Spoofing Detection Device and Spoofing Detection Method

Abstract

The purpose of the present invention is to provide a technology which enables appropriate determination of spoofing. An acquisition unit acquires GNSS signal data of a mobile body and luminance around the mobile body. A determination unit determines whether there is spoofing in the GNSS signal data on the basis of the GNSS signal data and the luminance. For example, the determination unit determines that there is spoofing in the GNSS signal data when: a change in luminance is equal to or greater than a prescribed threshold value; and the acquisition unit acquires the GNSS signal data over the change in luminance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a spoofing detection device and a spoofing detection method.

Background Art

[0002] Spoofing is known in which a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) signal transmitted by a satellite is disguised to cause a positioning device to misidentify its actual position. Patent Document 1 proposes a technique for determining that there is a suspicion of spoofing when the difference between the moving distance, which is the difference between the latest positioning result obtained from the GNSS signal and the past positioning result, and the moving distance obtained from the speed of the speed sensor is equal to or greater than a threshold value.

Prior Art Documents

Patent Documents

[0003]

Patent Document 1

Summary of the Invention

Problems to be Solved by the Invention

[0004] However, in the prior art, when spoofing is performed at a location where a GNSS signal cannot be received, such as inside a tunnel, and at a location before the vehicle enters or after it exits from such an environment, there is a problem that it is impossible to determine the presence or absence of spoofing.

[0005] Therefore, the present disclosure has been made in view of the above problems, and an object thereof is to provide a technique capable of appropriately determining spoofing.

Means for Solving the Problems

[0006] The spoofing detection device according to the present disclosure includes an acquisition unit that acquires GNSS signal data of a moving object and the luminance around the moving object, and a determination unit that determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance. When the change in luminance is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold value and the acquisition unit has acquired GNSS signal data over the change in luminance, the determination unit determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. is provided.

Advantages of the Invention

[0007] According to the present disclosure, the presence or absence of spoofing of GNSS signal data is determined based on the GNSS signal data of a moving object and the luminance around the moving object. With such a configuration, spoofing can be appropriately determined.

[0008] The object, features, aspects, and advantages of the present disclosure will become clearer from the following detailed description and the accompanying drawings.

Brief Description of the Drawings

[0009]

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Modes for Carrying Out the Invention

[0010] <Embodiment 1> FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the spoofing detection device 1 according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. In Embodiment 1, the spoofing detection device will be described as being provided in a moving body, but as will be described later, it may be provided in a server or the like. The moving body may be, for example, a vehicle such as an automobile or a drone. Hereinafter, an example in which the moving body is a vehicle will be mainly described.

[0011] The spoofing detection device 1 in FIG. 1 includes an acquisition unit 11, a determination unit 12, and an output unit 13. The acquisition unit 11 includes a GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a and a sensor information acquisition unit 11b. The determination unit 12 includes a reception environment determination unit 12a.

[0012] The GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires GNSS signal data capable of calculating the position of the vehicle. For the sake of convenience of explanation, hereinafter, the position information obtained from the GNSS signal data will be described only as "GNSS signal data". The GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a may be a GNSS signal receiver or an interface of the GNSS signal receiver.

[0013] The sensor information acquisition unit 11b acquires sensor information generated by sensors provided in the vehicle. In the first embodiment, the sensor information includes the luminance around the vehicle. The sensor information acquisition unit 11b may be a sensor including an optical sensor or a camera, or an interface of the sensor.

[0014] The reception environment determination unit 12a determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data acquired by the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a and the luminance included in the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit 11b. In the first embodiment, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data when the change in luminance is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold value and the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires the GNSS signal data over the change in luminance.

[0015] FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining the reception environment determination unit 12a. In FIG. 2, the GNSS signal data and the luminance at times 1, 2, and 3 are shown. In the following description, it is assumed that the time of the GNSS signal data and the time of the luminance are synchronized by appropriate interpolation or the like. Also, in the example of FIG. 2, the threshold value compared with the change in luminance is assumed to be 50.

[0016] In FIG. 2, the change in luminance (=60 = |20 - 80|) during the period from time 2 to time 3 is greater than the threshold value (=50). As a case where the luminance around the vehicle changes significantly like this, it is conceivable that the vehicle enters a tunnel or under an elevated structure where GNSS signal data cannot be acquired. Nevertheless, in FIG. 2, while the luminance is changing, that is, during the period from time 2 to time 3, the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires (6, 6, 4) and (7, 7, 4) as GNSS signal data.

