Power information management device, power information management system, power information management method, and program

Abstract

A power information management device comprising: an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider in association with each other; and a tampering determination unit that acquires measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with.

Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a power information management device, a power information management system, a power information management method, and a program. [Background technology]

[0002] The current head-end system collects meter readings from smart meters, but with the enforcement of the "Guidelines for the Specified Measurement System," the next-generation head-end system is expected to collect meter readings from distributed power sources as well as smart meters through a dedicated network (commonly known as Route A).

[0003] Patent Document 1 discloses a technology in which an aggregator system that remotely and centrally controls distributed power sources to create a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) compares the measurement values ​​of a smart meter on route A with the measurement values ​​of a smart meter on route B to determine whether the measurement values ​​of the smart meter on route B have been tampered with. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Patent Document 1] Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2018-164244 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] However, the system described in Patent Document 1 has a problem in that it is not possible to detect tampering with the metered values ​​of the distributed power sources.

[0006] The present disclosure has been made in consideration of the above circumstances, and provides a power information management device, a power information management system, a power information management method, and a program capable of detecting tampering with the measurement values ​​of a distributed power source. [Means for solving the problem]

[0007] This disclosure has been made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and one aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management device that includes an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information that identifies a power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other, and a tampering determination unit that obtains measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the operator identification information, and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​obtained from the device corresponding to the operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with.

[0008] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management device, wherein the tampering determination unit determines whether or not tampering has occurred by using an interpolated value of a measurement value obtained from a device corresponding to the operator identification information.

[0009] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management device, which is equipped with a missing value completion unit that, when a missing value is detected in the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device, obtains the measurement value for the period corresponding to the missing value from a device corresponding to the operator identification information and completes the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device.

[0010] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management device, wherein the missing value completion unit complements the measurement values ​​of the distributed power sources stored in the device using values ​​obtained by interpolating measurement values ​​obtained from a device corresponding to the business identification information.

[0011] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management device, wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the operator identification information, consumer identification information that identifies a consumer corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

[0012] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management device, wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the operator identification information, resource identification information of a smart meter corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

[0013] Another aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management system including a power management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, wherein the power management device includes an information memory unit that stores resource identification information identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information identifying an electric power company or an aggregation provider in association with each other, and a tampering determination unit that acquires measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with, and the VPP control terminal transmits the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source to the power management device.

[0014] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management system, comprising: a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal, and the device corresponding to the business operator identification information acquires metered values ​​of the distributed power source from a device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter.

[0015] Another aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management system including a power management device, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal, wherein the power management device includes an information storage unit that stores resource identification information identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information identifying an electric power company or an aggregation provider in association with each other, and a tampering determination unit that acquires metered values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the metered values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device itself with the metered values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the metered values ​​have been tampered with, and the metered values ​​of the distributed power source are transmitted from a device that controls the distributed power source to the power management device via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter.

[0016] Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management system, which includes a device corresponding to the business operator identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, and the VPP control terminal transmits the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source to the device corresponding to the business operator identification information.

[0017] Another aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management method having the steps of: correlating and storing resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system with provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider; and acquiring measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information, and comparing the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with.

[0018] Another aspect of the present disclosure is a program for causing a computer to function as an information storage unit that stores resource identification information identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system in association with operator identification information identifying an electric power company or an aggregation operator, and a tampering determination unit that obtains measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the operator identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​obtained from the device corresponding to the operator identification information to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. Effect of the Invention

[0019] The power information management device, power information management system, power information management method, and program disclosed herein are capable of detecting tampering with the measurement values ​​of distributed power sources. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0020] [Figure 1] 1 is a schematic block diagram showing a configuration of a power information management system 10 according to a first embodiment of the present disclosure. [Diagram 2] 2 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of an HES server 500 in the embodiment. [Diagram 3]7 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of an aggregation server 700 in the embodiment. [Figure 4] 10 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the relationship between resources, an HES server 500, and an aggregation server 700 in the embodiment. FIG. [Diagram 5] 4 is an ER diagram for explaining the relationship between the information stored in the measurement value storage unit 512 and the information stored in the master storage unit 513 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 6] 13 is a table showing an example of measurement value information stored in a measurement value storage unit 512 in the embodiment. [Figure 7] 13 is a table showing an example of resource information stored in a master storage unit 513 in the embodiment. [Figure 8] 13 is a table showing an example of B route provider information stored in a master storage unit 513 in the embodiment. [Figure 9] 13 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in a master storage unit 513 in the embodiment. [Figure 10] 13 is a table showing an example of matching information stored in a master storage unit 513 in the embodiment. [Figure 11] 13 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the HES server 500 in the embodiment establishes a communication connection with the aggregation server 700. FIG. [Figure 12] 11 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a process for updating resource information in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 13] 13 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a tampering determination process of the HES server 500 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 14] 13 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a missing data complement process of the HES server 500 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 15] 13 is a flowchart illustrating a process of an update request unit 508 in the embodiment. [Figure 16] 13 is a flowchart illustrating the process of a tamper determination unit 504 in the embodiment. [Figure 17] 13 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of a missing data complementing unit 509 in the embodiment. [Figure 18] 7 is an ER (Entity Relation) diagram explaining the relationship between the information stored in a metric value storage unit 712 and a master storage unit 713 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 19] 13 is a table showing an example of measurement value information stored in a measurement value storage unit 712 in the embodiment. [Figure 20] 13 is a table showing an example of consumer resource information stored in a master storage unit 713 in the embodiment. [Figure 21] 13 is a table showing an example of B route applied business information stored in the master storage unit 713 in the embodiment. [Figure 22] 13 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in a master storage unit 713 in the embodiment. [Diagram 23] 13 is a table showing an example of matching information stored in a master storage unit 713 in the embodiment. [Figure 24] 13 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the aggregation server 700 in the embodiment establishes a communication connection with the HES server 500. FIG. [Diagram 25] 13 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a process for updating resource information for each customer in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 26] 13 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a process of determining whether or not data has been tampered with by the aggregation server 700 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 27] 13 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a missing data complement process of the aggregation server 700 in the embodiment. FIG. [Figure 28] 13 is a flowchart illustrating the process of an update request unit 708 in the embodiment. [Figure 29] 13 is a flowchart illustrating the process of a tamper determination unit 704 in the embodiment. [Diagram 30] 13 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of a missing data complementing unit 709 in the embodiment. [Diagram 31] 13 is a diagram showing an example of an output screen by a determination result output unit 705 in the embodiment. FIG. [Diagram 32]FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram illustrating a hardware configuration of each device according to the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0021] Hereinafter, a first embodiment of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. Fig. 1 is a schematic block diagram showing a configuration of a power information management system 10 according to the first embodiment of the present disclosure. The power information management system 10 includes a distributed power source 100, a PCS (Power Conditioning System) 200, an IoT root terminal 300, a smart meter 400, a HES (Head End System) server 500 (power information management device), a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal 600, and an aggregation server 700 (power information management device). Note that Fig. 1 shows one each of the distributed power source 100, the PCS 200, the IoT root terminal 300, the smart meter 400, the HES server 500, the VPP control terminal 600, and the aggregation server 700, but each of them may be provided in a plurality.

[0022] The distributed power sources 100 are small-scale power generation facilities that are distributed and located adjacent to consumer areas. The distributed power sources 100 may be any power source, such as solar power generation, wind power generation, hydroelectric power generation, geothermal power generation, fuel cells, gas turbines, storage batteries, and electric vehicles. The multiple distributed power sources 100 are remotely and integrally controlled by an aggregation operator and are used to adjust the balance between power supply and demand.

[0023] The PCS 200 controls the distributed power source 100. The PCS 200 provides measurement values ​​(e.g., power supply amount, power consumption amount) of the distributed power source 100. The IoT root terminal 300 acquires the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source 100 from the PCS 200, and provides them to the HES server 500 via the smart meter 400. In addition, the VPP control terminal 600 acquires the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source 100 from the PCS 200, and provides them to the aggregation server 700.

[0024] The IoT root terminal 300 relays communication between the PCS 200 and the smart meter 400 using a protocol such as ECHONETLite (registered trademark). The route from the IoT root terminal 300 to the smart meter 400 is a so-called IoT route.

[0025] The smart meter 400 supplies the metered values ​​of the consumer (e.g., power consumption) and the metered values ​​of the distributed power sources 100 to the HES server 500. This supply route is so-called route A. The smart meter 400 can also supply the metered values ​​of the consumer to the aggregation server 700 via the VPP control terminal 600. This supply route is so-called route B.

[0026] The HES server 500 is a server operated by a power company, and collects and stores metered values ​​of consumers and metered values ​​of the distributed power sources 100.

[0027] The VPP control terminal 600 is a terminal installed on the consumer side in order for an aggregation operator to perform integrated control of the distributed power sources 100, and controls the PCS 200 using a protocol such as ECHONETLite (registered trademark).

