Cryptographic communication system, secure element, device, and cryptographic communication method

The cryptographic communication system addresses the risk of key leakage by dynamically generating and registering keys within a secure element and server, ensuring secure and flexible communication without prior key sharing.

JP7586355B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-19DAI NIPPON PRINTING CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024030428
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-02-29
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2039-06-11

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing communication systems in IoT devices require prior sharing of keys, which can weaken the confidentiality of the communication path due to the risk of key leakage.

Method used

A cryptographic communication system that includes a secure element generating dynamic public and private keys, allowing for secure communication without the need for prior key sharing, using a secure element and server to exchange and register keys dynamically.

Benefits of technology

Ensures secure communication paths without relying on fixed keys, maintaining confidentiality and flexibility in key settings, preventing unauthorized access and key leakage.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

To provide a cryptographic communication system, secure element, device, and cryptographic communication method that do not require prior sharing of keys.SOLUTION: A secure element includes a secure element key generation unit that generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, and a secure element output unit that outputs the generated secure element public key to a server. The server includes a server registration unit that obtains and registers the secure element public key, a server key generation unit that generates a server public key and a server private key, and a server output unit that outputs the generated server public key to the secure element. The secure element further includes a secure element registration unit that obtains and registers the server public key.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a cryptographic communication system, a secure element, a device, and a cryptographic communication method. [Background technology]

[0002] In the Internet of Things (IoT), a wide variety of devices are connected to the network, creating new added value. However, as the number of such devices connected to the Internet increases, security issues are gradually becoming apparent.

[0003] Patent Document 1 discloses a communication system in which, between a server device and an IoT device, authentication processing is performed between the server device using a first key, and a third key is sent and received between the server device and the IoT device through encrypted communication using a second key, thereby sharing the key. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Patent Document 1] Patent No. 6408536 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] However, in the communication system of Patent Document 1, before the third key is shared between the server device and the IoT device, the first key and the second key need to be stored in advance to be shared in advance. Therefore, a specific fixed key needs to be prepared in advance between the server device and the IoT device, and there is a risk that the confidentiality of the communication path may be weakened due to leakage of such a fixed key.

[0006] The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and has an object to provide a cryptographic communication system, a secure element, a device, and a cryptographic communication method that do not require prior sharing of a key. [Means for solving the problem]

[0007] A cryptographic communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention is a cryptographic communication system comprising a server and a device equipped with a secure element, wherein the secure element comprises a secure element key generation unit that generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, and a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device, the server comprises a server registration unit that acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element output unit, a server key generation unit that generates a server public key and a server private key, and a server output unit that outputs the server public key generated by the server key generation unit to the secure element via the device, the secure element further comprises a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers the server public key output from the server output unit, the server performs cryptographic communication based on the registered secure element public key, and the secure element performs cryptographic communication based on the registered server public key.

[0008] A secure element according to an embodiment of the present invention is a secure element mounted on a device that performs cryptographic communication with a server, and comprises a secure element key generation unit that generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device, and a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers a server public key output by the server, and uses the server public key registered in the secure element registration unit for cryptographic communication between the secure element and the server.

[0009] A device according to an embodiment of the present invention is equipped with the above-mentioned secure element and can perform encrypted communication with a predetermined server.

[0010] A server according to an embodiment of the present invention is a server that performs cryptographic communication with a device equipped with a secure element, and includes a server key generation unit that generates a server public key and a server private key, a server output unit that outputs the server public key generated by the server key generation unit to the secure element via the device, and a server registration unit that acquires and registers the secure element public key output by the secure element, and uses the secure element public key registered in the server registration unit for cryptographic communication with the secure element.

[0011] A computer program according to an embodiment of the present invention causes a computer to execute the following processes: generating a server public key and a server private key; outputting the generated server public key to a secure element mounted on a device; obtaining and registering a secure element public key output by the secure element; and performing cryptographic communication with the secure element using the registered secure element public key.

[0012] A cryptographic communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention is a cryptographic communication method between a server and a device equipped with a secure element, in which the secure element generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, and outputs the secure element public key generated via the device to the server, the server acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element, generates a server public key and a server private key, and outputs the server public key generated via the device to the secure element, the secure element further acquires and registers the server public key output from the server, the server performs cryptographic communication based on the registered secure element public key, and the secure element performs cryptographic communication based on the registered server public key. Effect of the Invention

[0013] According to the present invention, no pre-sharing of keys is required. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0014] [Figure 1] 1 is a block diagram showing an example of a configuration of an encrypted communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention; [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of generation of an asymmetric key pair and exchange of a public key. [Diagram 3] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of generation of a device common key. [Figure 4] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of public key exchange using a certificate authority; [Diagram 5] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of revoking a public key signature and discarding a device common key. [Figure 6] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of device authentication using a device certificate. [Figure 7] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of dynamic regeneration of a key. [Figure 8] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of common key generation when a shared secret is added to an input. [Figure 9] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of updating a shared secret; [Figure 10] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of adding a key generation algorithm. [Figure 11] 13 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a procedure for a public key exchange process performed by a server. [Figure 12] 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for a public key exchange process performed by a secure element. [Figure 13] 10 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a procedure for a process of generating a device common key by a server. [Figure 14] 10 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for a process of generating a device common key by a secure element. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0015] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of an encrypted communication system according to the present embodiment. The encrypted communication system includes a server 10 that performs key management, and a device 70. The device 70 is a device that is subject to encryption key management by the server 10, and includes a device (also referred to as an electronic device) that corresponds to a "thing" in the "Internet of Things" (IoT). The device 70 is also referred to as an IoT device, and includes a secure element 50 and a storage unit 71. That is, the device 70 is equipped with the secure element 50, and the parts of the device 70 other than the secure element 50 are referred to as the device main body.

[0016] The secure element 50 is tamper-resistant and is physically independent of the device 70. The secure element 50 stores a key for communicating with the server 10 and supplies a key that it generates to the device 70. The secure element 50 may be a hardware element or a software element (software component). In the case of a software component, it corresponds to an independent security environment such as a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) and an application that runs in that environment. This allows an appropriate secure element 50 to be mounted in the device 70 depending on the type of device, etc.

[0017] The server 10 is a server that manages keys for the device 70 together with the secure element 50. Encrypted communication can be performed between the server 10 and the device 70 via an interface 1. The interface 1 can be established by opening a network connection such as TCP / IP on a physical interface such as Ethernet (registered trademark) or Wifi (registered trademark).

[0018] The device 70 and the secure element 50 are connected via an interface 2. When the secure element 50 is an IC card, the interface 2 is, for example, ISO7816, and when the secure element 50 is other than an IC card, the interface 2 is a physical communication path such as SPI / I2C. When the secure element 50 is a software component, the interface 2 is assumed to be an API (Application Programming Interface) or the like. When the secure element 50 communicates with the server 10, the communication can be performed via an interface 1 between the device 70 and the server 10.

[0019] The server 10 can be connected to the certificate authority server 100 via an interface 4. The device 70 can be connected to the certificate authority server 100 via an interface 3. The interface 3 can be configured similarly to the interface 1.

[0020] The certificate authority server 100 is a server that certifies the validity of public keys held by other entities (servers and secure elements) and is also called a CA (Certificate Authority, Certification Authority) server. The certificate authority server 100 issues a signature for a CSR (Certificate Signing Request: signature generation request) and certifies the validity of the entity that provides the public key. The certificate authority server 100 also receives an inquiry about the revocation of a public key and returns the revocation status to the source of the inquiry.

[0021] The secure element 50 includes a storage unit 51, a server public key store 52, a key pair generation unit 53, a random number generation unit 54, a signature verification unit 55, a common key generation unit 56, a shared secret update unit 57, and a key validity confirmation unit 58. The common key generation unit 56 includes an algorithm for generating keys, and is equipped with SHA-1 (59) and SHA-256 (60).

[0022] The storage unit 51 stores values ​​such as an SCID, a shared secret, an SC private key, an SC public key, and a device public key. The SCID is also called secure element identification information, and is an ID uniquely assigned to each secure element. The shared secret is also called shared information, and is secret information shared in advance between the server 10 and the secure element 50, and can be secret information that is not disclosed to anyone other than the server 10 and the secure element 50. The SC private key is also called a secure element private key, and is a private key included in an asymmetric key pair generated by the secure element 50. The SC public key is also called a secure element public key, and is a public key included in an asymmetric key pair generated by the secure element 50. The device public key is a key for verifying the authenticity of a device certificate when the device 70 provides the certificate.

[0023] The server public key store 52 has a function as a secure element registration unit, and is a database for registering a server public key in the secure element 50. When a server public key is registered, a server ID (server identification information) and the server public key are stored in association with each other.

[0024] The key pair generation unit 53 has a function as a secure element key generation unit, and generates a key pair (SC public key and SC private key) for asymmetric key cryptography (RSA, etc.) within the secure element 50.

[0025] The random number generation unit 54 generates random numbers within the secure element 50 .

[0026] The shared key generation unit 56 has a function as a secure element shared key generation unit, and generates a shared key in the secure element 50 according to input information and a predetermined algorithm. The shared key generation unit 56 can, for example, perform a predetermined hash calculation on an input data string and output a hash value obtained by the hash calculation. The shared key generation unit 56 has a plurality of hash calculation algorithms, and it is decided in advance which hash calculation algorithm will be used.

[0027] The shared secret update unit 57 operates when updating the shared secret from outside.

[0028] The key validity confirmation unit 58 confirms the validity of the asymmetric key generated by the server 10. The key validity confirmation unit 58 inquires of the certificate authority server 100 about the validity state of the asymmetric key, and judges the validity of the key of the server 10 that it holds.