[0017] In such a case, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. Thereby, the reception environment determination unit 12a can determine the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data even if spoofing is performed at both a point in an environment where the GNSS signal cannot be received and a point before the vehicle enters the environment.

[0018] In the example of FIG. 2, the case where the luminance is reduced below the threshold value and the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires GNSS signal data while the luminance is being reduced has been described, but it is not limited to this. For example, even when the luminance increases above the threshold value and the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires GNSS signal data while the luminance is increasing, the reception environment determination unit 12a may determine that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. According to such a configuration, even when spoofing is performed at both a point in an environment where the GNSS signal cannot be received and a point after the vehicle exits the environment, the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data can be determined. Also, in the prior art, it was impossible to determine which of the latest point with suspicion of spoofing and the previous point with suspicion of spoofing was more suspicious of spoofing. On the other hand, according to the above configuration, it is possible to determine which of the latest point with suspicion of spoofing and the previous point with suspicion of spoofing is more suspicious of spoofing.

[0019] Note that the storage unit that stores the past luminance and the presence or absence of past GNSS signal data may be provided inside the reception environment determination unit 12a, or may be provided outside the reception environment determination unit 12a and inside the spoofing detection device 1. Also, the threshold value compared with the change in luminance may be appropriately changed based on the most recent luminance.

[0020] In the normal case, the output unit 13 in FIG. 1 outputs the GNSS signal data acquired by the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a to the outside of the spoofing detection device 1. However, when it is determined that there is spoofing, the output unit 13 stops the output of the GNSS signal data for which spoofing has been determined. In this case, the output unit 13 may output to the outside that there is spoofing. The GNSS signal data output from the output unit 13 is used, for example, for calculating the travel distance of a vehicle.

[0021] <Operation> FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing the determination operation of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the first embodiment.

[0022] In step S1, the sensor information acquisition unit 11b acquires sensor information including luminance.

[0023] In step S2, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines whether or not the change in luminance included in the sensor information is equal to or greater than the threshold value. If it is determined that the change in luminance is equal to or greater than the threshold value, the process proceeds to step S3. If it is not determined that the change in luminance is equal to or greater than the threshold value, the operation in FIG. 3 ends.

[0024] In step S3, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines whether or not the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a has acquired GNSS signal data over the change in luminance. If it is determined that the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a has acquired GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4. If it is determined that the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a has not acquired GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S5.

[0025] In step S4, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. As a result, the output unit 13 stops the output of the GNSS signal data. Thereafter, the operation of FIG. 3 ends.

[0026] In step S5, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data. Thereafter, the operation of FIG. 3 ends.

[0027] <Summary of Embodiment 1> According to the spoofing detection device 1 according to the first embodiment as described above, the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data is determined based on the GNSS signal data of the vehicle and the luminance around the vehicle. In the first embodiment, when the change in luminance is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold value and the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires the GNSS signal data over the change in luminance, it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data.

[0028] According to such a configuration, even if spoofing is performed at a location in an environment where GNSS signals cannot be received, such as inside a tunnel or under an elevated structure, and at a location before the vehicle enters or after it exits from such an environment, the presence or absence of spoofing can be determined. Also, according to the first embodiment, it is possible to determine to some extent at which of a location in an environment where GNSS signals cannot be received and a location before the vehicle enters or after it exits from such an environment spoofing is being performed. Also, according to the first embodiment, it is possible to determine at which of the latest point in time with suspicion of spoofing and the previous point in time with suspicion of spoofing there is more suspicion of spoofing.

[0029] By the way, when the speed of the vehicle is low, generally the position of the vehicle cannot be correctly calculated by the speed sensor, so there are cases where the presence or absence of spoofing cannot be correctly determined based on the GNSS signal data and the speed obtained from the speed sensor. In contrast, in the first embodiment, since the presence or absence of spoofing is determined without using the speed sensor, such a problem can be avoided.

[0030] Also, since map information is not used in the first embodiment, a storage area for storing map information is not required. Further, in the first embodiment, even without performing arithmetic processing on GNSS signal data, it is possible to determine the presence or absence of spoofing based on whether GNSS signal data has been acquired over a change in luminance, so the presence or absence of spoofing can be determined at an early stage. Further, in the first embodiment, it is possible to determine the presence or absence of spoofing without performing communication other than the communication for acquiring GNSS signal data.