[0028] The aggregation server 700 is a server operated by an aggregation operator, and collects and stores metered values ​​of consumers and metered values ​​of the distributed power sources 100. The aggregation operator provides the power transmission and distribution operator with functions similar to those of a power plant by remotely and collectively controlling a plurality of distributed power sources 100.

[0029] 2 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of an HES server 500 in this embodiment. The HES server 500 includes a communication unit 501, a metric collection unit 502, an authentication unit 503, a tamper determination unit 504, a determination result output unit 505, an authentication information matching unit 506, an update unit 507, an update request unit 508, a missing value completion unit 509, a metric request response generation unit 510, a master information update unit 511, a metric storage unit 512, and a master storage unit 513 (information storage unit).

[0030] The communication unit 501 communicates with other devices such as the smart meter 400 and the aggregation server 700. Each unit constituting the HES server 500 communicates with other devices via the communication unit 501.

[0031] The metered value collector 502 acquires metered values ​​of the consumer and the distributed power sources 100 from the smart meter 400, and stores them in the metered value storage unit 512. Hereinafter, the combination of the PCS 200 and the distributed power sources 100 that provide the metered values, and the smart meter 400, are referred to as resources.

[0032] The authentication unit 503 transmits authentication information to the aggregation server 700 to request authentication.

[0033] The tampering determination unit 504 acquires the resource metric value from the aggregation server 700, and determines whether or not the metric value has been tampered with by comparing the metric value stored in the own device with the metric value acquired from the aggregation server 700. The resource metric value at this time is acquired from the aggregation server 700 corresponding to the aggregation provider name (provider identification information) stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resource.

[0034] The determination result output unit 505 outputs the determination result by the tamper determination unit 504, for example, to an operation screen or a notification screen of the HES server 500. The output destination may be the screen of an operation terminal or a maintenance terminal capable of communicating with the HES server 500, or may be an audio output.

[0035] The authentication information matching unit 506 compares the authentication information received from the aggregation server 700 with the matching information stored in the master storage unit 513, and authenticates the aggregation server 700. The authentication information matching unit 506 transmits the authentication result to the aggregation server 700.

[0036] The update unit 507 receives a request to update the resource information from the aggregation server 700 and updates the resource information stored in the master storage unit 513 .

[0037] When the resource information stored in the master storage unit 513 is changed, the update request unit 508 transmits an update request for the consumer resource information to the aggregation server 700 .

[0038] When the missing value complementing unit 509 detects a missing value in the metric values ​​of the distributed power sources stored in the metric value storage unit 512, the missing value complementing unit 509 obtains the metric values ​​for the period corresponding to the missing value from the aggregation server 700 and complements the metric values ​​stored in the device itself. The metric values ​​of the resources at this time are obtained from the aggregation server 700 corresponding to the aggregation operator name stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resources.

[0039] The metric response request generator 510 reads the metric information requested by the aggregation server 700 from the metric storage unit 512 , and transmits it to the aggregation server 700 .

[0040] The master information update unit 511 updates the resource information, route B subscriber business information, authentication information, and verification information stored in the master storage unit 513 based on input operations by the operator of the HES server 500, etc.

[0041] The metric value storage unit 512 stores metric value information. The metric value information is information including a resource identification number, a measurement time, and a metric value. The resource identification number is information for identifying each of the PCS 200 and the smart meter 400, and may be, for example, an ECHONETLite (registered trademark) protocol number, a number combining a manufacturer and a product serial number, or other information.

[0042] The master storage unit 513 stores resource information, B route provider information, authentication information, and matching information. The resource information is information about each resource, and includes a resource identification number (resource identification information), a resource type, and an aggregation provider name (provider identification information). Furthermore, if the resource type is not a smart meter, the resource information may include a resource identification number of the smart meter 400 to which the resource is connected via the IoT route. The B route provider information is information about each smart meter 400, and includes a resource identification number and an aggregation provider name that provides the metered value on the B route from the smart meter 400. The authentication information is information about each aggregation provider, and includes an aggregation provider name, an IP address of the aggregation server 700, an authentication ID, and an authentication password. The matching information is information to be matched with the authentication information during authentication for communication connection with the HES server 500, and includes an authentication ID and an authentication password. The matching information may be different depending on the device that communicates with the HES server 500.

[0043] 3 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of an aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The aggregation server 700 includes a communication unit 701, a metric collector 702, an authentication unit 703, a tamper determination unit 704, a determination result output unit 705, an authentication information comparison unit 706, an update unit 707, an update request unit 708, a missing value complementation unit 709, a metric request response generator 710, a master information update unit 711, a metric storage unit 712, and a master storage unit 713 (information storage unit).

[0044] The communication unit 701 communicates with other devices such as the VPP control terminal 600 and the HES server 500. Each unit constituting the aggregation server 700 communicates with other devices via the communication unit 701.

[0045] The metered value collector 702 acquires the metered values ​​of the consumers and the metered values ​​of the distributed power sources 100 via the VPP control terminal 600 , and stores them in the metered value memory 712 .

[0046] The authentication unit 703 transmits authentication information to the HES server 500 to request authentication.

[0047] The tampering determination unit 704 acquires the resource measurement values ​​from the HES server 500, and determines whether or not the resource has been tampered with by comparing the measurement values ​​stored in the device itself with the measurement values ​​acquired from the HES server 500. The resource measurement values ​​at this time are acquired from the HES server 500 of the power company name (business operator identification information) stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resource.

[0048] The determination result output unit 705 outputs the determination result by the tampering determination unit 704 to, for example, an operation screen or a notification screen of the aggregation server 700. The output destination may be the screen of an operation terminal or a maintenance terminal capable of communicating with the aggregation server 700, or may be an audio output.

[0049] The authentication information matching unit 706 compares the authentication information received from the HES server 500 with the matching information stored in the master storage unit 713, and authenticates the HES server 500. The authentication information matching unit 706 transmits the authentication result to the HES server 500.

[0050] The update unit 707 receives an update request for the consumer resource information received from the HES server 500 and updates the consumer resource information stored in the master storage unit 713 .

[0051] When the resource information stored in the master storage unit 713 is changed, the update request unit 708 transmits a resource information update request to the HES server 500 .

[0052] When the missing value complement unit 709 detects a missing value in the measurement value of a distributed power source stored in the measurement value storage unit 712, it obtains the measurement value for the period corresponding to the missing value from the HES server 500 and complements the measurement value stored in its own device. The resource measurement value at this time is obtained from the HES server 500 corresponding to the power company name stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resource.

[0053] The metric response request generator 710 reads the metric information requested by the HES server 500 from the metric storage unit 712 , and transmits it to the HES server 500 .

[0054] The master information update unit 711 updates the consumer resource information, Route B application business information, authentication information, and verification information stored in the master storage unit 713 based on input operations by the operator of the aggregation server 700, etc.

[0055] The measurement value storage unit 712 stores measurement value information.

[0056] The master storage unit 713 stores consumer resource information, route B applied business information, authentication information, and matching information. The consumer resource information is information about each resource, and includes a resource identification number, a resource type, a consumer name, and a power company name (business identification information). The route B applied business information is information about each smart meter 400 that has applied for route B, and includes a resource identification number and a power company name. The authentication information is information about each power company, and includes the power company name, the IP address of the HES server 500, an authentication ID, and an authentication password. The matching information is information to be matched with the authentication information during authentication for communication connection with the aggregation server 700, and includes an authentication ID and an authentication password. The matching information may differ depending on the device that communicates with the aggregation server 700.

[0057] Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the relationship between resources, the HES server 500, and the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The relationship shown in Fig. 4 is a diagram showing which HES server 500 and which aggregation server 700 collects the metered values ​​of each resource. Note that the metered values ​​from the smart meter 400 are the metered values ​​of the consumer, and the metered values ​​from the PCS 200 are the metered values ​​of the distributed power sources.

[0058] 4, the metered value of the smart meter 400-1 of the consumer D1 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation provider AA. Also, the metered value of the PCS 200-1 of the consumer D1 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation provider AA.

[0059] The metered values ​​from the smart meter 400-2 of the consumer D2 are collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation provider AA. The metered values ​​from the PCS 200-1 of the consumer D2 are collected by the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation provider AA.

[0060] The metered value of the smart meter 400-3 of the consumer D3 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA. The metered value of the PCS 200-3 of the consumer D3 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation operator AA.

[0061] The measured value from the smart meter 400-4 of the consumer D4 is collected by the HES server 500-B of the electric power company PB and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation operator AA.

[0062] The metered values ​​from the smart meter 400-5 of the consumer D5 are collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-B of the aggregation provider AB. The metered values ​​from the PCS 200-5 of the consumer D5 are collected by the aggregation server 700-B of the aggregation provider AB.

