Cryptographic processing events for encrypting or decrypting data

The cryptographic processing method addresses resource-intensive encryption issues by using temporary generator points and keys determined during initialization, ensuring efficient and secure encryption and decryption of subscriber identifiers in communication networks.

KR103044368B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-06아이데미아프랑스
View PDF 3 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020210068253
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-05-27
Filing Date
2021-05-27
Publication Date
2026-11-06
Estimated Expiration
2041-05-27

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing cryptographic processing methods for encrypting subscriber identifiers in communication networks, such as 5G networks, are resource-intensive and time-consuming, leading to degraded performance and security risks, with no effective compromise between security level and processing efficiency.

Method used

A cryptographic processing method using temporary generator points and keys determined during an initialization phase, allowing for efficient encryption and decryption of data by predetermining these values during inactive periods, reducing resource and time costs during the encryption phase.

Benefits of technology

Enhances security and maintains efficient processing by using temporary generator points and keys determined during initialization, ensuring a balance between security and resource usage, thereby preventing unauthorized data interception and improving network access speed.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 112026091236878-PAT00019_ABST
    Figure 112026091236878-PAT00019_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present invention relates to an encryption method comprising an initialization step to determine a temporary generated point G' equal to the first product G' = [d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming an N-bit secret key and G is a generated point of an elliptic curve, and to determine a temporary key Q' equal to the second product Q' = [d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve forming a public key. During the encryption step, the second random scalar is M <N 인 M 비트의 제 2 비밀 키 k를 형성하고; 공개 키 P는 P = [k]G'가 되도록 계산되고; 타원형 곡선의, 중간 포인트 SP1의 좌표는 제4 곱 SP1 = [k]Q'와 같고; 유도 함수(F1)의 적용에 의한 적어도 하나의 키; 및 데이터(T1)는 상기 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 암호화된다.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technology Field

