TLS integration of post-quantum cryptography algorithms
By integrating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms into TLS protocols and using hybrid modes, the vulnerability of TLS to quantum computing attacks is mitigated, ensuring secure connections resistant to quantum threats.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2022579676
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2020-07-02
- Filing Date
- 2021-06-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-19
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-06-30
AI Technical Summary
Current TLS protocols are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, as quantum computers can break existing cryptographic algorithms like RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, allowing attackers to decrypt encrypted transmissions between servers and clients.
Integrate post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into TLS protocols by embedding signaling messages in random values during the handshake process, using PQC key pairs and shared keys to establish a secure connection resistant to quantum attacks, and employing hybrid modes to protect conventional algorithms.
The integration of PQC algorithms enhances TLS security by making it resistant to quantum computing attacks, ensuring secure communication between clients and servers even in the presence of quantum threats.
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Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present disclosure relates to post-quantum cryptography, and more particularly to the implementation of post-quantum cryptography algorithms in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. [Background technology]
[0002] Quantum computing is a model of computation that implements quantum physics to perform calculations differently than classical computers. Unlike classical computers, which operate on bits that are either 0 or 1, quantum computers are based on quantum bits (or qubits) that can be both 0 and 1 at the same time. This state of ambiguity is known as superposition. Quantum computing has the potential to perform quantum speedups and exponential speedups. Quantum speedups occur when a problem can be solved faster by a quantum computer than by a classical computer. Exponential speedups occur when a task that takes an exponential amount of time on a classical computer can be performed on a quantum computer with polynomial complexity.
[0003] The TLS protocol is a protocol used to establish a secure connection between a server and a client. Various public key cryptography algorithms are used by TLS to encrypt the transmissions between the server and the client. These cryptography algorithms include, for example, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Quantum computers have the potential to break these cryptosystems and allow an attacker to decrypt the encrypted transmissions between the server and the client. Summary of the Invention
[0004] An embodiment of the present disclosure includes a computer-implemented method for integrating a post-quantum cryptography algorithm into TLS. The computer-implemented method includes transmitting a client hello message to a server. The client hello message includes a random value signaling a request for a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mode of operation to establish a secure connection between the client and the server. Additionally, the client hello message includes a PQC public client key as another parameter. The computer-implemented method includes receiving a server hello message from the server in response to the client hello message. The server hello message includes a PQC server key exchange generated from the PQC public client key. The computer-implemented method further includes determining a server hello message including authorization to operate a PQC mode of operation. The authorization can be in the form of another random value signaling authorization for the mode. The computer-implemented method also includes transmitting a second client hello message to the server. The second client hello message includes a PQC encrypted client key share. The PQC encrypted client key share is encrypted using a client encryption key derived from the PQC share key and the transcript hash. The computer-implemented method includes receiving a second server hello message including a PQC encrypted server key share and decrypting the PQC encrypted server key share using a server encryption key derived from the PQC share and the transcript. The computer-implemented method includes establishing a secure connection between the client and the server using the decrypted server key share.
[0005] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein the step of transmitting the client hello message comprises the steps of: generating a PQC key pair, the PQC key pair including the PQC public client key and a PQC private client key; embedding a signaling message into a random value, the signaling message indicating a request for the PQC operation mode; and transmitting the client hello message to the server, the client hello message including the random value and the PQC public client key as parameters.
[0006] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein transmitting the second client hello message comprises: embedding a second signaling message into a second random value, the second signaling message indicating a continuing request for the PQC mode of operation; generating a PQC shared key using a PQC private client key and the PQC server key exchange received in the server hello message; deriving a client encryption key and a server encryption key from the PQC shared key and a transcript hash, the transcript hash being a value determined by hashing a concatenation of each handshake message; encrypting a client key share using the client encryption key; and transmitting the second client hello message, the second client hello message including the second random value and the encrypted client key share.
[0007] Preferably, the invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein the PQC public client key is set in a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the client hello message.
[0008] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method in which the client hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter.
[0009] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer implemented method further comprising the steps of detecting that said server is performing a traditional handshake process and abandoning the establishment of said secure connection.
[0010] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method in which the client key shares are encrypted using the Kyber algorithm.
[0011] An additional embodiment of the present disclosure includes a computer-implemented method for integrating post-quantum cryptography algorithms into TLS. The computer-implemented method includes receiving a client hello message from a client requesting establishment of a secure connection with a server. The client hello message includes a PQC public client key and a random value. The computer-implemented method also includes determining that the client hello message includes a request for a PQC mode of operation embedded in the random value. The computer-implemented method further includes transmitting a server hello message to the client. The server hello message includes as parameters a retry request, a server random value with an embedded signal identifying the PQC mode of operation, and a server key exchange. The server key exchange is generated from the PQC public client key received in the client hello message. The computer-implemented method also includes receiving a second client hello message from the client. The second client hello message includes a PQC encrypted client key share. The computer-implemented method also includes encrypting the PQC server key share using a server encryption key derived from the PQC share and the transcript hash, and establishing a secure connection with the client using the server key share.
[0012] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein transmitting the server hello message comprises the steps of: setting a retry request to true, the retry request indicating a request to resend another client hello message from the client; embedding a signaling message with a random value, the signaling message indicating authorization for the PQC mode of operation; generating a post-quantum key pair using a PQC public client key obtained in the client hello message, the PQC key pair including a PQC public server key and a PQC private server key; and transmitting the server hello message to the client, the server hello message including the random value and the PQC public server key as parameters.
[0013] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein transmitting the second server hello message comprises the steps of: setting the retry-request to false, the retry-request indicating a request to resend another client hello message from the client; embedding a signaling message with a second random value, the signaling message indicating authorization for the PQC mode of operation; decrypting the PQC encrypted client key-share using the client encryption key to generate a client key-share; encrypting the server key-share using the server encryption key to generate the PQC encrypted server key-share; and transmitting the second server hello message to the client, the second server hello message including the second random value and the PQC encrypted server key-share.
[0014] Preferably, the invention provides a computer-implemented method, wherein the PQC server key exchange is set to a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the server hello message.
[0015] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method in which the server hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter.
[0016] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer implemented method further comprising the steps of detecting that said client is performing a traditional handshake process and abandoning the establishment of said secure connection.
[0017] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented method in which the PQC encrypted server key share is encrypted using the Kyber algorithm.
[0018] Additional embodiments are directed to a post-quantum integration system for integrating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms into TLS, configured to perform the above method.
[0019] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer-implemented system further comprising the steps of: generating a PQC key pair, the PQC key pair including a PQC public client key and a PQC private client key; embedding a signaling message into a random value, the signaling message indicating a request for the PQC operating mode; and transmitting the client hello message to the server, the client hello message including the random number and the PQC public client key as parameters.
[0020] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer implemented system further comprising the steps of: embedding a second signaling message with a second random value, the second signaling message indicating a continuing request for the PQC mode of operation; generating a PQC shared key using a PQC private client key and a PQC server key exchange received in the server hello message; deriving a client encryption key and a server encryption key from the PQC shared key and a transcript hash, the transcript hash being a value determined by hashing a concatenation of each handshake message; encrypting a client key share using the client encryption key; and transmitting the second client hello message, the second client hello message including the second random value and the encrypted client key share.
[0021] Preferably, the invention provides a computer-implemented system, wherein the PQC public client key is set in a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the client hello message.
[0022] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer implemented system in which the client hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter.
[0023] Preferably, the present invention provides a computer implemented system further comprising the steps of detecting that said server is performing a traditional handshake process and abandoning the establishment of said secure connection.
[0024] This summary is not intended to describe every implementation or every embodiment or every aspect of any combination of the present disclosure. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0025] These and other features, aspects, and advantages of the embodiments of the present disclosure will become better understood with regard to the following description, appended claims, and accompanying drawings.
