SSH VCN 1312 can include SSH subnet 1314 (e.g., SSH subnet 1114 in FIG. 11 ), and SSH VCN 1312 can be communicatively coupled to control plane VCN 1316 (e.g., control plane VCN 1116 in FIG. 11 ) via LPG 1310 included in control plane VCN 1316, and to data plane VCN 1318 (e.g., data plane 1118 in FIG. 11 ) via LPG 1310 included in data plane VCN 1318. Control plane VCN 1316 and data plane VCN 1318 can be included in service tenancy 1319 (e.g., service tenancy 1119 in FIG. 11 ).

[0255] The control plane VCN 1316 may include a control plane DMZ tier 1320 (e.g., the control plane DMZ tier 1120 of FIG. 11 ) that may include a load balancer (LB) subnet 1322 (e.g., the LB subnet 1122 of FIG. 11 ), a control plane app tier 1324 (e.g., the control plane app tier 1124 of FIG. 11 ) that may include an app subnet 1326 (e.g., similar to the app subnet 1126 of FIG. 11 ), and a control plane data tier 1328 (e.g., the control plane data tier 1128 of FIG. 11 ) that may include a DB subnet 1330. LB subnet 1322 included in control plane DMZ tier 1320 can be communicatively coupled to app subnet 1326 included in control plane app tier 1324, which may be included in control plane VCN 1316, and to an Internet gateway 1334 (e.g., Internet gateway 1134 in FIG. 11 ), and app subnet 1326 can be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1330 included in control plane data tier 1328, as well as to service gateway 1336 (e.g., service gateway in FIG. 11 ) and network address translation (NAT) gateway 1338 (e.g., NAT gateway 1138 in FIG. 11 ). Control plane VCN 1316 can include service gateway 1336 and NAT gateway 1338.

[0256] Data plane VCN 1318 may include a data plane app layer 1346 (e.g., data plane app layer 1146 in FIG. 11 ), a data plane DMZ layer 1348 (e.g., data plane DMZ layer 1148 in FIG. 11 ), and a data plane data layer 1350 (e.g., data plane data layer 1150 in FIG. 11 ). Data plane DMZ layer 1348 may include a trusted app subnet 1360 and an untrusted app subnet 1362 of data plane app layer 1346 and an LB subnet 1322 that may be communicatively coupled to an Internet gateway 1334 included in data plane VCN 1318. Trusted app subnet 1360 may be communicatively coupled to a service gateway 1336 included in data plane VCN 1318, a NAT gateway 1338 included in data plane VCN 1318, and a DB subnet 1330 included in data plane data layer 1350. The untrusted app subnet 1362 may be communicatively coupled to a service gateway 1336 included in the data plane VCN 1318 and to a DB subnet 1330 included in the data plane data layer 1350. The data plane data layer 1350 may include a DB subnet 1330 that may be communicatively coupled to a service gateway 1336 included in the data plane VCN 1318.

[0257] The untrusted app subnet 1362 may include one or more primary VNICs 1364(1)-(N), which may be communicatively coupled to tenant virtual machines (VMs) 1366(1)-(N). Each tenant VM 1366(1)-(N) may be communicatively coupled to a respective app subnet 1367(1)-(N), which may be included in a respective container egress VCN 1368(1)-(N), which may be included in a respective customer's tenancy 1370(1)-(N). Each secondary VNIC 1372(1)-(N) may facilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet 1362 included in the data plane VCN 1318 and the app subnet included in the container egress VCN 1368(1)-(N). Each container egress VCN 1368(1)-(N) may include a NAT gateway 1338, which may be communicatively coupled to the public internet 1354 (e.g., public internet 1154 in FIG. 11 ).

[0258] An internet gateway 1334 included in the control plane VCN 1316 and included in the data plane VCN 1318 may be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1352 (e.g., metadata management system 1152 of FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to the public internet 1354. The public internet 1354 may be communicatively coupled to a NAT gateway 1338 included in the control plane VCN 1316 and included in the data plane VCN 1318. A service gateway 1336 included in the control plane VCN 1316 and included in the data plane VCN 1318 may be communicatively coupled to cloud services 1356.

[0259] In some embodiments, data plane VCN 1318 may be integrated with a customer's tenancy 1370. This integration may be useful or desirable for an IaaS provider's customer in some cases, such as when they may want support when executing code. A customer may provide code for execution that may be destructive, may communicate with other customers' resources, or may otherwise cause undesirable effects. In response, the IaaS provider may determine whether to execute the code provided to the IaaS provider by the customer.