[0029] The storage unit 71 of the device main body stores a device ID and a device certificate. The device ID is a unique ID assigned to each device. The device certificate is written by the device manufacturer when the device 70 is manufactured. A digest signature is applied to information including at least the device ID using a device private key held by the device manufacturer, and the signature is attached.

[0030] The server 10 includes a storage unit 11, an SC public key store 12, a key pair generation unit 13, a random number generation unit 14, a signature verification unit 15, a common key generation unit 16, a shared secret update unit 17, and a key validity confirmation unit 18. The common key generation unit 16 includes an algorithm for generating keys, and is equipped with SHA-1 (19) and SHA-256 (20).

[0031] The storage unit 11 stores values ​​such as a server ID, a shared secret, a server private key, and a server public key. The server ID is also called server identification information, and is an ID uniquely assigned to each server. The shared secret is also called shared information, and is secret information shared in advance between the server 10 and the secure element 50, and can be secret information that is not disclosed to anyone other than the server 10 and the secure element 50. The server private key is a secret key included in an asymmetric key pair generated by the server 10. The server public key is a public key included in an asymmetric key pair generated by the server 10.

[0032] The SC public key store 12 has a function as a server registration unit, and is a database for registering an SC public key within the server 10. When an SC public key is registered, the SCID and the SC public key are stored in association with each other.

[0033] The key pair generating unit 13 has a function as a server key generating unit, and generates a key pair (server public key and server private key) of asymmetric key cryptography (RSA, etc.) within the server 10.

[0034] The random number generation unit 14 generates random numbers within the server 10 .

[0035] The common key generation unit 16 has a function as a server common key generation unit, and generates a common key in the server 10 according to input information and a predetermined algorithm. The common key generation unit 16 can, for example, perform a predetermined hash calculation on an input data string and output a hash value obtained by the hash calculation. The common key generation unit 16 has a plurality of hash calculation algorithms, and it is decided in advance which hash calculation algorithm to use.

[0036] The shared secret update unit 17 operates when updating the shared secret from outside.

[0037] The key validity confirmation unit 18 confirms the validity of the asymmetric key generated by the secure element 50. The key validity confirmation unit 18 inquires of the certificate authority server 100 about the validity state of the asymmetric key, and judges the validity of the key of the secure element 50 held by the key confirmation unit 18 itself.

[0038] The certificate authority server 100 includes a public key revoked list 101, a signature generated list 102, a signature generation unit 103, a CA public key, and a CA private key.

[0039] The CA public key is a public key held by the certification authority server 100. When verifying a signature generated by the certification authority server 100, an entity wishing to verify the signature obtains and uses the CA public key.

[0040] The CA private key is a private key held by the certificate authority server 100. When a public key generation entity requests signature generation using a CSR, the certificate authority server 100 generates a signature using the CA private key.

[0041] In response to a request from a public key generating entity, the signature generating unit 103 generates a signature for the generated public key using the CA private key.

[0042] The signature generated list 102 is a list of public keys and signature target IDs for which signatures have been generated, and is added when the certificate authority server 100 issues a signature to a public key.

[0043] The revoked public key list 101 is a list of public keys that have been signed and whose signatures have been revoked at the discretion of the certificate authority server 100 .

[0044] Next, the operation of the encrypted communication system and the encrypted communication method according to this embodiment will be described.

[0045] 2 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of generation of an asymmetric key pair and exchange of public keys. In order to perform encrypted communication, it is first necessary to exchange public keys between the server 10 and the secure element 50. The processes indicated by the symbols P1 to P13 will be described below.

[0046] P1 (instruction to generate a key pair on the SC side): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50, via the interface 2 between the device 70 and the secure element 50, to generate an asymmetric key pair and exchange a public key.

[0047] P2 (SC-side asymmetric key pair generation): The secure element 50 internally generates a key pair for asymmetric key encryption using the key pair generation unit 53. Here, an SC private key 1 and an SC public key 1 are generated as key values.

[0048] P3 (encryption of SCID): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element second encryption section, and encrypts the value of its own SCID with the generated SC private key.

[0049] P4 (transmission of SC public key and encrypted SCID): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element output unit, and transmits the SC public key and the encrypted SCID to the server 10 via the device 70.

[0050] P5 (decryption of encrypted SCID): The server 10 has a function as a server second decryption unit, and decrypts the received encrypted SCID with the received SC public key (SC public key 1).

[0051] P6 (Verify SCID): The server 10 checks the value of the decrypted SCID. The SCID is verified by, for example, checking whether a public key has already been registered with the same SCID in the SC public store 12. If it has already been registered, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed, and the process is interrupted here.

[0052] P7 (registration in SC public key store): If there is no problem after checking the value of the decrypted SCID, the server 10 associates the SCID and SC public key and stores them in the SC public key store 12. Here, SCID: SC012345 and SC public key 1 are stored in association with each other. This makes it possible to determine the authenticity of the acquired SC public key before registering it.

[0053] P8 (server-side key pair generation instruction): The server 10 internally generates a key pair for asymmetric key cryptography using the key pair generation unit 13. Here, a server private key 1 and a server public key 1 are generated as key values.

[0054] P9 (encryption of server ID): The server 10 has a function as a server second encryption unit, and encrypts the value of its own server ID with the generated server private key.

[0055] P10 (transmission of server public key and encrypted server ID): The server 10 has a function as a server output unit, and transmits the server public key and the encrypted server ID to the secure element 50 via the device 70.

[0056] P11 (Decryption of encrypted server ID): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element second decryption unit, and decrypts the received encrypted server ID with the received server public key (server public key 1).

[0057] P12 (Verify server ID): The secure element 50 checks the value of the decrypted server ID. The server ID is verified, for example, by checking whether a public key has already been registered with the same server ID in the server public key store 52. If it has already been registered, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed, and the process is interrupted here.

[0058] P13 (Registration in Server Public Key Store): If the value of the decrypted server ID is checked and there is no problem, the secure element 50 associates the server ID with the server public key and stores them in the server public key store 52. Here, the server ID: KeyManagement.com and the server public key 1 are stored in association with each other. This makes it possible to determine the authenticity of the acquired server public key before registering it.

[0059] As described above, the server 10 can obtain and register the SC public key output from the secure element 50. This allows the server 10 to share the SC public key with the secure element 50. That is, there is no need to prepare the SC public key in advance and store it in the server 10 like a fixed key, and there is no risk of the confidentiality of the communication path being weakened due to leakage of the fixed key, etc. In addition, since the SC public key is dynamically generated by the secure element 50, it does not have the property of being a specific fixed key, and therefore the degree of freedom in key setting can be ensured.

[0060] Furthermore, the secure element 50 can obtain and register the server public key output from the server 10. This allows the secure element 50 to share the server public key with the server 10. That is, there is no need to prepare the server public key in advance and store it in the secure element 50 like a fixed key, and there is no risk of the confidentiality of the communication path being weakened due to leakage of the fixed key, etc. Furthermore, since the server public key is dynamically generated by the server 10, it does not have the property of being a specific fixed key, and therefore the degree of freedom in key setting can be ensured.

[0061] Then, as described later, the server 10 can perform cryptographic communication based on the registered SC public key, and the secure element 50 can perform cryptographic communication based on the server public key registered in the secure element 50. This eliminates the need for the server 10 and the secure element 50 to share keys in advance. Since an SC public key corresponding to the SC private key is registered in the server 10, a communication path capable of one-way encryption from the server 10 to the secure element 50 can be secured between the server 10 and the secure element 50. Since a server public key corresponding to the server private key is registered in the secure element 50, a communication path capable of one-way encryption from the secure element 50 to the server 10 can be secured between the server 10 and the secure element 50.

[0062] In the example of FIG. 2, a key generation instruction is first issued to the secure element 50 via the device 70, but the execution order may be reversed, and the server 10 may first generate an asymmetric key pair and transmit it to the secure element 50.

[0063] As described above, verification of the SCID when registering an SC public key, and verification of the server ID when registering a server public key may involve checking whether the public key to be registered (the value itself) has already been registered, or whether registration of the SCID and server ID is prohibited.

[0064] Fig. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of generation of a device common key. After a public key pair is shared by the process shown in Fig. 2, a device common key for performing encrypted communication between the server 10 and the device 70 is generated. The processes shown by symbols P31 to P42 will be described below.

[0065] P31 (key generation instruction): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to generate a device common key via the interface 2 between the device 70 and the secure element 50.

[0066] P32 (Generation of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 uses the random number generation unit 54 to generate an SC-side random number as predetermined secure element information.

[0067] P33 (encryption of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element first encryption unit, and encrypts the generated SC-side random number using the already registered server public key.

[0068] P34 (Transmission of encrypted SC side random number): The secure element 50 transmits the encrypted SC side random number to the server 10 via the device 70.

[0069] P35 (Decryption of encrypted SC side random number): The server 10 has a function as a server first decryption unit, decrypts the received encrypted SC side random number with the server private key that it owns, and stores the decrypted SC side random number. This allows the server 10 to share the SC side random number generated by the secure element 50 with the secure element 50.

[0070] P36 (Generation of server-side random number): The server 10 uses the random number generation unit 14 to generate a server-side random number as predetermined server information.

[0071] P37 (encryption of server-side random number): The server 10 has a function as a server first encryption unit, and encrypts the generated server-side random number using the already registered SC public key.

[0072] P38 (transmission of encrypted server-side random number): The server 10 transmits the encrypted server-side random number to the secure element 50 via the device 70.

[0073] P39 (Decryption of encrypted server-side random number): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element first decryption unit, decrypts the received encrypted server-side random number with the SC private key that it holds, and stores the decrypted server-side random number. This allows the secure element 50 to share the server-side random number generated by the server 10 with the server 10. The server 10 and the secure element 50 can then share the SC-side random number and the server-side random number, and can share information used when generating a device shared key.