[0026] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a post-quantum integration system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0027] [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a data flow diagram illustrating a post-quantum integration handshake between a client and a server using a post-quantum integration process by a post-quantum integration system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0028] [Diagram 3] FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of a client-side post-quantum integration handshake process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0029] [Figure 4] FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of a server-side post-quantum integration handshake process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0030] [Diagram 5] FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of a transmitting client hello message process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0031] [Figure 6] FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of a transmitting server hello message process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0032] [Figure 7] FIG. 11 is a flow diagram of transmitting a second client hello message according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0033] [Figure 8]FIG. 11 is a flow diagram of transmitting a second server hello message according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0034] [Figure 9] FIG. 13 is a flow diagram of a message embedding process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0035] [Figure 10] FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a message decoding process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0036] [Figure 11] FIG. 1 is a high-level block diagram illustrating an example computer system that may be used in implementing one or more of the methods, tools and modules, and any associated functionality, described herein in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0037] [Figure 12] FIG. 1 illustrates a cloud computing environment in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0038] [Figure 13] FIG. 2 illustrates an abstraction model layer according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0039] While the present disclosure is amenable to various modifications and alternative forms, specific contents of the present disclosure are shown by way of example in the drawings and will be described in detail below. It should be understood, however, that there is no intention to be limited to the particular embodiments described. On the contrary, the intention is to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the scope of the present disclosure. In the accompanying drawings, like reference numerals are used to designate like parts. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0040] The present disclosure relates to post-quantum cryptography, and more particularly to the implementation of post-quantum cryptography algorithms in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Although the present disclosure is not necessarily limited to such applications, various aspects of the present disclosure may be understood through the discussion of various examples using this context.
[0041] Quantum computing is an emerging technology that utilizes quantum mechanics to solve certain problems that were deemed impossible to solve effectively on classical computers. There are concerns that data protected by currently deployed encryption methods may become insecure with the development of quantum computing. Common algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography are just a few of the deployed asymmetric algorithms that may become insecure in the presence of quantum computing.
[0042] For example, the TLS handshake protocol implements RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography to establish a secure connection between a client and a server. However, these cryptographic algorithms, based on Shor's algorithm, would not be secure on a sufficiently large quantum computer. Shor's algorithm is a polynomial-time quantum computing algorithm for integer factorization. On a quantum computer, Shor's algorithm runs in polynomial time and can solve problems such as factoring, discrete logarithm (DLP) and elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDLP). To remain cryptographically secure, the above mentioned cryptographic algorithms rely on these problems that are impossible to solve on a classical computer.
[0043] Given the widespread use of TLS, a transition to post-quantum cryptography is necessary as current asymmetric cryptographic algorithms will become insecure with the advent of quantum computing. Various post-quantum algorithms have been created to replace the current asymmetric cryptographic algorithms used by TLS with the potential to remain secure in the era of quantum computing. These post-quantum algorithms include, for example, Kyber PQC, FrodoKEM, SIKE, Picnic, and TESLA.
[0044] There are implementations of post-quantum cryptography using TLS that replace the use of RSA, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). These implementations propose a hybrid model where both the key exchange and the signature are performed in parallel, producing both a classical exchange / signature and a post-quantum exchange / signature.
[0045] A hybrid approach to post-quantum TLS implementation implements a new cipher suite for signaling post-quantum cryptography. In addition, a key encapsulation method is used using a random key with an algorithm such as ECDHE. The exchanged post-quantum cryptographic values are concatenated or XOR'ed with the ECDHE key.
[0046] However, current implementations do not protect encryption methods using post-quantum algorithms from being negated, so limitations on post-quantum security remain. An attacker could prevent the implementation of post-quantum security. For example, an attacker could intercept a client hello message that contains a request for post-quantum encryption. Since current post-quantum TLS solutions operate in a hybrid mode, the client could then request a conventional TLS connection that is susceptible to quantum attacks. Alternatively, an attacker could directly break conventional algorithms without breaking quantum-safe algorithms. Current implementations use conventional and post-quantum algorithms side-by-side and combine them to perform a single TLS handshake. Thus, an attacker could simply break the conventional algorithm to create vulnerabilities in the connection.
[0047] As an example, a client transmits a client hello message to a server. Included in the client hello message are parameters requesting a post-quantum secure connection. A man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept the message and detect the post-quantum parameters. Once detected, the attacker can prevent the message from being transmitted to the server. On the client side, the client perceives the delay as a failed attempt to establish a post-quantum connection. Therefore, the client transmits another client hello message with a request for a conventional secure connection. The attacker can intercept the message, detect the parameters of the conventional secure connection, and allow the message to proceed to the server. Using quantum computing power, the attacker can intercept subsequent asymmetrically encrypted messages and potentially decrypt them.
[0048] The embodiments of the present disclosure may overcome the above problems and other problems by using a post-quantum integrated system. The post-quantum integrated system provides quantum-safe TLS. First, the post-quantum integrated system uses methods to signal a request for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to be used in establishing a connection between a client and a server. These methods are designed to make it less likely that they will be blocked by a perimeter processor, other middleware, or a man-in-the-middle attacker. The random values used in the handshake messages can be embedded with a signal indicating the request. This helps detect and avoid possible downgrade attacks in which an attacker attempts to downgrade from a PQC operating mode to a conventional operating mode.
[0049] In addition, the post-quantum integrated system uses a hybrid mode of operation where the PQC algorithm protects the classical algorithm as a result. In doing so, the PQC algorithm would need to be broken before the classical algorithm is exposed to a quantum computing attack. Thus, the classical algorithm receives the enhanced security provided by the PQC algorithm. Two sets of client / server hello messages are used to establish the connection. In the first client / server hello message, PQC keys are exchanged and a PQC shared key is established. In the second client / server hello message, the key is derived from the PQC shared key and the handshake transcript hash. The key is used to exchange a classical ECDHE key share. The handshake transcript hash used as part of the key schedule provides additional protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0050] More specifically, the post-quantum signaling system described herein embeds a signal into a random number that signals a request for a PQC mode of operation. Downgrade attacks are avoided because the request is not obvious in the client hello message. A man-in-the-middle eavesdropping message would not be able to detect the request by viewing the contents of the message. Additionally, the random number included in the client hello message cannot be altered without subverting the TLS handshake process.
[0051] Essentially, the post-quantum integrated system integrates post-quantum algorithms into the TLS protocol. Communications between a client and a server are generally secured using the TLS protocol. TLS provides a cryptographic protocol designed to provide communications security over a computer network. A server and a web client can establish a TLS connection by exchanging information in compliance with the TLS handshake protocol. The TLS handshake protocol defines the format of messages and the order of their exchange. Once exchanged, the result is a successful TLS connection, where both the server and the web client can securely exchange application data using the TLS protocol. A successful TLS handshake between a web client and a server that establishes a TLS connection is generally referred to as a TLS session.
[0052] Embodiments of the present disclosure include utilizing the generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension to exchange PQC secrets to provide middlebox resistance. GREASE is a mechanism to prevent extensibility failures in the TLS ecosystem. It reserves a set of TLS protocol values that can be advertised by clients to ensure that servers handle unknown values correctly. For example, a client may select one or more random GREASE cipher suite values and advertise them in the client Hello cipher suite field. In some embodiments, the client places the PQC client public key in an unused extension value defined by GREASE that defaults to being ignored.
[0053] An embodiment of the present disclosure includes embedding a signaling message into a random value. For example, a hash function can iteratively generate a hash value from the random number. After each iteration, the resulting hash value can be examined to determine if the signaling message is contained within the hash value. The iterative process continues until a hash value containing the signaling message is embedded within the random number.
[0054] For example, a client and a server start a process to establish a TLS connection. The server and the web client can establish the TLS connection by exchanging information in compliance with the TLS handshake protocol. During the TLS handshake, the client includes a 32-byte random value and optional information such as various protocol parameters. The client can embed a signaling message into the 32-byte random value before sending it to the server. The random number with the embedded signaling message can act as a signal to request support for the PQC operation mode during the establishment of the TLS connection. The server can decode the embedded message and respond based on the signal or authenticate the sender by verifying that the secret is correct.
[0055] In some embodiments, the client abandons the establishment of the secure connection when it detects that the server has reverted to the traditional handshake process. For example, during the TLS handshake process, the client and server can signal each other that they are operating under the PQC mode of operation. When the clients receive a message that does not contain a signal, they can stop communicating with the server and abandon the connection.
[0056] 1, a block diagram illustrating a post-quantum integrated system 100 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. The post-quantum integrated system 100 includes a PQC encryption mechanism 110, a post-quantum algorithm library 120, a key generator 130, a key derivation function 140, a hashing mechanism 150, and a message decoder 160.