[0260] In some examples, a customer of an IaaS provider may grant temporary network access to the IaaS provider and request the ability to connect to the data plane app layer 1346. The code to perform this function may run in VMs 1366(1)-(N), and this code may not be configured to run elsewhere on the data plane VCN 1318. Each VM 1366(1)-(N) may be connected to one customer's tenancy 1370. Each container 1371(1)-(N) contained in a VM 1366(1)-(N) may be configured to run code. In this case, double isolation may exist (e.g., containers 1371(1)-(N) running code may be contained in at least VMs 1366(1)-(N) that are included in untrusted app subnet 1362), which may help prevent incorrect or otherwise unwanted code from causing damage to the IaaS provider's network or to a different customer's network. Containers 1371(1)-(N) may be communicatively coupled to customer tenancy 1370 and may be configured to send or receive data to or from customer tenancy 1370. Containers 1371(1)-(N) may not be configured to send or receive data to or from any other entities in data plane VCN 1318. Upon completion of code execution, the IaaS provider may kill or otherwise destroy containers 1371(1)-(N).

[0261] In some embodiments, trusted app subnet 1360 may execute code that may be owned or operated by the IaaS provider. In this embodiment, trusted app subnet 1360 may be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1330 and may be configured to perform CRUD operations within DB subnet 1330. Untrusted app subnet 1362 may be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1330, but in this embodiment, the untrusted app subnet may be configured to perform read operations within DB subnet 1330. Containers 1371(1)-(N) capable of executing code from the customer, which may be included in each customer's VMs 1366(1)-(N), may not be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1330.

[0262] In other embodiments, the control plane VCN 1316 and the data plane VCN 1318 may not be directly communicatively coupled. In this embodiment, there may not be direct communication between the control plane VCN 1316 and the data plane VCN 1318. However, communication can occur indirectly through at least one method. The LPG 1310 may be established by an IaaS provider and can facilitate communication between the control plane VCN 1316 and the data plane VCN 1318. In another example, the control plane VCN 1316 or the data plane VCN 1318 can make a call to a cloud service 1356 via the service gateway 1336. For example, a call from the control plane VCN 1316 to the cloud service 1356 can include a request for a service that can communicate with the data plane VCN 1318.

[0263] 14 is a block diagram 1400 illustrating another example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. A service operator 1402 (e.g., service operator 1102 in FIG. 11 ) may be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1404 (e.g., secure host tenancy 1104 in FIG. 11 ), which may include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1406 (e.g., VCN 1106 in FIG. 11 ) and a secure host subnet 1408 (e.g., secure host subnet 1108 in FIG. 11 ). VCN 1406 may include an LPG 1410 (e.g., LPG 1110 in FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to an SSH VCN 1412 (e.g., SSH VCN 1112 in FIG. 11 ) via an LPG 1410 included in SSH VCN 1412. SSH VCN 1412 can include SSH subnet 1414 (e.g., SSH subnet 1114 in FIG. 11 ), and SSH VCN 1412 can be communicatively coupled to control plane VCN 1416 (e.g., control plane VCN 1116 in FIG. 11 ) via LPG 1410 included in control plane VCN 1416, and to data plane VCN 1418 (e.g., data plane 1118 in FIG. 11 ) via LPG 1410 included in data plane VCN 1418. Control plane VCN 1416 and data plane VCN 1418 can be included in service tenancy 1419 (e.g., service tenancy 1119 in FIG. 11 ).

[0264] The control plane VCN 1416 may include a control plane DMZ layer 1420 (e.g., control plane DMZ layer 1120 in FIG. 11 ) that may include a LB subnet 1422 (e.g., LB subnet 1122 in FIG. 11 ), a control plane app layer 1424 (e.g., control plane app layer 1124 in FIG. 11 ) that may include an app subnet 1426 (e.g., app subnet 1126 in FIG. 11 ), and a control plane data layer 1428 (e.g., control plane data layer 1128 in FIG. 11 ) that may include a DB subnet 1430 (e.g., DB subnet 1330 in FIG. 13 ). LB subnet 1422 included in control plane DMZ tier 1420 can be communicatively coupled to app subnet 1426 included in control plane app tier 1424, which may be included in control plane VCN 1416, and to an Internet gateway 1434 (e.g., Internet gateway 1134 in FIG. 11 ), and app subnet 1426 can be communicatively coupled to DB subnet 1430 included in control plane data tier 1428, as well as to service gateway 1436 (e.g., service gateway in FIG. 11 ) and network address translation (NAT) gateway 1438 (e.g., NAT gateway 1138 in FIG. 11 ). Control plane VCN 1416 can include service gateway 1436 and NAT gateway 1438.