[0063] In this way, the measurement values ​​by the PCS 200 are not necessarily collected by the HES server 500, but when they are collected by the HES server 500, they are collected by the HES server 500 that is collecting the measurement values ​​by the smart meter 400 of the same consumer as the PCS 200. In addition, the aggregation server 700 that is collecting the measurement values ​​by the PCS 200 also collects the measurement values ​​by the smart meter 400 of the same consumer as the PCS 200.

[0064] 5 is an ER (Entity Relationship) diagram explaining the relationship between the information stored in the metric value storage unit 512 and the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. Resource information 513-1 of one element includes a resource identification number serving as a key, a resource type, an aggregation operator name, and a resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via an IoT route). Measurement value information 512-1 of multiple elements is associated with resource information 513-1 of one element. Measurement value information 512-1 of one element includes a resource identification number and measurement time serving as keys, and a measurement value.

[0065] Furthermore, zero or one element of B route provider information 513-2 is associated with one element of resource information 513-1. One element of B route provider information 513-2 includes key resource identification information and an aggregation provider name. One element of authentication information 513-3 is associated with one element or multiple elements of B route provider information 513-2. One element of authentication information 513-3 includes key aggregation provider name, IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password.

[0066] Moreover, one element of the verification information 513-4 includes an authentication ID and an authentication password, which are keys.

[0067] FIG. 6 is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 512 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 6, the metric value storage unit 512 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and a metric value "100" in association with each other. Similarly, the metric value storage unit 512 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:30", and a metric value "150" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999911", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and a metric value "200" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores therein the resource identification number "0xFE99999902", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "50" in association with each other.

[0068] The metric value storage unit 512 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999903", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "60". The metric value storage unit 512 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "120". The metric value storage unit 512 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999905", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "20".

[0069] FIG. 7 is a table showing an example of resource information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 7, the master storage unit 513 stores, as resource information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a resource type "SM", an aggregation operator name "aggregation operator AA", and a resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via IoT route) "-" in association with each other. Note that the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via IoT route) "-" indicates that there is no corresponding smart meter 400. Similarly, the master storage unit 513 stores, as resource information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999911", a resource type "storage battery", an aggregation operator name "aggregation operator AA", and a resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via IoT route) "0xFE99999901" in association with each other.

[0070] The master storage unit 513 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999902", a resource type "SM", an aggregation operator name "aggregation operator AA", and a resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via the IoT route) "-" in association with each other. The master storage unit 513 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999903", a resource type "SM", an aggregation operator name "-", and a resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected via the IoT route) "-" in association with each other. The aggregation operator name "-" indicates that there is no aggregation operator (aggregation server 700) that is collecting the metric value of the corresponding resource.

[0071] The master storage unit 513 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the resource type "storage battery", the aggregation operator name "aggregation operator AA", and the resource identification number (the smart meter 400 connected via the IoT route) "0xFE99999903". The master storage unit 513 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999905", the resource type "SM", the aggregation operator name "aggregation operator AB", and the resource identification number (the smart meter 400 connected via the IoT route) "-".

[0072] Fig. 8 is a table showing an example of route B provider information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 8, the master storage unit 513 stores, as route B provider information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901" and an aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA" in association with each other. Similarly, the master storage unit 513 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999902" and an aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 513 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999905" and an aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AB" in association with each other.

[0073] Fig. 9 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 9, the master storage unit 513 stores, as authentication information, an aggregation operator name "Aggregation operator AA", an IP address "222.111.111.111", an authentication ID "AGG-A", and an authentication password "AGG-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other. Similarly, the master storage unit 513 stores, as authentication information, an aggregation operator name "Aggregation operator AB", an IP address "222.222.222.222", an authentication ID "AGG-B", and an authentication password "AGG-B-PASSWORD" in association with each other.

[0074] Fig. 10 is a table showing an example of matching information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 10, the master storage unit 513 stores, as matching information, an authentication ID "HES-A" and an authentication password "HES-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other.

[0075] 11 is a sequence diagram explaining an example of authentication processing when the HES server 500 in this embodiment connects to the aggregation server 700 for communication. The communication unit 501 sends an HTTP Get() to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sh1). When the communication unit 701 receives the Get() of sequence Sh1, it returns 401 Unauthorized to the communication unit 501 indicating authentication failure because the HES server 500 is not authenticated (sequence Sh2).

[0076] The communication unit 501, upon receiving 401 Unauthorized in sequence Sh2, requests the authentication unit 503 to acquire authentication information including the IP address of the aggregation server 700 (sequence Sh3). Upon receiving the request to acquire authentication information in sequence Sh3, the authentication unit 503 refers to the authentication information 513-3 in the master storage unit 513 (sequence Sh4) and acquires the authentication information (authentication ID, authentication password) of the IP address included in the request to acquire authentication information (sequence Sh5). The authentication unit 503 returns the acquired authentication information to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sh3 (sequence Sh6).

[0077] When the communication unit 501 receives the authentication information of sequence Sh6, it transmits Get() including the authentication information to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sh7). When the communication unit 701 receives Get() including the authentication information of sequence Sh7, it passes a matching request including the authentication information to the authentication information matching unit 706 (sequence Sh8). When the authentication information matching unit 706 receives the matching request of sequence Sh8, it refers to the matching information 713-4 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Sh9) and acquires the matching information (sequence Sh10).

[0078] Next, the authentication information matching unit 706 calls a process for matching the authentication information received in sequence Sh8 with the matching information acquired in sequence Sh10 (sequence Sh11), and acquires a matching result (sequence Sh12). Here, the authentication information and the matching information match, so the authentication information matching unit 706 returns a matching result match to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sh8 (sequence Sh13). In response to the matching result match in sequence Sh13, the communication unit 701 transmits 200 OK, indicating that authentication has been performed, to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sh7 (sequence Sh14).

[0079] FIG. 12 is a sequence diagram for explaining an example of a resource information update process in this embodiment. When a distributed power source 100 to be aggregated is added, the measurement value collector 502 or the master information updater 511 requests the resource information 513-1 in the master storage unit 513 to add a resource (add one element of resource information) (sequence Si1). Upon receiving the resource addition request in sequence Si1, the master storage unit 513 adds the resource to the resource information 513-1, and then notifies the update requester 508 of the resource addition (sequence Si2). At this time, the information added to the resource information 513-1 includes a resource identification number, a resource type, and a resource identification number (IoT route connection SM), but does not include an aggregation operator name. Note that the aggregation operator name is included in the resource addition request.

[0080] Upon receiving the notification of sequence Si2, the update request unit 508 requests the resource information 513-1 to acquire the resource identification number (the smart meter 400 connected via the IoT route) of the added resource information (hereinafter, referred to as update information) (sequence Si3). The master storage unit 513 acquires the resource identification number requested in sequence Sbi from the resource information 513-1 and returns it to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si4).

[0081] When the update request unit 508 receives the resource identification number in sequence Si4, it requests the authentication information 513-3 in the master storage unit 513 to acquire an IP address associated with the aggregation provider name included in the added resource information (sequence Si5). The master storage unit 513 acquires the IP address requested in sequence Si5 from the authentication information 513-3 and returns it to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si6). In sequence Si6, in addition to the IP address, an authentication ID and an authentication password are also passed to the update request unit 508.

[0082] The update request unit 508 makes an update request for the update information to the communication unit 501 (sequence Si7). At this time, the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password passed to the update request unit 508 in sequence Si6 are also passed to the communication unit 501, and the update information includes the resource identification number received in sequence Si4, i.e., the resource identification number of the smart meter 400. In response to the update request in sequence Si7, the communication unit 501 makes an authentication request to the communication unit 701 (sequence Si8). At this time, the communication unit 501 uses the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password. The communication unit 701 authenticates the HES server 500 in the same manner as the authentication process shown in FIG. 11 (sequence Si9), and returns 200 OK to the communication unit 501 (sequence Si10).

[0083] When the communication unit 501 receives the 200 OK of sequence Si10, it transmits the update information to the communication unit 701 using HTTP Put() (sequence Si11). When the communication unit 701 receives the update information of sequence Si11, it makes an update request including the update information to the update unit 707 (sequence Si12). When the update unit 707 receives the update request including the update information of sequence Si12, it makes an update request including the update information to the consumer resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Si13). When the master storage unit 713 has consumer resource information 713-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, it adds the name of the electric power company of the HES server 500 that transmitted the update information to the consumer resource information 713-1. When the master storage unit 713 does not have customer-specific resource information 713-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, the master storage unit 713 does not add any information to the customer-specific resource information 713-1.

[0084] When the master storage unit 713 receives the update request of sequence Si13 and updates the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 by adding the power company name, it returns the update result (here, update success) to the update unit 707 (sequence Si14). When the update unit 707 receives the update result of sequence Si14, it returns the update result to the communication unit 701 as a response to the update request of sequence Si12 (sequence Si15). When the communication unit 701 receives the update result of sequence Si15, it returns the update result to the communication unit 501 as a response to the Put of sequence Si11 (sequence Si16).