[65535] The present invention relates to the field of cryptography, and in particular to the execution of a cryptographic processing event that encrypts data securely transmitted from a device to an external entity. The present invention is particularly related to the encryption of an identifier of an embedded subscriber identification module and the transmission of such identifier in an encrypted form to authenticate a communication terminal through a communication network. Background Technology In telecommunications, "4G" refers to the fourth-generation standard for mobile phone communication corresponding to LTE Advanced (IMT-Advanced). Composed of an IP-based network core, 4G networks provided more efficient rates and services than previous 2G or 3G generations. As is known, to access a mobile 4G network and use related services, a telecommunications terminal ("smartphone," phone, or other) must transmit identification data to be authenticated by the network. To this end, a subscriber identity module (e.g., a SIM card) is embedded in the terminal to transmit the subscriber's IMSI identifier (for "International Mobile Subscriber Identification") to the 4G network and complete the authentication process with the 4G network. However, security issues and risks of infringing on privacy were discovered in the context of 4G. In particular, if security is insufficient while the terminal transmits the IMSI identifier to this 4G network, subscribers are at risk of having their IMSI identifier intercepted by malicious third parties known as "IMSI interceptors" or "IMSI catchers." Through monitoring systems used to block mobile communication traffic, malicious third parties can actually remotely retrieve sensitive information (including IMSI) or track the movements of 4G terminal users. To achieve this, IMSI interceptors intervene between the phone operator's network and the target client terminal, simulating a false relay antenna. The fifth generation, referred to as 5G, is an extension of the technology exploration LTE (for "Long Term Evolution") and offers much more effective rates and services. Communication networks of the 5G generation have now introduced measures to enhance user privacy security and, in particular, to prevent the unauthorized blocking of subscriber identifiers during terminal authentication over the 5G network.5G provides specific cryptographic processing events implemented by an embedded subscriber identification module (e.g., SIM, an "eSIM" card type of the "embedded SIM," or others) to encrypt a subscriber's identifier (SUPI for the "Subscriber Permanent Identifier"). The SUPI identifier is transmitted in an encrypted form from the embedded subscriber identification module to the associated 5G network. To this end, the embedded subscriber identification module includes cryptographic processing means capable of generating an encrypted identifier known as "SUCI" ("Subscriber Concealment Identifier") from the SUPI identifier and an encryption key. By providing the encrypted SUCI identifier, the terminal client can be securely authenticated over the network, receive a temporary identifier that is replaced by the encrypted identifier SUCI, and authenticate periodically over the network. FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a telecommunications terminal (2) of a user UR. This terminal can cooperate with a 5G mobile network (indicated as 6) via an access point (4) (or, for example, a relay antenna). In this example, The terminal uses a built-in subscriber identification module (3) to generate an encrypted identifier SUCI (S4) in response to the reception step (S2) of a request RQ1 coming from the access point (4). The encrypted identifier SUCI is transmitted from message MSG1 to the access point (4) (S6), and the latter determines from SUCI that the network (6) is the network associated with the subscriber UR (S8). It should be noted that the access point (4) generally does not have the means necessary to decrypt the identifier SUCI itself. The access point (4) transmits the encrypted identifier SUCI (including other related information) to the network (6) to infer the subscriber's SUPI identifier (S10) and then decrypts the encrypted identifier SUCI (S12).The network (6) and the subscriber identification module (3) perform a mutual authentication procedure together and establish a secure channel (step S14). When this step S14 is completed, the network (6) transmits the SUPI identifier in a decrypted form to the access point (4) (S16). From the SUPI, the access point (S18) determines a provisional identifier called "5G-GUTI" to record along with the SUPI identifier of the subscriber UR. The access point (4) transmits the provisional identifier 5G-GUTI to the built-in subscriber identification module (3) to record it locally (S22) (S20). Then, the built-in subscriber identification module (3) can be periodically authenticated using the network (6) through the provisional identifier 5G-GUTI transmitted to the access point (4). In this way, the user identifier SUPI is not communicated in a decrypted form between the terminal (2) and the access point (4), which prevents any unauthorized interception of the SUPI by a malicious third party monitoring the communication. The access point (4) can also periodically renew (S24) the temporary identifier 5G-GUTI attributed to the built-in subscriber identification module (3) to limit the risk of the terminal (2) being tracked by a malicious third party. As can be seen in FIG. 2, the built-in subscriber identification module (3) can later re-authenticate by transmitting the current temporary identifier 5G-GUTI to the access point (4) (S30). The access point (4) retrieves the associated SUPI identifier (S32) by referring to a database. Then, the access point (4) transmits the SUPI identifier retrieved from the database to the network (6) (S34). In SUPI, the network (6) can now perform a new procedure for authentication and establishing a secure channel (S36).The measures described above limit the risk of fraudulent interception by malicious third parties by securing the Subscriber SUPI identifier during client terminal authentication over 5G networks. Consequently, personal data and user privacy are better protected. However, there is a problem in that the performance of client terminals degrades when accessing 5G networks and using associated services because the encryption processing events required for SUPI identifier encryption are very expensive in terms of resources and processing time. Currently, there is no satisfactory encryption solution to achieve a good compromise between a high level of security for the Subscriber Identifier and effective access to the communication network (rapid and secure authentication), whether in 5G networks or other types of communication networks. More generally, effective encryption processing is required to encrypt or decrypt data (whether it is the SCCI identifier or other data in a different context) while providing a good trade-off between the level of encryption security and encryption performance (resource cost, processing time). means of solving the problem To this end, the present invention relates to a first encryption processing method executed by a first device that enables the encryption of data.In particular, the object of the present invention is a first cryptographic processing method executed by a device cooperating with a second system, said method comprising: - an initialization phase comprising: o a determination of a provisional generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptical curve; and o a determination of a provisional key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptical curve forming a public key associated with a second system; and - an encryption phase comprising: o M <N이고, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키(second secret key) k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; o 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계, 여기서 P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; o SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한, 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트(intermediate point) SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표의 계산 단계; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수의 적용에 의해 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계: o 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 대응 유도 단계 동안 유도된 상기 적어도 하나의 키로부터 데이터의 암호화; 및 o 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 공개 키 P 및 암호화된 데이터를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계를 포함한다.The present invention performs a first cryptographic process based on an elliptic curve (e.g., Diffie-Hellman type) that generates a shared secret (or common secret) to securely encrypt data by ensuring a suitable trade-off between the achieved level of security and the cost required for resources and processing time. To this end, the generator point G and public key Q used to calculate the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 (or at least one coordinate of SP1) are replaced by the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' obtained during the initialization step, respectively, and these parameters G' and Q' both depend on the same secret key d' coded in N bits. In particular, a high level of security is ensured by using the first secret key d' coded in N bits to determine the temporary generator point G' and the temporary public key Q'. The temporary generator point G' and the temporary public key Q' occur during the encryption step and the calculation step of the public key P and the coordinates of the intermediate point SP1, thereby enhancing the security of these calculations. In this way, the values ​​of the public key P and the coordinates depend not only on the second secret key k (coded in M ​​bits) but also on the first secret key d' (coded in N bits). Additionally, by subdividing the calculation of these two elements into two stages, the device may limit the resources required to determine the public key P and the coordinates, or at least improve the management of such resources. In the initialization stage, the device may determine the temporary generator point G' and / or temporary key Q' by acquiring them from an external source or calculating them at an appropriate time, for example, upstream of the encryption stage, for example during an inactive period, or at least when the necessary resources are available.Therefore, regardless of the data to be encrypted, the encryption speed of the data can be accelerated by predetermining a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q' during the initialization phase so that they can be used immediately when the encryption phase is triggered. The present invention performs the most expensive encryption calculations in terms of time and resources during the initialization phase before starting the encryption phase. The first secret key d' is coded with more bits than the second secret key k, which is the initialization phase that concentrates the most expensive calculations. Therefore, the calculation operations during the encryption phase are less expensive to the extent that the resolution of k occurring in the third and fourth products is low. According to an embodiment, the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' are received from outside the device during the initialization phase. The temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' can be registered by the device, for example, in the device's non-volatile memory, and thus can be retrieved and used later during the encryption phase. According to this embodiment, the device does not need to calculate generator point G' and temporary key Q'. According to a specific embodiment, the method includes a step of obtaining data to be encrypted (prior to the encryption step of said data). Such data may be received or determined in any way. According to a specific embodiment, the determination of secret key k, the calculation of public key P, and the calculation of at least one coordinate of intermediate point SP1 or the derivation of at least one key are performed in advance prior to the step of obtaining data to be encrypted. According to an embodiment, the public key P enables the second system to recalculate at least one coordinate of intermediate point SP1 from a scalar forming the second system's secret key, where SP1=[a]P, and at least one coordinate of intermediate point SP1 enables the second system to decrypt the encrypted data. According to an embodiment, N=256 bits and M=32 bits, 48 ​​bits, 64 bits, or 128 bits.According to an embodiment, the initialization step comprises: - a step of determining a first random scalar that forms the first secret key d' of N bits; - a step of calculating a temporary generator point G' that is equal to a first product such as G'=[d']G; and - a step of calculating a temporary key Q' that is equal to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q. According to an embodiment, following the initialization step, the method comprises a step of registering the temporary generator G' and the temporary key Q' in the non-volatile memory of the corresponding device. According to an embodiment, the encryption step is triggered by the detection of at least one event, and the initialization step is performed prior to the detection. According to an embodiment, while deriving at least one key, the application of a key derivation function to at least one coordinate of an intermediate point SP1 generates an encryption key, an initialization vector, and a MAC key; wherein the encryption comprises: - a step of applying an encryption function to decrypt the data from the encryption key and the initialization vector; and - a step of calculating an authentication code MAC from the encrypted data and the MAC key; Here, apart from the public key P and the encrypted data, the device transmits an authentication code MAC (MC1) to the second system so that the second system can verify the integrity of the encrypted data. According to an embodiment, the device performs at least two consecutive repetitions of the encryption step at the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q determined during the initialization step to encrypt data transmitted to the second system for decryption. In other words, multiple repetitions of the encryption step can be performed using the same temporary generator point G' and the same temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step, thereby further reducing the cost required for the resources and processing time required to perform data encryption.Accordingly, the present invention further accelerates the processing executed by the device because there is no need to perform an initialization step prior to each encryption step. According to an embodiment, for at least one iteration of the encryption step, the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' used during