[0057] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 is a component of the post-quantum integrated system 100 configured to apply one or more quantum-resistant public key encryption standards. The public key encryption standards may specify one or more additional unclassified publicly disclosed digital signature, public key encryption, and available key establishment algorithms. These PQC algorithms are capable of protecting information from quantum computing attacks. The PQC encryption mechanism 110 may utilize PQC algorithms listed in the post-quantum algorithm library 120 when performing encryption procedures.
[0058] For example, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 may utilize the Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices (CRYSTALS) Kyber algorithm to perform the encryption procedure. Kyber is an IND-CCA2-Secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) whose security is based on the difficulty of solving the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem via a modular lattice.
[0059] The post-quantum algorithm library 120 is a library of post-quantum algorithms of the post-quantum integrated system 100 that are utilized by the PQC encryption mechanism 110. For example, the post-quantum algorithms include Big Quake, Bike, CFPKM, Classic McEliece, CRYSTALS-Kyber, DAGS, DualModeMS, EMBLEM, FALCON, HILA5, HQC, Lepton, Lizard, LOTUS, MQDSS, Picnic, Rainbow, Titanium, FrodoKEM, NewHope, and Three Bears. The post-quantum algorithms can be further divided into categories. For example, these categories include lattice-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, hash-based cryptography, code-based cryptography, supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography, and symmetric key quantum resistance.
[0060] The key generator 130 is a component of the post-quantum integrated system 100 that is configured to generate PQC key pairs and conventional key pairs. A key pair is a public and private key pair that can be used with a selected algorithm. It can associate algorithm-specific parameters with each of the generated keys. Key pairs can be generated as either algorithm-independent or algorithm-specific initialization. A key pair consists of a public key and a private key, where the public key is used for encryption and the private key is used for decryption.
[0061] Key derivation function 140 is a component of post-quantum integrated system 100 configured to derive one or more private keys from a secret value and a master key using a pseudorandom function. Key derivation function 140 can be used to obtain a key in a required format, such as to extend a key to a longer key, or to convert a group element resulting from a key exchange into a symmetric key together with non-secret parameters to derive one or more keys from a common secret value.
[0062] Key derivation function 140 can be used in applications to derive keys from other keys or passwords, which have properties that allow the derived keys to be used directly as cryptographic keys. In some embodiments, key derivation function 140 uses a cryptographic hash function to expand the key along with the transcript hash. Key derivation function 140 can input the key and the transcript hash and apply a hash function to generate a fixed-length pseudorandom key. Using the pseudorandom key, key derivation function 140 expands the key into several additional pseudorandom keys. During expansion, the number and length of the output keys may depend on the particular cryptographic algorithm for which the key is required. Another hash function is applied to the pseudorandom key and any other additional information that may be optional and application specific.
[0063] The hash mechanism 150 is a component of the post-quantum integrated system 100 configured to apply a hash function to the random values generated by the number generator. Hash functions include, for example, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-3, and Blake2. These hash functions can include properties such as preimage resistance and collision resistance. Preimage resistance describes a security guarantee that, given a random hash value, an attacker can never find a preimage of that hash value. As such, a hash function can be considered a one-way function, since preimage resistance allows going from a message to its hash, but not going back from the hash to the message. As such, a hash function cannot be inverted.
[0064] Preimage resistance guarantees that it is practically impossible to find any message that maps to a given hash value. Specifically, preimage resistance, or first preimage resistance, describes the case where it is practically impossible to find a message that hashes to a given value, while second preimage resistance describes the case where, given a message, it is practically impossible to find another message that hashes to the same value as the first message.
[0065] Collision resistance refers to the property that prevents an attacker from being able to find two distinct messages that hash to the same value. Collision resistance can also be considered as second preimage resistance. Hash mechanism 150 is further configured to eliminate birthday attacks. A birthday attack is defined as N messages and many hash values, where a total of N×(N−1) / 2 potential collisions can be generated by considering each pair of two hash values. To prevent birthday attacks that determine collisions, hash mechanism 150 can utilize a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) as a hash function. By design, HMAC is less susceptible to collisions than other widely used hash functions.
[0066] Additionally, the hash value generated by hashing mechanism 150 preserves the randomness of the initial random value because the hash function provides an unbiased uniform distribution, so given a random value, the randomness of the resulting hash value does not decrease, resulting in an even random value.
[0067] The hashing mechanism 150 is further configured to iteratively apply a hash function to the random values until a bit sequence representative of the message is produced in the resulting hash value. The bit sequence is probabilistic and will, on average, be a power of 2 (the number of bits in the message). For example, a 12-bit message will require, on average, 4,096 hashing iterations. Therefore, the length of the message is preferably short, or around 12 to 18 bits.
[0068] There is a possibility that a fake message may be detected in the random values. These instances are:
number
[0069] The message decoder 160 is a component of the post-quantum integrated system 100 configured to decode the message embedded in the message. The hash mechanism 150 can apply a pre-shared hash function to the received random value to generate a hash value. The message decoder can analyze the hash value to verify that the bit sequence is set in the hash value generated by the hash mechanism 150.
[0070] In some embodiments, the message decoder 160 verifies that the bit sequence in the hash value matches a pre-shared secret between the sender and the receiver. For example, the sender may have embedded a password that is used to authenticate the sender. The message decoder 160 can verify that the password matches a password stored by the receiver. Upon verifying the bit sequence, the message decoder 160 can confirm that the message was received. Depending on the type of message transmitted and upon successful verification, the embedded message may be used to grant the sender access to restricted areas or it may allow different protocol features (e.g., post-quantum cryptography).
[0071] It should be noted that Figure 1 is intended to illustrate major representative components of an exemplary post-quantum integrated system 100. However, in some embodiments, the individual components may be more or less complex than depicted in Figure 1, components other than or in addition to those shown in Figure 1 may be present, and the number, type, and configuration of such components may vary.
[0072] 2 is a data flow diagram 200 illustrating PQC integration in a TLS handshake by a post-quantum integration system 100 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 200 begins with a key generator 130 generating a PQC key pair for a client. This is shown in step 210. The PQC key pair includes a PQC public client key and a PQC private client key. In addition, a hashing mechanism 150 embeds in the random value a signal indicating that the client wishes to enter a PQC mode of operation with the server.
[0073] In step 215, the client transmits a TLS client hello message to the server. The client hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter. The TLS client hello message includes the PQC public client key and the embedded random value as parameters. According to the TLS protocol, the client hello message is the first message that the client transmits to the server when requesting a secure connection. According to the TLS protocol, the client hello message includes the random value, a session identifier, a cipher suite list, and the compression algorithms supported by the client.
[0074] Upon receiving the client hello message, the message decoder 160 evaluates the received random value to determine whether a PQC signal is embedded in the random value. This is shown in step 220. Upon determining that the random value contains a PQC signal request, the server-side key generator 130 uses the PQC public client key as input to generate a PQC shared key and a PQC server key exchange. The PQC server key exchange can be used by the client to generate a client-side PQC shared key. In addition, the server-side hash mechanism 150 embeds in the random value a signal indicating that the server acknowledges the PQC mode of operation with the client.
[0075] In step 225, the server transmits a server hello message including the PQC server key exchange and a random value with a PQC signal authorizing the PQC mode of operation. According to the TLS protocol, the server hello message includes the server version, the random value, the session identification, the selected cipher suite, the compression method, and a list of extensions. Only the extensions provided by the client can be displayed in the server's list. In step 230, on the server side, the key derivation function 140 extends the PQC shared key and the transcript hash to generate a client encryption key and a server encryption key.
[0076] On the client side, message decoder 160 analyzes the random value received in the server hello message to determine that the request for the PQC mode of operation is authorized. Upon determining authorization, PQC encryption mechanism 110 generates a PQC shared key by decoding the PQC server key exchange using the PQC private client key. Client-side key derivation function 140 expands the PQC shared key and the transcript hash to generate the same client and server encryption keys generated on the server side. Using the client encryption key, PQC encryption mechanism 110 encrypts the client key share to generate a PQC encrypted client key share. This is shown in step 240.