[0265] Data plane VCN 1418 may include a data plane app layer 1446 (e.g., data plane app layer 1146 in FIG. 11 ), a data plane DMZ layer 1448 (e.g., data plane DMZ layer 1148 in FIG. 11 ), and a data plane data layer 1450 (e.g., data plane data layer 1150 in FIG. 11 ). Data plane DMZ layer 1448 may include trusted app subnet 1460 (e.g., trusted app subnet 1360 in FIG. 13 ) and untrusted app subnet 1462 (e.g., untrusted app subnet 1362 in FIG. 13 ) of data plane app layer 1446, as well as LB subnet 1422, which may be communicatively coupled to an Internet gateway 1434 included in data plane VCN 1418. Trusted app subnet 1460 may be communicatively coupled to service gateway 1436 included in data plane VCN 1418, NAT gateway 1438 included in data plane VCN 1418, and DB subnet 1430 included in data plane data layer 1450. Untrusted app subnet 1462 may be communicatively coupled to service gateway 1436 included in data plane VCN 1418 and DB subnet 1430 included in data plane data layer 1450. Data plane data layer 1450 may include DB subnet 1430, which may be communicatively coupled to service gateway 1436 included in data plane VCN 1418.

[0266] The untrusted app subnet 1462 may include primary VNICs 1464(1)-(N), which may be communicatively coupled to tenant virtual machines (VMs) 1466(1)-(N) residing in the untrusted app subnet 1462. Each tenant VM 1466(1)-(N) may execute code in a respective container 1467(1)-(N) and may be communicatively coupled to an app subnet 1426, which may be included in a data plane app layer 1446, which may be included in a container egress VCN 1468. Each secondary VNIC 1472(1)-(N) may facilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet 1462, which is included in the data plane VCN 1418, and the app subnet included in the container egress VCN 1468. The container egress VCN may include a NAT gateway 1438, which may be communicatively coupled to the public internet 1454 (e.g., public internet 1154 in FIG. 11 ).

[0267] An internet gateway 1434 included in the control plane VCN 1416 and included in the data plane VCN 1418 may be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1452 (e.g., metadata management system 1152 of FIG. 11 ), which may be communicatively coupled to the public internet 1454. The public internet 1454 may be communicatively coupled to a NAT gateway 1438 included in the control plane VCN 1416 and included in the data plane VCN 1418. A service gateway 1436 included in the control plane VCN 1416 and included in the data plane VCN 1418 may be communicatively coupled to cloud services 1456.

[0268] In some examples, the pattern illustrated by the architecture of block diagram 1400 in FIG. 14 may be considered an exception to the pattern illustrated by the architecture of block diagram 1300 in FIG. 13 and may be desirable for an IaaS provider's customers when the IaaS provider cannot communicate directly with the customer (e.g., in a disconnected region). Each container 1467(1)-(N) contained in a VM 1466(1)-(N) per customer may be accessed by the customer in real time. The containers 1467(1)-(N) may be configured to make calls to each secondary VNIC 1472(1)-(N) contained in the app subnet 1426 of the data plane app tier 1446, which may be included in a container egress VCN 1468. The secondary VNICs 1472(1)-(N) may send the calls to a NAT gateway 1438, which may send the calls to the public Internet 1454. In this example, containers 1467(1)-(N) that may be accessed in real time by customers may be isolated from control plane VCN 1416 and may be isolated from other entities included in data plane VCN 1418. Containers 1467(1)-(N) may be isolated from other customer resources.

[0269] In another example, a customer can invoke cloud service 1456 using container 1467(1)-(N). In this example, the customer may execute code in container 1467(1)-(N) that requests a service from cloud service 1456. Container 1467(1)-(N) can send the request to secondary VNICs 1472(1)-(N), which can send the request to a NAT gateway, which can send the request to public Internet 1454. Public Internet 1454 can send the request via Internet gateway 1434 to LB subnet 1422, which is included in control plane VCN 1416. In response to determining that the request is valid, LB subnet 1426 can send the request to app subnet 1426, which can send the request to cloud service 1456 via service gateway 1436.

[0270] It should be understood that the IaaS architectures 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400 depicted in the figures may include components other than those depicted. Additionally, the depicted embodiments are merely some examples of cloud infrastructure systems that may incorporate embodiments of the present disclosure. In some other embodiments, the IaaS systems may include more or fewer components than those depicted in the figures, may combine two or more components, or may have a different configuration or arrangement of components.