[0074] P40 (generation of device common key): The server 10 and the secure element 50 use the exchanged SC side random number and server side random number as input to obtain output from the common key generation units 16, 56. Here, it is assumed that the server 10 and the secure element 50 have agreed in advance to use, for example, SHA-256 as the algorithm to be used for key generation. Therefore, a SHA-256 operation is performed using the same SC side random number and server side random number as input, and the server 10 and the secure element 50 can obtain the same data string as output. This data string is used as the device common key.

[0075] P41 (extraction of common key to device): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to extract the device common key, and acquires the device common key from the secure element 50.

[0076] P42 (establishment of encrypted communication using device common key): After this, the server 10 and the device 70 establish a symmetric key encrypted communication path based on the same device common key, and perform encrypted communication.

[0077] As described above, the device symmetric key value itself is not exchanged between the server 10 and the secure element 50. That is, with the above-mentioned configuration, there is no need to exchange the common key via a communication path between the server 10 and the device 70, and since the common key is not on the communication path, the common key cannot be generated unless the details of the common key generation algorithm are known. Furthermore, even if the secure element information (e.g., SC side random number) and server information (e.g., server side random number) used to generate the common key are leaked, the common key cannot be generated unless the details of the common key generation algorithm are known. This prevents the cryptographic communication between the server 10 and the device 70 from being compromised.

[0078] In the above example, random numbers are used as the secure element information and the server information, but the present invention is not limited to this, and data other than random numbers may also be used as the secure element information and the server information.

[0079] Regarding the specific method of selecting the public key used in the encryption of the random numbers in this embodiment, the SC public key and server public key used in the most recent key exchange are simply selected, but it is also possible to select from multiple SC public keys and server public keys.

[0080] Next, we will explain use cases related to handling of asymmetric keys.

[0081] Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of public key exchange using a certification authority. In the example shown in Fig. 2, the server 10 and the secure element 50 each generate keys independently, but the validity of the generated keys is not guaranteed by simply generating the keys individually. In other words, even if information exchange using a public key is successful, the other party with which the information is exchanged is not necessarily a valid server or secure element, and there is a possibility of communication with an unauthorized party. In the example of Fig. 4, as a method for preventing unauthorized communication, the validity of the generated public key is enhanced by cooperating with a public key certification authority (certification authority server 100). The processes shown by symbols P51 to P71 will be described below.

[0082] P51 (instruction to generate a key pair on the SC side): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50, via the interface 2 between the device 70 and the secure element 50, to generate an asymmetric key pair and exchange a public key.

[0083] P52 (SC-side asymmetric key pair generation): The secure element 50 internally generates a key pair for asymmetric key encryption using the key pair generation unit 53. Here, an SC private key 1 and an SC public key 1 are generated as key values.

[0084] P53 (signature request to certificate authority): The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element authentication request unit, and requests the certificate authority server 100 to sign the generated SC public key. At least the SC public key is sent from the secure element 50 to the certificate authority server 100 via the device 70.

[0085] P54 (return of signature to SC public key): The certificate authority server 100 checks the signature request from the secure element 50. Here, the certificate authority server 100 checks whether the SCID of the secure element 50 that requested the signature is included in the signature generated list 102 held by the certificate authority server 100. If the SCID is not included, it is determined that there is no problem, and the certificate authority server 100 generates a CA signature for the SC public key using the CA private key held by the certificate authority server 100, and returns the generated CA signature to the secure element 50 via the device 70. After verifying that the secure element 50 that requested the signature is a trustworthy entity, the certificate authority server 100 signs the SC public key using the CA private key, thereby indicating that the SC public key is trustworthy. The secure element 50 has a function as a secure element acquisition unit, and acquires the CA signature for the SC public key. The certificate authority server 100 records the SCID in the signature generated list 102.

[0086] P55 (encryption of SCID): The secure element 50 encrypts the value of its own SCID with the generated SC private key.

[0087] P56 (sending SC public key and encrypted SCID): The secure element 50 sends the SC public key, the CA signature on the SC public key, and the encrypted SCID to the server 10 via the device 70. This makes it possible to establish the validity of the SC public key generated by the secure element 50.

[0088] P57 (CA public key request): The server 10 requests the certification authority server 100 to transmit the CA public key.

[0089] P58 (Verification of CA signature on SC public key): The certification authority server 100 sends the CA public key to the server 10. The server 10 uses the received CA public key to verify the CA signature on the received SC public key. If the verification reveals a problem, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed and the process is interrupted here. If the verification reveals no problem, the process continues. This reduces the risk of performing key exchange and communicating with an untrusted fraudulent entity.

[0090] P59 (decryption of encrypted SCID): The server 10 decrypts the received encrypted SCID with the received SC public key (SC public key 1).

[0091] P60 (Verify SCID): The server 10 checks the value of the decrypted SCID. The SCID is verified by, for example, checking whether a public key has already been registered with the same SCID in the SC public store 12. If it has already been registered, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed, and the process is interrupted here.

[0092] P61 (Registration in SC public key store): If there is no problem after checking the value of the decrypted SCID, the server 10 stores the SCID and the SC public key in the SC public key store 12 in association with each other.

[0093] P62 (server-side key pair generation instruction): The server 10 internally generates a key pair for asymmetric key cryptography using the key pair generation unit 13. Here, a server private key 1 and a server public key 1 are generated as key values.

[0094] P63 (signature request to certification authority): The server 10 has a function as a server authentication request unit, and requests the certification authority server 100 to sign the generated server public key. At least the server public key is sent from the server 10 to the certification authority server 100.

[0095] P64 (return of signature to server public key): The certificate authority server 100 inspects the signature request from the server 10. Here, the certificate authority server 100 checks whether the server ID of the server 10 that requested the signature is included in the signature generated list 102 held by the certificate authority server 100. If the server ID is not included, it is determined that there is no problem, and the certificate authority server 100 uses the CA private key held by the certificate authority server 100 to generate a CA signature for the server public key and return the generated CA signature to the server 10. The certificate authority server 100 verifies that the secure element 50 that requested the signature is a trustworthy entity, and then signs the server public key using the CA private key, thereby indicating that the server public key is trustworthy. The server 10 has a function as a server acquisition unit, and acquires the CA signature for the server public key. The certificate authority server 100 records the server ID in the signature generated list 102.

[0096] P65 (encryption of server ID): The server 10 encrypts the value of its own server ID with the generated server private key.

[0097] P66 (send server public key and encrypted server ID): The server 10 sends the server public key, the CA signature for the server public key, and the encrypted server ID to the secure element 50 via the device 70. This makes it possible to establish the validity of the server public key generated by the server 10.

[0098] P67 (CA public key request): The secure element 50 requests the certificate authority server 100 via the device 70 to transmit the CA public key.

[0099] P68 (Verification of CA signature on server public key): The certificate authority server 100 sends the CA public key to the secure element 50 via the device 70. The secure element 50 verifies the CA signature on the received server public key using the received CA public key. If the verification shows a problem, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed and the process is interrupted here. If the verification shows no problem, the subsequent processes continue.

[0100] P69 (Decryption of encrypted server ID): The secure element 50 decrypts the received encrypted server ID with the received server public key.

[0101] P70 (Verify server ID): The secure element 50 checks the value of the decrypted server ID. The server ID is verified, for example, by checking whether a public key with the same server ID has already been registered in the server public key store 52. If it has already been registered, the public key registration process is deemed to have failed, and the process is interrupted here.

[0102] P71 (Registration in Server Public Key Store): If the value of the decrypted server ID is checked and there is no problem, the secure element 50 associates the server ID with the server public key and stores them in the server public key store 52. This can reduce the risk of communicating with an untrusted unauthorized entity through key exchange.

[0103] In the example of Figure 4, compared to the example of Figure 2, (1) immediately after generating a public key, a request is made to the certification authority for a signature on the generated public key, and the returned signature is then attached and sent to the other party, and (2) immediately after receiving the public key, a request is made to the certification authority for a CA public key, and the received CA public key is used to verify the signature. In a public key infrastructure, a certification authority verifies that the entity that requested the signature is a trustworthy entity, and then signs the requesting entity's public key with its own private key, thereby indicating that the public key is trustworthy. Therefore, if signature verification fails on the public key receiving side, the public key indicates that the trust asserted by the certification authority is invalid. This reduces the risk of performing key exchange and communicating with an untrusted and fraudulent entity.

[0104] In this embodiment, for convenience, the certification authority determines whether or not to grant a signature request by checking whether the ID of the signature requesting entity is present in the list of generated signatures, which is a simple method. However, as for how the certification authority actually confirms the signature requesting entity, an appropriate method can be used in accordance with the security policy of the certification authority.

[0105] 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of revoking a public key signature and discarding a device common key. There may be cases where it is desired to revoke a public key that was once shared and block cryptographic communication using the device common key in case of leakage of a private key or for life cycle management of the device 70 or server 10. In such a case, for example, the revocation process of the public key by the certificate authority can be used as the trigger. The processes shown by symbols P81 to P87 will be explained below.

[0106] P81 (addition to revoked public key list): The certificate authority server 100 writes the ID of the public key to be revoked to the revoked public key list 101. Here, this information is added to revoke SC public key 1 with SCID: SC012345.

[0107] P82 (encrypted communication between server and device): The server 10 and the device 70 perform encrypted communication using a device common key that has already been generated.

[0108] P83 (server-side key verification process): Before decrypting the encrypted communication on the device 70 side, the encryption communication unit 21 of the server 10 requests the key validity confirmation unit 18 to verify the validity of the public key.

[0109] P84 (request to send revoked public key list): The key validity confirmation unit 18 requests the certificate authority server 100 to send the revoked public key list 101.

[0110] P85 (obtaining and verifying revoked list): The certificate authority server 100 returns the revoked public key list 101 to the key validity confirmation unit 18. The key validity confirmation unit 18 checks the revoked public key list 101 returned and verifies that the SC public key of the device 70, with which it is currently communicating, has been revoked.