[0031] <Modification Example of the First Embodiment> For example, when the current time is around noon and the luminance is equal to or less than a predetermined threshold value, it is considered that the vehicle is located inside a tunnel or under an elevated structure. Therefore, the reception environment determination unit 12a may determine that there is spoofing of GNSS signal data using the luminance itself at one time instead of the change in luminance at two times. Specifically, the reception environment determination unit 12a determines that the luminance is equal to or less than a predetermined threshold value, and if the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a continuously acquires GNSS signal data before and after that determination, it may be determined that there is spoofing of GNSS signal data. Even with such a configuration, the presence or absence of spoofing can be determined to some extent.

[0032] <Second Embodiment> FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the second embodiment. Hereinafter, among the components according to the second embodiment, the same or similar components as the above-described components are given the same or similar reference numerals, and different components will be mainly described.

[0033] The configuration of FIG. 4 is the same as the configuration in FIG. 1 with the addition of the map information storage unit 14 and the addition of the movement route determination unit 12b to the determination unit 12.

[0034] The map information storage unit 14 stores map information. The map information includes information indicating the shape of the route and the terrain, and information indicating the type of the route and the terrain.

[0035] The moving route determination unit 12b determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data acquired by the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a and the map information of the map information storage unit 14. In the second embodiment, among the map information, when the type of the terrain or the route corresponding to the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data is a sea or the like where the vehicle cannot travel, the moving route determination unit 12b determines that there is spoofing.

[0036] Also, in the second embodiment, when the switching of the type of the terrain or the route corresponding to the position of the vehicle accompanying the travel of the vehicle cannot be realized during the travel of the vehicle, the moving route determination unit 12b determines that there is spoofing. For example, it is assumed that the type of the route corresponding to the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data is a general road, and then the type of the route corresponding to the position of the vehicle obtained based on the next GNSS signal data is an expressway where the vehicle cannot directly travel from the general road. When such a type switch is made, the moving route determination unit 12b determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. Note that the storage unit that stores the types of past routes and terrains may be provided inside the moving route determination unit 12b, or may be provided outside the moving route determination unit 12b and inside the spoofing detection device 1.

[0037] <Operation> FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the determination operation of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the second embodiment. Since the operation in FIG. 5 is the same as the operation in FIG. 3 with steps S11 and S12 added, the steps S11 and S12 will be mainly described below.

[0038] In step S2, if it is determined that the change in luminance is equal to or greater than the threshold value, the process proceeds to step S3. If it is not determined that the change in luminance is equal to or greater than the threshold value, the process proceeds to step S11.

[0039] In step S11, the GNSS signal acquisition unit 11a acquires GNSS signal data.

[0040] In step S12, the movement path determination unit 12b determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the map information. If it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4. If it is determined that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the operation of FIG. 5 ends.

[0041] <Summary of Embodiment 2> According to the spoofing detection device 1 according to the second embodiment as described above, the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data is determined based on the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the map information. With such a configuration, the determination accuracy of spoofing can be improved.

[0042] <Modification Example of Embodiment 2> For example, when the moving object is a drone and the type of terrain of the portion corresponding to the position of the drone in the map information is an airport or the like where the drone cannot move, the movement path determination unit 12b may determine that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data.

[0043] <Embodiment 3> FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the third embodiment. Hereinafter, among the components according to the third embodiment, the same or similar components as the above-described components are denoted by the same or similar reference numerals, and different components will be mainly described.

[0044] The configuration of FIG. 6 is the same as the configuration in which a moving distance determination unit 12c is added to the determination unit 12 of the configuration of FIG. 4.

[0045] The sensor information acquisition unit 11b in FIG. 6 acquires sensor information in the same manner as in the first embodiment. However, in the third embodiment, the sensor information includes not only the luminance but also the driving information of the vehicle. The driving information may be any information different from the GNSS signal data that can acquire the driving distance, which is the moving distance of the vehicle. For example, the sensor information may be the driving distance of the vehicle itself, or the position, speed, or acceleration of the vehicle that can calculate the driving distance of the vehicle.