[0077] In step 245, the client transmits a second client hello message, the second client hello message using the PQC extension as a parameter, the second client hello message including the PQC encrypted client key share and another embedded random value as parameters.
[0078] At step 250, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 decrypts the PQC encrypted client key-share to reveal the client key-share. In addition, the message decoder 160 evaluates the received random value from the second hello message to determine that the PQC mode of operation is still requested. Using the server encryption key, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 encrypts the server key-share to generate a PQC encrypted server key-share.
[0079] In step 255, the server transmits a second server hello message. The second server hello message includes as parameters the PQC encrypted server key agreement and another embedded random value. In step 260, on the client side, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 decrypts the PQC encrypted server key agreement to reveal the server key agreement. Using the server key agreement and the client key agreement, the server and client can complete the establishment of a secure connection.
[0080] FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 300 for a client-side post-quantum integration handshake process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 300 begins by transmitting a client hello message from the client to the server. This is shown at step 310. The client hello message may be an initial message requesting a secure connection between the client and the server. The client hello message may adhere to different TLS handshake protocols defined by different versions of TLS. For example, the client hello message may adhere to TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The TLS handshake protocol is used to negotiate security parameters of the connection. The handshake messages (e.g., client / server hello messages) are provided to the TLS record layer where they are encapsulated within one or more TLS plaintext or TLS ciphertext structures that are processed and transmitted as specified by the created secure connection.
[0081] When a client first connects to a server, it must send a client hello message as its first TLS message. The client must also send another client hello message when the server responds to the first client hello message with a retry request. Included in the client hello message is a random value with an embedded signal indicating a request for a PQC mode of operation. The PQC mode of operation indicates that the client wishes to establish a secure connection with the server using a post-quantum algorithm to prevent possible post-quantum attacks. The client hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter. Additionally, the client hello message includes the PQC public client key. Step 310 is described in more detail below with respect to process 500 of FIG. 5.
[0082] The client receives a server hello message from the server to the client. This is shown in step 320. The server hello message may include a PQC server key exchange generated from a PQC public client key as well as a random value. The message decoder 160 may analyze the random value to determine whether it includes an authorization / acknowledgement of the PQC mode of operation. The analysis evaluates the random value to determine whether a corresponding signal was embedded within the random value in response to a signal transmitted in the client hello message. This is shown in step 330.
[0083] Upon determining that the random value does not include a signaling message authorizing the PQC mode of operation, the client may proceed by establishing a secure connection using a conventional standard handshake protocol, as shown in step 340. However, when the message decoder 160 detects an embedded signaling message, the client may proceed by transmitting a second client hello message, as shown in step 350.
[0084] The second client hello message may include a PQC encrypted client key share and another random value with an embedded signal indicating a request to maintain a PQC mode of operation. The PQC mode of operation indicates that the client wishes to continue to establish a secure connection with the server using a post-quantum algorithm. The stage 350 of transmitting the second client hello message is described in more detail below with respect to process 700 of FIG.
[0085] The client receives a second server hello message in response to the second client hello message. This is shown at stage 360. The second server hello message may include a PQC encrypted server key share and another random value with an embedded signal indicating acknowledgment / authorization to maintain the PQC mode of operation during the handshake process. The PQC encryption mechanism 110 decrypts the PQC encrypted server key share using a server encryption key derived from the PQC share key and the transcript hash. This is shown at stage 370. The result of the decryption is a server key share. The client establishes a secure connection with the server using the client / server key share. This is shown at stage 380.
[0086] FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 400 of a server-side post-quantum integration handshake process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 400 begins by receiving a client hello message from the client to the server. This is shown at step 410. The client hello message may be an initial message requesting a secure connection between the client and the server. The client hello message uses a PQC extension as a parameter. Included in the client hello message is a random value with a possible embedded signal indicating a request for a PQC mode of operation. The PQC mode of operation indicates that the client wishes to establish a secure connection with the server using a post-quantum algorithm to prevent possible post-quantum attacks. Additionally, the client hello message includes a PQC public client key.
[0087] The server-side message decoder 160 can analyze the received random value to determine whether it includes a request for a PQC mode of operation. This is shown in step 420. The analysis evaluates the random value to determine whether a corresponding signal is embedded within the random value that requests a PQC mode of operation. For example, when the random value includes the signal "PQC" within the random value, however, it should be noted that other signals can be used as predetermined by the client and server.
[0088] Upon determining that the random value does not include a signaling message requesting a PQC mode of operation, the server may proceed by establishing a secure connection using a conventional standard handshake protocol, as shown in step 430. However, when the message decoder 160 detects an embedded signaling message, the server may proceed by transmitting a server hello message, as shown in step 440.
[0089] The server hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter. The server hello message can include a PQC server key exchange and a random value with an embedded signal authorizing / acknowledging the PQC mode of operation. The embedded signal indicates that the server is capable and willing to proceed with the PQC mode of operation to establish a secure connection with the client. The stage 440 of transmitting the server hello message is described in more detail below with respect to the process 600 of FIG. 6.
[0090] The server receives a second client hello message in response to the server hello message, as shown at step 450. The second client hello message may include a PQC encrypted client key share and another random value with an embedded signal indicating a request to maintain a PQC mode of operation. The PQC mode of operation indicates that the client wishes to continue establishing a secure connection with the server using a post-quantum algorithm.
[0091] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 encrypts the server key share. This is shown in step 460. The server encryption key is derived from the PQC shared key and the transcript hash. The PQC shared key is generated by the key generator 130. Using the server encryption key, the PQC encrypted client key share received in the second client hello message is decrypted by the PQC encryption mechanism 110. The server key share is generated by the key generator 130 and encrypted by the PQC encryption mechanism 110 using the server encryption key.
[0092] The server proceeds by transmitting a second server hello message to the client. This is shown in step 470. The server hello message uses the PQC extension as a parameter. The second server hello message includes the PQC encrypted server key agreement and another random value with an embedded signal authorizing / acknowledging the continued PQC mode of operation. Step 470 of transmitting the second server hello message is described in more detail below with respect to process 800 of FIG. 8. The server uses the client / server key agreement to establish a secure connection with the client. This is shown in step 480.
[0093] 5 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 500 for transmitting a client hello message according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Process 500 begins with key generator 130 generating a PQC key pair for the client. This is shown at step 510. The PQC key pair includes a PQC public client key and a PQC private client key. The PQC key pair can be based on a post-quantum key technique selected by the client.
[0094] The hashing mechanism 150 applies a hash function to the random value generated by the PRNG to generate an embedding signal. This is shown in step 520. The hashing mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hashing function while evaluating the resulting hash value. The hashing mechanism 150 continues applying the hashing function to the resulting hash value until a hash value is generated on a sequence of bits that corresponds to a signaling message representing a request for a PQC mode of operation. The step 520 of embedding the signaling message in a random value is described in more detail below with respect to process 900 of FIG. 9.
[0095] The PQC public client key is set to the GREASE extension value. This is shown in step 530. In some embodiments, the client hello message uses the GREASE extension in the client hello message. The PQC public client key can be placed in the GREASE extension to help avoid middleware or man-in-the-middle attacks. The TLS protocol includes several extensibility points, including cipher suite lists and extension lists. Values in these lists identify implementation capabilities. TLS follows a model where one side, usually the client, advertises capabilities and the server selects them. The responder must ignore unknown values so that new capabilities can be introduced into the ecosystem while maintaining interoperability. However, due to errors, an implementation may reject an unknown value. To avoid these errors, GREASE reserves several currently unused values for TLS implementations to advertise randomly. The client hello message can use one of the unused values to carry the PQC public client key.
[0096] The client transmits a client hello message to the server, which is shown in step 540. The client hello message may be an initial message requesting a secure connection between the client and the server. The client hello message may include the PQC public client key set in the GREASE extension and a random value with an embedded signal requesting the PQC mode of operation.
[0097] FIG. 6 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 600 of transmitting a server hello message process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 600 begins by the server setting retry-request to true. This is shown in step 610. Typically, the server sends a retry request in response to a client hello message when it is able to find an acceptable parameter set, but the client hello does not contain enough information to proceed with the handshake. The retry request maintains the same format as the server hello message, where the legacy version, legacy session id echo, cipher suite, and legacy compression method fields have the same meaning. The retry request is sent to allow the client to send PQC information back to the server.