[0085] When the communication unit 501 receives the update result of sequence Si16, it returns the update result to the update request unit 508 as a response to the update request of sequence Si7 (sequence Si17). When the update request unit 508 receives the update result of sequence Si17, the update result is a successful update, so the update request unit 508 adds the aggregation provider name to the resource information 513-1 in the master storage unit 513 (sequence Si18). The master storage unit 513 returns the update result by the addition to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si19). Note that when the update result is a successful update, the aggregation server 700 of the aggregation provider name stores the same resource identification number, that is, the aggregation server 700 collects the metered values ​​of the same distributed power source 100 via route B, so the update request unit 508 adds the aggregation provider name in the resource information requested to be added to the resource information 513-1. If the update result is not a successful update (update failure), this means that the aggregation server 700 of the aggregation provider name does not store the same resource identification number, i.e., it cannot be confirmed that the aggregation server 700 is collecting the metering values ​​of the same distributed power source 100 via route B, so the update request unit 508 does not add the aggregation provider name in the resource information requested to be added to the resource information 513-1.

[0086] 13 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a tampering determination process of the HES server 500 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 504 specifies the resource identification number of the PCS 200 of the distributed power source 100 for which tampering is to be determined, and acquires the aggregation provider name associated with the resource identification number from the resource information 513-1 in the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sk1 and Sk2). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password associated with the acquired aggregation provider name from the authentication information 513-3 in the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sk3 and Sk4).

[0087] The tampering determination unit 504 requests the communication unit 501 for the resource identification number for which tampering is to be determined and the metric information for the target period (sequence Sk5). At this time, the tampering determination unit 504 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sk3 and Sk4 to the communication unit 501. From then on, sequences Sk6 to Sk14 are the same as sequences Sj10 to Sj18 in Fig. 26 if the missing period is read as the target period.

[0088] The communication unit 501 returns the metric value information returned in sequence Sk14 to the tampering determination unit 504 as a response to the request in sequence Sk5 (sequence Sk15). When the metric value information is returned in sequence Sk15, the tampering determination unit 504 invokes a determination process (sequence Sk16). In the determination process, the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the resource identification number for which tampering is to be determined and the metric value for the target period from the metric value information 512-1 in the metric value storage unit 512 (sequences Sk17 and Sk18), and compares the acquired metric value information with the metric value information returned in sequence Sk15 to determine whether tampering has occurred (sequence Sk19).

[0089] When the measurement time of the metric value information acquired from the aggregation server 700 does not match the collection cycle or collection start timing of the metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 512 when determining whether or not tampering has occurred in sequence Sk19, the tampering determination unit 504 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by using values ​​obtained by performing an interpolation process on the metric value acquired from the aggregation server 700. Specifically, the tampering determination unit 504 may make the determination as follows.

[0090] a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start timing is different The measurement values ​​of the aggregation server 700 are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) in accordance with the collection start timing of the HES server 500, and used to determine whether or not data has been tampered with. b) When the collection cycle is different and the collection start timing is the same The metric value of the least common multiple of the collection cycles is used to determine whether data has been tampered with. The long-period measurement values ​​are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) to match the periods of the short-period measurement values, and used to determine whether or not the data has been tampered with. c) When the collection cycle and collection start timing are different - Measured values ​​collected at the same time are used to determine whether data has been tampered with. - Short-period measurement values ​​are interpolated (linearly interpolated, etc.) to match the long-period collection timing and used to determine tampering.

[0091] 14 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the missing data completion process of the HES server 500 in this embodiment. The missing data completion unit 509 calls the missing data confirmation process by specifying a resource identification number and a period (sequence Sj1). In the missing data confirmation process, the missing data completion unit 509 obtains metric information of the specified resource identification number and period from the metric information 512-1 in the metric storage unit 512 (sequences Sj2, Sj3) and checks whether the measurement time of the metric information is in a specified cycle. If even a part of the period does not meet the specified cycle, the missing data completion unit 509 determines the period that does not meet the specified cycle as a missing period (sequence Sj4).

[0092] When the missing data period is determined, the missing data completion unit 509 acquires the aggregation provider name to be stored in association with the specified resource identification number from the resource information 513-1 in the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sj5 and Sj6). Next, the missing data completion unit 509 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password to be stored in association with the acquired aggregation provider name from the authentication information 513-3 in the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sj7 and Sj8).

[0093] The missing data completion unit 509 requests the communication unit 501 for the specified resource identification number and metric information for the missing period (sequence Sj9). At this time, the missing data completion unit 509 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sj7 and Sj8 to the communication unit 501. The communication unit 501 performs authentication processing with the communication unit 701 using the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password in the same manner as in FIG. 11 (sequences Sj10, Sj11, Sj12).

[0094] When the authentication process ends, the communication unit 501 sends a Get() including the resource identification number and missing period requested in sequence Sj9 to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sj13). When the communication unit 701 receives the Get() in sequence Sj13, it requests the resource identification number and metric information for the missing period included in the Get() from the metric request response generation unit 710 (sequence Sj14). The metric request response generation unit 710 obtains the metric information from the metric storage unit 712 in accordance with the request (sequences Sj15 and Sj16).

[0095] The metric request response generating unit 710 returns the acquired metric information to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sj14 (sequence Sj17). The communication unit 701 returns the metric information returned in sequence Sj17 to the communication unit 501 as a response to Get() in sequence Sj13 (sequence Sj18). The communication unit 501 returns the metric information returned in sequence Sj18 to the missing value complementing unit 509 as a response to the request in sequence Sj9 (sequence Sj19).

[0096] When the metric value information is returned in sequence Sj19, the missing data completion unit 509 calls the missing data completion process (sequence Sj20), uses the metric value information to complete the missing parts of the metric value information 512-1 (sequences Sj21, Sj22), and terminates the missing data completion process (sequence Sj23).

[0097] In addition, when the missing data completion unit 509 completes the missing portion in sequence Sj21, if the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the aggregation server 500 does not match the collection cycle or collection start timing of the measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 512, the missing data completion unit 509 may complete the measurement value using a value obtained by interpolating the measurement value acquired from the aggregation server 500. Specifically, the missing data completion unit 509 may perform completion as follows. The collection cycle is the interval between the measurement times of the measurement value information. The collection start timing indicates the time at which the collection cycle for the measurement time of the measurement value information starts.

[0098] a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start timing is different The measurement values ​​of the aggregation server 700 are interpolated (linearly interpolated, etc.) in accordance with the collection start timing of the HES server 500, and used for missing data completion. b) When the collection cycle is different and the collection start timing is the same - Use the metric value of the least common multiple of the collection cycles to complete missing data. - Short-term metrics are used to complement missing long-term metrics. - Long-period metric values ​​are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) to match the periods of short-period metric values ​​and used to fill in missing data. c) When the collection cycle and collection start timing are different - Use measurements collected at the same time to complete missing data. - Short-term measurement values ​​are interpolated (linearly, etc.) to match the long-term collection timing and used to fill in missing data.

[0099] FIG. 15 is a flowchart for explaining the process of the update request unit 508 in this embodiment. First, the update request unit 508 acquires the resource identification number of the smart meter 400 connected to the distributed power source 100 to be updated via the IoT route from the resource information 513-1 (resource table) (step Sl1). Next, the update request unit 508 acquires the aggregation business name that provides route B to the smart meter 400 with the resource identification number acquired in step Sl1 from the resource table (step Se2). Next, the update request unit 508 determines whether the aggregation business name to be acquired in step Sl2 is present in the resource table (step Sl3). Note that the update request unit 708 may determine that the aggregation business name is present when the aggregation business name can be acquired in step Sl2, and may determine that the aggregation business name is not present when the aggregation business name cannot be acquired.

[0100] If it is determined that the aggregation company name is present (step Sl3-Yes), the update request unit 508 acquires an IP address (destination IP address) associated with the power company name from the authentication information 513-3 (authentication information table) (step Sl4). Next, the update request unit 508 transmits update information for the distributed power source 100 to the aggregation server 700 having the IP address acquired in step Sl4 (step Sl5). Note that the update information for the distributed power source 100 may be information for adding the distributed power source 100, or information for updating information related to the distributed power source.

[0101] Next, the update request unit 508 acquires the update result from the aggregation server 700 (step Sl6). Next, the update request unit 508 refers to the acquired update result and determines whether or not the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated in the aggregation server 700 (step Sl7). Note that the update request unit 508 may determine that the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated if the update result is a success, and may determine that the information of the distributed power source 100 has not been updated if the update result is a failure.

[0102] If it is determined that the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated (step Sl7-Yes), the update request unit 508 updates the aggregation provider name of the resource to be updated in the resource table to the aggregation provider name acquired in step Sl2 (step Sl8). If it is determined in step Sl3 that there is no aggregation provider name (step Sl3-No) or if it is determined in step Sl7 that the information of the distributed power source 100 has not been updated (step Sl7-No), the update request unit 508 ends the process.