the current iteration are equal to the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 calculated during the previous iteration of the encryption step, respectively. According to an embodiment, when the device detects that it has performed at least X consecutive iterations of the encryption step, where X is an integer such that X≥1, at the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step to transmit encrypted data to a second system, the method comprises: - a step of executing a new iteration of the initialization step to update the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' at a new first secret random key d' different from the first random key determined during the previous iteration of the initialization step; The above-mentioned updated temporary generator G' and updated temporary key Q' are used during at least one subsequent iteration of the encryption step to transmit new encrypted data to a second system. Thus, the device can maintain excellent processing performance while enhancing security by periodically updating parameters G' and Q', for example, when the device is authenticated multiple times over a network. In particular, regularly updating parameters G' and Q' (and thus the first secret key d') prevents a malicious third party from tracking the device over the time it is registered with an embedded subscriber identification module with a communication network. Since these keys are distinguished not only by the secret key k but also by this secret key k and the temporary generator point G', it is actually difficult for a third party to track the user based on the public key P exchanged during various iterations of the encryption step or method.According to an embodiment, the first method is as follows: - The second system is a communication network; - The device is a built-in subscriber identification module of the terminal for authenticating the terminal through the communication network; - Data includes an identifier of the built-in subscriber identification module; - During the encryption, the identifier is encrypted based on at least one key derived during the derivation step to obtain the encrypted identifier, and - During the transmission step, the public key P and the encrypted identifier are transmitted to an access point of the communication network to authenticate the embedded subscriber identification module through the communication network. According to an embodiment, the encryption step is triggered when at least one event is detected, the initialization step is performed prior to the detection, and the at least one event includes the step of receiving a request from the access point of the communication network to register the embedded subscriber identification module with the communication network. According to an embodiment, the communication network is a 5G mobile network and the identifier of the embedded subscriber identification module is a SUPI identifier. The present invention particularly improves the encryption processing event performed by the embedded subscriber identification module to encrypt the subscriber's SUPI identifier and also ensures a good trade-off between the achieved security level and the required resource cost and processing time. In a specific embodiment, another step of the first encryption processing method is determined by computer program instructions. As a result, another object of the present invention is a computer program of a data carrier (or recording medium), and this program is an encryption processing device or Generally, it is likely to be executed on a computer (or any device constituting a processor, such as an embedded subscriber identification module), and this program includes instructions suitable for performing the steps of a first encryption processing method as defined in this document. Another object of the present invention is a computer-readable recording medium (or data carrier) that includes instructions of a computer program as mentioned above.Another object of the present invention is a corresponding first cryptographic processing device configured to execute the first cryptographic processing method of the present invention. The present invention relates particularly to a cryptographic processing device capable of cooperating with a second system and comprises: - an initialization module configured to execute an initialization step comprising: o a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve; and o a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve forming a public key associated with the second system; and - an encryption module configured to execute an encryption step comprising: o M <N 인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; o P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일한, 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계; o SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 같은 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표의 계산 단계; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; o 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 단계 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초한 데이터의 암호화; 및 o 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 공개 키 P와 암호화된 데이터의 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계.특정 실시 예에 따르면, 제1 장치는 초기화 모듈에 의해 결정된 임시 생성기 G'와 임시 키 Q'를 저장하도록 구성된 메모리(memory)를 포함한다.It should be noted that other embodiments mentioned above (described below) in relation to the advantages associated with the first encryption processing method of the present invention are applied similarly to the first encryption processing device of the present invention. For each step of the first encryption processing method, the first encryption processing device of the present invention may include a corresponding module configured to execute a corresponding step. The present invention is also applied similarly to the decryption of encrypted data. In particular, the object of the present invention is a second encryption processing method performed by a second encryption processing device that allows the decryption of encrypted data based on principles similar to the first method defined above (described below). A specific object of the present invention is a second encryption processing method performed by a device cooperating with a second system, said method comprising: - an initialization step comprising: o a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming an N-bit first secret key and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve; and a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to the second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point on an elliptic curve forming a public key associated with the second system; and - a decoding step comprising the following: o M <N인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; o 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계, P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; o 공개 키 P를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계; o 제2 시스템에서 발생하는 암호화된 데이터의 수신 단계; o SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 좌표 하나 이상의 계산 단계; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; 및 o 복호화 된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 암호화된 데이터의 복호화 단계.It should be noted that, in relation to the advantages associated with the first encryption processing method of the present invention, the previously mentioned other embodiment (described below) is applied similarly to the second encryption processing method of the present invention. Specifically, according to the embodiment, a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q' are received from outside the device during the initialization step. The temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' may be registered by the device, for example, in the device's non-volatile memory, so that they can be retrieved and used later during the encryption step. According to this embodiment, the device does not need to calculate the generator point G' and the temporary key Q'. According to a specific embodiment, even the calculation of at least one coordinate of the intermediate point SP1 or the derivation of at least one key is executed prior to the step of receiving encrypted data. According to a specific embodiment, the public key P causes the second system to calculate the at least one coordinate of the intermediate point SP1 based on a scalar forming the second system's secret key, where SP1=[a]P, and the at least one coordinate of the intermediate point SP1 causes the second system to encrypt the data so that it can obtain the encrypted data. According to a specific embodiment, N=256 bits and M=32 bits, 48 ​​bits, 64 bits, or 128 bits. According to a specific embodiment, the initialization step comprises: - a step of determining a first random scalar forming the first secret key d' of N bits; - a step of calculating a temporary generator point G' equal to a first product such as G'=[d']G; and includes a step of calculating a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as - Q'=[d']Q. According to a specific embodiment, according to an initialization step, the method includes a step of registering a temporary generator G' and a temporary key Q' in the non-volatile memory of the device. According to a specific embodiment, a decryption phase is triggered when at least one event is detected, and the initialization phase is performed prior to said detection.According to a specific embodiment, while deriving at least one key, a key derivation function is applied to at least one coordinate of an intermediate point SP1 to generate a decryption key, an initialization vector, and a MAC key; the decryption step comprises: - a step of applying a decryption function to decrypt encrypted data based on the decryption key and the initialization vector; and - includes a step of calculating an authentication code MAC based on the encrypted data and the MAC key to verify the integrity of the received encrypted data. According to a specific embodiment, to decrypt the encrypted data received from the second system, the device performs at least two consecutive iterations of the decryption step based on the temporary generator point G' determined during the initialization step and the temporary key Q'. According to a specific embodiment, for at least one iteration of the decryption step, the temporary generator G' and the temporary key Q' used during the current iteration are identical to the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 calculated during the iteration of the previous decryption step, respectively. According to a specific embodiment, when the device detects from the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q determined during the initialization step that it has performed at least X consecutive iterations of the decryption step to decrypt the encrypted data received from the second system, where X is an integer such that X≥1, the method also: - to a new first secret random key d' different from the first random key determined during the preceding iteration of the initialization step It includes an execution step of a new iteration of the initialization step for updating the temporary generator G' and the temporary key Q' based on; - the updated temporary generator G' and the updated temporary key Q' used during the decryption step to decrypt new encrypted data received from the second system are used.Consequently, another object of the present invention is a computer program on a data carrier (or recording medium), which is likely to be executed on an encryption processing unit or generally on a computer (or, for example, likely to be executed on any device constituting a processor such as an embedded subscriber identification module), and which includes instructions adapted to perform steps of a second encryption processing method as defined in this document. Another object of the present invention is a computer-readable recording medium (or data carrier) that includes computer program instructions as mentioned above. It should be noted that the computer program mentioned in this presentation may use any programming language and may be used in the form of source code, object code, or intermediate code between source code and object code, in a partially compiled format or other preferred form. Another object of the present invention is a data carrier (or recording medium) readable by an embedded subscriber identification module, which is more generally composed of computer program instructions as defined in this document. Additionally, the registration medium mentioned in this presentation may be an entity or device capable of storing the program. For example, the medium may include rewritable non-volatile memory or ROM (e.g., CD-ROM or microelectronic circuit ROM) or self-registering means (e.g., storage means such as a disk (floppy disk) or hard drive). On the other hand, the data carrier may be a transmittable medium such as an electrical or optical signal that can be transmitted via an electrical or optical cable, radio, or other means. The program according to the present invention may be downloaded, in particular, via a network of the Internet type. Alternatively, the data carrier may be an integrated circuit into which the program is integrated, or a circuit suitable for execution or to be used for the execution of the method in question.Another object of the present invention is a second encryption processing corresponding device configured to execute the second encryption processing method of the present invention. The present invention is particularly related to an encryption processing device capable of cooperating with a second system as follows, and comprises: - an initialization module configured to execute an initialization step comprising: o a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve; and o a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve forming a public key associated with the second system, and - a decryption module configured to execute a decryption step comprising: o M <N인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; o 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계, P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; o 공개 키 P를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계; o 제2 시스템에서 발생하는 암호화된 데이터 수신하는 단계; o SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 같은 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 좌표 하나 이상의 계산 단계; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; 및 o 복호화 된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 암호화된 데이터의 복호화 단계.특정 실시 예에 따르면, 제2 장치는 초기화 모듈에 의해 결정된 임시 생성기 G'와 임시 키 Q'를 저장하도록 구성된 메모리를 포함한다.