[0111] P86 (End of encrypted communication): The key validity confirmation unit 18 determines that the trust relationship based on the public key between the currently communicating device 70 and secure element 50 has been lost, and ends the currently established encrypted communication session.

[0112] P87 (discard public key and device common key): The key validity confirmation unit 18 discards the public key of SCID: SC012345 registered in the SC public key store 12, and the device common key.

[0113] As described above, the key validity confirmation unit 18 has a function as a server determination unit, and can determine whether or not a registered SC public key has been revoked at a required timing. The required timing can be, for example, at the start of encrypted communication, every time a predetermined number of communications have been performed, or at the time of an external request, but is not limited to these. The revocation of the SC public key can be determined, for example, based on the result of public key revocation processing by the certification authority server 100 (the revoked public key list 101).

[0114] The key validity confirmation unit 18 has a function as a server invalidation processing unit, and can invalidate the registered SC public key when it is determined that the SC public key has expired. This makes it possible to realize the demand to invalidate a public key that has been shared once in terms of preventing leakage of a private key or for life cycle management of a device or server.

[0115] Furthermore, the key validity confirmation unit 18 can invalidate the common key generated by the server 10. This makes it possible to block encrypted communication using the common key.

[0116] In the example of Fig. 5, the server 10 inquires about the revocation status of the public key, but this is not limiting, and the same process may be performed from the device 70 and the secure element 50. In this case, the key validity confirmation unit 58 of the secure element 50 has a function as a secure element determination unit and can determine whether the registered server public key has been revoked at a required timing. The required timing can be, for example, at the start of encrypted communication, each time a predetermined number of communications have been performed, or at the time of an external request, but is not limited to these. The revocation of the server public key can be determined, for example, based on the result of public key revocation process by the certificate authority server 100 (the revoked public key list 101).

[0117] The key validity confirmation unit 58 has a function as a secure element invalidation processing unit, and can invalidate the registered server public key if it is determined that the server public key has expired. This makes it possible to realize the need to invalidate a public key that has been shared once in order to prevent leakage of a private key or for the life cycle management of a device or server.

[0118] Furthermore, the key validity confirmation unit 58 can invalidate the common key generated by the secure element 50. This makes it possible to block encrypted communication using the common key.

[0119] In this embodiment, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is used as a means for transmitting and receiving revocation information, but revocation information may be confirmed by other means such as the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).

[0120] Next, use cases regarding handling of the common key will be described.

[0121] 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of device authentication using a device certificate. The processes indicated by the reference characters P91 to P104 will be described below.

[0122] P91 (key generation instruction): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to generate a device common key via the interface 2 between the device 70 and the secure element 50.

[0123] P92 (Generation of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 uses the random number generation unit 54 to generate an SC-side random number.

[0124] P93 (encryption of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 encrypts the generated SC-side random number using the already registered server public key.

[0125] P94 (Transmission of encrypted SC side random number): The secure element 50 transmits the encrypted SC side random number to the server 10 via the device 70.

[0126] P95 (Decryption of encrypted SC side random number): The server 10 decrypts the received encrypted SC side random number with its own server private key and stores the decrypted SC side random number. This allows the server 10 to share the SC side random number generated by the secure element 50 with the secure element 50.

[0127] P96 (Generation of server-side random number): The server 10 uses the random number generation unit 14 to generate a server-side random number as predetermined server information.

[0128] P97 (Encryption of server-side random number): The server 10 encrypts the generated server-side random number using the already registered SC public key.

[0129] P98 (transmission of encrypted server-side random number): The server 10 transmits the encrypted server-side random number to the secure element 50 via the device 70.

[0130] P99 (Decryption of encrypted server-side random number): The secure element 50 decrypts the received encrypted server-side random number with its own SC private key and stores the decrypted server-side random number. This allows the secure element 50 to share the server-side random number generated by the server 10 with the server 10. The server 10 and the secure element 50 can then share the SC-side random number and the server-side random number, respectively, and can share information used when generating a device shared key.

[0131] P100 (generation of device common key): The server 10 and the secure element 50 receive the exchanged SC side random number and server side random number as input and obtain an output from the common key generation units 16, 56. Here, it is assumed that the server 10 and the secure element 50 have agreed in advance to use, for example, SHA-256 as the algorithm to be used for key generation. Therefore, a SHA-256 operation is performed using the same SC side random number and server side random number as input, and the server 10 and the secure element 50 can obtain the same data string as output. This data string is used as the device common key.

[0132] P101 (input of device certificate and device ID): The secure element 50 requests input of a device certificate and a device ID as a prerequisite for outputting the device common key. The device 70 transmits the device certificate and the device ID to the secure element 50.

[0133] P102 (Verification of device certificate): The secure element 50 has a function as a device authentication unit, and verifies the contents of the received device certificate using the device public key held internally. Specifically, it decrypts the encrypted device ID in the device certificate with the device public key, and compares it with the plaintext device ID received separately. If the verification fails, the secure element 50 interrupts the process here and does not output the device common key to the outside. If the verification is successful, it carries out the subsequent processes.

[0134] P103 (extraction of common key to device): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to extract the device common key, and acquires the device common key from the secure element 50.

[0135] P104 (establishment of encrypted communication using device common key): After this, the server 10 and the device 70 establish a symmetric key encryption communication path based on the same device common key, and perform encrypted communication.

[0136] As described above, the secure element 50 includes a device authentication unit that authenticates a device (device main body) to which the secure element 50 (itself) is connected. Note that device authentication is performed using a certificate in which the device ID is encrypted with an asymmetric key, but is not limited to this algorithm and any appropriate method can be used.

[0137] If the device main body is authenticated, the secure element 50 outputs the generated common key to the device main body, making it possible to confirm that an appropriate secure element is connected to the intended (authorized) device.

[0138] FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of dynamic regeneration of a key. In this embodiment, the server 10 side can generate a key in a component that it can control, but the device 70 side relies on the secure element 50 for key generation, and the handling authority of the key is asymmetric between the server 10 and the device 70. This feature allows the security of the device 70 side to be subordinated to the secure element 50, and the key management of the device 70 can be strengthened. That is, if the keys of the server 10 and the secure element 50 are dynamically updated based on a certain regularity, the device 70 cannot correctly execute subsequent encrypted communication unless it receives the updated key from the secure element 50. This is synonymous with dynamic verification that the device 70 is operating under the appropriate management of the secure element 50, and means that the security of the device 70 can be verified continuously, not only at the time of startup such as secure boot or at the time of key generation. Hereinafter, the processes indicated by the reference characters P111 to P118 will be described.

[0139] P111 (Preparation of device common key): Based on the process illustrated in FIG. 3, a first generation key (device common key 1) is provided to each of the server 10 and the device 70.

[0140] P112 (Establishment of encrypted session and encrypted communication): The server 10 and the device 70 perform encrypted communication based on the device common key 1 until a key update trigger occurs. The key update trigger can be, for example, a certain number of data transfers, but is not limited to this.

[0141] P113 (device common key update): When a key update opportunity occurs during encrypted communication, the server 10 and the secure element 50 update the device common key 1 in accordance with a predetermined algorithm. The algorithm for generating the key at the time of update, for example, uses the current key as input to the common key generation units 16, 56, and uses the value obtained by SHA-256 hash output as the new key. In other words, the SHA-256 hash value of the device common key 1 is used as the device common key 2. Note that the algorithm for generating the key at the time of update is not limited to this, and any appropriate method can be used.

[0142] P114 (Device retrieves key after update): In this situation, even if the device 70 attempts encrypted communication, the communication cannot be performed properly because the key on the server 10 side has been updated. Therefore, the device 70 again requests the secure element 50 to output the device common key 2. The secure element 50 supplies the updated device common key 2 to the device 70.

[0143] P115 (establishment of encrypted session and encrypted communication): The server 10 and the device 70 perform encrypted communication based on the device common key 2 until a key update trigger occurs.

[0144] P116 (device shared key update): When a key update opportunity occurs during encrypted communication, the server 10 and the secure element 50 update the device shared key 2 in accordance with a predetermined algorithm. That is, the SHA-256 hash value of the device shared key 2 is set as the device shared key 3.

[0145] P117 (Device retrieves updated key): In this situation, even if the device 70 attempts encrypted communication, the communication cannot be performed properly because the key on the server 10 side has been updated. Therefore, the device 70 again requests the secure element 50 to output the device common key 3. The secure element 50 supplies the updated device common key 3 to the device 70.

[0146] P118 (Establishment of encrypted session and encrypted communication): The server 10 and the device 70 perform encrypted communication based on the device common key 3 until a key update trigger occurs.

[0147] As described above, each of the common key generation units 16 and 56 can update the generated common key at a predetermined opportunity. The predetermined opportunity can be, for example, when the number of encrypted communications performed using the same common key reaches a predetermined number, or when an update instruction is given from outside to the server or the secure element, but is not limited to this.

[0148] As described above, since the device 70 relies on the secure element 50 to generate the common key, the security of the device 70 is subordinate to the secure element 50, making the common key management of the device 70 even stronger.

[0149] In other words, when the shared key between the server 10 and the secure element 50 is dynamically updated based on a certain regularity, the device 70 cannot correctly execute encrypted communication after the shared key is updated unless the device 70 receives the updated shared key from the secure element 50. This makes it possible to continuously verify the security of the device 70.

[0150] The key update algorithm is not limited to the above. For enhanced security, it is also possible to apply a one-time password generation algorithm such as TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password) or HOTP (HMAC-based One-Time Password) defined in the RFC.

[0151] 7, if the device 70 attempts to communicate using the old device common key without extracting the updated device common key, the received data cannot be correctly decrypted on the server 10 side. In this case, the server 10 side can perform various appropriate processes according to the security policy.