[0103] 16 is a flowchart for explaining the processing of the missing data complement unit 509 in this embodiment. First, the missing data complement unit 509 refers to the metric information 512-1 (metric table) to calculate the missing data period for the target resource and period, and determines whether or not there is a missing data period (step Sm1). If it is determined that there is a missing data period (step Sm1-Yes), the missing data complement unit 509 refers to the resource table and acquires the name of the aggregation provider corresponding to the target resource, thereby determining whether or not there is the name of the aggregation provider (step Sm2).

[0104] If it is determined that the aggregation company name is present (step Sm2-YES), the missing data completion unit 509 acquires an IP address (destination IP address) associated with the power company name acquired in step Sm2 from the authentication information table (step Sm3). Next, the missing data completion unit 509 requests the aggregation server 700 of the IP address acquired in step Sm3 to acquire metric values ​​(missing values) for the missing period (step Sm4). Next, the missing data completion unit 509 acquires the result of the request in step Sm4 (step Sm5).

[0105] Next, the missing data completion unit 509 determines whether or not the result acquired in step Sm5 includes a metric value that completes the missing data (step Sm6). If it is determined that a metric value that completes the missing data (missing data completion value) exists (step Sm6-Yes), the missing data completion unit 509 registers the missing data completion value in the metric table (step Sm7).

[0106] On the other hand, if it is determined in step Sm1 that there is no missing period (step Sm1-None), if it is determined in step Sm2 that there is no aggregation operator name (step Sm2-None), or if it is determined in step Sm6 that there is no missing completion value (step Sm6-No), the missing completion unit 509 terminates the processing.

[0107] 17 is a flowchart for explaining the process of the tampering determination unit 504 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 504 determines whether the aggregation provider name is present by acquiring the aggregation provider name corresponding to the resource to be tampered with from the resource table (step Sn1). If it is determined that the aggregation provider name is present (step Sn1-present), the tampering determination unit 504 acquires an IP address (destination IP address) associated with the aggregation provider name acquired in step Sn1 from the authentication information table (step Sn2).

[0108] Next, the tampering determination unit 504 requests metric value information for the target period of the tampering determination from the aggregation server 700 of the IP address acquired in step Sn2 (step Sn3). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the result of the request in step Sn3 (step Sn4). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 determines whether or not the request result acquired in step Sn4 contains metric value information (step Sn5-Yes). If it is determined that the request result contains metric value information (step Sn5-Yes), the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the metric value information for the target period from the metric value table (step Sn6).

[0109] Next, the falsification determination unit 504 determines whether or not the metric value information for the target period was acquired in step Sn6, that is, whether or not there is metric value information for the target period (step Sn7). If it is determined that there is metric value information for the target period (step Sn7-Yes), the falsification determination unit 504 compares the metric value information determined to be present in step Sn5 with the metric value information determined to be present in step Sn7, and determines whether or not there is a difference between them (step Sn8). Note that, for example, if one of the metric values ​​is calculated by interpolation, the falsification determination unit 504 may determine that there is no difference even if the metric value information does not completely match, as long as the difference is within a predetermined range.

[0110] If it is determined that there is no difference (step Sn8-NO), the tampering determination unit 504 determines that there is no tampering (step Sn9). On the other hand, if it is determined that there is a difference (step Sn8-YES), the tampering determination unit 504 determines that there is tampering (step Sn11).

[0111] If it is determined in step Sn5 that there is no metric information (step Sn5-None) or in step Sn7 that there is no metric information (step Sn7-None), the tampering determination unit 504 updates the target period and returns to step Sn3. If it is determined in step Sn1 that there is no aggregation operator name (step Sn1-None), the tampering determination unit 504 ends the process.

[0112] 18 is an ER diagram explaining the relationship between the information stored in the metered value storage unit 712 and the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. One element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1 includes a resource identification number serving as a key, a resource type, a consumer name, and a power company name. A plurality of elements of metered value information 712-1 are associated with one element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1. One element of metered value information 712-1 includes a resource identification number and measurement time serving as a key, and a metered value.

[0113] Furthermore, zero or one element of B route applied business information 713-2 is associated with one element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1. One element of B route applied business information 713-2 includes key resource identification information and a power company name. One element or multiple elements of B route applied business information 713-2 are associated with one element of authentication information 713-3. One element of authentication information 713-3 includes key power company name, IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password.

[0114] Moreover, one element of the verification information 713-4 includes an authentication ID and an authentication password, which are keys.

[0115] FIG. 19 is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 712 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 19, the metric value storage unit 712 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and a metric value "100" in association with each other. Similarly, the metric value storage unit 712 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:30", and a metric value "150" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores, as metric value information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999911", a measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and a metric value "200" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999902", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "110" in association with each other.

[0116] The metric value storage unit 712 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999912", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "50". The metric value storage unit 712 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "40". The metric value storage unit 712 stores, in association with each other, the resource identification number "0xFE99999904", the measurement time "2023 / 1 / 16 10:00", and the metric value "30".

[0117] FIG. 20 is a table showing an example of consumer-specific resource information stored by the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 20, the master storage unit 713 stores, as consumer-specific resource information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901", a resource type "SM", a consumer name "Consumer D1", and a power company name "Power Company PA" in association with each other. The resource type "SM" represents a smart meter. Similarly, the master storage unit 713 stores, in association with each other, a resource identification number "0xFE99999911", a resource type "storage battery", a consumer name "Consumer D1", and a power company name "Power Company PA". The resource type "storage battery" represents that the distributed power source 100 controlled by the PCS 200 is a storage battery.

[0118] The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999902", a resource type "SM", a consumer name "Consumer D2", and a power company name "Power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999912", a resource type "storage battery", a consumer name "Consumer D2", and a power company name "-" in association with each other. The power company name "-" indicates that there is no power company (HES server 500) that is collecting the metered values ​​of the corresponding resource.

[0119] The master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the resource type "storage battery", the consumer name "consumer D3", and the power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999904", the resource type "SM", the consumer name "consumer D4", and the power company name "power company PB" in association with each other.

[0120] Fig. 21 is a table showing an example of route B applied business information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 21, the master storage unit 713 stores, as route B applied business information, a resource identification number "0xFE99999901" and a power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. Similarly, the master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999902" and a power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999904" and a power company name "power company PB" in association with each other.

[0121] Fig. 22 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 22, the master storage unit 713 stores, as authentication information, the power company name "Power Company PA", the IP address "111.111.111.111", the authentication ID "HES-A", and the authentication password "HES-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other. Similarly, the master storage unit 713 stores, as authentication information, the power company name "Power Company PB", the IP address "111.222.222.222", the authentication ID "HES-B", and the authentication password "HES-B-PASSWORD" in association with each other.

[0122] Fig. 23 is a table showing an example of matching information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of Fig. 23, the master storage unit 713 stores, as matching information, an authentication ID "AGG-A" and an authentication password "AGG-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other.

[0123] 24 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment establishes a communication connection with the HES server 500. The communication unit 701 transmits a Get() of HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sa1). Upon receiving the Get() of sequence Sa1, the communication unit 501 returns 401 Unauthorized to the communication unit 701 indicating authentication failure because the aggregation server 700 has not been authenticated (sequence Sa2).

[0124] The communication unit 701, upon receiving 401 Unauthorized in sequence Sa2, requests the authentication unit 703 to acquire authentication information including the IP address of the HES server 500 (sequence Sa3). Upon receiving the request to acquire authentication information in sequence Sa3, the authentication unit 703 refers to the authentication information 713-3 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Sa4) and acquires the authentication information (authentication ID, authentication password) of the IP address included in the request to acquire authentication information (sequence Sa5). The authentication unit 703 returns the acquired authentication information to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sa3 (sequence Sa6).

[0125] When the communication unit 701 receives the authentication information of sequence Sa6, it transmits Get() including the authentication information to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sa7). When the communication unit 501 receives Get() including the authentication information of sequence Sa7, it passes a matching request including the authentication information to the authentication information matching unit 506 (sequence Sa8). When the authentication information matching unit 506 receives the matching request of sequence Sa8, it refers to the matching information 513-4 in the master storage unit 513 (sequence Sa9) and acquires the matching information (sequence Sa10).

[0126] Next, the authentication information matching unit 506 calls a process for matching the authentication information received in sequence Sa8 with the matching information acquired in sequence Sa10 (sequence Sa11) and acquires a matching result (sequence Sa12). Here, since the authentication information and the matching information match, the authentication information matching unit 506 returns a matching result match to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sa8 (sequence Sa13). In response to the matching result match of sequence Sa13, the communication unit 501 transmits 200 OK indicating authentication to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sa7 (sequence Sa14).