본 발명의 제2 암호화 처리 방법과 관련하여 앞서 언급한 다른 실시 예(이하 설명된 것) 와 관련된 장점들은 본 발명의 제2 암호화 처리 장치와 유사하게 적용된다는 점에 유의해야 한다.For each step of the second encryption processing method, the second encryption processing device of the present invention may include a corresponding module configured to execute said step. According to the embodiments, the present invention is executed through software and / or hardware components. In this regard, the term “module” in this document may correspond to both software components and hardware components or a set of hardware and software components. A software component corresponds to one or more computer programs, one or more program subprograms, or elements of a program or software capable of executing more than one function or set of functions, and is accordingly described for the corresponding module below. In the same way, a hardware component corresponds to any element of a hardware assembly (or hardware) capable of executing a function or set of functions according to what is described in this document for the corresponding module. It may be a programmable hardware component or an integrated processor for software execution, such as an integrated circuit, a smart card, a memory card, an electronic board for firmware execution, etc. Brief explanation of the drawing Other features and advantages of the present invention will become apparent in the following description in conjunction with additional drawings showing embodiments that are not of a limiting nature. FIG. 1 is a diagram schematically illustrating a conventional authentication process for a communication terminal using a 5G network. FIG. 2 is a diagram schematically illustrating a conventional renewal process for authentication of a communication terminal through a 5G network. FIG. 3 illustrates, in diagram form, the steps of an encryption process for a subscriber identifier to authenticate with a 5G network. FIG. 4 illustrates, in diagram form, the steps of a decryption method for a subscriber identifier executed by a 5G network. FIG. 5 illustrates an encryption processing device that authenticates a user communication terminal through a communication network according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 6 illustrates a function module executed by an encryption processing device according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 7 illustrates the steps of an encryption method performed by an encryption processing device in the form of a diagram according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 8 illustrates the steps of an encryption method performed by a communication network in the form of a diagram according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 9 illustrates the steps of an encryption method performed by an encryption processing device in the form of a diagram according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 10 illustrates the steps of an encryption method performed by an encryption processing device in the form of a diagram according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 11 illustrates the steps of an encryption method performed by an encryption processing device in the form of a diagram according to a specific embodiment of the present invention. Specific details for implementing the invention The present invention proposes executing cryptographic processing events to encrypt or decrypt data, ensuring a good compromise between security levels and processing costs. The object of the present invention is to encrypt a subscriber identifier for authenticating a user over a communication network, although this is not particularly proprietary (e.g., in the case of encrypting the password of a SUPI identifier in the context of authentication over a 5G network). However, the present invention encrypts or decrypts all data regardless of whether it is a subscriber identifier or other appropriate data for a communication network. In particular, the present invention establishes a common secret (or shared secret) in light of transmitting encrypted data from a device to a third-party entity or decrypting encrypted data received in an encrypted form. The present invention particularly provides a cryptographic processing method executed by a cryptographic processing device (hereinafter also referred to as the "device" or "processing device"). This process includes an initialization step in which the device determines a provisional generator point G' and a provisional key Q' of an elliptical curve. This is an encryption step in which the device determines a public key P based on a generator point G' and encrypts data based on a temporary key Q'. Therefore, the device can transmit the encrypted data and the public key P to a system called a "second system".According to another embodiment, the present invention more specifically provides a cryptographic processing method executed by a device cooperating with a second system, said method comprising: - an initialization phase comprising: o a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve; and o a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve forming a public key associated with the second system, and - an encryption phase comprising: o M <N 인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계;o 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산, P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; o 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표의 계산 단계, 이 중간 포인트 SP1은 SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일하고; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; o 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초한 데이터의 암호화; o 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 공개 키 P와 암호화된 데이터를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계.본 발명의 또 다른 목적은 대응 장치 및 대응 컴퓨터 프로그램이다.본 발명의 또 다른 목적은 암호화된 데이터를 복호화 하는 방법이고, 이는 본 발명의 암호화 처리 방법과 유사한 원칙에 기초한다. 본 발명의 또 다른 목적은 대응 장치 및 대응 컴퓨터 프로그램이다.본 발명의 다른 측면과 장점은 앞서 언급한 도면과 관련하여 아래에 기술된 실시 예에서 나타날 것이다.In this document, exemplary embodiments of the present invention are described in the context of an embedded subscriber identity module configured to authenticate a user of a communication terminal through a 5G type communication network. To this end, the embedded subscriber identity module (e.g., SIM card or eSIM module) performs cryptographic processing to encrypt the user's SUPI identifier. The SUPI identifier may be in the form of a decimal chain (e.g., 15 digits), but various implementations are possible. According to a specific example, the SUPI identifier includes: - 3 digits representing the "Mobile Country Code" (MCC); - 2 or 3 other digits forming the "Mobile Network Code" (MNC) identifying the operator network; - the remaining digits (9 or 10) forming the identifier MSIN (for the "Subscriber Identification Number") representing the user of the operator network. However, it should be noted that the present invention is not limited to this specific example and applies more generally to the encryption or decryption of data by the cryptographic processing device of the present invention. The data to be encrypted (or decrypted) may be or include a subscriber's identifier for a communication network (5G or other types) or other data, such as, for example, personal data or data of sensitive characteristics. The present invention also applies to the encryption or decryption of data in contexts other than authentication through a communication network. A subscriber identification module embedded in a communication terminal may take various forms, particularly various modes (formats). A subscriber identification module embedded in this way may be in the form of a SIM card (or UICC in the case of a "Universal Integrated Circuit Card") or an eSIM card, also known as an EUiC.Another example of a security element is an embedded security element called an eSE ("embedded Secure Element"), which is typically soldered to a host terminal. Thus, the principles of the present invention apply to various types of security elements (e.g., SIM, eSIM card, EUICC, SE, eE, or combinations of security elements). Unless otherwise indicated, common elements or elements similar to multiple numbers have the same reference number and exhibit the same or similar characteristics, and such common elements are generally not described again for the sake of simplicity. For a clear understanding of the invention described below in specific embodiments, a method for encrypting the SUPI identifier and a method for decrypting the identifier SUCI are described below according to specific examples that do not implement the concept of the present invention. These specific examples are registered for the authentication of a subscriber over a 5G network. More precisely, as illustrated in FIG. 3, it is assumed that a communication terminal (2) includes a subscriber identification module (3) (e.g., in the form of a SIM card). This SIM (3) card authenticates user UR through a communication 5G network, denoted as 6, specifically through an access point (4) of the corresponding network. To this end, the SIM (3) card includes means for performing the operation of cryptographic processing events based on an elliptic curve (ε) selection case according to the case of a person skilled in the art. The SIM (3) card includes in memory, specifically, a generator point G of the elliptic curve (ε), a public key Q of the network (6), a SUPI identifier, a key derivation function F1, and a cryptographic function F2. During the generation step S40, the SIM (3) card randomly generates a scalar that forms a secret key k. It is assumed that this key k is coded in M ​​bits, where M is 256. Then, the SIM (3) card calculates the associated public key P (S42) based on the secret key k and the generator point G. To this end, the SIM (3) card calculates the product of k as follows (S42): Throughout this document, this notation represents the multiplication (or multiplication) of points (indicated between "[]") of an elliptic curve (indicated without hooks) by a scalar (indicated between "[]"). According to the corresponding notation (which is interchangeable throughout this document), the public key P is as follows: Then, the SIM (3) card calculates at least one coordinate CD1 (e.g., coordinates in the x direction and / or the y direction) of a point SP1 (called an intermediate point) on the elliptic curve (ε). This intermediate point SP1 is equal to the product of the secret key k and the public key Q of the network (6). In this example, it is assumed that the SIM (3) card determines only a single coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 (e.g., along x or y). During step S46, the SIM (3) card applies the key derivation function F1 to the coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 to derive a key (or parameter). In this example, the SIM (3) card derives the encryption key KY1, the initialization vector V1, and optionally the MAC key ("Message Authentication Code") indicated by KMAC1. For example, the function F1 can be a derivation function provided in the standard "ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation Function §5.6.3" and other functions are possible. Then, the SIM (3) card encrypts or encrypts (S48) the SUPI identifier based on the key (or data) obtained during the derivation step S46 to obtain an encrypted identifier SUCI that is identical to the SUPI identifier in the encrypted form. More precisely, the SIM (3) card determines the encrypted identifier SUCI by encrypting the subscriber SUPI identifier (or a sub-part of the subscriber SUPI identifier). To achieve this, the SIM (3) card applies the encryption function F2 to the SUPI identifier (or a sub-part of the latter) using the encryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1 to obtain the encrypted identifier SUCI. Additionally, based on the KMAC1 key, the SIM (3) card applies a MAC calculation function to calculate the authentication code MAC (MC1) of the encrypted identifier SUCI. For example, the MAC calculation function used may be HMAC (FIPS 198-1, July 2008) along with SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4 §6.2). For example, the function F2 may be the encryption function AES (FIPS 197) in counter mode, such as provided in the standard "SP800-38a §6.5". Through the access point (4), the SIM (3) card transmits the public key P as well as the encrypted identifier SUCI along with the authentication code MAC MC1 to the network (6) (S50).The SIM (3) card transmits an encrypted identifier SUCI with, for example, an authentication code MC1 inserted. For example, a public key P is incorporated into the encrypted identifier SUCI, even if other implementations are possible. Using the public key P allows the network (6) to decrypt the encryption of the identifier SUCI and retrieve the SUPI identifier in the decrypted form. Using the authentication code MAC MC1 allows the network (6) to verify the integrity of the encrypted identifier SUCI received from the SIM (3) card as described below. More precisely, as shown in FIG. 4, initiated through the SIM card 3 and the access point (4), the network (6) receives the encrypted identifier SUCI along with the authentication code MAC MC1 as well as the SIM card's public key P (S60). The network (6) stores in memory the secret key (indicated by a) associated with the corresponding network (6), the derivation function F1, and the decryption function F3. During the calculation step S62, the network (6) calculates at least one coordinate CD1 of the midpoint SP1 of the elliptic curve (ε). Therefore, in this example, the network (6) calculates the unique coordinates CD1 (e.g., along x or y) used by the SIM (3) card to encrypt the SUPI identifier. To do this, the network (6) determines the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1. This intermediate point is equal to the product of the secret key a and the public key P, as defined below: Here, the public key Q of the network (6) is equal to the product of the secret key a by the generator point G as defined below. As previously explained, the network (6) stores the secret key a in memory. In this way, the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 can be retrieved by calculation without knowledge of the secret key k. As illustrated in FIG. 4, the network (6) derives the encryption key KY1, the initialization vector V1, and the appropriately KMAC1-labeled MAC key by applying the key derivation function F1 in the same manner as the derivation step S46 previously performed by the SIM (3) card (S64). To do this, the network (6) applies the key derivation function F1 to the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 obtained in S62. Here, the KY1 key serves as the decryption key for decrypting the encryption of the encrypted identifier SUCI. As previously mentioned, the function F1 is a derivation function provided, for example, in the standard "ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation Function §5.6.3", and other functions are possible. During the verification step S66, the network (6) verifies the integrity of the encrypted identifier SUCI received from the SIM (3) card in S60. To this end, based on the MAC key KMAC1 obtained in S64, the network (6) calculates the authentication code MAC (MC2) of the encrypted