[0271] In one embodiment, the IaaS system described herein may include a suite of application, middleware, and database service offerings delivered to customers in a self-service, subscription-based, elastically scalable, reliable, highly available, and secure manner. An example of such an IaaS system is Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI), offered by the present assignee.

[0272] 15 illustrates an exemplary computer system 1500 upon which various embodiments may be implemented. System 1500 may be used to implement any of the computer systems described above. As shown, computer system 1500 includes a processing unit 1504 that communicates with multiple peripheral subsystems via a bus subsystem 1502. These peripheral subsystems may include a processing acceleration unit 1506, an I / O subsystem 1508, a storage subsystem 1518, and a communication subsystem 1524. Storage subsystem 1518 includes a tangible computer-readable storage medium 1522 and a system memory 1510.

[0273] Bus subsystem 1502 provides a mechanism for allowing the various components and subsystems of computer system 1500 to communicate with each other as intended. While bus subsystem 1502 is shown schematically as a single bus, alternative embodiments of the bus subsystem may utilize multiple buses. Bus subsystem 1502 may be any of several types of bus structures, including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. For example, such architectures may include an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, an Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, a Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, which may be implemented as a mezzanine bus manufactured to the IEEE P1386.1 standard.

[0274] Processing unit 1504, which may be implemented as one or more integrated circuits (e.g., conventional microprocessors or microcontrollers), controls the operation of computer system 1500. One or more processors may be included in processing unit 1504. These processors may include single-core or multi-core processors. In one embodiment, processing unit 1504 may be implemented as one or more independent processing units 1532 and / or 1534, with a single-core or multi-core processor included in each processing unit. In other embodiments, processing unit 1504 may be implemented as a quad-core processing unit formed by integrating two dual-core processors into a single chip.

[0275] In various embodiments, processing unit 1504 may execute various programs according to program code and may maintain multiple simultaneously executing programs or processes. At any particular time, some or all of the program code being executed may reside on processor 1504 and / or on storage subsystem 1518. With appropriate programming, processor 1504 may provide the various functions described above. Computer system 1500 may further include a processing acceleration unit 1506, which may include a digital signal processor (DSP), a special purpose processor, and / or the like.

[0276] The I / O subsystem 1508 may include user interface input devices and user interface output devices. User interface input devices may include a keyboard, a pointing device such as a mouse or trackball, a touchpad or touchscreen integrated into a display, a scroll wheel, a click wheel, a dial, buttons, switches, a keypad, a voice input device with a voice command recognition system, a microphone, and other types of input devices. User interface input devices may include, for example, a motion detection device and / or gesture recognition device, such as a Microsoft Kinect® motion sensor, which allows a user to control and interact with an input device, such as a Microsoft Xbox® 360 game controller, through a natural user interface using gestures and spoken commands. User interface input devices may also include an eye gesture recognition device, such as a Google Glass® blink detector, which detects a user's eye activity (e.g., "blinking" when taking a photo and / or selecting a menu) and translates the eye gesture as input to an input device (e.g., Google Glass®). Additionally, the user interface input devices may include a voice recognition detection device that allows a user to interact with a voice recognition system (e.g., Siri® Navigator) via voice commands.

[0277] User interface input devices may include, but are not limited to, three-dimensional (3D) mice, joysticks or pointing sticks, gamepads, and graphic tablets, as well as audio / visual devices such as speakers, digital cameras, digital video cameras, portable media players, webcams, image scanners, fingerprint scanners, barcode reader 3D scanners, 3D printers, laser range finders, and eye-tracking devices. Additionally, user interface input devices may include medical imaging input devices such as, for example, computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, position emission tomography, and medical ultrasound devices. User interface input devices may also include audio input devices such as, for example, MIDI keyboards, digital musical instruments, and the like.

[0278] User interface output devices may include non-visual displays such as a display subsystem, indicator lights, or audio output devices. The display subsystem may be a flat-panel device, such as a flat-panel device using a cathode ray tube (CRT), a liquid crystal display (LCD), or a plasma display, a projection device, a touch screen, or the like. In general, use of the term "output device" is intended to include all possible types of devices and mechanisms for outputting information from computer system 1500 to a user or to another computer. For example, user interface output devices may include, but are not limited to, various display devices that visually convey textual, graphical, and audio / video information, such as monitors, printers, speakers, headphones, navigation systems, plotters, audio output devices, and modems.