[0098] For a retry request, the server's extensions MUST include the supported versions. In addition, it SHOULD include the minimum set of extensions that the client needs to generate a corresponding second client hello message. The retry request MUST NOT include any extensions that were not offered by the client in their client hello message.
[0099] The hashing mechanism 150 applies a hash function to the random value generated by the PRNG to generate an embedding signal. This is shown in step 620. The hashing mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hashing function while evaluating the resulting hash value. The hashing mechanism 150 continues applying the hashing function to the resulting hash value until a hashing value is generated on a sequence of bits corresponding to a signaling message representing authorization / acknowledgement of the PQC mode of operation. Step 620 of embedding a signaling message in a random value is described in more detail below with respect to process 900 of FIG. 9.
[0100] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 uses the PQC public client key received in the client hello message to generate a PQC shared key and a PQC key exchange. This is shown in step 630. The key exchange is the method by which cryptographic keys are exchanged between two parties, allowing the use of cryptographic algorithms. The PQC key exchange can be decoded using the PQC private client key to generate a PQC shared key on the client side.
[0101] The PQC key exchange is set to the GREASE extension value. This is shown in step 640. In some embodiments, the server hello message uses the GREASE extension in the server hello message. The PQC key exchange can be placed in the GREASE extension to help avoid middleware or man-in-the-middle attacks. The server hello message can use one of the unused GREASE values to carry the PQC key exchange.
[0102] The key derivation function 140 derives the client and server encryption keys using the PQC shared key and the transcript hash to extend the shared key. This is shown in step 650. The key derivation function takes a source of keying material that has a randomness component (e.g., the transcript hash) and derives it from one or more cryptographically strong keys. In this case, the key derivation function 140 generates the client and server encryption keys.
[0103] The transcript hash is calculated by hashing the concatenation of each individual handshake message, including the handshake message header, which preserves the handshake message type and length fields. In some embodiments, when the server responds to a retry request, the value of the client hello message is replaced with a special composite handshake message that contains the hash of the client hello message. The reason for this structure is to allow the server to make a stateless retry request by simply storing the hash of the client hello message.
[0104] The server transmits a server hello message to the client, as shown in step 660. The server hello message is a response to the client hello message requesting a secure connection between the client and the server. The server hello message includes the PQC key exchange set in the GREASE extension and a random value with an embedded signal authorizing the PQC mode of operation.
[0105] FIG. 7 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 700 of transmitting a second client hello message process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 700 begins with the client-side hashing mechanism 150 embedding the signal into another random value. This is shown in step 710. Similar to step 520 in the process 500 of FIG. 5, the hashing mechanism 150 iteratively applies a hash function while evaluating the resulting hash value. The hashing mechanism 150 continues applying the hash function to the resulting hash value until a hash value is generated on a sequence of bits corresponding to the signaling message representing a request for a PQC mode of operation. The step 710 of embedding the signaling message into a random value is described in more detail below with respect to the process 900 of FIG. 9.
[0106] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 decodes the PQC shared key. This is shown in step 720. The PQC key exchange was included in the server hello message. Using the PQC private client key generated in the first client hello message, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 decodes the PQC key exchange to generate the PQC shared key.
[0107] The key derivation function 140 derives a client encryption key and a server encryption key using the PQC shared key and the transcript hash to expand the shared key. This is shown in step 730. The key derivation function takes a source of keying material that has a randomness component (e.g., the transcript hash) and derives it from one or more cryptographically strong keys. In this case, the key derivation function 140 generates a client encryption key and a server encryption key. The client encryption key and the server encryption key are the same keys derived on the server side as represented in step 650 of the process 600.
[0108] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 encrypts the client key share using a PQC algorithm available in the post-quantum algorithm library 120 and the client cryptographic key. This is shown in step 740. In some embodiments, the client key share is encrypted using the Kyber algorithm, the PQC algorithm.
[0109] The client transmits a second client hello message to the server, as shown at step 750. The second client hello message may be in response to a retry-request message received from the server. The second client hello message may include a PQC encrypted client key agreement and a random value with an embedded signal requesting a continued PQC mode of operation.
[0110] FIG. 8 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 800 of transmitting a second server hello message process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 600 begins with the server setting retry-request to false. This is shown in step 810. By setting retry-request to false, it communicates to the client that another client hello message is not necessary or required. The server-side hash mechanism 150 embeds the signal into another random value. This is shown in step 820. Similar to step 620 in the process 600 of FIG. 6, the hash mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hash function while evaluating the resulting hash value. The hash mechanism 150 continues applying the hash function to the resulting hash value until a hash value is generated with a sequence of bits corresponding to the signal message representing the authorization / acknowledgement of the PQC mode of operation. The step 810 of embedding the signal message into a random value is described in more detail below with respect to the process 900 of FIG. 9.
[0111] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 decrypts the PQC encrypted client key share, which is shown in step 830. The PQC encrypted client key share was previously included in the second client hello message received from the client. Using the PQC share key and a client encryption key derived from the transcript hash, the PQC encryption mechanism 110 can decrypt the PQC encrypted client key share to generate a client key share.
[0112] The PQC encryption mechanism 110 encrypts the server key share using a PQC algorithm available in the post-quantum algorithm library 120 and the client encryption key. This is shown in step 840. In some embodiments, the PQC encrypted server key share is encrypted using the Kyber algorithm, the PQC algorithm.
[0113] The server transmits a second server hello message to the client, as shown at step 850. The second server hello message may be in response to a retry-request message received from the server. The second server hello message may include a PQC encrypted server key agreement and a random value with an embedded signal authorizing a continued PQC mode of operation.
[0114] FIG. 9 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 900 for embedding a message into a random value according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 900 begins with a number generator generating a random value. This is shown at step 910. In some embodiments, the number generator utilizes a CSPRNG to generate the random value. The CSPRNG can be a secure block cipher that is converted to a CSPRNG by running the cipher in counter mode. Counter mode is performed by using the block cipher to encrypt a "1", then a "2", and so on until a random value is generated using the result of the encryption. In counter mode, the block cipher can start with any number other than 1 or 0. By utilizing a block cipher, the birthday paradox is avoided because a block cipher in counter mode does not output identical blocks. Types of block ciphers used by the number generator include, for example, Feistel ciphers, substitution-substitution networks, Lai-Massey ciphers, and ARX.
[0115] In some embodiments, the number generator uses a stream cipher to generate the random values. A stream cipher works by generating a pseudo-random stream of bits that are combined and XORed with the plaintext. The stream cipher can operate on a counter that returns the new pseudo-random stream. Types of stream ciphers used by the number generator include, for example, RC4, A5 / 1, ISAAC, Salsa20, VEST, and A5 / 2.
[0116] Once the random value is generated, the hashing mechanism applies a hash function to the random value. This is shown in step 920. The generated hash value is examined to determine if the bit sequence representing the message the sender wants to embed is located within the hash value. The generated hash value can also be placed in a hash table to allow the post-quantum integrated system 100 to reference the hash value as needed. For example, when the sender and receiver have a pre-shared number, the transmitted hash value can be any of the generated hash values depending on when the bit sequence was generated.
[0117] The hash mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hash function as shown in step 920 until the bit sequence representing the message appears in the generated hash value. This is shown in step 930. An iterative process is a repetition of the hash mechanism 150 applying the hash function to previously generated hash values to generate a hash value having a bit sequence representing the message that the sender wishes to embed. Each iteration of the process is a single iteration, and the outcome of each iteration then becomes the starting point for the next iteration (i.e., the generated hash value is used as an input in the subsequent iteration).
[0118] In some embodiments, the hash values generated in each iteration are placed in a hash table. After each iteration, a hash value can be generated and placed in the hash table. The hash values can be placed in the hash table until a hash value is generated that has a bit sequence that corresponds to the message. For example, when the message is "PQC," a hash value that has "PQC" embedded in its bit sequence will complete the iteration process.
[0119] In some embodiments, the iteration count is incremented after each iteration. After each iteration, the iteration count is incremented until a hash value is generated having a bit sequence corresponding to the message. The increment count can reflect the number of iterations that occurred to arrive at the final hash value having the embedded message.