identifier SUCI provided by the SIM (3) card. Then, the network (6) compares the authentication code MC2 calculated in S68 with the authentication code MC1 received from the SIM (3) card in S60 (S70). If the authentication code MC1 and MC2 match, the network (6) infers that the encrypted identifier SUCI received in S60 is complete. Otherwise, the encrypted identifier SUCI provided by the SIM (3) card is not complete. If it is detected that the encrypted identifier SUCI received in S60 is complete (unchanged), the network (6) decrypts the encrypted identifier SUCI according to the inverse principle of the encryption step S48 previously performed by the SIM (3) card.In particular, the network (6) decrypts or decrypts (S72) the encrypted identifier SUCI (or a sub-part of the latter) based on the decryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1 obtained during the derivation step S64 to retrieve the SUPI identifier in the decrypted form. The network (6) applies the decryption function F3 (as opposed to the encryption function F2 used by the SIM 3 card in S48) specifically to the encrypted identifier SUCI (or a sub-part of the latter) using the decryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1 to obtain the SUPI identifier. For example, the function F3 may be a counter-mode decryption function AES (FIPS 197) such as provided in the standard "SP800-38a §6.5". Based on the SUPI identifier obtained in S72, the network (6) Fig. 1 and 2 As previously described, subscriber authentication (S74) can be performed by reference. As previously mentioned, the encryption processing events of encryption and decryption performed by the SIM (3) card and the network (6), respectively, allow the SIM (3) card to be securely authenticated to the network (6) without providing the SUPI identifier in a decrypted form. These encryption processing events are advantageous in that they particularly address the blocking of unauthorized SUPI identifiers by malicious third parties. However, since these encryption processing events are particularly costly in terms of resources and processing time, these costs are not always compatible with available resources and applicable time constraints. In particular, the calculation of the public key P (where P=[k]G) (S42, Fig. 3The calculation (S44) of at least one coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 (SP1=[k]Q) and ) is a consumer of resources and processing time. However, the complexity of these two calculations stems particularly from the fact that the secret key k is coded with a relatively large number of bits, specifically 256 bits (M=256), and other values ​​of M are possible. Therefore, the object of the present invention is to improve the cryptographic processing events executed by the embedded subscriber identification module, in particular, to encrypt the subscriber's SUPI identifier and ensure a trade-off between the achieved level of security and the necessary costs in resources and processing time. As already noted, the present invention applies more generally to the effective and secure encryption or decryption of all data, whether it is a subscriber identifier (SUCI in the context of 5G or other) or other data that is securely protected and distributed. The principles of the present invention are described here, particularly in the embodiments. FIG. 5 IsThe encryption processing unit DV1 is schematically illustrated and, later referred to as the "Device," can cooperate with the communication network HN1 via the access point AP1. Here, it is assumed that the Device DV1 is a Subscriber Identification Module embedded in the communication terminal T1 and the communication network HN1 is a 5G mobile network. Therefore, the Device DV1 is specifically designed to authenticate subscribers using the network HN1. The Device DV1 communicates with the network HN1 through the communication terminal T1, which includes appropriate communication means. The Subscriber Identification Module DV1 can use various formats, such as a SIM card or an eSIM card. Specifically, the Device DV1 may be a removable card or a device soldered to the terminal T1. Although device DV1 is embedded in terminal T1, a variation is possible in which device DV1 is not embedded in terminal T1 but cooperates remotely with the latter. In this example, terminal T1 can be any 5G-compatible client terminal, such as a mobile phone (smartphone), a tablet, etc. More precisely, in this example, device DV1 comprises at least one processor 20, volatile memory (RAM) 22, a communication interface 24, and non-volatile memory MR1. In this example, memory MR1 is rewritable non-volatile memory or read-only memory (ROM or EEPROM or FLASH), and this memory constitutes a recording medium (or data carrier) according to a specific embodiment, is readable by device DV1, and has a computer program PG1 registered therein according to a specific embodiment. This computer program PG1 includes instructions for performing steps of an encryption processing method according to a specific embodiment. The steps of this method are described in detail below in specific embodiments. Memory MR1 can store data DT1 to be encrypted, in particular, according to the principles of the present invention.As mentioned later, it is assumed here that this data DT1 is a subscriber identifier of the SUPI type (or a sub-part of the latter) that allows subscriber authentication through a 5G network, or at least contains it. However, other types of subscriber identifiers are also possible. The principles of the present invention may be applied to encrypting data to be protected. This data DT1 may be obtained by the device DV1 in some way (receiving, determining, etc.). Memory MR1 may also store data (or parameters) used during the encryption processing method of the present invention to encrypt this data DT1. In the example considered herein, memory MR1 may specifically store a generator point G, a public key Q associated with network HN1, an induction function F1, and an encryption function F2. Memory MR1 may also store data determined during the encryption processing method, specifically a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q'. The characteristics and usage of these various parameters are described in detail later. The communication interface 24 is configured to enable the device DV1 to cooperate with the terminal T1 embedded therein. Device DV1 communicates with network remote HN1 using terminal T1. The characteristics of this interface 24 may vary depending on the case. Additionally, it should be noted that in memory, network HN1 includes a decryption function F3 corresponding to the inverse function of the encryption function F2 used by device DV1 to encrypt data DT1, as well as a secret key denoted by a, and a derivation function F1. It is evident that some elements typically implemented in communication terminals 5G and embedded subscriber identification modules have been intentionally omitted because they are not necessary for understanding the present invention. Furthermore, it should be noted that device DV1 shown in FIG. 5 is only one embodiment, and other embodiments are possible within the scope of the present invention.Those skilled in the art should understand that some elements of the device DV1 are described herein to make the invention easier to understand, and that these elements are not mandatory for carrying out the invention. According to a specific embodiment, as can be seen in FIG. 6, a processor 20 controlled by the computer program PG1 implements an initialization module MD1 and a cryptographic module MD7. According to a specific embodiment, the initialization module MD1 is configured to execute an initialization step comprising: - a step of determining a temporary generator point G', which is equal to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve (ε); and - a step of determining a temporary key Q', which is equal to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve (ε) forming a public key associated with a second system. The elliptic curve (ε) and the positive integer N used may be selected by those skilled in the art according to the application under consideration. The value of N can be selected based on the preferred security level, resource cost constraints, and processing time. As explained later, N can be equal to 256. For example, the first secret key d' is coded in 256 bits (however, other values ​​are possible). Those skilled in the art may adjust the value of N case on a case-by-case basis. The size of N can be selected as a function of the size of the elliptic curve (ε) used (i.e., the size of the order of point groups generated by the generator point G). For example, if a 384-bit elliptic curve (ε) is used, the number of bits for N is selected as 384 bits. In this way, the value of N can be selected from one of the following values. For example, N = 192, 224, 256, 384, 521, or 512 bits. The value of N can be selected as a function of the elliptic curve (ε) used (as a function of its size). M is M <N이라는 것을 감안할 때 M 값은 사용된 타원 곡선(ε)의 함수로 선택할 수도 있다.As explained later, various implementations of the initialization module MD1 are possible. The initialization module MD1 can be configured to acquire or determine a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q' during the initialization phase according to any appropriate method. According to a specific example, the initialization module MD1 is configured to receive the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' from outside the device DV1. The temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' are registered in the non-volatile memory MR1 and can be retrieved and used later during the encryption phase as explained later. According to a specific example, the initialization module MD1 determines G' and Q' by calculating based on a scalar denoted by d'. To this end, the initialization module MD1 is composed of a first determination module MD2 and a first calculation module MD4 as shown in FIG. 6, but other implementations are also possible. The first determination module MD2 is configured to determine a first scalar that forms an N-bit first secret key d'. The first calculation module MD4 calculates the temporary generator point G', which is equal to the first product such as - G'=[d']G; It is configured to calculate a temporary key Q' identical to the second product, such as - Q'=[d']Q. The results obtained for G' and Q' can be stored in the memory of device DV1 (live memory 22 or non-volatile memory MR1). It should be noted that an embodiment is possible without an initialization module executing the MD2 and MD4 modules described above. The initialization module MD1 can obtain G' and Q' in any way.In addition, the MD7 encryption module is configured to execute an encryption step consisting of the following steps: - M <N 인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; - 장치 DV1과 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계, P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; - 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표 CD1의 계산 단계, 타원 곡선(ε), 이 중간 포인트 SP1은 SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일하고; - 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; - 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초한 데이터의 암호화; 및 - 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 공개 키 P와 암호화된 데이터의 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계.양의 정수 M은 문제의 애플리케이션(M<N)에 따라, 특히 선호하는 보안 수준 및 자원 및 처리 시간의 비용 제약에 따라 당업자의 사례별로 선택할 수 있다. 예를 들어 M은 32, 48, 64 또는 128 비트와 같고 N은 256 비트와 같다고 간주된다(그러나 다른 커플 값 (N, M) 이 가능하다).아래에 기술된 실시 예에서, 본 발명의 측면에서 "제2 시스템"은 통신 네트워크 HN1 또는 더 일반적으로 액세스 포인트 AP1을 포함한 네트워크 HN1이라고 생각된다.도 6에서 볼 수 있듯이 특정 예에 따라 그러나 암호화 모듈(encryption module) MD7은 제2 결정 모듈(second determination module) MD6, 제2 계산 모듈(second calculation module) MD8, 키 유도를 위한 모듈 MD10, 암호화 모듈(encryption module) MD12 및 전송 모듈(sending module) MD14로 구성되며 다른 구현이 가능하다.보다 구체적으로, 제2 결정 모듈 MD6은 M<N인 M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라를 결정하도록 구성된다.The second computation module MD8 is configured to compute the following: - a public key P associated with device DV1, where P is equal to the third product P=[k]G'; and - the coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 of the elliptic curve (ε), where the intermediate point SP1 is equal to the fourth product SP1=[k]Q'. The key derivation module MD10 is configured to derive at least one key by applying a key derivation function to the at least one coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 calculated by the second computation module (MD8). The data encryption module MD12 is configured to encrypt based on at least one key derived by the key derivation module MD10 to obtain encrypted data. The transmission module MD14 is configured to transmit the public key P and the encrypted data to the second system (e.g., network HN1 in this example) for decryption by the second system. The configuration and function of the MD1-MD14 modules of device DV1 will be accurately represented in the embodiments described below. It should be noted that the MD1-MD14 module, as illustrated in FIG. 6, illustrates only one non-limiting embodiment of the present invention. In general, for each step of the cryptographic processing method of the present invention, the cryptographic processing device of the present invention may include a corresponding module configured to execute said step. In general, the concept of the present invention is particularly such that, on one hand, a generator point G is used to calculate the public key P in step S42 (Fig. 3) and the public key Q determines at least one coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 in step S44 (Fig. 3), while on the other hand, as previously mentioned, they are replaced by a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q', respectively, during the encryption step. Both the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' are generated based on an arbitrary scalar secret key d' coded in a number of bits N higher than the number of bits M in which the secret key k used in the encryption step is coded.By selecting a relatively high number N (e.g., N=256), a high level of security is maintained, while M(M <N) 수를 제한하여 암호화 단계에서 수행되는 계산 비용을 절감할 수 있다. 이미 표시된 바와 같이 숫자 N(M보다 큼)을 사용된 타원 곡선(ε)의 함수로 선택할 수 있다. 예를 들어 숫자 N은 사용된 타원 곡선(ε)에서 제공하는 최대 보안에 대응할 수 있다.비밀 키 k가 N보다 낮은 비트 수 M에 코딩 되는 범위까지, 공개 키 P와 중간 포인트 SP1의 좌표 CD1 중 하나 이상의 좌표 CD1을 결정하기 위해 이루어진 계산의 복잡성이 조정된 단계로 유지되어 암호화 보안 수준과 리소스 비용 및 처리 시간 사이의 적절한 절충안이 보장된다. 이러한 절충안은 N과 M의 값을 각 상황에 맞게 조정하여 사례별로 조정할 수 있다.나중에 언급되는 바와 같이, 임시 생성기 포인트 G' 및 임시 키 Q'는 G' 및 Q' 업스트림을 유리하게 획득하고 따라서 암호화 처리 장치가 암호화 단계에 참여할 때 암호화 처리 이벤트를 가속화하는 암호화 단계 이전의 초기화 단계 동안 결정될 수 있다. 또한 초기화 단계에서 획득한 G'와 Q'의 동일한 값을 암호화 단계에서 여러 번(예를 들어, 여러 반복 동안) 사용할 수 있다. 각 암호화 단계 이전에 초기화 단계를 실행할 필요가 없으므로 장치가 수행하는 처리 속도를 더욱 가속화한다.본 발명의 특정 실시 예는 현재 도 7을 참조하여 설명된다. 보다 정확하게, 암호화 처리 장치 DV1은 특정 실시 예에 따라 프로그램 PG1을 실행함으로써 본 발명의 암호화 처리 방법을 실행한다.