[0279] Computer system 1500 may include a storage subsystem 1518 that provides a tangible, non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium for storing software and data structures that provide the functionality of embodiments described in this disclosure. The software may include programs, code modules, instructions, scripts, etc. that, when executed by one or more cores or processors of processing unit 1504, provide the aforementioned functionality. Storage subsystem 1518 may also provide a repository for storing data used in accordance with the present disclosure.

[0280] 15, storage subsystem 1518 may include various components, including system memory 1510, computer-readable storage medium 1522, and computer-readable storage medium reader 1520. System memory 1510 may store program instructions readable and executable by processing unit 1504. System memory 1510 may also store data used during execution of the instructions and / or data generated during execution of the program instructions. Various types of programs may be loaded into system memory 1510, including, but not limited to, client applications, web browsers, middle-tier applications, relational database management systems (RDBMS), virtual machines, containers, etc.

[0281] System memory 1510 may also store operating system 1516. Examples of operating system 1516 may include various versions of the Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and / or Linux® operating systems, various commercially available UNIX® or UNIX-like operating systems (including, but not limited to, various GNU / Linux® operating systems, Google Chrome® OS, etc.), and / or mobile operating systems such as iOS, Windows® Phone, Android® OS, BlackBerry® OS, and Palm® OS operating systems. In particular implementations in which computer system 1500 runs one or more virtual machines, the virtual machines along with their guest operating systems (GOS) may be loaded into system memory 1510 and executed by one or more processors or cores of processing unit 1504.

[0282] The system memory 1510 may be provided in different configurations depending on the type of computer system 1500. For example, the system memory 1510 may be volatile memory (such as random access memory (RAM)) and / or non-volatile memory (such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash memory). Various types of RAM configurations may be provided, including static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc. In some implementations, the system memory 1510 may include a basic input / output system (BIOS), which contains the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within the computer system 1500, such as during start-up.

[0283] Computer-readable storage medium 1522 may represent storage media in addition to remote, local, fixed, and / or removable storage devices for temporarily and / or more permanently containing and storing computer-readable information for use by computer system 1500, including instructions executable by processing unit 1504 of computer system 1500.

[0284] Computer-readable storage medium 1522 may include any suitable medium known or used in the art, including storage and communication media, such as, but not limited to, volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media, implemented in any method or technology for storing and / or transmitting information. Computer-readable storage medium 1522 may include tangible computer-readable storage media, such as RAM, ROM, electronically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassette, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage device, or other tangible computer-readable medium.

[0285] By way of example, computer-readable storage medium 1522 may include a hard disk drive that reads from or writes to non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive that reads from or writes to removable, non-volatile magnetic disks, and an optical disk drive that reads from or writes to removable, non-volatile optical disks, such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, and Blu-ray disks or other optical media. Computer-readable storage medium 1522 may include, but is not limited to, Zip drives, flash memory cards, universal serial bus (USB) flash drives, secure digital (SD) cards, DVD disks, digital video tapes, etc. The computer-readable storage media 1522 may include solid-state drives (SSDs) based on non-volatile memory such as flash memory-based SSDs, enterprise flash drives, semiconductor ROM, volatile memory-based SSDs such as semiconductor RAM, dynamic RAM, static RAM, DRAM-based SSDs, magneto-resistive RAM (MRAM) SSDs, and hybrid SSDs that use a combination of DRAM and flash memory-based SSDs. Disk drives and associated computer-readable media may provide non-volatile storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, and other data for the computer system 1500.

[0286] Machine-readable instructions executable by one or more processors or cores of processing unit 1504 may be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may include physically tangible memory or storage devices, including volatile and / or non-volatile memory storage devices. Examples of non-transitory computer-readable storage media include magnetic storage media (e.g., disks or tapes), optical storage media (e.g., DVDs, CDs), various types of RAM, ROM, or flash memory, hard drives, floppy drives, removable memory drives (e.g., USB drives), or other types of storage devices.

[0287] The communications subsystem 1524 provides an interface to other computer systems and networks. The communications subsystem 1524 serves as an interface for receiving data from and transmitting data to other systems in the computer system 1500. For example, the communications subsystem 1524 may enable the computer system 1500 to connect to one or more devices via the Internet. In some embodiments, the communications subsystem 1524 may include radio frequency (RF) transceiver components for accessing wireless voice and / or data networks (e.g., using cellular technology, advanced data network technologies such as 3G, 4G, or EDGE (enhanced data rates for global evolution), WiFi (using the IEEE 802.11 family of standards, or other mobile communications technologies, or any combination thereof), global positioning system (GPS) receiver components, and / or other components. In some embodiments, the communications subsystem 1524 may provide a wired network connection (e.g., Ethernet) in addition to or instead of a wireless interface.