[0127] FIG. 25 is a sequence diagram for explaining an example of a process for updating consumer-specific resource information in this embodiment. When a distributed power source 100 to be aggregated is added, the metered value collector 702 or the master information updater 711 requests the addition of a resource (addition of one element of consumer-specific resource information) to the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Sb1). In response to the resource addition request in sequence Sb1, the master storage unit 713 adds the consumer-specific resource information, and then notifies the update request unit 708 of the resource addition (sequence Sb2). Note that the items to be added by the master storage unit 713 are the resource identification number, resource type, and consumer name, and the power company name is not included at this timing. Note that the power company name is included in the request for adding resources.

[0128] When the update request unit 708 receives the notification of sequence Sb2, it requests the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 to obtain the consumer name of the added consumer-specific resource information (hereinafter referred to as update information) and the power company name and resource identification number associated with the same consumer name and resource type "SM" (sequence Sb3). The master memory unit 713 obtains the power company name and resource identification number requested in sequence Sb3 from the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 and returns them to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb4).

[0129] For example, if the contents of consumer-specific resource information 713-1 are the example shown in Figure 7, when consumer-specific resource information including consumer name "Consumer D4" is added, the master memory unit 713 refers to the resource identification number "0xFE99999904", resource type "SM", consumer name "Consumer D4", and power company name "Power company PB" in the consumer-specific resource information 713-1, and returns power company PB and 0xFE99999904 to the update request unit 708.

[0130] When the update request unit 708 receives the power company name and resource identification number in sequence Sb4, it requests the authentication information 713-3 in the master storage unit 713 to acquire an IP address associated with the power company name (sequence Sb5). The master storage unit 713 acquires the IP address requested in sequence Sb5 from the authentication information 713-3 and returns it to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb6). In sequence Sb6, in addition to the IP address, an authentication ID and authentication password are also passed to the update request unit 708.

[0131] The update request unit 708 makes an update request for the update information to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sb7). At this time, the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password passed to the update request unit 708 in sequence Sb6 are also passed to the communication unit 701, and the update information includes the resource identification number received in sequence Sb4, i.e., the resource identification number of the smart meter 400. Upon receiving the update request in sequence Sb7, the communication unit 701 makes an authentication request to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sb8). At this time, the communication unit 701 uses the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password. The communication unit 501 authenticates the aggregation server 700 in the same manner as the authentication process shown in FIG. 24 (sequence Sb9), and returns 200 OK to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sb10).

[0132] When the communication unit 701 receives the 200 OK in sequence Sb10, it transmits the update information to the communication unit 501 using Put() of HTTP (sequence Sb11). When the communication unit 501 receives the update information in sequence Sb11, it makes an update request including the update information to the update unit 507 (sequence Sb12). When the update unit 507 receives the update request including the update information in sequence Sb12, it makes an update request including the update information to the resource information 513-1 in the master storage unit 513 (sequence Sb13). When the master storage unit 513 has the resource information 513-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, it adds the name of the aggregation operator of the aggregation server 700 that has sent the update information to the resource information 513-1. When the master storage unit 513 does not have the resource information 513-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, it does not add the name to the resource information 513-1.

[0133] When the master storage unit 513 receives the update request of sequence Sb13 and updates the resource information 513-1 by adding the aggregation provider name, it returns the update result (here, update success) to the update unit 507 (sequence Sb14). When the update unit 507 receives the update result of sequence Sb14, it returns the update result to the communication unit 501 as a response to the update request of sequence Sb12 (sequence Sb15). When the communication unit 501 receives the update result of sequence Sb15, it returns the update result to the communication unit 701 as a response to the Put of sequence Sb11 (sequence Sb16).

[0134] When the communication unit 701 receives the update result of sequence Sb16, it returns the update result to the update request unit 708 as a response to the update request of sequence Sb7 (sequence Sb17). When the update request unit 708 receives the update result of sequence Sb17, the update result is a successful update, so it adds the power company name to the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Sb18). The master storage unit 713 returns the update result by the addition to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb19). Note that when the update result is a successful update, the HES server 500 of the power company name stores the same resource identification number, that is, the HES server 500 collects the metered values ​​of the same distributed power source 100 via the IoT route, so the update request unit 708 adds the power company name in the consumer-specific resource information requested to be added to the consumer-specific resource information 713-1. If the update result is not a successful update (the update fails), this is because the HES server 500 of the power company name does not store the same resource identification number, i.e., it cannot be confirmed that the HES server 500 is collecting the metered values ​​of the same distributed power source 100 via the IoT route, so the update request unit 708 does not add the power company name in the consumer-specific resource information that was requested to be added to the consumer-specific resource information 713-1.

[0135] 26 is a sequence diagram showing an example of a tampering determination process of the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 704 specifies the resource identification number of the PCS 200 of the distributed power source 100 for which tampering is to be determined, and acquires the name of the electric power company associated with the resource identification number from the consumer resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sd1 and Sd2). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password associated with the acquired electric power company name from the authentication information 713-3 in the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sd3 and Sd4).

[0136] The tampering determination unit 704 requests the communication unit 701 for the resource identification number for which tampering is to be determined and the metric information for the target period (sequence Sd5). At this time, the tampering determination unit 704 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sd3 and Sd4 to the communication unit 701. After that, sequences Sd6 to Sd14 are the same as sequences Sc10 to Sc18 in Fig. 13 if the missing period is read as the target period.

[0137] The communication unit 701 returns the metric value information returned in sequence Sd14 to the tampering determination unit 704 as a response to the request in sequence Sd5 (sequence Sd15). When the metric value information is returned in sequence Sd15, the tampering determination unit 704 invokes a determination process (sequence Sd16). In the determination process, the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the resource identification number and metric value for the target period for which tampering is to be performed from the metric value information 712-1 in the metric value storage unit 712 (sequences Sd17, Sd18), and compares the acquired metric value information with the metric value information returned in sequence Sd15 to determine whether tampering has occurred (sequence Sd19).

[0138] When the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether or not tampering has occurred in sequence Sd19, if the measurement time of the metric value information obtained from the HES server 500 does not match the collection cycle or collection start timing of the metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 712, the tampering determination unit 704 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by using an interpolated value of the metric value obtained from the HES server 500. Specifically, the tampering determination unit 704 may make the determination as follows.

[0139] a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start timing is different The measurement values ​​of the HES server 500 are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) in accordance with the collection start timing of the aggregation server 700, and used to determine whether the data has been tampered with. b) When the collection cycle is different and the collection start timing is the same The metric value of the least common multiple of the collection cycles is used to determine whether data has been tampered with. The long-period measurement values ​​are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) to match the periods of the short-period measurement values, and used to determine whether or not the data has been tampered with. c) When the collection cycle and collection start timing are different - Measured values ​​collected at the same time are used to determine whether data has been tampered with. - Short-period measurement values ​​are interpolated (linearly interpolated, etc.) to match the long-period collection timing and used to determine tampering.

[0140] 27 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the missing data completion process of the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The missing data completion unit 709 calls the missing data confirmation process by specifying a resource identification number and a period (sequence Sc1). In the missing data confirmation process, the missing data completion unit 709 obtains metric information of the specified resource identification number and period from the metric information 712-1 in the metric storage unit 712 (sequences Sc2 and Sc3), and checks whether the measurement time of the metric information is in a specified cycle. If even a part of the period does not follow the specified cycle, the missing data completion unit 709 determines the period that does not follow the specified cycle as a missing period (sequence Sc4).

[0141] When the missing period is determined, the missing data complement unit 709 acquires the name of the electric power company to be stored in association with the specified resource identification number from the consumer resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sc5 and Sc6). Next, the missing data complement unit 709 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password to be stored in association with the acquired electric power company name from the authentication information 713-3 in the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sc7 and Sc8).

[0142] The missing data completion unit 709 requests the communication unit 701 for the specified resource identification number and metric information for the missing period (sequence Sc9). At this time, the missing data completion unit 709 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sc7 and Sc8 to the communication unit 701. The communication unit 701 performs authentication processing with the communication unit 501 using the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password in the same manner as in Fig. 24 (sequences Sc10, Sc11, Sc12).

[0143] When the authentication process ends, the communication unit 701 sends a Get() including the resource identification number and missing period requested in sequence Sc9 to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sc13). When the communication unit 501 receives the Get() in sequence Sc13, it requests the resource identification number and metric information for the missing period included in the Get() from the metric request response generation unit 510 (sequence Sc14). The metric request response generation unit 510 obtains the metric information from the metric storage unit 512 in accordance with the request (sequences Sc15 and Sc16).

[0144] The metric request response generator 510 returns the acquired metric information to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sc14 (sequence Sc17). The communication unit 501 returns the metric information returned in sequence Sc17 to the communication unit 701 as a response to Get() in sequence Sc13 (sequence Sc18). The communication unit 701 returns the metric information returned in sequence Sc18 to the missing value complement unit 709 as a response to the request in sequence Sc9 (sequence Sc19).