[0152] That is, when the shared key does not match with the device 70, the server 10 can execute processing to deal with the abnormality of the device 70. The processing to deal with the abnormality of the device 70 includes, for example, processing to cut off currently established encrypted communication, processing to invalidate an exchanged public key pair, processing to reject public key registration using the SCID of the secure element 50 and processing to treat the device as an unauthorized device, and the like.

[0153] 8 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of common key generation when a shared secret is added to the input. In the above example, all inputs from which the device common key is generated depend on information exchanged between the server 10 and the secure element 50. Even in this state, appropriate key generation is possible, but depending on the security policy, there may be a need to generate a key that depends on secret information held by the secure element 50. The processes indicated by the reference characters P121 to P132 will be described below.

[0154] P121 (Writing a shared secret and sharing it with the server): The manufacturer of the secure element 50 writes a shared secret into the secure element 50 in advance, and shares the shared secret with the administrator of the server 10 in advance.

[0155] P122 (key generation instruction): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to generate a device common key via the interface 2 between the device 70 and the secure element 50.

[0156] P123 (Generation of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 uses the random number generation unit 54 to generate an SC-side random number as predetermined secure element information.

[0157] P124 (Encryption of SC-side random number): The secure element 50 encrypts the generated SC-side random number using the already registered server public key.

[0158] P125 (transmission of encrypted SC side random number): The secure element 50 transmits the encrypted SC side random number to the server 10 via the device 70.

[0159] P126 (Decryption of encrypted SC side random number): The server 10 decrypts the received encrypted SC side random number with its own server private key and stores the decrypted SC side random number. This allows the server 10 to share the SC side random number generated by the secure element 50 with the secure element 50.

[0160] P127 (Generation of server-side random number): The server 10 uses the random number generation unit 14 to generate a server-side random number as predetermined server information.

[0161] P128 (Encryption of server-side random number): The server 10 encrypts the generated server-side random number using the already registered SC public key.

[0162] P129 (transmission of encrypted server-side random number): The server 10 transmits the encrypted server-side random number to the secure element 50 via the device 70.

[0163] P130 (Decryption of encrypted server-side random number): The secure element 50 decrypts the received encrypted server-side random number with its own SC private key and stores the decrypted server-side random number. This allows the secure element 50 to share the server-side random number generated by the server 10 with the server 10. The server 10 and the secure element 50 can then share the SC-side random number and the server-side random number, respectively, and can share information used when generating a device shared key.

[0164] P131 (generation of device common key): The server 10 and the secure element 50 receive the exchanged SC side random number, server side random number, and shared secret as input and obtain an output from the common key generation units 16, 56. Here, it is assumed that the server 10 and the secure element 50 have agreed in advance to use, for example, SHA-256 as the algorithm to be used for key generation. Therefore, a SHA-256 operation is performed using the same SC side random number and server side random number as input, and the server 10 and the secure element 50 can obtain the same data string as output. This data string is used as the device common key.

[0165] P132 (Extraction of common key to device): The device 70 instructs the secure element 50 to extract the device common key, and acquires the device common key from the secure element 50.

[0166] P133 (establishment of encrypted communication using device common key): After this, the server 10 and the device 70 establish a symmetric key encrypted communication path based on the same device common key, and perform encrypted communication.

[0167] As described above, the server 10 and the secure element 50 each include the memory units 11 and 51 as storage units for storing a predetermined shared secret (shared information). The shared secret may be, for example, shared secret information that is not disclosed to anyone other than the server 10 and the secure element 50.

[0168] Each of the common key generating units 16, 56 can further generate a device common key by using the shared secret. This makes it possible to further improve the security of the encrypted communication between the server 10 and the device 70, since even if an attacker illegally obtains and understands the SC side random number and the server side random number, the attacker cannot generate the device common key unless he knows the shared secret.

[0169] 9 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of updating a shared secret. The processes indicated by the reference characters P141 to P148 will now be described.

[0170] P141 (generation of device common key): Based on the process illustrated in FIG. 3, the server 10 and the device 70 are each provided with a device common key (old) generated based on the value of the shared secret before it is updated.

[0171] P142 (Establishment of encrypted session and encrypted communication): The server 10 and the device 70 open an encrypted communication path based on the device common key (old).

[0172] P143 (Server-side shared secret update): The server 10 updates the shared secret that it possesses.

[0173] P144 (execution of SC-side shared secret update command): The server 10 instructs the secure element 50, via the device 70, to execute the shared secret update unit 17 by including the updated shared secret in the input. As a general implementation, a shared secret update command / API implemented in the secure element 50 can be used.

[0174] P145 (update of SC-side shared secret): The shared secret update unit 57 of the secure element 50 updates the shared secret on the SC side with the received updated value of the shared secret.

[0175] P146 (regeneration of device shared key): The server 10 and the secure element 50 generate a new device shared key (new) using the SC side random number, the server side random number, and the updated shared secret as input.

[0176] P147 (retrieval of key after update by device): The device 70 again requests output of the device common key from the secure element 50. The secure element 50 supplies the updated device common key (new) to the device 70.

[0177] P148 (establishment of encrypted session and encrypted communication): The server 10 and the device 70 newly establish an encrypted communication path based on the device common key (new).

[0178] In the above example, after updating the shared secret, the device shared key is generated again without updating other information (random numbers). However, to ensure security, the device shared key may be generated again after updating other information such as random numbers.

[0179] 10 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of adding a key generation algorithm. In this embodiment, predetermined algorithms such as SHA-1 and SHA-256 are stored in advance as key generation algorithms, but if the secure element 50 is in an environment where a trusted application can be installed, such as JavaCard (registered trademark) or TEE, it is possible to dynamically add or delete a key generation algorithm. In the following, an example of adding SHA-3 as an algorithm used in the common key generation units 16 and 56 will be described. The processes shown by the reference characters P151 to P159 will be described below.

[0180] P151 (addition of server-side symmetric key generation algorithm): The server 10 adds an implementation (program code) of the symmetric key generation algorithm SHA-3 (22) to be newly added to its own symmetric key generation unit 16.

[0181] P152 (Encrypt implementation): The server 10 encrypts the implementation of the algorithm to be added with the registered SC public key.

[0182] P153 (creating a server-side signature): The server 10 signs the implementation of the algorithm to be added with the server private key that it owns, and attaches it to the encrypted implementation.

[0183] P154 (transmission of cryptographic implementation and signature): The server 10 transmits the generated cryptographic implementation and the generated signature together to the secure element 50 via the device 70.

[0184] P155 (decryption of encrypted implementation): The secure element 50 decrypts the received encrypted implementation with the SC private key that it possesses.

[0185] P156 (signature verification): The secure element 50 verifies the received signature using the registered server public key. It verifies that the result of decryption using the server public key corresponds to the signature decrypted in P155, and that it is a valid signature using the server private key. If the signature is not valid, it stops processing here and notifies the server 10 of an error termination.

[0186] P157 (Addition of SC-side common key generation algorithm): After verifying the validity of the signature, the secure element 50 adds the implementation of the received algorithm to its own common key generation unit 56.

[0187] P158 (change of SC-side shared key generation algorithm): The secure element 50 switches the algorithm currently being used for shared key generation. In this embodiment, a policy is applied to immediately enable a newly added algorithm, so the newly added SHA-3 (62) is immediately enabled and the settings are changed so that the previously used SHA-256 (60) is not used. If this process ends normally, the secure element 50 notifies the server 10 of this fact via the device 70.

[0188] P159 (change of server-side common key generation algorithm): The server 10 confirms from the secure element 50 that the process of P158 has ended normally, and changes the algorithm used in its own common key generation unit 16. Here, the same policy as that of the secure element 50 is applied, and the newly added SHA-3 (22) is immediately enabled, and the settings are changed so that the previously used SHA-256 (20) is not used. Thereafter, the server 10 and the secure element 50 generate a device common key using the newly added and enabled SHA-3.

[0189] As described above, each of the common key generating units 16 and 56 can change the algorithm for generating the device common key at a predetermined timing. The predetermined timing can be, for example, each time a predetermined number of communications have been performed, or when an external request is received, but is not limited to these. Changing the algorithm includes adding, deleting, and switching an algorithm. This can further improve the security of the encrypted communication between the server 10 and the device 70.

[0190] In the above example, the newly added algorithm is immediately enabled, but the present invention is not limited to this and may be enabled at any time. Also, in the above example, the symmetric key generation algorithm is added based on the exchanged public key, but the present invention is not limited to this and, for example, the symmetric key generation algorithm may be added or deleted by applying a separate technology such as the GlobalPlatform specification or the JavaCard specification.

[0191] 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for public key exchange processing by the server 10. The server 10 receives the SCID encrypted with the secure element private key (SC private key) and the secure element public key (SC public key) (S11), and decrypts the encrypted SCID with the secure element public key (S12).

[0192] The server 10 verifies the SCID (S13) and registers the secure element public key (S14). The server 10 generates a server public key and a server private key (S15), and encrypts the server ID with the server private key (S16).

[0193] The server 10 transmits the server public key and the encrypted server ID to the secure element 50 via the device 70 (S17), and ends the process.

[0194] 12 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for public key exchange processing by the secure element 50. The secure element 50 generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key (S21), and encrypts a secure element ID (SCID) with the secure element private key (S22).

[0195] The secure element 50 transmits the secure element public key and the encrypted secure element ID to the server 10 via the device 70 (S23). The secure element 50 receives the server ID and the server public key encrypted with the server private key (S24), and decrypts the encrypted server ID with the server public key (S25).

[0196] The secure element 50 verifies the server ID (S26), registers the server public key (S27), and ends the process.

[0197] 13 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for generating a device common key by the server 10. The server 10 generates a server-side random number (S41), and encrypts the server-side random number using a registered secure element public key (S42).