[0046] The moving distance determination unit 12c determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the difference between the driving distance of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the driving distance of the vehicle obtained based on the driving information included in the sensor information. In the third embodiment, the moving distance determination unit 12c obtains the positions of the vehicle at different times based on the GNSS signal data at different times, and obtains the difference between the positions of the vehicle at different times as the driving distance of the vehicle. When the difference between the driving distance of the vehicle obtained in this way and the driving distance of the vehicle obtained based on the driving information is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, the moving distance determination unit 12c determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data.

[0047] FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the moving distance determination unit 12c. In FIG. 7, the positions of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data at times 1, 2, and 3 and the speed, which is an example of the driving information, are shown. In the example of FIG. 7, it is assumed that the predetermined threshold value compared with the difference in the driving distance is 4.

[0048] In FIG. 7, the x, y, and z components of the change in the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data during the transition from time 1 to time 2 are 1 (=|6 - 5|), 1 (=|6 - 5|), and 0 (=|4 - 4|). That is, the x, y, and z components of the driving distance obtained based on the GNSS signal data during the transition from time 1 to time 2 are (1, 1, 0).

[0049] On the one hand, the x, y, and z components of the travel distance corresponding to the speed at time 1 are (7, 7, 0), and the x, y, and z components of the travel distance corresponding to the speed at time 2 are (8, 8, 0). Therefore, the difference (= 6.5×√2) between the travel distance (=√2) obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the average value of the travel distances corresponding to the speeds (= 7.5×√2) is larger than the threshold value (= 4).

[0050] In such a case, the movement distance determination unit 12c determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. Note that the storage unit that stores the past positions of the vehicle may be provided inside the movement distance determination unit 12c, or may be provided outside the movement distance determination unit 12c and inside the spoofing detection device 1.

[0051] <Operation> FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the determination operation of the spoofing detection device 1 according to Embodiment 3. Since the operation in FIG. 8 is the same as the operation in FIG. 5 with step S16 added, step S16 will be mainly described below.

[0052] In step S1, the sensor information acquisition unit 11b acquires sensor information including luminance and travel information.

[0053] In step S12, if it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4, and if it is determined that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S16.

[0054] In step S16, the movement distance determination unit 12c determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the difference between the travel distance of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the travel distance of the vehicle obtained based on the travel information. If it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4, and if it is determined that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the operation in FIG. 8 ends.

[0055] <Summary of Embodiment 3> According to the spoofing detection device 1 according to the third embodiment as described above, the presence or absence of spoofing of GNSS signal data is determined based on the difference between the travel distance of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the travel distance of the vehicle obtained based on the driving information. With such a configuration, the determination accuracy of spoofing can be improved.

[0056] <Embodiment 4> FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the fourth embodiment. Hereinafter, among the components according to the fourth embodiment, the same or similar components as the above-described components are denoted by the same or similar reference numerals, and different components will be mainly described.

[0057] The configuration of FIG. 9 is the same as the configuration in which a communication signal acquisition unit 11c is added to the acquisition unit 11 in FIG. 6 and a communication signal determination unit 12d is added to the determination unit 12.

[0058] The communication signal acquisition unit 11c acquires a communication signal indicating the position information of the vehicle by wireless communication with an external device separated from the vehicle. The external device is, for example, a ground base station such as RTK (Real Time Kinematic) used for assisting positioning. For the wireless communication, for example, DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications), 4G, 5G, IMES (Indoor Messaging System) communication is used. The communication signal acquisition unit 11c may be a wireless communication device or an interface of a wireless communication device.

[0059] The communication signal determination unit 12d determines the presence or absence of spoofing of GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data, the traveling information included in the sensor information, and the position information indicated by the communication signal. In the fourth embodiment, the communication signal determination unit 12d obtains the difference between the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data at a certain time and the position of the vehicle indicated by the position information at a time different from the certain time as the traveling distance of the vehicle. Then, when the difference between the traveling distance of the vehicle obtained in this way and the traveling distance of the vehicle obtained based on the traveling information is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, the communication signal determination unit 12d determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data.

[0060] FIG. 10 is a diagram for explaining the communication signal determination unit 12d. In FIG. 10, the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data at times 1, 2, and 3, the position of the vehicle indicated by the position information of the communication signal, and the speed which is an example of the traveling information are shown. In the example of FIG. 10, it is assumed that the predetermined threshold value compared with the difference in the traveling distance is 4.

[0061] In FIG. 10, the x, y, and z components of the position of the vehicle indicated by the position information of the communication signal at time 1 are (5, 5, 3), and the x, y, and z components of the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal data at time 2 are (6, 6, 4). Therefore, the x, y, and z components of the traveling distance during the transition from time 1 to time 2 are (1, 1, 1).