[0288] In some embodiments, the communications subsystem 1524 may receive incoming communications in the form of structured and / or unstructured data feeds 1526, event streams 1528, event updates 1530, etc., on behalf of one or more users who may use the computer system 1500.

[0289] By way of example, the communications subsystem 1524 may be configured to receive data feeds 1526 in real time from users of social networks and / or other communications services, such as Twitter® feeds, Facebook® updates, web feeds, such as Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, and / or real-time updates from one or more third-party sources.

[0290] Additionally, the communications subsystem 1524 may be configured to receive data in the form of a continuous data stream, which may include an event stream 1528 of real-time events and / or event updates 1530 that may have no explicit end, be continuous in nature, or be unbounded. Examples of applications that generate continuous data may include, for example, sensor data applications, financial tickers, network performance measurement tools (e.g., network monitoring and traffic management applications), clickstream analysis tools, automobile traffic monitoring, etc.

[0291] The communications subsystem 1524 may be configured to output structured and / or unstructured data feeds 1526, event streams 1528, event updates 1530, etc. to one or more databases that can communicate with one or more streaming data source computers coupled to the computer system 1500.

[0292] The computer system 1500 can be one of a variety of types, including a handheld portable device (e.g., an iPhone® mobile phone, an iPad® computing tablet, a PDA), a wearable device (e.g., a Google Glass® head-mounted display), a PC, a workstation, a mainframe, a ticket machine, a server rack, or any other data processing system.

[0293] Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, the description of computer system 1500 shown in the figure is intended to be a specific example only. Many other configurations are possible, including more or fewer components than the system shown in the figure. For example, customized hardware may be used, and / or particular elements may be implemented in hardware, firmware, software (including applets), or a combination thereof. Furthermore, connections to other computing devices, such as network input / output devices, may be employed. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, those skilled in the art will appreciate other ways and / or manners for implementing the various embodiments.

[0294] While specific embodiments have been described, various modifications, variations, alternative constructions, and equivalents are encompassed within the scope of the present disclosure. The embodiments are not limited to operation in one particular data processing environment, but can freely operate in multiple data processing environments. Furthermore, while the embodiments have been described using a particular sequence of transactions and steps, it should be apparent to those skilled in the art that the scope of the present disclosure is not limited to the sequence of transactions and steps described. Various features and aspects of the above-described embodiments may be used individually or together.

[0295] Furthermore, while embodiments have been described using particular combinations of hardware and software, it should be recognized that other combinations of hardware and software are within the scope of the present disclosure. Embodiments may be implemented exclusively in hardware, exclusively in software, or using a combination thereof. Various processes described herein may be performed on the same processor or on different processors in any combination. Thus, when a component or service is described as being configured to perform an operation, such configuration may be realized, for example, by designing electronic circuitry to perform the operation, by programming a programmable electronic circuit (such as a microprocessor) to perform the operation, or by any combination thereof. Processes may communicate using various techniques, including, but not limited to, conventional techniques for inter-process communication, and different pairs of processes may use different techniques, or the same pair of processes may use different techniques at different times.

[0296] Accordingly, the specification and drawings should be regarded in an illustrative, rather than a limiting sense. However, it will be apparent that additions, subtractions, deletions, and other modifications and changes may be made to the specification and drawings without departing from the broader spirit and scope as set forth in the claims. Accordingly, while particular disclosed embodiments have been described, they are not intended to be limiting. Various modifications and equivalents are within the scope of the appended claims.

[0297] The use of the terms "a," "an," and "the" and similar referents in the context of describing the disclosed embodiments (particularly in the context of the appended claims) should be construed to cover both the singular and the plural, unless otherwise indicated herein or clearly contradicted by context. The terms "comprising," "having," "including," and "containing" should be construed as open-ended (i.e., meaning "including, but not limited to"), unless otherwise noted. The term "connected" should be construed as partially or fully contained within, connected to, or joined together, even if there is something intervening. The recitation of ranges of values ​​herein is merely intended to serve as a shorthand method of individually referring to each separate value included in the range, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value is incorporated herein as if it were individually recited herein. All methods described herein can be performed in any suitable order unless otherwise indicated herein or otherwise clearly contradicted by context. Any and all examples provided herein, or the use of exemplary language (e.g., "etc.") are intended merely to better clarify the embodiments and do not impose limitations on the scope of the disclosure unless specifically claimed. No language in the specification should be construed as indicating any non-claimed element as essential to the practice of the disclosure.