[0198] The server 10 transmits the encrypted server-side random number to the secure element 50 via the device 70 (S43). The server 10 receives the encrypted secure element-side random number (S44) and decrypts the received secure element-side random number with the server private key (S45). The server 10 generates a device common key using a predetermined common key generation algorithm with the decrypted secure element-side random number and server-side random number as input (S46), and ends the process.

[0199] 14 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for generating a device common key by the secure element 50. The secure element 50 generates a secure element-side random number (S51), and encrypts the secure element-side random number using a registered server public key (S52).

[0200] The secure element 50 transmits the encrypted secure element side random number to the server 10 via the device 70 (S53). The secure element 50 receives the encrypted server side random number (S54) and decrypts the received server side random number with the server private key (S555). The secure element 50 generates a device common key using a predetermined common key generation algorithm with the decrypted server side random number and secure element side random number as input (S56), and ends the process.

[0201] The server 10 is configured as a computer including a CPU, RAM, ROM, etc., and each process of the server 10 can be realized by loading a computer program that defines processing procedures such as those shown in Figures 11 and 13 into the RAM and having the CPU (processor) execute the computer program.

[0202] A cryptographic communication system according to this embodiment is a cryptographic communication system comprising a server and a device equipped with a secure element, wherein the secure element comprises a secure element key generation unit that generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, and a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device, the server comprises a server registration unit that acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element output unit, a server key generation unit that generates a server public key and a server private key, and a server output unit that outputs the server public key generated by the server key generation unit to the secure element via the device, the secure element further comprises a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers the server public key output from the server output unit, the server performs cryptographic communication based on the registered secure element public key, and the secure element performs cryptographic communication based on the registered server public key.

[0203] The secure element of this embodiment is a secure element mounted on a device that performs cryptographic communication with a server, and comprises a secure element key generation unit that generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device, and a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers the server public key output by the server, and uses the server public key registered in the secure element registration unit for cryptographic communication between the secure element and the server.

[0204] The device according to this embodiment is equipped with the above-mentioned secure element and can perform encrypted communication with a predetermined server.

[0205] The server of this embodiment is a server that performs cryptographic communication with a device equipped with a secure element, and includes a server key generation unit that generates a server public key and a server private key, a server output unit that outputs the server public key generated by the server key generation unit to the secure element via the device, and a server registration unit that acquires and registers the secure element public key output by the secure element, and uses the secure element public key registered in the server registration unit for cryptographic communication with the secure element.

[0206] The computer program of this embodiment causes a computer to execute the following processes: generating a server public key and a server private key; outputting the generated server public key to a secure element mounted on a device; obtaining and registering a secure element public key output by the secure element; and performing cryptographic communication with the secure element using the registered secure element public key.

[0207] The cryptographic communication method of this embodiment is a cryptographic communication method between a server and a device equipped with a secure element, in which the secure element generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key, and outputs the secure element public key generated via the device to the server, the server acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element, generates a server public key and a server private key, and outputs the server public key generated via the device to the secure element, the secure element further acquires and registers the server public key output from the server, the server performs cryptographic communication based on the registered secure element public key, and the secure element performs cryptographic communication based on the registered server public key.

[0208] The device is equipped with a secure element. The secure element is tamper-resistant and is physically independent from the device. The secure element includes a secure element key generation unit, a secure element output unit, and a secure element registration unit.

[0209] The secure element key generation unit generates a secure element public key and a secure element private key. The secure element public key means a public key on the secure element side, and the secure element private key means a private key on the secure element side. The generated public key and private key can be said to be an asymmetric key pair, and for example, RSA cryptography has the characteristic that it is difficult to create a private key from a public key, but easy to create a public key from a private key.

[0210] The secure element output unit outputs the generated secure element public key, out of the generated asymmetric key pair, to the server via the device.

[0211] The server includes a server registration unit, a server key generation unit, and a server output unit.

[0212] The server registration unit acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element output unit. This allows the server to share the secure element public key. In other words, there is no need to prepare the secure element public key in advance and store it in the server like a fixed key, and there is no risk of the confidentiality of the communication path being weakened due to leakage of the fixed key, etc. In addition, since the secure element public key is dynamically generated by the secure element, it does not have the property of being a specific fixed key, so the degree of freedom in key setting can be ensured.

[0213] The server key generation unit generates a server public key and a server private key. The server public key means a public key on the server side, and the server private key means a private key on the server side. The generated public key and private key can be said to be an asymmetric key pair, and for example, in RSA cryptography, it is difficult to generate a private key from a public key, but it is easy to generate a public key from a private key.

[0214] The server output unit outputs the generated server public key, which is part of the generated asymmetric key pair, to the secure element via the device.

[0215] The secure element registration unit acquires and registers the server public key output from the server output unit. This allows the secure elements to share the server public key. In other words, there is no need to prepare the server public key in advance and store it in the secure element like a fixed key, and there is no risk of the confidentiality of the communication path being weakened due to leakage of the fixed key, etc. In addition, since the server public key is dynamically generated by the server, it does not have the property of being a specific fixed key, so the degree of freedom in key setting can be ensured.

[0216] The server performs cryptographic communication based on the registered secure element public key, and the secure element performs cryptographic communication based on the registered server public key. This eliminates the need for the server and the secure element to share keys in advance. Since the secure element public key corresponding to the secure element private key is registered in the server, a communication path capable of one-way encryption from the server to the secure element can be ensured between the server and the secure element. Since the secure element has a server public key corresponding to the server private key registered in the secure element, a communication path capable of one-way encryption from the secure element to the server can be ensured between the server and the secure element.

[0217] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the secure element comprises a secure element first encryption unit that encrypts specified secure element information using a registered server public key, the secure element output unit outputs the secure element information encrypted by the secure element first encryption unit to the server, the server comprises a server first decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted secure element information using the server private key and a server first encryption unit that encrypts the specified server information using the registered secure element public key, the server output unit outputs the server information encrypted by the server first encryption unit to the secure element, and the secure element further comprises a secure element first decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted server information using the secure element private key.

[0218] The secure element includes a secure element first encryption unit and a secure element first decryption unit. The server includes a server first encryption unit and a server first decryption unit.

[0219] The secure element first encryption unit encrypts predetermined secure element information using the registered server public key. The predetermined secure element information may be a random number generated by the secure element, or may be information other than a random number.

[0220] The secure element output unit outputs the secure element information encrypted by the secure element first encryption unit to the server.

[0221] The server first decryption unit decrypts the encrypted secure element information using the server private key, which allows the server to share information such as random numbers generated by the secure element with the secure element.

[0222] The server first encryption unit encrypts the predetermined server information using the registered secure element public key. The predetermined server information may be a random number generated by the server, or may be information other than a random number.

[0223] The server output unit outputs the server information encrypted by the server first encryption unit to the secure element.

[0224] The secure element first decryption unit decrypts the encrypted server information using the secure element private key. This allows the secure element to share information, such as a random number generated by the server, with the server. This allows the server and the secure element to share predetermined secure element information and predetermined server information, and to share information used when generating a shared key between the server and the secure element.

[0225] In the cryptographic communication system according to this embodiment, the server includes a server common key generation unit that generates a common key using the secure element information decrypted by the server first decryption unit and the server information, the secure element includes a secure element common key generation unit that generates a common key using the server information decrypted by the secure element first decryption unit and the secure element information, and outputs the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit to the device, and the server and device perform cryptographic communication based on the common key.

[0226] The server includes a server common key generation unit, and the secure element includes a secure element common key generation unit.

[0227] The server common key generation unit generates a common key using the secure element information and server information decrypted by the server first decryption unit. The secure element common key generation unit generates a common key using the server information and secure element information decrypted by the secure element first decryption unit. That is, the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit generate a common key using common secure element information and server information. For example, by using the secure element information and the server information as input data and, for example, a predetermined hash function as an algorithm for generating a common key, it is possible to obtain the same data string as an output, and this data string can be used as the common key. The secure element outputs the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit to the device.

[0228] The server and the device perform cryptographic communication based on the generated common key. With the above-mentioned configuration, there is no need to transmit and receive the common key via a communication path between the server and the device, and the common key is not transmitted over the communication path, so the common key cannot be generated unless details of the common key generation algorithm are known. Furthermore, even if the secure element information and server information used to generate the common key are leaked, the common key cannot be generated unless details of the common key generation algorithm are known. This prevents the cryptographic communication between the server and the device from being compromised.

[0229] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the secure element includes a secure element second encryption unit that encrypts secure element identification information using the secure element private key, the secure element output unit outputs the secure element identification information encrypted by the secure element second encryption unit to the server, the server includes a server second decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted secure element identification information using the acquired secure element public key, and the server registration unit determines whether or not the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on the secure element identification information decrypted by the server second decryption unit.

[0230] The secure element includes a secure element second encryption unit, and the server includes a server second decryption unit.

[0231] The secure element second encryption unit encrypts the secure element identification information by using the secure element private key. The secure element identification information can be, for example, an ID (SCID) that is uniquely assigned to each secure element.

[0232] The secure element output unit outputs the secure element identification information encrypted by the secure element second encryption unit to the server.

[0233] The server second decryption unit decrypts the encrypted secure element identification information using the acquired secure element public key.

[0234] The server registration unit determines whether the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on the secure element identification information decrypted by the server second decryption unit. Whether the secure element public key can be registered can be determined, for example, by verifying whether the decrypted secure element identification information is authentic. For example, if the decrypted secure element identification information is already registered secure element identification information, it is determined to be invalid and registration of the secure element public key is not executed. On the other hand, if the decrypted secure element identification information is not registered secure element identification information, it is determined to be valid and registration of the secure element public key is executed. In this way, the authenticity of the acquired secure element public key can be determined before registration.