[0120] The embedding signal hash value is utilized as the new random value in the cryptosystem. This is shown in step 940. In some embodiments, a previous hash value is utilized as the new random value in the cryptosystem. The previous hash value can be the hash value immediately preceding the final hash value that had the embedding message. In some embodiments, the hash value utilized is from an iteration that precedes the final hash value that includes the embedding signal by a pre-shared and pre-determined number. For example, the pre-shared number can often be known to the sender and the receiver. The hash value used will be from an iteration that occurred 10 iterations before the final iteration. A hash table can be consulted and the hash value can be obtained.
[0121] In some embodiments, the pre-shared and predetermined number is incremented after each use. The increment can be by 1, or by some other agreed upon number, such as 5 or 12. For example, when the predetermined number is 5 after the sender transmits a hash value that was generated 5 iterations prior to the final hash value, then 5 is incremented by the agreed upon number. When the agreed upon number is 1, then the predetermined number is incremented to 6, and so on.
[0122] In some embodiments, the hash value utilized is a random value generated by a number generator. The hash value generated by a predefined iteration can be examined to determine if a bit sequence is generated within the hash value. If it is determined that the hash value does not have the bit sequence, then the random value can be utilized as a random value in the cryptosystem. This prevents inadvertent messages from appearing in the random value if the sender wishes not to send the message.
[0123] FIG. 10 is a flow diagram illustrating a process 1000 for decoding a message in a random value according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The process 1000 begins with the post-quantum integrated system 100 receiving a random value. This is shown in step 1010. The random value may be a parameter in a transmission of a cryptosystem. For example, the random value may be a parameter in a transmission sent by a client establishing a TLS or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connection with a server. When the random value is included in a TLS client hello message, the length of the random value is 32 bytes. However, the size of the random value may vary depending on the cryptosystem utilized.
[0124] The hash mechanism 150 applies a hash function to the random value. This is shown in step 1020. The same hash function used to embed the message into the random value is the same hash function used. The type of hash function used by the sender can be included as a parameter when sending the random value. The hash mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hash function for a predetermined amount of time. The amount of time the hash mechanism 150 applies the hash function can be based on a predetermined number shared between the sender and the receiver. For example, when the predetermined number is 1, then the hash mechanism 150 applies the hash function once to the random value. In another case, when the predetermined number is 10, then the hash mechanism 150 iteratively applies the hash function 10 times to the random value and the resulting hash value. The final hash value contains the embedded message.
[0125] The message decoder 160 verifies that the final hash value contains the embedded message. This is shown in step 1030. The message decoder can verify the relationship between the sender and the receiver to determine the type of message received. For example, the sender and receiver may have agreement on a pre-shared secret that is used as the message. The sender can transmit the secret, which can be used as an authentication factor by the receiver to authenticate the sender.
[0126] In some embodiments, the message decoder 160 verifies the message as a feature signal. To avoid man-in-the-middle interference (e.g., an Internet Service Provider (ISP)) from blocking protocol features, the sender can transmit a signal message to the receiver about features in the protocol that may be prohibited by a man-in-the-middle. For example, the protocol feature may be post-quantum cryptography that the sender wants to enable. Upon receiving the embedded signal message, the receiver can provide the feature to the sender.
[0127] The message decoder 160 determines whether the message is verified. This is shown in step 1040. For example, when a message is used as the type of authentication mechanism, then the message decoder 160 can verify whether the message corresponds to a pre-shared secret. When the message does not exactly match the pre-shared secret, then the message is ignored. This is shown in step 1050. The sender can then utilize the random values in the cryptosystem as if the embedded message had not been transmitted. However, when the message is verified, the sender proceeds with a confirmation that the message was received. This is shown in step 1060. The confirmation may depend on the type of message sent. When the message corresponds to a protocol feature request, the sender can implement the feature and proceed with the cryptosystem steps as if the request had been made in the parameters. When the message corresponds to the pre-shared secret, then the server can authenticate the user and grant the user the benefits provided by the authentication.
[0128] 11, there is shown a high-level block diagram of an exemplary computer system 1100 (e.g., post-quantum integrated system 100) that may be used in implementing one or more of the methods, tools and modules described herein, and any associated functionality (e.g., using one or more processor circuits of a computer or computer processor) in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure. In some embodiments, the main components of the computer system 1100 may include one or more processors 1102, memory 1104, terminal interface 1112, I / O (input / output) device interface 1114, storage interface 1116, and network interface 1118, all of which may be communicatively coupled, directly or indirectly, for inter-component communication via memory bus 1103, I / O bus 1108, and I / O bus interface 1110.
[0129] Computer system 1100 may include one or more general purpose programmable central processing units (CPUs) 1102-1, 1102-2, 1102-3, and 1102-N, collectively referred to herein as processors 1102. In some embodiments, computer system 1100 may include multiple processors, as is typical for larger systems, although in other embodiments computer system 1100 may alternatively be a single CPU system. Each processor 1101 may execute instructions stored in memory 1104 and may include one or more levels of on-board cache.
[0130] The memory 1104 may include computer system readable media in the form of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 1122 or cache memory 1124. The computer system 1100 may further include other removable / non-removable volatile / non-volatile computer system storage media. By way of example only, a storage system 1126 may be provided for reading from and writing to a non-removable, non-volatile magnetic medium, such as a "hard drive." Although not shown, a magnetic disk drive may be provided for reading from and writing to a removable, non-volatile magnetic disk (e.g., a "floppy disk"), or an optical disk drive may be provided for reading from or writing to a removable, non-volatile optical disk, such as a CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or other optical medium. In addition, the memory 1104 may include flash memory (e.g., a flash memory stick drive or flash drive). Memory devices may be connected to the memory bus 1103 by one or more data media interfaces. The memory 1104 may include at least one program product having a set (eg, at least one) of program modules configured to perform the functions of various embodiments.
[0131] Although memory bus 1103 is illustrated in FIG. 11 as a single bus structure providing a direct communication path between processor 1102, memory 1104, and I / O bus interface 1110, memory bus 1103 may, in some embodiments, include multiple different buses or communication paths, which may be arranged in any of a variety of forms, such as point-to-point links in a hierarchy, star, or web configuration, multiple hierarchical buses, parallel and redundant paths, or any other suitable type of configuration. Additionally, while I / O bus interface 1110 and I / O bus 1108 are illustrated as single respective units, computer system 1100 may, in some embodiments, include multiple I / O bus interface units, multiple I / O buses, or both. Additionally, although multiple I / O interface units are illustrated separating I / O bus 1108 from the various communication paths reaching the various I / O devices, in other embodiments, some or all of the I / O devices may be directly connected to one or more system I / O buses.
[0132] In some embodiments, computer system 1100 may be a multi-user mainframe computer system, a single-user system, or a server computer or similar device that has little or no direct user interface but receives requests from other computer systems (clients). Further, in some embodiments, computer system 1100 may be implemented as a desktop computer, a portable computer, a laptop or notebook computer, a tablet computer, a pocket computer, a telephone, a smartphone, a network switch or router, or any other suitable type of electronic device.
[0133] It should be noted that Figure 11 is intended to illustrate major representative components of an exemplary computer system 1100. However, in some embodiments, the individual components may have greater or less complexity than those depicted in Figure 11, other or additional components may be present than those shown in Figure 11, and the number, type, and configuration of such components may vary.
[0134] One or more programs / utilities 1128, each having at least one set of program modules 1130 (e.g., post-quantum integrated system 100), may be stored in memory 1104. The programs / utilities 1128 may include a hypervisor (also referred to as a virtual machine monitor), one or more operating systems, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data. Each of the operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data, or any combination thereof, may include an implementation of a network environment. The programs 1128 or program modules 1130, or a combination thereof, generally perform the functions or methods of the various embodiments.
[0135] Although this disclosure includes detailed descriptions of cloud computing, it should be understood that implementation of the teachings described herein is not limited to a cloud computing environment. Rather, embodiments of the invention can be implemented in conjunction with any other type of computing environment now known or later developed.
[0136] Cloud computing is a model of service delivery for enabling convenient and on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, network bandwidth, servers, processing, memory, storage, applications, virtual machines, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or interaction with a service provider. The cloud model can include at least five characteristics, at least three service models, and at least four deployment models.