[0298] Disjunctive language, such as the phrase "at least one of X, Y, or Z," is generally intended to be understood within the context as being used to state that an item, condition, etc. may be either X, Y, or Z, or any combination thereof (e.g., X, Y, and / or Z), unless expressly stated otherwise. Thus, such disjunctive language is generally not intended to, and should not, imply that an embodiment requires that at least one of X, at least one of Y, or at least one of Z, respectively, be present.

[0299] Preferred embodiments of the present disclosure are described herein, including the best mode known for carrying out the disclosure. Variations of such preferred embodiments may become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description. Those skilled in the art will be able to adopt such variations as appropriate, and the present disclosure may be practiced other than as specifically described herein. Accordingly, this disclosure includes all modifications and equivalents of the subject matter recited in the claims appended hereto as permitted by applicable law. Moreover, any combination of the above-described elements in all possible variations of the embodiments is encompassed by the present disclosure, unless otherwise indicated herein.

[0300] All references, including publications, patent applications, and patents, cited in this specification are hereby incorporated by reference to the same extent as if each reference was individually indicated to be incorporated by reference and were set forth in its entirety herein.

[0301] While the foregoing specification has described aspects of the present disclosure with reference to specific embodiments thereof, those skilled in the art will recognize that the disclosure is not limited thereto. Various features and aspects of the foregoing disclosure may be used individually or together. Moreover, the embodiments may be utilized in any number of environments and applications beyond those described herein without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the specification. Accordingly, the specification and drawings should be considered illustrative rather than restrictive.

Claims

1. 1. A method comprising: monitoring network traffic received by a network virtualization device (NVD) within a cloud service provider infrastructure, the NVD running a set of one or more virtual network interface cards (VNICs) associated with a set of one or more compute instances within one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure, the network traffic being destined for at least one compute instance from the set of one or more compute instances; The method includes initiating a protection mode of the NVD to protect the NVD from potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks based at least in part on the monitoring; The method further includes causing one or more packets destined for the set of one or more compute instances to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the NVD while the NVD is in the protection mode.

2. Initiating the protected mode of the NVD includes: determining a set of the one or more VNICs executed by the NVD, the set of one or more VNICs including a first VNIC associated with a first compute instance in the set of one or more compute instances, the first VNIC associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, the first overlay address associated with a board address associated with the NVD; creating a set of one or more shadow VNICs for the set of one or more VNICs; Associating the set of one or more shadow VNICs with the DDoS scrubber system; and publishing information indicating the set of one or more shadow VNICs to the one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure.

3. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein causing the one or more packets destined for the set of one or more compute instances to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system comprises redirecting the one or more packets to the DDoS scrubber system via the set of one or more shadow VNICs.

4. the set of one or more VNICs includes a plurality of VNICs; The method of claim 2 or claim 3, wherein the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a single shadow VNIC.

5. the set of one or more VNICs includes a plurality of VNICs; The method of claim 2 or 3, wherein the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a plurality of shadow VNICs, the plurality of shadow VNICs including a shadow VNIC corresponding to each VNIC in the plurality of VNICs.

6. the set of one or more VNICs includes a plurality of VNICs; The method of claim 2 or 3, wherein the set of one or more shadow VNICs includes a plurality of shadow VNICs, and the number of shadow VNICs in the plurality of shadow VNICs is less than the number of VNICs in the plurality of VNICs.

7. The method of any one of claims 2 to 6, wherein the DDoS scrubber system includes at least one of a host machine configured to implement at least one shadow VNIC from the set of one or more shadow VNICs, or at least one NVD configured to implement at least one shadow VNIC from the set of one or more shadow VNICs.

8. Creating the set of one or more shadow VNICs for the set of one or more VNICs includes: creating a first shadow VNIC corresponding to the first VNIC associated with the first compute instance; associating the first overlay address with the first shadow VNIC; 8. The method of claim 2, wherein associating the set of one or more shadow VNICs with the DDoS scrubber system includes associating the first shadow VNIC with a board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system.

9. causing the one or more packets to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system For a first packet in the one or more packets, the first packet is destined for the first overlay address configured for the first compute instance; determining, for the first overlay address, that the first packet is to be sent to the board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; and transmitting the first packet to the DDoS scrubber system.

10. performing, by the DDoS scrubber system, at least one action on at least one of the one or more packets; 10. The method of any preceding claim, wherein the performing comprises dropping the one or more packets, throttling the one or more packets, or forwarding the one or more packets to the NVD.