[0235] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server includes a server second encryption unit that encrypts server identification information using the server private key, the server output unit outputs the server identification information encrypted by the server second encryption unit to the secure element, the secure element includes a secure element second decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted server identification information using the acquired server public key, and the secure element registration unit determines whether the acquired server public key can be registered based on the server identification information decrypted by the secure element second decryption unit.

[0236] The server includes a server second encryption unit, and the secure element includes a secure element second decryption unit.

[0237] The server second encryption unit encrypts the server identification information using the server private key. The server identification information can be, for example, an ID (server ID) uniquely assigned to each server, and can be, for example, the URL of the server.

[0238] The server output unit outputs the server identification information encrypted by the server second encryption unit to the secure element.

[0239] The second decryption unit of the secure element decrypts the encrypted server identification information using the acquired server public key.

[0240] The secure element registration unit determines whether or not the acquired server public key can be registered based on the server identification information decrypted by the secure element second decryption unit. Whether or not the server public key can be registered can be determined, for example, by verifying whether the decrypted server identification information is authentic. For example, if the decrypted server identification information is already registered server identification information, it is determined to be invalid and the server public key is not registered. On the other hand, if the decrypted server identification information is not registered server identification information, it is determined to be valid and the server public key is registered. In this way, the authenticity of the acquired server public key can be determined before it is registered.

[0241] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the secure element includes a secure element authentication request unit that requests authentication of the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to a certification authority server, and the secure element output unit outputs the secure element public key to the server when authentication by the certification authority server is obtained.

[0242] The secure element has a secure element authentication request unit. The secure element authentication request unit requests a certificate authority server to authenticate the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit. The certificate authority server is a server that certifies the legitimacy of public keys held by other entities (servers and secure elements). Authentication by the certificate authority server can prove the legitimacy of the entity providing the public key.

[0243] If the secure element output unit is authenticated by the certificate authority server, it outputs the secure element public key to the server, thereby establishing the validity of the secure element public key generated by the secure element.

[0244] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the secure element includes a secure element acquisition unit that acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the secure element output unit outputs the certificate authority signature acquired by the secure element acquisition unit to the server, and the server registration unit determines whether or not the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on the verification result of the certificate authority signature.

[0245] The secure element includes a secure element acquisition unit. When authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the secure element acquisition unit acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server. The certificate authority server generates a certificate authority signature (CA signature) for the secure element public key using a private key (CA private key) that it holds, and can transmit the generated certificate authority signature to the secure element via the device. After verifying that the secure element that requested the signature is a trustworthy entity, the certificate authority server signs the secure element public key using the CA private key, thereby indicating that the secure element public key is trustworthy. The secure element output unit outputs the certificate authority signature acquired by the secure element acquisition unit to the server.

[0246] The server registration unit determines whether or not the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on the result of the verification of the certificate authority signature. The certificate authority signature can be verified, for example, by obtaining a public key (CA public key) held by the certificate authority server and verifying the CA signature for the secure element public key using the obtained CA public key. If there is no problem with the verification result, the acquired secure element public key is registered, and if there is a problem with the verification result, the acquired secure element public key is not registered. This reduces the risk of performing key exchange and communicating with an untrusted fraudulent entity.

[0247] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server is provided with a server authentication request unit that requests authentication of the server public key generated by the server key generation unit from a certification authority server, and the server output unit outputs the server public key to the secure element when authentication by the certification authority server is obtained.

[0248] The server has a server authentication request unit. The server authentication request unit requests the certification authority server to authenticate the server public key generated by the server key generation unit. The certification authority server is a server that verifies the validity of public keys held by other entities (servers and secure elements). Authentication by the certification authority server can prove the validity of the entity that provides the public key.

[0249] If authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the server output unit outputs the server public key to the secure element, thereby establishing the validity of the server public key generated by the server.

[0250] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server includes a server acquisition unit that acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the server output unit outputs the certificate authority signature acquired by the server acquisition unit to the secure element, and the secure element registration unit determines whether or not the acquired server public key can be registered based on the verification result of the certificate authority signature.

[0251] The server includes a server acquisition unit. When authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the server acquisition unit acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server. The certificate authority server uses its own private key (CA private key) to generate a certificate authority signature (CA signature) for the server public key, and can transmit the generated certificate authority signature to the server. The certificate authority server verifies that the server that requested the signature is a trustworthy entity, and then signs the server public key using the CA private key, thereby indicating that the server public key is trustworthy. The server output unit outputs the certificate authority signature acquired by the server acquisition unit to the secure element.

[0252] The secure element registration unit determines whether or not the acquired server public key can be registered based on the verification result of the certificate authority signature. The certificate authority signature can be verified, for example, by obtaining a public key (CA public key) held by the certificate authority server and verifying the CA signature for the server public key using the obtained CA public key. If there is no problem with the verification result, the acquired server public key is registered, and if there is a problem with the verification result, the acquired server public key is not registered. This reduces the risk of performing key exchange and communicating with an untrusted fraudulent entity.

[0253] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server comprises a server determination unit that determines whether a registered secure element public key has expired at a required timing, and a server invalidation processing unit that invalidates the registered secure element public key if the server determination unit determines that the public key has expired, and the secure element comprises a secure element determination unit that determines whether a registered server public key has expired at a required timing, and a secure element invalidation processing unit that invalidates the registered server public key if the secure element determination unit determines that the public key has expired.

[0254] The server includes a server determination unit and a server invalidation processing unit, and the secure element includes a secure element determination unit and a secure element invalidation processing unit.

[0255] The server determination unit determines whether or not a registered secure element public key has been revoked at a required timing. The required timing can be, for example, at the start of cryptographic communication, every time a specified number of communications have been performed, or at the time of an external request, but is not limited to these. Revocation of the secure element public key can be determined, for example, based on the result of public key revocation processing by the certificate authority server (a public key revoked list).

[0256] The server invalidation processing unit invalidates the registered secure element public key when the server determination unit determines that the public key has been revoked. This makes it possible to realize the need to invalidate a public key that has been shared once in terms of preventing leakage of a private key or for life cycle management of a device or server.

[0257] The secure element determination unit determines whether or not the registered server public key has been revoked at a required timing. The required timing can be, for example, at the start of encrypted communication, each time a specified number of communications have been performed, or at the time of an external request, but is not limited to these. The revocation of the server public key can be determined, for example, based on the result of a public key revocation process performed by the certificate authority server (a public key revoked list).

[0258] The secure element invalidation processing unit invalidates the registered server public key when the secure element determination unit determines that the public key has been revoked. This makes it possible to realize the need to invalidate a public key that has been shared once, in order to prevent leakage of a private key or for the purpose of managing the life cycle of a device or server.

[0259] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server invalidation processing unit further invalidates the common key generated by the server common key generation unit, and the secure element invalidation processing unit further invalidates the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit.

[0260] The server invalidation processing unit further invalidates the common key generated by the server common key generation unit, and the secure element invalidation processing unit further invalidates the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit, thereby making it possible to block encrypted communication using the common key.

[0261] In the encrypted communication system according to the present embodiment, the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit each update the generated common key at a predetermined opportunity.

[0262] The server shared key generation unit and the secure element shared key generation unit each update the generated shared key at a predetermined opportunity. The predetermined opportunity can be, for example, when the number of encrypted communications performed using the same shared key reaches a predetermined number, or when an update instruction is given to the server or the secure element from outside, but is not limited to this.

[0263] As described above, since the device (device main body) relies on the secure element to generate the shared key, the security of the device is subordinate to the secure element, making it possible to further strengthen the shared key management of the device.

[0264] In other words, if the shared key of the server and the secure element is dynamically updated based on a certain regularity, the device cannot correctly execute encrypted communication after the shared key is updated unless it receives the updated shared key from the secure element. This is synonymous with dynamic verification that the device is operating under the appropriate management of the secure element, and means that the security of the device can be verified continuously, not just at startup such as secure boot or at key generation.

[0265] In the cryptographic communication system according to this embodiment, the device outputs a request to the secure element to obtain a common key in response to the specified trigger, and the secure element supplies the device with the common key updated in the secure element common key generation unit.

[0266] In response to a predetermined trigger, the device outputs a request to acquire a common key to the secure element. The secure element supplies an updated common key to the device. As a result, even if the common key on the server side is updated, the device can perform encrypted communication with the server using the updated common key supplied by the secure element installed in the device.

[0267] In the encrypted communication system according to the present embodiment, when the common key between the server and the device does not match, the server executes a process to deal with the abnormality in the device.

[0268] If the shared key does not match with the device, the server executes a process to deal with the device abnormality. The process to deal with the device abnormality can be any of various appropriate processes according to the server's security policy. For example, the process includes a process to cut off currently established encrypted communication, a process to invalidate an exchanged public key pair, a process to reject public key registration by the SCID of the secure element, and a process to treat the device as unauthorized.

[0269] In the encrypted communication system according to the present embodiment, the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit each change an algorithm for generating a common key at a predetermined timing.

[0270] The server shared key generation unit and the secure element shared key generation unit each change the algorithm for generating the shared key at a predetermined timing. The predetermined timing can be, for example, each time a predetermined number of communications have been performed, or when an external request is received, but is not limited to these. The change of the algorithm includes adding, deleting, and switching of an algorithm. This can further improve the security of the encrypted communication between the server and the device.

[0271] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the secure element includes a device authentication unit that authenticates the device main body to which the secure element is connected, and when the device main body is authenticated by the device authentication unit, the secure element common key generation unit outputs the generated common key to the device main body, and the server and device perform cryptographic communication based on the common key.

[0272] The secure element includes a device authentication unit that authenticates the device body to which the secure element (itself) is connected. The authentication of the device body can be performed by using an appropriate method.