[0137] The characteristics are as follows: On-Demand Self-Service: Cloud consumers can unilaterally provision computing capacity, such as server time and network storage, automatically as needed, without requiring human interaction with the service provider. Broad network access: The capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms that facilitate use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (eg, cell phones, laptops, and PDAs). Resource Pooling: Provider computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically allocated and reallocated according to demand. There is location independence in that consumers generally have no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources, but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or data center). Rapid Elasticity: This capacity can be rapidly and elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to quickly scale out, and rapidly released to quickly scale in. To the consumer, the capacity available for provisioning often appears unlimited and can be purchased in any amount at any point in time. Measured Services: Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource usage by leveraging metering capabilities at a level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency to both providers and consumers of the services utilized.
[0138] The service model is as follows: Software as a Service (SaaS): The ability offered to the consumer is to use a provider's applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are accessible from a variety of client devices through thin-client interfaces such as web browsers (e.g., web-based email). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including networks, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings. Platform as a Service (PaaS): The ability offered to a consumer is to deploy applications that the consumer has created or acquired, written using programming languages and tools supported by the provider, on a cloud infrastructure. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including networks, servers, operating systems, or storage, but does control the deployed applications and, in some cases, the application hosting environment configuration. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The ability provided to a consumer is to provision processing, storage, network and other basic computing resources, where the consumer can deploy and run any software, which may include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, but does control the operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control over selected networking components (e.g., host firewalls).
[0139] The deployment model is as follows: Private Cloud: The cloud infrastructure operates solely for an organization. A private cloud can be managed by that organization or a third party and can exist on-premise or off-premise. Community Cloud: This cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and supports a specific community with shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policies and compliance considerations). It may be managed by the organization or a third party and may exist on-premise or off-premise. Public Cloud: The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or large industry organizations and is owned by an organization that sells cloud services. Hybrid Cloud: The cloud infrastructure is a combination of two or more clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are tied together by standardized or proprietary technologies that allow portability of data and applications (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing between clouds).
[0140] Cloud computing environments are service-oriented and focus on statelessness, low coupling, modularity and semantic interoperability. At the core of cloud computing is an infrastructure that includes a network of interconnected nodes.
[0141] 12, an exemplary cloud computing environment 1200 is shown. As shown, the cloud computing environment 1200 includes one or more cloud computing nodes 1210 with which local computing devices used by cloud consumers (e.g., personal digital assistants (PDAs) or mobile phones 1220-1, desktop computers 1220-2, laptop computers 1220-3, or automobile computer systems 1220-4, or combinations thereof, etc.) may communicate. The nodes 1210 may communicate with each other. They may be physically or virtually grouped in one or more networks (not shown), such as a private cloud, a community cloud, a public cloud, or a hybrid cloud, or combinations thereof, as described herein above. This allows the cloud computing environment 1200 to provide infrastructure, platform, or software, or combinations thereof, as a service, without the cloud consumer having to maintain resources on the local computing device. The types of computing devices 1220-1 through 1220-4 shown in FIG. 12 are intended as examples only, and it will be understood that computing node 1210 and cloud computing environment 1200 can communicate with any type of computerized device via any type of network or network-addressable connection (e.g., a connection using a web browser) or combination thereof.
[0142] Referring now to Figure 13, a set of functional abstraction layers 1300 provided by cloud computing environment 1200 (Figure 12) is shown. It should be understood in advance that the components, layers, and functions shown in Figure 13 are intended to be illustrative only, and embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto. As shown, the following layers and corresponding functions are provided:
[0143] Hardware and software layer 1310 includes hardware and software components. Examples of hardware components include mainframes 1311, reduced instruction set computer (RISC) architecture based servers 1312, servers 1313, blade servers 1314, storage devices 1315, and networks and networking components 1316. In some embodiments, software components include network application server software 1317 and database software 1318.
[0144] The virtualization layer 1320 provides an abstraction layer from which the following examples of virtual entities may be provided: virtual servers 1321, virtual storage 1322, virtual networks including virtual private networks 1323, virtual applications and operating systems 1324, and virtual clients 1325.
[0145] In one example, management layer 1330 may provide the functionality described below. Resource provisioning 1331 provides dynamic procurement of computing and other resources utilized to execute tasks within the cloud computing environment. Metering and pricing 1332 provides tracking of costs as resources are utilized within the cloud computing environment and provides billing or invoicing for the consumption of these resources. In one example, these resources may include application software licenses. Security provides identity verification for cloud consumers and tasks, as well as protection for data and other resources. User portal 1333 provides consumers and system administrators with access to the cloud computing environment. Service level management 1334 provides allocation and management of cloud computing resources such that required service levels are met. Service level agreement (SLA) planning and fulfillment 1335 provides proactive coordination and procurement of cloud computing resources where future requirements are predicted according to SLAs.
[0146] Workload tier 1340 provides examples of functions for which a cloud computing environment may be utilized. Examples of workloads and functions that may be provided from this tier include mapping and navigation 1341, software development and lifecycle management 1342 (e.g., post-quantum integrated systems 100), virtual classroom instructional delivery 1343, data analytics processing 1344, transaction processing 1345, and precision cohort analysis 1346.
[0147] The present invention may be a system, method, or computer program product, or combination thereof, at any possible level of technical detail integration. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions for causing a processor to perform aspects of the present invention.
[0148] A computer-readable storage medium can be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions for use by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of computer-readable storage media includes portable computer diskettes, hard disks, random access memories (RAMs), read-only memories (ROMs), erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROMs or flash memories), static random access memories (SRAMs), portable compact disk read-only memories (CD-ROMs), digital versatile disks (DVDs), memory sticks, floppy disks, punch cards or mechanically encoded devices such as raised structures in grooves with instructions recorded therein, and any suitable combination of the above. A computer-readable storage medium as used herein is not, itself, to be construed as being a transitory signal, such as an electric wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., light pulses passing through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted over a wire.
[0149] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to the respective computing / processing device or to an external computer or external storage device via a network, such as the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, or a wireless network, or a combination thereof. The network may include copper transmission cables, optical transmission fiber, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, or edge servers, or a combination thereof. A network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and transfers the computer-readable program instructions to a computer-readable storage medium in each computing / processing device for storage.
[0150] The computer readable program instructions for carrying out the operations of the present invention may be either assembler instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, configuration data for an integrated circuit, or source or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object oriented programming languages such as Smalltalk® or C++, and procedural programming languages such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages. The computer readable program instructions may be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer as a stand-alone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (e.g., through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example, a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a programmable logic array (PLA) may execute computer readable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuitry by utilizing state information of the computer readable program instructions to perform aspects of the invention.
[0151] Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations or block diagrams or combinations thereof of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations or block diagrams or combinations thereof, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations or block diagrams or combinations thereof, can be implemented by computer readable program instructions.
[0152] These computer readable program instructions may be provided to a computer processor or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine such that the instructions executing via the computer processor or other programmable data processing apparatus create means for implementing the functions / operations specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts or block diagrams, or combinations thereof. These computer readable program instructions may also be stored on a computer readable storage medium capable of instructing a computer, programmable data processing apparatus, or other device, or combinations thereof, to function in a particular manner, such that the computer readable storage medium having stored thereon instructions comprises an article of manufacture including instructions that implement aspects of the functions / operations specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts or block diagrams, or combinations thereof.
[0153] The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to cause the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to perform a series of operational steps to generate a computer-implemented process, such that the instructions executing on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement the functions / operations specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts or block diagrams or combinations thereof.
[0154] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the drawings illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in a flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, segment, or portion of instructions that includes one or more executable instructions that implement a specified logical function. In some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the blocks may be performed in a different order than that noted in the drawings. For example, two blocks shown in succession may actually be realized as one step, or may be performed simultaneously, substantially simultaneously, partially or fully in a time-overlapping manner, or the blocks may possibly be performed in reverse order depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each block of the block diagram or flowchart diagram or combination thereof, and combinations of blocks in the block diagram or flowchart diagram or combination thereof, may be implemented by a special-purpose hardware-based system that performs the specified functions or operations, or performs a combination of special-purpose hardware and computer instructions.