이 예에서 단말기 T1에 내장된 가입자 식별 모듈을 구성하는 장치 DV1은 특히 데이터 DT1을 암호화하는 것을 목표로 암호화 처리를 실행한 다음 이러한 방식으로 획득한 암호화된 데이터(DTC1로 표기된)를 통신 네트워크 HN1로 전송한다고 가정한다.In this example, the data DT1 to be encrypted is or contains the SUPI identifier (or a sub-part of the latter) of subscriber UR for network HN1. As is well known to those skilled in the art, the SUPI identifier identifies a user with a 5G network to which they have subscribed. This data DT1 can be obtained by device DV1 in some way (receiving, determining, etc.). As described below, the cryptographic processing performed by device DV1 is based specifically on the use of an elliptic curve (ε) chosen by those skilled in the art as a function of the use case. More specifically, device DV1 determines a temporary generator point G' and a temporary key Q' while executing the initialization step S100. The temporary generator point G' is equivalent to the following first product: Here, d' is the first random scalar forming the first secret key of N bits, and G is the generator point of the elliptic curve (ε) above. Also, the temporary key Q' is equivalent to the following second product: Here, Q is the public key associated with the second system in terms of invention, specifically a point on the elliptic curve (ε) forming the network HN1 of this example. The bit level N of the secret key d' is coded bit by bit, for example, fixed at 256 bits or higher if a higher level of security is required. As previously mentioned, various methods are possible to obtain G' and Q'. According to the first example, the device DV1 itself does not compute G' and Q' but receives the latter from an external source. For example, the G' and Q' parameters are loaded into the device DV1 during initial private setup or are loaded into the device DV1 even while the device DV1 is already in use by terminal T1. According to another example shown in Fig. 7, the device DV1 itself computes G' and Q' based on the first random scalar d'. This specific example is described in detail below. The initialization step S100 includes steps S101, S102, and S104 described below. During the determination step S101, device DV1 determines a first random scalar d' that forms a first secret key of N bits. As previously described, it is assumed that N is fixed at 256 or higher if necessary. In the example considered here, device DV1 itself randomly generates the scalar d'. According to a variation, device DV1 may receive this random scalar d' from an external source (e.g., during personal setup or after execution). Device DV1 calculates a temporary generator point G' of the elliptic curve (ε) (S102). This temporary generator point G' is equivalent to the following first product: Here, d' is the first random scalar determined in decision step S101. Device DV1 (S104) also calculates a temporary key Q' identical to the following second product: [Equation 7] Here, Q is a point on the elliptic curve (ε) that forms the public key associated with the second system, specifically the network HN1 in this example. To this end, device DV1 extracts parameters G and Q previously stored in memory MR1. Calculation steps S102 and S104 can be performed simultaneously or in any order. Once the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' are determined in S100, device DV1 (S106, FIG. 7) stores these parameters G' and Q' in memory MR1 so that they can be used during the next encryption step S107. During the encryption step S107 (Fig. 7), device DV1 uses the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' obtained during the initialization step S100 to decrypt the data DT1. As previously mentioned, in this example, this data DT1 is network HN1 ( Fig. 5It is assumed that the SUPI identifier of the subscriber UR for ) (or a sub-part of the latter) is configured. As explained in detail below, in this example, encryption step S107 includes steps S108, S110, S112, S114, S116, and S118. During decision step S108, device DV1 is M <N인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라를 결정한다. 제2 비밀 키 k의 비트 단위의 코딩 레벨 M은 자원 및 처리 시간 측면에서 보안 레벨과 암호화 처리 비용 사이에서 각 경우에 달성하고자 하는 타협의 함수로서 당업자에 의해 선택된다. 리소스 및 처리 시간 측면에서 암호화 처리의 보안 및 비용 비트 단위의 코딩 수준이 높을수록 보안은 강화되지만 리소스가 더 필요할수록 암호화 단계에서 처리 이벤트 속도에 미치는 영향은 높아진다.특정 예에 따르면, N과 M은 N이 256 비트와 동일하고 M은 32, 48, 64 또는 128 비트와 동일하고 다른 조합(N, M)은 M<N이 존중되는 정도까지 가능하도록 선택된다.본 발명의 원칙 중 하나는 초기화 단계 S100 동안 암호화 계산에 개입하는 제1 비밀 키 d가 암호화 단계 S107 동안 암호화 계산에 개입하는 제2 비밀 키 k보다 더 많은 비트(N 비트) 로 코딩 된다는 것이다. 이 제2 비밀 키 k는 M<N으로 M 비트에서만 코딩 된다. M과 N의 차이는 사례별로 조정할 수 있다. 이는 암호화 단계 S107보다 초기화 단계 S100에 기초한 처리 비용이 많이 들며, 이는 중요하며 일반적으로 주어진 순간에 신속하게 수행되어야 한다. 나중에 설명되는 바와 같이, 초기화 단계 S100 동안 획득한 동일한 파라미터 G'와 Q'를 사용하여 암호화 단계 S107을 여러 번 반복하여 리소스 및 처리 시간의 비용을 더욱 제한할 수 있다.그런 다음 장치 DV1은 장치 DV1과 연관된 공개 키 P(S110)를 계산하고 P는 다음과 같은 제3 곱과 동일하다: [수학식 8] Therefore, the secretivity of the discrete logarithm of this public key P([k][d']) depends on the bit N size of the first secret key d' and the bit M (bit M) size of the second secret key k. During the calculation step S112, the device DV1 calculates one or more coordinates CD1 of an intermediate point SP1, and said intermediate point SP1 is equal to the following fourth product: While this is possible, device DV1 does not need to determine all coordinates of the intermediate point SP1 on the elliptic curve (ε). Device DV1 can calculate coordinates CD1 according to direction x and / or direction y, and these directions x and y define the space in which the elliptic curve (ε) extends. Later, it is assumed that it is simple for device DV1 to determine a single coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 in step S112. During the derivation step S114, device DV1 applies the key derivation function F1 to the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 to derive at least one key. That is, device DV1 executes the key derivation function F1 to determine one or more keys based on the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1. The nature and number of keys may vary depending on the use case, and in particular, may vary depending on the encryption type and the F1 function being considered. In step S114, device DV1 may generate a single key or multiple keys, or keys, used in the next encryption step S116 to decrypt the data DT1. In this example, it is assumed that separate parameters (or components), specifically the encryption key KY1, the initialization vector V1, and the MAC key denoted as KMAC1, are generated in the application of the derivation function F1 considering the coordinate CD1. As described below, variations that do not involve the KMAC1 key are possible. It should be noted that part of the encryption step S107 may be performed in advance before the data DT1 to be encrypted is determined or obtained by device DV1, or before device DV1 determines that the data DT1 should be encrypted. According to a specific example, prior to the encryption step S116, the method includes a step for obtaining the data DT1 to be encrypted (not shown in the figure) and / or a step for determining whether the data DT1 should be encrypted. This data DT1 may be received or determined in some way.According to a specific example, the step S108 for determining the secret key k, the step S110 for calculating the public key P, and the step S112 for calculating at least one coordinate CD1 of the intermediate point SP1, or even the derivation step S114 (or at least some of these steps) are performed in advance to further accelerate the encryption method, that is, before the device DV1 obtains the data DT1 to be encrypted or before the device DV1 determines that the data DT1 should be encrypted. During the encryption step S116, the device DV1 obtains the encrypted data DTC1 by encrypting the data DT1 based on the encryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1 previously derived during the derivation step S114. In the example considered here, the device DV1 uses an encryption function F2 to encrypt the data DT1 based on the encryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1. As previously described, the encryption function F2 is stored in the memory MR1 of the device DV1 in this example. Encryption step S116 encrypts the subscriber SUPI identifier (or a sub-part of the latter) contained in the data DT1 to generate encrypted data DTC1 corresponding to the encrypted version of the identifier SUCI (or a sub-part of the latter) SUPI. In this example, it is also considered that during encryption step S116, device DV1 calculates an authentication code MAC (MC1) based on the encrypted data DTC1 and the KMAC1 key. The authentication code MAC is calculated based on the encrypted data DTC1 according to an appropriate method. As is well known to those skilled in the art, the code MAC is a code accompanying the data to ensure the integrity of the latter by allowing verification of the code MAC later after the data in question has been distributed or processed. In this way, using the authentication code MC1 in the present case, network HN1 can later verify whether the received encrypted data DTC1 is mandatory (without undergoing modification).During transmission step S118, device DV1 transmits the public key P calculated in S110 and the encrypted data DTC1 for decryption by network HN1 to network HN1 (second system). In this example, device DV1 performs transmission S118 through the access point AP1 of network HN1. As described later, network HN1 can decrypt the received encrypted data TDC1. Specifically, the public key P causes network HN1 to recalculate the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1 based on the scalar forming network HN1's secret key, where: By using the coordinates CD1 of the intermediate point SP1, network HN1 can decrypt the encrypted data DTC1 without knowledge of the secret keys k and d', as described later. In the example considered here, apart from the public key P and the encrypted data DTC1, during step S118, device DV1 transmits the authentication code MC1 calculated in S116 to network HN1 so that network HN1 can verify the integrity of the encrypted data DTC1 received later. Device DV1 may insert the authentication code MC1 into the encrypted data DTC1 before transmitting S118 to network HN1. Depending on the variation, the authentication code MC1 (S118) is transmitted along with the encrypted data DTC1. It should be noted that the principle of the present invention can be implemented with or without transmitting the code MAC. However, the use of code MAC is advantageous to the extent that it allows the receiving entity (network HN1 in this example) to verify the integrity of the received encrypted data DTC1. The present invention performs cryptographic processing (e.g., Diffie-Hellman type) based on elliptic curves to encrypt (or decrypt) data by ensuring a good trade-off between the achieved level of security and the required resource costs and processing time. To this end, the generator point G and public key Q used to calculate the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 (or the coordinates CD1 of SP1) in steps S42 and S44, respectively, as previously described with reference to FIG. 3, are replaced with the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' obtained in the initialization step, respectively, and these parameters G' and Q' both depend on the same secret key d' coded in N bits. A high level of security is guaranteed, in particular, because the first secret key d' coded in N bits is used to determine the temporary generator point G' and the temporary public key Q'.Temporary generator point G' and temporary public key Q' are generated when calculating the public key P and coordinate CD1 of intermediate point SP1 during the encryption phase, thereby enhancing the security of these calculations. In this way, the values ​​of public key P and coordinate CD1 depend not only on the second secret key k (coded in M ​​bits) but also on the first secret key d' (coded in N bits). Additionally, the device DV1 can improve the management of these resources by limiting the resources required to determine the public key P and coordinate CD1, or at least by subdividing the calculation of these two elements into two stages. During the initialization phase S100, the device DV1 may determine the temporary generator point G' and / or temporary key Q' by acquiring them externally or calculating them in a timely manner, for example, upstream of the encryption phase S107, for example, during an inactive period, or at least when the necessary resources are available. Therefore, when the encryption step is triggered during the initialization step, the encryption speed of data DT1 can be accelerated by predetermining the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' to be used immediately, regardless of the data to be encrypted. The present invention performs the most expensive encryption computation in terms of time and resources during the initialization step S100 before starting the encryption step S107. If the first secret key d' is coded with more bits than the second secret key k, the initialization step S100 concentrates the most expensive computation. Therefore, the computational operation during the encryption step S107 is less expensive up to the degree of low resolution of k occurring in the third and fourth multiplications (S110 and S112). According to a specific example, the encryption step S107(. Fig. 7) is triggered when at least one event is detected, and the initialization step S100 is performed before at least one event is detected. The encryption step S107 (Fig. 7) of data DT1 containing a SUPI identifier (or a sub-part of the latter) is triggered, for example, in response to the reception of a registration request (e.g., a "registration request" or "identity request" provided in the standard ETSI TS 133 501) from device DV1 with network HN1 at access point AP1. According to a specific example, the initialization step S100 occurs only once, for example, during the initial startup of device DV1 or during the manufacturing of device DV1 (e.g., during pre-personalization or personalization). As described later in a specific example, the initialization step S100 may also occur multiple times, preferably for a predefined period that is helpful for this type of processing. Furthermore, the method by which network HN1 decrypts the encrypted data DTC1 provided by device DV1 in S118 (Fig. 7) is the device It is not modified by the encryption method executed by DV1. That is, network HN1 can decrypt the encryption of DTC1 provided by device DV1 in S118 (Fig. 7) according to the same method described above in relation to Fig. 4. In relation to Fig. 8, a processing method executed by network HN1 to decrypt DTC1 data previously encrypted by device DV1 in accordance with the principles of the present invention is described below. During the receiving step S130, network HN1 receives the encrypted data DTC1 and public key P provided by device DV1 through access point AP1. Here, it is assumed that an authentication code MC1 is included in the encrypted