[0062] On the other hand, the x, y, and z components of the traveling distance corresponding to the speed at time 1 are (7, 7, 0), and the x, y, and z components of the traveling distance corresponding to the speed at time 2 are (8, 8, 0). Therefore, the difference (= 7.5×√2 - √3 ≒ 8.8) between the traveling distance (=√3) obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the communication signal and the average value of the traveling distances corresponding to the speed (= 7.5×√2) is greater than the threshold value (= 4).

[0063] In such a case, the communication signal determination unit 12d determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. Note that the storage unit that stores the past vehicle position obtained based on past GNSS signal data and the past communication signal may be provided inside the communication signal determination unit 12d, or may be provided outside the communication signal determination unit 12d and inside the spoofing detection device 1. Further, the above determination is an example, and if the communication signal determination unit 12d determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data, the driving information, and the position information, it is not limited to the above determination.

[0064] <Operation> FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing the determination operation of the spoofing detection device 1 according to the fourth embodiment. Since the operation of FIG. 11 is the same as the operation of FIG. 8 with steps S21 and S22 added, steps S21 and S22 will be mainly described below.

[0065] In step S16, if it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4, and if it is determined that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S21.

[0066] In step S21, the communication signal acquisition unit 11c acquires a communication signal indicating the position information of the vehicle by wireless communication with an external device.

[0067] In step S22, the communication signal determination unit 12d determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data, the driving information, and the position information of the communication signal. If it is determined that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the process proceeds to step S4, and if it is determined that there is no spoofing of the GNSS signal data, the operation of FIG. 11 ends.

[0068] <Summary of the Fourth Embodiment> According to the spoofing detection device 1 according to the fourth embodiment as described above, based on GNSS signal data, driving information, and position information obtained by wireless communication, it is determined whether there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data. With such a configuration, the determination accuracy of spoofing can be improved.

[0069] <Modifications of Embodiments 1 to 4> At least one of the configurations of Embodiments 2 to 4 may be combined with the configuration of Embodiment 1. For example, in Embodiment 2, the movement path determination unit 12b may obtain a position moved by a driving distance obtained based on the driving information included in the sensor information from the position of the vehicle obtained based on the GNSS signal. Then, when the type of the terrain or route of the portion corresponding to the position in the map information is a sea or the like where the vehicle cannot travel, the movement path determination unit 12b may determine that there is spoofing.

[0070] <Other Modifications> The acquisition unit 11 and the determination unit 12 in FIG. 1 described above are hereinafter referred to as "the acquisition unit 11 etc.". The acquisition unit 11 etc. are realized by the processing circuit 81 shown in FIG. 12. That is, the processing circuit 81 includes an acquisition unit 11 that acquires GNSS signal data of the moving body and the luminance around the moving body, and a determination unit 12 that determines whether there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance. Dedicated hardware may be applied to the processing circuit 81, or a processor that executes a program stored in a memory may be applied. Examples of the processor include a central processing unit, a processing device, an arithmetic device, a microprocessor, a microcomputer, and a DSP (Digital Signal Processor).

[0071] When the processing circuit 81 is dedicated hardware, the processing circuit 81 corresponds to, for example, a single circuit, a composite circuit, a programmed processor, a parallel programmed processor, an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), or a combination thereof. Each function of each unit such as the acquisition unit 11 may be realized by a circuit in which the processing circuit is distributed, or the functions of each unit may be realized by one processing circuit collectively.

[0072] When the processing circuit 81 is a processor, functions such as the acquisition unit 11 are realized in combination with software or the like. Note that software or the like includes, for example, software, firmware, or software and firmware. Software or the like is described as a program and stored in a memory. As shown in FIG. 13, the processor 82 applied to the processing circuit 81 reads and executes the program stored in the memory 83 to realize the functions of each part. That is, when the spoofing detection device 1 is executed by the processing circuit 81, it includes steps of acquiring GNSS signal data of the moving body and the luminance around the moving body, and steps of determining the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance, and a memory 83 for storing a program that will be executed as a result. In other words, this program can be said to cause a computer to execute procedures and methods such as the acquisition unit 11. Here, the memory 83 may be, for example, a non-volatile or volatile semiconductor memory such as RAM (Random Access Memory), ROM (Read Only Memory), flash memory, EPROM (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), HDD (Hard Disk Drive), magnetic disk, flexible disk, optical disk, compact disk, mini disk, DVD (Digital Versatile Disc), their drive devices, or any storage medium to be used in the future.