[0145] When the metric value information is returned in sequence Sc19, the missing data completion unit 709 calls the missing data completion process (sequence Sc20), uses the metric value information to complete the missing parts of the metric value information 712-1 (sequences Sc21, Sc22), and terminates the missing data completion process (sequence Sc23).

[0146] When the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the HES server 500 does not match the collection cycle or collection start timing of the measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 712 when completing the missing portion in sequence Sc21, the missing value completion unit 709 may complete the measurement value by using an interpolated value of the measurement value acquired from the HES server 500. Specifically, the missing value completion unit 709 may perform completion as follows. The collection cycle is the interval between the measurement times of the measurement value information. The collection start timing indicates the time at which the measurement time of the measurement value information is the collection cycle that starts. The interpolation process refers to calculating the measurement value at measurement time T3 by linear interpolation or the like using at least the measurement value at measurement time T1 and the measurement value at measurement time T2.

[0147] a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start timing is different The measurement values ​​of the HES server 500 are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) in accordance with the collection start timing of the aggregation server 700, and used for missing data completion. b) When the collection cycle is different and the collection start timing is the same - Use the metric value of the least common multiple of the collection cycles to complete missing data. - Short-term metrics are used to complement missing long-term metrics. - Long-period metric values ​​are interpolated (by linear interpolation, etc.) to match the periods of short-period metric values ​​and used to fill in missing data. c) When the collection cycle and collection start timing are different - Use measurements collected at the same time to complete missing data. - Short-term measurement values ​​are interpolated (linearly, etc.) to match the long-term collection timing and used to fill in missing data.

[0148] FIG. 28 is a flowchart for explaining the processing of the update request unit 708 in this embodiment. First, the update request unit 708 acquires the consumer name of the distributed power source 100 to be updated from the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 (consumer-specific resource table) (step Se1). Next, the update request unit 708 acquires the power company name of the resource type "SM" associated with the same consumer name from the consumer-specific resource table (step Se2). Next, the update request unit 708 determines whether the power company name acquired in step Se2 is present in the consumer-specific resource table (step Se3). Note that the update request unit 708 may determine that the power company name is present when the power company name can be acquired in step Se2, and may determine that the power company name is not present when the power company name cannot be acquired.

[0149] If it is determined that the electric power company name is present (step Se3-Yes), the update request unit 708 acquires an IP address (destination IP address) associated with the electric power company name from the authentication information 713-3 (authentication information table) (step Se4). Next, the update request unit 708 transmits update information for the distributed power source 100 to the HES server 500 having the IP address acquired in step Se4 (step Se5). Note that the update information for the distributed power source 100 may be information for adding the distributed power source 100, or may be information for updating information related to the distributed power source.

[0150] Next, the update request unit 708 acquires the update result from the HES server 500 (step Se6). Next, the update request unit 708 refers to the acquired update result and determines whether or not the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated in the HES server 500 (step Se7). Note that the update request unit 708 may determine that the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated if the update result is a success, and may determine that the information of the distributed power source 100 has not been updated if the update result is a failure.

[0151] If it is determined that the information of the distributed power source 100 has been updated (step Se7-Yes), the update request unit 708 updates the power company name of the resource to be updated in the consumer resource table to the power company name acquired in step Se2 (step Se8). If it is determined in step Se3 that there is no power company name (step Se3-No) or if it is determined in step Se7 that the information of the distributed power source 100 has not been updated (step Se7-No), the update request unit 708 ends the process.

[0152] 29 is a flowchart for explaining the processing of the tampering determination unit 704 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether or not the power company name is present by acquiring the power company name corresponding to the resource to be subjected to the tampering determination from the consumer-specific resource table (step Sg1). If it is determined that the power company name is present (step Sg1-Yes), the tampering determination unit 704 acquires an IP address (destination IP address) associated with the power company name acquired in step Sg1 from the authentication information table (step Sg2).

[0153] Next, the tampering determination unit 704 requests metric value information for the target period for tampering determination from the HES server 500 with the IP address acquired in step Sg2 (step Sg3). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the result of the request in step Sg3 (step Sg4). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether or not the request result acquired in step Sg4 contains metric value information (step Sg5). If it is determined that the request result contains metric value information (step Sg5-Yes), the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the metric value information for the target period from the metric value table (step Sg6).

[0154] Next, the falsification determination unit 704 determines whether or not metric information for the target period was obtained in step Sg6, that is, whether or not metric information for the target period is available (step Sg7). If it is determined that metric information for the target period is available (step Sg7-available), the falsification determination unit 704 compares the metric information determined to be available in step Sg5 with the metric information determined to be available in step Sg7, and determines whether or not there is a difference between them (step Sg8). Note that, for example, if one of the metric values ​​is calculated by interpolation, the falsification determination unit 704 may determine that there is no difference even if the metric information does not completely match, as long as the difference is within a predetermined range.

[0155] If it is determined that there is no difference (step Sg8-NO), the tampering determination unit 704 determines that there is no tampering (step Sg9). On the other hand, if it is determined that there is a difference (step Sg8-YES), the tampering determination unit 704 determines that there is tampering (step Sg11).

[0156] If it is determined in step Sg5 that there is no measurement value information (step Sg5-no), or if it is determined in step Sg7 that there is no measurement value information (step Sg7-no), the tampering determination unit 704 updates the target period and returns to step Sg3. If it is determined in step Sg1 that there is no power company name (step Sg1-no), the tampering determination unit 704 ends the process.

[0157] 30 is a flowchart for explaining the processing of the missing data complement unit 709 in this embodiment. First, the missing data complement unit 709 refers to the metric information 712-1 (metric table) to calculate the missing data period for the target resource and period, and determines whether or not there is a missing data period (step Sf1). If it is determined that there is a missing data period (step Sf1-Yes), the missing data complement unit 709 refers to the consumer resource table, and acquires the name of the power company corresponding to the target resource, thereby determining whether or not there is a power company name (step Sf2).

[0158] If it is determined that the electric power company name is present (step Sf2-YES), the missing data completion unit 709 acquires an IP address (destination address) associated with the electric power company name acquired in step Sf2 from the authentication information table (step Sf3). Next, the missing data completion unit 709 requests the HES server 500 of the IP address acquired in step Sf3 to acquire metric values ​​(missing values) for the missing period (step Sf4). Next, the missing data completion unit 709 acquires the result of the request in step Sf4 (step Sf5).

[0159] Next, the missing data completion unit 709 determines whether the result obtained in step Sf5 includes a metric value that completes the missing data (step Sf6). If it is determined that a metric value that completes the missing data (missing data completion value) exists (step Sf6-Yes), the missing data completion unit 709 registers the missing data completion value in the metric table (step Sf7).

[0160] On the other hand, if it is determined in step Sf1 that there is no missing period (step Sf1-None), if it is determined in step Sf2 that there is no electric power company name (step Sf2-None), or if it is determined in step Sf6 that there is no missing data completion value (step Sf6-No), the missing data completion unit 709 terminates the processing.

[0161] Fig. 31 is a diagram showing an example of an output screen by the determination result output unit 705 in this embodiment. The example in Fig. 31 is an output screen when the tampering determination unit 704 determines that tampering has occurred. The output screen in Fig. 31 includes "notification time: yyyy:mm:dd hh:mm:ss" which is the year, month, day, hour, minute, and second when the detection of tampering was notified, "resource identification number: 0xFE99999911" which indicates the resource of the metric value for which tampering was detected, "resource type: storage battery" which indicates the type of the resource, and "consumer name: consumer D1" which indicates the consumer corresponding to the resource. The output screen of the determination result output unit 505 may also be similar to that in Fig. 31.

[0162] FIG. 32 is an explanatory diagram illustrating the hardware configuration of each device according to this embodiment. The devices are the PCS 200, the IoT root terminal 300, the smart meter 400, the HES server 500, the VPP control terminal 600, and the aggregation server 700. Each device is configured to include an input / output module I, a storage module M, and a control module P. The input / output module I is realized by including a part or all of the communication module H11, the connection module H12, the pointing device H21, the keyboard H22, the display H23, the button H3, the microphone H41, the speaker H42, the camera H51, or the sensor H52. The storage module M is realized by including a drive H7. The storage module M may further be configured by including a part or all of the memory H8. The control module P is realized by including a memory H8 and a processor H9. These hardware components are connected to each other so as to be able to communicate with each other via a bus, and are supplied with power from a power source H6.

[0163] The connection module H12 is a digital input / output port such as a USB (Universal Seriul Bus). In the case of a portable device, the pointing device H21, the keyboard H22, and the display H23 are touch panels. The sensor H52 is an acceleration sensor, a gyro sensor, a GPS receiving module, a proximity sensor, or the like. The power source H6 is a power supply unit that supplies electricity required to operate each device. In the case of a portable device, the power source H6 is a battery. The drive H7 is an auxiliary storage medium such as a hard disk drive or a solid state drive. The drive H7 may be a non-volatile memory such as an EEPROM or a flash memory, or a magneto-optical disk drive or a flexible disk drive. In addition, the drive H7 is not limited to being built into each device, but may be an external storage device connected to a connector of the connection module H12. The memory H8 is a main storage medium such as a random access memory. The memory H8 may be a cache memory. The memory H8 stores instructions when the instructions are executed by one or more processors H9. The processor H9 is a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The processor H9 may be a microprocessing unit (MPU) or a graphics processing unit (GPU). The processor H9 reads out programs and various data from the drive H7 via the memory H8 and performs calculations to execute instructions stored in one or more memories H8.