data DTC1.During calculation step S132, identical to the previously described calculation step S62 (Fig. 4), network HN1 obtains at least one coordinate CD1 of the midpoint SP1 of the elliptic curve (ε), i.e., the coordinate CD1 determined in this example in S112. Fig. 7 Calculate ). Thus, in this example, the network (6) calculates the unique coordinate CD1 (e.g., along x or y) used by the device DV1 to encrypt the data DT1. The intermediate point SP1 is equal to the product of the network HN1's secret key and the public key P as defined below: Given that the public key Q of network HN1 is equal to the product of the secret key a by the generator point G as defined below: As explained above, network HN1 has stored secret key a in memory. Therefore, through calculation, the coordinates CD1 of intermediate point SP1 can be retrieved without knowledge of the first secret key d' or the second secret key k. As can be seen in Fig. 8, network HN1 performs steps S134, S136, S136, S138, S140, S142, and S144, respectively, in the same manner as steps S64, S66, S68, S70, S72, and S74 as previously shown in Fig. 4. In particular, network HN1 derives the encryption key KY1, the initialization vector V1, and the appropriate MAC key indicated by the KMAC1 MAC key by applying the key derivation function F1, in the same manner as the derivation step S114 previously performed by device DV1. To do this, network HN1 applies the key derivation function F1 to the coordinates CD1 of intermediate point SP1 obtained in S132. Here, the KY1 key serves as a decryption key to decrypt encrypted data DTC1, which consists of the encrypted identifier SUCI. During the verification step S136, network HN1 verifies the integrity of the encrypted data DTC1 received from device DV1 at S130. To do this, network HN1 calculates the authentication code MAC (MC2) of the encrypted data DTC1 provided by device DV1 based on the MAC key KMAC1 obtained at S134. Then, network HN1 compares the authentication code MC2 calculated at S138 with the authentication code MC1 received from device DV1 at S130 (S140). If the authentication code MC1 and MC2 match, network HN1 infers that the encrypted data DTC1 received from S130 is integrated and the method performs the decryption step S142. Otherwise, the received encrypted data DTC1 is not integrated and the decryption method terminates.During the decryption step S142, network HN1 decrypts the encrypted data DTC1 (consisting of the encrypted identifier SUCI or a part of the latter) according to the inverse principle of the encryption step S116 (Fig. 7) previously performed by device DV1. In particular, network HN1 decrypts or decrypts (S142) the encrypted data DTC1 (S142) based on the decryption key KY1 and the initialization vector V1 obtained during the derivation step S134 to retrieve the data DT1 in the decrypted format of the subscriber identifier SUPI (or a sub-part of the latter). To this end, network HN1 obtains encrypted data DT1 by applying a decryption function F3 (where F3 is the inverse function of the encryption function F2 used by device DV1 in S116) to encrypted data DTC1 using decryption key KY1 and initialization vector V1. Based on the SUPI identifier contained in the data DT1 determined in S142, network HN1 can perform subscriber authentication (S144) as previously described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2. As previously mentioned, in this case, the encryption processing events of encryption and decryption executed by device DV1 and network HN1, respectively, can securely authenticate device DV1 to network HN1 without providing the subscriber's SUPI identifier in the decrypted form later. These encryption processing events are advantageous in that they enhance the security of users' personal data and private lives by addressing the unauthorized blocking of SUPI identifiers by malicious third parties. According to a specific example, the sequence of steps S100-S118 described above is Fig. 7Data DT1 in an encrypted format is encrypted by reference and executed multiple times to be transmitted to a second system or to a second system. The initialization step S100 may be repeated before each iteration of the encryption step S107. The invention is advantageous in that multiple iterations of the encryption step S107 can be performed using the same temporary generator point G' and the same temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step S100, which further reduces the cost required for resources and processing the time DT1 to perform data encryption. It is not necessary to perform the initialization step S100 before each encryption step S107. In this way, as illustrated in FIG. 9 in a specific embodiment, the device DV1 executes the initialization step S100 as described above, and then executes at least two consecutive iterations of the encryption step S107 based on the temporary generator point G' and temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step S100 to encrypt the data DT1 transmitted to a second system (network HN1) for decryption. For each iteration of the encryption step S107, the encrypted data DT1 and the second system to which the encrypted data DT1 is transmitted may also be different. In this way, the keys G' and Q' resulting from the first and second product (S102, S104) during the initialization step S104 may be used multiple times during several consecutive iterations of the encryption step (S107) to communicate with one or more second systems, for example, to authenticate subscriber UR multiple times over time in one or more communication networks. It is not necessary to execute the initialization step before all encryption steps. The initialization step S100 may, for example, perform all X steps of encryption S107 (or X is an integer greater than or equal to 2). This limits the processing time during the encryption calculations made by device DV1, while ensuring a high level of security because not only the secret key k but also the secret key d' influences the product during the encryption step S107.Additionally, multiple iterations of the initialization step S100 may be performed to update (modify) the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' used during different iterations of the encryption step S107 to encrypt data DT1. According to a specific embodiment, the device DV1 monitors the number of consecutive iterations of the encryption step S107 made with the same temporary generator point G' and the same temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step S100. When it is detected that at least X consecutive iterations of encryption step S107 have been performed based on the same temporary generator point G' and the same temporary key Q' determined during initialization step S100 to transmit encrypted data DTC1 to a second system (specifically network HN1 in this example), device DV1 performs a new iteration of initialization step S100 during the previous iteration of initialization step S100 to update the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' based on a new first secret random key d' different from the determined first secret random key d'. The updated temporary generator G' and the updated temporary key Q' are used during at least one subsequent iteration of encryption step S107 to encrypt new data DT1 and send this new encrypted data DTC1 to the second system (specifically network HN1 in this example). The number X is an integer such that X ≥ 1. According to a specific example, X≥2 means that the device repeats encryption step S107 at least twice in succession using the same G' and Q' before updating these values ​​to perform a new encryption. Thus, device DV1 can periodically update parameters G' and Q' to enhance security and maintain excellent processing performance, and, for example, authenticate device DV1 multiple times using network HN1. In particular, regularly updating parameters G' and Q' (and thus the first secret key d') prevents a malicious third party from tracking device DV1 while it is registered with a subscriber identification module embedded in the communication network.Since these keys are distinguished not only by the secret key k but also by the secret key k and the temporary generator point G', it is actually difficult for a third party to track the user based on the public key P exchanged during various iterations of the encryption step or method. To this end, device DV1 can use counter CT to monitor the number of times the same couple (G', Q') has been used for network authentication. A specific embodiment is described with reference to FIG. 10. It is assumed that device DV1 executes encryption step S107 as previously described. When it detects that this encryption step S107 has been executed (or started or during execution), device DV1 also updates counter CT1 (S162). In this example, counter CT1 is incremented by 1 for each new iteration of encryption step S107. Then, when it detects that a new encryption must be performed, device DV1 determines, based on the current value of counter CT1, whether at least X consecutive iterations of encryption step S107 have been performed with the same G' and Q' values ​​(S164). To achieve this, device DV1 determines whether counter CT1 is greater than or equal to a threshold X. If positive, the method updates parameters G' and Q' and re-initializes counter CT1 during a new iteration of the initialization step S100; otherwise, device DV1 executes a new iteration of the encryption step S107 without modifying parameters G' and Q'. In this way, during a new iteration of the initialization step S100, device DV1 updates (modifies) the temporary generator G' and the temporary key Q', and then device DV1 performs a new iteration of the encryption step S107 using the updated values ​​of G' and Q' obtained in S100.According to a specific embodiment illustrated in FIG. 11, in each iteration of the encryption step S107, the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' used during the current iteration of the encryption step S107 are, respectively, identical to the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 calculated during the previous iteration of the encryption step S107. Generally, while the encryption step S107 is repeated at least once, the temporary generator G' and temporary key Q' used during the current iteration of the encryption step S107 may be, respectively, identical to the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 calculated during the previous iteration of the encryption step S107. In other words, the parameters G' and Q' of the current iteration are replaced with the values ​​[k]G' and [k]Q' of the previous iteration of the previous encryption step S107, which enhances security to the extent that it is more difficult for a malicious third party (identifier interceptor) to track the embedded subscriber identity module based on the successive SUCI generated by the corresponding module to authenticate to the communication network. However, even if this is possible, the same secret key k value for each iteration of the encryption step S107 It should be noted that there is no obligation to use. As illustrated in Fig. 11, the following may be used: - In iteration I1 (S180), the following secret key k1:P[k1]G' and SP1=[k1]Q; - In iteration I2 (S182), the following secret key k2:P=[k1][k2]G' and SP1=[k1][k2]Q'; - In iteration I3 (S182), the following secret key k3:P=[k1][k2][k3]G' and SP1=[k1][k2][k3]Q'; etc. In this way, I with R in iteration. R (S186) is an integer such that at least 2, P and SP1 are equal to the following: P=[k1][k2]... [k R ]G' and SP1=[k1][k2]... [k R ]Q'. In special cases, the same secret key k value is used in each iteration. In this way, iteration I RIn (S186), P and SP1 are as follows: P=[k] R G' and SP1=[k] R Q'. In the embodiments described above, the present invention applies to the case of data encryption. As previously mentioned, the present invention is not limited to this particular case and also applies to the decryption of encrypted data. To achieve this, the present invention provides a second encryption processing method based on principles similar to the first encryption processing method described above. In this manner, according to a specific embodiment, device DV1 is configured to perform the second encryption processing. According to this specific mode, device DV1 cooperates with a second system (referred to as HN1), and the method comprises: - an initialization step comprising: o a step of determining a temporary generator point G', which is equal to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first random scalar forming a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve; and o a step of determining a temporary key Q', which is equal to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of an elliptic curve forming a public key associated with the second system; and - a decryption step comprising: o M <N 인, M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; o 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계, P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일하고; o 공개 키 P를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계; o 제2 시스템에서 발생하는 암호화된 데이터 수신하는 단계; o SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 같은 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표의 계산 단계; o 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표에 대한 키 유도 함수를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키의 유도 단계; 및 o 복호화 된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 암호화된 데이터의 복호화 단계.초기화 단계는 앞서 설명한 초기화 단계 S100과 유사하게 실행할 수 있다( Fig. 7 In particular, the step of determining a random key d' and the step of calculating a principal key G' and a provisional public key Q' can be performed, respectively, similarly to steps S101, S102, and S104 described above. The decryption step can also be performed similarly to the encryption step S107 described above (Fig. 7). In particular, the determination of a second secret key k and the calculation of a public key P can be performed, respectively, similarly to steps S108 and S110 described above. Likewise, the step of calculating at least one coordinate of an intermediate point SP1 and deriving at least one key by applying a key derivation function can be performed, respectively, similarly to steps S112 and S114 described above. Finally, the decryption of the encrypted data can be performed similarly to the encryption step S116 described above. It should be noted that the order in which the steps of the encryption processing method of the present invention are combined as previously described in the embodiments constitutes only one embodiment and variations are possible. Those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments and variations described above constitute non-limiting examples of embodiments of the present invention. In particular, those skilled in the art may conceive adaptations or combinations of the embodiments and variations described above to meet specific needs.