11. 10. The method of any preceding claim, wherein the potential Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is determined when the network traffic exceeds a predetermined threshold, including an average link utilization of more than 80% for several consecutive minutes, or bursts of link utilization of 100% or more for several consecutive minutes.

12. Exiting the protected mode of the NVD; 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising: after said termination, for any packet destined for a compute instance from said set of one or more compute instances, sending said packet to said NVD instead of redirecting said packet to said DDoS scrubber system.

13. 1. A method comprising: monitoring network traffic received by a first virtual network interface card (VNIC) associated with a first compute instance in an overlay network provided by a cloud service provider infrastructure, the network traffic being destined for the first compute instance; The method includes initiating a protection mode for the first VNIC to protect the first VNIC from a potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack based at least in part on the monitoring; causing, while the first VNIC is in the protection mode, one or more packets destined for the first compute instance to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to a first network virtualization device (NVD) implementing the first VNIC; The method of claim 1, wherein the first VNIC is associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, and the first overlay address is associated with a board address associated with the NVD implementing the first VNIC.

14. Initiating the protected mode of the first VNIC includes: creating a first shadow VNIC corresponding to the first VNIC associated with the first compute instance; Associating the first overlay address with the first shadow VNIC; Associating the first shadow VNIC with a board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; and publishing information indicative of the first shadow VNIC to the overlay network provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure.

15. causing one or more packets to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, For a first packet in the one or more packets, the first packet is destined for the first overlay address configured for the first compute instance; determining, for the first overlay address, that the first packet is to be sent to the board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; and transmitting the first packet to the DDoS scrubber system.

16. 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the DDoS scrubber system includes at least one host machine configured to implement the first shadow VNIC or at least one NVD configured to implement the first shadow VNIC.

17. performing, by the DDoS scrubber system, at least one action on the one or more packets; The method of any one of claims 13 to 16, wherein the execution includes dropping the one or more packets, throttling the one or more packets, or forwarding the one or more packets to the NVD.

18. 1. A method comprising: monitoring network traffic received by a plurality of network resources within one or more overlay networks provided by a cloud service provider infrastructure, the network traffic being destined for a first compute instance; The method further includes initiating a protection mode of a first network resource from the plurality of network resources to protect the first network resource from a potential distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack based at least in part on the monitoring, the first network resource being associated with the first computing instance; The method further includes causing one or more packets destined for the first computing instance to be redirected to a DDoS scrubber system instead of being sent to the first network resource while the first network resource is in the protection mode.

19. the first network resource is a network virtualization device (NVD) implementing a first virtual network interface card (VNIC) associated with the first compute instance in a first overlay network from the one or more overlay networks, the first VNIC enabling the first compute instance to be part of the first overlay network, the first VNIC associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, the first overlay address associated with a board address associated with the NVD; Initiating the protected mode of the NVD includes: creating a first shadow VNIC corresponding to the first VNIC associated with the first compute instance; Associating the first overlay address with the first shadow VNIC; Associating the first shadow VNIC with a board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; publishing information indicating the set of one or more shadow VNICs to the one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure; causing one or more packets to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, For a first packet in the one or more packets, the first packet is destined for the first overlay address configured for the first compute instance; determining, for the first overlay address, that the first packet is to be sent to the board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; transmitting the first packet to the DDoS scrubber system; 20. The method of claim 18, wherein the DDoS scrubber system determines whether the first packet should be forwarded to the NVD.

20. the first network resource is a virtual network interface card (VNIC) associated with the first compute instance in a first overlay network from the one or more overlay networks, the VNIC enabling the first compute instance to be part of the first overlay network, the VNIC associated with a first overlay address configured for the first compute instance, the first overlay address associated with a board address associated with a network virtualization device (NVD) implementing the VNIC; Initiating the protected mode of the VNIC comprises: creating a shadow VNIC corresponding to the VNIC associated with the first compute instance; Associating the first overlay address with the shadow VNIC; Associating the shadow VNIC with a board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; publishing information indicating the set of one or more shadow VNICs to the one or more overlay networks provided by the cloud service provider infrastructure; causing one or more packets to be redirected to the DDoS scrubber system, For a first packet in the one or more packets, the first packet is destined for the first overlay address configured for the first compute instance; determining, for the first overlay address, that the first packet is to be sent to the board address associated with the DDoS scrubber system; transmitting the first packet to the DDoS scrubber system; 20. The method of claim 18, wherein the DDoS scrubber system determines whether the first packet should be forwarded to the NVD.

Images