[0073] The above has described the configuration in which each function such as the acquisition unit 11 is realized by either hardware or software or the like. However, it is not limited to this, and a configuration in which a part of the acquisition unit 11 etc. is realized by dedicated hardware and another part is realized by software or the like may be used. For example, regarding the acquisition unit 11, its function can be realized by a processing circuit 81 as dedicated hardware, and for the rest, the processing circuit 81 as a processor 82 reads and executes a program stored in a memory 83 to realize its function.

[0074] As described above, the processing circuit 81 can realize each of the above functions by hardware, software, or a combination thereof.

[0075] Also, the spoofing detection device described above can be applied to a spoofing detection system constructed as a system by appropriately combining a vehicle device, a communication terminal, the functions of an application installed in at least one of the vehicle device and the communication terminal, and a server. The communication terminal includes, for example, mobile phones, smartphones, tablets, and the like. Each function or each component of the spoofing detection device described above may be distributed and arranged in each device constructing the system, or may be concentrated and arranged in any one device.

[0076] FIG. 14 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a server 91 according to this modification. The server 91 in FIG. 14 includes a communication unit 91a and a control unit 91b, and is capable of performing wireless communication with a vehicle device 93 of a vehicle 92.

[0077] The communication unit 91a, which is an acquisition unit, receives GNSS signal data acquired by the vehicle device 93 and the luminance around the vehicle 92 by performing wireless communication with the vehicle device 93.

[0078] The control unit 91b has the same function as the determination unit 12 in FIG. 1 when a processor (not shown) of the server 91 executes a program stored in a memory (not shown) of the server 91. That is, the control unit 91b determines the presence or absence of spoofing of GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance. Then, the communication unit 91a transmits the determination result of the control unit 91b to the vehicle device 93. According to the server 91 configured in this way, the same effect as the spoofing detection device 1 described in the first embodiment can be obtained.

[0079] FIG. 15 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the communication terminal 96 according to this modification. The communication terminal 96 in FIG. 15 includes a communication unit 96a similar to the communication unit 91a and a control unit 96b similar to the control unit 91b, and is capable of performing wireless communication with the vehicle device 98 of the vehicle 97. Note that, for example, a mobile phone, a smartphone, and a tablet computer carried by the driver of the vehicle 97 are applied to the communication terminal 96. According to the communication terminal 96 configured in this way, the same effect as the spoofing detection device 1 described in the first embodiment can be obtained.

[0080] It should be noted that it is possible to freely combine each embodiment and each modification, or to appropriately modify and omit each embodiment and each modification.

[0081] The above description is illustrative in all aspects and not restrictive. An infinite number of modifications not illustrated can be considered.

Explanation of Reference Numerals

[0082] 1 Spoofing detection device, 11 Acquisition unit, 12 Determination unit.

Claims

1. An acquisition unit that acquires GNSS signal data of a moving object and the luminance around the moving object; A determination unit that determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance; Comprising: The determination unit determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data when the change in the luminance is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold and the acquisition unit acquires the GNSS signal data over the change in the luminance. A spoofing detection device.

2. The spoofing detection device according to claim 1, The determination unit determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the position of the moving object obtained based on the GNSS signal data and map information. A spoofing detection device.

3. The spoofing detection device according to claim 1 or claim 2, The acquisition unit further acquires travel information of the moving object, which is different from the GNSS signal data, The determination unit determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the difference between the moving distance of the moving object obtained based on the GNSS signal data and the moving distance of the moving object obtained based on the travel information. A spoofing detection device.

4. The spoofing detection device according to claim 1, The acquisition unit further acquires travel information of the moving object, which is different from the GNSS signal data, and position information of the moving object by wireless communication with an external device separated from the moving object, The determination unit determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data, the travel information, and the position information. A spoofing detection device.

5. An acquisition unit acquires GNSS signal data of a moving object and the luminance around the moving object, A determination unit determines the presence or absence of spoofing of the GNSS signal data based on the GNSS signal data and the luminance, The determination unit determines that there is spoofing of the GNSS signal data when the change in the luminance is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold and the acquisition unit acquires the GNSS signal data over the change in the luminance. A spoofing detection method.

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