Claims

Claim 1 A cryptographic processing method executed by a device (DV1) cooperating with a second system (HN1), wherein the method comprises: an initialization step (S100); and an encryption step (S107), wherein the initialization step (S100) comprises a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G (S101) - where d' is a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve (ε) -; and a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q (S104) - where Q is a point of the elliptic curve (ε) forming a public key associated with the second system - and the encryption step (S107) comprises M <N 인 M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계(S108); 상기 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계(S110) - P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일함 -; SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한 상기 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)의 계산 단계(S112); 상기 중간 포인트 SP1의 상기 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)에 키 유도 함수(F1)를 적용하여 적어도 하나의 키(KY1, V1, KMAC1)의 유도 단계(S114); 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 상기 적어도 하나의 키에 기초한 데이터(SUPI)의 암호화(S116); 및 상기 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 상기 공개 키 P 및 상기 암호화된 데이터를 상기 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계(S118)를 포함하는 방법. Claim 2 A method according to claim 1, wherein the public key P enables the second system to recalculate at least one coordinate of an intermediate point SP1 based on a scalar forming the secret key a of the second system, SP1=[a]P, and the at least one coordinate of the intermediate point SP1 enables the second system to decrypt the encrypted data. Claim 3 A method according to claim 1, wherein the initialization step comprises: a step of determining a first random scalar that forms the first secret key d' of N bits (S101); a step of calculating the temporary generator point G' which is equal to the first product such as G'=[d']G (S102); and a step of calculating the temporary key Q' which is equal to the second product such as Q'=[d']Q. Claim 4 A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein after the initialization step, the method comprises the step of registering the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' in the non-volatile memory of the device. Claim 5 A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the encryption step is triggered upon detection of at least one event, and the initialization step is performed prior to the detection. Claim 6 In any one of claims 1 to 3, during the derivation step of at least one key, the application of the key derivation function (F1) to the at least one coordinate of the intermediate point SP1 generates an encryption key (KY1), an initialization vector (V1), and a MAC key (KMAC1); the encryption step comprises: a step of applying an encryption function (F2) to encrypt the data based on the encryption key (KY1) and the initialization vector; and a step of calculating an authentication code MAC (MC1) based on the encrypted data and the MAC key; and, separately from the public key P and the encrypted data, the device transmits the authentication code MAC (MC1) to the second system so that the second system can verify the integrity of the encrypted data. Claim 7 A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the device performs at least two consecutive repetitions of the encryption step to encrypt data transmitted to the second system for decryption, based on the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step. Claim 8 In any one of claims 1 to 3, the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' used during the current iteration for at least one iteration of the encryption step are each the same as the public key P and the intermediate point SP1 calculated during the previous iteration of the encryption step. Claim 9 In any one of claims 1 to 3, if it is detected that the device has performed at least X consecutive repetitions of the encryption step—where X is an integer such that X≥1—based on the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' determined during the initialization step, the method further comprises a step of executing a new repetition of the initialization step to update the temporary generator point G' and the temporary key Q' based on a new first secret random key different from the first secret key d' determined during the previous repetition of the initialization step, and the updated temporary generator point G' and the updated temporary key Q' are used during at least one subsequent repetition of the encryption step to transmit new encrypted data to the second system. Claim 10 In any one of claims 1 to 3, the second system is a communication network, the device is a built-in subscriber identification module of the terminal for authenticating the terminal to the communication network, the data includes an identifier (SUPI) of the built-in subscriber identification module, during the encryption, the identifier is encrypted based on at least one key derived during the derivation to obtain an encrypted identifier (SUCI), and during the transmission step, the public key P and the encrypted identifier are transmitted to an access point of the communication network so that the built-in subscriber identification module can be authenticated to the communication network. Claim 11 A method according to claim 10, wherein the encryption step is triggered by the detection of at least one event, the initialization step is performed before the detection, and the at least one event comprises receiving a request from an access point of the communication network to register the embedded subscriber identification module with the communication network. Claim 12 In claim 10, the communication network is a 5G mobile network, and the identifier of the embedded subscriber identification module is a SUPI identifier. Claim 13 A cryptographic processing method executed by a device (DV1) cooperating with a second system (HN1), wherein the method comprises: an initialization step; and an encryption step, wherein the initialization step comprises a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve (ε); and a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of the elliptic curve (ε) forming a public key associated with the second system, and wherein the encryption step comprises M <N 인 M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; 상기 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계 - P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일함 -; 상기 공개 키 P를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계; 상기 제2 시스템에서 발생하는 암호화된 데이터(SUCI)를 수신하는 단계; SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)를 계산하는 단계; 상기 중간 포인트 SP1의 상기 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)에 키 유도 함수(F1)를 적용함으로써 적어도 하나의 키(KY1, V1, KMAC1)의 유도 단계; 및 복호화 된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 단계 동안 유도된 상기 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 상기 암호화된 데이터의 복호화 단계를 포함하는 방법. Claim 14 A cryptographic processing device capable of cooperating with a second system comprises: an initialization module configured to execute an initialization step; and a cryptographic module configured to execute a cryptographic step, wherein the initialization step comprises a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve (ε); and a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of the elliptic curve (ε) forming a public key associated with the second system, and wherein the cryptographic step comprises M <N 인 M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; 상기 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계 - P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일함 -; SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표의 계산 단계; 키 유도 함수(F1)를 상기 중간 포인트 SP1의 상기 적어도 하나의 좌표에 적용함으로써 적어도 하나의 키(KY1, V1, KMAC1)의 유도 단계; 암호화된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 단계 동안 유도된 상기 적어도 하나의 키에 기초한 데이터(SUPI)의 암호화; 및 상기 제2 시스템에 의한 복호화를 위해 상기 공개 키 P 및 상기 암호화된 데이터를 상기 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계를 포함하는 암호화 처리 장치. Claim 15 A cryptographic processing device capable of cooperating with a second system comprises: an initialization module configured to execute an initialization step; and a cryptographic module configured to execute a cryptographic step, wherein the initialization step comprises a step of determining a temporary generator point G' identical to a first product such as G'=[d']G, where d' is a first secret key of N bits and G is a generator point of an elliptic curve (ε); and a step of determining a temporary key Q' identical to a second product such as Q'=[d']Q, where Q is a point of the elliptic curve (ε) forming a public key associated with the second system, and wherein the cryptographic step comprises M <N 인 M 비트의 제2 비밀 키 k를 형성하는 제2 랜덤 스칼라의 결정 단계; 상기 장치와 연관된 공개 키 P의 계산 단계 - P는 P=[k]G'와 같은 제3 곱과 동일함 -; 상기 공개 키 P를 제2 시스템으로 전송하는 단계; 상기 제2 시스템에서 발생하는 암호화된 데이터(SUCI)를 수신하는 단계; SP1=[k]Q'와 같은 제4 곱과 동일한 상기 타원 곡선의 중간 포인트 SP1의 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)의 계산 단계; 상기 중간 포인트 SP1의 상기 적어도 하나의 좌표(CD1)에 키 유도 함수(F1)를 적용함으로써 적어도 하나의 키(KY1, V1, KMAC1)의 유도 단계; 및 복호화 된 데이터를 획득하기 위해 상기 유도 동안 유도된 상기 적어도 하나의 키에 기초하여 상기 암호화된 데이터의 복호화 단계를 포함하는 암호화 처리 장치.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Device and method for certifying reliability of public key, and program therefor

    JP2019201398A

  • System and method for performing serialization of devices

    US20110063093A1

  • Device privacy protection

    US20190020439A1