[0273] If the device authentication unit authenticates the device itself, the secure element common key generation unit outputs the generated common key to the device itself, making it possible to confirm that an appropriate secure element is connected to the intended (genuine) device.

[0274] In the cryptographic communication system of this embodiment, the server and the secure element each have a storage unit that stores predetermined shared information, and the server shared key generation unit and the secure element shared key generation unit each generate a shared key further using the shared information.

[0275] Each of the server and the secure element includes a storage unit for storing predetermined shared information. The shared information may be, for example, shared secret information that is not disclosed to anyone other than the server and the secure element.

[0276] Each of the server shared key generation unit and the secure element shared key generation unit further generates a shared key by using shared information. That is, in addition to the secure element information and the server information, the shared information is further used as information from which the shared key is generated. This makes it possible to further improve the security of the encrypted communication between the server and the device, since even if an attacker illegally obtains and grasps the secure element information and the server information, the attacker cannot generate the shared key unless he knows the shared information.

[0277] In the encrypted communication system according to the present embodiment, the shared information held in the holding unit is updatable.

[0278] For example, the shared information stored in the storage unit of the secure element can be updated from an external server, which further enhances the security of the encrypted communication between the server and the device, since the shared information is not fixed but is updateable.

[0279] In the encrypted communication system according to this embodiment, the secure element is composed of a hardware element or a software element.

[0280] A secure element is composed of a hardware element or a software element, which allows a device to be equipped with an appropriate secure element depending on the type of device.

[0281] As described above, according to the present embodiment, the security and flexibility of key sharing of devices (e.g., IoT devices) can be dramatically improved, and the reliability of cryptographic communication in the devices and the devices themselves can be further improved. That is, there is no need to share a common key in advance, and the confidentiality of the communication channel does not depend on a specific fixed key. In addition, the flexibility of key setting can be ensured, and the risk of hacking, etc. can be reduced. Furthermore, since the key value is not transmitted over the communication channel, an attacker cannot generate a key even if he or she illegally obtains the information on which the key is generated, unless he or she knows the details of the key generation. This prevents the cryptographic communication between the server and the device from being compromised. [Explanation of symbols]

[0282] 10 Server 11 Storage section 12 SC Public Key Store 13 Key Pair Generation Unit 14 Random Number Generator 15 Signature Verification Unit 16 Common key generation section 17 Shared secret update section 18 Key validity confirmation section 21 Cryptographic Communication Department 50 Secure Element 51, 71 Storage section 52 Server Public Key Store 53 Key Pair Generation Unit 54 Random Number Generator 55 Signature Verification Unit 56 Common key generation section 57 Shared secret update section 58 Key validity confirmation section 61 Cryptographic Communication Department 70 Devices 100 Certificate Authority Server 101 Public Key Revocation List 102 Signature Generated List

Claims

1. A cryptographic communication system including a server and a device equipped with a secure element, The secure element comprises: a secure element key generation unit for generating a secure element public key and a secure element private key; a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device; Equipped with The server, a server registration unit that acquires and registers the secure element public key output from the secure element output unit; a server key generation unit for generating a server public key and a server private key; a server output unit that outputs the server public key generated by the server key generation unit to the secure element via the device; Equipped with The secure element further comprises: a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers the server public key output from the server output unit, The server, Performs encrypted communication based on the registered secure element public key, The secure element comprises: Encryption is performed based on the registered server public key. The secure element comprises: a secure element first encryption unit that encrypts predetermined secure element information using a registered server public key; The secure element output unit outputting the secure element information encrypted by the secure element first encryption unit to the server; The server, a server first decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted secure element information using the server private key; a server first encryption unit that encrypts predetermined server information using a registered secure element public key; The server output unit is outputting the server information encrypted by the server first encryption unit to the secure element; The secure element further comprises: a secure element first decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted server information by using the secure element private key; The server, a server common key generation unit that generates a common key by using the secure element information decrypted by the server first decryption unit and the server information; The secure element comprises: a secure element common key generation unit that generates a common key by using the server information and the secure element information decrypted by the secure element first decryption unit, outputting the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit to the device; The server and the device A cryptographic communication system that performs cryptographic communication based on the common key.

2. The secure element comprises: a secure element second encryption unit that encrypts secure element identification information using the secure element private key; The secure element output unit outputting the secure element identification information encrypted by the secure element second encryption unit to the server; The server, a server second decryption unit that decrypts the encrypted secure element identification information by using the acquired secure element public key; The server registration unit 2. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, further comprising: determining whether or not the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on the secure element identification information decrypted by the server second decryption unit.

3. The server, a server second encryption unit that encrypts server identification information by using the server private key; The server output unit is outputting the server identification information encrypted by the server second encryption unit to the secure element; The secure element comprises: a second decryption unit of a secure element that decrypts the encrypted server identification information by using the acquired server public key; The secure element registration unit 3. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, further comprising: determining whether or not an acquired server public key can be registered based on the server identification information decrypted by the second decryption unit of the secure element.

4. The secure element comprises: a secure element authentication request unit that requests an authentication authority server to authenticate the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit; The secure element output unit 4. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, wherein, when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the secure element public key is output to the server.

5. The secure element comprises: a secure element acquisition unit that acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, The secure element output unit outputting the certificate authority signature acquired by the secure element acquisition unit to the server; The server registration unit The cryptographic communication system according to claim 4 , wherein a determination is made as to whether or not the acquired secure element public key can be registered based on a result of the verification of the certificate authority signature.

6. The server, a server authentication request unit that requests an authentication authority server to authenticate the server public key generated by the server key generation unit; The server output unit is 6. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, wherein when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, the server public key is output to the secure element.

7. The server, a server acquisition unit that acquires a certificate authority signature generated by the certificate authority server when authentication by the certificate authority server is obtained, The server output unit is outputting the certificate authority signature acquired by the server acquisition unit to the secure element; The secure element registration unit 7. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 6, wherein a determination is made as to whether or not the acquired server public key can be registered based on a result of the verification of the certificate authority signature.

8. The server, a server determination unit that determines whether or not a registered secure element public key has been revoked at a required timing; a server invalidation processing unit that invalidates the registered secure element public key when the server determination unit determines that the secure element public key has been invalidated; Equipped with The secure element comprises: a secure element determination unit that determines whether a registered server public key has been revoked at a required timing; a secure element invalidation processing unit that invalidates the registered server public key when the secure element judgment unit judges that the server public key has been invalidated; The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1 , further comprising:

9. The server invalidation processing unit: Furthermore, the common key generated by the server common key generation unit is invalidated, The secure element revocation processing unit, The cryptographic communication system according to claim 8 , further comprising: invalidating the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit.

10. Each of the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit 10. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, wherein the generated common key is updated at a predetermined opportunity.

11. The device comprises: outputting a request for acquiring a common key to the secure element in response to the predetermined trigger; The secure element comprises: The cryptographic communication system according to claim 10 , wherein the common key updated by the secure element common key generation unit is supplied to the device.

12. The server, The cryptographic communication system according to claim 10 or 11, wherein, when the common key does not match with the device, a process for dealing with an abnormality in the device is executed.

13. Each of the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit 13. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, wherein an algorithm for generating a common key is changed at a predetermined timing.

14. The secure element comprises: a device authentication unit that authenticates a device main body to which the secure element is connected, The secure element common key generation unit If the device main body is authenticated by the device authentication unit, the generated common key is output to the device main body; The server and the device The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1 , wherein cryptographic communication is performed based on the common key.

15. The server and the secure element each include A storage unit that stores predetermined shared information, Each of the server common key generation unit and the secure element common key generation unit The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1 , further comprising: a common key generating unit that generates a common key by further using the shared information.

16. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 15 , wherein the shared information held in the holding unit is updatable.

17. The secure element comprises:

17. The cryptographic communication system according to claim 1, which is configured with hardware elements or software elements.

18. A secure element mounted on a device that performs cryptographic communication with a server, a secure element key generation unit for generating a secure element public key and a secure element private key; a secure element output unit that outputs the secure element public key generated by the secure element key generation unit to the server via the device; a secure element registration unit that acquires and registers a server public key output by the server; Equipped with a server public key registered in the secure element registration unit is used for cryptographic communication between the secure element and the server; a secure element first encryption unit that encrypts predetermined secure element information using a registered server public key; The secure element output unit outputting the secure element information encrypted by the secure element first encryption unit to the server; The secure element further includes a first decryption unit for decrypting server information encrypted by the server using the secure element private key. a secure element common key generation unit that generates a common key by using the server information and the secure element information decrypted by the secure element first decryption unit, outputting the common key generated by the secure element common key generation unit to the device; A secure element configured to perform cryptographic communication based on the common key between the server and the device.

19. A device equipped with the secure element according to claim 18, capable of performing encrypted communication with a predetermined server.

20. A method for cryptographic communication between a server and a device equipped with a secure element, comprising: The secure element comprises: generating a secure element public key and a secure element private key; outputting the secure element public key generated via the device to the server; The server, Obtaining and registering a secure element public key output from the secure element; Generate a server public key and a server private key; outputting a server public key generated via the device to the secure element; The secure element further comprises: Obtaining and registering a server public key output from the server; The server, Performs encrypted communication based on the registered secure element public key, The secure element comprises: Encryption is performed based on the registered server public key. The secure element comprises: Encrypting predetermined secure element information using the registered server public key; outputting the encrypted secure element information to the server; The server, decrypting the encrypted secure element information using the server private key; Encrypting predetermined server information using the registered secure element public key; outputting the encrypted server information to the secure element; The secure element comprises: decrypting the encrypted server information using the secure element private key; The server, generating a common key using the decrypted secure element information and the server information; The secure element comprises: generating a common key using the decrypted server information and the secure element information; Outputting the generated common key to the device; The server and the device A cryptographic communication method for performing cryptographic communication based on the common key.

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