[0164] The input / output module I is used in the PCS 200, the IoT root terminal 300, the smart meter 400, the HES server 500, the VPP control terminal 600, the aggregation server 700, etc. The memory module M realizes the metered value memory units 512, 712 and the master memory units 513, 713. The control module P is used to implement each unit of the HES server 500 and the aggregation server 700. In this specification, the descriptions of PCS200, IoT root terminal 300, smart meter 400, HES server 500, VPP control terminal 600, and aggregation server 700 may be replaced with the description of control module P.

[0165] In the above embodiment, the measurement value has been described as the amount of electricity, but may include the amount of gas or water usage. The smart meter 400 may transmit the amount of gas or water usage to the aggregation server 700 using route B. Also, the VPP control terminal 600 may transmit the amount of gas or water usage to the aggregation server 700 without using route B. In addition, although the name of the power company is used as information for identifying the power company, other information such as the identification number of the power company may be used. Although the name of the aggregation business operator is used as information for identifying the aggregation business operator, other information such as the identification number of the aggregation business operator may be used. Although the name of the consumer is used as information for identifying the consumer, other information such as the identification number of the consumer may be used.

[0166] The following embodiment may also be adopted. (1) One embodiment is a power information management device that includes an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider in association with each other, and a tampering determination unit that acquires measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with.

[0167] (2) Also, another embodiment is the power management device described in (1), wherein the tampering determination unit determines whether or not tampering has occurred by using an interpolated value of a measurement value obtained from a device corresponding to the operator identification information.

[0168] (3) In another embodiment, the power management device is as described in (1) or (2), and includes a missing value complementation unit that, when a missing value is detected in a measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device, obtains the measurement value for the period corresponding to the missing value from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information and complements the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device.

[0169] (4) Another embodiment is a power management device as described in any one of (1) to (3), wherein the missing value completion unit complements the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device using an interpolated value of a measurement value obtained from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information.

[0170] (5) In another embodiment, the power management device is a power management device as described in any one of (1) to (4), wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the business identification information, consumer identification information that identifies a consumer corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

[0171] (6) In another embodiment, the power management device is the one described in any one of (1) to (4), wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the operator identification information, resource identification information of a smart meter corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

[0172] (7) Another embodiment is a power information management system that includes a power management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, in which the power management device includes an information memory unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider in association with each other, and a tampering determination unit that acquires measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with, and the VPP control terminal transmits the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source to the power management device.

[0173] (8) Furthermore, another embodiment is the power information management system described in (7), comprising a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal, wherein the device corresponding to the business operator identification information acquires measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter.

[0174] (9) In still another embodiment, there is provided a power information management system including a power management device, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal. The power management device includes an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider, in association with each other. The power management device also includes a tampering determination unit that obtains measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​obtained from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with. The measurement values ​​of the distributed power source are transmitted from a device that controls the distributed power source to the power management device via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter.

[0175] (10) Another embodiment is a power information management system as described in (9), comprising a device corresponding to the business operator identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, and the VPP control terminal transmits the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source to the device corresponding to the business operator identification information.

[0176] (11) Another embodiment is a power information management method including the steps of: storing resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system in association with provider identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation provider; and acquiring measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information, and comparing the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​acquired from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not the measurement values ​​have been tampered with.

[0177] (12) Another embodiment is a program for causing a computer to function as an information storage unit that stores resource identification information identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system in association with provider identification information identifying an electric power company or an aggregation provider, and a tampering determination unit that obtains measurement values ​​of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the provider identification information and compares the measurement values ​​of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement values ​​obtained from the device corresponding to the provider identification information to determine whether or not tampering has occurred.

[0178] 1 may be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, and the program recorded on the recording medium may be read into a computer system and executed to realize the HES server 500 and the aggregation server 700. Note that the term "computer system" here includes hardware such as the OS and peripheral devices.

[0179] In addition, "computer-readable recording medium" refers to portable media such as flexible disks, optical magnetic disks, ROMs, and CD-ROMs, and storage devices such as hard disks built into computer systems. Furthermore, "computer-readable recording medium" also includes those that dynamically hold a program for a short period of time, such as a communication line when transmitting a program via a network such as the Internet or a communication line such as a telephone line, and those that hold a program for a certain period of time, such as volatile memory inside a computer system that serves as a server or client in such cases. Furthermore, the above program may be one that realizes part of the above-mentioned functions, or may be one that can realize the above-mentioned functions in combination with a program already recorded in the computer system.

[0180] Although the embodiment of this disclosure has been described in detail above with reference to the drawings, the specific configuration is not limited to this embodiment, and design changes and the like are also included within the scope that does not depart from the gist of this disclosure. [Explanation of symbols]

[0181] 10. Electricity Information Management System 100 Distributed power supply 200PCS 300 IoT root terminals 400 Smart Meter 500 HES Server 501 Communications Department 502 Metric data collection unit 503 Authentication Department 504 Tampering Judgment Unit 505 Judgment result output unit 506 Authentication information verification unit 507 Update Department 508 Update request section 509 Missing Data Completion Department 510 Metric value request response generator 511 Master Information Update Department 512 Measurement value storage unit 513 Master Memory Unit 600 VPP control terminals 700 Aggregation Server 701 Communications Department 702 Metric data collection unit 703 Authentication Department 704 Tampering Judgment Unit 705 Judgment result output unit 706 Authentication information verification unit 707 Update Department 708 Update request section 709 Missing Data Completion Section 710 Metric value request response generator 711 Master Information Update Department 712 Measurement value storage unit 713 Master Memory Unit

Claims

1. an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business operator identification information for identifying a power company or an aggregation business operator in association with each other; a tamper determination unit that acquires a measurement value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, and compares the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement value acquired from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with; Equipped with The tampering determination unit determines whether or not tampering has occurred by using a value obtained by interpolating a measurement value acquired from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information.

2. The power information management device of claim 1, further comprising a missing value complementation unit that, when a missing value is detected in the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device, obtains the measurement value for the period corresponding to the missing value from a device corresponding to the business identification information and complements the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device.

3. The power information management device according to claim 2 , wherein the missing value complementing unit complements the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device itself using an interpolated value of the measurement value obtained from the device corresponding to the business identification information.

4. A power information management device as described in any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the business identification information, consumer identification information that identifies a consumer corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

5. The power information management device according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the operator identification information, resource identification information of a smart meter corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other.

6. A power information management system including a power information management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, The power information management device includes: an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business operator identification information for identifying a power company or an aggregation business operator in association with each other; a tamper determination unit that acquires a measurement value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, and compares the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement value acquired from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with; Equipped with The VPP control terminal transmits a measurement value of the distributed power source to the power information management device, the tampering determination unit determines whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with by using an interpolated value of the measurement value obtained from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information. Electricity information management system.

7. The present invention includes a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal, The device corresponding to the business operator identification information acquires the metered value of the distributed power source from a device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter. The power information management system according to claim 6.

8. A power information management system including a power information management device, a smart meter, and an IoT root terminal, The power information management device includes: an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business operator identification information for identifying a power company or an aggregation business operator in association with each other; a tamper determination unit that acquires a measurement value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, and compares the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement value acquired from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with; Equipped with The tampering determination unit determines whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with by using an interpolated value of the measurement value obtained from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information; The metered value of the distributed power source is transmitted from a device that controls the distributed power source to the power information management device via the IoT root terminal and the smart meter. Electricity information management system.

9. A device corresponding to the business operator identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal are provided, The VPP control terminal transmits the metered value of the distributed power source to a device corresponding to the business operator identification information. The power information management system according to claim 8.

10. a step of storing resource identification information for identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business operator identification information for identifying a power company or an aggregation business operator in association with each other; acquiring a measurement value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, and comparing the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement value acquired from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with; having In the determining step, the presence or absence of tampering is determined using a value obtained by performing an interpolation process on the measurement value acquired from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information. Power information management method.

11. Computer, an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business operator identification information for identifying a power company or an aggregation business operator in association with each other; a tampering determination unit that obtains the measurement value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the business operator identification information, and compares the measurement value of the distributed power source stored in the device with the measurement value obtained from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information to determine whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with. A program for causing the device to function as a the tampering determination unit determines whether or not the measurement value has been tampered with by using an interpolated value of the measurement value obtained from the device corresponding to the business operator identification information. program.

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