[0155] The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of various embodiments. As used herein, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" are intended to include the plural unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It is to be further understood that the terms "includes" or "including" or combinations thereof, when used herein, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements or components or combinations thereof, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components or groups or combinations thereof. In the preceding detailed description of exemplary embodiments of the various embodiments, reference was made to the accompanying drawings, in which like numbers represent like elements. The accompanying drawings form a part of this specification, and in which are shown, by way of illustration, specific exemplary embodiments in which the various embodiments may be practiced. These embodiments have been described in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the embodiments, but other embodiments may be used, and logical, mechanical, electrical, and other changes may be made without departing from the scope of the various embodiments. In the foregoing description, numerous specific details have been set forth to provide a thorough understanding of the various embodiments. However, the various embodiments may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known circuits, structures and techniques have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure the embodiments.
[0156] Where different reference numerals comprise a common number followed by a different letter (e.g., 100a, 100b, 100c) or a common number followed by a punctuation mark followed by a different number (e.g., 100-1, 100-2 or 100.1, 100.2), use of the reference numeral alone, without a letter or subsequent number (e.g., 100), may refer to a group of elements, any subset of the group, or exemplary specimens of the group as a whole.
[0157] Furthermore, the phrase "at least one of," when used with a list of items, means that one or more different combinations of the listed items may be used, and only one of each item in the list may be required. In other words, "at least one of" means that any combination and any number of items from the list may be used, but not all of the items included in the list are required. An item may be a particular object, thing, or category.
[0158] For example, without limitation, "at least one of item A, item B, or item C" may include item A, item A and item B, or item B. This example may also include item A, item B and item C, or item B and item C. Of course, any combination of these items may be present. In some illustrative examples, "at least one of" may be, without limitation, for example, 2 of item A, 1 of item B, 10 of item C, 4 of item B and 7 of item C, or other suitable combinations.
[0159] Different examples of the word "embodiment" as used herein do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but may refer to the same embodiment. Any data and data structures shown or described herein are merely examples, and different amounts of data, types of data, fields, numbers and types of fields, field names, numbers and types of rows, records, entries, or organizations of data may be used in other embodiments. Furthermore, any data may be combined with logic such that separate data structures are not necessary. Thus, the previous detailed description should not be taken in a limiting sense.
[0160] Although the description of various embodiments of the present invention has been presented for the purpose of illustration, they are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the described embodiments. The terms used in this specification are selected to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications, or technical improvements to the art found in the market, or to enable those skilled in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.
[0161] While the present invention has been described in terms of specific embodiments, it is anticipated that variations and modifications thereof will become apparent to those skilled in the art, and it is therefore intended that the following claims be interpreted to cover all such variations and modifications that are within the scope of the invention.
Claims
1. 1. A computer-implemented method for integrating a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithm into Transport Layer Security (TLS), the computer-implemented method comprising: transmitting a client hello message to the server requesting a PQC mode of operation for establishing a secure connection between a client and a server, the client hello message having a PQC public client key; receiving a server hello message from the server, the server hello message having a PQC server key exchange generated from the PQC public client key; determining that the server hello message includes an authorization to operate the PQC mode of operation; transmitting a second client hello message to the server, the second client hello message including a PQC encrypted client key share; receiving a second server hello message, the second server hello message including a PQC encrypted server key agreement; decrypting the PQC encrypted server key share using a server encryption key to reveal a server key share; establishing a secure connection between the client and the server using the server key agreement; A computer-implemented method comprising:
2. The step of transmitting a client hello message comprises: generating a PQC key pair, the PQC key pair including the PQC public client key and a PQC private client key; embedding a signaling message into a random value, the signaling message indicating a request for the PQC mode of operation; transmitting the client hello message to the server, the client hello message including the random value and the PQC public client key as parameters; The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising:
3. The step of transmitting the second client hello message includes: embedding a second signaling message into a second random value, the second signaling message indicating a continuing request for the PQC mode of operation; generating a PQC shared key using a PQC private client key and the PQC server key exchange received in the server hello message; deriving a client encryption key and a server encryption key from the PQC shared key and a transcript hash, the transcript hash being a value determined by hashing a concatenation of each handshake message; encrypting a client key share using the client encryption key; transmitting a second client hello message, the second client hello message including the second random value and the encrypted client key share; The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising:
4. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the PQC public client key is set in a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the client hello message.
5. detecting that the server is performing a conventional handshake process; abandoning the establishment of said secure connection; The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising:
6. 1. A computer-implemented method for integrating a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithm into Transport Layer Security (TLS), the computer-implemented method comprising: receiving a client hello message from a client requesting to establish a secure connection with a server, the client hello message including a PQC public client key and a random value; determining that the client hello message includes a request for a PQC mode of operation embedded in the random value; transmitting a server hello message to the client, the server hello message including as parameters a retry request, a server random value having an embedded signal authorizing the PQC operation mode, and a PQC server key exchange; receiving a second client hello message from the client, the second client hello message including a PQC encrypted client key agreement; deriving an encryption key pair from the PQC shared key and the transcript hash, the encryption key pair including a server encryption key and a client encryption key; encrypting a server key share using said server encryption key to generate a PQC encrypted server key share; transmitting a second server hello message, the second server hello message including another random value with another embedded signal authorizing the PQC mode of operation and the PQC encrypted server key agreement; establishing a secure connection with the client using the server key agreement; A computer-implemented method comprising:
7. The step of transmitting a server hello message comprises: setting a retry-request to true, the retry-request indicating a request to resend another client hello message from the client; embedding a signaling message into a random value, the signaling message indicating authorization for the PQC mode of operation; generating a PQC key pair using a PQC public client key obtained in the client hello message, the PQC key pair including a PQC public server key and a PQC private server key; transmitting a server hello message to the client, the server hello message including the random value and the PQC public server key as parameters; The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , comprising:
8. The step of transmitting the second server hello message comprises: setting the retry request to false, the retry request indicating a request to resend another client hello message from the client; embedding a signaling message into a second random value, the signaling message indicating approval for the PQC mode of operation; decrypting the PQC encrypted client key share using the client crypto key to generate a client key share; encrypting the server key share using the server encryption key to generate the PQC encrypted server key share; transmitting the second server hello message to the client, the second server hello message including the second random value and the PQC encrypted server key share; The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , comprising:
9. 7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein the PQC server key exchange is set to a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the server hello message.
10. detecting that the client is performing a conventional handshake process; abandoning the establishment of said secure connection; The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , further comprising:
11. one or more processors; When executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors transmitting a client hello message to the server requesting a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) mode of operation for establishing a secure connection between a client and a server, the client hello message having a PQC public client key; receiving a server hello message from the server, the server hello message having a PQC server key exchange generated from the PQC public client key; determining that the server hello message includes an authorization to operate the PQC mode of operation; transmitting a second client hello message to the server, the second client hello message including a PQC encrypted client key share; receiving a second server hello message, the second server hello message including a PQC encrypted server key agreement; decrypting the PQC encrypted server key share using a server encryption key to reveal a server key share; establishing a secure connection between the client and the server using the server key agreement; One or more computer-readable storage media having stored thereon program instructions configured to cause the device to perform a method comprising: A system comprising:
12. An act of generating a PQC key pair, the PQC key pair including a PQC public client key and a PQC private client key; an operation of embedding a signaling message into a random value, the signaling message indicating a request for the PQC mode of operation; transmitting the client hello message to the server, the client hello message including the random value and the PQC public client key as parameters; The system of claim 11 further comprising:
13. an operation of embedding a second signaling message into a second random value, the second signaling message indicating a continuing request for the PQC mode of operation; generating a PQC shared key using a PQC private client key and the PQC server key exchange received in the server hello message; deriving a client encryption key and a server encryption key from the PQC shared key and a transcript hash, the transcript hash being a value determined by hashing a concatenation of each handshake message; encrypting a client key share using the client encryption key; transmitting a second client hello message, the second client hello message including the second random value and the encrypted client key share; The system of claim 11 further comprising:
14. 12. The system of claim 11, wherein the PQC public client key is set in a generate random extensions and sustain extensibility (GREASE) extension in the client hello message.
15. detecting that the server is performing a conventional handshake process; abandoning the establishment of said secure connection; The system of claim 11 , further comprising:
Citation Information
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